

**G. ETZEL PEARCY**


AND ASSOCIATES

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*World  
Political  
Geography*

SECOND EDITION

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# Preface

The first edition of this book was published in the summer of 1948, appearing in a world still in shock from the far-reaching effects of World War II. Reconstruction and rehabilitation from that global struggle were still in their early stages. Soviet Russia had yet fully to bare its teeth in a vicious program oriented toward world Communism. India was partitioned, and Israel emerged as a sovereign state—even as the chapters on those regions were being prepared.

Now, in the winter of 1956-57, pause can be briefly made to survey the world in mid-century. There has been time for postwar events to form what might be considered as a semblance of a pattern. The Korean War, the split of authority in Indochina, uprisings in North Africa, the Suez Canal incidents, and revolution in Hungary are testimonies to the tensions that were built up in the previous cataclysmic struggle. The wisest statesman, with access to his country's secret documents, is unable to tell whether these localized trouble spots are adjustments a disrupted world must endure in settling down to a more or less peaceful era or harbingers of an all-out third world war.

Like the first edition, the revision of this text presents to the student a survey that will enable him to understand a constantly changing world. Behind the scenes of current newspaper headlines the factors of geographic location, physical environment, population, economic resources, cultural heritage, and political aptitude have exerted and will continue to exert a strong influence on the destinies of the world and the nations of which it is comprised. These forces have operated in past centuries even as they operate now, and those who have some understanding of them can relate world political development to the geographic environment as international events unfold.

The thirty-eight chapters in this book survey the entire world and evaluate each of its segments, not only separately, but also in relation to the rest of the world. The *political area* is the underlying theme throughout, offering a regional point of view but with global dimensions. In these respects the present book is similar to the first edition. In content, however, extensive revision has created a text that is essentially new. The organization has been changed to emphasize

modern-day trends in the interrelation of the states of the world. Some chapters have been dropped, others added, and a substantial proportion of those remaining completely rewritten.

In the first edition the last five chapters presented "Some Special Aspects of Political Geography" that did not lend themselves to regional treatment. This section has been eliminated in favor of a single concluding chapter summing up the geopolitical situation in the world in mid-twentieth century. Three introductory chapters in the first edition have been replaced by five in the present book dealing with the orientation of the subject, its history and development, the nature of the political area, the peoples involved, and the bases of international friction. Of the thirty-two regional chapters, seven are given over to the Americas, twelve to Europe including Soviet Russia, two to Africa, and eleven to Asia and Oceania, in that order. In the first edition a chapter on the British Commonwealth included discussion of the dominions as a group, thus detracting from a strictly regional treatment.

In most instances the maps used in this book have been completely redrawn; only a small number from the first edition are retained. The maps, while not intended to serve as an atlas, point up the principal regions and topics under discussion, spotlight matters of geopolitical interest for each major political area, and delineate pertinent data involving areal distribution and statistical measurement that are difficult to grasp when presented only in textual form. Spelling of place names on the maps and elsewhere in the book conforms to usage commonly found in English-language atlases, maps, and texts.

Twenty-nine authors participated in the preparation of this text. Such a multiple authorship has marked advantages for a book so wide in scope that it must cover the earth. First, many of the authors are specialists who have written on the subject or of the region on which they are authorities. Second, all of them have had the opportunity to concen-

trate their attention on a more or less limited field of interest. It has been the task of the editorial staff to check the material from so many pens in order to achieve a unity in the over-all pattern yet not stifle the organization and creative ability of individual authors. In addition a logical sequence from chapter to chapter was sought to facilitate a consistent method of study throughout.

Many people have contributed to this volume, so many, in fact, that it is with regret that the editor cannot acknowledge all. A number of individuals are listed in the Acknowledgments of the first edition whose aid and cooperation are reflected in this edition. Likewise, Dr. Russel H. Fifield, coeditor of the first edition, as well as the coauthors and cartographers who did not participate in the present volume, have helped to mold this work.

The editor wishes to express his gratitude to the coauthors. Their scholarly contributions, and in addition their suggestions and criticisms, have been invaluable in this joint effort. Virtually all of the cartography was done by Monsieur Guy Lahorgue, of the *Institut Géographique National* in Paris, whose painstaking work never flagged during the execution of more than a hundred maps.

Above all, the editor expresses his utmost appreciation to two individuals who, in addition to being coauthors, shared editorial responsibilities. Dr. Lewis M. Alexander of the Department of Geography at Harpur College not only participated in the general editorial work but assumed responsibility for the detail associated with the preparation of the manuscripts for publication. Dr. N. Marbury Efimenco of the Department of Political Science at the University of Michigan served as Political Editor, synchronizing the political data with the geographical as well as ensuring an accurate portrayal of international politics in the contemporary world.

G. ETZEL PEARCY

Madrid, Spain  
November 15, 1956

# Contents

<b>PART ONE</b>	<b>1. THE SUBSTANCE OF POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY</b>	
<b>PRIMARY</b>	G. Etzel Percy and Lewis M. Alexander	<b>3</b>
<b>CONCEPTS</b>	What is political geography? Relation of political geography to other subjects. The state as a power region. Dynamics of earth relationships. Applications of political geography. Geopolitical problems.	
	<b>2. THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY</b>	
	G. Etzel Percy	<b>14</b>
	Development of political geography. German geopolitics. Swedish influence. Rudolf Kjellén. British political geography. Geopolitics in Poland. Political geography in France. American political geography. Conclusion.	
	<b>3. THE POLITICAL AREA</b>	
	G. Etzel Percy	<b>27</b>
	States of the world. Natural setting of political areas. Economic and human features. Political patterns of states. Dependent areas.	
	<b>4. POPULATION FACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS</b>	
	Clarence B. Odell	<b>43</b>
	World population as a dynamic factor. National greatness in terms of manpower. Distribution of the world's population. Significance of population composition. Population policies and controls.	

## 5 INTERNATIONAL TENSION

John E. Kieffer

60

Power concept State requirements for power Power belt.  
The dynamics of international tension ✓ Boundaries and international tension. Economic aspects of international tension.  
Governmental actions as a source of international tension.

## PART TWO THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

### 6. CANADA AND THE AMERICAN ARCTIC

J. Lewis Robinson

77

CANADA History of settlement. Physical aspects Natural resources Transportation Population. Ethnic factors Government International aspects ALASKA. Physical features. Economic development. Population. GREENLAND.

### 7. THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

J. Granville Jensen

93

Historical development. Location and boundaries Agricultural foundation. Forest foundation. Mineral foundation. Transportation facilities. Capacity to produce. Population.

### 8. THE GLOBAL POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES

N. Marbury Efimenco

110

New order in 1945. TO THE SOUTH. United States territories Hemispheric defense. TO THE EAST. Western Europe. The dead center. Eastern frontiers. Middle East flank. TO THE WEST: Geography of the Pacific. United States territories. Trust territory. Far East front. TO THE NORTH.

### 9. CARIBBEAN AMERICA

Earl B. Shaw

129

Political divisions. General physical aspects Regional development. MEXICO: Physical aspects. Human elements. Agriculture. CENTRAL AMERICA: The Republic of Panama. Nicaragua. Costa Rica. Guatemala. British Honduras. El Salvador. Honduras. THE WEST INDIES: Political relationships. The Greater Antilles. The Lesser Antilles and the Bahamas. THE GUIANAS. CARIBBEAN PROBLEMS: Economic problems. Political problems.

### 10. ANDEAN COUNTRIES OF SOUTH AMERICA

Anthony S. Reyner

148

General physical aspects. Historical development. VENEZUELA: Northern highlands. Maracaibo area. Orinoco llanos and Guiana highlands. COLOMBIA: Caribbean lowlands. Mountainous areas. Outlying regions. ECUADOR: Pacific lowlands. Highlands. Oriente. PERU: Coastal desert. Andean Mountains and plateau. East of the Andes. BOLIVIA:

The Altiplano. Eastern Bolivia and the Chaco. CHILE:  
Northern Chile Central Chile. Southern Chile. BOUND-  
ARY PROBLEMS

# 11. THE UNITED STATES OF BRAZIL

John W. Reith 166  
Historical background. Physical aspects. Economy. Popula-  
tion. International relations.

# 12. COUNTRIES OF THE RIO DE LA PLATA

William F. Christians 182  
Historical background. National contrasts. ARGENTINA:  
Historical background. Political area. Physical characteristics.  
Regional economies and resources. Population. National econ-  
omy. International aspects. URUGUAY. PARAGUAY.

## PART THREE 13. THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

### EUROPE

George W. Hoffman 201  
Physical aspects. Evolution of modern Russia. Demographic  
factors. Present internal political structure. The Soviet econ-  
omy. The future strength and weakness

# 14. THE POSITION OF THE USSR IN WORLD AFFAIRS

George A. Lipsky 225  
Pre-Soviet policy. The Soviet Union in World War II. Soviet  
postwar position. Soviet regional foreign policy. The larger  
strategy.

# 15. THE BRITISH ISLES

George Tatham 244  
GREAT BRITAIN: Physical aspects. Economic aspects. Pop-  
ulation. Historical sequence. Impact of global conflict. THE  
ISLAND OF IRELAND. Geographic background. Historical  
survey. Recent political developments.

# 16. FENNOSCANDIA

Trevor Lloyd 263  
Similarities and differences. NORWAY: Economic activities.  
Transportation. International trade. SWEDEN: Resources  
and industry. Transportation. Foreign commerce. DEN-  
MARK: Agriculture. Industry and trade. Transportation.  
FINLAND: Agriculture and forestry. Industry. Transporta-  
tion and trade. ICELAND. FENNOSCANDIA AS A RE-  
GION: Natural resources. People. International politics and  
problems. Overseas possessions.

<b>17. BENELUX</b>	
Lewis M. Alexander	281
Physical aspects   Economic aspects   Population aspects. Historical summary.   Political features   Recent regional asso- ciations	
<b>FRANCE</b>	
Lewis M. Alexander	299
Physical features.   Natural regions.   General economy   His- torical development   Population.   Political-administrative structure.   External aspects and problems   ANDORRA AND MONACO.	
<b>19. SPAIN AND PORTUGAL</b>	
Sidney E. Ekblaw	316
Physical aspects   Historical development.   Peoples of Spain and Portugal.   Modern Spain and Portugal.   The economy. Government and world relations.   Gibraltar.	
<b>20. ITALY</b>	
Clifford A. L. Rich	333
Historical development.   The land.   People.   Economic fac- tors.   Political factors.	
<b>21. SWITZERLAND</b>	
Franklin G. Erickson	348
Geographical structure.   Historical development.   Human factors.   Economic development.   International position. LIECHTENSTEIN.	
<b>22. THE GERMAN REALM</b>	
Sigismond deR. Diettrich	364
DEUTSCHLAND (GERMANY): Historical factors.   Location factors.   Physical factors.   Human factors   Economic factors. The two Germanies.   BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND (FEDERAL REPUBLIC GERMANY): Political organization. Economic development.   Cities and people.   DEUTSCHE DEMOKRATISCHE REPUBLIK (GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC): Political organization.   Economic development. Cities and people.   THE SAARGEBIET.   OSTERREICH (AUSTRIA): Historical significance.   Economic aspects. Cities and people.   Political status.   *	
<b>23. POLAND, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, AND HUNGARY</b>	
Eric Fischer	384
Physical features.   Interrelations of the three nations.   PO- LAND: Boundary changes.   Shift of center.   Economic factors. Repopulation of western provinces.   The emergence of a "Peo-	

ple's Republic." CZECHOSLOVAKIA Size, shape, and physical features. Internal weaknesses Economic factors Human pattern. HUNGARY. Location and boundaries Economic problems. Human problems

#### 24. THE BALKAN STATES

Colbert C. Held

401

Internal bases for disunity. External bases for disunity. YUGOSLAVIA: Land. People. Political development. Economy. Territorial problems. Political patterns BULGARIA. Law, people, and economy. Political development RUMANIA: Land. Minerals and industries People and political institutions. Territorial problems. ALBANIA (SHQIPNI). GREECE: Physical features. People and culture Political aspects. Territorial claims.

#### PART FOUR 25. THE CONTINENT OF AFRICA

##### AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Elvyn Arthur Stoneman

423

Physical factors. Human factors. Economic factors. Historical development.

#### 26. AFRICA—REGIONAL ASPECTS

Elvyn Arthur Stoneman

440

INDEPENDENT COUNTRIES: Union of South Africa. Southwest Africa. Ethiopia. Liberia. Sudan. BRITISH TERRITORIES: Dependencies in West Africa. British East Africa. Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. British South Africa. Minor British territories. FRENCH TERRITORIES: French North Africa. French West Africa. French Equatorial Africa. Other French territories. BELGIAN TERRITORIES: The Belgian Congo. Ruanda-Urundi. PORTUGUESE TERRITORIES: Angola. Mozambique. Portuguese Guinea. Other Portuguese holdings. SPANISH AND OTHER TERRITORIES: Spanish Morocco. Spanish Sahara. Spanish Guinea. Canary Islands. Somalia. TANGIER ZONE.

#### 27. TURKEY AND THE STRAITS

G. Etzel Pearcy

462

THE STRAITS: Physical aspects. Istanbul. THE TURKISH NATIONAL STATE: Historical evolution. Physical landscape. Cultural aspects. National economy. POLITICAL ASPECTS OF TURKEY AND THE STRAITS.

#### 28. THE ARAB STATES AND ISRAEL

Clarence W. Sorensen

479

Physical pattern. Peoples and religions. Rural and urban cultures. EGYPT: History. Economic problems. LIBYA. IS-

RAEL: The past The present The future JORDAN.  
SYRIA LEBANON IRAQ SAUDI ARABIA YEMEN  
DEPENDENCIES ON THE ARABIAN PENINSULA ARAB  
UNITY OR DISUNITY.

**29 PERSIA AND AFGHANISTAN**

Ben F. Lemert 501  
PERSIA Physical resources. Economy. Population His-  
torical background Political aspects AFGHANISTAN:  
Physical features. Economy. Population. Historic evolution.  
Government

**30. INDIA AND PAKISTAN**

George Kuriyan 517  
Historical background. Political units of India and Pakistan  
States of the Indian Union. UNION OF INDIA Physical  
factors. Economic aspects. Population and ethnic factors.  
Other territories. PAKISTAN. Physical geography Economic  
aspects. Human element INDO-PAKISTAN PROBLEMS:  
Irrigation on the subcontinent. Supplies and communications.  
Defense. Kashmir. Ceylon Maldiv Islands

**PART FIVE 31. CHINA**

Carleton F. Waite 543  
Historical foundation Physical features. Economic trends.  
Population. Political framework. FORMOSA

**EASTERN  
ASIA  
AND**

**AUSTRALIA 32. BURMA, THAILAND, AND INDOCHINA**

Charles Fisher 562  
Settlement patterns. Historic development. Boundaries.  
BURMA: Geography. History. THAILAND: Comparison  
with Burma Geographic regions. Modern Thailand Postwar  
problems. INDOCHINA: Diversity of Indochina. Regions.  
French rule.

**33. INDONESIA AND MALAYA**

Alden Cutshall 579  
THE MALAY ARCHIPELAGO: Regional similarities and con-  
trasts. INDONESIA: Indonesian independence. Economy.  
Indonesia and world affairs. MALAYA: Economic develop-  
ment. Racial and social problems. Strategic Singapore.  
BRITISH BORNEO.



<b>34. KOREA</b>	
Shannon McCune	597
Physical factors Economic pattern. People and culture. Historical development. Modern Korea.	
<b>35. THE JAPANESE ISLES</b>	
G. Etzel Percy	611
Physical aspects. Economic aspects. Human factors. Historical sequence. Geopolitical relations.	
<b>36. THE PHILIPPINES</b>	
Alden Cutshall	628
Physical aspects. People and culture Economic aspects. Political framework. Problems of an independent Philippines.	
<b>37. AUSTRALASIA AND OCEANIA</b>	
George Tatham	643
AUSTRALIA. Physical geography. Economic geography. Population Historical survey. Governmental problems. Territorial possessions. NEW ZEALAND: Geographical background. Discovery and settlement. Political problems. Australia and New Zealand. Pacific powers. OCEANIA: Geographical background. Political pattern.	
<b>PART SIX 38 WORLD POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY AT MID-TWENTIETH CENTURY</b>	
G. Etzel Percy and N. Marbury Efimenco	665
Rise of new states Dissolution of empires. From bipolarization toward normalization of power politics Integration versus division of political areas. New vistas of the mid-twentieth century Antarctica. the last frontier. Conclusion.	
<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY</b>	681
<b>BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES</b>	706
<b>GLOSSARY</b>	710
<b>INDEX</b>	717

**CONCLUSION**

# *List of Maps*

WORLD POLITICAL DIVISIONS	INSIDE FRONT COVER
POPULATION DISTRIBUTION	INSIDE BACK COVER
THE GEOGRAPHICAL PIVOT OF HISTORY	21
CANADA: ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES	82
CANADA: CITIES AND TRANSPORTATION	84
ALASKA	89
STATES OF THE ARCTIC MEDITERRANEAN	91
GROWTH OF THE NATION (UNITED STATES)	95
AGRICULTURAL LAND USE REGIONS IN THE UNITED STATES	97
PRINCIPAL MINERAL AREAS AND INDUSTRIAL CENTERS OF THE UNITED STATES	103
GLOBAL POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES	111
CARIBBEAN DEFENSES	114
THE CARIBBEAN REGION	131
PUERTO RICO	142
VENEZUELA AND COLOMBIA AND THE NORTHERN ANDES	151

ECUADOR	156
PERU	158
BOLIVIA	160
CHILE	162
MAJOR RESOURCES OF BRAZIL	171
BRAZIL: CITIES, REGIONS, AND TRANSPORTATION	174
RIO DE LA PLATA LANDS	183
RIO DE LA PLATA AREA	184
PROVINCES AND REGIONS OF ARGENTINA	187
MAJOR VEGETATION ZONES OF THE SOVIET UNION	203
MAJOR CITIES OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST RE- PUBLICS	210
SOVIET UNION: MAJOR POLITICAL DIVISIONS	211
USSR: MAJOR INDUSTRIAL REGIONS AND RAILROADS	219
THE GROWTH OF THE RUSSIAN STATE	229
THE SOVIET BLOC	234
BRITISH ISLES	245
BRITISH ISLES: CITIES AND REGIONS	246
INDUSTRIAL BRITAIN	248
COUNTRIES OF FENNOSCANDIA	263
BALTIC GATEWAY	269
THE NORTHERN COUNTRIES	278
LOCATIONAL MAP OF BENELUX	282
BENELUX: PHYSIOGRAPHIC REGIONS AND MINERAL AREAS	284
BENELUX: PROVINCES, CITIES, AND LANGUAGE BOUNDARIES	292
FRANCE AND ITS BOUNDARIES	300
NATURAL REGIONS OF FRANCE	303
OLD PROVINCES OF FRANCE	311
OLD PROVINCES OF SPAIN	323

SPAIN AND PORTUGAL: CITIES AND RAILROADS	327
GIBRALTAR	331
ITALY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN	333
PRINCIPAL REGIONAL NAMES OF PENINSULAR ITALY	336
ITALY: CITIES AND RAILROADS	341
GEOGRAPHIC REGIONS OF SWITZERLAND	351
SWISS CANTONS	354
LANGUAGES OF SWITZERLAND	356
SWITZERLAND: DISTRIBUTION OF RELIGIONS	357
THE GERMAN REALM	365
GERMANY SINCE 1871	366
THE TWO GERMAN STATES: CITIES AND REGIONS	373
AUSTRIA: CITIES AND MAJOR RAILROADS	381
POLAND, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, AND HUNGARY	385
POLAND: BOUNDARY CHANGES	387
POLAND (ECONOMIC)	390
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	392
HUNGARY: PAST AND PRESENT	397
THE BALKAN STATES	402
POLITICO-GEOGRAPHIC REGIONS OF THE BALKAN STATES	404
INTERNATIONAL RAILROADS TO AND THROUGH THE BALKAN STATES	406
THE ISTRIA AREA	409
AFRICA: PHYSICAL HIGHLIGHTS	425
AFRICA: POLITICAL DIVISIONS AND LEADING CITIES	427
POLITICAL AREAS AND CITIES OF SOUTHERN AFRICA	442
INDEPENDENT COUNTRIES OF AFRICA	444
UNITED KINGDOM TERRITORIES IN AFRICA	447
UNITED NATIONS TRUSTEESHIPS IN AFRICA	447

NORTH AFRICA: CITIES AND RAILROADS	451
FRENCH TERRITORIES IN AFRICA	453
AFRICAN TERRITORIES OF BELGIUM, PORTUGAL, AND SPAIN	455
MODERN TURKEY	463
THE STRAITS	464
GROWTH AND MAXIMUM EXTENT OF THE OTTOMAN EM- PIRE	467
DISINTEGRATION OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE	469
ARAB STATES AND ISRAEL INCLUDING ASSOCIATED POLITICAL AREAS	481
PETROLEUM IN THE MIDDLE EAST	487
HEART OF THE MIDDLE EAST	490
ISRAEL AND WESTERN JORDAN	493
PERSIA AND AFGHANISTAN	502
PERSIA	507
AFGHANISTAN: CITIES, TRIBES, COMMUNICATIONS, RE- GIONS	511
INDIAN SUBCONTINENT	517
STATES OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN	521
INDIA, PAKISTAN, AND CEYLON	531
KASHMIR AND JAMMU	538
HONG KONG	547
CHINA: CITIES AND RAILROADS	553
GREATER CHINA	557
INTERNAL ADMINISTRATIVE AREAS OF COMMUNIST CHINA	558
REGIONS OF COMMUNIST CHINA	559
POSITION OF FORMOSA	560
PENINSULAR SOUTHEAST ASIA	562
BURMA, THAILAND, AND INDOCHINA	565

POLITICAL REGIONS OF BURMA, THAILAND, AND INDOCHINA	573
LOCATIONAL MAP (MALAY ARCHIPELAGO)	580
INDONESIA AND MALAYA: MAJOR PHYSICAL FEATURES	583
PROVINCES OF INDONESIA	585
COMMERCIAL PRODUCTION (INDONESIA AND MALAYA)	587
BUFFER POSITION OF KOREA	597
KOREA	605
THE KOREAN WAR	607
JAPAN AND NEIGHBORING AREAS	612
JAPAN: CITIES AND PRINCIPAL RAILROADS	617
EXPANSION OF JAPAN TO EMPIRE	623
MANILA IN RELATION TO NEIGHBORING CAPITALS	629
THE PHILIPPINES	631
PHILIPPINES: PRINCIPAL AREAS OF COMMERCIAL PRODUCTION	637
DOMESTIC AIRLINES OF THE PHILIPPINES	638
AUSTRALIA: GEOGRAPHIC FEATURES AND MINERALS	647
AUSTRALIA: STATES AND CAPITALS	650
NEW ZEALAND	653
NATIONAL CLAIMS AND GEOPHYSICAL YEAR BASES IN ANT-ARCTICA	677

PART ONE

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*Primary Concepts*





## CHAPTER ONE

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# *The Substance of Political Geography*

Political geography consists of the description and analysis of the politically organized area. The land surface of the globe is divided and subdivided into numerous political regions at varying levels of organization, including (1) independent states, (2) dependent areas, and (3) internal civil divisions, which are components of either the independent or dependent national units. Every inhabitant of the modern world comes under the jurisdiction of one or more political systems. A typical American citizen, for example, is affected by the laws of the governments of a municipality, of a county (or parish), of a state, and of the Federal government.

The national units of the world—whether independent or dependent—are the particular concern of the political geographer, although he also directs his attention to political units at other levels as well. This text concentrates primarily on states and dependent areas, but it should be noted that political geographers in the United States are coming to delve more and more into

problems on the local and state levels; from the body of factual and analytical material which is being accumulated through these studies will come increased understanding of the over-all nature of geographic relationships and political behavior throughout the world. The political geographic approach to the various levels of political units may be summarized as follows:

<i>Level</i>	<i>Examples of Resultant Studies</i>
State, external	The relation of one state to another and to the family of nations; the grouping of states. Largely <i>dynamic</i> studies.
State, internal	Description and analysis of the area of the state. Largely <i>static</i> study.
Dependent area	Description and analysis, degree of dependency, relation to sovereign state or metropolitan area from which governed or controlled.

Level	Examples of Resultant Studies
High-order civil division (States of Brazil, Cantons of Switzerland)	Description and analysis; influence on state as a whole, reflection of internal regional interests of state.
Low-order civil division (counties of United States, French communes)	Consideration of problems of local interest. Of major concern as examples of politico-geographic problems.

The importance of relations among states in this age of global power and strategy is obvious. The overriding question of war or peace hinges upon activities and problems in this area. But to understand this complex pattern of external relations it is necessary also to be familiar with the internal structures of individual states. And both external and internal patterns must be viewed in relation to the physical environment—that is, geographically. The high cost of geographic ignorance or error is illustrated by Germany's attempt to conquer Russia during World War II without adequate knowledge of the difficulties involved, or by Britain's reliance on the sea defenses of Singapore and failure to consider the possibility of overland invasion of the base from the Malay mainland. Today, if Communism is to be contained within the Eurasian Heartland, geographic knowledge of states is essential, not only of such peripheral countries as West Germany, Turkey, and Japan but also of South America, Africa, and the Southwest Pacific.

#### WHAT IS POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY?

Although scholars have for centuries been analyzing the relationships between political behavior and the physical environment, political geography as a separate discipline is relatively new. As a result its limits have

been defined only in broad terms. As Richard Hartshorne has expressed it:

Political geography, then, may be defined as the study of areal differences and similarities in political character as an interrelated part of the total complex of areal differences and similarities. The interpretation of areal differences in political features involves the study of their interrelations with all other relevant areal variations, whether physical, biotic, or cultural in origin.<sup>1</sup>

As a part of geography, political geography deals with man's relation to the earth, encompassing aspects of such physical sciences as the studies of climate, landforms, and soils. In focusing on man's political activities it draws upon such social sciences as history, sociology, economics, political science, and international relations. At the level of the state political geography describes and analyzes the physical aspects of the area, the degree of political homogeneity of the state, and the state's external relations.

When all these constituent features of a state have been described and analyzed, we may draw a picture of that state's power potential. Political geography is thus related to the broad field of power politics, and some practitioners have concentrated on this aspect in terms of the national self-interest of a particular state. The most extreme exponents of this approach were the German geopoliticians, who perverted political geography into a tool of Nazi policy.<sup>2</sup> Before and during World War II German geopolitics (*Geopolitik*) was used to blueprint world conquest, and the Nazi creed incorporated those portions of political geography that served to justify German expansion. The natural result has been an attempt by some scholars to divorce the dis-

<sup>1</sup> Richard Hartshorne, "Political Geography," in Preston E. James and Clarence F. Jones (eds.), *American Geography. Inventory and Prospect* (Syracuse University Press, 1954), p. 178.

<sup>2</sup> See pages 16–20 for a discussion of German geopolitics.

cipline of political geography from geopolitics. The former is sometimes listed as a descriptive and analytical science dealing with spatial relations, boundaries, resources, and other aspects of the political area, the latter, while treating the same general subject material, approaches it from the point of view of national self-interest. In the words of Karl Haushofer, "Political Geography views the state from the standpoint of space, while Geopolitics views space from the standpoint of the state." In the final analysis the difference is one of emphasis, and no other difference between the terms *political geography* and *geopolitics* is implied in this text.

#### RELATION OF POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY TO OTHER SUBJECTS

Consideration of the relations between political geography and other subjects must begin with the overall field of geography. In the broader science man and his activities on the soil beneath him are considered in a general way, whereas the more limited discipline focuses attention on his political activities. True, there is a broad overlap between studying the political and other activities of man in relation to his environment, for the way he governs himself involves social institutions and economic pursuits as well. Nevertheless, the key to organization of human behavior in the community, in the state, and in the family of nations relies largely on political patterns at various levels.

Second, political science, with its study of government institutions, cannot be divorced from political geography. The two studies blend in their consideration of the political activities of man, the one involving the principles behind these activities, and the other accounting for them in relation to the earth on which they take place. It will be seen later that the power potential of a country necessarily depends upon the political rule to which it is subjected and the role a na-

tional government can or is willing to play in the politics of the world at large.

Third, the field of international relations, closely akin to political science, but on a global scale, enters political geography as a major ingredient. It is impossible to think of the relations of one nation to another, or to talk of power politics without becoming deeply embroiled in this broad science. Further, many of the working principles involved in international relations also form an important part of political geography. Likewise, vocabularies of the two fields each incorporate wide usage of terms having to do with such studies as foreign policy, balance of power, world conferences, provisions of peace treaties, and military strategy.

Fourth, history as a study of all time must enter strongly in any chronological sequence of political geography. In fact, all records of activity in the field automatically become history. In turn, political geographers must refer to pages of history to formulate principles and to acquire a background for coping with current problems.

Demography, as the scientific study of population factors, furnishes political geography with much necessary documentation. Any understanding of a state must take into consideration vital statistics and composition of population: growth as expressed by birth and death rates, age groups, distribution of sexes.

To a more limited extent political geography is related to other fields of study. As geography is related to anthropology (anthropogeography), botany (ecology), economics (economic geography), geology (geomorphology or physiography), meteorology (climatology), or physics (geophysics), so political geography is related to the same fields, though in a more peripheral sense. Likewise, any subject related to political science, such as political economy, or a study of political systems, may merge into the outer fringes of political geography. These minor relationships are mentioned here to

show the extreme fluidity of political geography as a discipline accounting for lack of clear definition and slow acceptance into the academic world as a science in its own right.

#### THE STATE AS A POWER REGION

A state may be defined as a portion of the earth's surface<sup>3</sup> throughout which one government extends its jurisdiction. The human society organized under the government in turn occupies the state and controls its sovereignty. Authority exercised is limited by the state's boundaries, either where contact is made with authority of another state or with a body of water over which no state authority is recognized. Each state also has a capital in which political strength is concentrated and from which authority is disseminated. These attributes of a state—sovereignty, boundaries, and capitals—and the interrelations among them comprise the fundamental components of political geography. The location and functioning of capitals and boundaries reflect the nature and extent of authority that a government exercises over a particular area. A capital's authority may be challenged in an area, as Washington's authority was challenged in the Confederacy prior to the Civil War in the 1860's. At that time there was grave danger that the political region of the United States might have been partitioned. Likewise, a state's boundaries may change, they may be expanded, as were those of the German Reich in the late 1930's under the Hitler regime, or as were Germany's at the close of World War II in 1945.

Each of the world's states is affected by two opposing political forces, one unifying and the other divisive. These forces may originate within the region itself, or they may be exerted from beyond its boundaries. Forces for unity would include a common

language, a historical background of accord, a well-developed transportation network, and, more intangible but nevertheless significant, a common sense of "belonging" to the political region on the part of the inhabitants. The United States and France exemplify the effective operation of these unifying forces. Tending to divide a political region are linguistic, religious, or other differences, physical disunity, such as barriers to transportation within the region; or pressures from foreign powers to divide a country. A complex pattern of ethnic groups was largely responsible for the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire following World War I, and a unified state could not be created from British India because of the tremendous religious conflicts within its borders. Enormous distances and inhospitable terrain on several occasions caused partial disintegration of the Chinese Empire. Within the last decade both Korea and Germany were divided by pressure outside of the countries themselves.

**POWER POTENTIAL**—Power potential—or national power as it is sometimes termed—might be defined as the ability of a state to determine and to implement policy. Some types of policy are purely internal in nature, such as a decision to construct a large dam or to develop a modern air force. The power potential here would be measured in terms of the success of the state in carrying out these objectives. Many policies, however, directly affect other states; in this case power potential is relative in nature. If one or more foreign powers are opposed to a state's policies, force or threat of force may be necessary to implement the policies. Germany's demands on Czechoslovakia in 1938 for cession of the Sudetenland to the Reich is an example of successful implementation of policy as a result of the strong German power potential. More recently, Egypt wished to absorb the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan upon the dissolution of the con-

<sup>3</sup> See Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion of the political area.

dominium. Instead, the Sudan in 1955 became an independent state; Egypt did not have the means of forcing the issue by which the area could be incorporated as a part of its own national territory.

The many factors that contribute to the power potential of states may be grouped into four general categories:

1. The political area itself and its physical attributes
2. The human element, or the population of the state
3. Economy of the state and its implications
4. The political pattern of the state and resultant policies

A state may be large, medium-sized, or small, existing states range in size from the Soviet Union with over eight and a half million square miles to the Vatican City with less than one square mile. A state may be compact, or attenuated in shape, or even divided by territory of an intervening state. The terrain may range from rugged mountainous wastes inhospitable to human occupancy to fertile lowlands of the most opulent productivity. The physical attributes of a state—including location with respect to other states and to continents and oceans—are of great importance to any government endowed with the responsibilities of sovereignty.

The human element of any state comprises not only the size of the numbers of people but also the multifarious cultural traits associated with this population. Here, too, variation among states is considerable; China has approximately 600 million people, whereas Andorra has hardly more than 6,000. However, the unity, energy, ingenuity, health, and traditional background of a people often contribute more to national power than mere numbers. Conversely, the discord created by dissident minorities may inhibit the building of a strong power potential.

The economic position of a state, partic-

ularly in the industrial sense, makes up a third set of factors affecting national power. In fact, industrial production in the modern world is a fundamental element of power potential. Success in modern warfare depends upon weapons, which in turn cannot be supplied without a strong industrial base. Resources must be present in the state, or at least available from other states in order to permit industrialization, capital goods and credit must be on hand to permit large scale production; and the population must be in possession of and able to utilize advanced technological methods. A strong power potential requires, too, a balanced economic development, so that industry is not maintained at the expense of other economic activities.

Every state has its own unique political pattern in which two prime characteristics stand out in facilitating or handicapping the power potential: degree of internal stability and relationships with other states. Internal stability reflects the interaction of unifying and dividing forces. Relations with other states may vary in form and in time. Through its foreign policy a state may create and maintain friendly relations with its neighbors, some of which may become allies. Friendly relations between states at one period of history may be followed by bitterness under different conditions. Witness how two allies during one war may be enemies in the next.

The four factors just described are basic to the regional analyses of political areas that make up the major part of this book.

**POWER REGIONS**—As the physical character of the earth's surface varies from place to place so vary the world's states located upon that surface. It is more than chance that some states become powerful and others remain weak. Within the over-all arrangement of states certain broad regions possess characteristics favorable to the development of power. In modern times all of the major and most of the minor powers have been

confined to three regions: (1) the continent of Europe, (2) east central North America, and (3) eastern Asia. These power regions are by no means sharply delineated, for within the first and third are weak states and they merge gradually into regions that do not possess all the characteristics essential to power generation. Moreover, only a portion of some states qualify as having a strong power potential.

All three regions have in common a temperate, invigorating climate, with marked seasonal changes but without any prolonged extremes in temperature and rainfall. They also include large areas of fertile, productive land capable of supporting dense population. Finally, the basic raw materials for an iron and steel industry are present or accessible. These attributes, plus others, which contribute to the development of power in a state are also factors strongly enhancing the quality of the population. Physical vigor, diet, ingenuity, and living standards reach their highest levels in the three power regions.

From the turn of the century until World War II eight countries have been rated as major powers: France, Great Britain, Germany, Russia, Austria-Hungary, the United States, Italy, and Japan. In addition, twelve other countries have qualified, according to some authorities, as secondary, or minor, powers: Spain, the Netherlands, China, Sweden, Rumania, Turkey, Poland, Yugoslavia, Australia, the Union of South Africa, Argentina, and Brazil. All of those in the first category and all but the last four in the second fall within the three major power regions under consideration. Likewise, all but two of the major and five of the minor powers just listed lie in Europe.\* Australia, the Union of South Africa, Argentina, and Brazil are of major importance within their respective regions. They are also note-

worthy from the standpoint of auxiliary value to Northern Hemisphere powers (Australia and the Union of South Africa in the British Commonwealth of Nations and Argentina and Brazil in the Organization of American States and in Western Hemisphere affairs).

Since World War II the whole question of major powers has had to be carefully reviewed. No longer are there a half dozen or so strong states around which can be built up a balance of power for at least provisional stabilization of world order. The United States and the Soviet Union emerged from the chaos of world conflict in 1945 as two global powers that overshadow by a wide margin even a third ranking power. Great Britain and France, though members of the victorious allies, were weakened by the war to the point of exhaustion. This handicap, plus limited area in comparison with the United States and Soviet Russia, makes it unlikely that either country will in the foreseeable future approach the power status of the two giants. Germany, Japan, and Italy fell from their previous ranks as major powers by defeat in World War II. Free from occupation, West Germany and Japan are now strengthening their economies, but it is doubtful that they will again be in a position to challenge the world as they did in the late 1930's and early 1940's. Italy is now recognized as a minor power, East Germany is submerged in Soviet bloc politics. China, which fell in 1950 into the orbit of the Soviets is now working feverishly to build up its industrial strength to the point of major powerhood.

With such a concentration of power in the hands of the United States and Soviet Russia, it remains for all other states to align their policies with one or the other, or to remain aloof from declarations in favor of either. Most of the world's prewar powers are aligned with one of the two present world superpowers. To date, the grouping dependent on the United States is voluntary; that of the satellite countries in the Soviet

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\* Turkey lies primarily in Asia, but is usually included as a European power, as is the USSR.

bloc is obligatory. Among the countries that base their policies upon neutrality are Sweden, India, and certain of the Arab States acting in concert. These states have not yet formed an organized group.

#### DYNAMICS OF EARTH RELATIONSHIPS

In the creation and governing of states men must rely on the earth itself as a source of all physical properties. In fact, the earth might be considered as an enormous laboratory where statecraft is a continual series of experiments. Any inventory of earth materials is so extensive that the possibilities offered man as to the way they may be utilized are beyond enumeration. We tend to look upon the earth as an inert sphere consisting of inert objects from which states must materialize: space for their location, soil for the raising of crops, coal and petroleum for the development of energy, iron ore for the production of steel. In addition, however, there must be considered a wide range of earth materials, or attributes, involving movement: the circulatory systems of the atmosphere and of ocean currents; all of the mobility associated with the rotation and revolution of the earth to produce diurnal and seasonal cycles; the flow of water in rivers and streams; and the more sporadic movements affecting the face of the earth such as floods, high winds, and earthquakes. Even more pertinent is the way the earth materials are utilized in any given state. Almost a cliché, but nevertheless still valid, is the contrast between the degree of civilization of the nations of North American Indians prior to the seventeenth century and that of modern-day United States and Canada. Yet the physical environment has changed imperceptibly except in a few minor details.

The development of natural routes for modern transportation facilities well illustrates the use a state may make of its physical environment to improve internal cohesion and to ex-

pand international commerce and influence. In France every pass or gap between mountainous or hilly regions is utilized by a railway line, a highway, and usually a canal. Every harbor site has been converted into a commercial port from which routes lead to the interior of the country—usually to Paris. As a result the geographic regions of France are integrated into a continuous and unified national economy. Likewise, rail lines and highways cross the boundaries wherever the terrain is favorable into Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, and Spain.

Just the reverse may be true in less advanced countries. In 1952 in East Pakistan no all-weather highway led from any provincial capital to any other provincial capital. In Thailand in the same year it was impossible to drive between Bangkok and Chengmai, the two largest cities of the country. Throughout Southeast Asia roads or railroads across an international boundary are the exception, yet road building in such tropical environments is by no means impossible; the British constructed an excellent highway network over the Malayan Peninsula.

Seaways and airways likewise come into play in their commercial and strategic value to any country. The complex system of British overseas routes developed during the last centuries across the Atlantic, through the Mediterranean and on to Australia and the Far East, and around Africa made use of most of the world's leading commercial and strategic seaways. From Trinidad to Hong Kong and from the Shetlands to the Falkland Islands are outposts of maritime Britain. Modern states aspiring to commercial importance and national prestige make extensive use of the world's airways. These flag carriers normally tend to follow the old established land and sea routes. As old time sailing vessels sought the trade winds and avoided the calms of the horse latitudes, so modern planes seek airways offered by the

earth's space relationships and its vertical miles of atmosphere.

**HUMAN RESPONSE**—Human reaction to the earth is more varied than the physical properties of that earth. For any given item of earth material, whether it be a mineral substance, a plot of fertile soil, or the air masses that pass over the surface of the land, there is an infinite number of uses. Man's ingenuity and skills may, in the creation of a state, proceed along a thousand different lines. Conversely, lack of ingenuity and failure to develop skills may leave individuals in a primitive and poorly organized community where existence is as simple as seeking roots and berries for food and crowding against a pile of brush for protection against the elements.

All of man's political endeavors can be traced to his utilization of the surface of the earth and to his movements over it. States are formed to help individuals live collectively in accord with the physical elements, to withstand the hardships imposed by inhospitable forces and to take advantage of the hospitable ones. The uneven patterns both of resources and of political areas have throughout history given rise to conflict and to population movements, for political boundaries often render desired resources inaccessible to certain peoples. Together with the uneven distribution of resources throughout the world is the factor of uneven degrees of resource utilization, giving rise to "under-developed" resource-exporting nations such as Indonesia and Bolivia, as well as to industrial resource-importing countries as the United States and Great Britain.

Human responses to the environment are also evident in the mass population movements which have frequently taken place. Whether such human movements entail a mass migration of a religious group fleeing from persecution, the invasion of one state by another, or the long process of colonization, there is an impact on the stability of

the communities or states thus affected, or even on the entire world. In essence this mobility is the way many politico-geographic problems are built up, political, ethnic, religious, language, economic, or other groups are split up and become minorities or otherwise penetrate communities alien to them.

On the credit side of the ledger, shifting of people about the world spreads ideas and techniques which may be beneficial to the societies receiving them. Wars, as deadly as they are to human existence and economic welfare, may completely change the cultural pattern of a region or speed up the dissemination of advanced techniques into less developed regions. History is replete with examples of this type. Some population groups living in relatively secluded sections of Europe are the remnants of invasions which took place many centuries ago. The Romansch sector of Switzerland settled by Roman soldiers and pockets of Moorish culture in Spain attest to such transfers of culture. As a more contemporary example, American soldiers in two world wars introduced many ideas as well as tangible goods to the peoples of overseas countries where they trained and fought. Thus the role of human beings in their movement over the surface of the earth is far from static.

#### APPLICATIONS OF POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY

**INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION**—Below the top diplomatic level of political relations among countries there are numerous international activities constantly taking place which involve cooperation with respect to the use of earth materials for the common good. Literally hundreds of international organizations, often convening in conferences, add tremendously to the work done in integrating national and international efforts toward a better life for the inhabitants of participating countries.

Any particular problem which one country may have soon becomes the problem of



other countries. If, for example, the underground level of artesian water in eastern Australia falls to the point of jeopardizing agriculture in the region there is immediate interest across the world: delegations may visit the stricken area, much is written on the subject, and Australia is the recipient of technical assistance to help to stem disaster. All such widespread activity is chronicled in scientific periodicals, trade magazines, and other similar publications, but seldom makes headlines. A basic knowledge of politico-geographic principles and relationships would prove invaluable to persons participating in such cooperative projects on the international level.

**WAR AND PEACE**—Since August, 1914, political and quasi-political problems of states have taken on a new and more profound meaning. It was during this month that the world experienced the outbreak of its first world war. Previous wars, and periods recorded in history as chaotic, were limited to relatively small segments of the earth's surface. Even the rise and decline of the Roman Empire with its attendant warfare did not spread far beyond the continent of Europe. Modern conflicts, however, which engulf in one way or another nearly all of the world's population, place a new and much more meaningful premium on world accord. Thus, following World War I the League of Nations was constituted in order to promote better understanding among the states of the world. Nevertheless, a generation later, at the end of the 1930's, World War II evolved as a global nightmare of even greater magnitude and more far-reaching disaster for the world community than was the conflict of 1914-18. In its wake was set up the United Nations to carry out what the League of Nations had failed to do—namely to maintain friendly relations among the countries of the world.

In the face of a post-World War II record of disunity and of catastrophe of global pro-

portions every statesman and most laymen now think of diplomacy in terms of war or peace. Whether expressed in so many words or not, every important aspect of the USSR's internal and external policy is weighed in this fashion, as are also many international and national problems and decisions on the part of the United States. Economic self-sufficiency, foreign commercial policy, development of jet aircraft and remote control rockets, size and location of military installations, and psychological propaganda, not to mention "A," "H," and even more powerful bombs, are topics converted directly into anxious conjecture relative to prospects of world peace. Business goes on as usual; nevertheless there is an awareness beyond mere "war hysteria" of international tensions that could loose still another world conflict.

Political geography figures strongly in war-versus-peace issues. Certainly the value of utilizing geopolitical science in wartime cannot be denied. In World War II the Germans built up a whole military strategy around their own version of political geography. More effectively, but with less fanfare, the United States made use of fundamental politico-geographic concepts and of their application in order to evolve counter plans of battle. The North Africa invasion, the hard-fought drives into and through Nazi-held "Fortress Europe," and the long bloody trek across the Pacific through Japanese defenses were the materialization of geopolitical planning. Military decisions depended in great part upon a knowledge of the terrain, water bodies, or air masses affecting areas where action was to take place. Backing up these efforts at the point of contact with the enemy, resources of the United States and of its allies were channeled at accelerated rates into war plants for the mass production of war goods. Supply routes to the fighting fronts were laid out on a vast scale, forming a network over much of the world. Transocean flying suddenly

turned from pioneer experimentation to daily routine. Many geographers in uniform or as civilians helped to spark this colossal project which in many of its aspects was geopolitical.

Maintaining the peace requires application of certain geopolitical techniques associated with war. The strength of a state by virtue of its resources and other natural advantages must be evaluated. It follows that capacity to produce is in large part dependent upon an inventory of the state's actual physical wealth. Equally important, those persons formulating policy must analyze the strength of potential enemies and to some degree be able to anticipate their action. In addition a factual knowledge of the world and its relationships from region to region and from country to country is basic to any contribution to global stability. For example, the problem of nationalization of the Suez Canal on the part of Egypt is an extremely complex one. To understand it involves a knowledge of the whole Middle East Question: inhospitable terrain where water is always a scarce item plus a maze of political cross currents going far back into Arab World history. Again, where to build air bases, to which countries to give technical assistance, and to whom to sell armaments are all issues demanding understanding of the geopolitical relationships at work.

### GEOPOLITICAL PROBLEMS

Geopolitical studies cannot stop with an understanding of the basic concepts of the science and with analyses of past events. Problems of the present day must be brought into focus and those of the future anticipated. Obviously they must be considered in relation to the earth, to the human element, and to the interaction between them. Problems of a politico-geographic nature are ever changing, yet they conform to a semblance of a pattern involving time, space, and circumstance. Problems of the past,

such as the Saarland or Trieste, are likely to emerge anew, for recurring space relationships over the globe often produce recurrent politico-geographic situations. The narrow seas, regardless of the continent they fringe, create particular problems of territorial control. Mountain passes, constrictions of land between water bodies, and other physical features give rise to convergence of routes—frequently resulting in conflict between states over their control. The old saying that "history repeats itself" is not without some geopolitical truth. Certain patterns tend to develop in instances where the stimuli are similar. For example, the drive of inland countries toward the sea, or the buffer role of weak states lying adjacent to strong ones may denote relatively consistent reactions to a given set of circumstances.

We can get down to actual cases, for problems abound on every hand; some potent in their capacity to create international tension, others more academic in nature. Only a scattered few can be suggested here, indicative nonetheless of the unlimited amount of seething ferment found in a politically unsettled world.

What of a divided Germany? Will the West Germans and East Germans succeed in uniting, or will the cleavage between the Free and the Communist worlds continue to be reflected on German soil?

Will the fires of nationalism recently kindled in North Africa spread to other parts of the French Union in Africa? Will the inhabitants of French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa become restive within a jurisdictional regime that apparently can be broken apart?

Does Red China have the potential to become an industrial giant as her present planning suggests she wishes to be? Can railroads and highways, even with Soviet technical aid, crisscross the vast empty spaces to unify far-flung geographic regions? Can the Yangtze and Yellow rivers be harnessed

through projects similar to that of TVA?

Will the United States deem it necessary to build a canal through Nicaragua to supplement the one across the Isthmus of Panama? Or are atomic power and rockets to outmode the concept that the country must have an emergency passage to get naval vessels from the Atlantic to the Pacific and back again?

Can the decreasing importance of the British Empire as a world power be offset by increasing solidarity of the Commonwealth? To what extent do dominions or republics within the Commonwealth framework prove as valuable as former colonies in supporting Great Britain's economic regime and political prestige?

Is the Kashmir Question proving to be a diplomatic impasse? Is it reasonable to assume that a solution cannot be reached and that India and Pakistan will freeze the unhappy territory into a permanent trouble

spot boding no good for the two contenders or for the Kashmiri themselves?

Soviet leaders in the Kremlin base their aspirations for world domination on a strong continental base covering much of the gigantic land mass of Eurasia. Understanding the geographical components of this power drive involves some of the most weighty of all geopolitical problems, calling for a broad application of all aspects of the science.

Without doubt the problem of war or peace on the global scale offers the greatest challenge to geopolitical analysis. Future developments in the field of atomic power and the use made by states of such unbridled energy serve to complicate the already complex issues of national and international power. Faced with the potentialities of mass destruction scholars and statesmen alike need to grasp the fundamentals and glimpse the truths of the manifold functions of states in the existing world order.

### Study Questions

1. Define a political area. What are its most important characteristics?
2. Show through a discussion of a national political area how the various social sciences contribute to political geography.
3. List the various political areas in which your home is located.
4. Discuss forces of unity and of division in (a) the United States, (b) Canada, and (c) Germany.
5. Describe the relationship between political geography and international relations.
6. Discuss the German perversion of political geography between the two world wars.
7. Discuss the principal functions of international boundaries.
8. List three states that have more than one capital city and give the reasons for these phenomena.
9. List the giant states (over 1,000,000 square miles in area) and discuss briefly the principal aspects of political power in each one.
10. Show how people in different states vary in the type and degree of their utilization of resources.
11. Describe the uneven pattern of resources in the world in terms of (a) coal, (b) petroleum, and (c) iron ore. Which states have significant quantities of each resource within their borders?
12. Discuss the present bipolarity of power in the world and list the military allies of both the United States and the Soviet Union.
13. Show how the physical structure of a state influences the role it plays in international affairs.
14. Discuss methods used for the peaceful solution of boundary disputes.
15. Describe the effects of large-scale migrations on the development of (a) the United States, (b) the Soviet Union, and (c) the Union of South Africa.

## *The History and Development of Political Geography*

Since the conception of the first state there has been direct relationship between man's political and military maneuvers on the one hand and the factors of geography favoring or handicapping him on the other. It seems odd indeed that a systematic science was not early developed to evaluate and utilize geographic phenomena for purposes of effective statecraft. The founding of nations, acquiring of colonies, building of national strength, waging of war, and preservation of peace all depend to a certain degree upon a comparatively small number of geographic factors which set outer limits to man's political accomplishments or endow him with strategic advantages over his neighbors; the more obvious of these factors are space, location, terrain, climate, and resources. For example, the factors of location and terrain in the Mediterranean played a prominent role in the expansion of Greece, Carthage, and Rome to empire; as it later did in the determination

of Italy to carry out her policy of *mare nostrum*, and as it presently does in providing Great Britain with a life line eastward to East Africa, South Asia, and beyond. Again, the great western bulge of Africa at Dakar and the eastern projection of the Brazilian coast create a relatively narrow expanse of water in the Atlantic (approximately 1,800 miles) which facilitated the discovery and exploration of South America in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. In our time the same short transocean route was followed during World War II by great numbers of American military cargo planes en route to Africa.

For centuries many scholars, statesmen, and military leaders gave their attention to matters that could be construed as political geography, but not until the last years of the nineteenth century did the *science* of political geography as we now know it begin to develop. The first studies of broad-con-

tinental and global—geographic and political patterns were published in the 1890's. The theories that resulted from the broad view taken by a few men in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries have now made it possible to analyze a state's being in terms of the earth on which it exists and to relate states one to another or as units in a world-wide arrangement. These men also sought to lift the veil of the future and to predict the behavior of states and foresee the application of geographic strategy to state growth and development—or survival.

#### DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY

The roots of political geography reach back into ancient history, the development of the subject being related to the growth of philosophy, history, political science, and mathematics. The Greek scholar Herodotus (484–425 B.C.), who is well known for his early historical writings, also showed an interest in geographical problems, and Hecataeus has been called the “father of ancient geography” because of his general treatise on the earth. Plato (425–347 B.C.) was intrigued by the relationship of the state to its area, and Aristotle (384–322 B.C.) considered the relations between the state and its physical environment in his *Politics*. In the first century A.D. Strabo discussed the relationship of physical environment to national power as it affected the Roman Empire. Succeeding geographers also contributed to the slow development of this embryonic subject, but political geography went virtually unnoticed during the evolution of geography in general. For the most part it remained a descriptive science, offering little as a practical analytical science.

Although the modern science of political geography<sup>1</sup> owes its existence to many

men, five stand out as leaders in its development: Alfred Thayer Mahan, Sir Halford Mackinder, Friedrich Ratzel, Rudolf Kjellén, and Karl Haushofer. Through their writings the various interpretations and implications of the subject were widely disseminated. Two of these men were German (Ratzel, Haushofer), one was Swedish (Kjellén), one British (Mackinder), and one American (Mahan). All five were born in the nineteenth century, all lived into the twentieth, and two survived the end of World War II.

Modern political geography reflects national emphases, and these must also be recognized in the development of the science. Every country has traditions, political objectives, and other distinctive national characteristics; hence, political geography develops in accordance with current state aims and political philosophy. A British political geographer of necessity does not think like one from the United States or Germany. British geopolitical doctrines related to the British Isles as a thalassocracy, to sea power as opposed to land power, and to ideas which seemed useful in governing a far-flung empire. In the United States, because of “an abundance of resources distributed over a superabundance of area,” political geographers have been preoccupied with the study of the space relations of the state. Indeed, many American political geographers have defined their subject as the “science of areas.” By the same token, until World War II they rarely paid much attention to the power of the state. In Germany, however, where nearly 70,000,000 people were concentrated within an area no larger than Oregon and Idaho combined, space and natural resources were more intensively utilized. Moreover, since Germany was closely ringed by a cordon of foreign states and had few protective physical boundaries—in fact, a large number of German-speaking people lived outside those boundaries—her political geographers early

<sup>1</sup> Although dealing with the history and development of *political geography*, this chapter necessarily incorporates *geopolitics*, virtually as a synonym. See pages 4–5 for a discussion of the two terms.

recognized the vital interest of the state in matters relative to both space relations and power. In time, however, they became more and more preoccupied with a study of power, until it grew to be an obsession with them.

Other countries, too, appreciated the new science of political geography. France and Poland, both deep in the maelstrom of European politics, had in their universities scholars who made rich contributions to the field, though these works are less well known than those of the five leading figures already mentioned. The French dealt with the human aspects of geography, emphasizing the role of the people in determining state action. Polish geographers concerned themselves with geostrategic studies of the territory extending from the Baltic to the Black seas.

In not a few instances statesmen, with a little imagination, can be classed as geopoliticians. In France Marshal Vauban devised a system of strengthening the state by a combination of financial, economic, and military means; he described his plans in monographs that were model geographic studies. The Monroe Doctrine, precluding European penetration of the New World, has strong geopolitical implications. During World War II Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin made geopolitical history at the Yalta Conference in 1945 in which postwar plans were projected. In fact, any political issue involving a strategic area is likely to have repercussions in the world's leading capitals and result in grist for the geopolitical mill; witness the international tension occasioned by any threat to free passage through the Suez Canal.

### GERMAN, GEOPOLITICS

The meteoric rise of German geopolitics, as associated with Nazi preparation and strategy in World War II, was foreshadowed by a number of men who evolved the doctrine

that political geography was a dynamic rather than a static science and thus capable of a historic role in the destiny of the German nation. The first German to put forth this view was Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), who defined the field of geography and delineated its parts, one of which he termed political geography. However, his ideas had little impact outside Germany. Friedrich List, Heinrich von Treitschke, Alexander von Humboldt, Karl Ritter, and Friedrich Ratzel were his most noteworthy German disciples.

Ratzel, living in the last half of the nineteenth century, was the real founder of political geography. His *Politische Geographie*, published in 1897, was the first systematic treatment of the subject. As a professor of geography his teachings bore fruit in Germany and were carried to many other countries. He was the teacher of Ellen Churchill Semple, who carried his philosophy of geography back to the United States; it influenced her own monumental work in anthropogeography.<sup>2</sup>

**MILITARY IMPLICATIONS**—With the growth of military mindedness in Germany, political geography gradually became an instrument of the state. At the end of World War I a defeated Germany was compelled to sign a treaty far from her liking. Here was the chance for the new dynamic science of geography to assume a place in the sun. German political and military geographers began to ask themselves the reasons for Germany's defeat. Their quest for answers led to an added emphasis upon geographic study and teaching. The prestige of political and military geography had not, however, been enhanced by the defeat of the German army and the confiscation of the German navy. There was needed, therefore, a new name for the old subject. Fortunately, this was already at hand in the word *Geopolitik*.

<sup>2</sup> E. C. Semple, *Influences of Geographic Environment* (Holt, 1911).

which Kjellén in Sweden had coined a few years earlier.

It should be noted, however, that the stigma of national defeat, the psychoses of war guilt, and the repudiation of the Versailles peace treaty had left the German geographers in no normal state of mind. They were not really searching for the politico-geographic reasons for Germany's defeat; they were seeking a blueprint for German vindication and revival, and a strategy for eventual national victory.

Political geography is a sane, cautious, and—above all else—an honest science. Its study did offer Germany the basis for partial vindication, a blueprint for a modest and sound postwar revival, and a strategy useful for either military defense or a limited expansion. These ends, however, were not what most Germans of that day sought; they wanted total vindication, total escape from war guilt, and total revival of wealth and power. Even German scientists had fallen victim to the psychosis of "all or nothing." To achieve their ends they were willing to convert political geography into *total geographical nonsense* if need be, and eventually to risk total war. Adoption of the new term *Geopolitik* fooled the German public into believing that here was something new, dynamic, and portentous of success; it enabled the German geographers themselves to escape the moral censorship of their science and to sidestep their own scientific consciences.

After the death of Kjellén in 1922, Karl Haushofer became the leading exponent of *Geopolitik*, and in 1923 he came into contact with some of the leaders of the Nazi movement. Beginning in 1924 he helped edit the *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*, house organ for the *Institut für Geopolitik*, which institute Haushofer headed at the University of Munich.

The *Institut* eventually attracted to itself able geographers and workers in cognate fields. These men developed a considerable

amount of "geopolitical" theory and began the elaborate collection of a vast array of data to be filed in the *Strategic Index* of the *Institut*. "The basic, incontestable truth is that Haushofer, directly in some instances, indirectly in others, coordinated, integrated, and rationalized the whole field of comparative geography for the uses of the Führer."<sup>3</sup> As time went by, the *Institut* became more and more an instrument for national policy and a tool of the state—for which purposes it received a government subsidy in funds and patronage. "Geography, particularly war geography, became a national preoccupation which influenced and molded public opinion in postwar Germany from elementary school to university seminar, from street corner and bookstore to factory, club, beer-hall, and dinner table."<sup>4</sup>

The geopoliticians of Munich started with an organismic concept of the state, as well as with the practiced techniques of cartography and geographic research. Added to these were their *Weltanschauung*, or world perspective, and a motivation springing from the national pathology that characterized Germany between the two world wars. They defined their subject as "The science of the earth relationship to political developments."<sup>5</sup> Karl Haushofer asserted that the word *Politik* is not preceded by the prefix *gēo* by accident. The prefix relates politics to the earth (*gē* = earth in Greek). The geopoliticians of Munich also attempted to apply the principles and methods of geopolitics to "branch" sciences, such as psychology, medicine, and jurisprudence.

Geopolitical concepts in Germany centered around a number of subjects. The ideas of the organic state, living space

<sup>3</sup> Edmund A. Walsh, "Geopolitics and International Morals," Hans W. Weigert and Vilhjalmur Stefansson (eds.), *Compass of the World* (Macmillan, 1944), p. 22.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 24.

<sup>5</sup> Karl Haushofer, Erich Obst, Hermann Launtesach, and Otto Maull, *Bausteine zur Geopolitik* (Berlin, 1928), p. 27.

(*Lebensraum*), and the organic frontier received considerable attention in German literature. Behind the ideas of political power of the state was its location with reference to a specific concept of the distribution of land masses and ocean spaces. The expression of the power of the state in wartime involved the study of *Wehr-Geopolitik*, or war geopolitics, for the aim of power was war. Haushofer used general Karl von Clausewitz' definition of war, "a continuation of policy with an admixture of other means."<sup>6</sup>

FRIEDRICH RATZEL (1844-1904)—A professor of geography at the Polytechnic Institute of Munich and later at the University of Leipzig, Ratzel remained aloof from the problems of German foreign policy.<sup>7</sup> He taught that the state, a union of the people and the land, was a spatial organism that grew like any other living organism, in 1896 he published an article on "The Laws of the Territorial Growth of States" and the first chapter of his *Politische Geographie* treated "The State as an Organism Fixed in the Soil." Ratzel believed that space was a political force of great importance and asserted that a state decayed as the result of a declining conception of space. He saw the frontier as a changing zone of assimilation, frontiers were dynamic, reflecting the expansive force of aggressive states, and a boundary, by obstructing the growth of the state, might lead to war. The idea of *Lebensraum*, or living space, is associated with the theory of the organic state and the dynamic boundary. Both Karl Haushofer and Adolf Hitler drew many of their ideas regarding *Lebensraum* from Ratzel.

<sup>6</sup> The German geopoliticians particularly studied the work of Alfred Thayer Mahan on sea power and the work of Clausewitz on land power. No writer on air power approached the stature of either Mahan or Clausewitz in the eyes of the Men of Munich.

<sup>7</sup> Ratzel was a friend of Max Haushofer, the father of Karl Haushofer, the younger Haushofer often accompanied the older men on their walks along the Isar River.

KARL HAUSHOFER (1869-1946)—Karl Haushofer first won attention as a German geopolitician in 1908, when he was sent on a mission to Japan as a military observer for the German General Staff. This term of service was the most formative period of his life. He not only studied the institutions of Japan but also became an expert on the Pacific and the Far East, areas which figured prominently in his later writings for the *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*.<sup>8</sup>

Haushofer received his doctorate *summa cum laude* from the University of Munich. By the end of World War I he had been promoted to the rank of a major general in the army of the Kaiser, but, while leading troops through the ruins of the German border provinces after defeat, he decided on a career of educating the new Germany. He laid aside his uniform to teach political geography and military history at the University of Munich.

The top organization of geopolitical research, in Germany as previously pointed out, was the Institute of Geopolitics (*Institut für Geopolitik*) at Munich. Haushofer shared the direction of it with his eldest son, Albrecht, a geopolitician in his own right who specialized in writing about the Atlantic region. At the Institute the strength and weaknesses of a certain area (*Raum*) were compared with the location (*Lage*) of the region and the nature of the boundaries (*Grenzen*).

Haushofer published more on geopolitics than any other person. His articles in the *Zeitschrift*, his own books, and his publications in collaboration with others reveal the industry of the professor. The geographic area in which he was most interested was the Indo-Pacific realm, scene of his earlier travels. His *Die Geopolitik des Pazifischen Ozeans: Studien über die Wechselbeziehungen zwischen Geographie und Geschichte* (*Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean: Studies on the Relationship between Geography and History*), first published in 1924,



is his most important book. Of considerable consequence in Haushofer's writings is the fact that he called the attention of many Germans to the political significance in the theories and teachings of Ratzel, Kjellén, Mahan, and Mackinder.<sup>8</sup>

Although neither Haushofer nor his colleagues at the Institute produced any one document containing a design for world conquest, their materials did present general ideas about the future of the Reich in the world. The first major objective was consolidation of the political forces of the Heartland. This objective primarily concerned the Soviet Union; control of Middle Europe (*Zwischen-Europa*) and acquisition of African colonies were secondary. The struggle for the Heartland, it was recognized, might result in war and might become a test of land power. In this respect Haushofer specifically stated that the infantryman decides the battle by taking possession of the space. The second major objective was the destruction of the sea power of the maritime states that opposed the Reich, principally the Anglo-Saxon countries. Haushofer realized the importance of sea power and noted that the conflict between oceanic and continental powers is a theme that runs through history. He stated that the most decisive of all political trends in the world is the drive of a country toward the sea. The Men of Munich believed that in the end the possibility of world domination was based upon both land power and sea power, supplemented by air power.

The personal relation between Hitler and Haushofer was limited, though the two were introduced while Hitler was in the Landsberg jail following the Beer Hall Putsch of 1923, and Haushofer visited Hitler a number of times while *Mein Kampf* was being dictated. A number of passages in *Mein*

*Kampf* reflect to a certain extent the influence of Dr. Haushofer. Hitler clearly indicated his belief that Germany needed living space to become a world power. In the chapter on "Eastern Orientation or Eastern Policy," for example, Hitler asserted:

Only a sufficiently extensive area on this earth guarantees a nation freedom of existence. . . . State frontiers are man-made and can be altered by man . . . Germany will either be a world power or will not be at all. To be a world power, however, it requires that size which nowadays gives its necessary importance to such a power, and which gives life to her citizens. . . . Never forget that the most sacred right in this world is the right to that earth which a man desires to till himself, and the most sacred sacrifice that blood which a man spills for this earth.<sup>9</sup>

After Hitler came into power in 1933 the Nazis directly furthered the work of the Institute at Munich. An important barrier between Hitler and Haushofer was the fact that Haushofer's wife was a Jewess. Haushofer was never, therefore, directly identified with the Nazi Party. Furthermore, Haushofer advocated a rapprochement between Germany and Russia, whereas Hitler precipitated an attack on Russia in 1941. This split on foreign policy led to a cooling of relations between Haushofer and Hitler. After the unsuccessful attempt to kill Hitler in July, 1944, Haushofer was detained at a concentration camp for a brief period by the Nazis, and he believed that his son Albrecht was killed because the Nazis considered him involved in the plot.

After the war Haushofer's papers were collected at the American Seventh Army Document Center at Heidelberg. They revealed his great interest in Asia, especially in Japan, China, and India. He himself was taken into custody of the American army in Germany. Haushofer asserted to American

<sup>8</sup>Geographers at the University of Munich have recently stated that Haushofer was not a scientific geographer but a gifted amateur with a flair for publicity.

<sup>9</sup>Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf* (Reynal and Hitchcock, 1941), pp. 934, 949, 950, 964. By permission of Houghton Mifflin Company, proprietors of the copyrights on all American editions of *Mein Kampf*.

questioners that his *Institut für Geopolitik* was really a department of geopolitics at the University of Munich, like a department in any American college. He claimed that he had very little to do with the Nazis, in fact, nothing to do with them after 1941. He asserted that his books spoke for him and that the Nazis ignored his teachings. He was in time released and allowed to return to his home. Early in 1946 Haushofer and his wife committed suicide at their Bavarian home.<sup>10</sup>

#### SWEDISH INFLUENCE: RUDOLF KJELLÉN (1864–1922)

No school of political geography evolved in Sweden despite the fact that Rudolf Kjellén, professor of government at the University of Goteborg, was the first to use the now familiar term *Geopolitik*. Nevertheless, the Fenno-Scandinavian region, in which Sweden ranks as the foremost state, has played more than a peripheral role in European affairs. During World War II Swedish statecraft resulted in a neutrality—almost dynamic in itself—delicately balanced between belligerents. Significantly, the military budget and activities within that country far exceeded those of many of the actual participants of the war. Perhaps it remains for a Swedish geographer to develop a “Geopolitics of Neutrality”!

Rudolf Kjellén, decidedly pro-German in his views, expanded the ideas of Ratzel. The Swedish professor taught in his *Staten som livsform*, first published in Stockholm in 1916, that the state, deep-rooted in historic and actual realities, had grown organically and was the same basic type of organism as an individual man. He believed that the most important attribute of the state was power. Power was more important in the

existence of the state than law because law could be maintained only by power.

In analyzing the state, Kjellén made the following distinctions: *Geopolitik*, or geography and the state, *Demopolitik*, or population and the state, *Oekopolitik*, or economic resources and the state; *Sociopolitik*, or social structure of the state; and *Kratopolitik*, or government of the state. It is noteworthy that he placed the study of geography and the state first and the study of the government of the state last. Kjellén believed that the power of the maritime empires would pass to the compact land empires, who would eventually control the seas. Kjellén foresaw the emergence of a few giant states in the world, with Germany as the great power in Europe, Africa, and western Asia. The Institute of Munich was greatly influenced by the studies of Kjellén. Dr. Haushofer and a group of followers enlarged, re-edited, and published some of Kjellén's works.

#### BRITISH POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY

The first scholar in Britain to formulate theories in political geography was Sir William Petty in the middle of the seventeenth century.<sup>11</sup> His studies included those on the geographic sphere of influence, population density, distance factors, and capital cities, all of which are still twentieth century problems. Sir William was well ahead of his day on politico-geographic thinking; over two centuries were to pass before other British names became associated with the development of political geography. Sir Halford Mackinder stands prominently above all others as a contributor to modern political geography, but several outstanding professors have written textbooks which are

<sup>10</sup> An interesting account of Haushofer's last days appears in Edmund A. Walsh, “The Mystery of Haushofer,” *Life*, XXI (September 16, 1946), 107–20.


<sup>11</sup> Y. M. Goblet, *Political Geography and the World Map* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1955), pp. 5–8. In this recent work the late Professor Goblet (French) gave Petty credit as one of the founders of political geography.

a credit to the conservative yet practical science which characterizes the British school. Among these men are James Fairgrieve, Charles B. Fawcett, W. Gordon East, and O. H. K. Spate. The two latter men edited *The Changing Map of Asia*, which considers geopolitically the partition of India, the decline of British power in South-east Asia, and the developments in the central part of that continent.

SIR HALFORD MACKINDER (1861-1947)—A professor of geography at the University of London, a member of Parliament, a director of the London School of Economics, and vice-president of the Royal Geographical Society, Sir Halford Mackinder was a guiding light in the development of German geopolitics—through no intention of his own. Mackinder brought to light political perspective on the geographic distribution of land masses and bodies of water. He interpreted history as essentially a struggle between land and sea power. His first important statement on the subject came in a lecture on “The Geographical Pivot of History,” delivered to the Royal Geographical Society in 1904. In 1919, as a warning to the statesmen of the Paris Peace Conference, he published *Democratic Ideals and Reality*. The Anglo-Saxon world paid little attention to the book, but Haushofer nevertheless saw the implications of the volume. In fact, Haushofer referred to Mackinder as “the most brilliant English geopolitician,” acknowledging a deep debt of gratitude to him.

Mackinder visualized the continents of Europe, Asia, and Africa as a World-Island, forming one land mass (see the map at the right on this page). He noted that three quarters of the world was water and only one quarter land. Of the land, the World-Island had two thirds, and the other land masses—principally North America, South America, and Australia—one third; the World-Island had fourteen sixteenths of the population, and the other land areas two sixteenths.

The key to the World-Island was the pivot area, or the Heartland. At first Mackinder defined the Heartland as a vast area in Eurasia that was characterized by Arctic and interior drainage. This area stretched from the Volga River to eastern Siberia and from the Himalayas to the Arctic Sea. It included most of the Iranian Upland in the southwest and much of the Mongolian upland in the southeast. The pivot area was not vulnerable to sea power. In 1904 the Heartland was, politically, entirely Russian in eastern Europe and largely Russian in Asia, although western China, part of Mongolia, Afghanistan, and—except for a narrow



coastal strip in each case—Baluchistan and Persia were also included. Mackinder later extended the Heartland concept westward to include much or all of European Russia. At present the Heartland is commonly understood to include all of the Soviet Union except the Far Eastern territories. Mackinder specifically excluded Lenaland in 1943.

Around Mackinder's Heartland, in the area known as the “Inner or Marginal Crescent,” was an arc of Coastland defined as an area of drainage into navigable seas. The Coastland included all Continental Europe except the Heartland portion of Russia; the monsoon areas of Asia—India, Southeast Asia, and most of China—were also included. The Outer or Offshore Islands were the British and Japanese homelands. The outlying islands in the Outer or Insular Crescent consisted largely of the Americas and Australia.

Africa south of the Sahara Desert was considered a southern but secondary Heartland, connected by the bridge of Arabia to the northern or main Heartland.

Mackinder believed firmly in the primary importance of the Heartland in Eurasia. Later in 1918 he expressed his thesis in the now-famous lines:

Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland:  
Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island:

Who rules the World-Island commands the World.<sup>12</sup>

Mackinder also recognized the strategic location of Germany in the peninsula of Europe with reference to the Heartland. The north, central, and west areas of the Heartland were a vast plain or great lowland, broken only by the Ural Mountains, and the lowland merged into the plains of north Germany. Although in the past Europe had been frequently invaded from the steppes of Asia, why could not the direction of invasion be reversed? In 1904 Mackinder asserted in his address on "The Geographical Pivot of History":

The oversetting of the balance of power in favour of the pivot state, resulting in its expansion over the marginal lands of Euro-Asia, would permit the use of vast continental resources for fleet building, and the empire of the world would then be in sight. This might happen if Germany were to ally herself with Russia.

During World War II Mackinder stated that his Heartland idea was "more valid and useful today than it was either twenty or forty years ago" and concluded that

All things considered, the conclusion is unavoidable that if the Soviet Union emerges from this war as conqueror of Germany, she must rank as the greatest land Power on the globe. Moreover, she will be the Power in the strategically strongest defensive position. The Heartland is the greatest natural fortress on earth. For

the first time in history it is manned by a garrison sufficient both in number and quality.<sup>13</sup>

## GEOPOLITICS IN POLAND

Poland, situated on the constriction of the European land mass between the Baltic and Black seas, has had an unusually turbulent geopolitical history during and since medieval times. The area is traversed by east-west land routes based on segments of river valleys. To the south and east the great Alpine barrier is lower and less obstructive to human movement, thus north-south routes enter Poland and intersect the lateral river valley routes, forming a *crossroads* region. History has proved this region to have been one of struggle with Poland fighting in it for her existence as a state.

The area possesses geographical unity by virtue of the hydrological pattern, and there has been a tendency to unify it into *one country*. From the twelfth to the sixteenth century Poland and Lithuania vied for supremacy between the Oder and the Dvina rivers, with the former country ultimately successful. Neighboring countries have in turn thrust their power into the area: Russia from the east, Germany from the west, Sweden from the Baltic, and Turkey from the Black Sea. Possession of the region, or a part of it, was of importance in the power politics of the day, for it strengthened a country's position in Europe. If penetration into the Polish area from more than one side destroyed the equilibrium, partition was the result. However, partition has to date proved to be only provisional because of the buoyancy of the Polish nation and its sustained will to exist as a state.

Eugeniusz Romer (1871-1954), a professor of geography at the University of Lemberg, analyzed Poland's position as the

<sup>12</sup> Halford J. Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality* (Holt, 1942), p. 150.

<sup>13</sup> Halford J. Mackinder, "The Round World and the Winning of the Peace," *Foreign Affairs* (July, 1943), 601.

most easterly of the three peninsular bases of Europe, the others being France and Germany.<sup>14</sup> Each of these areas offered access from north to south. Romer also advanced the thesis, counter to Ratzel's, that the geographical environment does not determine the state's development but presents several possibilities, among which the people may choose.

#### POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY IN FRANCE

Geopolitics is not taught in French universities, nor as a term does it enter to any extent into the language of the country. The study of man in relation to space and his utilization of this space falls into the category of human geography (*géographie humaine*). It was Vidal de la Blache (1845–1918) who gave impetus to modern geography in France through regional studies and adherence to a historical, and even archeological, approach. He directly opposed Ratzel's doctrine of man-space determinism, teaching that geographic phenomena is sufficiently fluid to provide man with a choice of action. Followers of Vidal de la Blache have continued this line of thought in the well-known volumes of *Géographie Universelle*, published by Armand Colin in Paris.

Deepening the rift between French geographers and geopolitics has been a distrust of German *Geopolitik* for its justification of the growth of a state at the expense of its neighbors. Only an occasional French publication deals with geopolitics as a study distinct from the accepted human or regional works. Between the two world wars J. Ancel published his *La Géopolitique* with the object of refuting the ideas of the German geopoliticians. Since 1945 only one book on the subject has appeared in French academic circles, *La Politique des États et*

*leur Géographie* by Professor Jean Gottman.

French geographers have never become involved in matters of state, despite the fact that great politicians and philosophers such as Richelieu, Vauban, and Montesquieu have availed themselves of geopolitical principles as devices of statecraft. On the other hand, French geographers have in their teachings and writings accepted the existence of a vast colonial empire, especially Africa. French expansion is explained in terms of civilization, based on the principles of the Revolution of 1789, in which individual initiative is respected.

#### AMERICAN POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY

America's fast ascending role in international politics during the last three quarters of a century has given impetus to the study of geopolitics. A few outstanding scholars have advanced theories and developed them in a manner quite as brilliant as any of their transatlantic counterparts. The newness of the country and its two-ocean position of continental proportions have molded American geopolitics into a social science quite distinctive from the European, despite interchange of ideas. In the United States the relation of geography to the politics of building a dam may be considered sound political geography.

ALFRED THAYER MAHAN (1840–1914)—A ~~graduate of the United States Naval Academy~~ in 1859, Alfred Thayer Mahan was a distinguished naval historian and a great proponent of sea power. He lectured on naval history and strategy at the Naval War College at Newport and became its president in 1886. Upon retirement in 1906 he was promoted to the rank of rear admiral.

Mahan is best known for his numerous publications on sea power: *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783* (1890), *The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793–1812* (1892),

<sup>14</sup> His article was translated and appeared as "Poland: The Land and the State" in *The Geographical Review*, IV, No. 1 (July, 1917).

and *The Life of Nelson* (1897). Emperor William II of Germany had Mahan's *The Influence of Sea Power upon History* placed in the libraries of German naval ships.

Mahan advanced the doctrine that control of the sea was the prime prerequisite of world power. He also believed that no state could be a great land and sea power at the same time because the problems of defending a land boundary against a strong continental rival would preclude successful competition for supremacy on the sea. Since all of the continental European states had to be on guard against their neighbors at the border and only France possessed a geographical position suited as a base for sea power, Mahan never feared that a land-sea power in Eurasia could seize control of the oceans.

Great Britain, on the other hand, had an excellent insular base at home and easily defended bases abroad. Her position of great strength had enabled her to maintain the naval supremacy she acquired during the Napoleonic conflict. Only the United States had a geographical position that rivaled Great Britain's. The United States, having no powerful potential enemies on its borders, possessed the advantages of insularity and had secure access to the great resources of a continent. Mahan therefore believed that the United States might succeed Great Britain as the leading oceanic power. To that end he advocated American control of the Hawaiian Islands and the Caribbean and favored the construction of an isthmian canal between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.

Mahan's ideas must, of course, be considered in the light of the conditions of his time. In those days the British navy ruled the world's seas, and British sea power had a firm geographical basis, for Britain controlled the narrow waterways through which all seaborne commerce between the leading trade centers of the world had to pass. Dover Strait between England and France, Gibraltar Strait and the Suez Canal at the

western and eastern ends, respectively, of the Mediterranean, and Malacca Strait between Sumatra and Malaya were all under British domination. In fact, Great Britain in 1901 controlled all the ocean gateways to Europe, Asia, and Africa and all the navigable passages among the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific oceans.

**RECENT GEOPOLITICAL WRITERS**—After the death of Mahan Professor Isaiah Bowman of Johns Hopkins University became the leading American geopolitician. His book, *The New World*, deals with post-World War I problems;<sup>15</sup> it was in part the outcome of his mission to Europe as a geographical advisor on peace treaty settlements. Bowman attempted to analyze real situations—not justify the claims, whatever they might be, of one nation against another.

A leading student in the development of American geopolitics was the late Nicholas J. Spykman, director of the Yale Institute of International Studies and professor of international relations at Yale University. Spykman defined geopolitics as "the planning of the security policy of a country in terms of its geographic factors."<sup>16</sup> He believed that the study of the location of the state in the world was essential in understanding its foreign policy. He recognized power as a means of preserving peace and believed that the great powers alone have the means of enforcing the peace. As a student of international relations, he noted that geopolitics revealed a picture of forces relative to a given frame of reference at a given time. A region from a geopolitical viewpoint was determined by the factors of geography and by the dynamic changes in the power centers. Geopolitical analysis was by its very nature dynamic and not static.

<sup>15</sup> Isaiah Bowman, *The New World* (World Book, 1921).

<sup>16</sup> Nicholas John Spykman, *The Geography of the Peace* (Harcourt, Brace, 1944), pp. 5-6. See also *America's Strategy in World Politics* (Harcourt, Brace, 1942).

Spykman had carefully studied the ideas of Mackinder. He questioned the validity of the thesis of the English geographer relative to the pivot area, or the Heartland, as expressed in 1904 and 1919. He doubted whether the Heartland would be, at least in the immediate future, a center of world power potential, pointing out that climatic conditions, agrarian productivity, the distribution of coal, iron, oil, and water power, and the geographical obstacles along the north, east, south, and southwest boundaries of the huge pivot area tended to lessen the validity of Mackinder's thesis.<sup>17</sup> The position of the central Asiatic regions of the Soviets would be less important if China and India were themselves more industrially developed than these areas of the Soviet Union. Spykman generally believed that Russian power would remain primarily west of the Urals, not in the central Siberian region.

Spykman considered the "rimland" of Eurasia as more important than the Heartland. Occupying the intermediate region between the Heartland and the marginal seas, the "rimland" specifically included all of continental Europe except Russia, Asia Minor, Arabia, Iraq, Persia, Afghanistan, India, southeastern Asia, China, Korea, and eastern Siberia. All this area was considered largely a buffer zone between sea power and land power. He stated his thesis as follows: "Who controls the rimland rules Eurasia; who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world."<sup>18</sup>

Continuing his analysis of Eurasia, he considered Great Britain and Japan as political and military centers of power outside the rimland, off the shores of western Europe and eastern Asia, respectively. Africa and Australia were off-shore continents, with Africa related to the southwestern shores of Eurasia by the European Mediterranean Sea and Australia to the southeastern shores of

Eurasia by the Asiatic Mediterranean Sea.<sup>18</sup> The power potential of both these continents was seen as restricted.

Spykman pictured the United States as surrounded by the land masses of Eurasia, Africa, and Australia and separated from the power centers of Europe and Asia by the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Eurasia, Africa, and Australia together were about equal in energy output to the New World, but they had a population ten times as great and an area two and one half times as large as that of the New World. He did not foresee to any great extent the development of the Arctic Mediterranean as a leading transit zone. He asserted that the leading political objective of the United States in peace and war should be to prevent the unification of the power centers in the Old World against the United States.

Spykman felt that France was not strong enough to restrain Germany, but that Russia would be the strongest land power in Europe. He believed that a unified rimland would be a menace to Russia as well as to the United States. As a consequence of these factors, he advocated an alliance of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain to preserve the peace. A peaceful world based on the balance of power in Eurasia and the cooperation of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain in an effective security system were his main objectives.

In the 1930's Professor Samuel Van Valkenburg of Clark University came to the fore with his geographical interpretation of international relations on the basis of individual states. Professor Derwent Whittlesey of Harvard, Professor Hans Weigert of Georgetown University, and Professor Richard Hartshorne of the University of Wisconsin have contributed influential writings of a

<sup>17</sup> *The Geography of the Peace*, p. 43.

<sup>18</sup> The Asiatic Mediterranean Sea refers to the water bodies separating Australia from southeastern Asia.

geopolitical nature, the latter having been selected to present the status of political geography in a recent inventory of all American geography.<sup>19</sup>

### CONCLUSION

War and peace may come and go, but the environmental factors in geography remain

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<sup>19</sup> Preston E. James and Clarence F. Jones (eds.), *American Geography Inventory and Prospect* (Syracuse University Press, 1954)

relatively constant. The Rhine still flows to the sea regardless of what state maintains the historic watch over it in days of peace or no matter whose blood stains its waters in days of war. Man may mold the resources of the earth to produce a golden age in civilization, or man may be destined to use the resources of the earth to destroy himself. In either case, however, one thing is certain: as long as international relations exist in the world, geography will remain an important consideration and influence.

### Study Questions

1. Name some of the earliest scholars who delved into problems of political geography.
2. Cite several examples of practical geopolitics in world history.
3. What dynamic role has geopolitics played in the history of modern Germany?
4. State the essential concepts in the geopolitics of the Men of Munich.
5. What was the influence of Friedrich Ratzel on political geography?
6. Show the relationship between the ideas of the organic state and *Lebensraum*.
7. What was the relationship between Haushofer and Hitler and between the geopoliticians and the Nazis?
8. Describe the world political outlook as developed by the Men of Munich.
9. What was Kjellén's plan for studying the state?
10. Contrast the conservatism of the British School of geopolitics with the aggressive aspects of the German School and explain the difference.
11. How have geographic factors affected Poland's struggle for existence as a state?
12. Along what lines did geopolitical thinking develop in France?
13. Compare the ideas of Mackinder and Spykman relative to the geopolitical structure of the world.
14. Summarize the teachings of Alfred Thayer Mahan.
15. Name several major geopolitical problems of the postwar world.



## CHAPTER THREE

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# *The Political Area*

The study of different types of regions, or areas, constitutes an important aspect of the science of geography. Appropriate, then, for study in political geography is the political area as a type of region. In theory at least, political areas are at any given time sharply delineated by boundaries, their size can be computed in square miles. In contrast, other types of geographic regions, such as physiographic, agricultural, or manufacturing, do not lend themselves to precise measurement. Even though they may exist on maps as clearly defined areas, their expression on the face of the earth is subject to irregularity, fragmentation, and transition from one type of region to another. Hilly belts separate mountainous terrain from plains, grazing regions merge gradually into crop lands, and industrial concentrations are interspersed with rural activities. Only political areas possess boundaries which may be precisely delimited on the surface of the earth.

As suggested in Chapter One of this text, political areas range from independent states

down to the smallest administrative units of local governments. Regardless of size or importance, all political areas should have one characteristic in common—governmental unity throughout. A group of states (United Nations, NATO countries, British Commonwealth) may have some of the prerequisites of a political area, but usually any such affiliations among states are for some specific purpose in which governmental unity is non-existent or of secondary importance. To most specialists, the study of political geography is normally limited to political areas having the status of either independent states or dependent areas. The major administrative divisions of national units may also be described and analyzed. Multiple-state groups, on the other hand, are usually considered in light of the individual units of which they are comprised.

### STATES OF THE WORLD

The number of independent states in the world is constantly changing. Several new

countries have appeared on the map as the outcome of World War II, others have resulted from the recent surge of nationalism in northern Africa and along the southern and eastern peripheries of Asia. At any given time the exact number of states existing in the world can be cited only with some arbitrary qualification, no sharp formula exists to determine the degree of autonomy that a political area must possess in order to be classed as independent. As a rule independence denotes in a formal sense two things: the existence of a foreign office and the capacity to enter into international commitments or adhere to international organizations, such as the United Nations.

For the purpose of this discussion, ninety-one political areas are considered as independent states. Full sovereignty in most of these can, without reservation, be recognized (Mexico, Sweden, Thailand). However, some political areas are included which do not enjoy complete freedom from external control but, on the other hand, can neither be assigned the rank of a dependent area nor designated as an internal administrative division of another state. The status of the eastern European satellites of the USSR (Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria) in the decade after World War II did not measure up to the concept of independence in the Western sense. However, as the case of Tito illustrates, the degree of independence can change even under Communist rule. Outer Mongolia in Asia also falls into the satellite category. In Europe a half dozen political oddities, inherited from feudal times and possessing varying degrees of self-rule, are usually included in any list of states (Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino, Vatican City).

Included also are new states that arose as the result of post-World War II exigencies and may be only of a provisional nature (a second Germany, a second Korea, a second Vietnam, and Formosa as a second China). Dominions of the British Commonwealth

automatically fall into the category of independent states because of their self-rule, but no other colonial power has yet worked out any comparable political system for confederation of former dependencies, except possibly the relation of Vietnam (south), Laos, and Cambodia in the French Union. The number of states is, in the near future, scheduled to be augmented: Morocco and Tunisia are now receiving their independence from France, and Gold Coast and other British dependencies are on the verge of becoming Dominions.

**DISTRIBUTION**—The world's independent states extend to all of the habitable continents and many of their numerous offshore islands. Within this widespread pattern, however, the distribution is very uneven. Europe alone accounts for thirty-three of the ninety-one states (including the USSR and Turkey); Asia follows closely with another twenty-eight. Thus, on the Eurasian land mass are to be found approximately two thirds of all independent countries. Latin America, which includes the Caribbean region as well as South America, also figures heavily in the count, with twenty states. At the other extreme stand Anglo-America and Oceania, each with only two independent states.

**CLASSIFICATION**—The states of the world are so varied in all aspects of their make-up that it is indeed difficult to classify them other than in rather vague categories. Mention has already been made of "major powers" and "minor powers," which is nothing more than a method of identifying the stronger states at any given time. Van Valkenburg devised a system of placing states in categories normally utilized for identifying landscapes within the cycle of erosion: *youthful*, *mature*, and *old age*. Certainly, states go through cycles of development, but the rather consistent age level of the human element in control of government prevents full cyclical expression as in the case of ac-

tion by the physical elements. Goblet distinguishes an *intensive state* from an *extensive state* and recognizes a *mixed state*, which combines their characteristics. The *intensive state* seeks to develop from within, advancing toward perfection in utilization of its wealth and in political stability. The *extensive state* seeks to feed on areas outside its boundaries in order to attain political stature and otherwise increase its prestige in world affairs. Any state may change from one to another of these types, or it may exhibit the tendencies of both at any given period.

It is possible to distinguish states in accordance with the type of government prevailing in each, republic, kingdom, empire. Any such classification, however, is apt to be rather meaningless. Britain is a kingdom and France a republic, yet their political systems are in many ways comparable. On the other hand both the United States and Bulgaria, which obviously have strongly contrasting political systems, are both labeled republics. Very simple classifications, each with two principal categories, may be employed, but without very profound results; for example, states may be maritime or continental. Frequently used is the distinction between the states of the Free World and those of the Communist World.

No satisfactory classification of political areas based on geographic features has been devised. Each political area is unique, and its features can be discussed only in general terms. Moreover, the responses to these features defy the setting up of arbitrary categories by which to pigeonhole states. Both Switzerland and Afghanistan, for example, are mountainous states; yet, one is highly developed and orderly, and the other is poorly developed and has some warlike tribes within its confines. Most large states have such a variety of physical features that it is impractical to segregate any one or two upon which to provide a basis for classification. The United States is not a mountain

state, a plains state, or a plateau state, but a combination of all three

Of some value in geopolitical study is the arrangement of states in broad regional patterns. Geographers and political scientists alike are prone to section off the world into great political regions. There are numerous ways to effect this type of a break-down, but representative units might be Western Europe, Middle East, Insular Far East, and Latin America. Thus, the states within each one of such blocs could conceivably be considered as a category in a regional *classification* based on geographic location.

**GROUPING OF STATES**—The grouping of states has long been a characteristic of international politics. The banding together of countries to prevent war or to protect themselves should war come is without doubt the usual form of this type of concerted action. History books endlessly discuss alliances, ententes, leagues, blocs, and other multiple-state groups. In the unsettled postwar world the tendency among states to group themselves as a means of mutual aid and to facilitate defense is stronger than ever. The greatest effort in this direction is the United Nations, which embraces most of the political areas of the globe.<sup>1</sup> The tendency is toward universal membership. Every country in the Western Hemisphere is a member, and Western Europe, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia, together with Oceania, contribute heavily to the membership. Recently the door has been opened to former Axis powers, to some of the satellite states, and to traditionally neutral countries. The few remaining nonmembers are small countries, such as microstates, neutral Switzerland, and the so-called "provisional" states (North Korea, South Korea). Red China has been denied representation by the

<sup>1</sup> Russia enjoys special consideration by virtue of Ukraine and Byelorussia, two of the Soviet Socialist Republics within the USSR, which are counted individually in addition to the USSR itself.

Western World, despite repeated application and support by the Soviet bloc. Ironically enough, the United Nations, created as an agency of world security, has itself been divided on global issues by the same cleavage that has brought about a bipolarization of global power.

Another important grouping of states comprises the fifteen members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The United States and Canada stand as the western guard to security in the North Atlantic community. In Europe thirteen member nations make up a zone of defense between the Atlantic and the Iron Curtain. Nine of them fringe or lie close to the ocean itself (the United Kingdom, Iceland, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, and Portugal); two are in Central Europe, touching territory of the Soviet bloc (West Germany, Italy); and the remaining two carry the zone deep into the Eurasian land mass (Greece, Turkey). Fourteen of the NATO countries are also members of the United Nations; only West Germany belongs to NATO but not the UN group. In Southeast Asia and the southwest Pacific are represented the SEATO group of countries (Australia, New Zealand, Philippines, Pakistan, Thailand, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France). Patterned after NATO, this treaty organization is younger and structurally more unwieldy. Diversity of interests in the area, plus the great distances involved for the participating nations, weakens any potential contributing force which might be developed here to resist aggression.

The Soviet power orbit, made up of the USSR and its European and Asiatic satellites, constitutes another distinct group of states having a community of interests. Welded together by a common political ideology this bloc of territory expresses in various degrees a Communist type of state. In the area within the orbit, aside from the USSR itself, military alliances and coalitions

have been forged since the end of World War II, culminating with the creation of Communist sections in two countries formerly recognized as unified: Korea and Vietnam.

The Arab League illustrates a strong association of states based on kindred ethnic ties of religion, language, and racial heritage, on regional community of interests, and on common political aspirations. The Organization of American States and Benelux illustrate two rather loosely knit organizations whereby regional groups of states seek to benefit by a limited pooling of interests. The former has for its objectives the promotion and maintenance of peace, commerce, and friendship. The latter functions largely in the furthering of economic relations among the three small states of the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg. The British Commonwealth (and, in a sense, any colonial empire) represents groupings of political areas (including dependencies). Likewise, other groups of states and combinations of political areas show at least some relationship among them beyond that of normal commerce or friendly diplomatic gestures.

#### NATURAL SETTING OF POLITICAL AREAS

Although the political area at the outset may be discussed in terms of its historical development and political framework, the natural setting comes into play to condition the composite pattern which evolves. These features help to determine the relative importance of the political area with respect to other political areas and may account for the ease of expansion or vulnerability to attack. Freedom of action versus restriction because of "encirclement" in foreign relations may likewise be indicated by the natural setting. The internal development of the political area depends to a certain extent upon the natural setting: pattern of population distribution, health and energy of the population, development of economic

strength, and degree of cohesive force within the state. Finally, the alignment and type of international and internal boundaries may be partially dependent upon the natural setting.

Expressed as geographic factors, this setting is tangibly evident in every political area, in some cases spectacular and looming as classic examples relating the state to the earth, but frequently commonplace to the extent that they may pass unnoticed as earth relationships. Geographic factors making up the natural setting which thus contribute to the molding of a political area are numerous and diverse, but they may be grouped into three broad categories: locational features, features of the natural landscape, and natural resources.

**LOCATIONAL FEATURES**—Position, size, and shape all figure as locational features of any political area. The last two of these three features may be measured, the first may not.

*Position* Position provides the geographic setting in which a state must largely depend for existence and for success in competition with other states. In ancient times powerful empires were founded on irrigation agriculture and centered on large rivers flowing through the fertile soil of desert areas. Thus, positions astride the lower reaches of the Nile, the Tigris-Euphrates, and the Indus all gave rise to the "great powers" of the day: Egypt, Babylonia, and the eastern reaches of Darius' empire. The Mediterranean as a seat of classical culture became the center of world civilization, and a position upon its shores was essential to dominance in that era: Carthage, Greece, the Byzantine Empire, the Roman Empire. Later, in the age of exploration across the great oceans of the world the keynote to power was location on the littoral of the North Atlantic: Spain, Portugal, Great Britain, France, the Netherlands.

In modern times accessibility denotes a great advantage in the location of any po-

litical area. States situated on the margin of continents or occupying their offshore islands stand to benefit because of access to world trade routes. The insular positions of Great Britain and Japan afforded them opportunity to develop as two of the most commercially active countries in the world. The United States and France, each facing two important water bodies, also qualify as maritime states. Russia, endowed with all the advantages of a continental power, has long searched for more ready access to the sea.

Some states, even though they may face the sea, suffer from isolation if they are remote from the great shipping routes of the world. Thus, the west-coast countries of South America are at a disadvantage as compared with the east-coast countries of the same continent. Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, and Montevideo are ports on the world's second busiest seaway. Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay, as a result, have long been recipients of European culture. In contrast Valparaiso and Lima lie "off the beaten track" on the remote face of South America. But even Chile and Peru are far better off than many landlocked countries, that is, states with no access to the sea except by grace of other states. Afghanistan, Bolivia, Paraguay, and the inland countries of Central Europe are continually faced with problems of how to make contact with the rest of the world. The airplane has helped to solve such problems; but surface means of transportation still carry the bulk of the world's goods, and it is overland that culture most readily spreads.

*Size.* The size of a state is usually a significant measure of its strength and importance. A large area is likely to possess a greater amount of the world's goods than a small area and at the same time provide greater variety of these goods to ensure a better balance in economic and political development. However, size alone may not be used as a

sharp criterion in determining the potential power of a state. An undue proportion of unproductive land within its boundaries, such as deserts or mountainous wastes, may even be a handicap inasmuch as transportation difficulties are increased and problems of defense become more complex. In a geopolitical sense, nevertheless, the great extent of a country may be a vital element in ability to resist aggression. For example, China was able to maintain her independent status in the west even after the Japanese had overrun all of the coastal sections of the country and most of the lower river valleys. In direct contrast, the resistance of a small country may be quickly crushed by invasion, as illustrated by Belgium in both world wars.

Six states stand out as giants among those in the world community: the USSR, China, Canada, Brazil, the United States, Australia, five more states, although individually much smaller, make up an intermediate group: India, Argentina, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia. But the preponderant number of states are medium-sized or small. It is striking to note that except for the United States and the USSR the most powerful states of the twentieth century have fallen into those classed as medium-sized. Great Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and Italy, to name the five outstanding, all range in area from a little under 100,000 to a little over 200,000 square miles. France, the largest of the five, is only one fourteenth as large as the United States. Yet, these states vigorously put to use the territory they did have and succeeded in one way or another in overcoming the handicap of a limited number of square miles: intense utilization of the soil, industrialization, widespread commercial relations with the rest of the world, the building of colonial empires.

*Shape.* No two states have the same shape, although three categories of form generally include all possibilities: *compact*, *attenuated*, and *fragmented*. Of course any state may

be a combination of two, or all three, of these categories. Before the advent of modern warfare the defense of a state was dependent in part upon its shape. Now, in the face of air power and nuclear weapons, any attempt at border patrol is hardly more than a gesture. Shape, however, continues to influence the internal development and functioning of a state. A compact form, such as that of France and Uruguay, favors the construction and operation of an efficient transportation pattern with minimum distances between centers. Contact between the central government and outlying parts of a state is easiest and strongest when the form is compact.

An attenuated form usually demands a longitudinal transportation system and poses problems for strong centralized governmental control, as illustrated by Chile, Norway, and Czechoslovakia. Fragmentation of a state may mean that it is composed of a group of islands, or it may mean that territory of another state lies between its component parts. Japan, the Philippines, and Indonesia provide examples in the first situation, and at the moment Pakistan is the sole example in the second.<sup>2</sup> A system of ferry lines and air routes facilitate liaison among the various fragments in archipelago countries, with the result that a surprising amount of unity can be maintained with no disrupting problems. Between the two world wars East Prussia was separated from the main body of Germany by the famous Polish Corridor, which was a constant source of friction and was eliminated by territorial changes in postwar Europe. Pakistan, too, experiences irksome problems in overcoming the 900 miles of India stretching between the western and eastern parts of the country. Such a situation is most subject to change in any territorial shuffle.

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<sup>2</sup> The West Zone of Berlin as a part of West Germany might also be cited as a case of a state that is separated by territory of another state.

**FEATURES OF THE NATURAL LANDSCAPE**—In any state internal activities, even the most political, must take place over the natural landscape of the political area. The most dominant feature to be seen is the relief, whether a monotonous plain or the most rugged of mountainous terrain. Closely allied to topography is the hydrographic pattern of an area, draining it and at the same time orienting lines of communication and transportation. Quite likely the original routes of territorial expansion can be tied in with the hydrography, for armies and pioneers, like roads and railroads, follow valleys and seek easy passes.

Any particular type of relief is capable of leaving its imprint on the cultural landscape and, hence, on political development. Some states are associated with a single type of topography. Denmark, a land of uniform relief and devoid of mineral resources, has developed an agrarian economy. It has a long tradition of peaceful, prosperous existence, singularly lacking in belligerent activities.

Mountainous states, or mountainous parts of states, have long been havens of refuge for peoples seeking protection from those who would overpower them. Afghanistan, a mountain state, is largely isolated within its rugged vastness. Western Ireland, Wales, and the Brittany Peninsula of France by the culture of their inhabitants evidence a relative seclusion from the outside world.

Most countries encompass multiple types of relief, for terrain tends to change frequently from place to place over the surface of the earth. Uplands, river valleys, and coastal plains are evident in most states, even in relatively small ones. Greece, for example, is divided into distinct regions by sharp mountain relief. In ancient times the pocketlike lowlands gave rise to small—even powerful—states, two of which, Athens and Sparta, strongly influenced the course of history in the ancient world. Without exception, the larger states of the world con-

tain sufficient variety of relief to offer great diversity of development.

Climate may be considered an integral part of the natural landscape. It was pointed out earlier that the world's more powerful states tended to develop where the climate favors human energy and lacks extremes that curtail resourcefulness and activity on the part of man. By the statistical recording of weather phenomena it is possible to know much about the climate of any political area. Seasonal rhythm of temperature, rainfall regime, and many other aspects of climate—even to the point of recognizing long-range cycles in weather behavior—can be measured. Accordingly, agriculture, development of hydroelectric energy, construction, and other types of activity can be adapted to the climatic factor of the natural landscape.

But the response of human beings themselves to temperatures, humidities, and other climatic elements is far from so exact a science. It is known that there is definite relationship between climatological data, on one hand, and capacity to produce, health statistics, and demographic trends, on the other. Just where a "good" climate ends and a "bad" one starts is not a line that can be accurately plotted on a map. Whether or not white men can carry on sustained labor in the tropics is still subject to conjecture. Nevertheless, human vigor and ingenuity spring from the so-called stimulating temperate climatic regions, and here are found the energetic populations that produce the most and set up the most powerful political organizations.

**NATURAL RESOURCES**—All of the physical wealth and advantages of a political area may be considered as its natural resources. Even characteristics difficult to evaluate, such as location and landforms, may conceivably be included. More commonly, however, the term is limited to physical substances of the natural environment which

directly serve to produce goods of economic value. Nearly all the individual items in any conventional inventory of natural resources would come under one of the following three headings: minerals (metals, building materials, petroleum, water, soils), natural vegetation (forests, grasslands), and animal life (wild game, fish). These resources in abundance and in variety endow a state with a strong economic potential and enable it to generate political strength.

Because of the sporadic distribution of resources over the earth, no country is entirely self-sufficient. The United States and the USSR approach self-sufficiency, but both of these states require access to raw materials not found within their borders. Most of the stronger states possess resources which enable them to engage in industrial production by trading surpluses of what they have for those items which they lack. Thus France, with its iron ore, and England and Germany, with their coal, are reasonably fortunate in the matter of resources for heavy iron-and-steel production. Many small countries must rely on very limited resources for any economic viability they attain. Ireland, nearly void of minerals except low-grade coal (peat), specializes in the production of animal products by virtue of its rich grasslands.

#### ECONOMIC AND HUMAN FEATURES

**NATIONAL ECONOMIES**—Every state must necessarily depend upon economic strength for political power. A heavy iron-and-steel industry is without doubt the best single index to national strength, but also essential is a proper balance of other economic advantages with which to mold a strong economy. Always a source of weakness in England has been lack of an agricultural economy to sustain the population. Despite heavy production of all types of manufactured goods, the island of Great Britain was hard pressed for food during both world wars and

could have crumbled in defeat had enemy blockades been a little more effective. In fact, the rationing of certain food products continued in Britain for eight years after the close of World War II.

Economic and political activities in any political area are intricately intertwined. A high level of economic production is to a large extent dependent upon the efficiency of the state in maintaining peace and order, in protecting property, in recognizing initiative, and in rewarding effort. High production in the United States reflects a government in full sympathy with economic enterprise and one able to support it. Soviet production policies give full play to those goods which will strengthen the military and industrial might of the state or furnish media for spreading propaganda, but they sadly neglect the manufacture of consumers' goods other than routine necessities. Many medium-sized or small states have limited production owing to lack of opportunity to produce domestically, plus lack of capital with which to import. Heavy taxation on home production or prohibitive tariffs on imports also curtail economic activity within a state.

Another economic factor governing the level of economic activity within a country is the size and extent of the market. Mass production in the United States is justified; in Norway it is not, unless some product suitable for widespread distribution to foreign markets can be manufactured. One of the basic reasons for maintaining a colonial empire has been that colonies provide a market for the domestic production of the mother state.

States are tending to assume increasingly greater roles in the location of industries, in the development of resources for strategic reasons, and in the regulation of transportation. Notwithstanding the policy of free enterprise in the United States, there is government control to the extent that a high national production, with attendant assembly



of raw materials and distribution of finished goods, does not clash with over-all efforts toward the welfare of the country and with proper defense measures. For example, the opening of a new air route or the exportation of certain commodities is subject to official scrutiny and approval.

Many states, including some of the most democratic, have tight controls on all economic activities. Since World War II France and Great Britain have nationalized all of the major railroads of their countries. In France all mineral rights belong to the state—not to the landowner on whose property the deposits are found.

By their very nature some countries are unable to develop strong economies. Dependence upon limited resources has already been stressed as a serious weakness. Inadequate transportation and communication systems normally prevent a state from effectively assembling or distributing those goods that it might otherwise be able to produce. Again, political areas in less advanced parts of the world must frequently rely upon foreign exploitation of their natural resources. Thus, the rubber and tin production of Southeast Asia and the copper mining in the Andes, although benefiting the countries concerned in monetary profit, cannot be directed toward the establishment of balanced domestic economies.

As a further example of weakness, within any political area there may be economic regions that have conflicting interests. While such environmental diversity may be advantageous under certain conditions, it can also be a divisive force. The mineral interests of northern Chile do not supplement the agriculture of middle Chile or the forestry and grazing interests of southern Chile. In Italy most of the economic strength of the country lies north of Rome; the southern part of the peninsula and the islands of Sardinia and Sicily fail to blend effectively into any national economic pattern.

**POPULATION**—The people give vitality to a political area, yet, population counts alone cannot serve as an index to political vitality. Consider, for example, Australia (2,975,000 square miles) and Portugal (35,000 square miles), each with approximately 9,000,000 inhabitants, and the vastly different geopolitical problems that confront the two countries. Or consider Italy (117,000 square miles) and Iraq (116,000 square miles), with sharply contrasting population totals: the former with nearly 50,000,000 people and the latter with approximately 5,000,000. It is little wonder that Ratzel claimed that the unqualified over-all population of a political area was "a dead thing." In fact, huge numbers of people in a country may be a handicap to the generation of political strength; otherwise, China and India, with their hundreds of millions, might well stand out as great powers.

The distribution of population and the resulting density patterns within political areas may be very significant in evaluating the human factor. Thus, Japan with a population of about 90,000,000 on 148,000 square miles of territory can be computed as having an average density of 608 persons per square mile. Several countries in Northwestern Europe exceed this figure. However, five sixths of the Japanese Isles are made up of mountainous terrain that is generally forbidding to human settlement. Accordingly, the distribution of population is almost exclusively along the narrow coastal plains and in those river valleys that offer level land or slopes capable of being terraced. Therefore, the density on the habitable part of the country climbs to well over 3,000 persons per square mile—more than three times greater than highly industrialized England, Belgium, or the Netherlands. Recognition of such a density pattern goes far to explain the Japanese dilemma of population pressure and man-space-resources strains. Even in states relatively free from overcrowding there may be problems relative to population distribu-

tion. In France, which has less than 200 persons per square mile on territory that is both agriculturally rich and conducive to the development of industry, the government faces the problem of depopulation in interior sections and movement of people into the Paris Basin and into industrial districts near the borders.

The problem of manpower for military and industrial purposes is contingent upon population—in this case over-all totals by counting heads have a greater meaning. To ensure a sufficient number of men for a large army and for heavy industrial output the governmental policy of a state may be in conflict with the actual requirements for optimum development in terms of space and resources available. Aggressive nations, such as Germany, Italy, and Japan prior to World War II, illustrate this unfortunate paradox when they encourage a high birth rate and at the same time demand additional "living space."

**ETHNIC GROUPS**—Population aspects of the political area can be related to the political pattern that evolves. Four ethnic characteristics are usually associated with any political area and lend themselves to geopolitical evaluation: nationality, language, religion, and race.

**Nationality.** Nationality refers to the sense of loyalty among the persons of a group toward a certain state or nation. A state has already been defined as applying to *area*; a nation may be defined as applying to the *human element*. It is a group of people unified by social and political consciousness and by adherence to certain ideologies and traditions. So strong may be these common bonds within a group that international boundaries are meaningless in delineating them. The Polish people from the last part of the eighteenth century until 1919 lived as a nation but not as a state. Chopin's fiery music symbolizes this spirit of a proud people without a country and under the heel of

an aggressor. Soviet Russia, a single state, is made up of fifteen nationalities, the multinationality implied by its official title Union of Soviet Socialist (Republics of) Russia. Georgians, Ukrainians, Turkmenians, and twelve other nationalities must all consider themselves citizens of Soviet Russia.

**Language.** As in the case of nationality, there tends to be a certain amount of uniformity between the arrangement of language groups and individual political areas. A state may have its own tongue, which is different from that of any other state: Sweden, Persia, Japan. In some instances two or more languages within a state are official: Belgium, with French and Flemish, Pakistan, with Urdu and Bengali; and Switzerland, with German, French, Italian, and Romansch. Or, quite commonly, a single language may sweep across international boundaries: German in West Germany, East Germany, Austria, and part of Switzerland; Arabic in the Middle East and northern Africa; and Spanish in Spain and most of Latin America.

**Religion.** Religion is no longer a state function as it formerly was in many parts of the world. Nevertheless, in some states a single faith dominates the population, with the result that it can be considered as quasi official: Mohammedanism in the Arab states, Catholicism in Spain and Latin America, and Buddhism in Burma and Thailand. Tolerance in religious matters is widely accepted in the modern state, and where a number of religions exist side by side, as in the United States, political problems seldom develop. In the USSR and the satellite states religion has been de-emphasized, but to a degree it is tolerated.

**Race.** As a social phenomenon race is difficult to qualify. There are human types distinguishable by color or other outstanding physical characteristics, such as the epicanthic fold in the eyes of Orientals.

There has been so much intermixture of population from place to place throughout the passing centuries that the concept of race tends to lose itself in the identification of nationalities or the association of people by the region in which they dwell or from which they come.

**MINORITIES**—A segment of one social class that finds itself outside the main body of the same class can be identified as a *minority*. Minorities may be small national groups, or they may be people of a language, religion, or color other than the population of the political area in which they reside. Normally minority groups live in harmony with their neighbors or in a state of mild discontent, which may create much discussion but no action. Seldom do minority groups get out of hand on their own initiative, but they make excellent tools in the hands of states wishing to promote trouble at the expense of other states. The Germans used the Sudeten Germans as the spark to generate a crisis whereby they gained the Sudetenland. The Moslems of pre-partition India, on the other hand, were powerful enough to effect a nation of their own in the establishment of Pakistan.

#### POLITICAL PATTERNS OF STATES

The political imprint superimposed over the natural and cultural landscapes constitutes one of the most artificial of patterns found on the surface of the earth. Political areas exhibit great diversity from place to place and are subject to sudden change in their internal structure as well as in their external form. Further, they may come into being overnight or go out of existence as quickly. The German Reich of Hitler was a far different type of political area than are the West and East Germanies of the postwar world. Earlier in the century Austria-Hungary, Serbia, and Tannu Tuva appeared in atlases as autonomous states. Only the newest at-

lases show Libya, Sudan, Laos, and Cambodia as states. Nevertheless, political areas tend to develop along certain fixed lines. Moreover, each state traditionally possesses a government of some type, the authority of which emanates from a capital, is compartmentized into internal administrative subdivisions, and is normally encompassed by definite boundaries.

**DEVELOPMENTAL FEATURES**—The region in which a state originates is said to be its *nuclear core*, or *core area*. The French state had its beginnings in the Île de France district of the Paris Basin. The USSR as a state grew from the Muscovite region in the valley of the Oka River. The core area of modern Turkey on the Anatolian plateau can be traced back to the thirteenth century. Some states have multiple core areas, such as the United States, with its separate centers of early colonization along the east coast, and Italy, which came into being as an amalgamation of numerous small states. Other states, as illustrated by Pakistan and Israel, appear on the map so suddenly that they are without true core areas except as might have been inherited from another political regime. Still other states do not presently have the opportunity for expansion and remain without territory beyond that in the core area. Haiti and Hungary are numbered among this type as are numerous other small states.

Most states extend over territory beyond the core areas in which they were founded. In some instances the outlying regions have been developed to become integrated culturally, economically, and politically into the state. France is perhaps the perfect example of a state in which population and political control have been spread to effect a homogeneous political area. In other instances territory incorporated within the boundaries of a state has remained undeveloped and reflects imperfect political control. Vast reaches in the Amazon Valley

and on the Mato Grosso plateau are but little integrated into Brazil's cultural and economic patterns. In fact, some of the political divisions in these remote regions have the status of *territories* rather than of *states*. The American West during the last century was outlying, pioneer country, remote from the Washington government; in fact, New Mexico, Arizona, and part of Oklahoma were territories rather than states until well into the present century.

Somewhat apart from the core area, yet a vital part of any state's anatomy, is the *ecumene*. Not political in itself, the *ecumene* generates political power, for here is found the economic heart of any political area. On the map it appears as the region of the most dense population, the greatest commercial and industrial activity, and the most closely spaced transportation network. The *ecumene* of the United States is the northeastern one eighth of the country, including the Great Lakes region, where one half of the population live and where economic activities are most concentrated. The Pampas of Argentina, the Rhine and Ruhr valleys of West Germany, and the southern coastal section of Honshu in Japan are other examples of the *ecumene*.

*Unredeemed* territories are political phenomena associated with the developmental features of the political area. Any state subjected to boundary changes in which territory is lost (either in fact or in fancy) may later lay claim to it, especially if the population living there is of the nationality of the state making the claim. China has a chain of such claims along her frontier, including one extending into Burma, where military forces are now maneuvering.

**THE CAPITAL**—The capital of a state may exert an influence far above that implied in its role as the administrative center. Not infrequently, as in news broadcasts, London, Washington, Paris, Cairo, and other capital cities are used symbolically in preference to

the name of the country as a whole. In most countries throughout the world the largest city is the capital—the United States, Switzerland, West Germany, and several countries in the British Commonwealth being notable exceptions. Thus, a capital commonly serves as the cultural and commercial center of a country and more often than not is a focal point for transportation routes.

As is reasonable to expect, the capitals of most countries can be associated with the core areas. By reason of this adherence to tradition, it is difficult to identify any pattern as to the placement of capitals. Based on space relationships alone, Madrid, Budapest, Brussels, and Bangkok are well situated, for they are about equidistant from the more remote parts of their respective countries. But many capitals off center from the standpoint of distances to various points in the country have excellent locations in other respects. Some capital are port cities, giving them an advantage in international commerce (Buenos Aires, Lisbon, Rangoon); others, in tropical latitudes, are high on plateaus because of a more salubrious climate (Mexico City, Bogotá); and still others have been selected for some reason which at the time was logical only by being politically strategic (Berlin for its central location, Ottawa at the junction between English and French settlement in Canada, and New Delhi to centralize British power in the Indian Empire). In the same vein the original site of Washington on the banks of the Potomac was selected to place it midway between the northern and southern states. If it were to be moved to the geographical center of the country in Kansas, the site would be more remote from most of the major population and commercial centers of the country than is now the case.

Capitals can be moved from place to place at the will of the political regime in power. Leningrad, Chungking, Nanking, and Kyoto have all been full-fledged capitals of their states. New national capitals which

have appeared on the horizon within the last decade include Bonn, Pyongyang, Taipei, Hanoi, and Khartoum. Some states have a secondary capital, or one which assumes some of the state's administrative functions (Sucre in Bolivia, The Hague in the Netherlands, and Dacca in East Pakistan).

**POLITICAL-ADMINISTRATIVE SUBDIVISIONS**—For effective internal political control all states but the very smallest must be broken down into administrative subdivisions. Typically, these secondary political areas are unitary in the regime of the country. France is made up of ninety *departments*; Spain, of fifty *provinces*, and Japan (exclusive of Hokkaido), of forty-six *prefectures*. In each case authority stems from the central government and is delegated only for matters of local administration. In turn, these subdivisions may be further broken down into second-order, third-order, and even fourth-order civil units.

A few states are subdivided into federal political areas, each of which exerts authority amounting to limited autonomy. The states of the United States, the cantons of Switzerland, and Soviet Socialist republics of the Soviet Union represent such internal administrative areas. Certain regulations and taxes likely to be uniform throughout all subdivisions of unitary countries may vary from state to state, from canton to canton, or from republic to republic in these three nations.

In the United Kingdom are found internal divisions with varying amounts of autonomy: England, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, and the Isle of Man. Northern Ireland, for example, has its own parliament, survey, and government printing office and handles other functions normally reserved for the central government. However, it has no voice in foreign relations and uses the same money and postage stamps as Great Britain. Within Great Britain and Northern Ireland

there are counties which carry on purely local administrative functions.

Modern-day requirements for administering a country are so complex that specialized functional areas are set up to handle many activities of more than routine importance. Usually these amount to regions within a country that coincide with a bloc of secondary civil divisions or a geographic region: Town and Country Planning Administration in Great Britain, Military Districts in France, Tennessee Valley Authority in the United States.

**BOUNDARIES**—International boundaries assume a major role in global politics. They are the attempt of man to mark off on the land or in the water the specific line where, other than along sea coasts, the sovereignty of one state terminates and that of another starts. In a sense, then, international boundaries are property lines drawn on a world scale. Some of them endure for centuries (Spanish-Portuguese); others are highly unstable (Balkan states). Once established, boundaries are ordinarily altered only in one of the following three ways: First, there may be an exchange of territory between two states or cession of an area from one state to another in exchange for some other concession. Second, and most common, new boundaries appear, are shifted, or disappear in accordance with conditions set forth in peace treaties resulting from armed conflict or as territory is annexed as the outcome of war. Third, partition of a political area may bring about new boundaries—two states occupying territory where before only one existed.

*Types of Boundaries.* Boundaries may be layed down on the surface of the earth to coincide with some physical feature, or they may be quite independent of the natural landscape. In the physical category, boundaries may follow mountain crests (Andes between Argentina and Chile), water divides (Orinoco and Amazon basins separating

Venezuela and Brazil), or even contours (slopes above Gatun Lake between Canal Zone and the Republic of Panama). Water, too, serves as a physical criterion for the determination of boundaries. Rivers are the most commonly used hydrographic feature (Rhine between France and Germany, Rio Grande between the United States and Mexico, Yalu between China and North Korea). It is questionable, however, whether or not rivers make good boundaries, for a river valley tends to have a unifying, rather than a divisive, effect in cultural development. In some instances lakes may form boundaries between political areas (Great Lakes between the United States and Canada, Lake Geneva between France and Switzerland). The exact trace of a line in the water, either river or lake, is subject to some arbitrary decision.<sup>8</sup>

Boundaries of an arbitrary nature frequently follow the coordinates of lines of latitude or longitude or form angles to them. This type is usually referred to as "straight line" or "mathematical" boundaries—easy to determine on a map. One finds numerous examples of such boundaries in the desert regions of Africa and Southwest Asia. The United States also has long stretches of mathematical boundaries in common with both Canada and Mexico.

Arbitrarily drawn, but quite different from mathematical boundaries, are those which are classed as cultural and attempt to segregate ethnic groups into countries in which they belong or are alleged to belong. Religion, nationality, language, history, and

group economy have all been issues at stake at one time or another and not always with outcomes marked with success. Europe and Asia both have many cultural boundaries (among the Balkans and countries of Central Europe, between Ireland and Northern Ireland, between Israel and Jordan, between India and Pakistan). It is significant to note that in southeastern Europe many culturally drawn boundaries have, even in the twentieth century, ceased to exist.

*Functions of Boundaries.* Boundaries perform negative rather than positive functions in that they restrict the movement of people, goods, and even ideas from one state to another. The amount of restriction may be low, as between adjoining countries within the same economic union. It is very high between the countries of the Western World and those of the Soviet bloc, where personal travel and trade may approach zero. In some instances great hardship is wrought on a population by harsh border regulations. After partition India and Pakistan closed the new boundary between them so effectively that it was not uncommon for members of the same family to remain separated by it for years.

Unfortunately, the restriction on movement of goods from one state to another places a handicap on any semblance of optimum world economy. Tariffs, some of them formidable, are erected by states wishing to protect national industries and prevent an outward flow of credit. Likewise, foreign policies dictated by overzealous nationalism tend to build boundaries into barrier-like walls. The results must obviously be the stifling of trade and the lowering of the standard of living. It is both paradoxical and ironical that the development of better transportation facilities and improved mediums for exchange of cultural and scientific attainment should go hand in hand with ever greater international travel restrictions

<sup>8</sup> The whole question of water boundaries is extremely complex, and the interested student is recommended to refer to one or more of several excellent works on the problem. Among these are S. Whitteman Boggs, *International Boundaries, A Study of Boundary Functions and Problems* (Columbia University Press, 1940), and Stephen B. Jones, *Boundary-Making, a Handbook for Statesmen, Treaty Editors and Boundary Commissioners* (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1945).

and in an increasing maze of red tape in the customs sheds.

## DEPENDENT AREAS

Colonial empires as a political-administrative type of territorial control are by no means new. Colonies of Phoenicia, Carthage, Greece, and Rome were scattered far and wide throughout the ancient world. Only after the opening of the age of exploration in the fifteenth century, however, did empire building reach global proportions. European countries on the Atlantic littoral succeeded, in ever-increasing orbits, to parcel off much of Asia and all or nearly all of Africa, Oceania, and the Americas as part of their realms. Spain and Portugal, which were the first European countries to aspire to overseas colonies, at one point in history divided the whole of the New World between them.

But to be a colony does not necessarily mean to remain one. There has been a strong tendency, especially in the last century and a half, for dependent areas to develop politically to the point where ties with the mother country are broken and the dependencies become sovereign states in their own right. This experience was shared by every one of the twenty-two states in the Western Hemisphere.

On the eve of World II there were still twelve states holding possessions of considerable extent beyond the borders of the sovereign state: Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Denmark, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. The colonial regions were largely limited to Africa, the southern periphery of Asia, including the Malay Archipelago, the Caribbean area, and islands scattered throughout the world. But post-war developments are taking heavy toll in the areal extent of these dependent areas. New states appearing in Southern Asia and

in Africa are rapidly breaking down the old colonial regimes. The recent disappearance of the Indian Empire and the Dutch East Indies from the map as dependencies were undoubtedly the greatest single changes, giving approximately one fifth of the world's people freedom from overseas control.

The actual day of independence may come about in a number of ways, ranging from bloody revolutions to guidance by the mother country in the ways of statecraft. There is an increasing tendency, however, for states to encourage self-rule for those dependencies thought to be sufficiently mature politically (Philippines, various member nations of the British Commonwealth).

**STATE VERSUS DEPENDENT AREA**—The dependent area is essentially a detached portion of the state which controls it. It is territory acquired by the mother state through conquest or some other means. The exact status of dependent areas in relation to the mother state may vary from empire to empire, but this status—in theory at least—is determined within the state itself. Some, or all, of the residents are citizens of the mother state. For example, to be a citizen of Puerto Rico is also to be a citizen of the United States.

Despite the political limitations that may be placed on a dependency, it must be regarded as a separate political area. It is comprised of a unique portion of the earth's surface and possesses its own locational features, physical landscape, and natural resources. Although the broad features of economic development are determined by the mother state, the dependent area has its own economic pattern. Patterns of ethnic distribution tend to be less distinguishable in dependent areas than in sovereign states and rarely bear any relationship to the shape of the dependency. Control from without rather than from within usually prevents a full-scale social adjustment in the colonial

area. Each dependency has characteristic developmental and political-administrative features, but their significance to the political structure is less than in the case of a state. Any importance that a colonial capital might have would naturally be overshadowed by the capital of the mother state. Nonetheless, all but the smallest and most backward of dependencies display a suf-

ficient number of the characteristics peculiar to independent political areas to serve as a training ground for self-government. Whether the peoples of such areas can seek and obtain their independence successfully is very possibly a question so steeped in human qualities, abilities, and frailties that at best its resolution can only be conjectured by the geopolitician.

### Study Questions

1. In what way is the political area unique among geographic regions?
2. Why might it be difficult to decide whether or not a particular political area is a sovereign state?
3. List several ways in which the states of the world may be classified. Why is no method completely satisfactory?
4. What are the unifying factors among the states of (a) the Arab League, (b) the Pan American Union, and (c) the Soviet bloc?
5. Why is it impossible to measure the "position" of a political area?
6. Why did the shape of a political area mean more a hundred years ago than it does now?
7. List a number of individual geographic factors found in the natural setting of the political area.
8. What is the difference between a broad application and a narrow, or conventional, application of the term "natural resources"?
9. Why does a country that is strong economically tend also to be strong politically?
10. Why may census statistics of a country be considered as "a dead thing"?
11. What four ethnic characteristics are usually associated with a geopolitical evaluation of a political area?
12. Compare the *core area* of a state with its *ecumene*.
13. What is the meaning of a "federal political" subdivision in a state? Give examples.
14. List several types of boundaries, and give one or more examples of each.
15. In what ways are dependent areas similar to independent states? In what ways are they different?



## CHAPTER FOUR

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# *Population Factors in International Affairs*

The dynamic nature of the world's population is basic to the problems of political geography. The number of people in any region rarely remains static; even though most of the world's population will be born, grow up, work, and die within the same political unit, a certain proportion, as a result of wars, famines, or the drive toward improved living conditions, will migrate to other areas, often giving rise to various types of international problems. Likewise, the changing composition of those more or less stationary population groups may be related to nationalistic tendencies, which stimulate international friction. Consequently, since variations exist in the characteristics of population from place to place throughout the world, and changes occur constantly, the study of global population is a pressing and ever-continuous responsibility of students of international affairs.

### WORLD POPULATION AS A DYNAMIC FACTOR

The world at present holds in excess of 2,500,000,000 inhabitants. If each person were allowed standing room ( $1\frac{1}{2}$  by 2 feet), the earth's total population could be assembled in an area less than one fifth the size of Rhode Island. Actually, however, the preponderant number of people are widely scattered throughout the land hemisphere<sup>1</sup> with densities ranging from less than one person in several hundred miles in large areas of Siberia, the Amazon Basin, the Sahara, and Australia, to the more than 600 persons per square mile in the urbanized industrial areas

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<sup>1</sup> The land hemisphere is the half of the earth's surface that includes the greatest area of land, comprising eighty-eight per cent of the land area and approximately ninety-five per cent of the world's population.

of the United States and Europe, in the agricultural areas of the Monsoon basins and valleys of Southeast and Eastern Asia, and in the Nile Valley of Egypt. These more than 2,500,000,000 persons are living under the jurisdiction of approximately eighty-four sovereign states. As a result of the shrinking linear dimensions of an air-age world, which has brought increased political contacts among national entities,<sup>2</sup> more people are brought into direct relationship with one another—a factor developing even further the interdependence of the world population groups.

The varied characteristics of the world's population create an outstanding problem and at the same time account for much of the interdependence that exists among some regions. The cultural background of any two groups of people may complement one another to the benefit of all mankind and especially of each other. On the other hand, the two groups may conflict with each other and consequently create friction that could result in serious diplomatic repercussions and even military action if not settled by peaceful compromise. Thus, variations in demographic structure and trends are closely related to international political problems.

World developments are able to alter the population structure and characteristics within any area or region of the earth's surface. For example, migrations may alter the ethnic composition of the population. Also, economic well-being may favor improved health and sanitation conditions that lower death rates and perhaps—although not always—reduce birth rates, thus causing a change in the age structure of the population and in the number of males in relation to the number of females. Again, variations in the way that people make a living may change the rural-urban ratio, which in turn reflects varia-

tions in the occupational patterns of a country.

Hypothetical estimates of population growth made several years ago by the Office of Population Research of Princeton University indicate a world total for the year 2000 of 3,300,000,000 people. The scholars of this office believed this projected evaluation conservative; it was based on an assumption of an accelerated growth between 1940 and 1970 and a sharp curtailment after the latter date. Of this hypothetical world total, approximately 1,900,000,000 people would be in Asia. The North American figure of 176,000,000 was in decided contrast to the vast increase projected for Asia, as was also the figure of 21,000,000 for Oceania. Some increase was assumed beyond 1970, granting a more widespread diffusion of the European and American demographic pattern through Asia. Today population estimates probably are as accurate as any predictions concerning the future generation because the next adult generation has already been born and will be the group to produce the oncoming generation.<sup>3</sup>

As of 1956 the world's population was increasing by approximately 80,000 persons per day. According to this absolute increase alone, the world's population would be close to 4,000,000,000 by the year 2000. With the ever-increasing life span and with lower infant mortality rates, even this larger forecast may well be an underestimation. Population numbers alone reflect ever-changing situations. The population of the United States in 1950, for example, was far greater than the projections for that year which were made in 1940, based on trends between 1930 and 1940.

In analyzing population growth and the capacity of an area to support greater num-

<sup>2</sup> There are more than 150 separate political entities in the world, although not all can be considered independent states.

<sup>3</sup> The most recent data on population trends is supplied by the United Nations Population Branch for regional forecasts to 1980. Asian and Latin American increases are of great significance.

bers at fairly high standards of living, consideration must generally be given to increased agricultural productivity, state of industrial growth, improvement in sanitation and health conditions, more and better transportation facilities, and the possibility of greater specialization in production. In other words, can low levels in living standards be raised, either through more scientific utilization of the resources of the area or through the development of specialization and exchange in trade with other areas?

In any case, even though there is a controversial issue involved, the world as a whole does not seem to be in any immediate danger of becoming overpopulated.<sup>4</sup> The problem essentially is one of enabling the world's population to live and work together in closer harmony, and at the same time of raising standards of living in underdeveloped areas of the world.

**PRESENT RATES OF GROWTH**—The world's population has an absolute increase of between 30,000,000 and 35,000,000 persons each year. This figure is equal to approximately the population of Mexico or of Spain or the combined population of the states of New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey. Some students have estimated that the world population has a net increase of 1.16 per cent each year; others assume a lesser rate. In light of international crises and concern about future stability and peace, present rates of growth and their variations from country to country have received increasing attention in recent years.

*Regions and Countries with Declining Rates of Growth.* Although practically all regions of the world have felt the population increase of the last three centuries, the rates of growth, nevertheless, have varied from place

to place and from time to time. As an example, the continent of Europe has provided immigrants for large areas in the Americas and in Oceania; yet much of Europe today is characterized by declining rates of population growth. Western Europe, while undergoing industrialization and urbanization—the test of modern civilization—first experienced a lowering of death rates; later, as a small-family pattern replaced the large-family pattern essential to group survival in the subsistent agrarian economies of the ancient and medieval worlds, birth rates likewise began to decline. Before World War II much of northwestern and Central Europe was not permanently replacing its existing population.

This demographic transition from high-mortality and high-fertility rates to low-mortality and low-fertility rates occurred first in the industrially advanced countries of Western civilization. As the transition progresses, slow growth, relative stability, and eventual decline replace rapid rates of population increase characteristic of the early period of modernization. The sequence in this demographic transition advanced noticeably in all of Europe except the extreme south and east. The same trend also took place in the United States and Canada, in Australia and New Zealand, and in the Union of South Africa—countries of special interest to an Anglo-American world position but including only a small portion of the world's population.

Many areas of the world will continue to experience a rise in population numbers for at least another generation or so and may then show tendencies to change from a high-fertility rate to a low-fertility rate. Such areas are the USSR, Japan, Eastern and southern Europe, and parts of Latin America. Approximately a fifth of the world's population now lives in these areas.

Thus, areas having less than two fifths of the world's population showed a decline in fertility, or a tendency toward a decline,

<sup>4</sup> States have used overpopulation as a weapon in justification of their drive toward empire building. Germany, Italy, and Japan did so in the 1930's. There is, however, no scientific definition of what constitutes overpopulation.

during the 1930's and 1940's which may indicate a definite slackening of population growth. All such areas except Japan and Soviet Asia are in Europe, the Western Hemisphere, and Oceania, and for the most part they are already industrialized and urbanized or are in the process of becoming modernized. In more recent years, however, increased rates of growth have indicated a continuing population increase in the various areas mentioned above.

*Regions of High Potential Growth.* The vast regions of Asia and Africa, given proper development of their resources—both material and human—show strong possibilities for further growth. In size Soviet Asia, China, and India outrank other nations in Asia. India and Java have already added vast numbers to their populations in recent decades. Although census and vital statistics data are inadequate or completely lacking for many areas of Asia, it is estimated that the population of the continent increased about thirty per cent, or more than 250,000,000, in the interval from 1900 to 1940. The absolute increase of 50,000,000 for pre-partition India from 1931 to 1941 is large, but because of the huge size of the base population it is not an excessive average annual percentage rate of growth. Actually the rate itself is slightly less than that of the United States. Africa with its rich resources is estimated as able to support an increasing population for a number of years.

Problems of human fertility and mortality are related to the capacity of regions and nations to support a settled population. Naturally in our times most people desire to live long and to enjoy the amenities of life. If more people live longer, however, even with no change in the birth rates, there will be more people in the world. Any attempt to estimate the maximum number of people a given area can support at certain accepted standards, therefore, must take into consideration the levels of fertility and mortality,

the patterns of migration, the natural resources to be utilized, and the prevailing pattern of living conditions

**PAST RATES OF GROWTH**—In 1650 the world's population totaled only about 500,000,000 persons. The present population of more than 2,500,000,000 represents an increase of 400 per cent in approximately 300 years (see table on page 47). Prior to 1650 the many famines, plagues, and public disorders tending to accelerate death rates led to slow and irregular population increases. With the development of applied sciences after 1800, improved medical care, better diet, and improved hospitalization made life more secure; children and adults lived longer, and the world's population in absolute numbers increased enormously. It must be recognized, however, that early population estimates may have been underenumerated; and if such an error exists, the actual increases have been less than they are believed to be.

Between 1650 to 1850 the population of the world more than doubled, at the later date the total had attained a figure of more than a billion persons. In the last hundred years the population has again doubled, the actual increase being well in excess of a billion. Between 1800 and 1900 it has been estimated that this increase was greater among the Europeans than among the Asians, so that the number of Europeans grew from a fifth of the world total to about a third, with the number of Asians changing from two thirds to about a half of the world total. In the light of the growth of population in the past, this change in relative numbers alone may indicate shifts in the dominance of national powers within the world picture. It must be recognized that rates of growth may reflect as well as determine certain national policies. For example, European migrations to frontier and colonial areas during this period, which favored large families in the rural type of economy, led to

a large natural increase and thus a high rate of growth in the new settlements abroad. Famine and disease—two major factors in growth limitations—have not been so common in Western rural areas during the last

a hundred years or more. Population in those areas is densely distributed, fertility is high, and, with variations, mortality is high. The presence or absence of growth depends on the state of political order, the

### Estimated Population in Each Continent, 1650–1950

(In Millions)

(Figures in parentheses show percentage distribution of world population)

Continent	1650 <sup>a</sup>	1700	1750	1800	1850	1900	1940	Mid-1950
World total	545 (100%)	623 (100%)	728 (100%)	906 (100%)	1,171 (100%)	1,608 (100%)	2,170 (100%)	2,400 (100%)
North America	1 (0.2)	1 (0.2)	1 (0.1)	6 (0.7)	26 (2.3)	81 (5.1)	143 (6.6)	166 (6.9)
Middle America	6 (1.1)	6 (1.0)	5 (0.7)	10 (1.1)	13 (1.1)	25 (1.6)	42 (1.9)	51 (2.1)
South America	6 (1.1)	6 (1.0)	6 (0.8)	9 (1.0)	20 (1.7)	38 (2.3)	89 (4.1)	111 (4.6)
Europe	100 (18.3)	110 (17.7)	140 (19.2)	187 (20.7)	266 (22.7)	401 (24.9)	543 (25.0)	559 (23.3)
Asia	330 (60.6)	400 (64.2)	479 (65.8)	602 (66.4)	749 (63.9)	937 (58.3)	1,186 (54.7)	1,302 (54.3)
Africa	100 (18.3)	98 (15.7)	95 (13.1)	90 (9.9)	95 (8.1)	120 (7.4)	157 (7.2)	198 (8.3)
Oceania	2 (0.4)	2 (0.3)	2 (0.3)	2 (0.3)	2 (0.2)	6 (0.4)	11 (0.5)	13 (0.5)

SOURCE. Above table taken from W. S. and E. S. Woytinsky, *World Population and Production. Trends and Outlook* (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1953)

<sup>a</sup> For 1650 and 1750–1900, estimates of Carr-Saunders, with segregation of the data for Mexico and the Caribbean, according to the original estimate of Wilcox, for 1700, figures interpolated on basis of data for 1650 and 1750, for 1940, pp 12–23, *Statistical Year-Book, 1942–44, Population and Vital Statistics Reports*, July, 1951, p 1. The population of the USSR in 1940 and 1950 has been distributed between Europe and Asia, counting 30,000,000 for the Asiatic part of the USSR and the rest for the European part.

century as they have in India and China. In many Asian areas the development of modern transportation is contributing to a rapid growth in numbers by alleviating famine conditions, with a resultant lowering of mortality, especially among infants.

Many factors are involved in the development of population trends. In the areas of dense population, such as India, Java, Formosa, Korea, Egypt, and the Caribbean, the colonial type of economy has prevailed for

abundance of food, and the incidence of epidemic diseases. On the other hand, in such regions as parts of Central and South America and Central Africa, population growth has been slow, and the areas have remained sparsely populated in comparison with the Nile Valley and the river regions of Asia.

**FUTURE POPULATIONS**—How large a population can the world hold? Though no scientific answer can be offered, much has been

written on the subject and estimates have been made.<sup>5</sup> Among the writers, Thomas R. Malthus, an English scholar (1766-1834), gained considerable renown for his writings on the relationship between population growth and food supply. On the basis of his studies Malthus gloomily predicted that since population increases at a greater rate than the means of sustenance, mankind is doomed to live in poverty. While the dire predictions of the Malthusian theory have not materialized in all cases, it is still a valid hypothesis for many of the crowded areas of south and east Asia.


A number of factors such as future population estimates and the carrying capacity of land are involved in the problem of population potentials. More than half of the world's population is still subject to high birth and death rates, and the areas in which population growth is limited primarily by high death rates differ widely from one another in present densities of population and potential carrying capacity. Theoretical future populations can be determined by projecting past rates of growth and present trends into the future on the basis of some assumption as to patterns of change. In determining the potential carrying capacity of a region, the type of the present economy, the agricultural pattern, the modernization and urbanization pattern (wherein the population is capable of buying items from other regions), and the interregional and international trade factors must all be taken into consideration. In addition, religious and social factors, standards of living, and health conditions all must be considered in establishing population potentials. Consequently,

<sup>5</sup> Some of the more prominent of recent investigations of demographic problems are. Marston Bates, *The Prevalence of People* (Scribner, 1955); Fairfield Osborn, *The Limits of the Earth* (Little, Brown, 1953); Sir Edward John Russell, *World Population and World Food Supplies* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1954); Karl Sax, *Standing Room Only: The Challenge of Overpopulation* (Beacon Press, 1955).

any figure given as a future population must be considered relatively and only for comparison with other areas, rather than as an absolute figure for any single country or region.

#### NATIONAL GREATNESS IN TERMS OF MANPOWER

Population numbers and manpower are not always synonymous. Nevertheless, the military strength of nations is usually related to the size and composition of the population. More important, however, is the effective



organization of the population and the technical skills developed by them. Contrast Japan and its 73,000,000 persons with China and its 450,000,000 in the long years of bitter conflict from 1931 to 1945. More people might make Australia stronger economically and politically; whereas fewer people might have made India stronger, potentially, if not actually, and would have given the country a larger voice in world affairs at a much earlier date. Population numbers alone certainly have not been the basis of the world position of Great Britain as the center of one of the most powerful empires. On the

other hand, approximately the same number of people in Brazil have not achieved an economic or political power even approaching that of the United Kingdom.

Why do numbers alone mean so little in determining political and economic power? All populations of the world must secure for themselves the essentials of living, namely, food, clothing, and shelter. In some countries all, or practically all, of the people are engaged in these activities related to mere subsistence. Consequently, such countries have little manpower or economic surplus to devote to the improvement of their levels of living through scientific or educational and personal-service pursuits. It is impossible to determine how many persons are engaged in producing only for their own countries, there is considerable variation from country to country in the proportion of the population thus engaged. In Western European countries approximately a fourth of the total population is engaged in production for national consumption, in contrast with two thirds in Eastern Europe.

Manpower is a significant factor in a study of peacetime as well as wartime economies. Countries producing a surplus of either essential or nonessential commodities can soon develop trade and become a source of commodities for countries not able to produce all that they need or desire. The fewer people required to produce for domestic use, the better chance any country has of acquiring a surplus of commodities for trading purposes. A survey of occupational groups, therefore, is important in studies of regional interdependence.

The most significant item with regard to the size of population is the way in which the people of various countries have developed available natural resources, whether within or outside the boundaries of their own countries. It is possible for small countries to develop high levels of living through the effective use of their national human and natural resources, and by the development

of favorable trade relations with other regions. Switzerland, for example, is a small country that has attained a significant position in the world group of nations. In some other countries, such as England, the Netherlands, and Belgium, the natural and human resources of relatively small countries have been supplemented by the utilization of the resources and manpower of empire areas much larger and more populous than the home countries.

#### DISTRIBUTION OF THE WORLD'S POPULATION

The world's population is distributed very unevenly throughout the countries of the world. A substantial proportion lives in areas with more than 600 persons per square mile; whereas approximately half of the total land area of the world (including ice-caps) is occupied by people in densities of less than one person per four square miles. Of tremendous significance is the fact that more than 1,250,000,000 people, or half of the world's total population, live in India, China, Japan, and the archipelagos southeast of Asia on about 8.7 per cent of the total land area of the earth.

About one seventh of the world's population lives in cities of 100,000 and over (see table on page 50). This urban population is far from uniformly distributed among the continental land masses. For example, only five per cent of the population of Africa is concentrated in large cities; whereas in the Americas approximately a third of the population is found in cities over 100,000. It is striking to note the high proportion of urban population occurring in Oceania, where forty-one per cent of the 14,500,000 people live in cities of 100,000 and over. This condition is partly due to the emphasis on overseas commercial activities in Australia and New Zealand and concentrations of population in port cities of these areas.

The continental distribution of the world's

population does not correlate with the size of continental areas. Africa with twenty per cent of the world's area has only eight per cent of the world population; whereas Europe with only three per cent of the area has sixteen per cent of the population. Asia with thirty per cent of the area has fifty-five per cent of the population, whereas the Americas with twenty-eight per cent of the area have only thirteen per cent of the total population. The Americas as a whole, when compared with Europe and Asia, are very sparsely populated.

Period in Which Present-day Urban Areas Reached  
100,000 Population

<i>Continent</i>	<i>Number of Cities by Continent</i>			<i>Total</i>
	<i>Before 1850</i>	<i>1850-1900</i>	<i>After 1900</i>	
Africa	3	2	21	26
Asia	42	45	150	237
Australia and Oceania	0	3	7	10
Europe	38	92	113	243
North America	8	34	91	133
South America	1	9	25	35
USSR	2	12	68	82
World (total)	94	197	475	766

SOURCE Above table based on Plate 33, compiled by the author for *Encyclopedia Britannica World Atlas*.

Within the continental areas, population concentrations reflect land use and industrial patterns and are closely related to the land-forms of mountains, plateaus, plains, and valleys. Climatic variations and soil differences are important factors in limiting population settlement. The population potential of regions—and thus of national entities—is a reflection of the present and potential carrying capacity of the areas in question. At any given standard of living an area favorable only for agricultural utilization cannot support as many people as one adapted to urban industrial development.

Many large areas, such as those found in Western Australia, are now considered un-

suitable for any intensive utilization. Such environmental limitations in the frontier areas of population settlement are uppermost in importance in analyzing the potential position of a country among the nations of the world. Thus, a comprehensive understanding of the densely and sparsely populated areas of the world provides a basis for the study of international problems.

**DENSELY POPULATED AREAS OF THE WORLD—**  
The largest areas of great population densities are located in Europe and Asia. Before World War II Europe, China, and India each had very roughly the same proportion of the world's population and of the land area. It must not be assumed, however, that their respective population problems have been the same. Although densities averaging 600 or more persons per square mile are to be found in the industrial areas of Northwest Europe, and in the lowland plains and valleys of China and India, these great densities are not confined to industrial areas alone. In Europe, excluding the USSR, over twenty-one per cent of the people live in cities of 100,000 and over; on the other hand, in India and China only about four per cent of the total population live in cities of this size. Europe's high density is primarily that of an urbanized industrial region, whereas the high densities of India and China are basically those of intensive agrarian economies.

In China the distribution of population is closely related to topography and climate. Large areas of China, such as rough hill land forty to fifty miles inland, are sparsely settled, and the areas of dense settlement are geographically localized. One Chinese population authority has even stated that approximately eighty-seven per cent of the area of China has less than thirty-five persons per square mile. There is also great diversity in the population density within the great agricultural producing areas of China. For example, in the country's Spring Wheat Region, where the conditions of climate, soil,



and topography are not so favorable for agriculture, the density is about 850 per square mile of crop area. On the other hand, in the Southwestern Rice Region the density runs as high as 2,500 per square mile of crop area. In extreme cases, such as in the Szechwan Basin between Chengtu and Chungking, the density runs as high as 4,000 in some localities, or more than six persons per acre! The greater density in the rice regions is the result of a climate favorable to rice production that supplies three times as much food per unit area as do the wheat region crops.

The total population of former undivided India,<sup>6</sup> with the enormous increase of as much as 50,000,000 in ten years, represented as many people as in all of Europe excluding the USSR. Approximately 200,000,000 people live in the densely populated Ganges-Punjab region, a concentration in which the density is more than 600 per square mile in widespread rural areas. This portion of India, a part of which is now shared with Pakistan, showed an increase in population of from twenty to twenty-five per cent in the decade 1931-40. In general, rice production throughout the subcontinent of India has failed to keep pace with population growth. Consequently, since rice imports go mainly to urban centers, the rural areas have of necessity had to lower per capita consumption of rice and turn to other foods. Crop failures have caused widespread famines, mitigated in recent years by imports of grains from the United States and elsewhere.

For the most part the island areas of the world have relatively large populations in proportion to their areas. The British Isles, with more than 53,000,000; the Japanese Islands, with 90,000,000, and the other islands of Asia and Oceania, with 190,000,000, together represent about one sixth of the total population of the world living on only about three per cent of the total land area.

Notable increases and concentrations of population are found in Southeast Asia, exemplified particularly by southern Burma, Java, Sumatra, southeastern Thailand, and the south peninsula of Celebes. In large measure the population concentrations in Monsoon Asia occur at elevations below 3,000 feet in areas having more than forty inches of rainfall annually and an average January temperature of not less than 32° F. The people are settled in the rice areas of the valley plains along the major rivers, in the deltas, or on other coastal plains.

#### SPARSELY POPULATED AREAS OF THE WORLD—

Approximately half of the land areas of the world have densities of less than one person per four square miles. The desert areas of Africa, Australia, and Arabia; the extreme wet areas of the Amazon Basin; much of Siberia, and the forests and tundra of northern Canada stand out on a population map as regions with relatively few people. Except in pastoral and nomad areas, the population concentrations seem to be localized on the best lands in the valleys or plains near transportation routes. Even in the vast areas of northern Siberia there has been, except in a few isolated cases, little spread of the population outward from the east-west Trans-Siberian Railway zone. In North America the distribution of population in the sparsely populated western and northwestern regions is largely in terms of transportation alignments. In general, the sparsely populated areas of the tropics are the extremely rainy areas and the extremely dry areas. Scattered population exists along the water or land transportation routes and in the oasis areas of the deserts.

CONTINENTAL PATTERNS—For the most part, the sparsely populated areas of the world are in the interiors of continental masses, and the coastal margins are more densely populated. Exceptions to this generalization are found on plateau areas at low latitudes where moderate temperatures prevail. These con-

<sup>6</sup> The population of India in 1941 was given as 389,000,000, including all the territory now comprising Pakistan.

tinental patterns may favor the desire of man to seek routes to other lands in the setting up of contacts and trade. Migrations and the dispersal of populations inland tend to follow rivers and natural routes over mountains which later may be followed by railways or highways. The tendency of populations to concentrate near the coast or in the low plains areas is indicated by the fact that a high proportion of the world's large cities are located at elevations below 1,600 feet.

The 209,000,000 people of Africa are widely distributed in densities varying from less than one in several hundred square miles in the Sahara to nearly 2,000 per square mile along the Nile in northern Egypt. The relatively dense areas of Nigeria and the adjoining coastal area with about 31,000,000 and the Lake Victoria area with approximately 15,000,000 stand out more significantly than that of South Africa with its better-known 13,000,000. The more than 22,000,000 people of North Africa form a regional concentration apart from the rest of the continent. In contrast with most of South America, the major proportion of the population south of the Sahara is not along the periphery. Contacts with the outside are thus more difficult and the transportation problems arising in moving goods and raw materials into the area or out of it are more pronounced.

#### SIGNIFICANCE OF POPULATION COMPOSITION

**DIFFERENCES AMONG ETHNIC GROUPS**—Many of the political problems of the world arise from variations in the composition of the world's population. Social and economic differences among the people of various regions are, in many cases, due in part to variations in religion, nationality, or occupation or even to age and sex differences within the various ethnic population groups. In view

of all of these demographic variations there is little wonder that conflicts arise among the peoples of the world.

*Races.* Much has been written concerning the political significance of the racial questions of the world. The term race, though difficult to define, denotes the biological divisions into which mankind is often grouped and on the basis of which social differentiations develop. Physical traits—shape of the skull, body structure, and skin color—form the basis of inherited traits in any scientific study of racial types. Mankind may be divided roughly into four broad color groups: yellow (Mongolian), white (Caucasian), black (Negro), and brown (Malayan). No nation contains pure racial strains; racial mixtures are the rule rather than the exception. This fact, however, has not deterred some nations from building policies on the basis of racial myths—such as the myth of Nordic supremacy in Nazi Germany.

On a world scale the white race, as defined above, comprises roughly three eighths of the world's population, but it has directly or indirectly controlled the greater portion of the world's people through a system of colonial rule and economic development. Apart from the question of the right or wrong of an "empire" policy, when racial hatreds become evident within intercolonial relations or among trading partners, they greatly influence the political policies of countries and endanger world peace.

*Religion.* Religion plays a significant role in modern society, and in many cases religion exerts a great influence upon the life and policies of a nation. As a component, religion can strengthen the basis of statehood; it also can be an international force. Most of the world's population can be grouped into broad religious patterns. The relative number of adherents in each of the major religious faiths is as follows:

Christian	800,000,000
Confucian and Taoist	350,000,000
Hindu	310,000,000
Moslem	322,000,000
Buddhist	150,000,000
Shintoist	30,000,000
Jewish	12,000,000
Primitive	121,000,000

Among these categories numerous sects and denominations give rise to religious differences, which greatly complicate an understanding of both international and national political problems

Religions in many lands have exercised a great influence upon the economic, social, and political life of the nation. In some societies religious taboos regarding marriage and family relations have especially important demographic repercussions. Up to recent years under Hindu custom in India girls married around the age of fifteen, and many wives became widows in their twenties with no chance of remarrying, again because of the prevailing custom. Thus, without this arbitrary curtailment, India's rate of natural increase would have been even greater. Many actual practices and customs as favored or forbidden by religions are important factors in determining the rates of growth of population.

*Nationalities.* Nationality is another factor to be considered in the differentiation of ethnic composition among population groups. Common loyalty and allegiance to one country is the essence of nations. The place of birth generally determines nationality or citizenship, and the citizenship of the parents is often the nationality of the child. In many cases, nationality of population groups is one of the strongest political ties. It has important social and economic meaning and even may be a yardstick of class distinction in many communities. Often where people have migrated and settled in well-populated areas, they have remained as specific "alien groups." Such alien groups

may remain distinctly separate as minority groups, or they may become assimilated through intermarriage. Many of the problem areas of the world, especially those of Europe, exist in part because ethnic lines cut across political borders. In the main, these problems are more social and cultural than economic, for in prosperous times ethnic problems as such may disappear or at least become insignificant.

#### RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF OCCUPATION GROUPS

—One of the outstanding differentiations used in classifying the world's population is the grouping into urban and rural categories. Difficulties arise, however, in distinguishing urban from rural groupings because varying systems of population classification may be employed; towns of a certain size may be considered rural in one country and urban in another. Nevertheless, urban-rural comparisons are significant in relation to occupational groups, which in turn may be the significant feature of the economic position of a country. A country largely rural and agricultural in character holds a position or status in world affairs very different from that of a neighbor with a large industrial and urbanized population. The first tends to be a producer of raw materials and exhibits a low per capita income. Conversely, the other is a consumer of raw materials and a producer of finished products, both of which roles reflect national earning power.

As a country develops industrially and becomes more urban, its dependence on other regions also increases, and international problems multiply proportionally. Consequently, a study of the urban and rural relationships of the political entities of the world should reveal agricultural and industrial patterns. Some countries, especially the United States and the USSR, have both types of areas and possess an advantage in such a combination of economic activities within their borders. Other countries, such

as the United Kingdom and Belgium, that are predominantly industrial have, in the past, developed large empires and thus have had political and economic control over both industrial and agrarian areas. Since World War II many of these colonial areas have been granted, or are in process of being granted, political independence. Certain economic ties between the mother country and the new state are usually worked out to ensure continued cooperation.

Closely related to an increasing urban proportion in the total population of countries are the trends in the rates of natural increase. As a normal pattern, death rates tend to decline first; then, with somewhat of a lag, birth rates tend to decline. For cultural, social, and economic reasons fewer births per 1,000 persons in the reproductive ages generally occur among urban populations than among rural populations. In post-World War II years, however, some increases in birth rates have occurred among the urban groups, especially within higher-income groups. In turn, these tendencies affect the natural increase of the country as a whole, augmenting the absolute numbers of the population, present and future.

Some countries, largely agricultural in character, have developed a relatively large urban population. Oceania, including Australia and New Zealand, which has about forty-seven per cent of its people in cities of 20,000 and over, and Uruguay, which has forty-two per cent, hold significant positions as exporters of agricultural raw materials. In recent years the larger urban centers have shown increases comparable with those in the cities of countries that have much larger populations. Such cities as Melbourne, Sydney, and Montevideo rank high among the large city areas of the world.

**RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF AGE AND SEX GROUPS**—In describing the population of any political unit, an important consideration is its breakdown into age and sex groups. The

national significance of such an analysis is threefold. First, the entire population of any country cannot be considered as the working group. The fifteen to sixty-five age group, especially of males, indicates the manpower available to develop and utilize the resources of an area. Second, age groups by sex indicate the portion of the population in the reproductive age groups, upon which birth rates depend. Third, in time of either war or peace, the age groups by sex indicate the potential military manpower available for wartime service.

Sex ratios, or the number of men per 100 women, may vary in terms of rural and urban classifications and also in terms of the type of industry in cities. Women are commonly employed in textile and other light industries and men in heavy industry, such as iron and steel, or mining. Correlations often exist, therefore, among sex composition, rural-urban ratios, occupations, and the type of economy in an area.

**Working Groups.** As a basis of comparison, approximately three fifths of the world's population are engaged in the three types of subsistence occupation that provide food, clothing, and shelter. In countries such as India and China approximately three fourths of the population are so engaged. On the other hand, the United States and the countries of Western Europe have more than three fourths of their total population available for nonsubsistence occupations. In the latter countries, a higher degree of specialization and the advantages of industrialization account for a higher level of well-being and national prosperity than is found in areas restricted to subsistence economies.

About a third of the total population of the United States is normally in the fifteen to sixty-five male age group. This group is the significant portion of the population, since the economic status of the country depends upon it. It is the segment of population engaged in the many productive occupations

supplying the essential needs of the population as well as the surplus that is essential to a highly developed exchange economy.

*Reproductive Groups.* In addition to economic and political implications, the relative proportions of a total population in the various age groups also affect rates of population growth. A large proportion of persons in the age group under fifteen years will mean a large number in the reproductive group in the next generation. The absolute numbers of youth represent the manpower of the next generation. Education of this group in the fashion of Nazi Germany and Communist Russia would have great political import. A youthful population, such as that of the USSR, assures a country adequate manpower, probably for several generations in the future. On the other hand, a higher proportion of the population in the upper age groups, as found in France, Sweden, and England, presents a different picture, involving a series of internal economic and social problems. The economic and cultural patterns that affect the size of family also limit the number of children born among the younger age groups. Pre-World War II Germany, Italy, and Japan attempted to raise birth rates through national policies in order to encourage a continued growth for an assured reproductive group and for the maintenance of future manpower for both labor and military service.

## POPULATION POLICIES AND CONTROLS

*POLICIES REGARDING INTERNATIONAL MIGRATIONS*—The movement of people across international frontiers has occurred, in various degrees, throughout the history of mankind. As a rule, however, social, economic, and political forces combine to limit the scope of mass movements of people for purposes of permanent settlement. On the whole, modern nations tend to restrict immigration as a matter of national policy. After World War

I the United States adopted a restrictive immigration policy under which foreigners are carefully classified as to country of origin and the maximum number of immigrants is limited at about 150,000 per annum.

World War II and subsequent political upheavals have had lasting effects upon millions of lives in Europe and Asia, although these results have usually been restricted within certain political areas. The plight of the Jews under Nazi rule in Germany, the displacement of Germans in East Europe, and the flood of refugees from Communist countries after the war—all illustrate the magnitude of postwar relocation and reconstruction. On the borders of the new state of Israel some 900,000 Arab refugees are subsisting under United Nations' relief projects. Farther east, the partition of India led to mass violence and untold loss of life and property and created huge camps of persons forced to take up residence in a land new to them. The problem of displaced persons and refugees has by no means ended, though the impact of forced migrations has been mitigated as a result of international action and cooperation under the aegis of the United Nations.

*Economic Limitations.* It generally has been true that unsatisfactory economic conditions force people to leave their homeland and seek better living conditions elsewhere. Often, however, these same conditions may, in certain circumstances, prevent the desired migration. It is no small matter for families to pull up roots, break strong ties, and set out for unknown lands. In many instances economic handicaps are overcome when part of a family migrates first and then sends remittances so that relatives may follow. On the other hand, forced migrations resulting from World War II gave little consideration to economics or family conditions.

In some cases subsidized resettlement programs have been developed in order to attract labor or occupational groups. For ex-

ample, the Matanuska Valley Project was developed in Alaska during the depression in the 1930's in order to attract settlers. For some years Australia has been interested in attracting new settlers, although admission qualifications limit persons to specified Caucasian extraction.

In many cases the mass transfer of peoples has been for the economic benefit of certain population groups. The importation of Negroes into the United States, although it created one of the most difficult social problems of the world, was a profit-dominated movement. The attraction of southern Europeans to northeastern United States for industrial labor contributed to the economic benefit of both employer and employee. It has been estimated that more than 60,000,000 Europeans migrated to other continents during the period between 1820 and 1930. Of these, approximately 38,000,000 came to the United States and settled permanently. Since 1953 the Refugee Relief Act has authorized 214,000 displaced persons to be admitted to the United States, one fourth of whom had entered by 1956. Financial responsibility through sponsorship by individuals who guaranteed to assist the "DP" to become established in his new home was required. Immigration into the United States still continues to be regulated under the quota system established by acts of Congress.

*Cultural Limitations.* Since the early 1920's the United States has had immigration quotas for most foreign national groups based on national origins and previous immigration figures. Restrictions on the immigration of Asiatics reflected the early fears of a "Yellow Peril."

Australia and New Zealand have maintained similar attitudes toward Chinese and Japanese immigration by favoring "White" immigrants, especially those of British extraction. Even with this policy of a "White Australia," about 70,000 migrants per year

are now sought, a number that would tend to establish a stationary population of from 8,000,000 to 9,000,000. Some Australians and New Zealanders, however, favor a more liberal immigration policy, which would lead to a white population of from 25,000,000 to 30,000,000.

In many areas another kind of limitation on migration arises from restrictions placed on the rights of alien residents. Many of these restrictions are real and legal in character; others are merely the results of racial or national prejudices. There are both cultural and economic limitations relating to employment and the choice of community in which the immigrants may work and live.

Through the agencies of the United Nations, international migration can become an international undertaking in accordance with policies determined in common by the countries involved. Recommendations concerning settlement of new lands, amount of state aid, and exchange of labor between countries have been formulated in United Nations studies. The Population Commission and the Trusteeship Council have worked on many such problems with varying degrees of success.

**POLICIES REGARDING INTERNAL MIGRATIONS—** Movement within the frontiers of a country is not new, but whether travel is by caravan or airliner, unrestricted internal migration is not possible. Such policies as the Homestead Act in the United States and the building of railroads into frontier areas, as exemplified in the Prairie Provinces of Canada, have stimulated internal migration where it was desirable and aided in the resettlement of agricultural persons. Shifts in the labor market, as well as state and local attitudes toward specific minority groups, may also stimulate movement from one area to another within the country. Policies of this type may be largely internal in origin but may nevertheless have an effect upon inter-

national migration if certain ethnic groups of foreign origin are favored by the provisions rather than others.

**POLICIES REGARDING NATURAL INCREASE—** Policies regarding natural population increase are concerned with birth rates, death rates, and health and sanitation conditions.

*Birth Rates.* The belief that countries should have population policies favoring growth is becoming increasingly prevalent. During the last generation declining birth rates in some nations were viewed with alarm. Population policies are not always formulated directly, and only rarely are they consciously planned by governments. For example, in China custom has long established the family as the basis of its social structure. The maintenance and strength of this institution are being tested in China under the pressures of modern industrialization and urbanization.

Traditionally, democratic states have left the determination of family size to the individual family rather than to any agency of the government. Higher taxes for bachelors and married couples without children may imply a policy favoring larger families; on the other hand, the effectiveness of low taxation as a stimulant to increase births is doubtful, since economically any reduction in taxes would not justify the added cost of maintaining additional members to the family.

Preference for certain standards of living and actual birth rates may be closely related. If additional children tend to lower the attainment of desired goals of life, many people would choose not to raise families. Thus, if a country practices a policy favoring manpower and population growth, subsidies may be given for large families. Experience with such subsidies in Western and southern European countries prior to World War II indicated that they had little influence on fertility. In Germany a comprehensive population policy did bring about some increase in the birth rates, but demographers

are still not agreed on whether the increase was due to economic inducements or to the psychological elements that accompanied Nazism and preparations for war. Witness, for example, the wartime increase in births in Great Britain and the United States without such a program of prizes or subsidies for big families.

The tremendous rise in world population, growing at a rate of 30,000,000 or more a year, has alarmed many demographers and students of international affairs. Consideration of the high birth rates in densely populated areas of low standards of living must be a part of any program designed to further the welfare of the world society. Controversies regarding birth control often involve strong religious and moral beliefs and also encounter wide ignorance of the basic facts of population pressure. Population growth is an upward trend, and policies regarding increase should be an essential part of the program of the United Nations and its member states. Famines and high death rates are not humane methods by which to limit net national increase. Control of birth rates probably is necessary in many populated areas of the world.

*Death Rates.* A study of population growth—natural increase plus net migration—is concerned primarily with birth rates. Although most discussions of population policies in Europe and America emphasize fertility, it is important also to consider death rates. In areas of population pressure, death rates ordinarily can be lowered more easily than birth rates. The prolongation of life is of great personal interest to all individuals. Policies providing for old-age security and greater medical care improve national well-being and create conditions conducive for world cooperation. A decrease in rate of infant mortality naturally increases the rate of population growth without any change in the birth rate. Consequently, policies regarding mortality conditions, although usu-

ally associated with humanitarian ideals, must be related to population potentials. Life expectancy throughout the world is increasing as death rates decline. Declining death rates, in turn, increase the net rate of population growth and in many areas aggravate the problems of population pressure.

*Improvement of Health and Sanitation Conditions.* International programs can do much to improve health and sanitation methods, especially in the backward areas of the world. Population policies dealing with birth and death rates are linked with the level of health and sanitation. The 950,000,000 people of India and China need outside assistance in improving their living standards. Such areas would be markedly benefited by better health standards and could raise their total national production if the working population suffered less from ill health and low vitality. Better use of their resources could well increase the size of the domestic market and account for the development of domestically produced manufactured goods, which in turn might reach other countries and, as a result, strengthen international relations.

The span of life expectancy is a good index to a nation's well-being. The expectation of life at birth always has been high in New Zealand, and today it is more than sixty-five years for both men and women. In the United States life expectancy at birth has risen to sixty-eight and in the United Kingdom to sixty-five. In India, on the contrary,

the expectation of life at birth is still only about thirty years. All these factors point to the vital significance of population problems for consideration at future meetings of the United Nations Population Commission.

**UNITED NATIONS PROGRAM OF POPULATION ANALYSIS**—The United Nations, through the work of the Secretariat and also through its various specialized agencies, has done much to highlight the population problems of the world. Census work for the year 1950 in many areas of the world has been carried out in accordance with standards and procedures set by the United Nations. The analyses of these data and those to be supplied by member nations in the 1960 census enumeration will result in the compilation of basic information needed for study of economic, social, and cultural problems. The Conference on Population at Rome in 1954 was only a beginning in a program of international cooperation in the study of demographic problems. The publication of demographic data by the United Nations provides information otherwise unavailable on a world-wide and relatively uniform basis. Prior to these publications such information, if published, was available only in scattered sources and published in the native language of the countries concerned. Continued cooperation in the taking of censuses and in the uniform and systematic reporting of the results is desirable among all countries of the world. The projection of population figures based on the period 1950–80 are the most complete yet to be tabulated.

### Study Questions

1. How are population estimates computed?
2. What factors should be considered in discussing the population-supporting capacity of nations?
3. Discuss the factor of national greatness in terms of absolute numbers of population.
4. Discuss the relationship between industrialization and population growth.
5. Where are the areas of great potential growth? How do these areas rank in world leadership today?
6. Why cannot a specific density of population



- be given as desirable for the total land surface of the world?
7. Should lack of population growth be considered an alarming condition? Why or why not?
  8. Where are the areas of declining rates of population growth? How do these areas rank among the important countries of the world?
  9. Why is the way in which an area is being utilized of greater significance than absolute population numbers?
  10. What are the limitations in regard to international migrations of population?
  11. Account for the mass migrations of people in the face of rigid immigration policies.
  12. Why are population projections into the future generation more sound than many other predictions?
  13. Why are studies of the ethnic composition of population so important in establishing a better understanding of the policies favoring permanent world peace?
  14. Should a world-wide policy be established in regard to immigration movements?
  15. What agency is providing the basic population data for study and analysis? Why is this possible?

## *International Tension*

In its broadest aspects international tension is essentially a geographic phenomenon. As such it is intimately associated with the earth, that is, the conduct and problems of the peoples who live on the earth and the material substances derived from it. International tension in its various forms and manifestations is created among the states of the world as they seek out positions which are advantageous to them. A state may stand alone in conducting any activities which cause international tension, or it may be involved either willingly or unwillingly as a member of a coalition engaging in such activities. In the final analysis, however, resolution of the problems created finds expression in geographic terms or solutions. To attempt to separate international tension from the broader interpretations of geography is to undertake a task which is clearly impossible.

With the recognition of the importance of geography in the life of the state, it is natural that the study of the causes and effects of international tension should be a matter of as great concern to geographers and

geopoliticians as to those scholars interested purely in an approach limited to the field of political science. Its study must be accomplished by a careful blending of political science and geography. Of necessity, we cannot examine international tension from the viewpoint of geography in its popular, restrictive sense, but must consider it in the light of geography in its many-faceted connotations—a science dealing with the earth, its life, its products, its inhabitants and their problems, and the maneuvers of man to achieve a desirable environment in which to live.

The study of international tension is concerned not merely with relations that may ultimately lead to war between nations; such a restrictive interpretation of the term excludes the greater number of international crises that confront the modern state. In the course of the twentieth century, solutions have been found for many of these problems without resorting to armed violence. To name even a few incidents points to rather remarkable changes in international politics: the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute of

1951, the incident of the Berlin blockade in 1948, and several aircraft incidents involving the United States and Soviet-controlled countries. All these issues, which, even a century or two ago, could have plunged nations into conflict, may be resolved today on a basis of law, order, and negotiation. It is true that the world has not resolved all situations without resort to armed conflict, but it has reduced considerably those tensions that tend to produce war.

The theory that international tension is created only because of issues of major importance in foreign policy is as untenable as the theory that all international tension foreshadows war. Although it would appear that major matters of foreign policy tend to produce a greater degree of international tension, it is also obvious that relatively minor questions can and do create friction between states. National pride, customs, tradition, and matters pertaining to sovereignty are capable of causing serious rifts that lead to strained relations but seldom to war.

International tension, therefore, may be defined, and will be so considered for purposes of this chapter, as a *condition in the relations between two or more states that could result in a straining or a rupture of the friendly relations normally existing between them.*

The question is frequently posed as to why international tension is regarded by some as a necessary evil. The answer is that so long as there are nations separated by differences of language, customs, religion, and political ideologies, as well as by physical and economic differences, there will be international tensions. Not all members of a family nor people in a given community think or react in unison even when they possess the most intimate ties or the strongest of common interests. And these differences in approach and reaction, when translated into international terms, where cultural, geographic, political, and economic factors create even

greater divergence of interest, are intensified manifold.

The question of power is omnipresent in all aspects of international tension, even though the manifestations may appear superficially to bear no relation to power. This underlying relationship should become apparent from a brief examination of the power concept.

### POWER CONCEPT

All states, large or small, rich or poor, utilize power in its various manifestations as an obvious mark of their importance in the international arena. As the term is used here, power means the attempt of one state to dominate or subject to its will another state. Without power a state tends to be a nonentity and at best plays a minor role in world affairs. In the field of power politics a weak country may disappear as a political entity; its lands and people may be merged into the area and population of a larger neighbor, and its customs, traditions, and even its language may cease to exist. The fate of Poland, when, in 1795, it was partitioned among Russia, Prussia, and Austria, its brief independence between 1919 and 1939, and its subsequent reduction to a satellite status, provides a classic study in the field of power.

To live, a state must have at least some power. This principle does not necessarily mean that the state must have the ability to dominate the international scene, constitute a threat to its neighbors, or be in a position to force its will on any other people. Rather it means that the state must either have the necessary potentialities of power to safeguard its independence or to benefit from a privileged status in the family of nations where a strong power guarantees its sovereignty for reasons of power politics.

**BASIC PURPOSES OF THE STATE**—Fundamentally the modern state has two basic functions

that explain its continued existence: first, the promotion of the welfare of its citizens, and, second, provision for the security of the state. In addition, it may have an agency—government—that has the means and techniques with which to achieve these objectives. From the point of view of promotion of welfare, the state must be able to provide conditions under which its citizens will have the opportunity to live, to work, and to perpetuate themselves and their culture within definite territorial limits. In the field of security the state must provide for the defense of its area and institutions, the preservation of its system of government, the maintenance of law and order, and the establishment of relations with other states to facilitate its own well-being. In short, the basic purpose of the state is to enable its citizens to enjoy good economic conditions and to live in security in a given area.

To realize these conditions the state requires power—not only power to ensure and further its basic needs but power sufficient to permit it to progress steadily beyond its existing standard of living. As is to be expected in the case of any aspiration, there are some states that fail to reach the standard of survival, while others succeed well beyond mere survival. Some fall woefully short of their projected goal and may become obliterated; others fall just below the norm and are able to exist in a power vacuum or only at the sufferance of more powerful states, while still others possess or acquire power beyond the mere survival needs of the state. As a result of the ebbing and flowing of national vitality, power, in the eyes of the states, becomes susceptible to the same appreciation as that accorded to money in the eyes of individuals; it is necessary for life.

#### STATE REQUIREMENTS FOR POWER

If each state should seek just enough power to ensure the fulfillment of only its basic purposes, international tensions might well

disappear. Unfortunately, however, such moderation is not the way of man or of his government. The state in the world order is constantly competing for favorable power advantage just as the individual strives for greater and greater wealth.

Under competitive conditions, in proportion as a state acquires more and more power its ambition may lead it to accelerate the process. Up to a certain point a state can acquire the power it needs without trespassing upon the rights of others, but beyond this point it can acquire more power only at the expense of other members of the family of nations. Once each and every state has acquired the power it needs for its basic purposes, further gains in power can be achieved only by pressure, violence, or forceful reshuffling, and the threat of such redistribution or disturbance of the power balance creates international tension.

**TYPES OF POWER**—For convenience, power may be classified as follows: (1) *actual power*, or that which the state can apply at any given moment; (2) *potential power*, or that which the state is capable of developing in the future; and (3) *prestige power*, by which is meant the estimate by other states of a state's power. Each of these three types is capable of stimulating international tension.

Obviously the visual and demonstrable power of a state may produce feelings of resentment and unrest among its neighbors, or, the exercise of this power in any form may produce an unfavorable reaction or tension, even though the state exercising this power is actually pursuing a course of action not inimical to the state that resents it. Recognizable latent, or potential, power may produce international tension because of the apprehension that the possessor state may prove to be a menace at some future date. Prestige power is dangerous and a constant cause of international tension because, in reality, it is unknown; it can only be esti-

mated, and there is always the danger that it may be exaggerated in a fearful nation's imagination.

## POWER BELT

**THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER**—There never has been—nor can there be—a distribution of power among nations that gives to each a share proportionate to its needs. Like wealth, some have it, some will acquire it, and others will never have it in sufficient amount. Despite the drawbacks, all dynamic states continue to scheme and maneuver to achieve it. Those states that have power will seek to retain and augment it; those states that acquire it will seek to gain more in order to compete on even terms with the states that have most power; and those states that are very weak will cease to exercise influence in world affairs.

Just as there is no way of equalizing power among individual nations, there is no way of distributing it rationally among the various geographic areas of the world. Historical studies on power disclose that at any given period it appears to be concentrated in a definite zone on the earth's surface. It is highly unlikely, for example, that there would ever be three or four intensely powerful states widely separated by an area in which there was a complete absence of power or, at most, only a kind of token power. Normally there appears to be a concentration of power in a sharply defined area, with a gradual decrease in power the farther we go from the area of concentration; those states farthest from the concentration are the weakest in terms of international significance.

The present-day concentration of power appears to be along a belt stretching around the world between the 10th and 60th Parallels of North Latitude. South of this belt the degree of power appears to diminish rapidly; north of it, except for Norway and Sweden, which are secondary powers, there

appears to be none at all.<sup>1</sup> Within this power belt are most of the world's people, the greatest part of its important natural resources, a preponderance of the world's industry, and all of the world's major powers.<sup>2</sup>

**THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE POWER BELT**—All the problems of international tension during the present era will arise within the power belt and will be directly or indirectly associated with the nations in that belt. Such a concentration of power in a well-studied area is of great significance, for it enables the scholar to analyze the problems associated with international tension at a moment in the history of the major powers when the interplay of all contributing factors is at its highest. Such an analysis may result in many premises, long accepted, being declared no longer tenable, they will have been disproved by events. Further, it should be possible for statesmen to anticipate certain areas of tension and to take proper measures to counteract or cope with it successfully.

## THE DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION

**FACTORS IN POWER: CLASSIFICATION**—The factors that contribute to power in a state are innumerable, but they may be chiefly classified as follows: (1) geographic, (2) human or ethnic, (3) economic, and (4) political. These are not only the factors of power, they may also be called the "dynamics of international tension," for out of them or

<sup>1</sup> John E. Kieffer, *Realities of World Power* (New York: David McKay Company, 1952), p. 83, and John E. Kieffer, *Strategy for Survival* (New York: David McKay Company, 1953), pp. 80–82.

<sup>2</sup> Sir Halford Mackinder, writing in the early stages of World War II, visualized this belt as a considerably narrower area extending from the Missouri River in the United States eastward to the Yenisei River in Siberia, he called it the "fulcrum of power." See Sir Halford Mackinder, "The Round World and the Winning of the Peace," *Foreign Affairs*, July, 1943. Also reprinted in *Foreign Affairs Reader*, Harper & Bros., 1947.

from their manifestations grow all the problems that lead to tension among nations.

**CHARACTERISTICS**—In addition to the scope of each of these four groups, all four possess certain characteristics in common; moreover, certain generalities may be stated as applying to the groups. These generalities may be aptly termed the “essence of international tension”

1. *All problems of international tension fall within the four classifications.* Irrespective of the apparent nature of any given problem, careful examination will disclose that it can be classified under one of the headings listed above. There is no problem that is capable of creating tension between states that does not have its roots in geographic, human, economic, or political factors. Some problems, it is true, may appear to have had their origin in bygone days and may be classified as historical or traditional struggles that have been carried down into our era; this historical explanation, however, will under rational examination rapidly give way to some one of the four general factors given above. The tensions that are called traditional do not in fact have their basis in the history of the relations between nations; they are traditional only in that they go far back in history and no solution has yet been found for them.

2. *No single one of the four groups of factors can be assigned as the singularly pre-eminent factor in all questions of international tension.* The pre-eminent factors in all questions of international tension vary with circumstances to the extent that it is not possible to select one group of factors and designate that group as the constant principal cause of the difficulty. In some instances, for example, the geographic factors appear to be predominant; whereas study of the problem over a period of years may reveal that at an earlier time the economic or the human aspects of the problem were of greater importance.

3. *No isolated group can be described as the only source of international tension for any given problem or in any given area.* It is not possible to state that any question of international tension is entirely geographic or economic, or that it is entirely ethnic or political. All questions of international tension involve all four groups in varying degrees of importance. For example, a problem may appear to be strictly that of the reclamation of a minority group by one state from the jurisdiction of another; but careful analysis reveals that the motive behind the problem will involve the other three groups of factors.

4. *The obvious motive given may not always be the real issue at stake.* Some problems of international tension which nations openly claim as belonging in one category may in reality acquire significance when considered under another category. For example, Nazi Germany publicly claimed that the Sudetens in Czechoslovakia should be returned to the Reich for ethnic reasons; her real reasons were political and economic, for the return of this group and the land they occupied would expose the northern frontier of Czechoslovakia to German pressure, add to the economic resources of Germany, and render the Czechoslovak government less able to provide for the defense of the country.

**ETHNIC FACTORS**—Long before the concept of nationalism and the nation-state became a part of our civilization, the tribal unit, with all its emphasis on customs and mores, laid so strong a claim on mankind that even the passage of centuries has not succeeded in completely eradicating its influence. Evidence of this traditional heritage is still common today, and, although two nations may not actively engage in hostilities primarily because of different nationalities, it cannot be denied that ethnic factors do play an important part in international tension. Given a partial excuse, there are still some nations

in the world, particularly along the southern fringes of Asia, which will engage in international disputes, even to the extent of going to war, largely because of ethnic differences rather than because of their interests in the issues at stake. International tensions due to human or ethnic factors are, in almost any case, the outgrowth of misunderstanding, suspicion, lack of direct communication, or differences in cultural patterns. In the final analysis, the sole reason for disagreement may be that the people of the other nation are different. This difference leads, or may lead, to a distrust or fear of foreigners, a condition known as "xenophobia."

We may divide the human, or ethnic, causes of tension into four main groups, (a) xenophobia, (b) tribal differences, (c) population difficulties, and (d) minority problems.

*Xenophobia.* Fear or distrust of foreigners is a condition encountered wherever societies evolve their own distinctive behavior patterns in isolation from one another. In such circumstances tourists visiting abroad often display prejudices against the customs of the country visited largely due to ignorance of the language of the host country or to an overly exaggerated national pride in the culture of the visitor's own country. For similar reasons in many countries the press misinterprets or slants the news from foreign countries. Where distrust between two countries is deeply rooted or has continued over long periods of time, as, for example, the historic enmity between Russia and Turkey, xenophobia contributes to international tension and blocks the development of peaceful relations.

Basically, xenophobia has its roots in a lack of communication between peoples, a lack due to extreme language differences, governmental restrictions, and the absence of a common focus of interest. A source of potential trouble and danger for the twentieth century is still another factor: the sense of

inferiority that marks the mental outlook of former colonial peoples in their relation with the more advanced nations of the world. The attempt of underdeveloped states to emulate their more favored neighbors but in comparatively disadvantageous economic circumstances can produce a state of national resentment that of itself may create international tension.

On the whole, xenophobia acquires dangerous dimensions when governments sedulously sponsor or direct antiforeign campaigns that exploit latent sources of fear and distrust. In the twentieth century, totalitarian states and other extremely nationalistic countries have exhibited official policies based on hatred of the "enemy." The Nazi government in Germany launched its expansionist doctrines with a hatred for the Allies who had forced the Versailles Treaty upon defeated Germany in 1919. On occasions weak states exploit popular resentment against stronger states where the latter have held imperial power over the former. Thus, Egypt permitted the press to wage a campaign of hostility against the British nation in an "undeclared war" to oust British forces from the Suez Canal Zone. Egyptian nationalism is on the whole directed against all forms of European influence and control. Communist regimes frequently launch bitter attacks on capitalist societies in order to strengthen group solidarity within the Communist fold.

*Tribal Differences.* Although such differences as race, religion, language, and customs played a more significant part in world tension in past centuries than they play today, they are by no means dead issues. Many countries harbor tribal communities still far from being integrated into the body politic. Much of the tension existing along the periphery of the Arabian Peninsula can be ascribed to these tribal differences. Except for a relatively few instances, however, tribal differences are emphasized in modern

times to cover up more devious causes of differences or to attain objectives which might be condemned by the family of nations if they were openly stated.

*Population.* This subject has been so thoroughly covered in the preceding chapter that it will suffice to say here that extremes of population, either overpopulation or underpopulation, can contribute greatly to the creation of international tension. Overpopulation may lead to demands for more living space or for favorable economic areas or to efforts to annex or to dominate regions inhabited by people less advanced politically and culturally.

*Minority Problems.* The position or status of alien groups in a state can pose a serious problem in creating international tension. The very fact that the group is smaller in numbers than the dominant majority tends to create friction and give rise to mutual suspicions. But tensions may be aggravated in cases where minorities face legal discrimination in attempting to participate in the life of the political community. On the other hand, the dominant group may attempt to convert or extinguish the group identity of a minority. The Russification program of the Czars in the nineteenth century represented a threat to some minorities, for example, the Poles in the Russian Empire.

Minorities, however, are not all of one kind. By class they may be differentiated chiefly as racial, linguistic, and religious. These categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive; a minority may be a distinct group by reason of more than one category. The French Canadians, for example, pride themselves on their language and religion. Not all minorities are potentially dangerous as sources of international tension; indeed, many minority groups are perfectly content to remain in the state in which they reside without, however, losing their identity entirely, and they are not, necessarily, a problem to the state. These we may call "na-

tional minorities" or "adjusted minorities," since they have adjusted themselves to the life, political and cultural, of the major group in the state.

International tension, as created by minorities, lies with the so-called antinational minorities, or those who, for one reason or the other, are at odds with the state in which they live. Of these we recognize two general groups: static antinational minorities and dynamic antinational minorities. In the static antinational minority group are those who would be satisfied to remain in the state as peaceful citizens but are rejected by it for reasons of race, religion, or political beliefs. Examples of this type are Orientals in the United States and Jews in certain European countries. A second type are those who desire to gain freedom from control by the state in which they reside but are too few or too feeble to create sufficient trouble or tension to make an impression. Groups of this type were numerous in the several states created by the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and they still may be found in many European countries.

The really potent source of international tension—and hence a dangerous threat to peace—are the dynamic antinational minorities who desire separation from their present country and who have sufficient support from their mother country to give them a reasonable chance of securing it. Such was the case of the German irredenta in the Sudetenland area of Czechoslovakia, in the districts of Eupen and Malmédy in Belgium, and in Poland, Lithuania, and Denmark after World War I.

**GEOGRAPHICAL FACTORS**—In what ways does the geography of a state create or affect international tension? What are the physical factors of the state's national area that may be a threat to the stability of the world? To this query a variety of answers have been propounded over the centuries, each answer depending upon conditions prevail-



ing in the era in which the question was raised. The effort of a state to readjust its territorial boundaries at the expense of another state is one illustration of geographical factors involved in the creation of international tension. Moreover, the motivation that impels a state to readjust its boundaries or the reasons actually advanced by the state constitute the core of the tension problem.

A state inherits the basic physiographic structure of the region it controls, and only relatively minor modifications are possible in effecting changes of a topographic nature. Therefore, states face the alternative of accepting a particular territorial environment or extending their outer boundaries at the expense of another state. Tensions that arise in the latter case may involve no purely geographic factors but are normally allied with the complex problem of territorial aggrandizement.

International tension due to geographic factors may arise from a state's effort to improve its strategic position. Geographical expansion, whether attempted or accomplished, is an expression of a state's ambition to better its position relative to other states. Thus, the location of a state may be modified as a result of boundary changes; its size and shape may be materially altered; and new terrain may be acquired which offers strategic advantages. These categories, though involving geographical expansion in each case, may be viewed individually.

*Location, Size, and Shape.* Attempts to enhance the position of a state vis-à-vis other states have played a part in almost every major period of international tension during the past century and a half. In our present era, no state can modify its location without violating the prerogatives or sovereignty of another state. Consequently any attempt to do so will create a period of tension not only between the two states but, also, between the aggressor state and any other state suf-

fering a disadvantage. The pressure built up by such actual or contemplated changes can easily lead to the ultimate in international tension—war.

A state may seek territorial changes for several reasons. (1) It may be a landlocked nation and therefore handicapped in international trade. It will seek locational changes that give it access to the sea. (2) It may feel the need of more territory for defensive purposes. (3) It may be prompted to annex territory inhabited by people bound to it by cultural ties. (4) It may need more and better land for economic reasons. (The last two reasons will be discussed more fully later in the chapter.)

Occasionally areas of tension occur when one state attempts to establish a *glacis*<sup>3</sup> in the territory of another. Such an act is, naturally, a cause of international tension inasmuch as it means acquisition of territory at the expense of another state; moreover, it gives the aggressor state defensive advantages and thus is regarded as a hostile act by the other states in the area.

When we consider changes in size as a major factor in the creation of international tension, it becomes immediately obvious that a state lying within the power belt can increase its size only at the expense of another state. The addition of isolated colonies may increase the power of the state and thus lead to tension, but this does not affect the immediate size of the colonizing country. The extension of one state to embrace the territory of another requires no detailed explanation as a factor in producing international tension.

What reasons can a state offer for desiring to increase in size? Primarily, of course, there is the power factor. Except in the case of insular states, such as Great Britain, whose source of power lies in other areas

<sup>3</sup> A *glacis* is an extension of one nation's territory beyond its natural physical boundaries into the territory of a second

under British control, we have come to associate great power with great size. Large size offers a greater opportunity for the creation of diversified industry; a greater supply of economic and natural resources and a more efficient employment of the land; a stronger position for defense in depth against attack; the alleviation of overcrowding of population, and other associated advantages.

Unless the other factors, such as defensive possibilities, resources, and economic potential, are present, the mere increase in size is of no value. Great size alone can, in fact, be a handicap to development of the state, for great size by itself can complicate the transportation pattern, tend to isolate rather than unite regions of a country, and in some cases serve to weaken rather than promote the state's position. Consequently, nations seeking to extend their domains into those of neighboring countries select the areas most profitable for their growth.

Although much has been written by Van Valkenburg<sup>4</sup> and others concerning the importance of shape to a state, it appears that the desire of a state to change its shape is never the sole factor in any maneuver producing international tension. Compact shape does offer advantages to a state in that there is a much shorter border to protect. To permit ground defense in depth, however, compactness and size must be considered together. When perimeter warfare employing only ground forces was the practice of warring nations, the factor of shape was of greater importance to a state than in this age of aerial warfare and guided missiles. Changes in shape that lead to a state's being divided and its parts separated are unquestionably a great source of international tension. An illustration is the division of the German Reich by the creation of the Polish Corridor following World War

I. Such a situation is always a potential trouble spot, for the divided state most likely will seek ways to regain and merge the intervening area into its home territory.

*Terrain.* Technically, terrain adjustments or efforts of nations to acquire areas of more favorable terrain are comparatively uncommon and almost always occur primarily as border readjustments following a war. In most cases such instances are basically minority problems rather than geographic problems for the terrain aspects, unless natural resources are great, are usually secondary to other issues. However, the loss of fertile farm lands by Hungary to Rumania after World War I created an area of local tension possessing potential international repercussions and undoubtedly influenced Hungary in her decision to support Hitler in World War II.

#### BOUNDARIES AND INTERNATIONAL TENSION

The problem of boundaries as a factor in the production of international tension lies midway between the physical and the human factors, with a slightly closer relationship to the latter. Although it is true that boundaries involve the physical aspect of geography, their role in international tension is so closely bound up with the fortunes and objectives of the people who live on or near them that the two sets of factors appear to be inseparable. Therefore, the problem should stand alone and be classed with neither the physical nor the human factors.

**BORDER DIFFICULTIES**—In general, difficulties involving boundary disputes capable of creating international tension may be divided into several broad groups. These include situations involving, or growing out of, (1) territorial claims, (2) minority or irredentist problems, (3) "border incidents" (hostility between patrols, customs officers, "cross border" firing), and (4) border violations on

<sup>4</sup> Samuel Van Valkenburg, *Elements of Political Geography* (2nd ed., Prentice-Hall, 1954).

land, sea, or air. In our present era most border disputes arising between friendly nations are settled amicably, irrespective of cause, by negotiation or through one of the various legal or quasi-legal international bodies. Border disputes between unfriendly nations are often deliberately provoked to serve as a pretext for stronger action and are therefore rarely susceptible to peaceful settlement.

**FRONTIER PROBLEM**—Although boundary lines are sharply defined on political maps, in reality, if we consider the *inhabitants* of two adjoining states, we frequently find no distinct and abrupt separation, but rather a gradual transition from one basic type of population, possibly through a mixed type, to a second basic type. In many cases, as in Latin America, Central Asia, and on the Canadian-United States border, there may be no differences—or only barely perceptible differences—between the population characteristics of one state and those of another. Thus, although political separations may be clearly defined, cultural or ethnic differences may remain indistinct and be manifested in the form of a zone. This idea of transition may be expressed in a rule basic to geopolitics: *In border areas the cultural difference between neighboring peoples is less sharply defined than the political boundary line and is manifested in a zone, the width of which varies proportionately to the dissimilarities in the basic culture of each.*

Pursuing this thesis of "border culture" further, we find several distinct types, identifiable by more or less constant characteristics. The first type—or Type A—is one in which the basic language, economic structure, social organization, and group loyalty of the population on either side of the border differ yet find a common meeting ground in the border zone. Certain elements of the culture of each have been adopted by the other within the frontier zone. The second type of frontier zones—Type B—are those in

which the people may have a common heritage in antiquity with many cultural characteristics in common yet with enough difference to distinguish them as separate peoples. The third type—Type C—are zones in which the political boundary lines are drawn across the ethnic or tribal lines, and there results a people or tribe with two political entities but possessing constant common ethnic traits. The political world affords many examples of these phenomena. The German-Austrian zone, for instance, is Type B, the German-French zone is Type A; and the western Persian-Soviet and Syrian-Lebanese frontier areas are Type C zones.

As might be expected, frontier zones can be and often are the scenes of much political disorder and the possible cause of international tension. In Type A zones the intermingling of peoples tends to produce a group somewhat different and apart from the basic type of either state. Members of such a group develop separate political and cultural characteristics and in many instances are more prone to take pride in their border status than in their basic nationality. One speaks, for example, of the Alsatian almost as if he were a separate national entity within France, and of the Tyrolean, the Saarlander, and a variety of others in the same way. The frontier man may be fiercely loyal to the basic state, in some cases even more so than the basic type, or he may go to the opposite extreme, where, torn between two loyalties, he may elect to throw his lot with the winning side or with the potential victor. On the other hand, he may elect to oppose both basic states. This complex loyalty may be referred to as the "phenomenon of equivocal loyalty" and can be the source of much border trouble.

The division of frontier peoples in their loyalty usually produces three distinct types: in the frontier zone between States A and B, for example, there may be a group intensely loyal to A; one intensely loyal to B; and a third group, which we may call AB,

loyal to the frontier group itself. In the Alsace-Lorraine area, for example, we find a pro-French group, whose intense loyalty to France is traditional; a pro-German group equally loyal to the Reich, and a third group primarily loyal to Alsace. Each group can be troublesome. Should Alsace be French, the pro-German group could constitute a vocal minority clamoring for return to Germany; if Alsace became German, the pro-French group would become the troublemakers, while in either case the third group forms a nationalist bloc which can create a great amount of disorder and multiply the problems of whichever state exercises control.

The Type B frontier zone offers the least possibility of international tension, for here it would be almost impossible to create difficulty between the border peoples unless basic issues of freedom were at stake. To visualize war between the United States and Canada or border clashes between the citizens of New York and Ontario is impossible. The basic loyalty here is to the respective state of each group, yet there is sufficient ethnic or cultural unity across the border to make disorder almost out of the question. It is safe to say that in a Type B frontier zone international tension is possible but improbable unless one state deliberately embarks on a campaign of aggression.

Strange as it may seem, the Type C frontier offers a great possibility for international tension, especially in areas inhabited by nomads who move across political frontiers. The problem of providing law and order along India's northwest frontier is well known to students of British India. As the British administrator Sir Kenneth Wigram cites the so-called axiom of frontier administration: *A tribe or group of tribes situated between two comparatively powerful states must be under the influence of one or the other of these.* Along this type of frontier the primary loyalty is usually to the tribal group rather than to the basic state; for the divided people

have a kinship with their fellow tribesmen on the other side of the border rather than with the basic major nationality. In a situation of this type there is bound to be a violently manifested desire by one segment of the tribe to join the other. The situation of the Pushtu-speaking tribe along the Afghan-Pakistan frontier provides one example (see page 536). In such regions complicated political problems arise, the disposition of which involves diplomacy and compromise on the part of the two states concerned.

The frontier tribal problem is a source of considerable vexation to the states of southwest Asia where mountain tribes of desert nomads move freely across political boundaries. The frontier between Yemen and Saudi Arabia and Aden is marked by frequent clashes caused by raiding expeditions of Yemeni tribesmen. Less serious but equally marked by tension is the Iraqi-Persian frontier which is crossed continually by Kurdish tribes. In most cases loyalties in such areas are either divided between two states or rendered somewhat vague or ambivalent by strong tribal cohesion and the attraction of kinship ties.

#### ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION

**NATIONAL WEALTH AND ITS INFLUENCE—**No state can exist without wealth, measured not in gold or silver alone, but in terms of population, natural resources, commerce, industry, and—we may add—cultural intangibles. But there are many degrees of wealth among the nations of the world and from this very discrepancy in wealth may arise international tensions. A nation possessing great national wealth relative to all other nations would normally be a peaceful state, since it has little to gain and much to lose by creating trouble in the international community. But for every wealthy nation there are many less wealthy nations, and these latter may re-

sort to violence to gain for themselves a larger share of the world's total wealth. Their proneness to stir up trouble is augmented by the fact that as a rule the less wealthy states are also less stable—less viable—than the wealthier states. Being less stable, they are more likely to yield to pressures at home for the adoption of aggressive action against other states. The object of their aspiration may be an area of too little significance to warrant a more powerful state creating an international incident to thwart it. In such cases there is much for the less favored state to gain and little for it to lose, and thus a premium is placed on its ability to create international tension. It was under these conditions that Italy successfully subdued and conquered Ethiopia in 1935–36.

**"HAVES" AND "HAVE-NOTS"**—In consequence of the unequal distribution of national wealth, the world has become divided, in theory at least, into two general economic camps known as the "haves" and the "have-nots." Although many factors may contribute to this division, the more outstanding are the possession or lack of natural resources, facilities for commerce, productive ability, and economic balance.

Obviously a state that has no coal and no iron can hardly become an industrial state; nor can one that lacks access to the sea or close contacts with other states become a great mercantile or trading power. Lack of population or of facilities to train the population prevents a state, in spite of good natural resources, from utilizing its capabilities. Lastly, only in extraordinary circumstances can a state that is completely dependent upon other states for a large part of its food or raw material become a great and enduring power.

To become a "have," a state must possess great natural resources, plus the ability to change them into usable or salable items and the opportunity to trade with other states.

A "have" state has a high degree of self-sufficiency. No state enjoys all these advantages in an unlimited degree, and no one state in the world is completely self-sufficient or likely to be; for this reason the difference between the "haves" and the "have-nots" is one of degree. In certain respects all states are "haves" and all states are "have-nots." In normal circumstances international trade and exchange can mitigate the adverse effects of a "have-not" status. But in certain cases, as illustrated by Nazi Germany, a program of military preparedness disrupts the normal course of trade and accentuates the difference between the two categories.

**THE THEORY OF AUTARKY**—The theory of autarky, based on the existence of "haves" and "have-nots," is not especially new, for the importance of economic factors in world tension has long been known. Under the impact of economic nationalism states tend to strive toward economic self-sufficiency as their goal. Although few states actually attain the ideal of being completely independent of foreign imports, steps taken in this direction intensify rivalry between trading states and disrupt established patterns of trade. Kjellén, the famous Swedish exponent of geopolitics, even argued that autarky expressed the individuality of the state in its natural struggle for existence. Seizing upon this idea, the Nazi geopoliticians expanded it into their national philosophy of aggression, to the point where Wulf Siewert wrote, in 1932, "Autarky has ceased to be a goal and has become a fact."

The concept of autarky goes beyond that visualized by Kjellén and, in recent times, has become the basis of justification by some "have-not" nations for deliberately aggressive actions to incorporate desired resource areas into their national economy. Applying the reasoning of these geopoliticians, Nazi Germany set out to achieve this self-sufficiency by seizing and annexing valuable territory of its weaker neighbors.

Although the vast majority of the nations recognize the theory of autarky as one which ultimately leads to totalitarianism and a rigid state-controlled economy and have denounced it, some aspects of the concept still exist in practice in international relations.

Autarky is closely associated with the total national economy, and in some cases it is linked with national political ambitions. Ordinarily a nation that is dependent upon her sister states for many of the resources needed to produce wealth has unusual difficulty in becoming a great state in terms of world power. In short, her war-making ability is curtailed or restricted. It is not necessary, as was stated previously, that a state be self-sufficient in order to be great, provided that an even exchange of goods and resources can be peacefully effected between states. The world's commerce, normally conducted, can usually create a balance to the extent that all states may exist and do so with a fairly high standard of living. So long as states are prepared to rely on trade to overcome deficiencies, international complications are minor; but when a state refuses to accept the situation and aspires to power status and self-sufficiency, the result is international tension.

**STRATEGIC RAW MATERIALS**—In the twentieth century industrialization is a primary determinant of national power, and in a competitive world order major states strive to increase their productive capacities to the highest degree possible. A high degree of industrialization requires, among other things, a wide variety of raw materials and an uninterrupted access to the principal sources of supply. Ever since World War II the United States and other major powers have stressed the procurement of valuable raw materials as indispensable to their security and defense requirements. The United States follows a classification of raw materials which the Army and Navy Munitions Board defined in World War II. The three categories include:

1. Strategic materials. Those essential to the national defense for the supply of which in war dependence must be placed in whole or in part on sources outside . . . the boundaries of the country . . . and for which strict conservation and distribution . . . control measures will be necessary.

2. Critical materials. Those also essential for national defense but whose procurement in time of war is assured and is less serious than the strategic materials, that is, limited quantity within the state or obtainable from proved allies.

3. Essential materials. Those which present no procurement problem in wartime, that is, may be obtained wholly within the state or may be substituted for by ersatz products.

In general there are twenty-two industrial raw materials that are considered essential to self-sufficiency in an industrial state: coal, iron ore, petroleum, copper, lead, nitrates, sulphur, cotton, aluminum, zinc, rubber, manganese, nickel, chromite, tungsten, wool, potash, phosphates, antimony, tin, mercury, and mica. No nation possesses all of these within its boundaries in quantities adequate to ensure self-sufficiency. The lack of any of these materials in a state and the steps taken to procure them can be the source of international tension and the cause of much international maneuvering.

**INTERNATIONAL TRADE**—The exchange of commodities between nations is essential to the welfare and advancement of all states, but though necessary it can be a source of international tension. For some states, Great Britain, for example, foreign trade is the very heart of the national economy, and the tensions arising when that trade is threatened can be very bitter. Such measures as high or retaliatory tariffs, restrictive trade regulations, embargoes on raw material or finished products, denial of credit, and similar actions may be the means of erecting barriers to international trade and lead to misunderstandings between nations that cause tension that lingers even after the barriers have been removed. In recent

years, the United States has used the closing of trade with the Russian satellites as a retaliatory weapon and the threat of refusal to trade as a bargaining factor. It is axiomatic that whatever threatens a nation's foreign trade is bound to produce international tension.

#### GOVERNMENTAL ACTIONS AS A SOURCE OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION

Whatever the apparent cause of tension among states—geographic, economic, cultural, or ethnic—governmental, that is, political, motives and actions are generally involved. Such governmental actions fall into a number of classes.

*First*, and most serious, are acts threatening the sovereignty of another state. Not only do these acts cause tension, they frequently lead to aggression—to war. In this class we can include attempted annexation of territory belonging to another state, mobilization of superior forces on another state's borders, closure of a state's embassies, refusal of recognition to governments in exile; interference in the internal affairs of another state, and similar actions that tend to threaten a state's right to exercise freely its prerogatives as an independent power within the family of nations.

A *second* class of tension caused by governmental action embraces acts against international comity. Included in this class are acts considered politically discourteous; violation of the privileged status of diplomatic representatives; recall of diplomatic officials without replacement; failure to accord full recognition to another state's judicial acts, the giving of haven to antigovernmental groups and permission to plot against the other state, denunciations of treaties; violation of the pledged word; default on promises, and other actions interpreted as derogations from international comity.

A *third* class embraces acts of one state against the national honor and dignity of

another state. They include refusal to recognize the national flag of another state or its jurisdiction over its ships at sea; violation of a state's good name, traditions, and customs; and any other actions which can be construed to be provocative. Such actions as border violations, curtailment of trade, and attempted economic strangulation (previously discussed in this chapter) are also manifestations of a state's foreign policy and should be included in any list of governmental actions creating international tension.

**HISTORICAL ASPECTS OF GOVERNMENTAL ACTIONS**—Quite often the historical pattern of a state's actions can be used in predicting its future actions and the possibility of its causing international tension. The objectives of a state may remain constant over a period of decades, even centuries, and may be so strongly rooted in that state that time and again it will deliberately create international incidents, even war, in an effort to achieve them. A notable example is Russia's traditional urge to gain strategic control of territories along her political frontier. The emphasis placed by the United States on the Monroe Doctrine and Great Britain's century-old determination to keep control of the British lifeline route are other examples, any nation attempting to disrupt either of these policies would be rebuffed.

Violations of the traditional spheres of interest of any nation, however innocent the violation may be, would certainly be met with violent resistance by the state possessing these vested interests. American attempts to gain exclusive control of Middle East oil would surely create a state of tension with Great Britain and other interested states traditionally operating in that area. Attempts of any power to procure large commercial holdings within the colonies of another state or within areas traditionally within another's sphere of influence have always led to international tension. Nations are extremely jealous of their rights and pre-

rogatives, possibly even more so than individuals.

**IDEOLOGIES**—One of the most potent sources of international tension in this century has been the growth of politically oriented ideologies and their spread across state lines. These ideological sources of tension are chiefly of two types. (1) There are those political parties or movements that are totalitarian in aim; that is, they seek monopoly control over their own state and would spread their ideas to other states. Such are Communism, National Socialism, and Fascism. (2) There are international movements and parties that are not totalitarian in aim; that is, they do not seek absolute control of governments. Such are the democratic socialist movement, the international labor movement, syndicalism, and anarchism.

In the first type the threat is extremely dangerous; for it is based upon the deliberate attempt by one state to subvert the established order of a second in order that

the political philosophy of the first may be superimposed on the victim, thereby reducing it to a subordinate status. In the second type the threat is only potential either because of a lack of governmental sanction or because of a reliance upon democratic techniques of persuasion and upon the efforts of private individuals rather than of governments. Whatever the nature of the motivation, in either the first or the second type, the methods utilized constitute significant differentiations in political behavior.

International movements or ideologies that have a political basis can, irrespective of type, become a source of international tension if they exacerbate national feelings. The spread of ideas is a force difficult to counteract. If provocative ideas antagonistic to the political system of one state but not to that of another are spread to the first with the sanction of the second, or by the failure of the latter to restrict them, they can constitute a most serious threat to the world peace.

### Study Questions

1. Define the term "international tension."
2. Distinguish among strategic, critical, and essential materials.
3. Discuss the basic purpose of the state.
4. Give examples of both static and dynamic anti-national minority groups in Europe.
5. Describe the frontier of the Soviet Union in terms of frontier Types A, B, and C.
6. Describe the current situations now causing international tension in (a) Europe, (b) the Middle East, and (c) Southeast Asia.
7. Analyze the nature and geographic extent of the world's power belt.
8. Discuss xenophobia in terms of Cold War tension.
9. List five Type B frontier zones.
10. Discuss the basic characteristics of "have" and "have not" states.
11. Describe degree of economic self-sufficiency in (a) the United States, (b) the Soviet Union, and (c) the British Empire.
12. What is autarky?
13. Which of the industrial raw materials considered essential to self-sufficiency are not present in the United States-Canada-Alaska area?
14. Indicate on a map the principal sources of the minerals listed on page 72. Note how important South America and Africa are in terms of this distribution.
15. List and describe five current border disputes which have proven to be incapable of permanent settlement.



PART TWO

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*The Western Hemisphere*



## CHAPTER SIX

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# *Canada and the American Arctic*

The northern half of North America is occupied by three political units. Directly north of the United States and by far the largest of the three is Canada, extending in an east-west direction from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and northward to within seven degrees latitude of the North Pole. To the northwest of this gigantic land mass the

peninsula of Alaska reaches a longitude farther west than Honolulu. To the northeast, in the North Atlantic, lies the island of Greenland separated by only 500 miles from Arctic Canada. The eastern fringe of Greenland is within ten degrees of the longitude of western Ireland, and less than 1,600 miles of water separate the two.

## CANADA

Canada is an independent, self-governing country within the British Commonwealth of Nations. Although settled in the seventeenth century as a colony of France it was ceded to Great Britain after conquest in 1763. After a hundred years or more of varying degrees of autonomy under Britain the area finally achieved a definite measure of self-government. There never was any definite break away from Great Britain, but

simply a steady and peaceful evolution of a new nation under Britain's guidance and protection.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Canada acquired Dominion status in 1926; the Statute of Westminster (1931) accorded it equality with Britain as a freely associating member in the British Commonwealth. Canada officially avoids use of the term "Dominion" in its name, and the Royal Style and Titles Act of 1953 permits each Commonwealth to define its concept of relationship with the Crown.

## HISTORY OF SETTLEMENT

Early in the seventeenth century French settlement penetrated into the interior of Canada by way of the broad St. Lawrence Gulf and River and for a hundred years white settlement in Canada was almost entirely French. The citadel of Quebec was built at an imposing site overlooking the narrowing of the river. Gradually the region between Quebec and Montreal was settled. Subsistence agriculture was the mainstay of economic existence, but it was supplemented by hunting and trapping. From this original core of settlement French trappers, traders, and adventurers penetrated still farther into the continent, first to the Great Lakes region and then on westward till they ultimately reached the Interior Plains.

In 1670 English traders and explorers entered Canada through Hudson Strait and Bay, founded the historic Hudson's Bay Company, and established a great fur-trading empire to the north of the French. From the shores of Hudson Bay trader-explorers could penetrate westward on the long, but rapids-infested, rivers to encourage trapping by the interior Indians. In these early days when travel on streams and by portage was practically the only means of inland movement, the river systems of Canada provided access to the prairie regions.

After French-Canada was turned over to Britain in 1763 British settlers began to arrive in numbers and they came in waves after Britain lost her American colonies in the Revolutionary War. For almost a century a steady flow of English, Scottish, and Irish settlers moved up the St. Lawrence River, past the French settlements, and into what is now Ontario. Most of the arable land was cleared, and a transportation network was gradually developed which fostered the growth of small towns and cities. This original core area in the broad lowlands of southern Quebec and Ontario, which has continued to be the heart of Canada,

was for many years the only settled area, the rocky, poorly drained barrier of the Canadian Shield<sup>2</sup> restricted settlement to the St. Lawrence-Great Lakes region, or diverted large numbers of Canadians into the United States.

With the building of the first railways across the Shield in the 1860's, settlers began to pour westward into the grasslands of the southern Prairie Provinces. The greatest waves of immigrants, many of whom were from Central Europe, reached western Canada just prior to, and after, World War I. By 1930 most of the fertile lands of western Canada had been occupied; at the same time the northward advance of agricultural settlement in the Prairie Provinces slowed down. "Effectively occupied" Canada was a narrow east-west belt, almost 3,500 miles in length, stretching across the continent. This pattern of settlement has continued, and at present ninety per cent of the population live within 200 miles of the United States border.

## PHYSICAL ASPECTS

SIZE—Canada ranks among the world's largest countries; its total land area of 3,845,144 square miles exceeds that of the United States by twenty-seven per cent. From north to south it extends through forty degrees of latitude (about 2,800 miles), and from east to west over eighty-eight degrees of longitude, or almost one quarter the way around the world. In such a large area it is not unusual to find a vast range of land-forms, climates, and resources. There are notable contrasts from place to place in the local geography of Canada, and the resources of one region serve to supplement the economy of another region. In climate, too, Canada has considerable diversity, although only a small fraction of the country is south

<sup>2</sup> The Canadian Shield is a rough, but not high, upland area of old, hard, resistant rock north of the Great Lakes.

of the forty-fifth parallel, and no tropical or sub-tropical types are to be found.

**SHAPE**—Canada has a rectangular shape, with a triangular wedge of islands jutting northward into the Arctic Ocean. Canada therefore has the geographical advantage of compactness (see Chapter 3). Two indentations, however, break into this rectangular structure. In the northeast, Hudson Strait leads to the vast water body of Hudson Bay, which extends halfway across the Dominion. Although English fur traders used the Hudson Bay route as a means of tapping the fur trade with the western Indians, the Hudson Bay navigation route has been of little value in Canada's development, for it is frozen over for eight or nine months of the year, and leads only to a sparsely settled part of Canada.

The other opening, in southeastern Canada, is the important and strategic gulf and estuary of the St. Lawrence River. This water opening permitted the French to enter the heart of North America while the American colonies were being confined to the coastal areas by the Appalachian Mountains. The waterway has continued to be the main entry for ocean navigation, which reaches as far inland as Montreal, even though the St. Lawrence route is frozen over for about four months each winter. Newfoundland Island, Canada's most easterly outpost, guards the opening of the Gulf of St. Lawrence.<sup>3</sup>

**DEPTH**—Geopolitically, Canada has the protection of size, shape, and depth. Its population core and main industries are located in the south-central area near the Great Lakes. To the west is a vast expanse of territory and a wide mountain system as a

barrier; to the north is the difficult terrain and intolerable climate of the barren Arctic. Only to the east is the heart of Canada somewhat vulnerable, but even here the inland position of its central core gives some protection in depth. To the south Canada joins the main population and industrial core of the United States, where people have a similar culture and outlook. These two cores have grown together, their resources have mutually complemented one another, their populations have intermixed, and peace between the two nations has reigned for almost seven generations.

**LANDFORMS**—Stretching across North America at its widest extent Canada exhibits a diversity of landforms, many of them measured by hundreds or thousands of miles in their linear dimensions. Alaska, the United States, and Mexico all have higher mountains than Canada, but in expanse of rough terrain the Dominion stands first. The surface features of Canada can be conveniently divided into six major landforms. Four of them—Appalachian Mountain System, St. Lawrence Lowlands, Interior Plain (Prairie Provinces), and Western Cordillera—are northern extensions of the same landform regions found in the United States. The remaining two regions—Canadian Shield and Arctic Islands—are peculiar to central and northern Canada.

In the east the Appalachian Mountain System of the eastern United States extends northward and forms the base of the Maritime Provinces and Newfoundland. In Canada the region is rolling to hilly with altitudes generally less than 2,000 feet. Settlement is mainly coastal, or confined to a few major river valleys, similar to the pattern found in New England. Newfoundland is part of the folded Appalachian system, largely a rough plateau which slopes toward the east.

The St. Lawrence Lowlands comprise the smallest, but most important, physiographic region in Canada. They are the northeast-

<sup>3</sup> In 1934, Newfoundland, then a British Dominion, was forced to change its political status to that of a British colony because of financial difficulties. In 1949, after a popular referendum, Newfoundland joined Canada as its tenth province.

ern extension of the Central Lowlands region of the United States. Along the St. Lawrence River and in southern Quebec the terrain is low in elevation and without sharp relief. With an accessible position, good soils, and favorable climate, this region is the most densely populated part of Canada and is easily identified as the core area.

The Canadian Shield is the largest physiographic region of Canada. This huge horseshoe of ancient rock stretches from the coast of Labrador, around Hudson and James bays, to the line of lakes running from Winnipeg in the south to Great Bear in the north. The Shield attains altitudes of 2,000–4,000 feet on its eastern and southern edges; much of it slopes inward toward Hudson Bay. Made up of low, rough, rocky hills dotted with innumerable, irregular-shaped lakes, the region has been inhospitable to agricultural settlement. Because of the rough terrain and the poor drainage in northern Ontario the Shield constitutes a physical barrier between the population clusters of eastern and western Canada.

The Interior Plains are the narrowing northern part of the Great Plains which cover the west-central section of the United States. These plains rise in successive steps across the southern part of the Prairie Provinces. To the northward the region narrows between the northwestern fringe of the Canadian Shield and the eastern bulge of the Mackenzie Mountains in the Western Cordillera. This lake-dotted section is traversed by rivers of the Mackenzie system which drain northward into the Arctic Ocean. The southern Interior Plains region is the heart of Canada's wheat-growing belt.

The Western Cordillera in Canada is part of the huge mountain system that extends along the Pacific coast of North and South America from Chile to Alaska. In Canada it is a much narrower system of north-south mountain ranges than that in the United States, but it is comparable in complexity. The mountains are compressed together in rugged grandeur, and are separated by nar-

row, deep valleys. Because of the north-south alignment of mountains and valleys, east-west transportation lines are difficult to build. A plateau-like area in the Canadian territory of Yukon is the only part of the Cordillera encouraging settlement, through this passes the Alcan Highway to Fairbanks.

The Arctic Islands are unlike any other landform area of Canada in that they have no uniform topographic character. Relief ranges from the highest mountain range of eastern North America, through extensive flat-topped plateaus and rough, barren hills, to broad, lake-covered lowlands. Many of these northern islands are large; Baffin Island, for instance, is almost as large as Texas. Only the southern group of islands are inhabited along the coasts by a few thousand Eskimos.

**CLIMATES**—All of Canada, except the mild west coast, is cold during the winter, and many parts of the central continental land mass have monthly temperatures averaging as low as 0° F. Summer temperatures, however, may run to the other extreme, especially in the south. Ottawa, for example, has a July average monthly temperature of 70° F., and readings in Montreal not infrequently go above 90° F.

The northeast region, under the influence of the cold water of Hudson Bay, remains cool in the summer, whereas the land mass of northwestern Canada warms up. This major difference in climate is both the problem and the hope of northern Canada. Because the arctic climate penetrates almost 600 miles south of the Arctic Circle in the northeast region, a million square miles are inhospitable to settlement; on the other hand, since northwestern Canada becomes warm in summer, this region offers some hope for the northward extension of agriculture and forestry.

Most of Canada's population experiences the same kind of climate as their neighbors in the United States. The people of the St. Lawrence Lowlands, for example, have

hot summers with a 150-day growing season. Winters in southern Ontario are about the same as those in Pennsylvania and New York, while the cold season in the Maritime Provinces is not unlike that of adjoining New England. The grain farmers of the southern Prairie Provinces have the same cold winters as their neighbors in the Dakotas and also worry about scarcity of rain during the growing season. The people of British Columbia pride themselves on the cool, bright summers which are similar to those of coastal California, but they say little about the heavy winter rains which likewise fall on the coasts of Washington and Oregon.

#### NATURAL RESOURCES

**LAND**—Agriculture has been the basis of settlement in Canada, as it was in the United States. After most of the good land in southeastern Canada was occupied, settlers first entered the Interior Plains, and eventually filtered into the narrow valleys of the Western Cordillera. At present about eight per cent of Canada is in farms. Even this small proportion of land has been more than sufficient to feed the small Canadian population and to provide a surplus for export. It has been estimated that fifteen per cent of Canada is suitable for cultivation and could conceivably support agricultural settlement. These estimates have particular interest in view of an enlarged Canadian population as well as the possible world shortage of food within the next few decades.


**FORESTS**—Much of Canada's area which cannot produce crops does grow trees. Canada's forest area ranks third in the world (behind those of the USSR and Brazil) even though only one third of Canada is actually forested. The mild, wet climate of the Canadian west coast produces some of the world's tallest trees outside of the tropics and lumber matching in quality that of Washington and Oregon. As Canada itself provides a small market for lumber, about

half the annual crop is exported. Across the continent eastern Canada is covered with smaller coniferous trees of the Northern, or Boreal, Forest, whose chief value is for use as pulpwood. In the interior of the country the well-forested southern edge of the Canadian Shield makes Quebec and Ontario a third forest area. An advantage here is the proximity of the forests to the rivers down which the logs may be floated and to many water-power sites where sawmills are operated.

**MINERALS**—One of Canada's major assets lies in its mineral wealth (see map on page 82). In the northwestern part of the Canadian Shield is one of the world's largest sources of pitchblende, from which uranium and radium are obtained. In northern Ontario is the world's chief source of nickel; the same region is also Canada's principal source of copper. To the east, on the Quebec-Labrador boundary, is an iron ore deposit estimated to exceed 500,000,000 tons. The Shield also produces large amounts of gold, silver, platinum, cobalt, zinc, titanium, mica, and graphite.

Other areas of Canada also help both to increase the Dominion's importance as a mineral source and to foster industrial development in North America. Iron ore and strategic fluor spar are found in Newfoundland, and coal and gypsum in Nova Scotia. Southern Quebec produces the world's greatest amount of asbestos, most of which is shipped to the United States. At the southeastern part of the Cordillera in British Columbia is the world's largest lead-zinc mine.

In the Interior Plains of Canada are large supplies of each of the three power fuels: coal, petroleum, and natural gas. There is a reserve of 75,000,000,000 tons of bituminous coal in Alberta and Saskatchewan, but it is too far away from major industrial markets to encourage utilization. Large petroleum reserves in western Canada were discovered after 1948, and pipelines have already been constructed to connect the fields



with centers of population and industry. To the north of the petroleum reserves are tar sands, estimated to contain more than 100 billion barrels of petroleum (equal to the present known world reserves). No one yet, however, has found an economic means of separating the petroleum from the sand.

**WATER POWER**—Canadian industry is based chiefly on the processing of mineral, agricultural, and forest resources. Seventy-five per cent of Canada's manufacturing wealth is produced in Ontario and Quebec. Such a concentration of development has been pos-

sible because of the great reserve of water power in or near this area. More than ninety per cent of Canada's power is derived from hydroelectric energy, most of which is generated along the southern edge of the Canadian Shield and from the Niagara and St. Lawrence rivers of the Great Lakes system.

**FISHERIES**—In addition to being a major source of certain agricultural products for the rest of the world, Canada is also a surplus producer of fish. Both coasts are favored with excellent fishing banks and acces-



sible coastal rivers and since only a small part of Canada's population lives near the sea, much of the fish catch is deflected to world markets.

## TRANSPORTATION

The huge area and transcontinental breadth of Canada defied cohesion and development until a pattern of transport could be established. Although Canada's population spreads across the country in an east-west belt, the people tend to be separated into pockets by the rough topographical barriers of the Appalachians, Canadian Shield, and the Western Cordillera, and each of the geographic regions tends to be linked to the southward with similar areas in the United States. Canada's history of growth has therefore been vitally and closely connected with the development of a transportation network. In addition, Canadian resources, which are widespread across its vast area, have only been utilized when transport lines made them accessible.


**RAILWAYS**—Canada has been called "a geographic impossibility tied together by railways" (see map on page 84). Railways were, in fact, the first means of tying together the several cores of settlement. In the middle of the nineteenth century the Maritime Provinces were linked by rail with the French-speaking center of southern Quebec. From this start a railway network gradually spread across the lowlands of southern Ontario. British Columbia, on the Pacific coast, required the building of a transcontinental railway as a stipulation to its entrance into the confederation with Canada in 1871. When completed in 1887, the transcontinental line also opened for settlement the grasslands of the Prairie Provinces. At the same time raw materials began to move toward the industries and the population core of southeastern Canada. Railway building ceased about 1930, when Canada's

population spread slowed down, but construction was resumed after 1950, lines being built to the north to tap such resources as iron ore.

**HIGHWAYS**—Highways were less important than railways in Canada's development and growth. The first transcontinental highway was not opened for its entire length until 1942, and even as late as 1953 it was not completely paved. Locally, however, the population clusters are well served by good highway networks which help to move people and resources. During World War II the famous Alcan Highway was constructed between the railhead at Dawson Creek, Alberta, and the city of Fairbanks, Alaska, thereby providing the first overland communication between Alaska and the United States. After the war the highway became part of the Canadian system.

**AIRLINES**—Because of the great distances involved it is not surprising that Canada became an early leader in the development of commercial air transportation. Many northern settlements and industrial installations have depended upon servicing by air. The innumerable lakes that dot northern Canada serve as landing fields for hydroplanes in summer and ski planes in winter. During and since World War II many all-season permanent airfields have been constructed at sites all across northern Canada. These are of strategic importance, both in relation to Canada's position on the Arctic Ocean, and also as a means of linking local populations with larger communities to the south.

**WATERWAYS**—Although canoe transport on the numerous rivers was the means of early exploration in Canada, the streams have too many rapids and falls to be used as commercial waterways. Inland water transport is confined mainly to the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence system. Canada's chief use of the Great Lakes is for the movement of wheat from the Prairie Provinces to the ports of



Montreal and Quebec and to the flour mills of southern Ontario. The Great Lakes route is less significant for iron ore and coal movement in Canada than in the United States because the canals, built by Canada in the last century to bypass the rapids in the St. Lawrence River between Lake Ontario and Montreal, are too shallow (only 12-foot clearance) to accommodate the large modern Great Lakes freighters. A few of the smaller ocean vessels, however, can reach the Great Lakes ports through the St. Lawrence waterway. Recently the United States and Canada reached an agreement on the building of an international St. Lawrence Seaway project.

#### POPULATION

Canada has a population of about fifteen million people. Fifty per cent of these are concentrated in the core area of the St. Lawrence Lowlands and southern Quebec and Ontario, where population densities average about 125 persons per square mile. Eighteen of the Dominion's thirty-four cities of over 30,000 population are located in this area. The largest city, Montreal (1,400,000), has one tenth of the total population of Canada—more people than any one of the western provinces. Canada's second population core, Toronto (671,000) and environs, has nearly as many people as all of Maritime Canada.

Outside the central concentration Canada's population is distributed across the southern parts of the country in several small cores. They are located in areas of less favorable environment than the St. Lawrence Lowlands. In the Maritime Provinces, owing to the rough nature of the interior, population is concentrated along the coast. The presence of good fishing grounds along the continental shelf has led to the settlement of numerous fishing villages along the indented, rocky shore. The main strip of inland settlement is along the fertile St. John River valley of western New Brunswick.

The vast rocky lands of the Canadian Shield to the west are sparsely populated. Agricultural settlement is confined to a few favorable lowland areas which were formerly glacial lake bottoms, such as the Lake St. John-Saguenay region of Quebec and the Great Clay Belt of the Quebec-Ontario boundary region. Settlement is spotty across the Shield, where most towns and cities are based on some specific function or resource use, such as mining, pulpwood, or water power. Most of the cities which do exist are in northern Ontario; the Shield sections of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and the Northwest Territories have only a few mining towns. It is likely that the disadvantages of rough topography, repelling climate, and poor drainage will continue to discourage people from settling in this large area of Canada.

In the southern Prairie Provinces much of the population settled during the first thirty years of this century. Outside of the three major cities of Winnipeg, Edmonton, and Calgary, the population is chiefly rural and is concerned with grain or livestock raising. The only province that has continued to grow in the last two decades is Alberta, in which the recent exploitation of oil and natural gas deposits has resulted in increased population.

In the far western province of British Columbia more than half the population is concentrated in or near Vancouver, the chief west coast seaport and third largest city of Canada. The rest of the population is found in narrow linear valleys of the south. The northern half of the mountainous province is inhospitable and virtually devoid of population.

Fewer than 25,000 people occupy the Yukon and Northwest Territories of northern Canada, and almost half of this population is native Indian or Eskimo. White residents are found only in small settlements along the Yukon and Mackenzie river systems. About 8,500 Eskimos, including those

of Arctic Quebec, are the sole residents of about 1,000,000 square miles of Arctic Canada north of the tree line. Eskimos depend for their livelihood on trapping and hunting, and this occupation can support but few people per hundred square miles.

### ETHNIC FACTORS

Canada is a composite of several ethnic groups that are amalgamated into one nation. The English and the French represent two cores of contrasting cultures, each having preserved its own language and customs for almost two centuries. Canada is bilingual, two thirds of the population speak English, and one third speaks French. The large majority of people are either Roman Catholics (forty-three per cent) or Protestants (forty-eight per cent). The remaining nine per cent are Greek Catholics, Mennonites, and Jews. The French-speaking Canadians are overwhelmingly Catholic; the majority of English-speaking Canadians are Protestant.

**LANGUAGE**—The original French-speaking center in southern Quebec was gradually surrounded during the nineteenth century by English-speaking immigrants. The Canadian constitution guarantees to the French the use of their own language, law, and religion, and from the original core a distinct ethnic unit has survived. This distinctiveness has strengthened the case for provincial autonomy in Quebec. During recent decades the growing French-speaking population has begun to expand outward as a result of its high birth rate. Most of northern New Brunswick is now French-speaking, and there are large French-Canadian settlements in eastern and northern Ontario. French-speaking people have also crossed the international border into Vermont and New Hampshire.

**RACIAL GROUPS**—About half the Canadian population is still British in origin—English,

Scottish, and Irish, in that order of relative size. These people do not reproduce as rapidly as the French Canadians, consequently the ethnic composition of the nation is gradually changing. During the first thirty years of this century, when immigration to Canada was at its peak, large numbers of Europeans other than British came to the Dominion. Dutch, Scandinavian, German, Polish, Ukrainian, and a few other ethnic groups combined make up about twenty per cent of the total population. They form a large segment of the population of the western provinces, where they remain in agricultural communities, and have also been fairly well absorbed into the industrial cities of Ontario.

### GOVERNMENT

The British North America Act of 1867 defined the powers of the central government as well as those of the provinces. The Act, by this division of powers, created a sort of dual government, somewhat similar to that in the United States. The central government was given the right to legislate for peace, order, and good government as well as to exercise specific functions for the nation. The provinces, however, retained control of education, taxes, civil rights, and property within their borders. With growth the Canadian constitutional system has reflected an organic process of development and adjustment to new circumstances, but a strong centralized government has not evolved. Federal-provincial relations, therefore, have never crystallized and even in the mid-twentieth century are undergoing scrutiny. True, during World War II the central government directed the nation's destiny, especially in the economic field, but after the war provincial autonomy promptly reasserted itself. So strong is the rivalry between provincial and federal authority that efforts to frame a Canadian constitution that would eliminate the twilight zone be-

tween federal and provincial powers have so far proved ineffective.

Within this framework of dual government Canadian provinces are significantly important. Limited to ten in number, they are much larger on the average than American states. Also, each province has a larger percentage—both in area and in population—of the total than any one state has of the United States total. Partly because of this, provincial governments tend to be a strong factor in Canadian political life. The preoccupation of the French Canadians with the preservation of the French language in a predominantly English-speaking country is a case in point.

The provincial governments are also strong because of the distribution of Canadian population in clusters across the continent. There is at least one large cluster, or satellite core, of population in each province, usually around the provincial capital. These cores tend to turn to the local rather than to the federal government.

Because of the political significance of the large internal units of government, the location of boundaries between the provinces may attain greater importance in the future. The surveying and demarcation of these boundaries have been slow; some lines exist only on maps and not on the ground. Most serious of the current boundary questions is that concerning the border between Labrador (now a district in Newfoundland Province) and Quebec Province. The latter has never recognized a boundary and still does not show one on provincial maps. The issue assumed importance when it became known that large Labrador iron ore deposits extend far into Quebec.

## INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS

**WORLD POSITION**—After the turn of the twentieth century, Canada, in line with its internal growth and maturity, assumed a dominant role in world affairs. Equal and

independent status within the Commonwealth is one manifestation of this, active participation in international conferences is another. Military contributions in two world wars earned for Canada a claim to participation with the world powers in formulating postwar policies. Thus Canada has continually supported the United Nations, participated in the work of its specialized agencies, discussed along with the great powers proposals for the international control of atomic energy, and contributed in the Korean conflict. Canadian leadership in the Western World would seem to belie its rank as only a middle power.

As a world trader Canada ranks fourth, surpassed only by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. Roughly one fourth of its economy is tied to foreign markets. Canada is the chief supplier, particularly for the United States, of such basic commodities as newsprint, lumber, nickel, platinum, and asbestos, leading the world in the production of these commodities. Canada also ranks high as a source of zinc, copper, aluminum, fish, and flour. Dependent as it is on trade, Canada has worked for greater freedom in international trade. It is a signatory of the Geneva Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1947), which widens Canada's trade area under reciprocal arrangements and is also related to the preferential trading system of the Commonwealth area. Even so, about one half of Canada's trade is with its southern neighbor. Canadian imports include such items as machinery, automobile parts, petroleum, coal, and electrical supplies.

**BOUNDARIES**—Canada is one of those fortunate countries, which, despite its large size, has no serious external boundary problems. Canada's common boundary with the United States is cited as "the world's longest undefended boundary." These friendly nations, whose basic influences are traced to Great Britain, settled upon their boundary by

negotiation and arbitration more than 100 years ago.<sup>4</sup> The two countries maintain an International Joint Commission which settles all matters related to the common frontier and considers disputes regarding the use of common river systems.<sup>5</sup>

Canada's boundary with Alaska was determined early in the century by agreement between Britain and the United States. Canadians were unhappy over the decision because northern British Columbia and southern Yukon were cut off from the Pacific Coast. Fortunately transit movements through the coastal strip of the Alaskan Panhandle have not been impeded, and the boundary has caused no serious difficulties. The right of American fishermen to enter Hecate Strait, between the Queen Charlotte Islands and the mainland of British Columbia, is, however, a slight problem. Although protested many times by west coast Canadian fishermen, it is sanctioned by federal authorities.

Hudson Bay and Strait have for many decades been recognized as Canadian territory, despite the fact that the width of Hudson Strait is much greater than the three-mile sea limit recognized by international law. When Newfoundland joined Canada

in 1949, the Gulf of St. Lawrence became virtually an enclosed Canadian "sea."

Off the Canadian east coast, immediately south of Newfoundland, are two small islands which belong to France: St. Pierre and Miquelon, the last remnants of France's colonial empire that once embraced most of eastern Canada. The islands have no economic importance except as a base for fishing.

Prior to 1940 Canada's claim to the sector of the Arctic Ocean extending to the North Pole caused little concern among other nations because the ice-covered sea was considered useless. In 1931 Norway, an interested nation, recognized Canadian sovereignty over the Sverdrup group of Arctic islands. Thus Canada holds sovereignty over the whole Arctic sector north of the Canadian mainland. In the modern air age these islands have taken on a strategic importance as steppingstones for global air routes across the top of the world. Although the United States has not claimed the Arctic sector north of Alaska, nor has it recognized the Soviet Arctic sector on the other side of the North Pole, American weather-reporting planes make frequent flights over the water area from Alaska to the Pole.

## ALASKA

Alaska was settled by Russian traders and fishermen in the eighteenth century, but was purchased by the United States in 1867. Since that time it has remained in territorial


status, but, as the population has grown, increasing amounts of self-government in local affairs have been granted. Many Alaskans now wish the territory to be admitted to statehood in order that it may benefit from the rights and privileges enjoyed by other states in the Union. (For the Alaskan point of view, see page 127.)

The western reaches of Alaska are a virtual land bridge connecting northwestern North America with northeastern Asia. The Aleutian Archipelago extends through the North Pacific for 1,500 miles to within 600 miles of

<sup>4</sup> Under the Rush-Bagot agreement (1817) both parties endorsed disarmament of their naval forces on the Great Lakes. The northern land boundary, however, remained a source of dispute until the signing of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty in 1842.

<sup>5</sup> Established in 1909, the Commission acts as a permanent tribunal in a wide range of problems, provided that the United States Senate and the Canadian government jointly agree to submit their differences.

the Kamchatka Peninsula in Soviet Russia. Thus Alaska not only guards the approach to the United States from the northwest but is the northern point of the American defense triangle in the Pacific, with the Hawaiian Islands and the Panama Canal as the other points. North of the Aleutian Islands the Seward Peninsula of Alaska is only fifty-four miles distant from the eastern tip of the Siberian mainland (see map below).



It is believed that the first inhabitants of North America, the Indians, entered the continent by way of the Alaska route at least 10,000 years ago. It is also fairly well established that the Eskimo inhabitants of Arctic North America crossed to this continent over Bering Strait more than 2,000 years ago. From Alaska the Indians moved southward; the Eskimos, eastward.

#### PHYSICAL FEATURES

Alaska is a land of diverse land formations. A series of arching mountain ranges rise steeply from the indented coastline of the Panhandle, along the coast of Canada, and the southern coast to form the structural backbone of the huge peninsula. Crowned by Mt. McKinley (20,300 feet) in south-central Alaska, these ranges dip into the sea on the southwest to form the chain of volcanic Aleutian Islands. Such formidable mountains have acted as a barrier to

the inward penetration of Alaska and have helped to confine settlements to the southern coastal regions. Northern Alaska consists of the high, east-west Brooks Range and, beyond it to the north, a sloping, poorly drained Arctic coastal plain. Between the southern mountains and the Brooks Range, the central part of the country is a rolling upland, cut by broad, deep valleys and sloping down to a low plain near the mouth of the Yukon River and adjacent coastal stretches along the Bering Sea.

A wide range of temperature and precipitation conditions is found in this large area of 586,000 square miles. The southeastern coast is mild in winter, cool in summer, and wet all year round, much like the coastal area of British Columbia, Washington, and Oregon. In marked contrast, interior Alaska has a subarctic, or continental, climate, with fairly warm summers and severe, cold, dry winters. Northern Alaska has an arctic climate of cool summers and cold winters.

#### ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Alaskan resources are not fully utilized; in fact, they are not even completely known. Fishing is the only economic activity that has been carried to a stage of maturity. Concentration of population and large towns in the Panhandle and along the south-central coast can be attributed in large measure to the establishment of salmon fisheries. Forests and minerals, except for gold, have defied exploitation because they are bulky resources and are remote from a market. Alaskan agriculture could absorb many future settlers, provided that they were willing to accept a lower standard of living than most farmers in the United States enjoy. Unfortunately, the areas of longest frost-free period—on the south and southeast coasts—have the smallest amount of level land. The chief agricultural development lies in the

Matanuska Valley, at the head of Cook Inlet. Nearby is Anchorage, the market area and Alaska's largest city.

### POPULATION

Between 1940 and 1950 Alaska's population increased from 73,000 to 130,000, after having been stationary for half a century. Although civilian immigration from the United States accounts for most of the growth, the military population in 1950 numbered about 20,000. The native population remains stable at about 34,000 (16,000 Eskimos, 12,000 Indians, 6,000 Aleuts). About two thirds of Alaska's inhabitants live in or near the several urban centers close to the shores of the Gulf of Alaska: Anchorage, Juneau (the capital),

and Ketchikan. Most of the nonnative population of the interior lives in Fairbanks, in the heart of the Yukon drainage basin.

Alaska resembles Canada in that each has a relatively small population in a large area and both populations are concentrated in the south where the climate is more favorable and transportation more easily developed. Also like Canada, Alaska seems to have large resources that are only now beginning to be exploited. Northern Alaska is geographically similar to Arctic Canada and, since World War II, likewise occupies a strategic position with respect to the Soviet Arctic. For this reason Alaska has been treated largely as a military district, with Anchorage as the headquarters of the Alaskan Command.

### GREENLAND

Greenland was settled by Norse adventurers about 1,000 years ago, but by 1500 disease and malnutrition had wiped out the colonists. Later Danes settled western Greenland, and in 1814 Denmark claimed sovereignty over the whole island, since the settlement of 1814, which dissolved the Union of Norway and Denmark, did not mention Greenland. Controversy with Norway over seal-fishing rights led, in 1932, to a decision by the International Court of Arbitration upholding Denmark's claims.

As a territory Greenland is largely uninhabitable, and no opportunity for development seems likely. A vast ice cap covers eighty-five per cent of its 840,000 square miles. Most of the 23,000 inhabitants live on the headlands and along the sheltered fiords of the ice-free west and southwest coasts. East Greenland accounts for only a handful of the total.

For more than a century Denmark has ruled the colony with a strong paternalistic hand and sheltered the native inhabitants

from contacts with the outside world. A paucity of European settlers and a preponderance of native Eskimos explain the lack of political growth toward self-rule. In fact, despite the existence of local councils, the island became, in 1953, an integral part of Denmark.

Greenland's part in world economy can never reach impressive proportions. Its people, only now emerging from a primitive hunting and fishing economy, have just two resources of sufficient importance to enter international trade: codfish, from the fishing grounds off the southwest coast, and the world's foremost cryolite deposits at Ivigtut. Although trade is a monopoly of the Crown, the costs of administration have generally exceeded the revenues collected from Greenland.

Somewhat different is Greenland's role in world politics, because of its location far within the Arctic Circle and close to Canada on the west and Iceland on the east. As a colony of Denmark Greenland has acquired





prominence since 1949 because of the mother country's membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Of strategic importance is the establishment of the American air base at Thule, one of the most elaborate bases built since World War II. Located halfway between the Arctic Circle and the

North Pole, it is a vital part of the Arctic defense sector (see the map above). Although it serves military purposes as an experimental center in the upper polar areas, Thule could become part of a short route over the North Pole for commercial airlines connecting North America and northern Asia.

Scandinavian Airlines uses airfields in Greenland and central Canada on its route from Europe to the west coast of the United States.

Because of its geographic position in the

North Atlantic, Greenland is important as a source region for weather that affects the whole North Atlantic area. Meteorological research is, therefore, valuable to several countries.

### Study Questions

1. What are the main differences in political status among Alaska, Canada, and Greenland?
2. What are some of the advantages and disadvantages of Canada's northern global position?
3. Discuss how landform barriers and drainage patterns played an important part in the early history of Canadian settlement.
4. What are some of the advantages and disadvantages of Canada's generally rectangular shape and large area?
5. How has the character of Canada's chief landform regions influenced the present distribution of population?
6. Discuss, and show by the use of maps, how the climate of most of the populated areas in Canada is similar to that experienced in the United States.
7. What are the possibilities and the difficulties of Canada's increasing her area of cultivated land in order to support a larger population?
8. What are the major contributions that Canada's forest area is making to world economy?
9. Discuss the validity of the statement: "Canada is becoming one of the major sources of mineral wealth in the world."
10. Show how the Canadian transportation pattern has been important in the economic development of the country. Draw sketch maps in your answer.
11. What historical and geographical factors have acted to keep seventy per cent of the Canadian population within one hundred miles of the United States border?
12. By means of maps, show the original core of French-Canadian settlement, and the area now inhabited by French-speaking peoples in Canada. Discuss some of the reasons for this growth.
13. Discuss the possibilities of expanding agricultural production in Alaska sufficiently to feed the rapidly increasing population.
14. Discuss the strategic position of Alaska and the Canadian Arctic in world politics.
15. Make some comparisons between the position and character of Greenland in the North Atlantic and those of Alaska in the North Pacific.

## CHAPTER SEVEN

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# *The Foundations of the United States*

In the twentieth century the United States of America has become one of the most powerful nations of the world. The 3,000,000 square miles of land within its borders comprise only five per cent of the world total, but no other area has been as richly endowed with the foundations for great power. The nation's people, about 160,000,000 at mid-century, constitute only about six per cent of the world population, but in no other comparable area do most of the people enjoy the benefits of as high living standards and opportunities for self-improvement. Few other nations approach the United States in capacity to produce the food, the raw materials, and the manufactured goods associated with modern world power.

✓ The strength and leading position of the United States are attributable to several complex and interrelated factors. Some are historical, others are political or economic, and still others are results of good fortune in

time and location. But in the final analysis the real foundations of the nation's strength are to be found in its men and resources. ✓ The greatness and prosperity of the United States are firmly rooted in a rich and varied endowment of resources—climate, terrain, water, soil, vegetation, and minerals. To this land there came from Europe settlers already possessed of an advanced culture to become the builders of America and to become the beneficiaries of its wealth of resources. Among the many interrelated factors that fostered the building of the United States to a position of world leadership in production and power, ten appear most significant:

- ✓ 1. Gradual expansion across North America from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean to form a large, compact area under one government.
2. Physical isolation from the strife of Europe and Asia combined with simple, peaceful international boundaries.

3. Location in the favored middle latitudes with sufficient variety of environment.

4. Space to accommodate a rapid growth of population coincident with industrialization without the stresses of overpopulation.

5. Agricultural land resources sufficiently varied in quantity and quality to sustain a large industrial and urban-centered population.

6. Abundant forest-land resources to sustain growing industries and provide adequate homes and dwellings throughout the nation.

7. A generous and varied mineral resource endowment, especially of fuels and iron ore, to form the basis of modern industrialization.

8. A well-developed network of transportation facilities binding the country into a single unit.

9. Great productive capacity coupled with scientific and technical development stimulated by the application of efficient organizational administration and a mass-production system.

10. Organization under a democratic form of government able to further the welfare of the people.

#### HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

The story of the westward expansion of the United States from the Atlantic to the Pacific coast is one of the sagas of modern empire building (see map on page 95). As the historian Frederick Jackson Turner observed, in 1893, "Up to our own day American History has been in a large degree the history of the colonization of the Great West. The existence of an area of free land, its continuous recession, and the advance of American settlement westward, explains American development." Certainly the fact that all the land from Canada to Mexico and from the Atlantic to the Pacific came to be occupied by American settlers is of profound importance in the nation's political geography. Had the favored middle belt of North America been fragmented into several nations, perhaps with different languages, it is less likely that any great nation would ever have developed in North America.

The settlements at Jamestown (1607) and

at Plymouth (1620) by English colonists laid the foundation for the United States. To the new land the people brought a background of knowledge, skills, and a concept of individual liberty and self-reliance that have formed the foundation of the American way of life.


For more than a hundred years the English colonists concentrated occupancy in a narrow Atlantic coastal area generally within 100 miles of the sea. No doubt this concentration was an asset to the English in their conflicts with the French who settled more widely but held their territory only lightly as hunters and trappers. Not until 1774 was there a permanent settlement by English colonists west of the Appalachian Mountains. In 1763 the Treaty of Paris removed the French as a major contender for eastern North America and established the Mississippi River as the western boundary of the English colonies.

Close settlement along the Atlantic seaboard also fostered a spirit of self-confidence which eventually led to the Revolution of 1775 and the separation of the colonies from England. The United States of America became a reality with the adoption of a federal Constitution in 1787.

Skilful diplomacy and the fortunes of history enabled the young republic, step by step from 1803 to 1853, to secure for itself vast stretches of land lying beyond the confines of the original thirteen colonies—land claimed and partially settled by France, Spain, and Mexico, or still retained in the far northwest by England. First, in 1803, the purchase of the Louisiana Territory from France for \$15,000,000 extended the United States border westward to include the Mississippi drainage area and doubled the size of the young nation. Over the new territory the westward movement continued to the margins of the dry west. Here the expansion lost its wavelike character and continued in narrow streams of settlers and wagon

caravans making their way to the Pacific by such famous routes as the Oregon and California trails.

In 1819, Florida was purchased from Spain; in 1845, Texas was annexed. In 1846, Great Britain relinquished the Oregon Territory. In 1848, California, New Mexico, and other lands from the Gila River north to the Oregon Territory were ceded by Mexico. In 1853 the United States paid \$10,000,000 to Mexico for the so-called Gadsden Purchase, and thus completed the present boundaries



No other series of events have been so significant in the growth of the United States. With the youthful nation stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific and from Mexico to Canada, the stage was set for men to fill in and develop a great world power in the favored middle belt of North America.

#### LOCATION AND BOUNDARIES ✓

The land occupied by the United States is highly favored, in both size and location, for great development by man. The 3,022,387 square miles of area places it fifth in size among world nations, the Soviet Union being two and one half times as large, China nearly forty per cent larger, and Canada and Brazil only slightly larger. But no nation excels the United States in quantity and quality of land favorable for human development, for the United States is fortunate above others in its middle latitude location. (Its size and lo-

cation combine to provide a variable range of climatic conditions without the cold and dry extremes of the boreal lands that hamper development in much of the Soviet Union and Canada or the extremes of the humid tropics such as limit Brazil. The nation's climatic regions include important areas of humid subtropic, dry summer subtropic, humid continental, subtropical and middle latitude drylands, and marine west coast.<sup>1</sup> The greatest single locational asset of the nation is its occupancy of the humid lowland in North America extending from the 100th Meridian eastward to the Atlantic Ocean.

The United States borders but two other nations, Canada and Mexico. The eastern portion of the Canadian-American boundary, following water features for the most part, is formed chiefly by the St. Croix and St. John rivers, the St. Lawrence River, four of the Great Lakes,<sup>2</sup> and the Pigeon River. West of Lake of the Woods, which is shared by Minnesota and the provinces of Ontario and Manitoba, the boundary runs westward along the 49th Parallel for 1,300 miles, until it ends at the Strait of Georgia, an arm of the Pacific Ocean. This northern boundary is one of the longest and most peaceful international frontiers in the world. There are, to be sure, traditional customs posts set up for health regulations and the prevention of smuggling, but the entire line is unfortified. Ever since the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817 no warships have been maintained on the Great Lakes.

The Mexican-American boundary follows the Rio Grande River from the Gulf of Mexico westward for over 1,200 miles to

<sup>1</sup> These terms are among the commonly accepted ones in characterizing the world's major climatic regions. For example, humid subtropical means hot summer, mild winter, rainy throughout the year. A good basic treatment of climates is found in Glenn T. Trewartha, *An Introduction to Climate* (3rd ed., McGraw-Hill, 1954).

<sup>2</sup> Only Lake Michigan lies completely within the confines of the United States.

El Paso. Westward from El Paso it consists largely of a series of straight lines through the desert areas to the Pacific. Since 1848 there has been considerable controversy over boundary location along the Rio Grande and over international water rights, both at the Rio Grande and in the basin of the Colorado River. In all cases, mutual agreements were finally worked out between the two nations. Recently some friction has developed along the Mexican-American boundary in connection with the illegal crossing of the border by Mexican immigrants<sup>3</sup> in search of employment in the United States. Despite efforts by both nations to halt this illegal crossing, many thousands have escaped detection and now reside within the United States.

#### AGRICULTURAL FOUNDATION

Favorable combination of landforms, climate, and soils has provided the United States with a strong foundation for feeding its people and supplying agricultural raw materials. In total about 460,000,000 acres may be considered suitable for crop agriculture.<sup>4</sup> This area represents 23.5 per cent of the nation's total land and about fifteen per cent of the world's potential cultivated land. Agricultural land per capita in the United States is 2.9 acres as compared with only about 0.5 acre in China and 2.4 acres in the Soviet Union.

One may consider the 100th Meridian as the dividing line between the "well watered" or humid eastern half and the dry, mountainous western half of the United States. Throughout the eastern half there is adequate seasonal precipitation combined with sufficient water and length of growing season for a wide variety of crops. The humid region accounts for about eighty-five

per cent of the nation's agricultural land. Here is indeed an impressive "heartland" on which to base a great world power.

**AGRICULTURAL REGIONS**—Sufficient differentiation in soils, occupancy, and climatic conditions, together with the factors of early development of commercial agriculture, a good transportation system, and growing markets, has led to the establishment of fairly well-defined agricultural regions. A broad classification of these regions is illustrated in the map on page 97.


The well-known Corn Belt is one of the great grain- and meat-producing areas of the world. Favorable terrain of low relief permits most of the land to be cropped. The growing season averages 150-200 days. The annual precipitation of twenty to fifty inches with the maximum occurring in summer, combines advantageously with warm days and nights during the growing season. The area has special significance as a producer of corn and pork and as a fattening area for range cattle moving to market.

North and to the west of the Corn Belt is the Spring Wheat Region where summer temperatures are lower, with July averages at 65-70° F., and the growing season shorter, averaging 120-150 days. In the west precipitation is as little as twenty inches, but fortunately it comes in spring and summer. The land is level to rolling, and soils are especially fertile in the Red River area, providing the basis for the highly specialized commercial wheat growing which is carried on in this region.

North of, and eastward from, the Corn Belt extends the Dairying Region. Here annual precipitation is greater, but the soils are less adaptable to commercial farming and the terrain is rougher. Nevertheless, much of this area has been utilized for growing forage crops to support a dairy industry. Large urban concentrations in the vicinity of the Great Lakes and on the Eastern Seaboard provide an ample market for milk, butter,

<sup>3</sup> Known as "wetbacks," many of the migratory workers, who have entered the United States illegally, have served as farm hands in the Far West.

<sup>4</sup> Of the total, about 350,000,000 acres are normally planted in crops each year.



and cheese. In the more favorable areas diversified farming also provides products for city markets, culminating in the Truck Garden and Mixed Farming Region that extends along the Atlantic Coast from the Carolinas to southern New England. The truck gardens on the sandy coastal soils represent the most intensive type of American agriculture, except possibly that in some irrigated regions in the western part of the country.

Agriculture in southeastern United States is generally associated with the Cotton Belt. The area is characterized by very high growth potentials and suitability to a variety of commercial crops. Its growing season is over 200 days. Annual precipitation is from thirty to sixty inches, generally with a summer season maximum. Growing season temperatures are warm, with July averages generally over 75° F.; in addition, winters are relatively mild. Although cotton remains a leading crop, the area is becoming more and more diversified in farming prac-

tices—grains, animal products, fruits and vegetables, tobacco, and even tree crops add to the stability of agricultural development.

Between the Cotton Belt and the Corn Belt is an area of general farming where corn and wheat predominate. The Ohio River Valley marks the heart of this region. Along the Gulf Coast and in Florida the climate is unfavorable to cotton production, and the region is one of humid subtropical crops, of which the citrus fruits of Florida are probably the most widely known.

The Winter Wheat Region centering on Kansas consists of wide expanses of level to rolling land which make it one of the most significant surplus-producing areas in the Western Hemisphere. Kansas alone produces as much wheat as does Argentina or Australia.

The dry western half of the nation contains a number of important irrigated crop-producing areas. These include the Columbia Basin areas, particularly the irrigated valleys of the Snake, Yakima, and Wenatchee

rivers; the very important Imperial Valley of California; and other Southwest irrigated areas, plus a number of areas in Utah and Colorado. Together, the irrigated lands of the West total 25,000,000 acres. They supply to the nation many specialties, which range from dates, citrus fruits, long-staple cotton, and grapes in the south to sugar beets, apples, hops, potatoes, and dry beans in the north. Dry-farming areas of the Columbia Basin produce ten per cent of the nation's wheat. The Puget Sound-Willamette Lowland, in the extreme northwest, with forty inches of annual precipitation but a notably dry summer, is important for many specialties, notably horticulture crops, grass and forage seeds, and animal and poultry products. In addition, dry farming<sup>5</sup> is practiced on many areas of the Great Plains west of the twenty-inch precipitation line. Together, these many specialized regions add strength to the nation's agricultural resources through variety as well as quantity.

The open spaces of the West, though low in productive capacity, are an important part of the nation's agricultural foundation. West of the 100th Meridian there are some 750,000,000 acres of range land, from which comes a considerable portion of the nation's meat requirements, as well as hides and wool. Throughout the area many great ranches utilize mountain and open-range pastures during the warm months.

**AGRICULTURAL POTENTIAL**—The United States is the world's greatest agricultural producer, despite the fact that the number of agricultural workers has steadily declined in recent decades until only about twelve out of every 100 persons are now engaged in producing food and other raw materials on the farm (in contrast to India, for example, where seventy out of every 100 are so em-

ployed). The nation is a surplus producer of such major commodities as wheat, corn, rice, potatoes, meats, fats and oils, and cotton.<sup>6</sup> It is true that there are some shortages, the principal ones being such tropical commodities as cane sugar, coffee, tea, bananas, spices, hard fibers, and natural rubber.

## FOREST FOUNDATION

The forest lands of the United States cover one fourth of the land area. The existence of large forests is an especially fortunate factor in the American economy both because timber is a renewable crop and because the uses of wood are increasingly important and varied in the production of such commodities as rayon, cellophane, and plastics, as well as of lumber and paper. In total, some 461,000,000 acres are classified as capable of growing commercial timber. About twenty per cent of the forest land is under Federal ownership, five per cent is held by various state and local governments; an estimated fifteen per cent is owned by private forest industries; and the remainder is scattered in 4,000,000 small holdings. The area devoted to tree growing is likely to be relatively stable because the forests still standing are for the most part on nonarable land, and the nation's forest industry is entering an era of organized reforestation.

The forest lands can meet the needs of the nation if adequate safeguards are adopted in the exploitation of the timber resources. Much of the timberland of the Northwest was depleted in the nineteenth century through wasteful processing of timber and lack of forest conservation projects. The recent more careful management of our forest resources is largely the result of government regulation and a spirit of public welfare on the part of the forest industry. To

<sup>5</sup> The method of allowing land to lie fallow a year or more between harvests and plowing and planting at times when the limited moisture supply can be best conserved.

<sup>6</sup> About twenty to forty per cent of the principal agricultural products are exported in the world's markets.



meet the needs of the future, trees must be growing in all stages of the long growth cycle in order that the annual harvest may be balanced by a maturing crop. At the present time about forty per cent of the forest land supports trees of saw-timber size to provide the annual harvest of timber. About twenty per cent, or nearly 100,000,000 acres, supports vigorously growing young trees over five inches in diameter, which will in time become saw timber. The remainder is in seedlings or saplings or is inadequately stocked for commercial cutting.

Two forest areas are of outstanding importance to the nation. The Southern Pine Forest Region, extending from Texas to Virginia, contains forty per cent of the nation's forest land and produces over twenty-five per cent of all timber volume. Its warm, moist climate and nearly year-round growing season promotes rapid growth of trees, and the region is important as a supplier of naval stores and a producer of cellulose for paper, rayon, and other products. The Pacific Northwest has half the nation's softwood saw timber and half the virgin timber. Mild, moist climate and rugged terrain make the land excellent for tree growing, the Northwest supplies approximately twenty-five per cent of the nation's total timber harvest. Other important areas are the Northeast—especially Maine and Vermont—and the northern Great Lakes states.

#### MINERAL FOUNDATION

The United States has a bountiful mineral resource base; it is especially strong in fuels and iron ore (see map on page 103). Moreover, the two basic minerals, coal and iron ore, are located in close proximity to each other and are, therefore, favorably situated for development. The table on pages 100–101, showing the nation's position in major minerals, as compared with world resources, indicates the strength, as well as some of the weaknesses, of the nation.

**ENERGY RESOURCES**—Energy from coal, petroleum, natural gas, and water falls, developed in enormous amounts, is an essential element of the nation's strength. Without it the great productivity of farm, forest, mine, and factory would be impossible. The fact that the people of the United States utilize at least forty per cent of the world's energy is a direct index to the nation's high living standard and a comparative measure of its prodigious capacity to produce. In the United States the share of total energy contributed by each of the several resources, computed in British thermal units, is: coal, 34.2 per cent, petroleum, 39.5 per cent; natural gas, 22.2 per cent; water power, 4.1 per cent.

Reserves of coal make it the backbone of the energy resources. The nation's reserve of all coals is estimated at about 1,900,000,000 tons, or about thirty-four per cent of the world total. Coal accounts for about eighty-five per cent of all mineral fuel reserves. Annual production is between 500,000,000 and 600,000,000 tons, or about thirty per cent of the world total. Over ninety per cent of all production is east of the Mississippi River, especially within the Appalachian and eastern interior fields. In both regions machine mining is particularly favored because the deposits are in thick, horizontal beds. The American miner produces over six tons per day in contrast with less than two tons per man-day output in most other coal-producing countries.

The share of coal in providing the basic energy of the nation has, however, steadily declined from about ninety per cent at the opening of the century to a mid-century low of only thirty-four per cent. Petroleum and natural gas, however, have advanced in the same ratio. Nevertheless, there has been an over-all increase in quantity of coal mined to help meet the nation's growing requirements. About twenty-five per cent of the coal is used for coking purposes, most of it in smelting iron ore; as yet there is no

Position of the United States in Selected Major Minerals  
(Tonnage Based on 1950 Statistics)

Minerals	Production		Consumption		Supply Situation and Foreign Sources
	Quantity (in tons)	Per Cent of World Total	Quantity (primary metal only)	Per Cent of World Production	
Fuels					
Coal					
bituminous	512,000,000	28	453,830,000	25	Adequate net exporter
anthracite	44,076,703		39,900,000		
Coke	72,718,038	37	73,416,519	37	Tight supply problem in depletion of high-grade coking coal
Petroleum (barrels)	1,971,845,000	52	2,483,000,000	65	Demand above domestic production; reflects high living standard
Natural gas (billion cu. ft.)	6,281	88	6,026	—	Increasing consumption
Minerals					
Iron (ore)	98,045,360	40	106,610,273	43	Tremendous production, yet demand higher, no serious problem
Antimony	2,497	4	15,494	28	Available by land from Mexico; also from Bolivia, Peru, Chile, Belgium, Yugoslavia
Asbestos	41,358	3	728,786	55	Imported from Canada, except for certain quantities available only in Union of South Africa
Bauxite	1,334,527	16	3,332,803	40	Critical, also from Surinam, Indonesia, British Guiana
Chromite	404 (In 1953, 57,000 tons produced)	—	980,369	39	Critical, also from South Africa, Turkey, Philippines, Southern Rhodesia

satisfactory substitute for coke. Coal is also of major importance as a raw material for a vast chemical industry.

Petroleum has profound strategic implications because of its essential military as well as industrial uses both as fuel and as lubricant. The United States has long led the world in the production of petroleum

and is still producing about half the world's total, as well as consuming a still larger percentage. Annual domestic production capacity is 6,500,000 barrels daily compared with about 1,000,000 daily in the Soviet-controlled areas. World estimates of proved petroleum reserve credit the United States with 29,000,000,000 barrels, or 21.5 per cent of the world

Position of the United States in Selected Major Minerals—*continued*

Minerals	Production		Consumption		Supply Situation and Foreign Sources
	Quantity (in tons)	Per Cent of World Total	Quantity (primary metal only)	Per Cent of World Production	
Minerals ( <i>continued</i> )					
Cobalt*	405	5	4,141	53	Critical, also from Belgian Congo, Belgium
Copper	909,343	33	1,447,000	53	Demand greater than domestic production, substitutions and scrap important, also from Chile, Northern Rhodesia, Canada, Mexico
Lead	430,827	24	952,490 (from new lead only)	52	Available by land from Mexico, Canada
Manganese	134,451	2	1,650,429	28	Most critical weakness; also from India, Brazil, Gold Coast
Mercury (76-lb. flasks)	4,545	3	49,215	36	Domestic production is function of price; also from Spain, Italy
Molybdenum	14,240	90	13,014	82	Surplus for export
Nickel	none	—	98,904	62	Available from Canada
Phosphate	11,114,159	48	8,580,925	36	Net exporter
Potash	1,286,762	39	1,409,940	43	Adequate
Sulfur (native)	5,192,184	91	4,158,462	73	Net exporter
Tin	15	—	69	69	Critical shortage; also from Bolivia, Indonesia, Nigeria
Tungsten (60% conc.)	4,820	15	6,932	23	Shortage; also from Korea, Bolivia, Brazil, Peru, Thailand, Australia
Zinc	623,375	27	964,099	41	Shortage, also from Canada, Mexico

total; the Middle East is estimated to have sixty per cent, and the Soviet Union seven per cent. Half of the nation's reserve is in Texas, and nearly fifteen per cent is in California.

\* Estimates of proved reserves are always subject to revision as new pools are discovered within continental United States as well as abroad. Geologists have credited the United States with a twenty-five-year supply of petroleum, although the prediction seems to be an underestimate of our total available reserves

The United States is the only important user of natural gas; it produces about ninety per cent of the world total. The extraordinary increase in the consumption of this fuel in the United States is due to its use to heat homes. In terms of reserves, petroleum accounts for an estimated two per cent of the total of the various mineral fuels available in the United States, natural gas for another two per cent, and oil from oil shale for twelve per cent.

It is evident that petroleum and natural gas cannot long continue to increase in importance as suppliers of energy. With depletion of present stocks there will be a gradual shift, first to oil shale, then to other oil-bearing sources, with a later transition to some form of atomic-energy source. Ultimately man is likely to harness the sun for the operation of machines and the heating of homes.

**IRON ORE**—Iron ore deposits of the United States are ample and favorably situated for industrial development. Estimates of reserves credit the nation with a remaining resource of 4,300,000,000 tons of high-grade ore and some 75,000,000,000 tons of comparatively low-grade ore. Most of the reserve is in the Lake Superior region. To meet the requirements of the nation's industry, an annual production of crude ore of over 100,000,000 tons is needed. About eighty per cent of this is mined in the Lake Superior region and shipped by ore boats to blast-furnace centers. Access to the other Great Lakes is through the Sault Ste. Marie Canal, which connects Lake Superior and Lake Huron. The Soo Locks of this canal handle at least seventy per cent of the nation's total ore production; in 1952 about 15,700 vessels passed through it in the 265-day shipping season. The Soo Locks are a highly important and vulnerable link in the United States industrial economy in as much as about seventy per cent of the nation's blast-furnace capacity is located just south of the Great Lakes where the iron ore meets the coal. Anticipating the eventual exhaustion of Lake Superior ore, the mining industry is actively developing economical techniques for utilizing the large deposits of low-grade ores, as well as turning toward foreign sources of rich ore deposits. About ten per cent of the nation's iron-ore consumption is imported, chiefly for coastal blast-furnace centers. Recently high-grade ores have been developed in Labrador and


Venezuela. Major ports of entry are Baltimore—by far the most important—Philadelphia and Mobile.

**MINERAL DEFICIENCIES**—Requirements are generally greater than domestic production in a number of essential major minerals other than fuels, and there are some serious deficiencies. The United States produces a third of the world's copper but uses fifty-three per cent, produces 24 per cent of the three per cent, produces twenty-four per cent of the world's lead but uses fifty-two per cent, produces twenty-seven per cent of the world's zinc but uses forty-one per cent of the total Potash, phosphate, and sulfur are produced in large quantities adequate for domestic needs. Molybdenum and possibly vanadium are the only ferroalloys produced in adequate amounts.

The major minerals in which domestic production is inadequate and for which there are no satisfactory substitutes include manganese, chromite, nickel, tin, bauxite, antimony, cobalt, columbium, asbestos, quartz, graphite, platinum, and uranium.<sup>8</sup> Manganese is essential as a "purifier" in all steel production and as an alloy for strength and toughness in tool products. There are known low-grade domestic deposits, but ninety-nine per cent of the nation's large requirement comes from distant overseas sources. Very little chromite is mined and no nickel, although both are essential to modern industry.

Tin has not been found in important commercial quantities. The government-built tin smelter at Texas City, Texas, improved the nation's situation, but ore must still come from Bolivia or Southeast Asia. Bauxite reserves of commercial quality in aluminum production are small, and only about one third of the nation's requirement is met by domestic mining. Antimony, essential to

<sup>8</sup> In the classification of raw materials, such items are listed as "strategic materials" by the United States Government (see page 72 for a further discussion).



the military in ammunition making as well as for storage batteries, is in critical shortage, but fortunately available in neighboring Mexico. Cobalt for magnets and heat-resistant alloys must be imported from the Belgian Congo and Northern Rhodesia. Columbium and tantalum, vital for strength and stability in high-temperature alloys, come almost entirely from sources in Africa.

Asbestos needs are met by imports from Canada. Industrial diamonds are imported from South Africa for use in cutting and grinding; practically none are produced in the United States. Quartz crystals of radio grade come from Brazil. High-grade graphite, needed for crucibles, foundry facings, and other uses, is imported from Mexico and Ceylon. Platinum metals, essential in many industrial and military uses, are imported almost wholly from Canada and Colombia. Even the bulk of strategic uranium ores used at Oak Ridge in the production of atomic bombs comes from the Belgian Congo and the Great Bear Lake region in western Canada. To offset these shortcomings, the United States resorts to stockpiling of many commodities and offers economic incentives to the mining industry designed to encourage the exploration and mining of critical minerals.

In the study of political geography it is important to note that minerals are distributed unevenly in the world and that access to commercial deposits and control of supply lines assume strategic importance. Modern industry requires at least seventy-five different minerals; no nation has them all.<sup>9</sup> Data on resource reserves are not immutable; they are subject to modification as the result of new discovery, new technology, rising and falling prices, or changing consumption demands. Domestic production

also is flexible, varying greatly with the need and the price that industry or government will pay.

## TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES

The United States has a well-developed, adequate network of transportation facilities including ocean ports, waterways, railroads, highways, pipelines, and airways. The ability to move raw materials, machinery, and people—always a fundamental requirement—becomes in time of war a critical consideration. Railroads are by far the most important, moving nearly sixty per cent of the ton-miles of freight; waterways move about sixteen per cent, pipelines about fourteen per cent; and trucks about twelve per cent. Airways are important for critical movements requiring speed, but the quantity of freight hauled is still comparatively small.

**RAILWAYS**—The 236,000 miles of railways in the United States represent about a third of the world's total mileage. A map of rail lines reveals concentration in the eastern half of the nation. There are, however, seven transcontinental lines: three in the north, two through the center, and two traversing the southern part of the country west of the 100th Meridian. (These seven lines are in significant contrast with the one east-west rail line in the Soviet Union!) New York is the leading eastern rail terminal, favored as it is by its ocean commerce and by easy access to the productive interior through the Mohawk Depression. Chicago, at the southern end of Lake Michigan, is the largest mid-continent terminal. New Orleans is the rail hub of the Gulf area, and Atlanta, at the southern end of the Appalachians, is the chief terminal in the southeast. Other important terminals are St. Louis, Minneapolis-St. Paul, Kansas City, Omaha, and Dallas. On the west coast Seattle, Portland, San Francisco, and Los Angeles are the major terminals for transcontinental lines.

<sup>9</sup> The President's Materials Policy Commission Report (1952) lists seventy raw materials in which American requirement exceeds domestic supply.

**WATERWAYS**—The United States merchant fleet is the largest in the world, accounting for 25,669,000 of the world's 81,924,000 gross tons—a fact that indicates the significant world relations of the United States. The indented Atlantic coastline has permitted development of excellent port facilities. Outstanding ports are Boston, on a natural harbor in Massachusetts Bay; New York, on the drowned lower Hudson River; Philadelphia, on the Delaware River; Baltimore, well inland on Chesapeake Bay, and Hampton Roads, at the entrance to Chesapeake Bay. The Gulf coast has major port facilities at Mobile, at the head of Mobile Bay; New Orleans, 110 miles up the Mississippi River, Galveston, at the entrance of the bay of the same name; and Houston, joined to the Gulf by a sixty-mile man-made channel.

The Pacific front has four major harbors. The Puget Sound, an arm of the ocean, penetrates far into the state of Washington and has many ports, including Seattle and Tacoma. The Columbia River has been improved by dredging to provide a ship channel to Portland, 110 miles inland. San Francisco Bay provides spacious harbor facilities and is the gateway to the Great Valley of California. Los Angeles harbor at San Pedro, though almost wholly man-made, has the largest volume of trade of all Pacific ports. Between the east and west coasts, the Panama Canal provides a significant water connection of commercial importance.

Inland waterways play an important role as transportation arteries, especially in the eastern half of the country. The most important of all are the Great Lakes on which vessels may sail as much as 1,000 miles from Duluth or Buffalo. Over 700 vessels are engaged on these lakes, chiefly moving iron ore, wheat, and limestone from the northern ports to the industrial area, although large tonnages of coal are also moved northward. The ice-free season is about eight months, usually from mid-April to early December.

The Sault Ste. Marie Canal between Lake Superior and Lake Huron carries more tonnage than the Suez and Panama canals combined. The St. Lawrence Waterway, penetrating deep into the continent to join the Great Lakes, has been limited in its importance by shallow controlling depths in canals that bypass the rapids and falls. The St. Lawrence Seaway Project with a twenty-seven-foot channel into the Great Lakes will enable ocean-going vessels to reach such inland cities as Buffalo, Cleveland, and Chicago. When these inland cities take on the functions of ocean ports, tremendous reverberations will be felt in areas along the eastern seaboard.

In addition to the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence route, there are other inland waterways in the United States, the most important of which is the Mississippi River and its tributaries, particularly the Missouri, Ohio, Monongahela, and Illinois. Although the major axis of this system is oriented north-south (thereby focusing on the Gulf of Mexico, rather than on the Atlantic Ocean where population and trade are centered), freight tonnages of coal, petroleum, grain, and other bulk cargoes on the Mississippi are large; shippers benefit from the comparatively low-cost river transportation.

**PIPELINES**—With the growth in consumption of petroleum and natural gas, pipelines now play a major role in transportation. In 1953, there were 150,000 miles of interstate petroleum pipelines and 110,000 miles of natural-gas pipelines. Major pipelines extend from the producing fields to the market areas.

**HIGHWAYS**—All parts of the nation are interconnected by 2,000,000 miles of paved highways and 1,000,000 miles of unpaved roads. Highways and motor equipment perform major service as feeders for rail and water carriers, and long interregion hauls have been undertaken more and more in recent

years. Citizens of the United States own and operate about 55,000,000 of the world's 75,000,000 motor vehicles.

**AIRWAYS**—Commercial airlines join all major cities of the nation with speedy passenger and cargo service. In addition, flights are scheduled to practically all parts of the world. The saving in time resulting from the use of Great Circle routes and from high speed is still difficult to comprehend. Regular airline schedules from San Francisco to New York require only eight hours. In the mid-1950's the domestic airlines have had 1,315 aircraft in service flying more than 162,000 miles of regularly scheduled routes. The airways travel over 12,000,000,000 passenger-miles and carry over 150,000,000 ton-miles of air freight plus 68,000,000 ton-miles of air mail. However, air freight constitutes less than one per cent of the nation's total freight. In 1953 the thirteen major international lines under the United States flag carried over 2,000,000 passengers and over 95,000,000 ton-miles of cargo, including mail.

#### CAPACITY TO PRODUCE

The birth of the United States coincided with the advent of the Industrial Revolution, which opened to the nation new vistas in economic growth. American development was carried forward on the rising tide of a new world that demanded raw materials for its growing industries and food for its increasing numbers of urban workers. Industrial cities were established in the early years of the United States, and commercialized and specialized farming soon characterized American agriculture. As a result of good fortune in timing, an industrial economy developed faster and more completely in the United States than in other world areas of comparable size.

Capacity to produce provides fundamental indices to a nation's industrial strength. Steel production alone may be considered

an index to world power. In 1954 steel capacity in the United States reached the record high of 117,000,000 tons, forty-four per cent of the world total and three times greater than that of any other one nation. Aluminum metal production in the United States equals forty-five per cent of the world's new aluminum. The farms of the nation have capacity to produce surpluses of the main foods and fibers. Forest industries are able to produce the nation's lumber and much of the pulp requirements. In fact, the enormous productive capacity of the nation has made possible a high living standard which is often measured objectively in numbers of automobiles, freight cars, electric ranges, refrigerators, television sets, telephones, and many other commodities. Industrial development in the United States has progressed so far that, as one authority points out, our resources and productive capacity enable us to fulfill our needs in every conceivable circumstance.<sup>10</sup>

#### POPULATION

The population of the United States recently passed 160,000,000; only China, India, and the Soviet Union have larger populations. A sizable population, technologically trained and well organized, is an important factor of national power, whether in peace or war. In times of emergency it is important that the bulk of manpower be quickly utilized in war production activity or in the armed forces.

Throughout most of its history, the United States has had a rapidly growing population, which has risen from 3,000,000 in the 1790's to the present figure. Although the nation's population growth was approaching an equilibrium during the 1930's, the birth rate rose sharply during World War II and has

<sup>10</sup> See J. F. Dewhurst and Associates, *America's Needs and Resources* (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1947).



remained high since that time<sup>11</sup> The present crude birth rate is 24.5 per thousand, higher than in most of Europe, but lower than that in South America and Asia. The nation's death rate is 9.6 per thousand, lower than that of most other nations of the world. Infant mortality is only 28.5 per thousand live births, compared with 115 or more in India and 41 in France. These vital statistics indicate a healthy population trend in the United States—an important factor in political geography.

**AREAS OF CONCENTRATION**—Most of the population of the country is concentrated east of the 100th Meridian, and about one half of the people live in the northeastern one eighth of the country. The New York metropolitan district, with over 13,000,000 people, is the great urban hub of the nation and the center of a heavily populated area extending from Boston to Washington, D.C., including Providence, Philadelphia, and Baltimore<sup>12</sup> Chicago is by far the major urban hub of the interior. Other outstanding cities of the industrial northeast include Detroit, Cleveland, Buffalo, Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, and St. Louis. The "Twin Cities," Minneapolis-St. Paul, dominate the upper Mississippi Valley. Kansas City and Omaha occupy strategic locations in the heart of the nation. In the Southeast the great cities are Atlanta, Birmingham, New Orleans, Houston, and Dallas. In the dry West, population is sparse, and there are few large cities; Denver is the only major urban center. Spokane, Salt Lake City, El Paso, and Phoenix are lesser centers. The west coast has developed four urban hubs. In the north these

are Seattle-Tacoma on Puget Sound and Portland at the intersection of the Columbia River with the Willamette-Puget Lowland, San Francisco, dominating central California; and Los Angeles, the greatest west coast agglomeration of people, dominating southern California.

**Mobility.** Nothing is more striking in the development of urban centers and the growth of the nation than the mobility of the American population. Not only have people tended to move from country to city until about sixty per cent of the total population is classed as urban, but in the last decade twenty per cent of the people have shifted from one state or county to another. Economic opportunities opening during the war years, the pressure and hardship of the "dust bowl" area, and climatic attractiveness of certain regions account for this change. As a result, the 1950 Census revealed significant gains over a decade in the following states: Michigan, twenty per cent; California, fifty-three per cent; Arizona, fifty per cent; and Florida, forty-six per cent.

**ETHNIC COMPOSITION**—"Melting pot" is the term used to describe the amalgamation into one unified nation of several races and peoples of diverse national origins. In a sense the United States is a laboratory in the art of democratic living and an experiment for the assimilation process in which changes are continuing. The majority of the population in the nation is of European origin, particularly from the British Isles and Western Europe, the indigenous Indians form only a fraction of the total. Thus the basic cultural characteristics and political institutions were largely brought with them by early European settlers, and in many instances both the culture and the institutions were modified and molded into an American pattern. European emigrants who settled in the New World during the past century and a half account for one fourth of the total population. The steady blending of various

<sup>11</sup> Total population increase for the United States between 1940 and 1950 was 14.5 per cent.

<sup>12</sup> "Metropolitan district" refers to a major city together with its suburbs and associated satellite areas. The Bureau of the Census lists about 150 of these areas, each totaling 50,000 or more. As a governmental unit the metropolitan district is defined by each state under its own legislative enactments, quite apart from the Census concept.

national strains from Europe has precluded a serious minority problem of the proportion existing in parts of Europe.

Existence of basic national unity has not in itself, however, produced national uniformity or obliterated cultural and racial differentiations. Some foreign-born elements still speak their native languages and follow native customs in their several localities while accepting the national tongue in schools and in government.<sup>13</sup> About seventy-five per cent of the foreign-born are concentrated in cities and these mostly in a few northern states and along the coasts. Least integrated in the community are Negroes and people of Asiatic origin. Of these the Negroes number almost ten per cent of the national total, or 15,000,000; Chinese, Japanese, and others total 600,000. Discrimination manifesting itself in the denial of equal privileges to racial minorities in certain areas has weakened our national unity. The wholesale evacuation of our Nisei inhabitants (Americans of Japanese parentage) from the Pacific coast and their settlement in relocation centers during World War II demonstrated the depth of the racial bias; generally, both Negroes and Asiatics have viewed their status as being that of second-class citizens. The antisegregation ruling of the Supreme Court in 1954 is a milestone in a long and painful process of adjustment between the Negro minority and the white majority. As long as equality does not exist, the "Negro question" will remain and serve to detract from United States leadership in the world at large.

Religious differences, unlike racial distinctions, do not weaken the social fabric of American life but rather point up its richness and variety. The dominant religious faiths are Protestant and Roman Catholic, whose adherents number, 54,000,000 and

29,000,000, respectively. The Protestants are divided into twenty-six denominations, this is in marked contrast with the unified organization of the Catholic Church. Only about one half of the population is affiliated by membership with any church. The religious question assumes some importance in national politics, in which the Catholic element in such cities as Boston, Jersey City, and New York tends to play a dominant role in elections.

**CIVIL DIVISIONS**—In a territorial sense the United States as a nation is subdivided into forty-eight political units (states) and about 3,000 local subdivisions (counties). Constitutionally, power is divided between the national government and the state units in the federal structure. The forty-eight states are real geographic and political entities, not mere administrative subdivisions of the Federal government.

In the twentieth century regional undertakings of the Federal government have become an important step toward a greater degree of national growth and development. With the passing of the frontier in the early twentieth century and the crisis of the Great Depression in the 1930's, the Federal government launched significant regional projects which have transformed and modernized several sectors of the economy. Most outstanding of these projects is the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), which provides flood control, promotes agriculture, and develops electric power for an area of 41,000 square miles. Not only Tennessee but also Kentucky, Mississippi, Alabama, North Carolina, and Georgia benefit from TVA.

Reclamation on the Colorado River centers on the Hoover (Boulder) Dam which in 1936 helped to restore the semiarid lands of Arizona and Nevada. Farther west, the Grand Coulee Dam project on the Columbia River has turned 1,000,000 acres into cultivatable territory, as well as provided ample electric power in the Pacific Northwest. A

<sup>13</sup> Chinatown in San Francisco, Harlem in New York, and Hamtramck of Detroit are colorful examples of unassimilated clusters in our cities.

similar regional reclamation project has been suggested for the Missouri Valley, but, except for measures taken to control the river flow, the plan remains to be implemented.

In general it may be said that the northern and Pacific coastal states benefit from a higher standard of living and greater employment opportunities than do the southern areas. The South and the mountain states, in turn, depend more strongly on Federal expenditures to rationalize the sec-

tional inequalities in wealth, resources, and development. Nonetheless, any appreciable unevenness in opportunities and progress from one section of the nation to the other is gradually disappearing, as has been illustrated in recent decades by the decline of certain industries in the North and their advance in the South. It has been American tradition to consider underdeveloped or underprivileged areas as challenges for the application of new methods and techniques.

### Study Questions

1. How did the United States acquire possession of the compact area it now occupies? Describe the political and geographic conditions at the time of one of the major acquisitions, such as the Oregon Territory.
2. Why is "isolationism" an impractical national policy in our time?
3. What developments and trends are evident in the United States in the assimilation of peoples from Europe? What trends in assimilating the Negro?
4. Discuss the national boundaries of the United States in terms of international involvements.
5. Give examples of, and describe, state boundaries that you consider (a) good and (b) poor. (Study a physical map of the United States.)
6. What is the basis for the statement. "The United States is fortunate above most other nations in its middle latitude location"?
7. From the point of view of a war economy, analyze the critical material shortages of the United States.
8. If you were charged with responsibility for assuring supplies of essential materials what steps would you recommend to the President and/or the Congress?
9. Analyze world-wide implications of the fact that the people of the United States, about six per cent of the world's population, consume at least half of the world's goods.
10. At present what are the main elements of strength in the United States agricultural foundation? What are the main weaknesses?
11. What are the main elements of strength in the United States mineral foundations? What are the main weaknesses?
12. Indicate some specific examples related to political geography which support the statement. "It is fortunate that control of local affairs has been reserved to the states."
13. Why is the "Soo Canal" of such great significance? Analyze its role in the American economy.
14. List and analyze the factors that have favored major industrialization within the manufacturing belt of the United States.
15. Prepare a paper on the subject. "The Role of the United States in the Twentieth-Century World."

## CHAPTER EIGHT

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# *The Global Position of the United States*


Favored by a compact territory of 3,000,000 square miles, by its continental position between two oceans, by an optimum population and great natural resources, the United States has all the advantages that single a country out for world power. It is only within the past half century, however, that the United States, influenced by world events beyond its control, has unwillingly and almost unwittingly moved out from a status of isolation to one of leadership—to become, in fact, one of the two great world powers.

The position of the United States in the heart of North America, which in turn is in geographical juxtaposition to South America, is a factor of tremendous importance from the standpoint of national destiny. Together the two American continents make up the Western Hemisphere, forming an elongated land mass completely surrounded by water and well endowed in most basic raw materials. The two continental units are con-

nected by a narrow, twisting land corridor, in which the Panama Canal Zone is the most strategic sector.

The bulk of the South American continent is located south of the Equator, in a region less industrialized than its counterpart to the north. The consequent flow of South American resources to the industrial workshops of the North Temperate Zone has helped to mold the continent's economy and fix its power status as dependent upon the neighboring continent to the north. Though geographical South America as a unit lies closer to Europe than to the United States, South American countries nevertheless developed an existence independent of the Old World. Among the factors that in the nineteenth century made South America an important sector of the Western Hemisphere were the independence from European colonial rule, which had hampered them in the 1800's, the friendly protection offered the new republics

# GLOBAL POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES



by British seapower, and the warning issued by the United States in the Monroe Doctrine (1823) against further colonization by European powers.

On both the east and the west great oceans separate the United States from the major population centers of the world and isolate it from the historic power centers as well. Geographic detachment is a factor of very great significance in the growth of American power and in the conditioning of the American outlook toward world affairs. So deeply rooted is the sense of separateness and national identity, as molded by a century and a half of history, that even now the inviolability of the American heartland is fundamental to all concepts of national security (see map on page 111).

In the twentieth century the historic concept of hemispheric security is seriously challenged. Intercontinental air power, including trans-Polar flight, and the development of atomic weapons are among the factors transforming space relationships. Oceans that once provided a measure of insulation now can be easily and quickly spanned by aircraft and can be turned into highways of invasion. Experience in World War II well demonstrates the dangers confronting American sea power in its efforts to meet challenges to the security of the Western Hemisphere on two ocean fronts. Great transformations in the science of warfare and communications in the mid-twentieth century have forced the United States to reappraise its fundamental position as a world power.

#### NEW ORDER IN 1945

Following World War II both the United States in the Western Hemisphere and the USSR in the Eurasian land mass loomed as the two superpowers possessing the resources and manpower adequate for self-defense and for the pursuit of world-wide responsibilities. In concert these two powers theoretically pos-

sessed the capacity for the maintenance of a stable world order, as rivals the two antagonists transformed the climate of world politics and ushered in a postwar era of cold war that oscillated between the threat of total war and peace. The consequent bipolarization of power split the world into two parts: the West attracted toward Washington; and the East, toward Moscow.

In the superpower world Britain and Western Europe could not offer protection or security for the New World. No longer was the British Navy a shield in the Atlantic; rather, the British Isles themselves were exposed to destruction in the atomic age. Moreover, the eclipse of Britain as a classic stabilizing force on the Continent removed one of the major deterrents to domination of Europe by a single power. Still, by reason of its geographical position and as head of the Commonwealth, Britain did retain considerable influence in diplomatic maneuvering following World War II. With the shattering of the Axis enemy in the heart of Europe, Allied armies from the West and the Red Army from the East moved in to fill the vacuum. Although the surrender of the enemy in 1945 resulted in a military line of demarcation between two blocs—a line drawn roughly along the Elbe and projected to the Adriatic—it by no means destroyed Western Europe as a potential power area. For this reason neither Moscow nor Washington could act indifferently toward the political disposition of the industrial complex that comprised West Germany.

Bipolarization has produced a global division of power between the East and West. A wide frontier zone curves in a vast arc around the periphery of the Soviet Union, stretching from the Baltic Sea, through Central Europe and the eastern Mediterranean, across the Middle East, and onto the inner plateaus of Asia. For each antagonist the intervening zone constitutes a testing ground in its search for security and survival.

Within the framework of the new power

division, the United States fixed its basic directives upon national survival and accommodation to a superpower world. Necessity dictated an attempt to redress the imbalance of power in order to create a viable world order between East and West. A position disadvantageous to the United States was due largely to the rapid demobilization of Allied forces, to the full mobilization of Soviet strength, and to Moscow's intransigence during the years 1945-47. To construct a balance-of-power situation favorable to the Free World, the United States first moved to contain Soviet power (as stated in the Truman Doctrine in 1947) and to prevent its expansion into vital sectors of the Free World through the application of counterforce at strategic points on the periphery of the USSR. Several tests in Greece, Persia, Turkey, and Korea marked the struggle between Communist expansion and American containment.

— Along with containment the United States also moved to rebuild the military strength of the West as a shield against the Soviet Goliath. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is therefore a military coalition designed to keep Soviet power away from the shores of North America; by implication it rules out isolation and neutrality in the postwar era as dangerous to American security and survival.

Implementation of the American program has taken the form of seeking allies all over the globe through a series of mutual defense pacts, with appropriate allocations of resources on the part of the United States; necessity and strategic requirements, rather

than ideological considerations, dictate this course. Thus, the problem of coexistence in a power-dominated world has led to some modification in the theoretical assumption of incompatibility between a Free and a Communist World. Allies that are basically anti-Moscow in orientation or those primarily interested in preserving their independence meet with American approbation.

The American defense network rests on a series of air bases radiating outward across both the Atlantic and the Pacific to various strategic spots, many of them on the periphery of the Eurasian land mass. The establishment of these military outposts serves both offensive and defensive purposes and, in the mid-twentieth century, testify to the global proportions of the American power position.

Looking outward from continental United States as the center, this nation faces specific challenges and commitments to the south, east, west, and north. Although American policy in each sector varies in its application to individual countries, there is evident an over-all regional approach to world affairs. Entire regions and continents are involved in calculations of high strategy, economic planning, and military-aid programs designed to bring maximum returns for the expenditures involved. The shift toward regional orientation merely underscores the basic reality that the nation-state is no longer an adequate unit for the attainment of security in the twentieth-century world. The nature of American commitments in terms of its world-wide responsibilities since World War II attests to its global status.

## SOUTH


The hard core of American strength consists of continental United States set within the larger framework of the Western Hemisphere. To the south three sectors form

components of considerable interest to the United States. (1) Across the Texas border and beyond Mexico lie five republics of Central America north of Panama, in total area

not much larger than the state of Texas (Guatemala, Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica). (2) Eastward is the Caribbean, a veritable American Mediterranean, sprinkled with tropical islands and constituting a strategic sector between North and South America. (3) Further southward a narrow land corridor contains within it the artificial waterway that links the two oceans and forms the primary strategic zone in the whole area.

States defense system, since in terms of air communication it is relatively close to West Africa, the distance from Natal to Dakar being only 1,900 miles. South of this second zone, however, most of South America lies outside of strategic calculations of the post-war era.

**PANAMA CANAL ZONE**—The Canal Zone is not a territory of the United States in the same sense as are its other possessions, nor



In military terms two forward zones guard this vital waterway: the Caribbean sector and the northern portion of South America. Of the two zones the Caribbean sector lies within the sphere of American sea and air power (see map on this page). Here the United States holds naval bases, such as that at Guantánamo, Cuba, and possesses territories under its own sovereignty. The second zone lies outside of American control and is not maintained by United States military forces. Brazil is still vital to the United

is its status exactly that of the Suez Canal Zone prior to the Anglo-Egyptian Accord in 1954 (see page 490). The Treaty of 1903 granted the United States a permanent leasehold over the Canal Zone, including the right to annex any additional lands necessary for the canal project.<sup>1</sup> Under the Treaty of 1936 the right to expand the area or intervene in

<sup>1</sup> For this concession the United States government agreed to pay to Panama an annual sum of \$250,000, which has increased considerably since 1933.



Panama's internal affairs is forbidden. Panama's assumed independence in matters of strategy is, however, more illusory than real in view of the fact that in World War II all Central American states were co-belligerents and since the war have been welded into the inter-American defense system.

#### UNITED STATES TERRITORIES

**PUERTO RICO**—The island of Puerto Rico is located in the heart of the Caribbean archipelago on the main route of the Atlantic sea lanes leading from the Atlantic coast of the United States to the northern parts of South America. Puerto Rico is 965 miles from Key West, 506 miles from La Guaira, Venezuela, and 480 miles from Cuba. The island is linked to the mainland by Pan-American Airways with five-hour service to Miami San Juan, with its deep-water harbor, guards the Atlantic gateway through Mona Passage on the west and the Virgin Passage on the east. Strategically the island controls the approaches to the Panama Canal and serves as an outpost for the Caribbean region. In colonial times the fortress of El Morro, commanding San Juan harbor, served as a watchtower guarding the Spanish domain against roving English sea pirates. During World War II San Juan served as a base for naval operations in the Atlantic and the Caribbean. Major naval and air installations are located on Isla Grande near San Juan harbor, as well as on the islands of Culebra and Vieques to the east of the island.

The defeat of Spain in 1898 raised a glimmer of hope for complete independence among ardent Puerto Rican nationalists, but the Treaty of Paris in 1898 put the island under the American flag. As a result, the United States has ruled the territory under acts of Congress for over half a century, and, on the whole, remarkable achievement has been made in rural rehabilitation, health, education, and industrialization. The reconstruction projects have been costly, but Puerto

Ricans now enjoy a much higher standard of living than they ever did prior to 1898. On the political side, however, Puerto Rico has registered less progress, partly because of the inexperience of its inhabitants and partly because of uncertainty within the United States Congress as to the island's political future. Puerto Rico, as a result, has wavered between independence and statehood, without attaining either.

Relationship between the mainland and the island has developed through several stages, as is indicated in congressional legislation. After the occupation in 1898, military governors ruled the island until 1900. Congress then passed the Foraker Act, under which a governor, appointed by the President, provided a civil government and instituted administrative reforms. More significant was the provision for free trade between Puerto Rico and the United States and the tariff protection extended to American manufactures entering Puerto Rico. This provision, plus the restriction of coastwise shipping to American vessels, chained the island's economy to that of the United States. The Organic Act of 1917 provided for an elective legislature and more home rule but failed to solve the status of the island. Congress conferred American citizenship on Puerto Ricans in 1917, although a United States Supreme Court decision in 1922 implied that Puerto Rico was an "unincorporated" territory. In 1952, however, Congress raised the island to the status of a commonwealth association (*estado libre asociado*) with the United States, granting it full home rule but within America's tariff walls.

**VIRGIN ISLANDS**—In 1917 the United States acquired the Virgin Islands from Denmark for \$25,000,000. The purchase was motivated largely by the wartime need to reduce the menace of German submarines in the Caribbean region. The island group consists of fifty isles but only St. Thomas, St.

John, and St. Croix are of importance. The total area is 140 square miles, of which St. Croix accounts for two thirds.

The Virgin Islands lie at the crossroads of the historic shipping routes in the New World. In contrast with the practice in early buccaneer days, the islands are largely ignored by modern steamers, and their commercial value is therefore extremely small; of strategic value, however, is the deep harbor at Charlotte Amalie, which contributes to the defense of the Caribbean.

### HEMISPHERIC DEFENSE

In diplomatic terms and quite apart from considerations of vital strategy the United States treats the entire Western Hemisphere as a regional unit. The key to the hemispheric security system is the Rio Pact of 1947, which establishes the principle that an attack against one is considered to be an attack against all. It defines the security zone as including all the area between the North and the South poles, embracing also the Aleutians, Greenland, the Falklands, and a part of Antarctica. Iceland, however, and the Hawaiian Islands fall outside the inter-American defense perimeter. Collective defense efforts require periodic consultative procedures, since the various states are under no compulsory obligation to contribute armed forces in case of aggression. The Rio Pact, as a regional defense plan, later served as a model for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Inter-American relations traditionally emphasize the strengthening of peace and security through frequent consultations and cooperative action. For this purpose the Bogotá Conference in 1948 provided the machinery for the Organization of American States (OAS). The supreme body, the Inter-American Conference, meets regularly every five years, but an extraordinary meeting of foreign ministers is summoned in cases of great emergency. It was through the OAS that the United States took

action in 1954 to forestall a Communist-inspired coup in Guatemala.

It is common practice to speak of "continental solidarity" in the two Americas. This, however, should not obscure the fact that there are rivalries within Latin America and that there is a divergence of economic interest between Latin American states and the United States. The "Colossus of the North" is still a reality, despite the inauguration of a "good-neighbor" policy in 1933. Geographically most Latin American countries are far removed from the postwar danger spots in the cold-war struggle, and thus, although the Council of the OAS adopted a resolution endorsing United Nations action in Korea, Latin American states other than Colombia and Bolivia offered no troops, nor were they inclined to earmark any contingents for the use of the United Nations Command. A basic factor in this position taken by Latin American countries is the knowledge that the northern colossus serves as their shield against any external aggression.

A major difficulty in inter-American relations is the extreme dependence of Latin America upon the United States for its industrial development and economic prosperity. It is essentially a relationship between a semideveloped, raw-material region and a highly industrialized one. What the countries to the south need is great capital investments, a step-up in industrialization, and guarantees against adverse fluctuations in the price of their exports. Since 1951 the amount of American aid has been far short of the \$2,500,000,000 estimated as necessary to raise the standard of living in Latin America.

The imbalance in its trade is the chief index to the dependent status of South America in the world economy. The countries are generally dependent upon imports of manufactures and capital goods from the north, which they secure at costs over which they have no control; whereas their own major exports—coffee, cocoa, sugar, as well

as cotton, tin, and wool—fluctuate in price on the world market, also beyond their control. In 1951, for example, while most tropical products were declining in price in world markets, South America was importing greater quantities of the manufactured goods

it needed—and at *higher* prices. The strain of developing a semi-industrial economy has exacerbated inter-American relations, even though local conditions have not seriously undermined the defense position of the United States.

## EAST

In marked contrast to its orientation southward the United States faces eastward across the Atlantic a different landscape and dangers of great scope and complexity. The European continent as a historic center of great power rivalries would not easily adopt a security system designed by the United States, even though the rising threat of Soviet power presented a common danger to all. Moreover, the lack of possessions to the east forced the United States to forge a general alliance system based on treaties, arrangements for air bases, and economic assistance for the common defense of the Western democracies. Above all, the realities of geography and modern warfare forced the elaboration of new plans and policies in the pursuit of security and defense of the Free World.

The ramparts of North America stretch eastward from Newfoundland to the ice cap of Greenland, to Iceland, and on to the shores of the British Isles. Beyond this 2,500-mile Atlantic communication line looms the landscape of Europe, where the term "Old Europe" becomes obsolete, giving way to a new power distribution and concept of security constructed largely in the New World. From the standpoint of grand strategy the United States must take into calculation the prospect of a Soviet military drive out of Eurasia into Central Europe, the borderlands of the eastern Mediterranean, or toward the Persian Gulf. If the entire region is to be viewed as part of a grand design, rather than in terms of separate states, a new

concept of military strategy needs to be devised.

The term "Atlantic Barrier" best denotes the establishment of a military barrier to prevent the movement of the USSR power toward the Atlantic Ocean. In geographic terms the Atlantic Barrier traces a huge arc, extending from North Cape within the Arctic Circle to the Hindu Kush and Himalayan mountain ranges, curving around Iberia and encompassing the coastland of North Africa and deserts of the Arabian Peninsula and the Iranian plateau. Lying within the compass of this arc is the European peninsula, in which is located the heart of Free Europe. In a geopolitical sense the eastern portion of the great barrier is a frontier zone that separates the East from the West, with the dividing zone itself creating two Europes. Of the two, the western one falls within the Atlantic projection of the defense structure of the Western Hemisphere and confronts Communist power in East Europe. The disequilibrium of power balance resulting from the shattering destruction of World War II accounts for the great power rivalry between the two blocs and the artificial demarcation line running through the exposed plains of Central Europe.

## WESTERN EUROPE

Viewed as the thick portion of a curved bow, West Europe assumes vital strategic meaning for the United States. In resources, manpower, and political vitality it is an asset of

first-rate importance. Western Europe is a workshop, possessing an industrial economy almost equal to the capacity of the USSR itself. The countries that comprise the region form an area one third the size of the United States and support a population of 300,000,000, almost double that of the United States. A strong cultural tradition of nationalism further strengthens the desire for independence in West Europe.

The weakness of West Europe in the post-war world explains much of the tensions, instability, and severity of two-power rivalry. The advance of the Red Army into Central Europe and the overwhelming land power of the Soviet Union have made this region vulnerable to attack from the east. The inability of Western European nations to meet singly the challenge to their security makes obvious the necessity for cooperative defense planning. As a superpower, the United States has added its weight and provided leadership in restoring Western Europe to a position of strength through three specific programs: economic assistance, creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and support for European integration schemes.

Restoration of Europe to economic health was a prime prerequisite following the havoc wrought by World War II. From 1941 to 1945 the United States contributed \$48,500,000,000 in Lend-Lease supplies to sustain Europe's war economy. In the first two postwar years piecemeal economic aid from the United States totaled \$8,800,000,000; yet the effort failed to restore Europe's vitality. Then in 1947, under the Marshall Plan, the United States launched a four-year reconstruction program that finally restored West Europe's productive capacity to normal levels. The Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 represented a new approach in that consideration of a single country's need was replaced by a regional consideration of Europe's requirements on the basis of joint planning and self-help. Two organs were therefore created: Office of the Administra-

tor of ECA in Washington and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in Paris, the common organ for the recipients of the European Recovery Program. ECA missions operated in the sixteen Western European countries to supervise expenditures under the Act of the United States Congress. The net result, despite the break in East-West trade, chronic dollar shortages, and trade deficits, registered amazing success in raising Europe's productive capacity above 1939 levels. In 1951, with the German question still unresolved and the Korean conflict being waged, the United States established the Mutual Security Agency, which combined military and economic assistance in one package in order to strengthen the mutual security and collective defense of the Free World. Military strength was deemed essential in any guarantee of European recovery.

NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), established in 1949, is the keystone to the whole defense system of the Atlantic community.<sup>2</sup> The principle of collective security under the treaty requires members to develop their individual and collective capacity for military defense. For the United States it marked an historic turning point. For the first time since the Treaty of Alliance with France in 1778 America committed itself to the defense of overseas allies. By the Vandenberg Resolution, approved by the Senate in 1948, the United States pledged its resources to the protection of Western Europe; it thus warned a potential aggressor of the futility of trying to detach and conquer each state singly. To implement this objective the NATO powers established a NATO Council and Supreme Headquarters (SHAPE) at Paris in order to plan and execute the task of coordinating over-all defense strategy.

<sup>2</sup> Membership includes Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom, United States; later, Greece and Turkey (1951), West Germany (1955).

The scope of NATO extends over the North Atlantic waters and, with the accession to NATO of Greece and Turkey, into the eastern reaches of the Mediterranean. Extension of American naval power into Turkish waters is a notable departure from the hemispheric concept of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, wherein attention was focused on the Western Hemisphere. Among the members of NATO, coordination is less of a problem than is that of persuading each state to shoulder a proportionate share of the costs of defense. Western Europe, despite its steadily increasing contributions to defense forces, is still scarcely able to assume a major share of the costs or to support armed forces of a size reasonably to be expected from each member. For this reason the United States believes that a rearmed Germany will prove to be the keystone in the European security system.

#### THE DEAD CENTER

It is in Germany, the very heart of Europe, that the military demarcation line creates an eastern and western Europe as well as two Germanies. For the United States there can be no real solution to the cold war unless a reunited Germany takes its proper place in the family of nations. But there cannot be a reunited Germany until a formula acceptable to both Washington and Moscow is found; for over ten years this formula has been sought in vain. From the standpoint of the United States the growing industrial power of the Ruhr and the vitality of 51,000,000 people in West Germany are an essential counterweight to the formidable USSR army divisions to the east; a revived German military force could act as a shield for the rest of Western Europe. To the USSR the addition of German power to the Western coalition poses a danger for the Communist regime in East Germany and the prospect of a hostile Germany driving eastward to the Urals. It was the failure of the

two powers to agree on the restoration of a united Germany that brought two Germanies into existence—the West German Republic at Bonn and the East German Republic under Soviet auspices in Berlin. Following the creation of the Bonn Republic in 1949 the United States and the Western Powers restored sovereignty to West Germany on May 4, 1955, and in the subsequent London and Paris accords integrated it into the NATO defense structure within the framework of a Western European Union.<sup>3</sup>

Although at high-level talks the Big Three (the United States, the United Kingdom, and France) have defined their terms for unification—including German rearmament within the NATO framework, free elections, establishment of an all-German government, and withdrawal of occupation forces—they have failed to produce a formula acceptable to the Soviet Union. Moscow's terms have periodically included provision for the neutralization of Germany, its exclusion from any military coalitions, and the withdrawal of occupation troops. It would seem therefore that no solution is possible unless the German peoples themselves reassert an independent role in Europe, and Moscow permits the rise of a third force.

#### EASTERN FRONTIERS

The countries that form a broad belt through Central and Eastern Europe together constitute a zone of separation and contact between the Free and the Satellite World. Like faults in a region of earthquakes, the exact geographic boundary between the two worlds is steadily shifting in response to outside pressures. In 1945, with the end of military operations, the position of the Allies created a tentative military demarcation line that separated the respective advances of the

<sup>3</sup> An enlarged Brussels Pact, composed of the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, West Germany, and Italy.

Western and the Red armies toward the center of Europe. The territory east of the Elbe came within the sphere of Communist domination and lay outside the command of American military power while within the intervening shatter zone Berlin, Vienna, and Trieste remained as isolated bridgeheads for the Western World.

In each of the occupied areas—Germany, Austria, and the Free Territory of Trieste—Allied representatives maintained their position as occupying powers, pending the settlement of the whole European question. Owing to the bitter rivalry between the democratic and Communist ideologies, a deep gulf separated the American concept of independent status for East Europe and the realities of power alignments. The United States refused to recognize Soviet annexation of the Baltic republics and protested against the Soviet failure to observe the Yalta pledge with respect to the creation of an independent Poland and the observance of the principle of free democratic governments for Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria, as provided in the Peace Treaties of 1947. In reality each of the countries remained behind the Iron Curtain, despite American protests and a strategy of psychological warfare from the West.

The position of great powers rarely remains static, and since 1945 changes in Central Europe, south of Germany, affect both the East and the West. In contrast to the stalemate over Germany, the war left Italy within the Western orbit, and the Peace Treaty of February 10, 1947, recognized the restoration of Italy to independence. Italy's position is most significant for Western Europe, since it bisects the Mediterranean and flanks both France and Yugoslavia. After 1949, Italy, as a member of NATO, of the Schuman Coal and Steel Community, and of the Council of Europe, linked its fortune even more closely with the West.

In 1948 two shifts took place in Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, each constitut-

ing a countermove in the balance of power: Tito removed Yugoslavia from the Satellite World, and a coup d'état brought Czechoslovakia into the Satellite fold. Moscow's victory in adding the highly industrialized sector of Czechoslovakia, with its Skoda munition works and its railway network, was a serious blow to the West. On the other hand, Yugoslavia, bordering Italy and commanding the Balkan regions to the south, blocked Soviet expansion into the eastern Mediterranean. Tito's break with Stalin permitted closer ties between Yugoslavia and the West. As Yugoslavia possesses an effective army, American aid has been extended to that country since 1945 to strengthen her economy and to assist her to preserve her independence in the face of Moscow's pressures or overtures. The value of an independent Yugoslavia to the Western democracies must, nevertheless, be viewed against its traditional pull toward the Balkan satellites and its possible reorientation toward Moscow.

Similarly, the Austrian settlement in 1955 represents still another readjustment of power relationship long advocated by the United States. The treaty marks the end of allied occupation and a return to independent status for the Central European republic. The withdrawal of Red Army units from Austria is counterbalanced by the provision for neutralization, which breaks the direct line of communication between Italy and NATO areas to the north.

#### MIDDLE EAST FLANK

The eastern segment of the great arc controls in a strategic sense any possible drive toward the Atlantic south of the European continent, and includes the eastern Mediterranean Levant, the lands of the Fertile Crescent, and the trans-Iranian plateau near the frontiers of India. Strategically Greece, Turkey, Iraq, Persia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan form the northern barriers against Soviet

expansion into the Middle East, as well as against Soviet drives toward the Mediterranean Sea and to north and central Africa. Strategic considerations, largely, impelled the United States to thrust its power into the eastern Mediterranean. This sector formed the traditional bridgehead between Europe and the Orient and divided Soviet power to the north from the Anglo-American power position to the south. On this exposed sector the United States with considerable success met the most serious Soviet threats in the cold war. To thwart Soviet pressure on the eastern Mediterranean, the United States extended military aid to Greece and Turkey. In both instances the containment policy tended to preserve the independence of these weak states.

Moreover, diplomatic action and United Nations Security Council hearings in 1946 resulted in the withdrawal of Soviet troops from northern Persia. Gradually a north-tier defense scheme took shape in the Middle East. As a member of NATO, Turkey holds a pivotal position, since it stands guard over

the strategic Dardanelles and provides naval and air bases for United States forces in Asia Minor. Together with air bases in North Africa and British naval strength at Cyprus, the Anglo-American power combination dominates the waters of the Mediterranean and places Western air power within striking distance of the Soviet industrial areas north of the Black Sea. With the formation of the Middle East Treaty Organization (METO), the Baghdad Pact in 1955 forged the last link of a common strategic plan along the north tier of states extending from Turkey to Pakistan.

The Arab hinterlands, south of the northern barrier itself, however, defy the blandishments of American power. Here anti-Western sentiments, the Arab-Israeli tensions, and sensitive nationalism weaken the area and offer the Soviet Union opportunities for fishing in troubled waters. To secure a balance of power here calls for adroit measures—to strengthen the Middle East and at the same time to avoid a clash between the Western powers and the Soviet Union.

## WEST

### GEOGRAPHY OF THE PACIFIC

Westward America confronts the Pacific and beyond it the vast, teeming continent of Asia. In this direction the American power position is based largely on domination of the Pacific Ocean; for the location of this vast body of water between the American continent and the Orient sets the pattern of American relations with the Far East. The Pacific encompasses some 68,600,000 square miles—more than one third of the earth's surface; within its limits isolated land areas are relatively small in size and serve chiefly as communication links between the continents. The most significant geographic factor is the vast distance involved; the ex-

pense of water from Panama to Singapore is more than one third the circumference of the globe. Far to the north the triangular body of the Pacific narrows down to fifty miles, and only the Bering Strait separates Russian Siberia from the North American continent. In this region, however, unfavorable weather conditions, marked by fog, rain, and cold, provide an effective barrier against human contacts.

The vast realm of the Pacific is interlaced with important trade routes, which have, for more than a century, historically linked the United States and the Orient. Early in the nineteenth century Yankee clippers plied the Pacific in the lucrative trade with China and East Asia; later steamship lines tapped

the markets of Japan and the Philippines in the exchange of goods between Asia and America. Today trans-Pacific steamship lines follow a regular pattern. One route is along the arc of the great circle south of the Aleutian chain; others cross the enormous distances farther south, using islands as steppingstones. Hawaii, located at the crossroads of lines running from the Pacific coast of North America to Asia and the South Pacific, is the hub of several important oceanic trade routes.

In the twentieth century a network of airlines is superimposed over the oceanic shipping routes. Besides the established trans-Pacific commercial routes via Honolulu, one follows the great circle, connecting Chicago with Tokyo and Manila via Edmonton, Anchorage, and the Aleutians. Still another air route runs south from Honolulu toward Auckland, New Zealand, and Sydney, Australia, via the Fijis or New Caledonia.

Strategic control of the approaches to the west coast areas of this continent is clearly of supreme importance to the United States. As a result of wartime events, the Pacific, it is fair to say, is now a gigantic "American Lake." No power appears on the horizon to challenge the supremacy of American sea-air power in the vital sectors of the Pacific. In logistic terms the United States has constantly pressed its military power westward, picking up strategic islands and projecting its frontier outposts close to the Asiatic mainland. No Asian power in modern times has successfully attacked or invaded the western coasts of North America. The position of the United States has been particularly strong in power calculations since World War II.

#### UNITED STATES TERRITORIES

American power in the Pacific is based on the acquisition of islands strategically located and scattered over the vast spaces in the

Pacific.<sup>4</sup> Not all the territories acquired by the United States are of equal worth, but *in toto* they constitute a formidable network of military bases and strategic outposts. The Hawaiian group serves as a center for the Pacific defenses. From this group one island chain stretches westward toward Asia; another toward the South Pacific. The first chain consists of the islands of Midway, Kure, Wake, and Guam. The second chain, stretching southeastward, is made up of Kingman Reef, Palmyra, Howland, Baker, Jarvis, Canton, Enderbury, and American Samoa.

**HAWAIIAN ISLANDS**—The Hawaiian archipelago is scattered over a distance of 2,000 miles, from 154° to 178° West Longitude and from 18° to 28° North Latitude. The bulk of the half million inhabitants are concentrated in seven islands: Hawaii, Maui, Molokai, Lanai, Oahu, Kauai, and Nihau, comprising an area of 6,400 square miles. Of the seven islands, Hawaii with an area of 4,000 square miles is the largest, but Oahu with one sixth as much area has seventy-five per cent of the total population.

Prior to Captain Cook's discovery of the islands in 1788, a form of tribal rule under a kingship prevailed among the Polynesian settlers. As early as 1820 American missionaries introduced Christianity and reduced the native Hawaiian language to a written form. The excellence of Hawaiian seaports—Honolulu, Lahaina, and Hilo—early attracted American fishing fleets as well as European whaling ships and merchant vessels plying the Pacific.

Long before 1898 American interests in the Hawaiian Islands earmarked them as United States possessions. Naval strategists noted the natural advantages of Oahu as a naval base for the Pacific fleet and as a keystone in the whole 4,000-mile arch sweeping the Pacific waters. In 1894 a republic

<sup>4</sup> See table on page 123.



## Territories and Possessions of the United States. Area, Population, and Political Status

	<i>Area</i> (in sq mi)	<i>Population</i> (latest fig)	<i>Date</i> <i>Acquired</i>	<i>Political Status</i>
Puerto Rico	3,435	2,216,000	1898	Commonwealth Association
Virgin Islands	133	26,600	1917	Unincorp. Territory
Canal Zone	648 <sup>a</sup>	52,900 <sup>b</sup>	1903	Permanent Leasehold
Hawaii	6,435	500,000	1898	Incorp. Territory
American Samoa (incl. Swain's Islands)	76	20,000	1899	Unincorp Territory
Guam	225	59,000	1898	Unincorp Territory
Midway	2	416	1867	Unincorp. Territory
Wake	3	350	1898	Unincorp. Territory
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands				Strategic Trust
Mariana Islands	185	6,200	1947	Territory under United Nations and U.S. Administrative Authority
Caroline Islands	461	36,900		
Marshall Islands	70	14,000		
Equatorial Islands.				
Kingman Reef	0 01	c	1935	Unincorp. Territory
Palmyra Island	0 50	c	"	"
Howland	0 73	c	"	"
Baker	0 65	c	"	"
Jarvis	1.74	c	"	"
Canton	3 50	230	1939	Joint Administration
Enderbury	2 30	100	1939	U.S.-Britain
Alaska	586,400	160,000	1867	Incorp Territory
UNDER UNITED STATES ADMINISTRATION				
Ryukyu Islands (incl. Okinawa)	1,406	900,000	1945	U.S. Administration
Bonin Islands (Parry, Beechey, Bailey group)	27 7	e		
Rosario Islands	d	e		
Volcano Islands	11 31	e		
Marcus Island	1.2	e		
Parece Vela Reef	d			

<sup>a</sup> Incl. land and water area<sup>b</sup> Incl. Military personnel<sup>c</sup> Uninhabited<sup>d</sup> Microscopic size<sup>e</sup> No figures available

succeeded the monarchy of Queen Liliuokalani, and in 1898 Admiral Dewey's victory in the Philippines finally spurred Congress to enact a joint resolution for the annexation of the islands. By the Organic Act of 1900 passed by the American Congress, Hawaii became an incorporated territory of the United States.

The Hawaiian Islands are an integral part of the United States with a territorial form

of government. Its inhabitants are citizens of the United States and are entitled to virtually all the privileges of the Constitution. On the basis of spectacular economic growth and rapid progress in government, especially in postwar years, Hawaiians demand statehood. Nevertheless, extensive hearings in the United States Congress have not produced results. Since 1945 an attempt to link the statehood of Hawaii with that of Alaska

and domestic rivalries between the Republicans and Democrats have blocked final action in Congress.

**AMERICAN SAMOA**—The Samoan group of islands is part of central Polynesia just south of the Equator and lies between 170° and 175° East Longitude. American Samoa, inhabited by 19,000 Polynesians and totaling seventy-six square miles in area, includes the islands of Tutuila, Ofu, Olosega, Tau, and Rose Atoll. Tutuila alone is fifty-four square miles and is significant for its fine sheltered harbor at Pago Pago Bay.

Located 3,600 miles south of Pearl Harbor, Samoa is the southernmost point in the naval defense system established by the United States in the Pacific. As a far outsider, it serves to reinforce the triangle formed by Alaska, Hawaii, and Panama. In the War of the Pacific Pago Pago with its harbor played a vital role in the strategy of communications and island campaigns north of Australia. Since the end of the war the United States has retained possession of the islands, although vulnerability to air attack renders their usefulness in modern warfare open to question.

**MAJOR STEPPINGSTONES**—Various islands and atolls in the Pacific serve as steppingstones to larger land areas and thus deserve mention as American acquisitions in the Pacific defense sector. The growth of air power and the need for refueling stations account for their new importance. Midway, Wake, and Guam islands form a string of key links between the Hawaiian Islands and Asia. Midway is a circular atoll in the Leeward Islands of the Hawaiian chain, lying 1,304 miles west of Honolulu. Though Midway is not a part of the Territory of Hawaii, the United States took possession of it in 1867. After 1935 it began to be used as a stop on the Pacific air route, and in World War II it assumed strategic value as an air base. Wake is three square miles in area and lies 1,185 miles west of Midway; over it the

United States raised a flag in 1898. Like its neighbor to the east, it is valuable for trans-Pacific aircraft.

Of the three islands, Guam is the largest, with an elongated area of 206 square miles and 52,800 inhabitants, located midway between Wake and the Philippines. As part of the Mariana chain that formed part of the Spanish empire the island came under American control following the Spanish-American War.

### TRUST TERRITORY

The United States exercises jurisdiction over the strategic Micronesian archipelago, composed of the Mariana, Caroline, and Marshall islands. These islands lie between the Philippines and the Hawaiian Islands and bisect the north-south communication line between Japan and Australia. They are distributed in a north-south direction between 20° North Latitude and the Equator. In strategic terms the trust territory forms a screen over a 2,000-mile area south of Japan. As sea and air approaches to Japan proper the value of the islands was well proved by the campaigns of the recent war. The proportion of the land area to that of the ocean is a unique feature of the distribution pattern. Some 2,148 islands, comprising 687 square miles, lie scattered over an ocean area of 2,500,000 square miles. The total native population of the eighty-four inhabited atolls is about 54,000.

Of the three groups, the Marianas are closest to Japan, a distance of 1,350 miles; they are about 1,400 miles from Manila. In World War II they provided important air bases for the northward naval campaign toward Japan proper. Except for Guam (in the Marianas, but not a part of the Trust Territory), the islands in this group are the smallest. They are inhabited by Chamorros, who live on fish and on such tropical foods as yam and arrowroot. To the south of the Marianas lie the Carolines, which support

36,900 people on 461 square miles of islands. Most of the isles are volcanic, but some are low atolls not far above sea level. The Carolines are divided into western and eastern sections by the 148° West Longitude line. Palau is the administrative center in the west, Truk and Ponape form the two districts in the east. East of the Carolines are the Marshalls, scattered over 500,000 square miles of water. The location of these islands puts them off the route of air and steamship travel. Their 11,000 inhabitants follow a primitive tropical life on the low coral atolls. Kwajalein and Eniwetok were important military centers during the Pacific War, and since the war atomic bomb tests at Eniwetok, Bikini, and Kwajalein have made Americans conscious of their existence.

The Micronesian chain, unlike other areas in the Pacific, is not a true territory or possession of the United States. Prior to 1945 Japan exercised control over these islands under the mandate system of the League of Nations. After a brief postwar period of American military rule, the United States turned the Marianas, Carolines, and Marshalls into a Trust Territory of the Pacific, for which a trusteeship agreement was arranged with the Security Council of the United Nations in 1947, designating the United States as the administering authority. In effect, this accord authorizes the United States to fortify the islands for strategic purposes but provides a civil administration for the inhabitants.

#### FAR EAST FRONT

Proximity to the Asiatic coast exposes American power to the dangers and complexities inherent in Asiatic alignments. For fifty years the pursuit of American objectives in the Orient depended on a firm position in the Philippines and upon an uneasy power equilibrium in which Czarist Russia, Britain, and Japan each challenged the other; but no one power was dominant in Asia. This

situation did not last, with the withdrawal of European military and naval power after 1919, Japan moved to assert its hegemony over China and adjacent areas. Only the defeat of Japan in the Pacific War of 1941-45 put an end to her march to power. The expulsion of Japan, far from laying the groundwork for a stable order, created a partial power vacuum in the Pacific island area toward which both the United States and the Soviet Union moved. A still greater setback to American policy occurred when the wartime ally, Nationalist China, was superseded on the mainland by the Communist regime at Peking. By 1950 the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Alliance turned the balance of power against American interests in the Pacific. Two land powers, China and the USSR, now confronted the United States as a threat to her island possessions in the western Pacific.

**DEFENSE PERIMETER IN THE WEST**—This change in the power structure forced the United States to devise a practical defense scheme generally known as the "defense perimeter" concept. The exact definition of the "perimeter" has varied with the complexity of world politics and with American interpretation of its commitments abroad. In geographic terms the defense line in the Pacific in 1949-50 ran from the Aleutians to Japan southward to the Ryukyus and on to the Philippine Islands. By this definition the Pacific was divided into two types of areas: (1) east of the line were those territories that geographically fell into America's power sphere; (2) westward were those in which American military power was severely exposed to hostile powers on the mainland. In the latter category were Korea, Formosa, and Southeast Asia, all of which were omitted from the defense concept. The Korean War in June, 1950, however, and, later, the collapse of French power in Indochina forced a redefinition of the defensive perimeter. The United States now extended its power

westward to include the southern half of the Korean Peninsula, the island of Formosa, and parts of Southeast Asia. This shift to the Asian borderlands necessitated an elaborate long-range security system, which involves the United States in key areas in the North and South Pacific.

According to the Formosa Treaty of 1955, in which this nation pledged itself to protect the Chinese Nationalist regime on Formosa against attack from the mainland, it remained for the President of the United States to determine the status of the offshore islands in case critical issues should arise. Although the power of the American fleet in the Formosa Straits served to discourage a Communist invasion of Formosa and to pave the way for diplomatic settlement, the situation by no means resolved Red China's claim to Formosa nor its demand for recognition as an Asian power.

The collapse of the French-supported regime in Indochina led to the formation of the Manila Pact (signed in September, 1954), designed to shore up the defenses of the Southeast Asian area. For this purpose the signatories created the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) providing military planning and coordination of policies somewhat similar to NATO in the Atlantic area. The treaty area covers the territories of the United States, Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, the Philippine Republic, and Pakistan. As defined by the Pact the northern limit of the treaty area in the southwestern Pacific is  $21^{\circ} 30'$ , thereby omitting Formosa to the north.

Whether the United States can in the long run keep the borderlands of South Asia within its military orbit depends on such imponderables as the anti-imperialist sentiment in the area, the dynamic force of new

nationalisms, and the policy and prestige of Red China as the coming great power in Asia. Geographic factors, it must be noted, inevitably tend to work to the disadvantage of the United States; for the United States in her western Pacific position is confronted by large population centers, a massive land area with considerable depth in the interior, and a group of nations—especially Red China—intent on industrialization and a prestige status in the postwar world order. Moreover, as the United States extends its line of communication close to the Asiatic mainland, it renders itself vulnerable to enemy aircraft and to all the hazards of the modern techniques of warfare. Added to this is the significant fact that the United States has no possessions or territories of its own close to the Asiatic mainland but is forced to rely on defense pacts and alliances, the usefulness of which depends on quixotic elements of international diplomacy.

Security arrangements designed to protect Southeast Asia encompass a region of primary importance to the United States and the West. At the southern tip of the area the Straits of Malacca and Singapore command the communication lines between Europe and the Far East. Along this global shipping route pass the world airlines linking European cities with Manila, Hong Kong, and Tokyo. Nor can the economic value of Southeast Asia be ignored. Its storehouse of raw materials—rubber, tin, tungsten, oil, as well as rice, coconuts, and other food-stuffs—is important to the industrialized West as well as to free Asia itself. Natural rubber is grown almost exclusively in Southeast Asia, and about sixty per cent of the world's tin is produced in Malaya, with Singapore the largest smelting center in the world.

## NORTH

Only since the development of aircraft as weapons of war and the establishment of trans-Polar air routes has the United States felt the need of protection from an enemy coming from the north. Now both Canada and the United States are fully conscious of the need to be prepared against attack along this shortest route from the Eastern Hemisphere to the Western. Their mutual fears have led the United States and Canada to military collaboration. Canada itself first outlined a defense program for the northern territory in 1951, but the United States has since cooperated with Canada in the establishment of three radar screens across Canada.

Alaska, though not contiguous with the United States, is closely linked with our Pacific Northwest by a highway across Canada and also by steamer and air services. Like northern Canada, it is open to trans-Polar attack by aircraft, moreover, by its closeness to Siberia, it is doubly vulnerable. It becomes, therefore, a very vital link in the American defense system.<sup>5</sup>

Alaska originally belonged to Russia, but owing to its distance from the seat of government and the consequent difficulty of administration, Russia was willing, in 1867, to sell it to the United States. Acquisition by the United States came at a time when Secretary Seward believed in manifest destiny, even though the country was preoccupied with other problems. In 1898 the Klondike gold rush in the Yukon attracted adventurers to the Alaskan Panhandle and into Seward Peninsula. A civil government was established at Sitka in 1884 and the Interior Department treated the area as a District without constitutional status. Until 1912, how-

ever, the Federal government largely ignored the new possession—the War Department, the Treasury, and the Navy successively exercising control.

The Organic Act of 1912 gave Alaska the status of an incorporated territory, making it a part of the United States but not a possession. The territorial government follows the pattern in Hawaii, along with the same privileges and restrictions in relation to the Federal government. Its citizens pay Federal taxes and send delegates to the House of Representatives but have no vote on legislation affecting the Territory. Sparseness in population settlement, limitation of its development to extractive industries, and the large number of primitive inhabitants have long blocked favorable action on its demands for home rule.

Alaskans resent regulation and control from distant Washington, the slow development of roads, and the extreme degree of absentee ownership over its major industries. The flourish of activity and growth during and since World War II has strengthened the case for statehood. Those who argue for statehood point to an increased population, improved transportation ties to the United States, strategic developments, and the ability of the Territory to pay the costs of government. In terms of population, Alaska compares favorably with many continental territories in the West before they achieved statehood. A referendum in 1946 expressed Alaskan sentiment in favor of statehood, but political friction between the two political parties in Washington has blocked the attainment of this goal. The continuing pressure for statehood in Alaska was evidenced in 1956 by the convening of a state constitutional convention and the drafting of an Alaskan constitution.

<sup>5</sup> For other geographic features, see Chapter 6.

### Study Questions

1. Account for the contrast in power status between the United States and the continent of South America
2. What event produced the two-power world order in 1945?
3. Outline the adjustments that the United States made in its relations with Western Europe during the postwar era
4. Evaluate the military and economic programs of the United States in terms of strength and weaknesses.
5. Under what circumstances did the United States acquire territories overseas? Would you term this process "imperialism"?
6. Why is it that Puerto Rico has failed to attain statehood or independence? Explain the present relationship of the island to the American mainland
7. To what degree is the heritage of "Yankee imperialism" an obstacle to good relations with Latin American republics?
8. Would the rise of a strong Germany solve the conflict of power between the East and West?
9. Compare the positions of the United States and the Soviet Union regarding Eastern European regions. What states would the latter include and what factors account for the position of the two powers?
10. To what extent have American military schemes for the Middle East overcome the forces of disunity in the area?
11. What islands form the "stepping stones" to the Orient?
12. Explain the origin and status of our Trust Territory of the Pacific
13. Is the concept of a "defense perimeter" a sound idea as applied to the Pacific realm?
14. What arguments could be mustered in favor of Hawaiian statehood?
15. What effect, if any, would statehood for Alaska have upon its strategic importance to this nation? Compare the case of Alaskan statehood with that of Hawaii

## CHAPTER NINE

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# *Caribbean America*

The term Caribbean America may have various meanings. In this study the area to be considered includes Mexico, Central America, the West Indies, and the Guiana colonies on the mainland of the South American continent. Central America is composed of the six republics of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama, together with the European colony of British Honduras; it also includes the Panama Canal Zone, which is territory leased to the United States. More complex are the West Indies, made up of four major islands known as the Greater Antilles; an arching chain of smaller islands known as the Lesser Antilles; the peripheral Bahamas to the north; and a series of small islands lying off the coasts of South and Central America. There are three republics in the West Indies—Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic; in addition there are islands belonging to European, South American, and North American countries. The three Gui-

anas belong to Britain, the Netherlands, and France (see the map on page 131).

The region just outlined does not conform to a strict interpretation of Caribbean America, when delineated as only those lands that border the great sea lying just north of South America. As a specific example, Salvador does not touch the Caribbean but has ocean frontage only on the Pacific. Nor do the Bahamas lie in or on the edge of the Caribbean, but in the Atlantic well to the north. Again, only the Yucatan Peninsula part of Mexico touches the sea in question, and the three European colonies of northern South America lie southeast of the Antillean fringe forming the Caribbean's eastern boundary. Nevertheless, the entire region under discussion has long been associated with the economic and political activities crisscrossing and circling this sea, so that all its units can rightly be included in a broad interpretation of Caribbean America. On the other hand Venezuela and Colombia, on the southern

rim of the Caribbean, also belong to any interpretation of the region, but they will be discussed in the next chapter as Andean countries.<sup>1</sup>

### POLITICAL DIVISIONS

Sixteen flags fly over the lands of Caribbean America. Ten belong to the republics of the region itself, three to European nations, two to the countries of continental South America, and one to the United States. As recently as 1917 the Danish flag flew over three islands of what now comprise the American Virgin group in the Lesser Antilles. And in 1898 the final Spanish flag was lowered in Caribbean territory, ending an era of Spanish domination, from which language and customs still remain in stronger evidence than those of any other nation. The table on pages 132-133 gives a detailed breakdown of the political units of Caribbean America.

### GENERAL PHYSICAL ASPECTS

The location of Caribbean America between the main blocks of the North and South American continents gives this region importance both politically and economically: first, it forms an important part of the larger political region of Latin America; and, second, it has extensive communication with the United States directly to the north.

Caribbean America is situated largely within the tropics. Only the northern half of Mexico and parts of the Bahamas lie north of the Tropic of Cancer. As a result, the entire Caribbean registers relatively high sea-level temperatures.


The republics and colonial areas of Caribbean America include more than 1,000,000 square miles—approximately one third the number in continental United States. More than 50,000,000 people, or about one third as many as those living in the United States, live in the Caribbean. Thus, in density of population Caribbean America and the United States are similar, but in most other respects the populations are vastly different. Population in Caribbean America is made up of a mixture of races—Indian, white European, and African. In many places the native Indians are mixed with Europeans who conquered them and with Africans brought in by the conquerors to work on plantations and in mines.

**RELIEF**—The Caribbean area is essentially mountainous. Its mountains link the Western Cordillera of North America with the great Andean ranges of Pacific South America. Mexico and Central America have mountainous backbones, which are roughly coincidental with their axes. The West Indies are made up of an offshoot of the same mountain system as it arches from southern Mexico to eastern Venezuela. Lowlands are largely limited to narrow fringes on coastal plains, the only exception of note being the nearly level topography of the limestone plain of Yucatan. Population is not confined to the coasts, however, but extends, often in dense proportions, into valleys and interior basins.

**CLIMATE**—Caribbean mountains and plateaus provide climatic controls that have a marked influence on temperature and precipitation. Throughout the Caribbean, altitude zones bear names descriptive of the characteristic temperatures: the *tierra caliente*, or hot zone of the lowlands; the *tierra templada*, or temperate zone of the medium elevation; and the *tierra fria*, or cold zone of the higher lands. The mountains act as barriers and intercept the moisture of prevailing northeast trade winds, with the result that heavy rains fall on the windward

<sup>1</sup> Two other terms are sometimes applied to Caribbean America: Middle America and the American Mediterranean region. The former can probably be defended for use in describing Caribbean lands; the latter is more inclusive and applies to areas bordering both the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean. Any discussion involving the shores of the Gulf of Mexico would, then, undoubtedly encompass parts if not all, of the United States.





## Area and Population of Political Divisions of Caribbean America

<i>Name</i>	<i>Area</i> (in sq mi)	<i>Population</i> <sup>a</sup>	<i>Capital</i>
<b>Republics</b>			
Costa Rica	19,695	825,000	San José
Cuba	44,216	5,800,000	Havana
Dominican Republic	19,129	2,300,000	Ciudad Trujillo
Guatemala	42,042	3,000,000	Guatemala City
Haiti	10,714	3,200,000	Port-au-Prince
Honduras	46,600	1,505,465	Tegucigalpa
Mexico	760,373	28,800,000	Mexico City
Nicaragua	57,000	1,200,000	Managua
Panama	28,575	817,000	Panama
Salvador	13,176	2,100,000	San Salvador
<b>British possessions</b>			
British Guiana	82,997	459,000	Georgetown
British Honduras	8,867	72,000	Belize
British West Indies			
Bahamas	4,404	85,000	Nassau
Barbados	166	221,000	Bridgetown
Jamaica (incl. Caicos, Cayman, Morant, Pedro Cays, and Turks islands)	4,613	1,500,000	Kingston
Leeward Islands			
Anguilla	423	121,400	St Johns
Antigua			
Barbuda			
Montserrat			
Nevis			
Redonda			
St Kitts			
Virgin Islands			

<sup>a</sup> The population figures given above are from the most recent census or the most recent official estimates.

slopes, but the descending air brings drier conditions on the leeward sides.

**VEGETATION**—Altitude zones, mountains exposed to the prevailing winds, and highlands facing away from them encourage a variety of vegetation types, ranging from rain forest on the windward slopes to desert on the leeward, and from heavy tree vegetation on well-watered sea-level lands to Alpine flora and permanent snow on the highest peaks.

#### REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The present pattern of settlement, involving so many political units as are found in Caribbean America, reflects a highly diver-

sified physical landscape. Colonial communities sprang up around centers of population which had been attracted to local environments offering a means of livelihood. These centers in some instances served as core areas, or nuclei, for the development of the modern republics. However, because of their relative isolation from one another, national boundary problems in Caribbean America have been but few.

A transportation pattern over the Caribbean region as a whole failed to develop; rather, each political area strove to build up internal transportation facilities for its own needs, crude though the results may have been. With the development of commer-

Political Divisions of Caribbean America—*continued*

<i>Name</i>	<i>Area</i> ( <i>in sq. mi.</i> )	<i>Population</i> <sup>a</sup>	<i>Capital</i>
British possessions ( <i>continued</i> )			
Trinidad (incl. Tobago)	1,980	678,300	Port of Spain
Windward Islands			
Dominica	820	295,000	St. George
Grenada			
the Grenadines			
St. Lucia			
St. Vincent			
Dutch possessions			
Netherlands Guiana (Surinam)	55,144	230,000	Paramaribo
Netherlands West Indies			
Aruba	366	163,000	Willemstad
Bonaire			
Curaçao			
Saba			
St. Eustatius			
St. Martin—shared with France			
French possessions			
French Guiana	35,000	28,000	Cayenne
Guadeloupe (incl. Désirade, Les Saintes, Marie Galante, St. Bartholomew, and St. Martin—shared with the Netherlands)	687	289,000	Basse-Terre
Martinique	425	273,000	Fort-de-France
United States possessions			
Panama Canal Zone	648	42,049	—
Puerto Rico	3,435	2,216,000	San Juan
Virgin Islands	133	26,600	Charlotte Amalie

cially exploitable crops and industries, however, an astonishing pattern of transportation lines was developed to tie the area to

centers beyond the shores of the Caribbean—first by ships and seaports; more recently by airplanes and airports.

## MEXICO

The Mexican Republic, composed of twenty-nine states, two territories, and a federal district, is the largest country in the Caribbean area.<sup>2</sup> Yet its 760,370 square miles are less than half of what it was in the mid-

nineteenth century before Mexico lost Texas, California, and other adjoining territory to the United States. Since this huge peripheral area had no effective lines of communication connecting it with Mexico City, the center of population and the core of the country, it is unlikely that it could have been held under the Mexican flag even if Mexico had not suffered defeat in the war with the United States.

<sup>2</sup> Each state has its own governor, legislature, and constitution under a federal system. The president appoints a governor for Quintana Roo and Baja California, the two territories, and a magistrate for Mexico City, the Federal District.

### PHYSICAL ASPECTS

Two thirds of Mexico's land area is mountainous. Between the Eastern Sierra Madre and the more rugged Western Sierra Madre lies a plateau surface that increases in elevation from north to south. Eastern and Western Sierras meet near Mexico City, on a site a mile and a half above sea level. The mountain complex, forming the juncture of the two Sierras, contains volcanic peaks rising to 18,250 feet, just 2,000 feet less than Alaska's Mt McKinley, the highest elevation in North America. South of Mexico City the rugged Sierra Madre del Sur and the mountains of Chiapas follow an east-west trend, rather than a northwest-southeast direction, which is characteristic of most of the two northern Sierras.

Over half of Mexico has insufficient rainfall for successful agriculture, and on such land irrigation and dry farming must be practiced. Natural vegetation reflects these conditions, ranging from rain forest on the wet Gulf and Caribbean lowlands to desert on great expanses of the northern intermountain plateau and on the Sonoran Desert of the northwest. The character of the soil is likewise influenced by the amount of rainfall; for example, the arid peninsula of Baja California is lacking in humus, and along the Gulf coast, east of Puerto Mexico, rain-forest soils are likely to be leached.

### HUMAN ELEMENTS

Mexico's population amounts to more than 28,000,000, making the nation the second most populated one in Latin America. Mexico City, with more than 2,000,000 people, has always been the center of the country's greatest concentration of people. When Cortes captured the city in 1521, large numbers of Indians occupied the fertile valleys which surrounded the capital. The rich

environment probably encouraged dense settlement then just as it does now.

**RACE**—In their long period of control over Mexico, the Spaniards formed but a small percentage of the population. Probably not more than 300,000 of them (mostly men) originally migrated from Spain. Spanish intermixture with indigenous Indian population was common, accounting for the large number of mestizos in Mexico today; over sixty per cent were so listed in the last census. Nevertheless, 2,000,000 Indians remain to complicate the population types and pose a real problem to Mexican political unity. The 1940 census, for example, was taken in fifty different languages, and thirty-four Indian languages were listed as important. Moreover, many Indians described as Spanish-speaking understand but a few words of Mexico's official language.

Negroes and Negro mixtures are not so numerous in Mexico as Indians and people with a high percentage of Indian blood. In the colonization period the Spaniards imported a small number of Africans to work in mines and on plantations. However, these slaves gained freedom during the war for independence between 1810 and 1821. Today not more than a few hundred thousand Mexicans show traces of Negro blood, most of them live in the coastal lowlands.

**MIGRATION**—Harsh agricultural conditions in northern Mexico force many landless people to migrate across the border to the United States. This migration may be permanent and legal or temporary and illegal. Within recent years it has averaged more than a quarter million persons annually. Illegal entry has been relatively easy across the shallow Rio Grande boundary and is encouraged by wage differentials north and south of the border and by the lack of sufficient border patrol. Attempts to stop illegal migration are prompted by major labor organizations in the United States. In gen-

eral an amicable agreement between the two governments regulates this matter, despite occasional friction.

## AGRICULTURE

Although social, economic, and political distinctions were made on the basis of race during the colonial period, no such conditions exist today. In fact, racial diversity in Mexico poses less of a political problem than the wide gulf that exists between Mexico's wealthy few and the large poor classes. The contrast is not now so great, fortunately, as it was in 1910 under the regime of President Díaz. At that time ninety per cent of the Mexicans owned no land. In recent years Mexico has effected reforms by taking land from large landowners and the Church and distributing it among the landless farmers.

Much of Mexico's total area is unsuited for distribution among farmers who need land for cultivated crops.<sup>3</sup> In fact, less than one third can be adapted for crop agriculture, the rest being hopelessly unfit either because of rugged terrain or because of inadequate or badly distributed precipitation. Much rough or arid land, which is suitable for grazing, could be turned to crops if more irrigation were available.

**IMPROVED METHODS**—Soil depletion by over-cropping or poor farming methods in areas of maize production lowers total productivity and reduces the capacity of the nation to support its population. Progressive changes, suggested by experts, include less dependence upon maize as a major food crop and more care in the choice of proper land for seeding. Cultivation of maize without some

system of rotation encourages soil erosion along the rugged slopes and tends to deplete the soil on both hill and plain. It is doubtful whether Mexicans will introduce these needed changes rapidly because dietary habits are as difficult to alter as farming practices that have followed well-established customs for centuries. Yet land handled thus unwisely leads to lower production in a country of increasing population, a sure formula for the creation of political unrest and of tendencies for migration from the country.

**WATER TREATY**—The American-Mexican Treaty of 1944 regulates irrigation problems of vital concern to both countries.<sup>4</sup> In the utilization of common rivers covered by the treaty both countries possess bargaining points. The United States could, if desired, cut off almost all Colorado River water from Mexico. Mexico, in turn, could cut off waters of the Tijuana, as well as those reaching the Rio Grande along the Texas-Mexico border. Practically all Rio Grande water below Fort Quitman, Texas, comes from Mexico. Curiously enough the treaty reduced Mexico's share of Colorado River water from the previous consumption of 1,800,000 acre-feet permissible per year to 1,500,000 acre-feet; but the treaty recognizes Mexico's rights to this water. In times of surplus Mexico may receive up to 1,700,000 acre-feet, but without thereby acquiring rights to more water than the treaty guarantees. In times of drought both nations will reduce their use of water on a pro rata basis.

<sup>3</sup> Distribution of the 17,000,000 acres of arable lands on a per capita basis amounts to less than one acre per person.

<sup>4</sup> Friction over the Rio Grande and Colorado waters has existed for more than a century, the Treaty of 1944 is but the latest step toward an amicable arrangement. For its text see World Peace Foundation, *Documents on American Foreign Relations* (Princeton University Press), VI (1943-44), 547-572.

## CENTRAL AMERICA

Central America is a long narrow belt of land extending from the Mexican border to Colombia in extreme northwest South America. Six republics, together with the Crown Colony of British Honduras, form the political units of the area. Physical features hinder communications within and between the countries, and population is concentrated in relatively small areas of each country. Although there has been little conflict among the nations, there have been few attempts at federation on the part of these small states during the past century.

In many respects landforms resemble those of mountainous Mexico, but Central America lacks a plateau similar to Mexico's broad basin region between the two Sierras. Almost all of its mountain ranges trend from east to west; the area covers more degrees of longitude than of latitude.

As in Mexico, plains are found along the coast, wider on the Caribbean than on the Pacific. Caribbean plains receive more rain than the Pacific fringe and support luxuriant rain-forest vegetation. Both in Panama and in Nicaragua mountain topography gives way to lowlands which have international political significance. The Panama lowland is occupied by a transoceanic canal. Another important lowland in Central America follows Nicaragua's San Juan River and Lakes Nicaragua and Managua and may be used for an interoceanic canal at some future date.

**THE PANAMA CANAL**—The narrow isthmus connecting the two continents is probably the most important factor in the political geography of Central America. Since the early days of Spanish exploration, the isthmus has served as a significant transport route between the Atlantic and the Pacific. In the sixteenth century pack mules and Indian runners carried Andean gold across the narrow

country. Later, the gold rush in California encouraged the building of the first transcontinental American railroad across Panama. In the decades following 1850, Great Britain and the United States claimed a joint interest in any interoceanic canal.<sup>5</sup> In 1878 the Frenchman De Lesseps, who had built the Suez Canal, launched a canal-building project across the Isthmus of Panama but failed to complete the work. With the growth of American naval power and the adjustment of Anglo-American differences regarding exclusive rights to construct a canal, the United States finally chose the Panama route. Despite the difficulties of terrain and tropical climate, construction proceeded and the canal was opened in 1914.

The Panama Canal has become the key-stone of the United States military strategy in the Caribbean. In September, 1940, President Roosevelt gave Britain forty old destroyers in exchange for a ninety-nine year lease on six Caribbean bases in the Bahamas, Antigua, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Trinidad, and British Guiana.<sup>6</sup> All these bases were developed and used during World War II primarily to guard the Panama Canal Zone. Today all have been deactivated, except the one at the northwest corner of Trinidad, near Chaguaramas. However, all leases are still valid, and the United States has relinquished none of these strategic locations.

The bases obtained from Great Britain to safeguard approaches to the Canal supplement military installations previously obtained. Guantánamo Bay, granted by Cuba

<sup>5</sup> The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty (1850) required joint Anglo-American control and neutralization of the proposed canal. A subsequent treaty in 1902 gave the United States the sole right to construct an isthmian canal.

<sup>6</sup> Samuel Van Valkenburg (ed.), *America at War* (Prentice-Hall, 1942), pp. 200-257.

to the United States in the Spanish-American War of 1898, stands guard over the Windward Passage, which opens toward the canal; Borinquen Field on Puerto Rico, also obtained as a result of the Spanish conflict, overlooks Mona Passage, a route to the canal between Hispaniola and Puerto Rico. The Virgin Islands, purchased from Denmark in 1917 to keep Germany from using them as a submarine base in World War I, provide protection for the Virgin Passage between Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands (see map on page 114).

**THE PAN-AMERICAN HIGHWAY**—Adequate transportation is one of the very real problems of the republics of Central America, where roads vary in quality and distribution. A plan for the construction of a Pan-American highway linking the two continents of the Western Hemisphere existed for several decades. Military necessity in World War II accelerated its construction. Mexico's portion of the road has been completed, as have some links in the Central American states leading to the Canal Zone. An all-weather highway when completed will tap the resources of several states, will enhance tourist trade, and, most significantly, will be of value in defense of the Canal Zone.

#### THE REPUBLIC OF PANAMA

One of the youngest republics in the Western Hemisphere, Panama gained its independence from Colombia in 1903, after the United States had supported an uprising and extended *de facto* recognition to the new government. The contour of the isthmus, with a breadth varying from fifty to 100 miles, made it a logical site for an inter-oceanic canal between the Atlantic and the Pacific.

The question of a canal across Central America, a paramount and long-standing diplomatic problem involving Nicaragua and Costa Rica, long dominated Panama's rela-

tion with the United States. The Treaty of 1903<sup>7</sup> at last provided occasion for the construction of a canal across Panama.<sup>8</sup> In the treaty the United States acquired in perpetuity sovereign control over a zone five miles wide on each side of the canal route. The republic is thus cut in two by the Canal Zone. In return for this grant the United States has paid Panama an annual sum of \$250,000 and increased the amount in recent years. The two key cities, Colón and Panama, at either end of the canal, remain under Panama's jurisdiction, except for certain authority granted the United States in public health. During World War II Panama granted the United States the right to construct military facilities on Panama's soil to aid in defense of the Canal. After the war, this permission was withdrawn. Under the Treaty of 1936, however, America is still permitted to defend the canal in any way deemed necessary. In addition to the income received from the Canal, Panama's principal source of revenue is from agricultural exports—particularly bananas—to the United States.

Panama has demonstrated an aptitude for orderly government despite a tendency toward oligarchic rule. Stability is partly due to the balance existing between the landholders and the city population, one fourth of the latter being located in Colón and Panama. The Panama Canal is an issue in the country's domestic politics.

#### NICARAGUA

With an area of 57,143 square miles, Nicaragua is the largest and most thinly popu-

<sup>7</sup> Known as the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, whereby the new Panamanian government granted the United States the use of a zone five miles in width on each side of the proposed canal across the Isthmus of Panama for the construction of a canal.

<sup>8</sup> Colombia refused recognition of Panama until 1914 and restored diplomatic relations with the United States in the Treaty of 1921.

lated state in Central America. The western and eastern halves present contrasts in many respects. About sixty-nine per cent of the people, largely of mixed Spanish and Indian blood, live in the west, Mosquito Indians live along the Caribbean coast.

Agriculture is the principal source of wealth, with coffee accounting for thirty-two per cent of the country's exports; cotton is also an important commodity. Banana plantations have suffered from sigatoka, a serious banana-leaf disease, and this crop is only eight per cent of the total exports. Gold has become the chief single export item, being forty-two per cent of the total value, but gold production is largely worked by foreigners and hence does not directly enrich the economy of Nicaragua.

Nicaraguan politics exhibit a mixture of revolutions, dictatorship, constitutional rule, and foreign intervention. The Conservative party between 1863 and 1893 did provide an era of placid rule, but the regime of Zelaya in 1893 plunged the country into turmoil which lasted until his removal in 1909. American intervention, including the landing of Marines, characterized Nicaraguan politics from 1912 to 1929. Relatively stable government in the last two decades has contributed to progress in education, highway development, and agriculture.

Nicaragua has figured prominently in the canal problem of the past half century. Under the treaty signed in 1916, Nicaragua granted the United States an option for a canal route from San Juan del Norte (Grey-Town) on the Caribbean coast to Brito on the Pacific. The eastern part of the canal would be a water level route following the Rio San Juan to Lake Nicaragua; to the west the highest point to be traveled would be about 150 feet. Nicaragua also granted the United States naval bases on the Gulf of Fonseca and on Corn Islands, locations offering protective bases for both Pacific and Caribbean approaches to the canal. Nicaragua is anxious to have building operations

start, but for various reasons the United States has delayed decision on the canal.

## COSTA RICA

An independent state since 1821, Costa Rica is one of the few stable democracies in the Western Hemisphere. Historical as well as geographic factors may account for this stability. The early Spaniards found no gold in Costa Rica, and the few Indians proved insufficient to work on the large haciendas.

In its comparatively dense highland population of small farmers and the absence of a complex racial pattern that might engender political friction, the nation has two very important factors encouraging democracy. Its social legislation provides for a liberal labor code, social security, and sickness benefits. Labor unions exist but are not strong in the agricultural country.

Most of the population is of the white race with a sprinkling of native Indians. Some Negroes from the West Indies work on tropical plantations along the Caribbean coast, but they are not increasing in number, and there is little mixture with the whites. The population is settled near the capital, San José, and in the towns.

Railways link San José in the interior with Limón, the Atlantic port, and Puntarenas on the Pacific. These are the chief commercial ports linking the country with its foreign markets. In value of total exports coffee ranks first, followed by bananas and cacao.

## GUATEMALA

Tranquility is not the hallmark of this republic. Since its foundation in 1839 a succession of revolts and military rules has marred its constitutional history. The constitution itself sanctions rebellion whenever the president violates the injunction against re-election. Strong-man rule has occasionally produced reforms, such as the regime of Ubico in the 1930's, which developed trans-



portation, improved government administration, and introduced land reforms. Since World War II Guatemala has continued a liberal economic program designed to improve its well-being.

The population is densely settled in the tropical highlands and along the Pacific fringe. In the Petén lowlands in the Yucatan only 12,000 people live on forty-five per cent of the country's total area. This lowland region, once inhabited by the highly civilized Mayas, might be a partial answer to Guatemala's land-reform problem. Certainly the social picture of the nation is an unpleasant one: two per cent of the people own seventy per cent of the arable land; seventy-two per cent are illiterate, and fifty-three per cent are Indians, while most of the remainder are ladinos (mixed Indian and Spanish).

Guatemala's economy is basically dependent on a few crops, of these coffee and bananas constitute the principal exports. The United Fruit Company has for many years owned vast plantations in the country, and other American companies dominate the railways and power production. Such foreign holdings are a source of international friction. Under the Agrarian Reform Law of 1952 the government provided for the expropriation, with compensation, of certain landed estates. The United Fruit Company protested, thus adding fire to Guatemala's sensitive nationalism. Final disposition of foreign-owned lands in Guatemala may take years to work out.

The government has claimed that its policies are designed to break the chains of feudalism and colonialism, and its aim—to improve the living standards of the nation—cannot be criticized. However, the government has at times worked in alliance with Communist elements. The prospect of a Communist bastion some 700 miles from the Panama Canal has especially disturbed the United States. In June, 1954, following a coup, a government more friendly to the

United States than its predecessor was installed in Guatemala.

#### BRITISH HONDURAS

A small Crown Colony on the Caribbean, British Honduras contains but 8,867 square miles, equal in size to Massachusetts. Its 67,000 people follow an economy based largely on the exploitation of forest products, such as chicle, mahogany, cedar and rosewood. Belize, the capital, is its principal port, from which exports go to the United States and the United Kingdom.

For over a century now international friction has existed over British Honduras-Guatemala frontiers.<sup>9</sup> Guatemala has continually claimed the whole colony as Guatemalan territory. The British claim to the colony is based on early explorations and settlement along the rain-forest coast by loggers from the island of Jamaica.

#### EL SALVADOR

The republic of El Salvador is the smallest and most densely populated in Central America. With highlands comprising the dominant topographic feature, its economy is completely geared to raising coffee, a major farming enterprise throughout plateau and mountain lands of Caribbean America where there is sufficient precipitation. So much emphasis on one crop in El Salvador, and in other Caribbean countries as well, is a dangerous economic practice. Such a policy may have unfavorable political repercussions following a crop failure or a weak market for the commodity. Counteracting this hazard is a certain national stability. Most of El Salvador's population, consisting of eighty per cent mestizos, almost twenty per cent Indians, and a few Europeans, live on relatively small

<sup>9</sup> Details of the boundary dispute are found in L. M. Bloomfield, *The British Honduras-Guatemala Dispute* (Toronto: Carswell & Co., Ltd., 1953).

farms. Therefore neither large land holdings nor racial frictions provide serious problems for the nation.

### HONDURAS

Honduras, like El Salvador, places major commercial emphasis on a single crop, in this instance, bananas. The country led Caribbean production prior to the recent attack of

sigatoka, a serious banana-leaf disease, which, however, is now under control. The country is much less densely populated than is Guatemala on the west: 20.3 people per square mile in Honduras, compared with 85.8 people per square mile in Guatemala. As in all other Central American republics, except Panama, the capital city (Tegucigalpa) is in the interior and outranks coastal cities in size.

## THE WEST INDIES

The chain of islands called the West Indies describes an arc of some 1,800 miles from Cuba, in the western portion of the Antilles, to Trinidad, off the Venezuelan coast in the east. The individual islands are really isolated surfaces in the continuation of the Central American mountains, which extend submerged through the Caribbean Sea eastward from southern Mexico and the channel of Yucatan. Mountains belonging to this group appear in each of the Greater Antilles and in a few of the Lesser Antilles. Some of the mountainous islands on the latter Antillean group are geologically related to the Andean Cordillera which sweeps through Colombia and Venezuela and reappears in the Caribbean as widely separated islands off the mainland.

The prevailing northeast trade winds within this region account for a tropical forest vegetation on the windward side, or in the north, east, or northeast portions. Similarly the dry leeward sides along the southern fringes reveal a desert, steppe, or savanna vegetation. This climatic condition naturally affects the economy and agricultural pursuits in the area.

### POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS

The West Indies are a fertile field for studying the historical phases of political geog-

raphy. Here, in the Bahamas, Columbus first sighted land. Later Cortes set out from Cuba for the conquest of Mexico. In the days of the buccaneers, Spanish explorers used the islands to provision their ships for the long voyage to Spain. In the race for gold many European nations challenged Spain for control of the islands. It was at Antigua that Admiral Nelson refitted his ships before the Battle of Trafalgar that was to end Napoleon's bid for sea power. During the American Civil War European nations used the islands as bases for trade with the Confederacy. Most of the activity of the Spanish-American War in 1898 took place in the West Indies. In the present century these important events are overshadowed by America's strategic moves to safeguard the Caribbean approaches to the Panama Canal.

### THE GREATER ANTILLES

The West Indies are divided according to size into the Greater Antilles and Lesser Antilles. The former group consists of the islands of Cuba, Hispaniola, Puerto Rico, and Jamaica; the latter include the chain of islands stretching from Puerto Rico to the South American mainland, as well as the Bahamas off the Florida coast.

CUBA—By far the largest island of the West Indies, Cuba is unlike the other Greater Antilles in the distribution of its major land-forms. It has no dominating east-west mountain backbone, as is true on neighboring islands; rather, there are only three small mountain groups in Cuba, two of them hardly more than hills and occupying much less land than the nearby gently rolling plains. The Organos Mountains in the far west and the Trinidad Mountains in the center of the island are lower and less rugged than are the Sierra de Maestra in the extreme eastern sector.

Cuba is the world's leading producer of sugar cane. Several factors combine to make this possible: extensive plains, tropical climate, suitable soil, cheap labor, American capital, and a great consumer market a short distance to the north. Sugar and its products account for ninety per cent of Cuban exports by value. Sugar dominates both the economic and the political life of the nation. Great fluctuations in prices have on occasion brought a boom-and-bust economy and have even affected international relations. No doubt American investments in sugar explain the terms of the Treaty of 1903, wherein the United States asserted the right of intervention for the purpose of preserving Cuban independence.<sup>10</sup> This prerogative, exercised on several occasions, was not terminated until 1934, when the United States negotiated a general treaty of friendship with Cuba.

In troubled times dependence on a single product can be dangerous. Cuba has, therefore, experimented to a moderate degree with diversified agriculture. Its staple products include tobacco, cacao, cereals, and citrus fruits as well as vegetables, mostly for home consumption. Cuba also possesses

minerals, such as iron ores, chromite, copper, gold, and silver, but industrial development is still in its infancy, and what industries do exist are largely developed by American interests.

HISPANIOLA—Hispaniola, second largest island in the West Indies, is much more mountainous than Cuba to the west. Elevations in the Antillean chain reach their maximum in the western part of Hispaniola, with peaks towering up to over 10,000 feet—far exceeding the highest peak in the Appalachian Mountains. Lowlands are limited to fragments of coastal plains and a labyrinth of interior valleys. Lack of any broad plateau areas has largely confined the population to lowlands, so that there are no interior cities of note, as there are in Central America and Mexico.


The two republics situated on Hispaniola offer unique geographic contrasts. Haiti, on the western end of the island, is only about half as large as the Dominican Republic on the east, yet it has fifty per cent more people. There are other striking contrasts. Haiti, the second republic to organize in the Western Hemisphere, is populated with French-speaking Negroes who practice subsistence agriculture under a semidemocratic form of government. In annual per capita income Haiti ranks lowest among the republics of Caribbean America. On the other hand, the Dominican Republic is largely mulatto and Spanish-speaking and practices both subsistence and plantation agriculture under the skillful economic and political guidance of one of the most rigid dictatorships in the world.<sup>11</sup> Infiltration of Negroes from densely populated Haiti into Dominican territory has created serious friction between the two countries. In 1937 over 10,000

<sup>10</sup> In 1901 the terms were originally contained in the Platt Amendment as an insertion in an Army appropriation bill and were later incorporated in the treaty.

<sup>11</sup> Since 1930 the Trujillo brothers have monopolized the presidency in the Dominican Republic. The president has extraordinary powers to rule by decree and dispense with congressional approval in times of national emergency.

Haitian migrants were massacred by their Dominican neighbors, for this outrage Haiti was later paid damages. Tragedies of this kind are possible when poorly defined political boundaries separate such contrasting national groups.

**PUERTO RICO**—Following acquisition of Puerto Rico from Spain in 1898, the United States ruled the island as a territory closely linked to the American mainland in essential economic and political matters<sup>12</sup> But since 1952 it has been a commonwealth. The political status is far overshadowed by a serious condition of overpopulation and economic distress—twin drawbacks to a state of well-being. Puerto Rico has a density of 700 per-



sons per square mile on land that is largely occupied by corporation monoculture and small-scale farming. Small holdings have been steadily declining while sugar culture monopolizes the best lands (see map on this page). Owing to an unusually high birth rate, social distress has forced some migration to the United States, particularly New York City, but not enough to relieve the population pressure on the island. Laws favorable to industry have helped somewhat, but the island lacks the basic factors needed for heavy manufacturing. Despite this shortcoming in Puerto Rico's physical en-

vironment, American efforts at improvement of economic conditions there have had rather remarkable results.<sup>13</sup>

In the words of Governor Luis Munoz Marin, "Puerto Rico in its upsurge is an exemplification of the fine spirit of freedom in which the United States can deal with civilized people of different origin in their homeland; . . . and Puerto Ricans feel a pride and affection regarding the citizenship they have lived with for 37 years, defended in war, and honored in their practice of democracy in peace" (*Foreign Affairs*, July 1954).

**JAMAICA**—Only 4,470 square miles in size, Jamaica, a British colony, has a population of about 1,500,000. Its mountainous terrain permits agriculture, but the productive yields fail to support an increasing population. Poor soils, topography, and primitive habits plague the island's economy. About one third of the land is divided into average holdings of fifty acres each. Its principal exports—sugar, bananas, rum, cacao, and coffee—are shipped to the United Kingdom and Canada.

The Jamaica Welfare Society has attempted to raise the living standards of the working class. Lately Jamaicans have organized politically as a result of a new consciousness. Part of this movement since 1938 led to a new constitution in 1944 under which the London government granted greater local autonomy to the colony. The people elect their own House of Representatives, and an executive council, partly

<sup>13</sup> By careful planning in agricultural, industrial, social, and political fields and by actual execution of such plans, Puerto Rico has made remarkable progress since 1940, and is an island to watch in the Caribbean. In twelve years, 1940–52, life expectancy increased 32.6 per cent, school enrollment, 58.2 per cent, per capita net income, 227 per cent; income from manufactures, 307.1 per cent; income from agriculture, 150.2 per cent, and private savings, 246.5 per cent. All this occurred in spite of a 50 per cent decline in the death rate and a population increase of from 1,878,000 to 2,226,000, or 18.5 per cent.

<sup>12</sup> See Chapter 8 for a further discussion.

elected, assists the Governor as a cabinet. Both the Labor Party and People's National Party attest to the island's progress toward a greater measure of self-rule.

#### THE LESSER ANTILLES AND THE BAHAMAS

Common topographic features appear in most of the Lesser Antilles. Like three of the four Greater Antilles, they are mountainous, though limestone plains dominate landforms in the Bahamas and Barbados. Subsistence agriculture is widespread, but corporations and private individuals farm large acres of sugar, cacao, and other monoculture crops. In fact, monoculture is centuries old in some islands, in the eighteenth century Europeans sought such tropical lands primarily because of their potentialities for sugar production. At one point during the eighteenth century British statesmen considered trading Canada to the French for Martinique. Such a trade would be utterly unthinkable today.

**BRITISH INTERESTS**—Three European powers rule this area: Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands. Each has developed its own pattern of political organization. Great Britain has ruled its colonies through governors appointed by the Crown. Suggestions have been advanced for a closer federation of the British West Indies, including Jamaica. However, islands have a strong feeling of isolation—the very word *island* suggests isolation. Furthermore, there are great differences among the various units. For example, Jamaica, with more than half of the approximately 3,000,000 British colonial population in the Caribbean, might exercise a dominating role in a federal organization. Again, only Trinidad is self-supporting. It is also difficult to agree on the location of the capital for the federation. Finally, officials in the various colonies are apprehensive lest

their personal importance be diminished in the event of a large federation.

**FRENCH INTERESTS**—France owns but two West Indian islands, Martinique and Guadeloupe, which are remnants of a vast French empire in the New World which was lost in the eighteenth century. Despite contests by rival powers, French sovereignty over both islands has been acknowledged since 1815. Both islands are largely agricultural and depend on exports of sugar, bananas, coffee, and cacao, which find markets in France. Steamship lines, as well as Pan American Airways and Air France, provide communication with the United States and Europe. Since 1946 France has accorded "statehood" to both colonies, each being a department of France. Martinique is the site of a French naval base, a factor of strategic significance in 1942 when American pressure forced a pro-German regime on the island to resign following the collapse of France in 1940.

*The Netherlands' Interests.* The Netherlands owns a group of islands lying off the Venezuelan coast, of which Curaçao, Aruba, and Bonaire are best known. Because a sand bar prevented oceangoing vessels from reaching Maracaibo, in Venezuela, huge refineries were established on Aruba and Curaçao, located north of Lake Maracaibo.<sup>14</sup> The presence of the installations emphasizes the importance of stable government in the attraction of foreign capital. The Netherlands has provided an enviable record of political stability, although its paternalistic rule has recently been modified to include a measure of self-rule.

<sup>14</sup> A subsidiary of the Royal Dutch Shell (CPIM) operates the refinery on Curaçao; the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey (Lago Oil Transport Company) operates on Aruba.

## THE GUIANAS

The Guiana colonies—British, Dutch, and French—include a total of 173,141 square miles, a little larger than the state of California, and 717,000 people, equivalent to the population of South Dakota. Settlement is mostly limited to the narrow coastal plains, with mountain and plateau interiors averaging less than one person per square mile. The coastal fringe of Dutch Guiana, or Surinam, and of British Guiana is largely devoted to plantation crops of sugar and rice. The remaining lands retain their natural vegetation, much of it rain forest. Near the Brazilian border, however, tropical grasslands appear in the Guianas as extensions of the llanos which flourish in Colombia and Venezuela.

The coastal lands of British Guiana and Surinam have concentrations of agricultural workers, some of whom have migrated from India on contract to work the sugar plantations. The mountainous interior of the Guianas, with its forest and grass vegetation, contains only semicivilized Indian tribes. In the late 1930's Britain considered the

Rupununi savannas of British Guiana as a possible haven for German Jews suffering persecution under Hitler.<sup>15</sup> Careful study, however, showed that they might suffer no less from Guiana's physical environment than from Hitler's treatment, and no migration resulted.

Mineral resources are an asset to the governments of the Guianas. Both Britain and the Netherlands defray the costs of operating British Guiana and Surinam by levying a tax on the exploitation of large bauxite resources. This mineral finds a ready American market and contributed notably to the United States aluminum industry during World War II.<sup>16</sup>

French Guiana, sparsely populated and largely uninhabitable, is the least important of this group. Its plantations, producing coffee, cacao, and sugar, have fallen on evil days since slavery was abolished and the lure of gold mining attracted the workers to other areas. Depressed economic conditions plus social distress have plagued this French colony for many years.

## CARIBBEAN PROBLEMS

In any approach to over-all problems of the Caribbean region, three items will stand out as significant: (1) *population* problems, arising from overcrowded areas and low living standards; (2) *economic* problems, growing out of monoculture and the influx of foreign capital which hinder subsistence agriculture and local development; and (3) *political* problems, created by the superimposition of governmental patterns upon peoples of various degrees of political maturity.

## POPULATION ASPECTS

Several of the island areas, as well as parts

of the mainland, are overpopulated. However, population densities on Cuba, Hispaniola, and Jamaica are far less than that on Java, the most crowded island of the East Indies. Even Puerto Rico, with 700 persons per square mile, is considerably less crowded than is Java. Continental densities range from less than one person per square mile in

<sup>15</sup> Earl B. Shaw, "The Rupununi Savannas of British Guiana," *The Journal of Geography*, XXXIX (March, 1940), 89-104.

<sup>16</sup> Bauxite ores from British Guiana go to Canada; those from Surinam to the United States.

French Guiana to 163 per square mile in El Salvador. Nicaragua has eighteen persons per square mile, Honduras, twenty-two; Panama, twenty-seven; Mexico, thirty-two; Costa Rica, forty-three; and Guatemala, eighty-six. All the continental areas except Guatemala and El Salvador are below the average density of the United States (50.7 per square mile); all the Greater Antilles and many of the Lesser Antilles have densities above the United States average. In view of these statements one must qualify the generalization that the entire Caribbean region is overpopulated.

Race differences cause few problems in much of the Caribbean. One example, though, is intermittent trouble stirred up by Indians from India, who, after being brought to British Guiana to work on sugar plantations, resist political assimilation. The West Indies have a large Negro element, but few traces of the indigenous Arawak and Carib Indians remain. Great numbers of the indigenous Indians, enslaved to work in mines and on plantations, died from mistreatment, overwork, and susceptibility to disease brought by the Europeans. On the other hand, continental areas offered more hiding places for the hunted Indians, and, as a result, large numbers of people of pure Indian blood are found on the continent.

With the annihilation of the Indian race on the islands, Negro slaves were brought in from similar latitudes in Africa to work on the plantations. The descendants of these slaves, many of them showing mixture with other racial groups, make up a large segment of West Indian population today. There is no color bar in the West Indies, such as that found in parts of the United States; rather, class distinction is based more upon wealth.

#### ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

The limited food supply of the Caribbean needs to be increased to assure greater eco-

nomie stability. Since most of the good land is already in use, improvements must stem from better farming methods. Not only must harmful soil erosion be stopped, but agricultural education and use of mechanical equipment should be introduced into local farming communities. As previously suggested, monoculture crops may provide the most profitable land use in time of peace, but too much emphasis on them carries a serious hazard in time of war. World War II proved this to the Caribbean region, when almost every West Indies monoculture island was clamoring for shipments of fats and proteins,<sup>17</sup> which together with other foreign products were difficult to obtain during the period of submarine warfare.

The Caribbean not only lacks self-sufficiency in food supply but is deficient in many other natural resources. Like all of Latin America, it has but little coal; so charcoal must serve as a fuel. Minor coal fields in Mexico account for most of the Caribbean production. Together with Trinidad, Mexico also accounts for the bulk of Caribbean petroleum, though heavy production also takes place in nearby Venezuela and Colombia. Other areas may also possess petroleum, but in many places foreign capital hesitates to move in for exploration. This hesitation is based on fear of expropriation—a fear somewhat justified when one considers Mexican nationalization of privately owned oil concessions.

In a land as mountainous as most of the Caribbean, one might expect to find rich deposits of metallic minerals. Significant resources of silver, lead, vanadium, and other metals have been exploited in Mexico, but no important deposits have been discovered in Central America, the Guianas, or in the West Indies.

<sup>17</sup> Earl B. Shaw, "The Food Front in the Greater Antilles," *Economic Geography*, XIX (January, 1943), 55-76.

### POLITICAL PROBLEMS

Basic to political stability in a country is a certain amount of well-being. Throughout much of the Caribbean region the low economic level encourages instability and extremist movements, because opportunities for advancement are limited among the masses of the population. In fact, in the entire Caribbean region, there is only an extremely small beginning of what might be termed a middle class. Moreover, the high percentage of illiteracy among Caribbean peoples is a handicap to the development of democracy. These two weaknesses create a tendency for political movements to oscillate between the extreme right and the extreme left. Dictatorships are fairly widespread in the Caribbean as well as in most of Latin America.

Communism feeds on the same maladjustments as do dictatorships. Although the danger of Communism in the Caribbean region should not be dismissed, it should not be overrated, only when cloaked as an agrarian reform movement is Communism a danger. Whether it can capture and hold power is a moot question. Actually at present Communist parties are weak, being confined to the urban centers and to young labor movements. If democracy is to be established in the area, local governments must raise economic standards and reduce illiteracy among the masses through a widespread education program.

Curiously enough, nearness to the United States poses a political problem to Caribbean lands. True, continental America pro-

vides an excellent market for monoculture crops, contributes investment capital for various industries, and aids in education and health. But throughout history fear of Yankee imperialism south of the Rio Grande has been real, and this fear affords excellent propaganda for enemies of the United States. The Caribbean cannot forget American history in the Panama Canal Zone, talk of annexation, the Platt Amendment, or the many military occupations by United States forces in Caribbean countries. The average American, discarding past history, points to the contemporary scene and the desire of the United States to raise living standards, increase literacy, and encourage democracy in underprivileged areas. Yet, in spite of the logic of the American current viewpoint, the Latin American adopts a skeptical and cautious approach.

To counter the charges of imperialism the United States and other powers have devised a regional approach to Caribbean problems. Exigencies of World War II produced the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission, which has meliorated the economic stress that existed during the war period. Since 1946 France and the Netherlands have joined Britain and the United States as sponsors of the Caribbean Commission. This body carries on technical research in agriculture, health, and education, in which fourteen territories participate. Major policies, in turn, are decided in periodic West Indian Conferences.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>18</sup> See *Report of the Caribbean Commission* (since 1946).

### Study Questions

1. Give striking examples of the political and economic interdependence existing between the United States and the countries around the Caribbean Sea.
2. Discuss how climate influences the economic products of the Caribbean and the lives of the people themselves. Name the most important controls on Caribbean climates.



3. The Caribbean has been called a region of racial annihilations Explain
4. Describe the essential features of Puerto Rico's economy.
5. What is there about the physical environment of the Rupununi savannas of British Guiana which discouraged the establishment of a Jewish homeland there?
6. Compare and contrast interoceanic canal routes in Panama, Nicaragua, and Mexico's Isthmus of Tehuantepec.
7. Several Caribbean countries have been stressing a policy of land reform Give the background for this political action.
8. Comment on the generally accepted idea that governments in Cuba become strong or weak depending upon the strength or weakness of world sugar prices.
9. The Bahamas were used as bases for British trade with the Confederacy during the Civil War in the United States. Discuss locational aspects of this development.
10. Give arguments for and against the formation of (a) a political federation of British Caribbean islands and (b) one large state in Central America.
11. The Panama Canal is a lock canal Some authorities believe that a change to a sea-level canal would be a wise move from a military standpoint. Explain.
12. Prospecting for oil is active in Cuba What will be the economic and political effects upon Cuba if important petroleum discoveries are made?
13. Since the period of discovery the Caribbean has to a high degree been controlled by conditions and policies determined outside its own boundaries. Explain
14. The Caribbean region may be considered a unit in many ways, but it lacks certain characteristics of unity. Explain.
15. When a major fraction of the population can neither read nor write, high participation in national life is impossible; and in political affairs the best that can be expected is a government by the upper class. Comment on this statement as it concerns the Caribbean region.

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## *Andean Countries of South America*

Along the axis of the Great Andean ranges from the Caribbean Sea to the southernmost tip of South America extend the republics of Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, and Chile (see table on page 149). Their combined area exceeds 2,000,000 square miles, making up roughly the western one third of the entire South American continent. To fly from the most northerly to the most southerly point in this enormous stretch of territory would be equivalent to flying from San Diego to the southern part of the Alaskan Archipelago. In longitude the area corresponds to the area between Cleveland, Ohio, and the center of Newfoundland in eastern—not western—North America. Though the Andean republics are all in the western part of the continent, their coastal positions vary; Ecuador and Peru touch only the Pacific; Chile borders on the Pacific for over 2,500 miles but also touches the Atlantic for a short distance; Colombia faces both the Pacific and the Caribbean; Venezuela can look only to the Caribbean; and Bolivia has no seacoast at all.

Over such an extended portion of the world's surface, especially when the jurisdiction is divided among six governments, one necessarily finds a striking variety of both physical and human characteristics, but there are also some surprising similarities, which provide a basic pattern for almost the entire area. The population density is relatively low; only 40,000,000 people are scattered over an area two thirds the size of the United States. Spanish is the official language throughout, although most of the people are of Indian origin. Catholicism, often intermixed with local customs, is the dominant religion. In the small districts along the coasts, in the valleys, and on some of the elevated plateaus farming has remained the principal occupation, but the percentage of tillable land is low. Mineral resources, developed in large part by foreign enterprise, are internationally important, but they contribute little to internal stability of the countries. Disputes over boundaries are frequent, even though tracts of land lie unused within the individual republics.

Andean Countries of South America: Area, Population, and Products

<i>Republic</i>	<i>Area (in sq. mi.)</i>	<i>Population</i>	<i>Capital and Number of Inhabitants</i>	<i>Typical Products</i>	<i>Typical Industries</i>
Venezuela	352,150	5,600,000	Caracas 700,000	Petroleum, iron ore, sugar, cotton, sisal	Textiles, clothing, cement
Colombia	439,997	12,000,000	Bogotá 650,000	Coffee, bananas, metals, petroleum, cotton, tobacco	Textiles, tobacco products
Ecuador	175,830	3,400,000	Quito 275,000	Cacao, rice, rubber, ka- pok	Textiles, Panama hats, leather goods
Peru	514,059	9,300,000	Lima 1,000,000	Metals, sugar, cotton, wool, meat	Textiles, clothing, food products
Bolivia	416,040	3,054,000	La Paz (actual) 321,041 Sucre (legal) 33,381	Metals (tin), rubber	Mining
Chile	286,396	6,000,000	Santiago 1,500,000	Wheat, grapes, copper, nitrates, tobacco	Textiles, tobacco, glass

## GENERAL PHYSICAL ASPECTS

The Andes, which parallel the Pacific coast for almost 5,000 miles, come eastward in their northern reaches to parallel the Caribbean as well. This great mountain system, unsurpassed in length among the mountain systems of the world and second in height only to the Himalayas of Asia, has played a vital part in the life of the states, interposing serious obstacles to transportation and hindering political unity. The Andes define, though sometimes rather vaguely, the several regions which have developed into states. In the pre-Spanish days the Chibcha<sup>1</sup> realm of the northern Andes was as distinct from the Inca Empire in the central part as was the Inca Empire from the Araucanian domain in the south. Difficult communication resulted in regional weaknesses, particularly the lack of political cohesion, and made Spanish conquest of the

entire region relatively easy and rapid. Even with the present six countries poor transportation and intense sectionalism have retarded their development as truly strong nations.

The rain-bearing winds that blow from the east in low latitudes (near the Equator) meet a continuous barrier in the Andes. This has resulted in almost impenetrable tropical rain forest (*selvas*) in the humid Amazon Basin in Brazil and in stretches of desert along the Pacific margins of Peru and southern Ecuador. Zonal arrangements of climate and vegetation near the Equator correspond to altitudes, varying from the sultry coast to the cold, barren glacial depressions, known as *paramos*, and the eternally snow-clad high peaks. In the middle and high latitudes rain-bearing winds blow primarily from the west, causing dense forest growth along the coast of southern Chile and steppe and middle latitude desert on the Atlantic side of the Andes. With increasing distance from the Equator the high Andean ranges and plateaus are subject to frost, even in relatively low latitudes.

<sup>1</sup> The Chibcha Indian Empire was in some ways as culturally advanced as the Inca, Maya, and Aztec groups, but is less well known.

South America's three great river systems—the Amazon, the Orinoco, and the Paraná—and their vast, low, ill-defined sedimentary plains are oriented toward the Atlantic by the Andes. The plains have been generally of minor economic importance, owing to their inaccessible location in the hot and humid tropical rain forest. Only the most southerly lowlands, those of the Paraná, located almost entirely in the middle latitudes, have been economically significant. The coastal plains in the west, with few exceptions, are narrow and difficult to approach. In places along the Pacific the Andes virtually emerge from the sea. Unlike some of the eastern river systems, the short rivers flowing westward out of the mountains are generally unnavigable.

#### HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT


Spanish penetration in search of gold and glory began in 1499, only a year after Columbus' third voyage which culminated in his discovery of Venezuela. The Spaniards explored the narrow Caribbean lowlands rimmed by intermittent Andean ranges, without much difficulty, as far west as the Maracaibo Basin. Few precious metals were discovered, but pearls of exceptional size and beauty were found. As some of the "Pearl Coast" Indians lived in houses built on stilts above the swamps, one of the explorers, supposedly Vespucci, called this region "Little Venice"—hence, Venezuela.

The first attempt at colonization in South America for the slave trade at Cumaná Mission (founded by Dominican monks in what is now Venezuela) enraged the Indians, who soon wiped out this initial settlement on the continent. The lure of gold and excitement continued to attract English, French, German, and Dutch adventurers as well as Spaniards. New bases were founded westward along the Colombian coast at such lo-

cations as Santa Marta (1525) and Cartagena (1533). From there, small armed bands of Spaniards proceeded southward through the Andes. The amounts of precious metals found were disappointing until Francisco Pizarro discovered and conquered the wealthy Inca Empire in Peru and Bolivia. Farther south the conquest of Chile proved less easy than expected, for the Araucanian Indians took full advantage of the difficult terrain, although Pedro de Valdivia temporarily subdued the area before he was killed in 1553.

In Europe the emergence of British, French, and Dutch power weakened the hold of Spain on her overseas territories, while isolation, as well as distance, contributed further to breaking the bonds which linked colonies and mother country. During the early nineteenth century the South American Empire of Spain broke up into a number of independent states.

Although independence meant the end of European rule, it failed to change the Spanish-colonial social structure. In most of the republics small groups of conservative landowners still predominate as the ruling class. Except in Colombia, the middle class is small and socially ineffective. The living standards of the majority of the inhabitants are low. Since neighboring countries generally produce, trade, and consume almost identical commodities, they have little economic incentive to cultivate relations with each other. Political strife between extreme conservatives and liberals continues to create instability within several states, and desire for territory or resources has caused boundary disputes that often led to war. The global demand for strategic raw materials, together with technological advances in transportation, is slowly helping to overcome many of the economic handicaps in the Andean countries, and interest in Hemispheric solidarity is gradually increasing.



## VENEZUELA

Once a part of Greater Colombia, Venezuela formed a republic in 1830 and adopted federalism as a principle of government.<sup>2</sup> Extending from 12°11' to 1°8' North Latitude, all of Venezuela is located within the tropics (see the map on this page). Sixth largest among the states of South America, Vene-

zuela (352,150 square miles) exceeds in size the total areas of Oklahoma and Texas, but has only about half their combined population—about 5,600,000 inhabitants. As in many other parts of Latin America, persons of Indian-European blood (mestizos) are a numerical majority throughout the country, but politically they are relatively weak. Landowners, who live in the large centers of population and are frequently descendants of the original Spanish grantees, remain the

<sup>2</sup> On April 8, 1953, the United States of Venezuela officially changed its name to the Republic of Venezuela.

ruling class. In striking contrast, the Indians who till the outlying districts, and the Negroes, as well as a few other groups of mixed parentage who live along the hot coasts, have played a minor role in politics. Except among the Indians, there has been an upward trend in population, migration has tended toward urban centers rather than toward undeveloped lands. There are signs, however, that a middle class is developing in some of the larger cities along the coast. Complete national unity will require the adoption of some constructive measures, as in Mexico, to improve the economic status of the Indians.

Immigration has been negligible. As in other South American republics, internal politics and parochial national spirit have discouraged prospective foreign settlers and investors from participating in the ambitious agricultural and industrial programs of Venezuela. But the existence of oil and some other valuable mineral resources has attracted American and other foreign companies. Unfortunately emphasis on production for immediate gains, with little attention focused on the conservation of natural and human resources, has done little to improve the low standard of living among most of the native laborers.

#### NORTHERN HIGHLANDS

Some 1,750 miles of Caribbean coastline make up Venezuela's northern boundary. Intermittent extensions of the Andean ranges rise rather sharply from the narrow coastal plain and closely parallel the sea. Inhabitable highland areas are of sufficient height to provide welcome relief from the oppressively hot climate along the coast. Amid the rugged highlands, and in the steep but fertile intervening valleys at an altitude of 3,000 feet or more, lies the well-defined political, social, and economic core of the nation. Caracas, with nearly three quarters

of a million people, is the capital, and along with its densely settled surroundings it is also the hub of Venezuela's more than 6,000 miles of road network. Westward from the capital one section of the Pan-American Highway runs for 800 miles through most of the nation's productive agricultural districts to tie up with the main north-south arterial route of the highway which passes through Colombia, at an elevation of 14,000 feet above sea level. There are other important roads suitable for motor vehicles that link Caracas with the centers of outlying sectors to the east and south. Domestic and international airlines and short railways to the coast complete the transportation picture. It can be said that the Venezuelan transportation system is almost adequate for the country's immediate needs.

#### MARACAIBO AREA

Northwest, beyond the Venezuelan Andes, and east of those of Colombia, lies the Maracaibo Basin—one of the most debilitating lowlands anywhere in South America. In the north is a narrow opening toward the Caribbean, but to the south mountains almost encircle the basin and cut off winds which might otherwise relieve the excessive heat and humidity. Until a few decades ago the poverty and unhealthy climate of this region caused it to be generally avoided. Toward the north the amount of rainfall and the density of vegetation are not so great, and dry scrublands border the Caribbean. Here, near a shallow outlet from Lake Maracaibo, is the city of Maracaibo, whose port formerly served the needs of a few Indian villages scattered through the swamps, as well as those of a handful of sugar and cacao plantations farther south.

The presence of petroleum in and around Lake Maracaibo was noticed rather early, but drilling of wells by American and Anglo-

Dutch companies began only after World War I. Within a few years Venezuela became one of the world's leading oil producers. The value of petroleum exports from Maracaibo soon eclipsed that of all other exports, including coffee, cacao, and rubber. Agriculture and stock raising employ the vast majority of workers in the area, but it is the petroleum that has strengthened Venezuela's economy, assuring the country an important place in international affairs and balancing the national budget. Maracaibo, until a few decades ago a sleepy provincial town, has now grown into a modern cosmopolitan industrial center of 250,000, second largest in the country. The reserves of oil in Venezuela are not the greatest in the world—for example, they are exceeded by those in the Middle East; but the strategic location of Maracaibo with respect to the United States makes almost certain its continued growth, provided that friendly international relations are not halted by untimely nationalism.<sup>3</sup>

#### ORINOCO LLANOS AND GUIANA HIGHLANDS

Vast, sparsely settled plains, called llanos, extend for some 600 miles south and east from the Andes to the Atlantic. These featureless grasslands, 200 miles wide and bounded on the south by the Orinoco River, are subject to floods from May to October and are parched during the remainder of the year. Though the llanos are only moderately suited for cattle raising, grazing has been the principal land use since early Spanish times.

The new El Pao and Cerro Bolívar high-grade iron ore deposits, undergoing development since 1949 by American capital, lie some 250 miles south of the Orinoco River in the partly explored Guiana Highlands. The entire output has been exported to the United States, but the government of Venezuela has recently considered the establishment of domestic heavy industry, supported by coal and other minerals that are available in the country.

### COLOMBIA

In 1886, to honor Christopher Columbus, although he never visited that country, the Republic of New Granada changed its name to the Republic of Colombia.<sup>4</sup> Liberated in 1819 by Simón Bolívar after three centuries of Spanish rule, Greater Colombia also included the territories of Venezuela, Ecuador, and Panama. Owing to isolation and regional jealousies, Ecuador and Venezuela

left the Confederation between 1829 and 1830 and formed separate nations. The province of Panama broke away in 1903 in the famous dispute over the projected canal across Panama.

Colombia is the fourth largest country in South America. Its area of 439,997 square miles exceeds that of Louisiana, Texas, and New Mexico combined. The country extends for some 1,100 miles from 12°30' North to 4°13' South Latitude and stretches east and west more than 800 miles at its broadest extent (see map on page 151). The republic has 12,000,000 inhabitants, of which well over half are mestizos. Negroes, mulattoes, and other mixed-blood groups, who live along the coastal margins, are about equal in num-

<sup>3</sup> Three foreign producers dominate the oil industry: Standard Oil of New Jersey, Royal Dutch Shell, and Gulf Oil Company. The fifty-fifty profit-sharing plan with Venezuela set a new pattern in oil-concession arrangements.

<sup>4</sup> This change in 1886 involved the adoption of a unitary, centralized government in contrast to the federalist system contained in the United States of Colombia Constitution of 1863.

ber to the European group—mostly of Spanish origin—who for the most part live in the cities. The latter hold much of the nation's wealth and are most influential in politics. There are scarcely 200,000 Indians left in Colombia. The Guajira Indians of the Caribbean coast are vanishing, and the once fierce Motilones no longer threaten the lowland settlements. The remnants of the sedentary Chibcha tribes are barely eking out a living in some of the less desirable mountain areas.

### CARIBBEAN LOWLANDS

For 1,094 miles the Caribbean Sea constitutes the northern limits of Colombia. The unhealthy climate of the coastal region, frequent attacks on the Caribbean forts, and the desire to search for gold were among the reasons for the early colonial movement southward from the coast of Colombia to the Andes. The shallow estuary of the Magdalena River, near which are the historically important towns of Santa Marta and Cartagena, provided a gateway to some 1,000 miles of navigation. The Spaniards streamed through the swampy coastlands up the Magdalena and along the valley of its important tributary, the Cauca, to the highlands.

It is interesting to note that the Magdalena system has remained Colombia's chief transportation artery down to the present time. The modern prosperity of Santa Marta, a city of 50,000, depends chiefly on the banana trade. Cartagena's population has grown to 130,000, for the city's port handles a large portion of the country's agricultural and mineral exports. Barranquilla, located ten miles upstream on the Magdalena, with more than a quarter of a million people, is a busy, modern, cosmopolitan city and one of Colombia's great centers of commerce, industry, and shipping. The lower course of the Magdalena is now paralleled by some 400 miles of pipeline from new petroleum fields. Where gradients are too steep for river navi-

gation, railways tap major centers of population.

### MOUNTAINOUS AREAS

Three mighty Andean ranges (*cordilleras*) run through Colombia in complex chains from north to south, where they meet near Ecuador in the Knot of Pasto, 13,900 feet high. A fourth, and lower, range parallels the Pacific to the Panamanian boundary. Human settlement and economic life of Colombia are acutely adjusted to these great mountainous areas, the valleys separating them, and the lowlands on their periphery. Despite the trend of the past decades toward development of the coastal lowlands, the real heart, or core, of the country lies in the highlands, especially the highlands of the eastern and central ranges.

**CORDILLERA ORIENTAL**—The Magdalena, rising high in the Andes, works its way between the eastern and central ranges for a considerable part of its 950-mile course northward toward the Caribbean. To the east of the river lies the high Cordillera Oriental. Its several ranges and intervening fertile valleys are sufficiently elevated to ensure a healthfully cool climate throughout the year. At an altitude of more than 8,600 feet above sea level, on a vast tableland, 300 miles from north to south and 150 miles wide, broken only by occasional hills, was situated the Chibcha capital of Bacatá. Since 1538, this productive plateau, known as the Sabana de Bogotá, has attracted a dense Spanish population. It is now one of the major centers of agriculture, grazing, mining, and industry. Once the seat of the Spanish viceroy, the city of Bogotá became the capital of the republic. Its population now exceeds 650,000.

Owing to the city's location and isolation from other centers, approach to Bogotá has always been time consuming. However, commercial air transportation—the first to be introduced in South America—has almost



overcome this problem. The journey from the Caribbean coast, which takes a week or more overland and via the Magdalena, can be made in less than three hours by airplane. Most of the country's main highways and air lanes, domestic and international, pass through, or terminate, in Bogotá. Unfortunately, the railways are somewhat uncoordinated, serving principally as feeders to the Magdalena River route. Owing to the mountainous character of the land and the uneven distribution of developed resources, rail lines were constructed in widely separated, and often competing, regions. Although this situation is slowly improving, with the energetic promotion of the railways and highways from the capital to the west coast and elsewhere, Colombia's railways on the whole have probably contributed less to national unity than have other means of transportation.

**CORDILLERA CENTRAL**—West of the Magdalena, high in the snow-clad Cordillera Central, is Medellín, the second largest city of Colombia. With 355,000 inhabitants and located in a densely settled, rich coffee and mining region, Medellín is one of the most industrialized cities in Colombia. Its rapid economic and political growth has exceeded that of other cities. Farther south, Manizales, the great coffee center, has grown to a city of about 125,000 inhabitants, although founded only about one hundred years ago. Colombian production of high-grade coffee, stimulated by high prices, now represents over one third of the country's agricultural output. In quantity of coffee produced, Colombia ranks second only to Brazil. The growth of ancient Cali to a city of a quarter of a million persons is phenomenal: the population increased by 175 per cent between 1938 and 1952 by reason of its location in a productive coffee, sugar, cotton, and tobacco area on the Cauca River and on the railway to the Pacific port of Buenaventura.

Cali's textile and other industries have also been greatly aided by nearby coal and other mineral deposits.

**CORDILLERA OCCIDENTAL**—Between the Cauca Valley and the Pacific coastal plain lies the high, narrow Cordillera Occidental. Rising in places to over 10,000 feet, the mountain range is heavily forested, and little settlement has taken place here. The region is of minor economic significance to Colombia.

## OUTLYING REGIONS

West of the swamplands of the lower Magdalena, the coastal plain broadens as it gradually merges, through the hot, humid Atrato country, with the selvas of the Pacific sector. This area is unhealthful, but some day it may be developed into an agricultural and mineral-producing hinterland for the city of Buenaventura on the Pacific coast. East of the Magdalena Delta is the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, an isolated range close to the Caribbean coast. It contains the highest point in Colombia—the Pico de Cristóbal Colón, 18,947 feet high.


The eastern two thirds of Colombia is called the Oriente. Though larger than Texas, this region is much less important politically than the northwestern sector of Colombia. In its northern part, the Oriente is a continuation of the Orinoco llanos, while to the south the landscape becomes a dense rain-forest area as the Amazon Basin is approached. The Amazon River provides east-west transportation, although it hinders overland traffic in a north-south direction. Very few people, most of these Indians, inhabit this part of Colombia. The dense rain forests along the Brazilian boundary of Colombia and Venezuela represent a continental transportation divide. All important points south of the divide can be reached only by a circuitous sea and river route or directly by air.

## ECUADOR

The republic of Ecuador is the smallest of the Andean countries and the smallest, except Uruguay, in South America (see map on this page). It is also the poorest country, since most of its resources are either potential or underdeveloped, and those which have been developed no longer yield large revenues. Ecuador's economic core is along its Pacific shores, the remote and

countries. It is difficult to give the exact area of Ecuador and Galapagos,<sup>5</sup> since official estimates vary anywhere from 104,510 square miles to 175,830. If the latter figure is accepted, Ecuador is still somewhat smaller than Illinois, Iowa, and Nebraska combined.

Only 3,400,000 people, the majority of whom are mestizos (*cholos*), make up the population of this nation. Small numbers of orientals and Negroes (the latter free since 1821) live among the Indians along the sultry coast north of Guayaquil Bay, while only Indians occupy the dry southern lowlands. Most of the country's population, however, live in the high Sierra—as the Andes are called. They are practically isolated from outside influences. Descendants of the Spaniards, many of whom are landowners living in the cities, constitute the ruling class. Their number is about equal to that of the Indians. Indians either till their community lands and breed llamas or, more commonly, live as farm workers (*huasipungos*) tied to the land.



inaccessible political nucleus is located in the basins (*hoyas*) which are separated from one another, and from the western coast, by a series of high and complex interconnecting ridges traversing the country from north to south. Most of Ecuador's Oriente, the densely forested region east of the Andes, which has direct access to Amazonian navigation, was lost to Peru in 1942. Although this backward area has contributed virtually nothing to the welfare of Peru, it still causes a great deal of tension between the two

## PACIFIC LOWLANDS

The coast of Ecuador extends some 500 miles from north to south. The productive humid plains, about 100 miles wide, are dissected by a series of alternating low hills and rivers, the most important of which is the partly navigable Guayas, largest river of Pacific South America. Its fertile valley, some 200 miles long, is one of the world's great pro-

<sup>5</sup> Galapagos, some 600 miles from the mainland, is an historically and biologically interesting group of sixteen sparsely populated islands. During World War II the United States maintained naval bases in the islands for the defense of the Panama Canal.

ducers of cacao, and more recently of rice. The prosperity of the port of Guayaquil, with 300,000 inhabitants, depends on the export of the commodities just mentioned, as well as of coffee, bananas, and other tropical fruits. This city, Ecuador's largest and most progressive, is situated on the western bank of the bay formed by the estuary of the Guayas River. The well-known Panama hats made by Indians farther north along the coast and gold and petroleum are the main sources of wealth, the revenue from all three commodities is, however, relatively small.

Guayaquil's port facilities, though recently enlarged and modernized, are still rather inadequate for handling its traffic, which includes almost all the imports and the greater part of the exports of the country. Durán, at the upper end of the bay, some sixty miles from the Andean foothills, is linked with Quito in the highlands by the American-built 290-mile single-track railway. Owing to frequent washouts and rock slides along the line, it takes two full days to negotiate this extremely difficult route.

#### HIGHLANDS

Once in the mountains, the railway from Durán quickly rises to a height of more than 10,000 feet within a span of fifty miles and enters the narrow, 300-mile-long intermontane plateau, which is fringed by gigantic, snow-clad volcanoes. In the four compartment-like basins of this region lies the core of the nation. Throughout these elevated basins (the altitude of which increases as one proceeds northward) agricultural and pastoral activities exceed in importance any local manufacture. Riobamba, midway between the coast and Quito—the nation's capital—is separated from the next basin to the north by the volcano Mt. Chimborazo (20,574 feet), one of the highest peaks in

the Andes. The railway spur from Riobamba southward toward Cuenca, Ecuador's third city, still awaits completion. Quito lies only fifteen miles south of the Equator, but at an elevation of 9,350 feet, in the agriculturally rich basin surrounding Mt. Pichincha. Its cool climate, due to the high elevation, attracts more than a quarter of a million people. Once an administrative center of the declining northern part of the Inca Empire, Quito became, in 1534, one of the *Audiencias* (provincial districts) under the authority of Lima, Peru, base for Spanish expansion northward through the Andes.

The tensions that have always beset the relations between the isolated highland capital of the country and the rich lowland center of Guayaquil, are not easily erased by modern projects for highway and railway expansion. The extension of the railway north of Guayaquil to the port of Esmeraldas would shorten the overland trip from Quito to the Pacific by some 100 miles, but owing to high costs of operation it would not bind the highland area with the economy of the lowlands. Despite modernization of railways, pack trains of llamas still compete successfully for freight along the country's 5,000 miles of roads. Similarly, the airlines compete with the railways for passenger traffic throughout the republic.

#### ORIENTE

The greater part of what used to be Eastern Ecuador is now controlled by Peru (see page 164). There are few transportation facilities between the area, which drains eastward toward the Amazon, and the remainder of Ecuador. There are no large towns in this region, where the majority of the population is Indian. Its chief contact with the outside world is confined to the sale of wild rubber, which traders ship eastward down the Amazon.

## PERU

Peru is one of the oldest political entities in the Western Hemisphere. In 1821, the present republic replaced the Spanish viceroyalty which had been established in 1533 on the ruins of the Inca Empire. The country, third largest in South America, borders the Pacific along 1,410 miles of coastline (see the map below). In size (514,059 square


owing to the cool Humboldt Current; they are comparable to those of our middle Atlantic coast. Valleys along this coast would be largely desert were not water from some fifty short rivers diverted for the irrigation of sugar and cotton.

Peru's northern boundary with Ecuador, disputed for a century, is far from settled to mutual satisfaction. Other portions of its frontier—with Colombia to the northeast, with Brazil to the east, and with Bolivia to the southeast—are the result of territorial settlements and exchanges. The present boundary with Chile to the south was agreed upon less than twenty years ago.

The Spanish minority is small, but rich and powerful; most of the people are mestizos. The Indians live in scattered settlements in the relatively unproductive Sierra. A considerable number of orientals, who arrived about fifty years ago, live along the coast.

## COASTAL DESERT

A barren coastal strip, no more than 100 miles in width, is the westernmost of three broad geographic divisions into which Peru is divided (Coastal Desert, Andean Sierra, and Eastern Lowlands). It extends the entire north-south length of the country, from Ecuador to Chile. In 1535, Francisco Pizarro transferred the capital of the uprooted Inca Empire from Cuzco to the new city of Lima, located in this arid region about eight miles from the coast on the Rimac River. In time the city developed into the undisputed political, economic, and intellectual center of the nation; today it is a metropolis of 1,000,000 people. Callao, busy seaport for Lima, is only seven miles distant. Many other port cities are found along the Peruvian



miles) Peru exceeds the total areas of California, Oregon, Washington, Idaho, and Nevada combined, but its population of 9,300,000 is only about four fifths that of California. Although it is situated entirely in the tropics, temperatures are moderate,

coastal strip, each one at the mouth of a stream flowing through, and giving life to, a ribbon of territory in the desert

The coastal desert plays an important role in the economy of Peru. Valuable mineral deposits have been developed both in the desert and in the nearby foothills of the Maritime Andes. The area around Talara, enlarged by former Ecuadorian territory, has developed into one of the major petroleum exporters of South America.<sup>6</sup> Formerly of great importance were exports of guano from the coastal Chincha Islands, but severe competition with synthetic fertilizers in recent years has reduced the value of this product. The Pacific Ocean traffic is fed by short rail lines reaching inland or running parallel to the coast. Recently an improved road system has aided economic development of the region.

#### ANDEAN MOUNTAINS AND PLATEAU

The Andes Mountains occupy almost one third of Peru, and the majority of the country's inhabitants live in this region. The mountains, somewhat lower along the Ecuadorian boundary, assume a southeastward trend in Peru and attain great heights as their tangled ranges broaden out into a vast plateau. Large parts of this area that are on the average more than two miles above sea level are referred to as *puna*. Extending within the mountains from southern Ecuador to northern Chile, this high zone is too cold and too dry to support much vegetation and is generally uninhabited; people who live in the Andes cling tenaciously to the terraced slopes of isolated valleys. Numerous rivers flow out of this Andean sector, which includes the rich, mineral-bearing Cerro de Pasco (14,144 feet at the "Knot"). Two of these are the Marañon and the Huallaga, Amazon tributaries which flow

northward beyond the Eastern Cordillera. Another river is the Ucayali, which makes its way through the plain farther to the east and provides access to the former Ecuadorian territory.

Some 2,750 miles of foreign-built and mainly foreign-controlled railways and more than 12,000 miles of roads provide transportation along the coast and to the mountains. The American-built Central Railway, which also serves the coastal region in the vicinity of Lima, extends from Callao eastward, through extremely rugged terrain, to Oroya. There a branch owned by the Cerro de Pasco Copper Corporation brings copper and other ores from the north to be smelted with domestic coke. The region also produces bismuth, lead, zinc, silver, gold, and approximately forty per cent of the world's vanadium. From Oroya the railway runs south to Huancavelica, its present terminus; but plans are under consideration to extend the track to Cuzco, the ancient Inca capital, once a city of 250,000 inhabitants, but now possessing only 45,000. From the southern port of Mollendo, the British-owned Southern Railway taps the wool center of Arequipa and the irrigated agricultural and stock-raising plateau region near Bolivia. On this frontier is Lake Titicaca, 12,518 feet above sea level. The same British company that controls the railway also operates scheduled steamer service across the Lake to Bolivia, but the traffic is light and sporadic.

#### EAST OF THE ANDES

Some sixty per cent of Peru lies east of the Andes. The eastern slopes, called *Montaña*, merge through almost impassably steep valleys with the oppressively hot and humid selvas of the lower watershed of the Amazon. Thinly peopled with Indians who live along the many rivers, this vast region has only one urban center of some importance, Iquitos, which was the Amazon port for Ecuador prior to the acquisition of this territory by

<sup>6</sup> Talara is the port; the chief oil fields are nearby Lobitos and Negritos, the latter being the principal oil-producing area.


Peru. The distance from Lima to Iquitos is 1,200 miles, requiring three weeks' travel overland. Distance and difficult terrain have stimulated air transportation of passengers and goods to this region, as to the

rest of Peru. However, under international agreements, the Peruvian government still sends bulky supplies to the eastern territory from Callao via the Panama Canal and 2,000 miles up the Amazon.

## BOLIVIA

Liberated from Spanish rule in 1825, Bolivia was named in honor of the great liberator Simón Bolívar, who served as the republic's first president. The Bolivian republic is a landlocked country, having lost to Chile in the War of the Pacific (1879-83) its coastal strip along the Atacama Desert, a region rich in nitrates and copper. As a result of equally disastrous wars with her other neighbors, the area of Bolivia was reduced approximately one half (see the map below).

dians and mestizos, live on the Altiplano. This high plateau, covering some sixteen per cent of the country's area, is rich in tin and other scattered mineral deposits. The descendants of the Spaniards are mostly urban dwellers, a landed minority that controls the politics, as well as the intellectual and economic life, of Bolivia. Population growth has been slow, and recent immigrants, few in number, have chosen to settle in the cities rather than in rural areas.



Now 416,000 square miles in extent, Bolivia is slightly larger than the total areas of our three Pacific states and Nevada and has some 3,000,000 inhabitants. Most of the Bolivians, mainly Quechua and Aymara In-

### THE ALTIPLANO

Between the volcanic Coastal Cordillera and Bolivia's Cordillera Real spreads the Altiplano, a tableland some 500 miles long and eighty miles wide, with altitudes exceeding 13,000 feet, above which several peaks reach to more than 21,000 feet. Strong winds, cold temperatures, and low rainfall result in a bleak landscape, with agriculture limited to the hardiest of food crops. Yet, because of its mineral wealth, this inhospitable region forms the most important sector of Bolivia. After the Spaniards had exhausted the gold of the Incas and had reached the point of small returns from the Potosi silver mine, tin-ore concentrates became the backbone of Bolivian economy. This modern development came about despite high transportation costs and severe competition from the richer and more easily accessible tin ores of Southeast Asia.

Bolivia has consistently suffered from lack of fuel and adequate transportation. Some petroleum production from the reserves at Camiri, meager as it is, has provided fuel for homes and for the mines and industries of Oruro and for the country's railways.<sup>7</sup>

The Southern Railway of Peru continues on Bolivian territory south of Lake Titicaca, from Guaqui to La Paz, 9,300 feet above sea level. La Paz, with 320,000 inhabitants, is the actual capital of Bolivia and is 9,330 feet above sea level, but for reasons largely sentimental, Sucre, only about one tenth as large as La Paz and some 320 miles to the southeast, has remained the legal capital.<sup>8</sup> Railways connect the tin mines with the ports of Arica and Antofagasta in Chile. A third rail line extends southeast, connecting the lofty tableland with Argentina (see the map on page 160).

### EASTERN BOLIVIA AND THE CHACO

This region represents about four fifths of the national domain. In the northern portion of the eastern Andean slopes, *yungas* (steep valleys covered by lush forests) descend into the almost uninhabited llanos, an area tributary to the Amazon. The central *yungas* overlook the fertile agricultural and stock-raising areas surrounding Cochabamba, Bolivia's second largest city, with a population of 75,000. Connected with La Paz by 190 miles of railway, this populated area produces a variety of agricultural products. The southern *yungas* and other valleys are drier and cooler. To the southeast they merge with the Chaco, a large region sparsely settled by minor Indian tribes. This vast plain, known as the Gran Chaco, is shared by Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina.<sup>9</sup>

## CHILE

The area of the republic of Chile is 286,396 square miles, slightly smaller than the combined areas of Michigan, Minnesota, Iowa, and Illinois. Chile stretches over 38°15' of latitude, or 2,653 miles north to south; its maximum width nowhere exceeds 250 miles (see the map on page 162). In places, there are only fifty miles between the Pacific and the main ranges of the Andes. Chile's elongated shape explains to some extent the country's great diversity of climates, reminiscent of our Pacific coast (in reverse sequence, of course) and the irregular distribution of the nation's population. The Atacama Desert in the north is only thinly


peopled; the pleasant climate of the fertile Central Valley has attracted a dense population; the population of the cold and humid south is sparse.

Chile is inhabited by 6,000,000 people, somewhat less than the population of Michigan. The Chileans are rather homogeneous ethnically; about sixty-five per cent are mestizos. The landowning Spanish element is strong in Central Chile, but descendants of British, German, French, and Italian immigrants are significantly numerous in the south. Persons of Euro-Araucanian ancestry are scattered in considerable numbers throughout the country; there are about 200,000 Indians, of whom the Araucanians are most numerous. Remnants of the

<sup>7</sup> Petroleum reserves are located in the northwest area bordering Peru and on the Argentine frontier in the south. The output supplies only one half of Bolivia's needs.

<sup>8</sup> The Supreme Court and the Archbishop's residence are in Sucre, while other governmental departments operate at La Paz.

<sup>9</sup> The Chaco boundary dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay produced a bloody conflict (1932-35) which was ended only through international intervention.



smaller tribes inhabiting southernmost Chile are slowly vanishing.

#### NORTHERN CHILE

Since the prevailing winds either parallel the coast of northern Chile for some 1,000 miles or blow offshore, most of the Atacama region is a barren desert. Backed by three Andean ranges, the central one of which—Cordillera de los Andes—forms the boundary with Argentina, this desolate area normally would be of negligible political significance (it supports only about 500,000 inhabitants). But rich nitrate deposits, as well as other important minerals, have made it an economic asset and given it international importance. The minerals lie among the Andean ridges, some fifteen to 100 miles from the Pacific. Chile acquired control of this area in 1883, when it overpowered the combined forces of Bolivia and Peru in the War of the Pacific. After World War I, when the exports of nitrates declined sharply, owing to synthetic production in other parts of the world, copper exports quickly gained the lead. Open-face pits in the Atacama, together with those in El Teniente in central Chile, now provide the bulk of the country's foreign trade. At present, Chile's output of copper is second only to that of the United States.

The ports of this region deserve special attention. Arica, in the very north, is the starting point for the shortest route (283 miles) to the Bolivian Altiplano. This port is also linked to Peru by a railway running north to Tacna. The port city of Iquique is attempting to compensate for its declining nitrate trade by the development of a fish-processing industry. Largest of the Atacama ports, Antofagasta, with its subsidiary ports, Mejillones to the north and Caleta Caloso to the south, is an important smelting and concentration center for the ores brought down over some 700 miles of railway from the Bolivian Altiplano. In addi-



tion it is the terminus of the new (1948) railway from the agricultural and lumbering Salta district of Argentina. Caldera is another center that prepares concentrates of copper and manganese for shipment—mostly to the United States. It is connected by one of the oldest railways in South America with Copiapó, a point on the longitudinal rail line of Chile, which connects Pisagua, in the northern desert, with Puerto Montt at the margin of southern Chile.

#### CENTRAL CHILE

South of Copiapó begins the gently rolling Central Valley of Chile. Delimited by the Coastal Range and the snow-capped ridges of the Andes, it is the political nucleus of the nation. The Central Valley runs for more than 600 miles from north to south but seldom attains a width of more than thirty miles. Within this area live approximately ninety per cent of the population.

In the northern sector of central Chile irrigation must be practiced, but rainfall increases with increasing latitude. Chile's excellent main port, Valparaíso, has a population of 350,000, while the national capital, Santiago, counts a million and a half people. The modern city of Concepción and its fast-growing port of Talcahuano are major centers in the southern part of this rich, agricultural-industrial area. Expanding highways, railways, and airlines have aided the development of natural resources. An integrated private and government rail- and air-transport network links central Chile with the northern and southern sections of the na-

tion as well as with the Pacific and, across the Andes, with Argentina.

South-central Chile, with heavier precipitation and more forested areas, is the home of the warlike Araucanian Indians, who until late in the nineteenth century resisted settlement by the whites and mestizos from the north. The Araucanians are now beginning to enter into the political life of the country, and the area represents an important pioneer agricultural area.

#### SOUTHERN CHILE

The southern 1,000-mile stretch of Chile, as well as the innumerable islands in the archipelago, is cold, rainy, and heavily forested. The area supports only some 250,000 people, many of whom are foreign-born. Lumbering and sheep raising are the chief occupations, but coal mining and exploitation of petroleum are developing. Owing to earlier glaciation, the worn-down Andes begin to lose their identity in this region as they gradually fade out through the innumerable fjords and islands that form the western margin of southernmost South America. At the southern tip of the continent is the archipelago of Tierra del Fuego, consisting of one large and several small islands, separated from the mainland by the Strait of Magellan. Most of the area belongs to Chile, although the eastern sector of the main island is controlled by Argentina. Here is located Punta Arenas, the most southerly city in the world. The region is cold, wet, and stormy and suitable only for sheep raising.

### BOUNDARY PROBLEMS

Reference has already been made to boundary disputes among various Andean countries. Sometimes these disputes have been extremely turbulent; always they have ag-

gravated the national and international tensions. They have retarded the progress of the Andean states and have contributed much to the instability of most of the govern-

ments. The following material concerns recent specific disputes that have most critically affected the history of the six states under discussion.

From a politico-geographic point of view some basic factors underlie all of the more critical boundary disputes. Most controversies stem from the fact that during the era of Spanish rule boundaries were not clearly defined and the statesmen of each of the newly independent republics were greatly perplexed when they attempted to delimit the frontiers. It soon appeared that Spanish cartographers had either ignored geographic realities entirely or devised wrong descriptions. In either case treaty texts provoked disputes and recriminations among later cartographers, who often produced conflicting treaty texts. Then, too, as lines of settlement of each state moved outward and clashed with settlers of other states, questions of rights and priority of claims added to the confusion. Economic considerations provide substance to the controversies since, in many cases, valuable minerals or petroleum reserves are at stake in the claims and counterclaims of states. What has served to perpetuate the conflicts, however, has been the rising tide of nationalist feeling, which accounts for the refusal of many states to honor demarcation agreements.

The Leticia dispute, focused on the northwest sector of the Amazon, illustrates the difficulty of delimiting the river's tributaries. Colombia, after making peaceful cessions of Amazonian territories to Brazil, clashed with Peru in 1932 over the latter's seizure of Leticia, a town near Iquitos on the Amazon. Only the intervention of the League of Nations produced a settlement in 1934. The treaty, ratified by Colombia and Peru, restored Leticia to Colombia and assured each country right of free navigation of the Amazon and Putumayo rivers.

The boundary dispute between Ecuador and Peru spans a full century of time and is

still causing tension and alarm. Military action in 1941 erupted along a thousand-mile front as Peruvian forces advanced northward into Ecuadorian Oriente. In this area Ecuador had developed petroleum resources and sought to maintain its access to the Amazon navigation system, but Peru challenged Ecuador's claims militarily, as well as legally. Only after arduous diplomatic intervention by the United States, Brazil, and Argentina did the Rio Conference (1942) bring the hostilities to an end and reconcile the disputants.<sup>10</sup> The Conference awarded Tumbes, the small but valuable oil territory, to Peru. Ecuador retained a part of Jaén, a southern province, but lost to Peru most of Oriente and, with it, direct access to the Amazon. Since 1942, however, only diplomatic pressure of the four guarantors of the Rio settlement—the United States, Argentina, Brazil and Chile—has kept Ecuador and Peru from reopening hostilities.

Equally disturbing in the Andean region is the Tacna-Arica controversy, which centers upon a troublesome boundary dispute among Chile, Peru, and Bolivia.<sup>11</sup> Both Chile and Peru claimed the nitrate and copper territory, and eventually both conspired to defeat Bolivia, the weakest of the three, and annex the coastland. As a result of the War of the Pacific in 1879, Chile took away Bolivia's corridor to the Pacific and annexed Peruvian provinces as well. A settlement in 1929, however, resulted in a division of the disputed area: Tacna going to Peru, and Arica, to Chile. Landlocked Bolivia has continually, but unsuccessfully, attempted to regain access to the sea.

The Chaco affair likewise led to military action and to international intervention in Latin America. Both Bolivia and Paraguay disputed the Chaco wilderness lying west of the Paraguay River. The two fought

<sup>10</sup> I. Bowman, "The Ecuador-Peru Boundary Dispute," *Foreign Affairs*, XX (1941-42), 757-761.

<sup>11</sup> For a good analysis see *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. I (1922), 29-48.

a war between 1932 and 1935, which left both impoverished and exhausted. Tragic and futile in many ways, the war demonstrated the power and appeal of nationalism. To neither side was the territory strategic, although Bolivia aspired to gain access to the navigable Paraguay River.

After the war a peace conference outlined a common boundary in the Chaco. It netted Paraguay 91,800 square miles of additional unprofitable territory and left to Bolivia a few oil-producing fields. Certainly the gains were scarcely commensurate with the costs of the conflict.

### Study Questions

1. What factors influenced the break-up of the Spanish Empire in South America?
2. Describe the West Coast pattern of agriculture and the political implications of this arrangement.
3. In which country does relief offer the greatest hindrance to national unity?
4. How do the Andes affect the rainfall pattern? How does rainfall affect the distribution of population?
5. Discuss the locations of the capitals of the Andean republics.
6. Give reasons for political instability in the Andean republics.
7. What are the major economic relationships between Venezuela and the United States?
8. What factors affect Colombia's population distribution?
9. How has the Panama Canal affected the political development of Pacific South America?
10. How do Ecuador's population components affect national unity?
11. What are the natural divisions of Peru? What are their effects on the national economy?
12. Why is it to Bolivia's advantage that she and Chile, particularly, remain friends?
13. What political action stemmed from the location of the nitrate beds in Chile?
14. What part do the Andean republics play in the defense of the Western Hemisphere?
15. Discuss the War of the Chaco.

## *The United States of Brazil*

Brazil occupies the central position on the great eastward bulge of the South American continent. It is the world's fourth largest nation, with an area of 3,288,000 square miles, almost a tenth larger than the United States. The country is compact, as broad as it is long, running through 38 degrees of latitude and 38 degrees of longitude. Its maximum dimensions are about 2,600 miles, both north to south and east to west. Only South Brazil deviates from this pattern of compactness; the states of Paraná, Santa Catarina, and Rio Grande do Sul form a narrow 600-mile southward extension between Paraguay and Argentina on the west and the Atlantic coast on the east.

Brazil has certain elements of strength that may eventually advance it to the status of a major power. Most striking is the recent industrial expansion; though uneven in extent and distribution, as will be revealed later, it is of tremendous importance to a nation that has depended for centuries on an agricultural export economy, and is indica-

tive of an awareness of the resource potential. Also an element of strength is the fact that from a population welded together from diverse racial strains a sense of national unity has come into existence. In a different vein, but equally significant, is Brazil's strategic location dominating the South Atlantic and controlling the shortest air crossing to Africa.

At the same time Brazil must overcome some problems inherent in its geography if it is to achieve major-power status. First is the problem of making great areas of tropical land productive. Second, surface transportation facilities throughout the country are inadequate, even in the southeast where seventy-five per cent of the population lives, and air transportation makes up only part of this deficiency. A third disturbing problem, particularly for an industrial nation, is the lack of sufficient internal supplies of mineral fuels. Dependence on outside sources for coal and petroleum is a grave weakness for a nation that aspires to world power.

## HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

COLONIAL ERA—The Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494 between Spain and Portugal reserved for Portugal the great bulge of South America east of the mouth of the Amazon River.<sup>1</sup> Brazil<sup>2</sup> was discovered by the Portuguese Pedro Alvares Cabral in 1500, and subsequent explorations established its coastal configurations. Although the Spaniards started to explore and settle in the New World almost immediately after discovery by Columbus, the Portuguese did not send out a colonizing group until 1530. The settlements, called *captaincies*,<sup>3</sup> resembled feudal fiefs and were fifty leagues each along the coast, extending inland to the Tordesillas Line. No semblance of unity existed until 1549, when the king appointed a governor-general for the whole area. These *captaincies* survived as the foundation of the fragmented state pattern which presently exists along the coastal section of Brazil. Even the names of several of the states are the same as those of the original *captaincies*.

Diffusion of the settlements by the *captaincies* system and the natural conditions under which settlement took place provided the basis for some of the problems of political fragmentation that are still current here. Great distances between settlements as well as from the mother country, together with poor and slow transportation, resulted in a pronounced regional consciousness. The economic development of the

colony was uncoordinated, and its defenses were weak. The tropical climate of the coastal area proved a handicap for Europeans, and its easily leached and eroded soils made traditional Portuguese crops and types of farming difficult or impossible. Furthermore, the colonies had to produce valuable exports to finance essential imports from Portugal because they were chartered as agricultural colonies and prohibited by Portuguese policy both from manufacturing products for domestic needs and from trading with other than the mother country.

At the outset the forests were cut for dyewood and shipbuilding materials, but soon the colonists turned to raising sugar on the coastal plains of Bahia and Pernambuco and herding cattle on the grassy plateaus of the interior. Cattle provided food for the settlers, as well as hides and tallow for export, but sugar proved more profitable. Sugar was the first of the great commercial ventures, or speculations, which have since characterized Brazilian economy and have so greatly influenced its whole political geography. Sugar cultivation also was responsible for the introduction of Negroes as slaves when the local Indians proved inadequate as agricultural workers.

The most important settlements in the early days were Bahia, where the first speculative crop, sugar, set an important cultural pattern; São Paulo, whence the rough and rugged *Paulistas*<sup>4</sup> ranged far to the interior in search of better land, slaves, and gold; and Rio de Janeiro, where a defense post controlling the whole coast was established.

Preoccupied as the colonists were with expansion and exploitation, they were scarcely prepared to cope with the raids by English, French, and Dutch whom the Papal Line of Demarcation had excluded from the rich tropical lands of the New

<sup>1</sup> The treaty fixed the line of division between Spanish and Portuguese claims to the New World at 250 leagues west of Cape Verde Islands for discovered territories, 370 leagues for future discoveries. Spanish interests were to be west of the line; Portuguese to the east. The treaty effected a revision of the Papal Line of Demarcation (1493) in favor of Portugal.

<sup>2</sup> The red dyewood *Pau Brasil*, which was brought back to Europe, established the name of the country.

<sup>3</sup> The fiefs were granted to proprietary landlords (*donatários*) who promised to develop the lands entrusted to them and who exercised quasi-sovereign powers.

<sup>4</sup> Term applied to *mamelucos*, or mixtures of Indian and Portuguese, who inhabited the region of São Vicente (later São Paulo).

World.<sup>5</sup> The Dutch planted colonies on the sugar coast and held it from 1580 to 1655. Pernambuco and Bahia owe much to the Dutch, and traces of their occupation are still evident in the architecture and in the physical characteristics of people of the coastal northeast.

At the same time the Portuguese were laying foundations for claims to the west of the Tordesillas Line. *Paulistas* ranged from the Paraná to the Amazon, grazing their cattle on the Plateau of Mato Grosso and the Chaco and founding several agricultural settlements. Missions were also established along the northern coast and the Amazon at strategic points as far inland as Tabatinga, where the Javary River joins the main branch of the Amazon. The Treaty of Ildefonso in 1777, wherein Spain agreed to a boundary drawn nearly at its present extent, formalized Portuguese occupation. The Ildefonso line gave Brazil, after it gained its independence, a common boundary with all South American countries except Chile. Boundary changes between Peru and Ecuador have since made Ecuador noncontiguous.

The colonial policies of Portugal, although less rigid than those of Spain, nevertheless precipitated several revolts during the 1700's. Early in the next century, however, when Napoleon conquered Portugal (1807), the royal family of that country fled to Rio de Janeiro, and Brazil was freed from the commercial restraints imposed by the mother country. When Napoleon was defeated at Waterloo (1815), the Portuguese king was free to return to Lisbon, but he left his eldest son, Dom Pedro, as his representative in Brazil. The Cortes, or Constituent Assembly, which met in 1821 in Lisbon to form a new constitution for the empire, tried to return Brazil to colonial status, but failed; in 1822 independence was declared, and Dom

Pedro became monarch of the newly formed empire.

MODERN ERA—After an auspicious start, the empire floundered badly. Arbitrariness on the part of the ruler and popular resistance to centralization forced the monarch's abdication in 1831. Order was not restored until 1840 when young Dom Pedro II ascended the throne, and the evolution of modern Brazil began. During the half century of his reign (1840-89), Brazil grew in strength and became one of the foremost powers in Latin America. The economy steadily expanded, slaves were freed in a manner which did not cause upheaval; education and other cultural pursuits advanced, internal government was solidified; and a strong representative parliamentary system was established.<sup>6</sup>

In 1889 Dom Pedro II was deposed by a military coup, and a republic was formed, which established the United States of Brazil. A constitution similar to that of the United States of America was promulgated in 1891. The proclamation of the republic, however, was followed by a prolonged period of economic and political difficulties. New forces were in the making, and revolt succeeded revolt, until in 1930 Dr. Getúlio Vargas seized power and, in 1934, promulgated a new constitution. An able administrator and shrewd politician, Vargas established a personal dictatorship, which, despite its harshness, gave substance to the *Estado Nova*, or New Republic, as the state was termed in 1937.

The Vargas regime was more than a mere personification of the spirit of authoritarian political revolution; it was, in fact, a concentrated, energetic attempt to industrialize Brazil, to raise its living standard, to educate its people—in a word, to effect modernization. A long list of reforms included some

<sup>5</sup> Neither the Papal Line nor the 1494 treaty recognized British, French, or Dutch interests.

<sup>6</sup> See João P. Calogeras, *A History of Brazil* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1939), chs. VI-XII.

concessions to every group: educational benefits for the masses; unemployment relief and workers' benefits for the laborers, government contracts and public building projects on behalf of business. Although these reforms undoubtedly established a balanced economic system for the nation, the price was centralization of power—in the executive—widespread corruption, and the diminution of democratic liberties.<sup>7</sup> The peculiar popularity of Vargas endured, and, despite his eclipse for a five-year period, he was re-elected in 1950 and held the presidency until his demise in 1954.<sup>8</sup> After the Vargas regime Brazil faces an uneasy period of experimentation with political democracy.

#### PHYSICAL ASPECTS

Physically, Brazil is oriented toward a power status. Its huge size and compact shape represent strength, its land boundaries, except in the south, lie in thinly populated territory, and its location in the heart of South America gives it an excellent over-all strategic position. There are five major regions: the Southeastern Heartland, the South, the Northeast, Amazonia, and the Interior.

**THE SOUTHEASTERN HEARTLAND**—The Heartland of Brazil is composed of the states of Espírito Santo, Minas Gerais, São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, the Federal District, and parts of the states of Bahia, Goiás, Mato Grosso, and Paraná. The central position of the Heartland on the coast is excellent for national control, especially if an adequate pattern of transportation can be established. At present there are few passes through the Serra do Mar, a high escarpment which faces

the sea a few miles inland, and the completion of a railroad from São Paulo to its port, Santos, was a major engineering feat. Nevertheless, the Heartland essentially dominates the country politically, economically, and culturally.

Relief in the Heartland is diverse. A complex of hilly uplands and low mountains provides almost no level land. Climate varies with altitude, marine influences being partly offset by the Serra do Mar. The coast is hot and humid; precipitation is high, with only a slight seasonal fluctuation. On the cooler plateau summer precipitation of forty to sixty inches provides moisture for agriculture and water for power.

Except for a total lack of mineral fuels, the Heartland is the best resource base of all Brazil. Natural vegetation varies from grassland to rain forest in the coastal areas and to semideciduous and coniferous forests in the interior. Soils, notably the famous *terra roxa*, are good, but mismanagement has lowered their productivity. Crystalline rocks of the plateau contain deposits of iron ore, manganese, quartz, mica, chromium, molybdenum, nickel, tungsten, bauxite, and many other minerals.

**THE SOUTH**—The South is an area of small farms settled by European immigrants—principally Germans, Italians, and Portuguese—who transferred almost intact their farming practices and traditions from Europe. The region is composed of the states of Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina, and part of Paraná.

The Serra do Mar escarpment extends into the southern states where it becomes a number of low ridges permitting easy access to gently rolling uplands. The *terra roxa* soil also continues into the South and forms a rich base for agriculture. Climatically the area is mildly temperate with fairly abundant rainfall throughout the year and occasional frost in winter. Grasslands are extensive south of the Uruguay River, but to the north,

<sup>7</sup> Any assessment of the achievements of the Vargas regime is most hazardous. For one estimate see Karl Loewenstein, *Brazil under Vargas* (Macmillan, 1942).

<sup>8</sup> In August, 1954, President Vargas committed suicide, after being faced with the prospect of removal from office because of the disclosure of widespread graft in his regime.

and in stream valleys, forests of deciduous and coniferous trees are predominant. The Araucaria pine is one of the best lumber trees of South America, and solid stands of it exist here. Yerba maté, a leaf used in the making of a locally popular tea, is also an important product in this area.

**THE NORTHEAST**—The Northeast is a triangular area from a point south of the mouth of the Amazon almost to the southern border of the state of Bahia. It includes the states of Piauí, Ceará, Rio Grande do Norte, Paraíba, Pernambuco, Alagoas, Sergipe, parts of Maranhão and Bahia, and the territory of Fernando de Noronha. Topographically it is like the lands further south, except that the uplands are of lower elevation. North of Bahia there is no steep escarpment, as there is to the south, although the surface rises rapidly back of a narrow coastal plain. South of Cape São Roque the coast is well watered, but inland precipitation is lower and the area subject to droughts. During dry years the region may become parched. Only in those areas where dams provide water for irrigation can population be permanent in any activity other than grazing.

**AMAZONIA**—The basin of the Amazon River is the largest area of tropical forest in the world. The Brazilian section—including the states of Amazonas and Pará and parts of Maranhão, Goiás, and Mato Grosso, plus the territories of Guaporé, Acre, Rio Branco, and Amapá—makes up more than forty per cent of the national territory. At present it has practically no value to the national economy, although certain potentials seem large. However, there are strategic implications for Brazil in having this huge area as a buffer zone against neighboring states to the north and west.

In the eastern section of the Amazon River system lowlands are restricted to a relatively narrow region between the Guiana Highlands and the Plateau of Mato Grosso. Only above the confluence of the Rio Negro with


the Amazon does the lowland area widen out to form a great interior basin. Except for savanna, on uplands to the north or south, where seasonal dryness does not permit dense tree growth, the vegetation is selva, that is, a forest of tall trees with little undergrowth. Only along streams where sunlight reaches the ground is there the tangle of undergrowth called jungle. Rain falls in every month of the year, and the constant heat rules out deciduous trees. Temperatures are not so high as imagined, averaging monthly about 80°F. and rarely going over 95°F., but the lack of seasonal change is debilitating. Large amounts of precipitation and high temperatures rapidly leach soil of plant foods, so that shallow-rooted crops exhaust the soil after a few years.

**THE INTERIOR**—The sector of Brazil lying in the central and southern parts of Mato Grosso is one of the most isolated regions of the country. It consists of the Plateau of Mato Grosso, averaging 1,500 to 2,500 feet in elevation, together with the swampy alluvial plains of the Paraguay River system in the southwest. Because of its remote location and lack of important minerals, the Interior has remained sparsely inhabited. The principal vegetation is savanna grassland, although forests occur along water courses and on the upland slopes.

## ECONOMY

Brazilian capitalists were early recognized for their ability to exploit products from which a high return could be obtained. The most important of such speculations were sugar in Bahia and Pernambuco during the colonial period, gold and diamonds in Minas Gerais in the middle eighteenth century, and coffee in São Paulo after 1850. Other products, such as rubber, cacao, cotton, and oranges, had speculative periods but were not important enough to influence substantially the national economy.





During the great speculations both producers and areas of production influenced the course of national politics. Thus Salvador (Bahia) in the sugar country became the first capital, Rio de Janeiro acquired that honor in 1762, when gold and diamonds replaced sugar as the important product; and the coffee growers of São Paulo engineered the coup d'état that deposed Pedro II in 1889 and elected a "São Paulo" dynasty of presidents for many terms.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>9</sup> A pattern of succession was established in which the presidency alternated between the states of São Paulo (Paulista) and Minas Gerais (Mineiro). This was finally broken in 1930, when the Mineiro candidate backed Vargas, from Rio Grande do Sul, for the presidency.

Except for gold and diamonds, all speculations have been in agricultural products. Brazil has only recently begun to develop other economic activities essential to a major power. Agriculture engages approximately two thirds of the labor force, whereas only ten per cent is engaged in manufacturing and three per cent in mining. Although minerals are abundant, mining activities have been sporadic. Industry is yet in its infancy, but since its recent spectacular upsurge there is a tendency to think of it as another speculation (see the map above).

**AGRICULTURE**—Brazil has extraordinary resources for agriculture. It has a climate ranging from truly tropical to moist tem-

perate and soil which, if handled correctly, can be highly productive of a wide variety of crops for food, feed, home industry, and export. The more important crops raised at present are coffee, which supplies half the world consumption; cotton, about sixty per cent of which is shipped to world markets; cacao, in the production of which Brazil is second only to the Gold Coast in Africa; sugar, which is entirely consumed locally; and rice, maize, beans, manioc, and wheat, which are the food staples of the Brazilian people. Nevertheless, production of food-stuffs is not sufficient to meet the needs of the expanding population. Wheat is one of Brazil's most valuable imports, ranking only after machinery and chemicals. Furthermore, the basic foods do not provide the mass of the people with an adequate diet. The problem is so grave that the SALTE plan,<sup>10</sup> inaugurated in the early 1950's, includes increased food production as one of the four major needs of the country.

Improvement of agriculture is an immense challenge. Fewer than one quarter of the farmers have plows; other farmers use the hoe and do not seem inclined to change. Soil management practices are almost nonexistent. Fire agriculture<sup>11</sup> is widely practiced, and even whole plantations are moved to virgin soil to avoid the trouble and expense of maintaining fertility on the same site. Agricultural laborers on estates have a status little better than that of peons, and immigrants brought in to work on farms usually drift to the cities. Agricultural col-

onists often find their farms far in the interior, away from transportation facilities and without access to markets. A long-range program to improve education, establish social benefits, and develop transportation is necessary if any appreciable improvement is to be registered.

**MINING AND EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES**—Brazil has sufficient mineral resources, except for the fuels, to support an industrial economy. Gold and diamonds have formed the basis for large-scale speculations, but the other minerals have been given only limited attention. World War II gave great impetus to production for export of such strategic minerals as manganese, wolfram, mica, and quartz crystals. Many others are known to be present, but the size, quality, and location of deposits may not be conducive to economic exploitation.

Brazil is fortunate in having extraordinarily rich deposits of high-grade iron ore. At Itabira the ore is sufficiently pure to be used in place of scrap iron in charging open-hearth furnaces, and the deposit would be large enough to satisfy even the United States consumption for many years. Furthermore, it is located only 360 miles inland from the coast, on the eastern plateau, with an easy down-grade route to the populous area in the vicinity of Rio de Janeiro. Despite this favorable situation, only a relatively small amount is mined because Brazil does not have the coking coal necessary to form a large-scale iron-and-steel industry and foreign exploitation of such resources has been limited. Most of the output is used in a small local iron-and-steel industry.

Other minerals are mined for export, but they are either high-value, low-bulk commodities, such as gold, diamonds, and silver, or those in short supply elsewhere, such as manganese, quartz crystals, and sheet mica. Mineral production for home use is restricted largely to fuels and building materials, and there is little production of the nonferrous

<sup>10</sup> Named for *saúde* (health), *alimentação* (food-stuffs), *transporte* (transportation), and *energia* (power). It coordinates existing federal and regional plans to amplify public health services, increase agricultural production, improve transportation, and develop petroleum resources and hydroelectric power sites. The four fields are considered the most important basic improvements needed in the country. More than \$1,000,000,000 were to be spent in the five years of its life.

<sup>11</sup> The practice of burning the brush for new garden patches, which eventually destroys the forest area.

and chemical minerals, which Brazilian industry has only limited use for. Mining methods are still reminiscent of colonial times.

**DEVELOPMENT OF POWER**—Throughout Brazil there is a dearth of mineral fuels. One small oil field near El Salvador produces 300,000 barrels per year. The coal in Rio Grande do Sul is close to the coast but has a high ash content. Santa Catarina coal, which is of better quality and will coke, is used at the nation's steel mill in Volta Redonda, but must be mixed with imported coal for best results. Two million tons of coal are mined each year, and an additional million tons is imported. Hydroelectric potential is huge, but unfortunately it is uneconomical to transmit power from the largest sites in the interior to distant industrial centers. Most of the present power facilities center around São Paulo and in the southeast. It is a remarkable fact that almost eighty-five per cent of the fuel used in Brazil is wood: by railways, in industrial plants, as charcoal in small blast furnaces, and even in steam-powered electric establishments.

So serious is the lack of sufficient high-quality fuels as a barrier to further industrial expansion that the SALTE plan has designated funds for hydroelectric development and for exploration of petroleum. Present indications are that sizable petroleum deposits exist in the Amazon Basin, but considerable capital will be required to develop them before they can fulfill Brazil's needs.

Amazing potentialities for future development lie in the discovery of rich uranium and thorium deposits in Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul. The government hopes by utilizing these resources to have a power reactor in operation by 1958.

**INDUSTRY**—Rapid industrialization is the best index of Brazil's progress toward world-power status. Brazilians claim that everything they use in Brazil can be produced

domestically, but a woeful shortage of basic industries belies this assertion. Steel production is about 800,000 tons a year, more than one half at Volta Redonda, and another 400,000 tons are imported. Intricate machines are manufactured, but largely from imported components. The largest group of industrial imports consists of machinery, tools, motor vehicles and parts, railway equipment, and ships. There are no armament or aircraft industries. Actually, despite the recent growth of diversified industry, more than eighty per cent of Brazil's manufactures is in such consumers' goods as processed foods, clothing, and houses.

Industrialization in Brazil is largely a twentieth-century phenomenon, and even today industry is still in its infancy. Periods of war cut off Brazil's sources of supply and markets and diverted its efforts toward home production. Severe decline in the world market for agricultural products, especially coffee, attended by exchange difficulties, provided a strong impetus to domestic production. Historic circumstances and an assiduous program of economic nationalism have combined to sustain Brazilian industrialization.<sup>12</sup>

**TRANSPORTATION**—Inadequacy of transportation is without doubt one of the greatest hindrances to internal economic development and to national strength. Moving goods from the area of production to centers of consumption is often difficult and always expensive. It is frequently cheaper to import from overseas than to transport from another section of Brazil. Many parts of the vast land are almost inaccessible and can be reached only by primitive means of transport (see map on page 174).

<sup>12</sup> On recent achievements see Lawrence F. Hill (ed.), *Brazil* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1947), ch. XV. An estimate of Brazil's potentialities is George Wythe, *Brazil, an Expanding Economy* (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1949).



**Water.** Brazil was settled from the coast inland, and coastwise shipping is still the most adequate part of the national surface-transport pattern. North of Salvador it is impossible to ship goods south by any means except water. In the interior the only method of surface transport is by river. The Amazon, open to the shipping of all nations, will admit ocean-going vessels of fourteen feet draft as far as Iquitos, Peru. But the major tributaries of the Amazon, especially those from the south, are blocked by falls and rapids, so that they are unusable in their upper courses. Coastal rivers also are not

navigable, although the São Francisco can be used for traffic in its middle reaches. In the south the Paraná-Paraguay river system gives access into Brazil from the Rio de la Plata, but the control of the mouth of the Plata by other countries and the seasonal fluctuations of the upper streams reduce its usefulness.

**Railways.** Railways date back to 1854 and were originally built to transport products from the interior to the coast rather than to tie together sections of the country. Even today they do not fulfill the latter function.

Only after World War II did a line connect Salvador with the south. In 1950 there were approximately 23,000 miles of rail lines—one tenth the mileage in the United States. More than half of the total is in the states of Minas Gerais, São Paulo, and Rio Grande do Sul. The lack of uniformity in the railway gauge is another handicap. The *Central do Brazil*, which connects Belo Horizonte, Rio de Janeiro, and São Paulo, uses a broader gauge than the United States standard of four feet, eight and a half inches, while some branch lines have a gauge as narrow as three feet.

The fuel problem is immense. Many lines use wood, the cost of which rises as forests are depleted. Only lines near the coast can utilize coal. Electrification of lines is being pushed to solve the fuel problem, but electricity is already in short supply because of the many demands for it.

A basic plan for rail development was issued by Vargas in 1934 and more recently expanded in the SALTE plan. Four projected north-south trunk lines will form a grid with extensions of already-existing east-west lines. One east-west line to the Bolivian border at Corumbá has already been finished and is being extended to the Pacific. Connections with Uruguayan and Argentinian lines, to the south, are also completed. Nevertheless, much of the planned construction will be many years in accomplishment.

**Roads.** The SALTE plan includes a system of highways both to supplement and to complement the railways. At present Brazil has only a few thousand miles of surfaced roads; gravel and dirt roads form a larger, but still inadequate, system. Serious effort is being given to building all-weather highways connecting the major cities. Commercial truck and bus operations are expanding as roads become available, but again dependence upon imported fuel is a weakness, since imports could be cut off by war or nationalistic policies. International connections are made

possible by the Pan-American Highway, which terminates at Rio de Janeiro.

**Airlines.** The most adequate transport coverage of Brazil is by airline, the country having the most extensive air transport system in Latin America. There are more than forty flights daily from Rio de Janeiro to São Paulo, nearly as many as from New York to Chicago. All the large cities are connected by air routes, not only with one another but also with the hinterlands and with foreign countries. Many an interior town has become accessible through the construction of an air strip. Despite extensive development, however, airplanes are not yet suited to the transportation of bulky commodities. Businessmen attain greater mobility by use of air routes, but their products, as well as the great majority of the people, remain land-bound.

Basic land transportation by rail, road, and water must be expanded and coordinated much further to supply the country with adequate internal mobility. Inadequacy of transportation results in regional stagnation, produces great social and economic inequalities, and, because industrial goods cannot move easily, denies the mass market needed for a true industrial economy.

**REGIONAL ECONOMIES—The Heartland.** The original colonists in the Heartland were deported Portuguese criminals who had to shift for themselves rather than work for absentee plantation owners. Grasslands supported grazing, which is still the only steady source of income in areas away from transportation facilities and the influence of cities. Discovery of gold in the Minas Gerais area of the Heartland, northeast of Rio, in the mid-eighteenth century induced a flow of internal migrants, largely from Northeast Brazil, and attracted many Europeans as well. Towns that grew up as supply centers for the grazing and early mining areas remain as centers of population today despite the lack of railroad service.

Railways were built in the late nineteenth century to haul coffee from the interior uplands to the coastal towns. Because little attempt was made to tie routes together, the result was one funnel-shaped net focused on Rio de Janeiro and a second focused on São Paulo. Because of the special conditions of soil and climate that prevail there, the area around São Paulo is the best suited of any in Brazil for coffee growing.

Coffee, chief speculative crop for the past century and Brazil's main export, still dominates agriculture. Each coffee plantation, or *fazenda*, produces food for its own use, and areas unsuited to coffee are given over to cotton and to fruit, vegetables, and staples for the cities. The back country is *sertão*, with subsistence agriculture and grazing.

The Heartland is the industrial center of Brazil; the Volta Redonda plant in the Paraíba Valley produces most of the nation's steel. Industrial development in the Heartland area has stimulated harnessing of water power for electricity as a supplement to more expensive mineral fuels. However, a shortage of electrical power is restricting industrial expansion. Cheap atomic power could be the region's industrial salvation.

Much of the industry is centered on São Paulo, one of the most rapidly growing and modern cities of the world. In 1950 it had a population of slightly more than 2,000,000. São Paulo produces more than forty per cent of Brazil's total manufactured goods. The major products are food, clothing, and textiles, but manufactures also include drugs and chemicals, cement, metallurgical products, and electrical goods. In contrast to the noisy industry and blatant commercialism of São Paulo is the relative calm of Rio de Janeiro. Larger by 300,000 people than São Paulo, it also has industries, but it functions primarily as the political, cultural, and educational center of the nation, with pre-eminence in finance and trade. It does not depend on a relatively small hinterland, as does São Paulo, but has the whole coast as

its hinterland. The port at Rio has the largest volume of trade in the nation, collecting and distributing goods for the population clusters to the north and south.

All other cities in the Heartland are far smaller. Most are district centers for commercial activity or primary processing centers for agricultural or mineral products. Belo Horizonte is a rapidly expanding city of 200,000 with modern factories but with limited markets in the surrounding hinterland.

*The South.* Original settlement of the South was by Paulista herdsmen, but their hold on the area was weak. When Dom Pedro I became Emperor he recognized the potential for conflict with Argentina in the region and decided that it needed permanent settlement. By 1860 about 20,000 Germans had been brought over and settled. Later they were joined by many other European immigrants from northern and southern Europe, but German stock has remained the most prominent. Isolated from other Brazilian centers, the residents have maintained German culture patterns, although most of them will insist that they are Brazilians. Nazism did not make the feared inroads upon the population; nevertheless, in 1938, use of German as a language of instruction in their schools was prohibited.

Agriculture is diversified and is the basic activity. There is grazing on the grasslands but not much shifting cultivation of the *sertão* type. Instead, there are agricultural colonies, each composed of one nationality group. Products raised vary with the original nationality of the colonists. Paulistas produce meat, hides, and wool on the grasslands; Italians, grapes on the ridges; Germans, maize, rye, potatoes, and even some dairy products on stream terraces; later Portuguese arrivals, rice and tobacco on the flood plains.

Minerals, except coal found in Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina, are little exploited. Some of the coal is exported north-

ward; the remainder, used locally, has helped to make Pôrto Alegre the leading industrial city of the South. Its industries are the processing of agricultural raw materials, for example, woolen yarns, garments and cloth, leather, meat, wine, and beer. Other cities have industries and supply services similar to those of Pôrto Alegre. Each controls by river valley or railroad a small but expanding hinterland.

The South is the most impressive area of growth in Brazil. No barriers thwart human movement toward the frontier areas; rather, there is constant expansion by new settlement. New colonies are appearing near railroads or strung along rivers, so that surplus products can be shipped out. As population becomes denser and as better land is taken up, covetous eyes may be cast on sparsely settled northern Uruguay, Paraguay, or the Argentine state of Misiones. If the boundary should be overstepped, if the South could no longer play the role of a buffer area, Brazilian efforts to expand could easily create serious international problems.

*The Northeast.* The wetter coastlands in the Northeast, although suitable to a wide variety of crops, have not been stable economically. Sugar, cotton, and, in recent year, cacao and oranges have been regional speculations. Other crops are mostly for food, raised by tenant farmers who have few ties to the land and who migrate as speculative bubbles burst. Lack of stability in economy and population is a weakness in this strategic area, as is lack of land transportation. Both contribute to a low level of efficiency in regional economy and account for poor living standards. Because of drought conditions the interior has received federal relief, but little has been done to solve the basic problems of poverty, economic instability, and absence of a public health policy.

The region's strategic location calls for its development. In the São Francisco Val-

ley a Brazilian TVA is being built. Within the valley it will provide flood control, transportation, power, and irrigation. A potential 1,200,000 horsepower of electricity is to supply needed power from Salvador to Recife. These cities, now commercial outlets and agricultural-processing centers, have promise of becoming more industrialized. Furthermore, the recent connection of Salvador with the south by rail and paved road and the future continuation of the railroad to connect the short coastal lines will make interregional exchange more efficient.

*Amazonia.* The major resources of Amazonia are its forests. There are literally thousands of species, but no pure stands. In gathering a forest product, workers may find only one tree of any given species in an acre. The scattered distribution of the rubber tree was the original cause for the decline of the rubber boom. The Amazon now produces less than two per cent of the world's supply of rubber. An attempt to expand production during World War II had small success, only doubling annual production to 30,000 tons. Lack of success was due not only to the scattered trees but to the shortage of workers. Even the Ford Company's plantations at Fordlândia and Belterra, which overcame health, soil, and botanical problems, found it impossible to attract sufficient workers. The plantation concessions were returned to the Brazilian government in 1945. The Ford example will tend to keep others from attempting plantation agriculture. Only high-value products, such as cabinet woods, skins of animals, medicinal plants, gums, and resins, can profitably be collected and shipped out from the cities of Belém, Santarém, and Manaus.

Subsistence agriculture is not generally suited to Amazonia soil, although rice culture on flood plains may be possible. Japanese may succeed at this, and 5,000 families of them are to move to Amazonia. For their

cash crop they are expected to raise jute for coffee bags, and a processing mill for jute is to be constructed at Santarém. But 5,000 families are not many in 1,500,000 square miles.

Amazonia is believed to have considerable petroleum deposits. Coal is possibly present, and other minerals are known to exist in the highlands of this area. Iron ore has been discovered in Amapa territory, and plans are being laid to move it into export trade.

*The Interior.* In this region the major occupation is grazing. Development is limited, however, by distance from markets and by lack of nutritive forage, especially during the dry winter months. The only railway crossing Mato Grosso is in the south, from São Paulo westward to Corumbá on the Paraguay River. Otherwise, the nearest railhead is at Goiás, one hundred miles east of Mato Grosso's borders. Cuiabá, a city of about 20,000 inhabitants, is the capital of Mato Grosso and is located in the central part of the plateau; there are no other large towns. Any substantial influx of population in future years must await better transportation facilities.

#### POPULATION

Brazil, with 57,000,000 people, is the most populous of all the Latin American countries. Despite the large number, the land is not densely populated, averaging in 1950 only sixteen persons per square mile. The vast interior is sparsely populated, and even the coastal districts are not evenly settled. Three main centers of population are discernible: (1) the northeastern coast from Recife to Salvador—the old sugar area; (2) the plateau Heartland north and west of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo—the mineral and coffee country and the center of the new industrialized region; and (3) the South, largely Rio Grande do Sul, where the European immigrants have settled. Around and

between these clusters is the *sertão*—a transition zone of shifting cultivation and grazing. Disparity between the *sertão* and urban clusters is as tremendous as that between the ox cart and the airplane, which are their mediums of travel. Effective peopling of the *sertão* depends upon better agricultural practices and better transportation facilities to tie the inhabitants to the land and to tie the hinterland to the cities.

The population is expanding rapidly, having increased twenty-five per cent from 1940 to 1950. National well-being is showing improvement through governmental expenditures for education and public health and liberal immigration and social welfare policies, but the unevenness of the pattern of population distribution makes uniform application of such policies difficult except in the more populous districts.

Four elements comprise the Brazilian population: the Portuguese, the Indians, the Negroes, and the Japanese. Racial segregation has not been practiced since colonial times, and there were instances of Negroes being ennobled during the Empire. Original Portuguese settlers had no racial consciousness; in São Paulo they intermarried with the Indians and in the north with Negroes imported to work on sugar plantations. Later, Japanese immigrated, adding a fourth element to the racial pattern. Caucasians are numerically superior in census statistics, but in Brazil anyone with white blood is considered white, although his skin color may be quite dusky. The segregation that does take place is on the basis of wealth, education, and social position.

The fusion of races is not yet complete. Distinct types are found in different regions: in the Northeast there is a big proportion of dark-skinned peoples with Negroid features; in the South, where most of the 5,000,000 Caucasian immigrants of the past century settled, there is much unmixed white blood; in São Paulo and Amazonia live a quarter million Japanese; and also in Amazonia are



pure Indian peoples. But these people all call themselves Brazilians. For the most part they have been culturally assimilated into a new country and are in the process of forming a new and distinct racial type.

Immigrants are still being accepted on a restricted basis. Brazil needs and will accept artisans and skilled operatives for industry. It likewise needs farmers who will settle in the *sertão*, but unfortunately the kind of people Brazil requires do not want the difficult life of a frontier zone. The 10,000 displaced persons admitted after World War II were assigned to work on plantations or in other agricultural activities, but eventually the cities enticed them away from the dull rural landscape.

Cities and their industries are the goal of most migrants. Industrial wages, while low by American standards, are still far above rural incomes. Furthermore, labor and social legislation has improved the lot of the industrial worker. Public health and educational facilities are also better in the cities. In contrast, health problems in rural areas are so urgent that they received priority rating in the SALTE plan. The concept of universal education is recognized, but in rural areas its implementation will be slow. Illiteracy in Brazil is still high; an estimated fifty per cent of the population over eighteen can neither read nor write. In the major cities and towns, where social strides are most marked, a middle class is taking root. Political maturity and cultural alertness stamp this group as one of the greatest sources of Brazil's strength.

Assimilation, successful as it is, has produced no standardized product in Brazil. Although Portuguese is the official language, several communities, composed of recent immigrants, use German, Italian, or Japanese. The percentage of foreign-born persons in Brazil has been reduced in recent decades largely as a result of restrictive immigration policies adopted since 1934. Fairly concentrated, about three fourths of the foreign-

born reside in São Paulo and the Federal District. Quantitatively they account for only three per cent of the population. More uniform is the influence of religion, which is dominantly Roman Catholic, despite some German Protestants, Jews, Buddhists, and others. The Church, particularly the Jesuit order, spread culture and education in early colonization. In the historic evolution religion acquired some native customs and beliefs which give it a Brazilian flavor. Close as are the ties to the Vatican, Brazil's constitution separates church and state.

#### INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Brazil is the most powerful and the most peaceful country in South America. Its century-long record of peace rivals that of any major power in the world. Adequacy of land space and preoccupation with internal consolidation have tended to channel Brazilian efforts toward peaceful pursuits. The few wars with its neighbors belong to the last century, and none was serious except the Rio de la Plata boundary conflicts with Uruguay and Paraguay. Many boundary revisions have taken place along the upper tributaries of the Amazon as more expert surveys became available and as obvious discrepancies were eliminated. The various controversies associated with delimitations of Brazil's boundaries have rarely flared into wars, since Brazil's neighbors are smaller and weaker states and since boundaries run through relatively nonvaluable areas. Brazil gained slight additions of territory from each of its neighbors in the adjustment process. All settlements were arranged either by arbitration or direct negotiation. Extant treaties provide for peaceful settlement of all future disputes with other South American countries.

In its world orientation Brazil has followed a practical policy of restraint and moderation. A realization on the part of Brazilian statesmen that Brazil was essen-

tially an emerging, rather than a first-class, power strengthened the force of conciliation at international conferences and enhanced the country's prestige in the United Nations. Brazil has acted as a leader in cultural, economic, and strategic Pan-Americanism. The Rio pacts of 1942 and 1947, providing for mutual security among the American states, were initiated by Brazil and the United States.

Brazil's successful role in world affairs can ultimately be attributed to British sea power in the nineteenth century and American military strength in the twentieth century. Both have served to protect Brazil from European invaders and enabled it to pursue its evolution unhampered by foreign wars. Brazil participated in two world wars to the extent necessary to safeguard its shipping and coastal defense. In World War II cooperation with the Allies included the grant of air bases to the United States, convoy service in the Atlantic, and the dispatch of an expeditionary force of 25,000, which fought with valor in the Italian campaign. Brazil emerged at the end of 1945 with its prestige enhanced under the able leadership of Oswaldo Aranha, its Foreign Minister.

Despite a strategic location Brazil has never supported an extensive army or navy. Clearly cognizant of its vital role in a West-

ern Hemispheric defense system, Brazilian leaders have, with the assistance of the United States, strengthened the nation's armed services and strategic installations.

The Northeast is the most strategically located region of Brazil. From the bulge of Africa to the bulge of Brazil is only 1,800 miles. If both bulges were held by an unfriendly power, airplanes and submarines could restrict ships of North Atlantic powers to the northern sectors of the Atlantic. The Brazilian bulge without strong defenses could serve as an avenue of approach to the Western Hemisphere. Hitler's strategy of world conquest portended the use of this route, and only quick action on the part of the allied powers at Dakar (see map on page 111) saved the opposite shore. Furthermore, resource-rich central and southern Africa can be easily reached from the Western Hemisphere. The defense of Africa south of the Sahara, with its uranium, copper, tin, industrial diamonds, and other strategic supplies, could conceivably depend on an airlift from Brazil; or if the Northeast region were held by an unfriendly nation, these necessities could be denied to the United States. The region thus is of the greatest strategic importance to the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Brazil also participates actively in over-all defense plans of the Inter-American Defense Board.

### Study Questions

1. What have been the effects of speculative ventures on transportation development in Brazil?
2. What problems did the Ford plantation managers solve in Amazonia and what caused the failure of the venture?
3. What are the possibilities of a commercial lumbering industry in the forests of Amazonia?
4. What is shifting cultivation and where is it practiced in Brazil?
5. Will the Plateau of Mato Grosso and the valleys of the Paraná and the Paraguay ever compare in productivity with the United States Midwest?
6. Compare the rates of industrialization of Brazil and Canada.
7. Why were the problems represented by the SALTE plan selected from among all of Brazil's problems for early solution?
8. How did Portugal substantiate its claim to lands beyond the Tordesillas Line?

9. On what bases can Brazil be said to be developing a homogeneous population?
10. What products have been major speculations in Brazil?
11. Why are Japanese being settled in Amazonia?
12. Why is control of the "Straits of the Atlantic" so important to the United States?
13. Why are not more of Brazil's mineral riches being mined?
14. Why did São Paulo rather than Rio de Janeiro become the industrial center of Brazil?
15. Where and why is Brazil likely to have border problems?

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## *Countries of the Rio de la Plata*

The Rio de la Plata, or River Plata, is the name given to the 225-mile estuary of the Paraná and Uruguay rivers. Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay are all closely associated with this estuary and the system of rivers draining into it. All three countries have the Rio de la Plata at their "front door" (see map on page 183). The national capitals of Argentina and Uruguay are on the banks of the estuary itself, and that of Paraguay is on a river that flows directly into it.

Notwithstanding the concentration of the political and economic life of Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay in the vicinity of Rio de la Plata waters, the aerial extent of the three countries is considerable. The northern periphery of Paraguay reaches nearly to 21° South Latitude while in Argentina the Tierra del Fuego sector passes 55° South Latitude—a distance of some 34 degrees of latitude, or about 2,300 miles. On the eastern side of North America a comparable latitudinal spread would encompass the is-

land of Cuba in the south and half of Labrador's coast in the north. East and west the three countries occupy the southern part of the South American continent except for the narrow strip of Chile along the west coast. At the latitude of Buenos Aires this lateral dimension amounts to more than 850 miles, or well over the distance from New York to Chicago.

### HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In 1516 a Spaniard, Don Juan Díaz de Solís, discovered the Rio de la Plata, the region which was to give rise to Paraguay, Argentina, and Uruguay in the nineteenth century. For more than three centuries the estuary of the Rio de la Plata and its hinterland remained under the Spanish crown, and the mother country provided no stimulus for constructive development. During this period and even in the years since independence, the trans-Andean region directly west has never been intimately involved in the affairs

of the eastern region. A dearth of easy passes negates the short transcontinental distance at this latitude<sup>1</sup>

The Spanish for the most part restricted their early activities in South America to



the northern coastal regions and the Andean highlands, including the west coasts. There the advanced Aztec and Inca civilizations offered precious metals for the conquistadores. First attempts at settlement in the La Plata area were primarily based on the belief that this water course would afford easy access from the Atlantic to the silver mines on the Bolivian Plateau. But as an


easy route to the Andean mines, the waterway proved disappointing. Moreover, the area was occupied by nomadic, savage Indians, and its internal development was impeded by the heavy soils which could not be successfully tilled by the techniques then practiced by the Spaniards. Finally, the grassy plain yielded no supply of the precious metals so eagerly sought by the Spanish.

Although the distinguished Pedro de Mendoza led an expedition from Spain in 1535 to settle the shore of the estuary at Buenos Aires, the attempt was an abortive one. The first permanent Spanish settlement in eastern South America was established a few years later at Asunción in what is now Paraguay. Here the Indians (the Guaraní) were sedentary and docile, and the land was suitable to Spanish agricultural methods. A Spanish feudal society gradually evolved in this area. The region formed an outpost against Portuguese settlements to the north and served as a source of supplies for the mining areas in the Andean territories. The site of what is now Buenos Aires was established in 1580 as the southern edge of a settlement oriented westward (see map on page 184).

Through subsequent political developments this broad area became divided into three independent countries—Paraguay, Uruguay, and Argentina. Major segments of the political boundaries which separate these states are formed by the various rivers tributary to the Rio de la Plata. Nowhere, save perhaps in southeastern Europe, do rivers approach such importance as international boundaries. Portions of the Paraná and Paraguay rivers separate Brazil from Paraguay; the Pilcomayo and Paraná together form the boundary between Paraguay and Argentina; and Uruguay is separated from the Argentine republic by the Uruguay River and the Rio de la Plata.

These three states of the Rio de la Plata, including territory acquired as the result

<sup>1</sup> In the central border area between Argentina and Chile, the Andes reach their greatest height. Peaks rise above 20,000 feet, culminating in Mt. Aconcagua (22,835 feet), highest peak in the Western Hemisphere.



of Argentine expansion, have come to occupy the whole southern portion of South America east of the Andes and, together with Chile and southernmost Brazil, constitute the temperate part of the continent. In this temperate zone European migration represents a genuine ethnic expansion in contrast with the purely commercial and political exploits of Europeans in the tropical regions.

#### NATIONAL CONTRASTS

The three countries of the Rio de la Plata are hardly homogeneous. They have in

common the Spanish language and an almost total lack of raw materials for basic heavy industries; otherwise there exists little real similarity among the three. The contrast between Uruguay and Paraguay, lying within two hundred miles of each other, is especially striking. Uruguay, unmistakably a buffer state, has a highly developed social organization, a high standard of living based on commercial livestock raising, and a paternalistic government with thoroughly democratic institutions. Its population is almost entirely of European stock.

Paraguay, on the other hand, still feels the crippling effects of a devastating war fought nearly a century ago (1865-70) and is a land of poverty and illiteracy. Its commercial relations are limited, and its agricultural practices backward. Across the estuary from Uruguay is spacious Argentina, with its fertile plains and nearly "all-white" population. Like its neighbor Uruguay, it has a temperate climate and an economy dependent to a large extent on international trade. But the base upon which Argentinian trade rests is much broader, including a variety of crops as well as livestock products. Argentina's vastly greater size gives it a varied environment and a productive capacity that far exceeds that of little Uruguay.

## ARGENTINA

#### HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

**COLONIAL PERIOD**—So long as Argentina remained a colony of Spain, her contacts with the outside world were very greatly limited. Primary interest during the Spanish era was centered in the irrigated foothills toward the northwest. These food- and animal-producing oases complemented the mining economy of the barren Bolivian plateau.

The agricultural potential of the eastern plains was considered definitely second rate as compared with the actual mineral resources of the Andes.

For more than two centuries, Argentina was forbidden to trade with countries other than Spain. To control this trade and to prevent smuggling, the Spanish Viceroy at Lima required that all goods destined for export be moved north and west across the

Andes to Callao, the port for Lima in Peru. From here they were transhipped to the western side of the Isthmus of Panama, moved by pack trains across the Isthmus, and then reloaded in Spanish bottoms for shipment to Spain. Eventually, in the 1760's, the Spanish monarchy responded to the commercial revolution in Europe by encouraging the economic growth of the Argentine seaboard. This eastward orientation led to the transfer of political rule from Peru to the Viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata in 1777. Buenos Aires became the capital and center of trade with Europe.

Resentment of irksome trade controls by the mother country combined with a spirit of revolution in South America to sweep away Spanish authority. The climax came in 1810 when an armed band of Argentine Creoles in Buenos Aires successfully declared their independence from Spain, which was deeply involved at home with the Napoleonic Wars. In the space of a few years there was a general collapse of Spanish power throughout South America. What gave momentum to the liberation movement in Argentina was the successful resistance of the country against the British invasion of the estuary in 1806. This national struggle first introduced the word "Argentina" into popular usage, and in 1826 the name received official sanction. As the old viceroyalty disintegrated, there followed the rise of three nations: Paraguay (1814), Argentina (1825), and Uruguay (1828).

Although freedom opened the way for sound economic development, the change in political control did not bring immediate prosperity to Argentina. It was half a century before the country was able to take advantage of her newly won opportunities. The center of power and influence shifted from the oases of the northwest to Buenos Aires and the pampas; but provincialism and class interests were, if possible, even more pronounced than they had been before liberation. So long as political conditions

remained chaotic, economic improvement was slight, trade remained stagnant, and population remained almost static. Such development as did take place in the eastern part of the country was accompanied by an increasing neglect and deterioration of the hinterland.

Over a seventy-year period turmoil and frequent change in government characterized the national scene. For twenty-three years (1829-52) Juan Manuel de Rosas kept the provinces intact, promoted trade, and set the stage for the authoritarian leadership that was to emerge a century later. Liberalism and constitutionalism emerged in 1853, and the constitution of that date still survives. It was not until 1868, when Domingo F. Sarmiento, "the schoolteacher-president," assumed office that the country began to develop the trade relations that characterize Argentina today. He initiated a period of relative political stability that enabled Argentina to take advantage of newly opened markets. Almost coincidental with Sarmiento's rise to power, the United States of America found its own international trade curtailed by the Civil War. This circumstance opened many world markets to Argentina, led to a rapid increase in exports, and paved the way for the growth of a new commercial nation.

**MODERN REPUBLIC**—The latter half of the nineteenth century in Argentina saw a rapid expansion of the cultivated area, an amazing increase in agricultural production, a considerable influx of white European settlers, and the development, aided by British capital, of the only true rail network in South America.<sup>2</sup> But throughout the period of rapid economic development and on into the twentieth century, political unrest con-

<sup>2</sup> Contrary to practices of good planning, the Argentine rail network, like that in Brazil, was developed in three varying gauges, which have ever since been a handicap to the free movement of goods about the country.

tinued. It manifested itself many times, with the government shifting from totalitarian to democratic forms and back again. Between 1880 and 1930, however, the changes were bloodless, in contrast with the violent revolutionary changes of the earlier period.

Unfortunately, political leaders neglected to take into account the growing gap between the extremely rich and the overwhelming numbers of impoverished workers and lower-middle-class groups. The depression in 1929 magnified Argentina's distress and led to nationalist movements aimed at solving the nation's economic ills. Her concentration on domestic problems precluded Argentina's active involvement in the two world wars.

The rise of Perón to a position of leadership characterized a whole decade of post-war life in Argentina. The army coup in 1943 paved the way for seizure of power by Colonel Juan Domingo Perón. In 1946 Perón, owing to his strong popular appeal with the electorate as well as to the backing of various interested groups, was overwhelmingly voted into office as president. He had long been an important figure on the national political scene and the main driving force in the reorientation of the country's development along corporate, or fascist, lines. Perón consolidated personal control over the army and the labor organization as the basis for his power. Personal dictatorship—exercised through the Perónist party—widespread corruption, and a precarious state economy taxed the dictator's ability to hold together discordant elements within the regime. Perónist elements were unable to check the general anti-Perón feeling of dissatisfaction in the country at large and within the Navy and Army as well. Undoubtedly Perón's arrest of Church dignitaries and a design for the separation of church and state added to the disunity. In the balance, the forces of disunity produced a series of internal revolts in 1955 that finally

led to Perón's resignation and flight into exile.

#### POLITICAL AREA


Both geography and history combined to favor a federal form of government for Argentina. The constitution of 1853 recognized the autonomy of the provinces and reduced the centralizing force of Buenos Aires, whereupon the Province of Buenos Aires set itself up as an autonomous state and only in 1860 joined the Federal Republic. Dispute over the location of the national capital was not settled until 1880, when Buenos Aires received the designation.

Only recently has the rich core area in the Pampas come to overshadow other geographic sectors of the country. Through long civil wars the interior provinces resisted the strong drive from Buenos Aires for political unity. The isolation of the oasis towns and the lack of adequate transportation facilities contributed to provincial autonomy. Recent commercial growth, along with improved railway transportation, and the economic dependence of the provinces upon the capital for market outlets have led to a strengthening of the economic and political powers of Buenos Aires over the rest of the nation.

#### PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS

Argentina is blessed with extensive plains, fertile soils, and a temperate climate, all serving as the physical base for a population that has been augmented both by natural increase and steady immigration. From the area of the River Plata estuary, Argentina expanded southward across the Rio Negro, over the sparse grassland of the Patagonian Plateau, and on to Tierra del Fuego. On the west it merged with the early Andean piedmont settlements. To the northwest it encompassed the old colonial area. Today the nation occupies 1,079,960 square miles, sec-





ond in size only to Brazil among the countries of South America and the eighth largest country of the world.

About one fourth of the area of Argentina (some 250,000 square miles) is occupied by a grassy, almost featureless, fertile plain known as the Pampas.<sup>3</sup> This area stretches inland 300 miles from Buenos Aires. Somewhat south of Buenos Aires the Pampas attain a maximum width of some 400 miles. North-south the region extends through some ten degrees of latitude, or about 700 miles. The estuary of the Rio de la Plata cuts deep into the north-central portion of the Pampas.

Westward from the moist eastern zone of the Pampas, level land continues, but precipitation decreases. From an annual total of around forty inches in the vicinity of Buenos Aires, precipitation declines to about sixteen inches on the western border of the humid Pampas. Beyond this sixteen-inch rainfall line of the western edge, the grass cover, so characteristic of the Pampas, gives way to the drought-resistant vegetation of the *monte*, or bushland, which continues to the lower slopes of the Andes. The flat plain-like topography also continues north of the Pampas, but here heavier precipitation has produced a forested area of less fertile soil in a region known as the Gran Chaco. To the south, the boundary of the Pampas merges with the northern edge of the sparsely populated barren tableland of Patagonia, a wind-swept, generally arid land, sloping to the east, with thin soil and unattractive marine climate characterized by chilly summers and cold winters. The Pampas, then, represent the true core area of the country, having provided the basis for development of the modern state. In the early colonial period the oases of the Arid West, though stimulated politically, failed to evidence any

of the strong attributes characteristic of a core area

## REGIONAL ECONOMIES AND RESOURCES

Argentina can be divided conveniently into five major regions: (1) the Pampas, (2) Mesopotamia, (3) the Gran Chaco, (4) the Arid West, and (5) Patagonia (see map on page 187). In addition to these five regions, which together make up the national state, Argentina also has "claims," or desires, for certain territories beyond her present political boundaries. These territorial aspirations apply particularly to the Falkland Islands, which are now controlled by Great Britain, to the Argentinean-Chilean border, and to Antarctica.

**THE PAMPAS**—From the extensive and fertile plains of the Pampas comes the major portion of the foodstuffs which give Argentina so important a position in international trade. It is here that Argentina produces the vast quantities of wheat and flour, beef, and corn, as well as hides, skins, and flax seed, which enter into world trade. In addition to these important export items, the Pampas is the primary area of alfalfa production, an animal feed occupying a high percentage of the cultivated acreage.

In view of the great productive capacity of the Pampas, it is not surprising that this region is the most densely populated part of the republic and the one over which a dense rail net has been superimposed. Here, in addition to the great agricultural industries, are found other activities, especially commercial, that are partly responsible for, and partly the result of, the population concentrations. Such concentrations of people provide a supply of labor for agriculture and for the distribution and processing of products grown on the land. Urbanization reaches its maximum development in the Pampas and provides an important

<sup>3</sup> The Pampas is known as *La Pampa* in Spanish, although this nomenclature is apt to be confused with *La Pampa*, one of the Argentine Territories in the same general area.

market for many specialized types of agricultural products, such as fresh fruit, vegetables, and milk. Because they are perishable, these products tend to be "market oriented," and, as a consequence, dairying and truck farming achieve their maximum importance in the environs of the largest of Argentinian cities—Buenos Aires.<sup>4</sup>

Despite its many advantages, agriculture is not without hazard in the Pampas. Some of the hazards are physical—periodic droughts, excessive late rainfall, or the all too frequent invasions of grasshoppers and locusts from the northwest. Other hazards are economic or semipolitical in origin. Recurring surpluses of export commodities constantly plague the commercial farmers of the Argentine. Every change in world market conditions has its repercussions on the Argentine economy. The hoof-and-mouth disease plagues the grazing industry and is responsible for the American quarantine law that prohibits the importation of fresh or frozen beef from countries in which the disease is known to exist. The people of Argentina resent this law, claiming that it discriminates against them.

**MESOPOTAMIA**—This "land between the rivers" occupies some 75,000 square miles between the Paraná and Uruguay rivers. On its southern margin Mesopotamia is essentially an extension of the featureless grassy plain so characteristic of the Pampas. But its extreme flatness, coupled with somewhat lower elevation than in the Pampas, subjects this area to frequent flooding. Northward the flat plain gives way to an open forest area of rolling hill country and finally to an undulating, more heavily wooded upland area interspersed with swamps. In the extreme north the region is essentially an extension of the rugged Brazil-

ian Highlands. The whole of Mesopotamia is well watered, and, where well drained, soils are fertile. Precipitation ranges from forty inches in the south to over sixty inches in the north. High temperatures and high humidity are handicaps to the economic development of the lower elevation in the north. But the highlands are as healthful as the lowlands of the south.

The primary economic activity in Mesopotamia is production of beef cattle and wool sheep, activities localized primarily in the southern grasslands and to a lesser degree in the open forests of the central portion of this region. But the tick and the poor quality of the native beef, together with the isolation of the more northerly areas, are handicaps to profitable beef production. In contrast, sheep raising for wool is well developed in the south and especially in the southeast, favored as it is by good grass, an adequate water supply, and cheap water transportation. As crop agriculture expands, however, this productive region will probably not be able to meet the competition of a more intensive land use.

While limited commercial agriculture has evolved along the southern margins of Mesopotamia, subsistence cropping still dominates the agricultural scene. Chief field crops include corn, wheat, flax, peanuts, fruit manioc, and small amounts of sugar cane. Another product peculiar to Mesopotamia is yerba maté. The product is obtained from both wild and plantation-grown trees, but the cultivated tree is by far the more important source.

Although forests with fairly good stands of softwoods cover considerable acreage in the region, they represent a potential, rather than an actual, resource. Inaccessibility to market is a difficulty that as yet has not been overcome.

Despite its many assets, Mesopotamia is one of the least developed areas of the republic. To date economic handicaps have far outweighed economic advantages.

<sup>4</sup> The city of Buenos Aires has a population of about 2,500,000, overshadowing all other cities in the country. Next largest is Rosario, also in the Pampas, with somewhat over 500,000 inhabitants.

**THE GRAN CHACO**—The Gran Chaco region, usually known simply as the Chaco, is a vast undeveloped lowland of 150,000 square miles in northernmost Argentina. A formidable array of problems must be solved before Argentina's economy will benefit greatly from the resources of the Chaco. Its climate is particularly unfavorable, for it is excessively rainy, hot, humid, and enervating during the summer months and extremely dry during the rest of the year. Combined with the generally low relief, the heavy rains of summer produce widespread swampy areas. During winter there is an inadequate supply of fresh water. The presence of predatory wild animals, poisonous snakes, the tick, the locust, and numerous tropical diseases further hinders profitable settlement. Transportation, or rather the lack of it, is still another unsolved problem: rail lines are virtually nonexistent, and many rivers even in the wet season are navigable only by small boats.

Despite its many handicaps the Chaco is not entirely valueless. Economic development is largely focused on the exploitation of the quebracho tree, the production of cotton, and cattle grazing; crop agriculture is generally of a subsistence type.

The quebracho tree, which produces tannin so important to the tanning of leather, provides the leading export of the Chaco. The north-central part of the region near the Paraná and Paraguay rivers supplies about two thirds of the world's vegetable tanning extracts. But good stands of trees are becoming exhausted and replanting is not practiced, since the trees require a century or more to mature. In the southern margin of the Chaco, climate and soil favor cotton production. But even with government assistance, cheap land, and improved transport, the result has been meager. Locusts, in particular, exact a very high toll from the cotton farmers, and climatic vagaries and occasional labor shortages combine to reduce the harvest to only about three fourths

of what might be expected from the planted acreage. Despite many obstacles, Argentina has become virtually self-sufficient in cotton.

Cattle grazing is a 300-year-old activity in the Chaco, but it occupies only a minor place in the economy of the region. A combination of physical and economic factors has impeded its development. The native grasses are nutritive during the wet season but lose much of their feed value during the dry winter, and limited localized production of alfalfa has not fully overcome this deficiency. During the winter months water for the animals is often in short supply. The hoof-and-mouth disease is endemic to the region. Insufficient transportation further limits development. Unless and until these adverse conditions are overcome, the cattle industry in the Chaco will continue to contribute little to the wealth of the republic.

**THE ARID WEST**—Lack of precipitation is the major limitation to the economic development of most of this western area of Argentina. Except where irrigation is feasible, the land is predominantly a grazing area, supporting goats and wool sheep and small numbers of very low grade cattle. Population is sparse, generally fewer than ten persons per square mile and falling to an average of less than one in the least favored areas. Very limited mineral resources (copper, tin, lead, salt, borax, tungsten, and gypsum) are found in the region, but exploitation is almost negligible.

Where irrigation is practicable, oases have developed, which, although small in size, have achieved regional—indeed national and international—significance. Where Andean streams along the Andean piedmont provided water, oases were important as way stations on the early routes to the Andean plateau mining centers. At such places as Mendoza, San Juan, and Tucumán food and water were available to overland travelers.

Founded in 1561, 1562, and 1565, respectively, these settlements predate Buenos Aires.

Crop specializations have been developed in these western oases because of their considerable variation in environment (the oases are located in a belt running through some fifteen degrees of latitude). Tucumán produces more than three fourths of the nation's sugar cane, Mendoza and San Juan are vital centers of grape and wine production. These specializations became pronounced after 1874, when rail connections were first established with the coastal cities. Although sugar and wine are of major importance, many other products are associated with the oases. In terms of acres under cultivation, alfalfa is the chief crop, but a great variety of citrus and deciduous fruits, as well as corn and potatoes, are also raised.

**PATAGONIA**—South of the thirty-eighth parallel is a vast area of some 300,000 square miles that stands out as a regional unit differing considerably from the rest of Argentina. This area is the wind-swept tableland of Patagonia, with its cool summers and generally cold winters. Owing largely to its unattractive environment, settlement of Patagonia has progressed slowly. It first became a part of Argentina in 1902, following the settlement of a boundary dispute with Chile. Even today Patagonia is the most sparsely populated region of the Republic, with population densities averaging less than one person per square mile.

From the earliest settlement sheep raising on a large scale has been the only economic activity of importance throughout most of Patagonia. Individual holdings cover hundreds of thousands of acres. Ranch houses are miles apart. Many owners are of Scottish, Welsh, and English extraction whose forefathers migrated from the sheep-raising areas of the British Isles.

Patagonia has limited petroleum resources at Comodoro Rivadavia on the coast. Some

coal is also found in the extreme north-west of the region. Both deposits, although constituting virtually the only sources of these fuels in Argentina, are hopelessly inadequate to meet domestic needs.

## POPULATION

The population of Argentina is approximately 18,700,000, giving an average density of only about seventeen per square mile, a sparse population indeed when compared with that of the intensively used portion of the earth. But the brief analysis of the country's regions and resources has helped to point up many of the problems in the way of economic development and expansion. Population is not evenly distributed throughout the republic. Three fourths of the total population are in the Humid Pampas, and more than one fifth of these are in the city of Buenos Aires which tends to dominate the political scene of the nation. A secondary clustering of population is to be found in the older colonial areas (the oases) of the Andean piedmont.

The population is approximately ninety-eight per cent of unmixed white European ancestry, but the proportion of European-born immigrants to native Argentines is a significant factor. The heavy tide of immigration from Italy and Spain increased the European-born from seven per cent in 1850 to twenty per cent of the total in 1930. Although this element provided a needed labor force, it also added to the discontent and instability of the middle class.

## NATIONAL ECONOMY

Although there has been a relatively rapid growth of manufacturing industries, it must be borne in mind that Argentina's national economy is based primarily on commercial agriculture. This fact is borne out by an analysis of agricultural production and of the nature of the manufacturing industries.

The leading manufactures are processed foods, textiles, and processed forest products, together accounting for nearly two thirds of the value of all manufactured commodities. Even in these fields it must be recognized that exchange restrictions, high import duties, and policies of extreme nationalism have been necessary to support the development that has taken place.

Such restrictions obviously tend to limit normal free trade and would seem inevitably to work against any free flow of Argentine exports. Fundamentally, this conflict of interests is at the root of much of the political instability of the republic. Traditionally, Argentine trade with Western Europe has been between owners of land in Argentina and owners of capital in Europe. Social prestige in Argentina rested on land ownership rather than on money income. But now, with the encouragement and protection of domestic manufacturing, the new owners of capital and the income earners are becoming economic and political forces in the republic, and their interests and policies are frequently diametrically opposed to those of the landowners and the traders. This dilemma must be successfully resolved before political stability or sound economic development can be assured.

In the realm of international politics the ability to wage effective war is the hallmark of power and prestige. The ability to wage war becomes almost synonymous with heavy industrial output; this capacity, in turn, is based in large measure, on the possession of, or ready accessibility to, iron ore, coal, and the other bulky raw materials that support these heavy industries. Judged on this basis, Argentina does not seem to possess the necessary resources on which to build a powerful nation—the country is totally lacking or sadly deficient in metallic minerals and fuels.

The republic has been able to develop some small iron and steel foundries dependent on scrap iron, imported pig iron, and

several alternative fuels. But the dearth of iron ore and coal almost precludes the development of a large blast furnace industry producing pig iron. Such an industry, using imported materials, might be built up behind a tariff wall, but, at best, it would be a high-cost operation and an uneconomic use of production factors.

Whatever the material obstacles, Argentina has moved to free its economy from dependence on external capital. Greater government controls and five-year plans are part of the movement to gain economic independence. Argentina has reduced the amount of foreign capital invested locally by one fourth, with the United States replacing Britain as the chief source of capital. Despite the surge of nationalism, the road toward economic health still requires considerable foreign capital.

#### INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS

**FOREIGN TRADE**—Virtually all parts of Argentina contribute some products to be sold in foreign markets. The aggregate is enormous; so great is the total that Argentina is the leading commercial nation of all Latin America. Being an agricultural nation, Argentina must export if it is to be able to supply its people with manufactured products—cars, machinery, and so on. International trade, the movements of commodities to world markets, and world price levels vitally affect the economic well-being of the people.

The Civil War in the United States gave great stimulus to Argentina's trade. The British, deprived of sources and markets in the United States, turned to Argentina for meat and wheat in exchange for coal and manufactured goods. Trade followed this pattern with little change until World War I, when dislocations resulting from a world at war helped bring about the beginnings of tariff-protected manufacturing. Under the artificial conditions of a wartime economy, factories began to produce or process

textiles, food stuffs, and other market-oriented products. Recent trends in Argentina's foreign trade demonstrate that these activities have been increasing in importance.

Prior to World War II Europe was the source of sixty per cent of Argentina's total imports, which annually averaged \$400,000,000. The United Kingdom was the leading supplier. The United States accounted for fifteen per cent. Quite significantly very little came from nearby neighbors. Brazil sent less to Argentina than did Japan. Such items as machinery, vehicles, iron and steel manufactures, coal, petroleum, newsprint, and textiles made up the bulk of the imports.

During World War II the trade pattern of the prewar period was modified. The United Kingdom continued its exports, but the United States and Brazil became relatively far more important as suppliers of needed goods. Trade from Sweden also showed a marked increase. Trade with the belligerent countries of the European continent showed, of course, a marked decline. Perhaps the most significant change was the marked increase in imports from the United States in the early war years. By 1941 these imports had reached an all-time high of \$109,000,000. Despite some fluctuations during the war, the United States overtook Britain as Argentina's primary supplier of basic needs. The postwar shift indicated also that raw materials and fuels largely replaced consumer items that constituted forty per cent of Argentina's pre-1939 imports. The emphasis upon industrialization is thus a focal point in Argentina's national economy.

Before World War II Argentina's foreign trade was characterized by an export balance, with exports amounting in some years to as much as \$700,000,000. Britain was the leading customer, taking over one third of the exports by value; seventy-five per cent of all exports moved to European markets. In the decade just prior to the war, Germany nearly doubled its imports from Argentina.

Principal items in the export trade from Argentina included grains and grain products, meat, wool, hides, and quebracho extract. During the war Argentina profited enormously by the increase in demand for her surplus foodstuffs. After the war Britain continued to take one fourth of Argentine exports, but in 1950 the United States replaced Britain as the best customer. Whether this ratio is to be permanent is not yet certain.

In the postwar period, Argentina has faced periods of drought as well as years of great surpluses. To help reduce the impact of these wide fluctuations in available supplies on the local economy, the government of Argentina is attempting to institute an "ever-normal granary" policy. Such devices as price controls, trade-allocation agreements with other major wheat exporters, and construction of storage facilities, including some underground bins, are being used.

Another difficult problem has arisen as a result of the large export trade balance of the war years. A dearth of imports during this period enabled Argentina to accumulate large gold and foreign exchange reserves. After the war the Central Bank of Argentina limited the use of the reserves for the import of valuable but high-priced capital items in preference to consumer goods. A stringent foreign-trade policy, combined with a scarcity of consumer goods, has resulted in price inflation and an alarming rise in living costs.

In recent years the Export Development Committee has attempted to promote trade between Argentina and her Latin American neighbors. Brazil, Paraguay, Bolivia, Cuba, Colombia, and Chile have all entered into agreements, generally of the most-favored-nation type with reciprocal tariff concessions. As a result, there has been a marked increase in the sale of manufactured goods to her neighbors and in the import from them of raw materials not produced domestically. Exports to Brazil, Peru, and Chile now ac-

tually exceed those to any European country. These trade agreements, together with tariff protection and wartime-induced shortages, have stimulated the growth of manufacturing within the country.

**ARGENTINE-UNITED STATES RELATIONS**—From the period of the American Civil War down to the present time, the Argentine attitude toward the United States has fluctuated between indifference and hostility. The degree of overt or covert antagonism has in fact increased with the growth of interdependence. Although the explanation is complex, in large measure economic conditions would appear to underlie these political antagonisms. The economies of the two nations, while differing in many respects, have numerous features in common. Thus, although Argentina needs many manufactured items produced in the United States, it has little to offer which is not found within the borders of the United States. In addition, the two economies are in direct competition in several fields.

As the United States generally sells much more than it buys in Argentina, the latter country has been constantly faced with an unfavorable trade balance. This situation tends to lead to political antagonism between the two nations. It has seemed to the Argentinians that the United States has generally taken government actions that tend to restrict imports from Argentina. Tensions were aggravated by the accord that the United States tendered to Brazil—many of whose products found ready markets in the United States—especially since the economies of Argentina and Brazil tend to be complementary. Competition on the economic level unfortunately found expression on the political level; in fact, tension has been reinforced by the existing rivalry between Brazil and Argentina in the arena of South American politics.

Experience during World War II further

aggravated the tension between Argentina and the United States. The war in Europe caught Argentina short of many manufactured goods, particularly iron and steel, automobiles, and various types of machinery. Argentina had the dollar exchange to buy them, but the United States, faced with wartime needs, had little to spare. Certain elements of the Argentine government attributed the failure to secure needed goods from the United States to American discrimination and not to real shortages.

The tense situation between the two countries was further aggravated by a series of unfortunate events. First, many figures in the Argentine cabinet and the army publicly stated that it made little difference whether the war resulted in an Axis or Allied victory, in either case, Argentina would achieve her rightful position among the nations of the world as a totalitarian state. Further, it was well known that there were many active pro-Nazi organizations in Argentina. Unlike other Latin American states, Argentina resisted declaring war against the Axis until the closing months of the war. Such a combination of events and conditions provided a most unfavorable climate for friendly relations between the two nations. Although the postwar situation is less tense, relations are still far from congenial.

Location in the lower half of the South American continent has contributed to Argentina's relative independence from United States influence. An economic rivalry, with political overtones, has developed between the highly industrialized northern nation and the ambitious and potentially vigorous South American nation. Since World War II Argentina, confining its attention to Rio de la Plata or to its relation with Brazil, has taken only a restrained interest in the inter-American security system, and there seems to be little reason to believe that any significant change in her attitude will occur in the immediately foreseeable future.



**TERRITORIAL ASPIRATIONS**—Argentina bases its claim to the Falkland Islands on its past use of them as a penal colony and the fact that the title formerly belonged to Spain. Their possession is advantageous to the British, who have no other base in this part of the world intermediate between England and New Zealand. It was in this area on December 8, 1914, that the British fleet met and destroyed the German Pacific fleet.

The history of the Falkland Islands reflects their strategic importance as a base from which to protect the entrance to the Strait of Magellan and the passage around Cape Horn. These islands have been desired and held in turn by all the chief European powers that have colonies in the Orient as well as by Argentina. First permanently settled by France, the islands have been successively ruled by Spain, England, Spain again, England again, Argentina after 1820, and, finally, by England since 1833. Of late, Argentina has been making bolder assertion of its right to the Falklands.

Another disputed territory is Tierra del Fuego, the southern tip of the South American continent. Argentina has never been completely satisfied with the compromise

settlement of boundary disputes with Chile in this area. The difficulty dates back to 1847. In 1881, with the United States as mediator, a partial settlement was arranged. Again, in 1902, King Edward VII functioned as mediator and the Strait of Magellan was given to Chile along with the western half of Tierra del Fuego, while Argentina was awarded the eastern half of this island.

Although dissatisfaction over British control of the Falkland Islands and general unwillingness to accept as final the boundary settlement with Chile represent Argentina's official primary extraterritorial interests, there is also a certain amount of popular interest in Antarctica. The government has established a weather station in the area and sends representatives to international scientific conferences concerning the Antarctic region.

No official boundary problems exist between Argentina and her neighbors to the north—Uruguay and Paraguay—although these countries have at times been fearful lest their territories might be included in a long-range plan of aggrandizement by Argentina. From a practical standpoint there seems to be little real basis for their fears.

## URUGUAY

Uruguay, the smallest of the independent South American countries (72,000 square miles), is a rolling grassland with wooded valleys, a truly temperate climate, and adequate precipitation. Its climate, tempered by oceanic influences, has been acknowledged to be the most agreeable to human endeavor in all of South America. There are no mountain barriers, and all parts of the country are accessible by transportation to Montevideo, the port and capital city.

In Spanish colonial times what is now Uruguay was known as the Banda Oriental,

or east bank of the river. Uruguay owes its status as an independent nation, which dates from 1830, largely to the British desire to prevent Argentina from gaining control of both banks of the La Plata estuary. Moreover, the British, intent on furthering trade with the Plata area, favored establishing a buffer state between Brazil, the center of Portuguese culture, and Argentina, the center of Spanish culture. It was British capital that made possible a network of railways radiating from Montevideo.

For about sixty years after its establish-

ment Uruguay's existence as an independent nation was threatened by bitter internal struggles between two hostile groups—the Colorados and the Blancos.<sup>5</sup> The embryonic nation survived this trouble and since then has had one of the most successful histories of democratic government of any nation in Latin America.

The people of Uruguay are often referred to in South America as Orientales.<sup>6</sup> Among the country's 2,500,000 inhabitants, Spanish and Italian descendants predominate. Only about ten per cent of the population are mestizo, and most of these live in the more remote sections of the country. The state religion is Roman Catholicism; the language is Spanish. Fully one third of the population lives in Montevideo, a fact that tends to centralize government control in the capital at the expense of the provinces. The riparian provinces, while comprising only one eighth of the total land area of Uruguay, support more than one half of its population.

Pastoral pursuits provide the primary economic activity of the country. The chief farming regions are in the south, in Soriano, Colonia, and Canelones. Fully two thirds of the population are engaged in agriculture, either directly or indirectly through the processing of agricultural products, such as wool, meat, and hides. These three items together constitute about ninety per cent of the nation's exports. Only about one acre in twenty is under the plow; most of the land under cultivation is devoted to wheat, corn, and flax. So long as Uruguay continues to be a land of large landholdings and sparse population, grazing will continue to be the dominant economic activity. The sparse population rules out intensive crop cultivation while absence of basic raw materials inhibits heavy industry. An old and unresolved problem is the constant movement of the rural population to towns and cities. There is little in the present picture that indicates a marked change in Uruguay's economic life.

## PARAGUAY

Paraguay, although differing from Argentina in many respects, is nevertheless essentially an extension of the northern part of that country. Climatically it is similar, except that temperatures tend to be somewhat higher. Topographically and regionally the area is a continuation of the Gran Chaco and Mesopotamia (see maps on pages 183 and 187).

The Paraguay River divides the country's 157,000 square miles into two well-defined re-

gions. Two thirds of the area is west of the river, but most of the 1,500,000 population live in a narrow plain, paralleling the east bank of the river, which eventually merges with the Paraná Plateau to the north. The contrast between the two sides of the river is striking. West of the Paraguay the population is sparsely settled over the scrub forest and savanna country of the Chaco. Locked in the interior of the continent, Paraguay has faced powerful rivals in Brazil, Argentina, and Bolivia. The Paraguayan capital, Asunción, is 1,000 miles upstream from the Atlantic on the Paraguay River, which provides it with an important means of transportation. The single railway connection between Paraguay and the outside is through Argentina to Buenos Aires.

<sup>5</sup> The rival groups followed two presidential contenders and were distinguished by their colors. President Oribe's men wore white (Blancos), General Rivera's adopted red (Colorados). The Blancos were the more conservative of the two parties.

<sup>6</sup> A term applied to Spaniards settling on the Banda Oriental—the left bank of La Plata.

Paraguay declared its independence from Spain in 1812, and for many years it enjoyed prosperity. Later, however, its rate of growth fell behind that of neighboring states. One of the major reasons for this stagnation was the costly war that the country began in 1865 against the combined forces of Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. During five years of fighting Paraguay's population was reduced from around 1,000,000 to a mere 200,000, and most of the survivors were women and young children. Moreover, considerable territory was lost to both Brazil and Argentina.

The area of the country was increased in 1938, following the Chaco War with Bolivia. At that time six neutral nations awarded three fourths of the disputed territory to Paraguay. But the additional area did not solve the country's basic economic problems. The oil resources which Paraguay hoped to obtain in the Chaco remained in Bolivian hands. In terms of agriculture and grazing the Paraguayan Chaco, like that of Argentina, is of little economic value.

Despite the dominant role played by Argentina in Paraguay's economy, the country broke relations with the Axis Powers in 1942. This political maneuver resulted in an increase in the output of forest products needed by the Allies. In appreciation of Paraguay's help the United States later made available a loan to improve the country's health and sanitation facilities.

In remarkable contrast with Uruguay nearly ninety-seven per cent of Paraguay's population is estimated to be mestizo, with the Guaraní influence especially strong. In fact, Guaraní language is still spoken by the common people. Although representing a definite minority group, a small core of Europeans (chiefly German, Czech, and Russian) constitutes the economically and politically responsible class in the country. Except among the European population illiteracy and poverty abound; at least seventy-five per cent of the people are unable to read or write.

Economic life centers on agriculture and the exploitation of the forests. Corn and manioc are the principal crops and the chief items of diet. The most productive lands around Asunción are only five per cent of the total area but support sixty per cent of the population. Although limited amounts of long-staple cotton are grown for export, the grazing of cattle is a more significant occupation, and one fourth of the nation's exports are cattle products. The chief forest products are timber, quebracho extract, and yerba maté. In 1948 forest products replaced animal products as the leading class of exports. There are so many difficult and interrelated problems requiring solution that marked improvement in Paraguay's economic conditions in the near future seems most unlikely.

### Study Questions

1. What is the "hoof-and-mouth" disease? What part has this disease played in United States-Argentine relations?
2. Analyze the statement "The traditional trade between Argentina and Northwestern Europe has been one between owners of land and owners of capital goods."
3. Discuss the internal class struggle in Argentina between the landowners and the industrialists.
4. Discuss the regional conflict in Argentina between the Pampas and the old oases of the Northwest.
5. On what basis does Argentina claim the Falkland Islands? Why were these islands so valuable to the British? Do they remain so today?
6. Discuss Uruguay's role as a buffer state.
7. Why, despite its early settlement, has Asunción failed to grow and develop as rapidly

- as many other towns of the La Plata basin?
8. Why did Argentina lag behind all other Western Hemisphere nations in declaring war on the Axis during World War II?
  9. Does Argentina have aspirations to become a world power? Cite evidence to support your conclusions.
  10. How may the nature of the natural resources of Argentina affect future industrial growth?
  11. Characterize United States-Argentine relations. What are some of the major causes of dissension between the two nations?
  12. What evidence of economic nationalism exists in Argentina?
  13. Locate Argentina on a globe. How has Argentina's location affected her foreign policy?
  14. Why did Spain take little interest in the Pampas area in the early colonial period?
  15. Account for some of the principal differences in the economic development of Uruguay and Paraguay.

PART THREE

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*Europe*



## CHAPTER THIRTEEN

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# *The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics covers an area of about 8,500,000 square miles, or roughly one sixth of the land area of the earth, and has a population of approximately 200,000,000.<sup>1</sup> In both size and population it is nearly equal to the United States plus Alaska, Canada, and Mexico. The emergence of the Soviet Union as one of the major world powers is related to the successful outcome of World War II. The effects of this victory are manifested in the acquisition of territories both in Asia and in Europe<sup>2</sup> in the extension of influence over neighboring territory, and in an accelerated industrial production, including the most

modern atomic weapons. Especially significant was the control of the Red Army and subsequent installation of a pro-Soviet Union government in the countries of the politically unstable "shatter belt" of eastern Central Europe.

The USSR extends from close to the North Pole (80° N.) to the borders of Afghanistan (35° N.). Its greatest west-east distance is nearly 7,000 miles, from Kaliningrad (previously Konigsberg) (20° E.) to Cape Dezhnev (170° W.) on the Bering Strait. The borders of the Soviet Union extend for more than 35,000 miles, two thirds of which are coastlines. Land boundaries adjoin eleven countries, six of which are in Europe and five in Asia. The continentality of the USSR explains many geographic facts peculiar to the country, such as topographic diversity, seasonal climatic extremes, great variety of vegetation patterns, and many different population characteristics. The size also helps to account for the abundance of important raw materials which enable the

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<sup>1</sup> Central Statistical Administration, *The National Economy of the USSR, a Statistical Compilation* (Moscow, State Statistical Publishing House, April, 1956), p. 2. Statistics and figures quoted in this chapter have been taken from sources cited or from the official USSR compilation.

<sup>2</sup> For a discussion of the new frontiers of the USSR, see W. Gordon East, "The New Frontiers of the Soviet Union," *Foreign Affairs*, XXIX (1951), 591-607.

Soviet Union to approach economic self-sufficiency more nearly than any other country except the United States.

By reason of its vast land mass the country naturally encounters the problem of establishing stable boundaries, in particular on the western frontiers of Eastern Europe, along the southern perimeter of Central Asia, and along the northeast frontiers of Chinese territory. From the original core, the forested region between the Valdai Hills and Moscow, with its many rivers and portages, the Russians expanded their control to embrace the present extent of the USSR. Starting in the southeast and proceeding counterclockwise, her boundaries are the Caucasus Mountains, the Caspian Sea, the Himalaya chain, the ranges along the boundary with Mongolia, the Amur River and its branches, the Pacific Ocean, the Arctic Ocean, across the Finnish forests and lakes, the Baltic Sea, across the East European plain along the slopes of the Carpathian Mountains, and to the Black Sea. Although many pressures were exerted in the hope of gaining access to the world's oceanic trade lanes, the large area of the country has provided sufficient *Lebensraum* (living space) for its people and considerable security against outside pressures.

The USSR—especially in the light of its present position as a world power—merits special consideration. It is of vital importance that the United States and the rest of the non-Communist world have a clear understanding of the forces within the USSR—geographic, economic, historical, and political—if they are to conduct their affairs successfully with the USSR. Two facts stand out prominently. First, the Soviet Union has succeeded in achieving economic and political uniformity throughout its vast territory. This has been accomplished by the enforcement of strictly uniform rules and by subjecting the huge population to the rigid control of the Communist party. Second, there are basic factors that consistently


play an important role in the development and growth of the country and also in the determination of Soviet foreign policy. It is true that economic pressures and changes in political alignments may seem at times to point to some flexibility in governmental policies, but they most certainly do not reflect any fundamental change in the USSR foreign policies, whatever political system may be dominant in the USSR, foreign policies, fundamentally, are rigid, and these should be recognized, delineated, and evaluated by the student of world power politics. Finally, it should be observed that it is the successful interplay of the same forces that govern her foreign relations—geographic, economic, and political forces—that will maintain the USSR in her position as a major world power.

#### PHYSICAL ASPECTS

**RELIEF**—The USSR is an enormous country, but size alone does not ensure importance, it could be a handicap. (Many areas are well peopled and rich in resources, but great expanses are equivalent to the barren wastes of northern Canada, the infertile stretches in the American west, and the arid stretches of northern Mexico. A glance at the population map inside the back cover will reveal the extent of these "empty" areas.

(The main feature of the topography is the vast plain extending from the Western European boundaries to the middle Yenisei River, with an average elevation of less than 1,000 feet. Only the low ranges of the Ural Mountains relieve the monotony of this plain. In the north and south the Urals reach up to one mile high, but in the center they are a barrier of no more than 3,000 feet and are crossed by five railways.) Change in climatic condition or vegetation zones in this plain is scarcely noticeable. (South of the plain, mountains—most of them geologically young and therefore rugged—border the country from the Black Sea to the Bering





Strait. This mountainous belt offers some national security, but it likewise hinders trade and discourages exchange of people and ideas.) Mountainous terrain with dissected valleys is also found in eastern Siberia; here little-explored highlands reach elevations close to 12,000 feet. Volcanic peaks on the Kamchatka Peninsula on the Pacific are among the most active in the world.

South of the mountain fringe is an area of steppes, deserts, oases, and irrigated lands which stretches from the lower Don and Volga rivers across the Central Asiatic Lowlands. The northern part of this region borders the most important agricultural heartland, the "fertile triangle," which stretches from Leningrad and Odessa approximately to the Ob River in west central Siberia. In total, the mountainous country, lands too hilly for proper cultivation, swamps, bogs, land continually frozen, and deserts amount to more than 7,000,000 square miles. Thus, only 1,000,000 square miles have any real opportunity for development, according to Cressey, however, crop-growing areas

amount to only about 500,000 square miles, a mere six per cent of the country.<sup>3</sup>)

**CLIMATE AND VEGETATION**—Climatic conditions are generally continental with cold winters, warm to hot summers, and short transitional periods. Only the Mediterranean climate of southern Crimea, the subtropical climate prevalent in Transcaucasia, and the monsoon region of the Far East differ from this uniformity. The uniformity is due, first, to the continentality of the great Eurasian land mass and, secondly, to the modifying influences of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. In spite of its distance from the Atlantic, some moderating effect is felt in European USSR and even as far inland as western Siberia. The average range of mean monthly temperature in the coldest and warmest months increases eastward, and there is less precipitation from the west to southeast and northeast.

Frost-free days diminish from west to

<sup>3</sup> George B. Cressey, *How Strong Is Russia?* (Syracuse University Press, 1954), p. 25.

east and vary from 210 days at Odessa, 150 at Leningrad, 130 at Moscow, 122 at Novosibirsk, and 95 at Irkutsk to less than 65 at Verkhoyansk. As a result of the cold climate most of the northern parts of the country and all of the territory east of the Yenisei have permanently frozen subsoils, the so-called *merzlot*. This covers forty-five per cent of the total area of the Soviet Union and often extends to a depth of several hundred feet. Vast areas in the Soviet Union are, then, too cold for cultivation, and high temperatures with excessive evaporation and a shortage of water typical of extreme continentality are widespread in Soviet Central Asia. Over twenty-five per cent of the area of the USSR has less than twelve inches of precipitation. This semidesert or desert area can be cultivated only by irrigation or must be considered wasteland as far as cultivation or even grazing is concerned.

Climate is primarily responsible for the division of the USSR into broad vegetation zones which generally extend in an east-west direction. In the north, fringing the Arctic, is a band of barren tundra, to the south ecological conditions become more favorable and support forests and grasses. Further south, steppes or desert conditions preclude all but the simplest types of nomadic economy, except where oases permit irrigated agriculture. The map on page 203 shows these major regions of vegetation, and later in this chapter reference will be made to their striking influences on the exploitation and settlement of the country.

#### EVOLUTION OF MODERN RUSSIA

Russian history has been described variously as the interplay between forests and rivers or between the steppe and rivers, evidenced by the periodic shift of the capital from Kiev to Moscow to St. Petersburg (now Leningrad) and again to Moscow. Indeed, each of these centers pinpoints a definite phase of Russia's growth. Early traders and

explorers moved along the rivers, crossed the portages connecting the Baltic with the southern steppes, established trading posts,<sup>4</sup> and organized political units. Before political unity could be achieved in the area, powerful invaders from Asia—the Mongols—poured into the southern steppes. Not only did the invasion in the thirteenth century interrupt the trade with the Black Sea areas, it also ended the predominance of the steppe zone and the pre-eminence of Kiev, located in the boundary between steppe and forest. Activity now shifted to the zone of mixed forest, Moscow became the capital city, and the Muscovite state, sheltered by the extensive forest area, became the decisive factor in the evolution of modern Russia.

In a long and bitter struggle the Russian rulers of the Muscovite state eventually expelled the Mongol conquerors in 1462 and set up an autocratic state that turned its attention toward consolidating and enlarging its holdings, first in the north and west, then in the east, and finally to the south. A singular point was reached in 1715 when Peter the Great shifted his capital to the Baltic and made St. Petersburg a symbolic window opening Russia to Western influences. For two centuries the czars at St. Petersburg encouraged intercourse with Europe while attempting to preserve Russian political institutions, including absolute rulership, free from the liberal influences of the West. The contest between the old and the new finally involved Russia in the upheaval of the Revolution of 1917, which ended the czarist regime and shifted the capital back to Moscow, a location favored by reason of its geographic position in the interior of European Russia.

<sup>4</sup> These trading posts consisted at first only of blockhouses or forts (*ostrogs*) at strategic sites, such as portages. The sites were so well chosen that many of them later became important trading towns and leading cities—Smolensk, Vitebsk, Moscow, and many others.

FROM VARANGIAN EMPIRES TO THE MUSCOVITE STATE—In the eighth century trade in forest products and animal pelts brought the Varangians (Norsemen) from Sweden into contact with loosely organized Slavic tribes living in the Valdai Hills and the west central regions of the mixed forest lands and with the Greeks in Constantinople. Commercial success gave the Varangians political control and much prosperity. Novgorod in the forested zone and Kiev on its southern boundary, two Slavic cities, became the most important trading centers. Within a century of the first appearance of the Varangians, these people became thoroughly Slavicized. Later, a Varangian tribe by the name of Rus extended its influence from Novgorod into the valleys of the Oka and the Volga and in 882 established its new capital at Kiev. This state was hereafter known as Kievan Russia.<sup>5</sup>

The prosperity of the Kievan state lasted roughly four centuries. Its rulers were strongly trade-minded, and many trading towns grew up, which were united into a loose confederation. Trade also went along the Volga to the old Slavic towns of Rostov and Murom and to the capital of the Volga Bulgars on the Kama River. Contact with Greeks brought Christian influences. In 988 Grand Duke Vladimir of Kiev and his people adopted the Christian faith, with the result that the Greek Orthodox Church, rather than the Roman Catholic, became, in time, the established church of the Russian Empire.

In the thirteenth century Mongol invaders out of Asia swept across the southern steppes of Russia to reach as far as the Hungarian Plain. These highly organized horsemen interrupted peaceful trade in the region of the Dnieper and Volga rivers. In 1240 the

Mongols sacked Kiev and eventually brought under their sway an area extending all the way from Central Asia to the forests of Eastern Europe. Mongol domination for a period of two and a half centuries altered the course of Russian cultural and political history.

In the west there were developments which, in some respects, were more serious than the Mongol (Tatar) invasions.<sup>6</sup> Polish and Lithuanian Roman Catholic raiders and German traders combined to attack the Greek Orthodox Slavic-speaking inhabitants. At the height of their invasions, coinciding in time with the Mongol conquests, the Poles and Lithuanians had extended their domain to include Smolensk and Kiev and had moved on to the Black Sea.

Attacked by the Tatars on the east and south and by the Poles and Lithuanians on the west, the Slavic settlers of the Kievan state sought refuge in the remote forests of the northeast, within the watershed area between the upper Volga and the Oka rivers. This *mezhdurechye* (Mesopotamia) was sparsely settled and inhospitable, but the protection of its forests enabled it to become the nucleus of the modern Russian state. Trade brought prosperity to the region, but the constant threat of nomadic intrusions forced the leaders to hold strict control over the inhabitants. Favored by a central location and the power of their rulers, the Tatar Khans in time centered their control in Moscow, although outlying areas refused to submit to foreign rule. During the Mongol period (1238–1462) Slavic princes were indeed subservient to their overlords. However, the Russian princes, called grand dukes, eventually marshaled their forces in a concerted attack against foreign rule. In 1380 they led an attack against the Tatar Khan

<sup>5</sup> The origin of the name Rus is uncertain. For details of the formation of Russia see the valuable study by Samuel H. Cross, *Slavic Civilization through the Ages* (Harvard University Press, 1948).

<sup>6</sup> Tatar (also spelled Tartar) is the name applied by Russians to the Mongol enemy. Historians refer to the Mongol invasion and occupation as the "period of the Golden Horde."

Mamay and later captured the important trading center of Nizhni Novgorod (Gorki), which controlled an important part of the Volga trade.

**CONSOLIDATION AND EXPANSION**—The fifteenth century saw the beginning of the expansion of the Muscovite state. By conquests and by peaceful trade it absorbed other Russian principalities. The Muscovite dukes expanded their holdings and ultimately threw off the yoke of the Golden Horde. Roads were opened to the northern taiga, and Moscow's warehouses were filled with much sought-for honey, furs, wax, and other products. Tver (Kalinin) was occupied in 1485, and the power of the western Slavs was consequently much reduced. In addition, with the fall of Constantinople to the Turks in 1453, Moscow came to be recognized as the center of the Greek Orthodox Church.

When the unification of the Muscovite state was completed, in 1505, under Ivan III, its rulers were ready to expand from the forested core into the open steppe of the south and to initiate conquests of non-Russian lands. Conquests were first directed toward the east and southeast along the Volga, which became the first all-Russian river. Ivan IV (1530-84), who first assumed the title of Czar, conquered Kazan and Astrakhan and founded several trading and military posts along the lower Volga, such as Samara (Kuiybyshhev) and Tsaritsyn (Stalingrad). Slavic settlers searched for mineral riches on the western slopes of the Urals and later for iron ore on the eastern slopes. Russian horsemen, known as Cossacks, were encouraged to cross into Siberia, where, in 1584, they conquered the Tatar Khanate of Sibir, on the lower Irtysh River. Cossacks and other settlers crossed broad rivers along the south edge of the forests and built a string of *ostrogs*. Siberia was crossed and the Pacific reached in 1632, less than sixty years from the first penetration into Siberia. Later,

the Russians established themselves in Alaska and along the Pacific coast of North America as far south as San Francisco Bay. In fact, explorations took them all the way to the Mexican coast. But the colonists had little governmental support and were never effective on the American continent. In 1867 Alaska was sold to the United States.

Less rapid were the expansion and conquests to the west, northwest, and south. Various attempts to establish a Baltic outlet were unsuccessful until 1721, when Peter the Great won Ingria, Estonia, Latvia, and a foothold in southern Finland. Archangel and St. Petersburg became important ship-building and trading centers, with the former port assuming a major role in the exploitation of the valuable timber of northern Russia. Further territorial gains were made in the west under Catherine II (1762-96), but not until the third Polish Partition in 1795 were the approximate western limits of the present Soviet Union reached. The drive toward the Black Sea began during Peter's rule (1682-1725), but the coast and the lower Dnieper were not finally won until the latter part of the reign of Catherine the Great (Crimea, 1783, Jassy, 1791). When the fertile grasslands of the Ukraine were occupied, Russian settlers were attracted to this section from the forested regions of the north and from even more remote regions.

The many wars against the Turks during the nineteenth century are all well remembered. All had as their goal the conquest of the gate into the Mediterranean, a desire which is still unfulfilled. Farther westward expansion was stopped for a time by Prussia in the north and Austria in the south, although this expansion in the south was later made possible by the power vacuum created by the dissolution of the Austrian Empire following World War I. Russian territorial gains in Asia, in addition to the Amur River Basin, consisted of extensions along the southern frontier of Central Asia—Bukhara, Samarkand, and Turkestan. After World

War II the Soviet Union incorporated Tannu Tuva and gained a short-lived predominant influence over Outer Mongolia. New agreements between the Soviet Union and China now give China added influence in this vital region. Before World War I Russian rulers generally showed little interest in the economic development of their Asiatic domain, the abundant minerals remained unexplored and the forests, on the whole, unexploited. It was left to the USSR government, especially when her needs greatly increased during World War II, to start large-scale explorations and exploitations of Siberia's wealth.

#### DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS

In an analysis of the demographic basis of the USSR three main characteristics can be stressed: (1) its multinational character and the varied ethnic composition; (2) its high birth rate and the relative youth of the population, and (3) state-controlled internal migrations of the people and the rapid urbanization, in progress since the 1930's as a result of forced industrialization.

**CULTURAL DIVERSITY**—No official population count of the USSR has been published since 1939. War losses on the debit side and territorial gains and natural increases on the credit side have only slightly increased the total population figure since the beginning of World War II. The present estimated population of about 200,000,000 consists of approximately 180 ethnic groups speaking 125 different languages and dialects. They belong to nearly forty different religious groups.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Theodore Shabad, *Geography of the U.S.S.R.* (Columbia University Press, 1951), pp. 512-14, Table 4, lists the major ethnic groups of the USSR and their autonomous political divisions reported in the 1926 and 1939 censuses. Considerable material is also found in George Jorre, *The Soviet Union, the Land and Its People* (Longmans, Green, 1950), pp. 65-71.

Of the various nationalities, the Russians (eastern Slavs) make up over three fourths of the total population: fifty-five per cent Great Russian, seventeen per cent Little Russian, or Ukrainians; and five per cent White Russian or Byelorussians. The Great Russians are predominant, and their dialect is the one most widely used, even though it differs greatly from that of the Ukrainians. The people of Turkic stock (primarily Mongolian and Turkish strains) number about 17,000,000, 5,000,000 people belong to the Finno-Ugrian ethnic group, 4,500,000 are Georgians and Armenians; 3,700,000 belong to the Slavonic-Baltic ethnic groups; 1,300,000 are Tadjiks (Tadzhiks); and 350,000 Ossetians are members of the Iranian groups. In addition, 2,000,000 Moldavians of Bessarabia, the Buryat-Mongolians of Eastern Siberia, and approximately 2,000,000 Jews and many other linguistic minorities are included among the national groups of the Soviet Union.

The large number of ethnic groups raises a question as to how the many autonomous political divisions based on cultural aspects can be reconciled with over-all unity. The official USSR prides itself on its accommodation of various national autonomous political units, each of which is permitted to have its own schools and its own newspapers and to use the local language in official government business; all of these aspects of autonomy are compatible with Soviet ideology. This cultural autonomy assumes greater significance when viewed in the light of the intensive Russification which has gone on during the past twenty-five years. An example of this Russification is the introduction of Cyrillic script among all the non-Russian groups except those in the Baltic states, and in Armenia, where the Armenian alphabet and the age-old Georgian script are still permitted.<sup>8</sup> The Soviets call

<sup>8</sup> The extent of use of the Jewish (Hebrew) alphabet in the Yiddish language is unknown.

this a development "national in form, Socialist in content."

What might be called an evidence of USSR toleration of cultural autonomy is the attitude of the state toward the church. Prosecuted as a "crime against the state" until World War II and condemned by an intense antireligious propaganda, religion today holds a position of official toleration. The Russian Orthodox Church is the most widespread of Christian denominations, though Roman Catholicism, Protestant Lutheranism, the Gregorian Church of the Armenians, and the Orthodox Church of the Georgians each has its following. Islam, the second largest religion, is widespread among the Turkic peoples. Among the many other religions practiced in Russia, mention should be made of the Lamaist Buddhist religion of the Buryats and the Hebrew faith of the Jews. Religious freedom is reported to exist today, but the churches often serve only as an arm of the USSR government. Nevertheless they are not abolished, in fact, new places of worship have appeared in recent years.

**NATURAL INCREASE**—Records for the years 1926-39 show that the population of the Soviet Union increased at an average rate of 1.23 per cent per year, adding 23,600,000 people in thirteen years. While exact figures indicating natural increase are not presently available, it is assumed that there has been no material decline since the war. The large war losses were compensated for in part by the acquisition of over 24,000,000 people in newly acquired territories. Of some significance is the large proportion of young people in the USSR population. In 1939 thirty-five per cent of the total was in the fifteen to thirty-four age bracket. About thirty-six per cent of the total was under fifteen years, a segment contributing to the manpower resources of the postwar era.

**POPULATION DISTRIBUTION**—The population

of the USSR is most irregularly distributed over the country. Forty-eight per cent of the Soviet population in 1939 lived in six per cent of the total area. Although the average density was twenty-three persons per square mile, in the most densely settled parts from Moscow and Ivanovo to the Donets Basin, density ranged from 150 to 250 per square mile, whereas northern Russia showed densities of less than ten persons per square mile, with most of the population concentrated in a few cities. By 1941 only nine per cent of the total population lived in the Asiatic parts of the USSR, an area comprising fifty-six per cent of the total national area at that time. Even here great contrasts were typical: an average of fifty persons per square mile along the Trans-Siberian Railroad, 500 in some oases in the Central Asiatic region; two in Eastern Siberia and the Far East; and as low as 0.14 in Yakutia.

Ever since the first Five-Year Plan was inaugurated in 1928, internal migrations have been going on at an accelerated rate (see table on page 209). World War II increased the tempo, and the latest plans for opening up new agricultural land in northern Kazakhstan and western Siberia will again bring thousands of new settlers into an area with a low population density. The effects of the war are particularly impressive when population increases are viewed in Siberia and the Far East between 1939 and 1944: seventy-nine per cent increase for Komsomolsk, sixty-five per cent for Chita, fifty-nine per cent for Krasnoyarsk, and forty-eight per cent for Novosibirsk. The city of Omsk grew from 280,000 inhabitants in 1940 to approximately 600,000 by 1950 (based on its election district data).<sup>9</sup> Continuous new economic developments, such as the building or enlargement of industrial establishments, stimulate internal migrations.

<sup>9</sup> Harry Schwartz, *Russia's Soviet Economy* (Prentice-Hall, 1950), pp. 32-33.

## Regional Shifts in the USSR Economy, 1926-50

(Total and Urban Populations, in Millions)

Region	Total Population			Total Population of Cities over 50,000		
	1926	1939	1950	1926	1939	1948-50
Northwest Russia	5.83	7.19	8.1	1.69	3.44	3.65
North Russia	3.09	3.18	3.3	0.13	0.38	0.40
Baltic	4.98	5.57	16.5	0.42	0.78	2.30
Central Russia	40.1	46.8	48.0	3.79	9.05	10.1
Urals	8.04	12.7	13.5	0.52	2.02	2.60
Ukraine	29.7	32.1	44.7	2.65	6.56	7.70
Volga	11.8	10.4	10.8	1.03	2.23	2.50
North Caucasus	9.25	10.5	9.6	0.97	1.32	1.75
Transcaucasus	5.86	8.03	8.4	0.87	1.71	1.90
Turkestan	13.8	16.6	16.8	0.75	2.17	2.40
Western Siberia	9.29	9.6	11.4	0.41	1.67	2.20
Eastern Siberia	3.67	5.33	5.7	0.24	0.73	1.00
Far East	1.26	2.34	4.5	0.16	0.61	0.85
Total USSR	146.7	170.5	201.3	13.6	32.7	39.3

SOURCE: Demetri B. Shumkin. "Economic Regionalization in the Soviet Union," *The Geographical Review*, XLII (October 1952), 594.

As a result of governmental emphasis on industrialization, urban centers have expanded rapidly, evidenced by the constant reorganization of election districts. The total urban population at the end of 1954 was estimated as thirty-seven per cent of the total population; whereas in 1926, before the first Five-Year Plan, the corresponding figure was only eighteen per cent.<sup>10</sup> As mining centers (such as Karaganda: population 450 in 1924; 165,900 in 1939; and 350,000 in 1956), and transit points or agricultural supply and tractor stations were expanded, their populations increased rapidly. Today the Urals, with over 100 cities, the areas around Moscow and Leningrad, with 145 and

seventy-five urban centers, respectively; the Donets Basin, with fifty cities; and Kuznetsk in Central Siberia are the main centers of urban concentration of the USSR. In April, 1956, more than 1,500 cities and 2,422 urban-type settlements were counted according to the official estimates. Their location tends to offer a reliable guide on centers of industrial production in the USSR (see map on page 210).


## PRESENT INTERNAL POLITICAL STRUCTURE

The Revolution of 1917 proclaimed "a socialist state of workers and peasants," where "all power in the USSR belongs to the working people of town and country as represented by the Soviets of Working People's Deputies."<sup>11</sup> The Supreme Soviet at present is the highest organ of the state and con-

<sup>10</sup> "Bevölkerungsverschiebungen," *Ost Europa*, IV (April, 1954), 118-24. To the total urban population just given should be added the people of the workers' settlements (*rabotschiye posselki*), which are often outside the city limits and therefore not included in the above figures. *The National Economy of the U.S.S.R.*, pp. 1, 10, gives this figure as 43.4 per cent but includes workers' settlements, resort settlements, and such like.

<sup>11</sup> As incorporated in the basic constitution of 1924. The present political structure is contained in the constitution of 1936.

## MAJOR CITIES OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS



sists of the Council of the Union and the Council of Nationalities representing all the people. The Council of Ministers, appointed by the Supreme Soviet, stands at the top of the administrative apparatus of government. Each of the republics follows a similar organization. In practice Communist party leaders wield power and exercise political authority through the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist party.<sup>12</sup> From all reports the members of


the Presidium of the party are now collectively the real rulers of the USSR. In a general way this basic structure is the one on which the Soviet government operates.

**ADMINISTRATIVE SUBDIVISIONS**—Two basic principles have been observed in the governmental structure ever since the original constitution was adopted: first, a certain degree of autonomy for separate ethnic groupings, but under the aegis of the all-union political structure; and, second, a constantly changing administrative organization based on economic necessities and political expediencies.

The principle of "national autonomy" accounts for the existence of the union republics (see map on page 211). In the Soviet

<sup>12</sup> Stalin has stated the party function in clear language: "The Party verifies the work of the organs of government and organs of authority" and attempts to guarantee them the support of the masses. Quoted from Andrei Y. Vishinsky, *The Law of the Soviet State* (Macmillan, 1948), p. 160.





Union the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic are the two largest in population and were also the first republics organized in 1917.<sup>18</sup> Each of the republics in essence duplicates the structure of the two major units, with variations to conform to local peculiarities (see table on page 212). The administrative subdivisions below the level of the republic are arranged in a descending order from territories (*Krai*) to provinces (*Oblast*), to autonomous regions (*Okrug*), to county (*Rayon*), down to the local units (city, town, village). As individual union republics of considerable size and complexity were formed, plans were simultaneously made to reorganize the administrative units at the union level. Progress toward centralization and stability is seen in the strengthening of the powers

of the central government over a vast and complicated federal structure. The desire for stability has accounted, in part, for the constant remodeling of internal boundaries. The size of an administrative division is determined by the size of the area needed to make a minimum contribution to the total economic needs of the union. For example, a given area which becomes a commercial or industrial center, or one in which new mines are opened—in short, an area that attains a degree of self-sufficiency, would thereby become eligible to form an administrative district. Moreover, as a locality grows, its administrative structure also changes. The economic administrative divisions serve, therefore, as an excellent guide to the changing economic geography of the USSR.

#### THE SOVIET ECONOMY

The Soviet government brought to Russia new economic ideas, among which was that of complete nationalization of all land and

<sup>18</sup> In 1936 the republics numbered eleven; from territory newly acquired in 1940–45 five new republics were created. One of the newly created republics was abolished in 1956.

its mineral resources. In fact, state control was put into effect in all phases of the economy, including foreign trade. All agricultural and industrial activities were centrally directed by the state. Economic planning is, then, the essence of the over-all Soviet economy.

planning served to increase industrial output. In agricultural output, however, the collectivization program did not work so well. As a result of the deportation of the more prosperous peasants (*kulaks*) and the enforced slaughter of cattle, there was, early in the 1930's, a catastrophic drop in agri-

Union Republics of the USSR with Area and Population, 1956

	Area		Population		Capital	
	Thousand Kilometers	Per Cent	Millions (est.)	Per Cent	(with estimated popu- lation in thousands)	
Russian SFSR	16,901	74.3	112.2	54.3	Moscow	4,389 <sup>a</sup>
Ukrainian SSR	601	5.3	40.6	20.3	Kiev	2,814
Byelorussian SSR	208	0.9	8.0	4.0	Minsk	412
Kazakh SSR	2,766	12.2	8.5	4.3	Alma-Ata	330
Uzbek SSR	399	1.7	7.3	3.8	Tashkent	778
Georgian SSR	72	0.3	4.0	2.0	Tiflis	635
Azerbaijani SSR	87	0.4	3.4	1.7	Baku	901 <sup>a</sup>
Lithuanian SSR	65	0.3	2.7	1.3	Wilno	200
Moldavian SSR	34	0.1	2.7	1.4	Kishinev	190
Latvian SSR	64	0.3	2.0	1.0	Riga	565
Kirghiz SSR	198	0.8	1.9	1.0	Frunze	190
Tadzhik SSR	142	0.6	1.8	0.9	Stalinabad	191
Armenian SSR	30	0.1	1.6	0.8	Yerevan	385
Turkmen SSR	488	2.2	1.4	0.7	Ashkabad	142
Estonian SSR	45	0.2	1.1	1.0	Tallin	257
Karelo-Finnish SSR <sup>b</sup>	173	0.6	0.6	0.3	Petrozavodsk	118
Total USSR	22,403	100.0	200.2	100.0	Moscow	

SOURCE: Central Statistical Administration, Council of Ministers, USSR, *The National Economy of the USSR* (State Statistical Publishing House, Moscow, 1956), pp 2, 6, 9. (All figures are official estimates of beginning 1956.)

<sup>a</sup> Excluding the suburbs.

<sup>b</sup> Abolished as SSR July, 1956

The years since the Revolution have seen a number of economic experiments and adjustments in long-range planning. The harshness of nationalization during the war years (1917-20), combined with the ravages of war, resulted in the adoption of the New Economic Policy (NEP), which was in effect from 1921 to 1927; this was, in fact, a partial return to free enterprise. Large-scale food requisitions, increasing inflation, and a shortage of raw materials were common in the 1920's and again after the first Five Year Plan had been in effect. This first venture in strict governmental control and long-range

cultural production and famine conditions prevailed in 1931-32. The situation worsened when, during World War II, the Germans devastated Russia's most heavily industrialized and prime farming areas, and another crisis ensued. However, the mass transfer of industrial plants to the Urals and beyond, the uninterrupted and increased production in Asiatic Russia, and aid from the United States and Britain all combined to enable Russia to maintain her strength and to stem the German invasion. The following brief survey of Russia's economy at mid-century should suffice for an evaluation of

the accomplishments of the USSR and a fair estimate of both her strength and her weaknesses.

**ECONOMIC PLANNING**—Soviet economy operates under the National Economic Plan, which is a central coordinating mechanism. All phases of the national economy are outlined in this plan—the various production goals, the allocation and utilization of all resources, investments, the size and direction of foreign and internal trade, banking transactions, and the annual government budget. In short, all economic activity and reciprocal relations of people of the USSR are blueprinted in the national plans.

This over-all plan consists, in reality, of hundreds of individual plans giving directives both for the national economy as a whole and for its various components and for each separate enterprise; moreover, it adapts these directions to meet conditions in each sector and region of the country. Plans are prepared quarterly, annually, and biennially for periods of five years or more. Best known to outsiders are the widely publicized Five-Year Plans set in operation to ensure future economic expansion in all major areas. All plans are approved by the Supreme Soviet for a full period of time, but generally are kept flexible enough to permit changes during their operation—changes dictated by Soviet foreign or domestic policies.

**SOVIET AGRICULTURE**—Agriculture in Imperial Russia until the year 1861 was characterized by serfdom and feudalism. In that year the serfs were partially freed; and later, by the reforms of 1906, other changes were made in the status of the peasants. Nevertheless, at the time of the Revolution, 1917, nearly two thirds of the land was still owned by the nobility, the churches, and large landowners; the rest, by some 10,000,000 poor peasants. The agricultural heartland lay west of the Urals, where the rural in-

habitants specialized in cash crops which, however, gave them but little return. With the nationalization of all land by the USSR government and the inauguration of a central plan outlining production goals and labor productivity, basic changes were introduced into the agricultural pattern, and there followed a period of experimentation and unrest—with declining output. But the real agricultural revolution did not start until 1930 when collectivization forced most peasants into collective-farm settlements, and individually owned farms almost completely disappeared.

**Organization.** In the USSR there are three types of farms: (1) the collective farm (*kolkhoz*), (2) state farms (*sovkhos*); and (3) private gardens. The collective farm is the most common and the most important, inasmuch as it is responsible for the largest agricultural output. The 1956 official estimates revealed 87,500 farms in the USSR. Members of the collective farm are obliged to work between 100 and 200 days for the *kolkhoz*; during the rest of the year they are permitted to tend their own garden plots. The government sets production quotas for the farms and buys the produce for cash.<sup>14</sup>

One of the chief complaints of the farm laborers—and a reason for low productivity—is the low prices the government pays to the peasants. After all expenses, including taxes, are paid, surplus products and cash are distributed to the members of the *kolkhoz* according to the number of man-hours and type of work contributed by each individual. Recent complaints by government officials indicate their belief that the members devote too much time to their own plots.

The state farms (*sovkhos*) serve as experimental or model farms; they employ peasants on a straight piece or time basis.

<sup>14</sup> Recent reports speak of greater decentralization, with a corresponding increase in local initiative.

New Land Developments in the USSR

Region	State of Development	Area (in sq mi)	Type of Development
Kazakh SSR <sup>a</sup>	In progress	10,937	By plough
Volga Valley, <sup>b</sup> Urals, Siberia	In progress	20,312	By plough
Central Russia <sup>c</sup>	Plan of 1947	2,500	By irrigation
Southern Ukraine <sup>d</sup>	In progress	8,125	By irrigation
Lower Volga Valley <sup>d</sup>	In progress	6,800	By irrigation
Volga-Ural <sup>d</sup>	Planned	22,656	By irrigation
Turkmenian Republic	Planned	5,078	By irrigation

<sup>a</sup> *New York Times*, May 17, 1955.

<sup>b</sup> *New York Times*, Feb. 14, 1954.

<sup>c</sup> *New York Herald Tribune*, Aug. 18, 1947.

<sup>d</sup> G. B. Cressey, "Changing the Map of the Soviet Union," *Economic Geography*, XXIX (July 1953), 203-4.

Most of these *sovkhosy* are under the direction of the Ministry of State Farms, they are larger than the average *kolkhoz*, but their number is restricted. Their importance in the USSR economy is great, and recent available figures credit them with roughly ten per cent of the sown area of the USSR. *Sovkhosy* have their own tractors, but the *kolkhoz* receive their machinery from special machine-tractor stations (MST), 9,000 of which in 1955 were strategically located about the country. The importance of these MST stations is manifest, for the *kolkhoz* are dependent upon the prompt and exact work done by the machines supplied by these stations. The stations also serve as the control mechanism over the output of the *kolkhoz*. Criticism leveled against the MST deals largely with the high percentage of tractors under repair at a given time and the resultant delays in the farm work.

The third farm type—the private gardens—comprises less than 1.5 per cent of the total agricultural lands; they are important, however, for these one- or two-acre plots permit the peasants to augment their cash income by sales in the open city markets.

The goals of the USSR planning for agriculture have been twofold: increased acreage and higher yields. Expansion of the crop area is receiving constant attention. The introduction of mineral fertilizers and of

drought-resistant and quick-maturing types of grain, conservation of soil, and large-scale irrigation projects have all been strongly encouraged and to some extent have proved quite successful over the years. As stated earlier, however, the short growing season, the small agricultural heartland, extreme continentality, and insufficient precipitation are limiting factors which even with the most perfect plan can be little influenced by man.<sup>15</sup> It should be added that the resistance of the peasants to complete state dominance is an ever-continuing problem.

*Regional Distribution.* Various factors, such as cold, aridity, mountain areas, and swamps, limit the amount of arable land in the USSR to only six per cent of the country. Even optimum lands have highly variable crop yields and a small range of crops.<sup>16</sup> Rich chernozem soils run in a broad zone along the southeastern portion of the "fertile tri-

<sup>15</sup> Chauncy D. Harris, "Growing Food by Decree in Soviet Russia," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXIII (January, 1955), 268-81.

<sup>16</sup> The USSR has no long, warm growing season with sufficient precipitation comparable to that in the United States Corn and Cotton Belts. Even the "fertile triangle" described by Harris (*loc. cit.*, *supra*, page 271) has "cool continental semiarid climate similar to that of the spring wheat region of the Prairie Provinces of Canada and the Dakotas of the United States."

angle," but sparse and unpredictable rainfall hampers their productivity (see table on page 214).

Wheat is the leading grain in acres used, followed by rye, oats, and barley (see table on this page). Some corn is grown in the Ukraine, Bessarabia, and the Caucasus, rice is cultivated in southern Azerbaidzhan, southern Kazakhstan, and the Far East. Sugar beets are most prevalent in the western Ukraine and the adjoining chernozem

Transcaucasia and near the Black Sea tea, grapes for wine, citrus fruits, and tobacco are grown. All in all, agricultural commodities in great variety are widely produced in the USSR, but the total farm output in 1949 had hardly increased over the prewar level. In world production the USSR ranks second only to the United States. Still the vagaries of climate and governmental policies combine to make agriculture the stepchild of the Soviet economy.

Agriculture in the USSR  
(In Millions of Metric Tons)

	1928	1940	1946	1950	1955	1960 Plan
All grains	73	119	(57) <sup>a</sup>	125	129	180
Wheat	21	—	—	30	—	—
Potatoes	46	72	(40) <sup>a</sup>	87	—	—
Unginned cotton	0.8	2.7	1.2	3.8	3.68	5.74
Flax fiber	0.3	0.6	(0.2) <sup>a</sup>	(0.8) <sup>a</sup>	1.07	1.44
Sunflower seed	2.1	3.3	(1.6) <sup>a</sup>	3.1	5.8	8.9
Sugar beets	10.1	21	(7)	23	31.4	48.4
Cattle (1916-61)	71	55	47	57	67 <sup>b</sup>	—
Hogs (1916-21)	26	28	10	24	36 <sup>b</sup>	—
Sheep and goats (1916-21)	146	42	69	99	159 <sup>b</sup>	—
Horses (1916-36)	—	20	11	14	15 <sup>b</sup>	—
Weighted index farm production	100	116	(80) <sup>a</sup>	125	—	—

SOURCE: Research and Planning Division, Economic Commission for Europe, *Economic Survey of Europe Since the War* (Geneva: United Nations, 1953), p. 45. Research and Planning Division, Economic Commission for Europe, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1954* (Geneva: United Nations, 1955), p. 78. Demetri B. Shimkin, "Russia's Industrial Expansion," *Fortune*, XLIII (May, 1951), 106-11. Harry Schwartz, *Russia's Soviet Economy* (Prentice-Hall, 1950), p. 321. "Sixth Five-Year Plan," from *The New York Times*, Jan. 19, 1956, and other issues.

Attention should be called to the method of calculation used by the Soviet Union. No allowance is made for the large grain losses which occur during the period of gathering and transportation of crops to mills and storage bins. Also official Soviet statistics deliberately leave the size of the harvest vague.

<sup>a</sup> Figures in parentheses are estimated.

<sup>b</sup> Original 1955 plan.

areas of Russian SFSR, but it is also common in western Siberia, Kazakh, and Kirghiz. Fiber flax is an important crop in northwestern European USSR, hemp in Orel and the Bryansk *oblast*, and also in the middle Volga area. Irrigation in the arid regions is resulting in an increased production of cotton. In subtropical regions of

MINERAL RESOURCES AND INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION—In the industrial sector the accomplishments of the Soviet economy have in many ways been outstanding in comparison with its achievement in the agricultural sector. As late as the 1920's the USSR was mainly an agricultural country; there was relatively little industrialization, and its important

## Production of Basic Materials in the USSR

	1928	1939/40	1946	1953	1955	Actual 1955	Plan 1960
<b>Primary Industries</b>							
Coal, incl lignite, mill. mt	33	166	133	390 <sup>a</sup>	372	391	593
Petroleum,						70 8	135
incl nat. gas, mill. mt.	11 4	31	24	53 <sup>a</sup>	70	13 9	40
Pig iron, mill. mt.	3 3	15	13	30 <sup>a</sup>	34	33	53
Steel, mill. mt.	4 3	18		41 <sup>a</sup>	45	45	68
Rolled steel, mill. mt.	3.4	13		32 <sup>a</sup>	34	35	53
Manganese, mill. mt.		0.3	1	4 <sup>b</sup>			
Electric power, bill. kwh.	5	48	47	131	165	170	320
Cement, mill. mt	2	6	4	16	23	22 4	55
Fertilizers, mill. mt.	0.3	3	1	6	10	10	19 6
<b>Miscellaneous Raw Materials</b>							
Copper ore, mill. mt.	19	91	(124) <sup>c</sup>	(292) <sup>c</sup>	486		
Nickel, mill. mt.		2	(13) <sup>c</sup>	(25) <sup>c,d</sup>			
Bauxite, mill. mt	0	577	761	(600) <sup>c,d</sup>			
Lead ore, mill. mt	2	63	(52) <sup>c</sup>	150 <sup>d</sup>	405		
Zinc ore, mill. mt.	2	65	(56) <sup>c</sup>	170 <sup>d</sup>	425		
<b>Machinery &amp; Equipment</b>							
Automotive vehicles, thous.				397 <sup>d</sup>		445	650
Trucks, thous.				369 <sup>d</sup>			
Passenger cars, thous.				28 <sup>d</sup>		1.7	2 8
Tractors (in terms of 15-hp. equiv.), thous.		684		1,390	200	163	322
Combines, grain, thous.		182		350		47 9	140
Machine tools, thous		38		83 <sup>b</sup>	105	117 8	200
Freight cars, thous.				117 <sup>d</sup>		34.4	52
Steam turb., thous. kw.		1,447		4,064		4,100	10,500
Metallurgic equipment, thous. mt.				133 <sup>d</sup>		172	280
<b>Locomotives</b>							
Steam, number				2,200			
Diesel, number				300		136	1,630
Freight cars, thous		662		909 <sup>d</sup>			
<b>Timber, cut in round wood, mill.     m.<sup>a</sup></b>							
	(54) <sup>c</sup>	119	79	162 <sup>d</sup>	253	197	264

SOURCE: Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress, *Trends in Economic Growth* (U S. Government Printing Office, 1955), pp. 132, 262. Harry Schwartz, *Russia's Soviet Economy* (Prentice-Hall, 1950), pp. 200-54. "Soviet Publishes Wide Statistics," *New York Times*, June 7, 1956. Various Soviet publications, 1956. Abraham Bergson (ed.), *Soviet Economic Growth* (Row, Peterson, 1953), pp. 163-89. R. L. Somon, "Industries," *Ost-Europa*, II (December, 1952), 438; V (July, 1955), 212.

<sup>a</sup> 1954. <sup>b</sup> 1951. <sup>c</sup> Figures in parentheses are estimated. <sup>d</sup> 1950.

mineral resources had hardly been touched. Today the USSR is one of the world's largest producers of industrial goods, and production is constantly rising. The basic aim of the regime as stated in the 1920's, namely, to "transform the agrarian state as quickly

as possible into an industrial power" has obviously been attained (see table above).

*Planning and Organization.* Production in the USSR is carried on by three types of enterprises: (1) state-owned establishments;

(2) cooperatives; and (3) private enterprises, that is, those in which a few individual craftsmen work independently. State mines and factories produce most of the goods for industrial use, cooperatives produce most of the consumer goods. The various ministries supervise industrial production, but in the last analysis the Presidium of the party's Central Committee has the final word. The Central Statistical Administration, the State Planning Committee, the State Committee on Construction Affairs, and many others are organs of planning and supervision. Some USSR industries are tremendous in size, and sixty-four per cent of the industrial workers are employed in plants having 1,000 or more employees each. These large plants are the more effective because they have the advantages of increased mechanization, better state control, greater utilization of their by-products, and reduced production costs. Disadvantages are that they take time for construction, may require unusually long hauls to market their products, and are strategically much more vulnerable. The so-called *kombinat*, or combine, is the most common among these large enterprises; it may produce several different commodities that depend on the same basic raw materials, or it may concentrate on a single commodity from the raw material stage to the finished product.

Harris<sup>17</sup> discusses the special conditions that made possible the rapid progress in industrialization. Briefly they are (1) borrowing in some cases of Western engineering skills and technical know-how in order to obviate a long period of experimentation; (2) complete governmental planning powers and the allocation of two thirds of all investments to heavy industry; (3) the subordination of both agriculture and the production of consumer goods to heavy industry, that is, the latter is given priority in the

allocation of capital and raw materials, and (4) existence of large reserves of all important raw materials. Perhaps there should be added to this list the tremendous human resources of the country and their willingness to make sacrifices.

*Raw Materials.* The great increase in industrial production has largely resulted from the spectacular increase in the production of key raw materials. The large reserves of these raw materials assures the USSR ample supplies for a long time to come; but although reserves are ample, their distribution is very uneven and the difficulties and costs of rail transportation constitute the Achilles' heel in Russia's general industrial progress.

Generalizing, the following major areas of mineral resources can be distinguished: (1) *Northeastern European Russia* produces coal (Pechora-Vorkuta), petroleum (near Ukhta), natural gas, asphalt rock, iron ore, timber, and water power. This area was developed largely during and following World War II. (2) In the *Kola Peninsula* are concentrated the deposits of nickel, copper, apatite, potash, and a number of rare minerals such as titanium, vanadium, and molybdenum. (3) The area of *Leningrad and Karelia* is characterized by timber, bauxite, oil shale, marble, a strong water-power potential, and an abundance of peat, which has played an important role as fuel for thermal power plants since modern processes of peat extraction, dehydration, and transportation enhanced its use. (4) The *industrial center*, which includes Moscow, Yaroslavl, Ivanovo, and Tula, has peat and lignite, iron-ore deposits of inferior quality, and, near Tula, some phosphorites. (5) The *Ukraine*, especially the area between the Dnieper Bend and the Don, known as the *Donbas*, is the original core for industrial production in Russia. Coal, iron, manganese, mercury, and salt deposits, together with important water-power sites and the

<sup>17</sup> Chauncy D. Harris, "U.S.S.R. Resources: I—Heavy Industry," *Focus*, V (February, 1955).


petroleum fields of the Carpathian foothills, make this the richest raw-material region of the Soviet Union. (6) The eastern and western *Urals* play a vital role in supplying raw materials. In this broad area iron, manganese, gold, copper, bauxite, chromite, nickel, and many other minerals are found in abundance; but there is no coal. (7) The *northern Caucasus* has petroleum, lead, zinc, and numerous nonferrous metals. Nearby *Transcaucasia* is rich in petroleum (Baku), manganese (Chiatura), coal (Tkvarcheli), iron ore (Dashkesan), and nonferrous metals and gold. (8) *Kazakhstan* contains coal, iron ore, copper, silver, chrome, nickel, manganese, tin, lead, zinc, petroleum, antimony, and bauxite. The copper reserves in this area are among the largest in the Soviet Union and the Ural-Emba petroleum fields and Karaganda coal basin are two of the largest sources of fuel in the USSR. (9) The *Kuznetsk Basin* (Kuzbas) in Western Siberia saw its first development during the first Five-Year Plan. Coal deposits, much of coking quality, with known reserves of more than 500,000,000,000 tons are five times larger than those of the Donbas. Iron ore, manganese, zinc, lead, and gold supplement coal to make this concentration one of the richest in the USSR. As in many other interior regions, the Kuzbas area was greatly stimulated during World War II. (10) The *Soviet Far East* has known deposits of coal, iron, tin, gold, and petroleum (on Sakhalin Island), but only a portion of these reserves has been exploited or even surveyed.

Many other isolated regions, especially in the Asiatic part of the USSR, have important mineral resources, especially coal, nickel, tin, and tungsten. The Tunguska Plateau, Central Asia, and in the extreme east the areas between the Lena River and the Sea of Okhotsk are rich in minerals, but they lack transportation.

*Expansion of Industry* Two major principles have determined the location of industry in the USSR. First, industrial centers should be close to raw materials as well as readily accessible to consumers. Second, each major unit and subdivision should develop its own speciality, but at the same time it should try to attain a high degree of self-sufficiency in industrial production. During the last twenty-six years Soviet industry has increased the number of items which can be produced and also has kept up to date on new technical processes. Of special significance has been emphasis on new developments toward the east, in and beyond the Urals. World War II accelerated this migration to the east. Over 1,300 large plants, one fourth of them from Leningrad and Moscow, were shipped east. Of these, 455 were moved to the Urals, 250 to Turkestan, and 210 into Western Siberia. New industries were established in the southern Urals, the southern irrigated valleys of Central Asia, and several widely separated areas of Siberia. Only a small fraction of the people returned to European Russia after World War II, and very few plants were relocated there.

Postwar developments were concentrated upon the repair of war damages—a task largely completed by 1950—and upon giving regional emphasis to several new local schemes, without changing the basic development pattern. The central industrial region and the Ukraine still remain the economic pulse of the Soviet Union, but the Urals, Western Siberia, and Kazakhstan have increased significantly in importance (see map on page 219). In contrast the Caucasus regions and northwest Russia have proportionately declined in production, with the newly acquired lands on the Baltic—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—appearing to be the poorest on a per capita basis. Some headway is being made in developing northern Russia, the interior of Siberia, and the





far eastern regions, but the surfaces of these areas have hardly been scratched, for together they account for less than one twentieth of the total national production.

Regions of future industrial development, based on *known* mineral resources, water and timber supply, labor supply, agricultural and transportation potentials, will be briefly summarized. (1) The European border area, encompassed by the western frontier and, on the east, by a line passing through Leningrad, Moscow, Kiev, and Odessa, now inhabited by close to one fourth of the Soviet Union's population—this region includes most of the newly acquired territories and for military reasons has not been given a high priority for industrial investments. (2) Siberian regions, such as Stalinabad-Termes, Irkutsk, and Sretensk (with excellent hydroelectric power resources), Omsk, Barnaul-

Biysk, Chita (with food-producing possibilities), and the Khabarovsk and Vladivostok-Voroshilovsk region in the Far East (with a variety of raw materials). (3) The Transcaucasian region (with many minerals and hydroelectric power potentials). (4) Kola Peninsula and northern Russia (Kola iron with Vorkuta coal). The latter region especially will prosper if foreign trade should again grow to significant proportions.

**TRANSPORTATION**—Many geographic factors are involved in the problem of supplying the USSR with an adequate transportation system. (1) The very size of the country and the consequent long distances that separate sources of essential raw materials from industrial centers is a primary factor. It is reported that forty per cent of Soviet railroad freight is hauled over 1,300 miles and twenty per cent over 2,000 miles. (2) The

direction of flow of the major rivers and the fact that many of them are frozen for many months of the year is another important factor. In Siberia in particular rivers flow north or south, whereas the main flow of freight traffic is from east to west. (3) The absence of year-long open seas to the north has long been important. Coastwise traffic is of minor importance. (4) The fact that the USSR is without its own outlets to southern open seas must always be considered. (5) One geographical factor that is an advantage rather than a hindrance to transportation adequacy is the fact that the predominantly lowland surface of the country facilitates the building of railroads.

*Railways.* The development and building of rail lines in Russia was closely connected with the Imperial needs, namely, agriculture and the beginning of industrial production in the central core, exports of grain to Europe from a few key port cities, and political and military demands both toward the heart of Europe and toward the south and the east. Between 1917 and 1922, 36,000 miles of network, much of it damaged, were inherited by the Soviet regime. This mileage included the famous Trans-Siberian Railroad. The new Soviet government in the years following 1922 gave special attention to the improvement and enlargement of the rail system to meet the needs of growing industrialization. Additional lines were built, others were double-tracked, some were electrified, and short cuts and by-passes were built. New regions were connected with old ones; in this development the Urals, Western Siberia, and Central Asia received first priority. A network of 67,000 miles was available at the beginning of World War II; by 1955 even this mileage had doubled. Large-scale investments are needed and tremendous distances must be covered by new rail lines before new land can be opened up for agricultural and industrial use. At present the old industrial core has a dense rail network which

progressively thins out toward the Urals and the Caucasus. Toward the Far East the Trans-Siberian Railroad is now supplemented by several feeder lines and by a new parallel line in the recently developed regions of northern Kazakhstan and Western Siberia.

Many military lines were added during the war, among them the important lines from Omsk-Chelyabinsk-Irgiz to Stalingrad and the line from Gorki-Kirov-Kotlas to the petroleum fields of Ukhta and the coal mines of Vorkuta. Since one of the most important Soviet programs involves the opening up of new land, an increase in mining operation, and the building of new factories in the areas of northern Kazakhstan and Western Siberia, an ever greater increase in rail mileage is indicated. The new South Siberian Railroad, through Magnitogorsk, following the existing line to Akmolinsk, and then through the northern Kazakh steppes and the Kuznetsk Basin, is planned to meet the main Trans-Siberian line at Tayshet. This rail line will afford an outlet for, and contribute to the development of, the Bashkir mining area, the steel mills of Magnitogorsk, the newly ploughed steppes of Kazakhstan, the salt mines of Kulunda, the coal fields of Ekibastuz, and the iron and timber resources of Kuznetsk Ala-Tau. A 700-mile narrow-gauge system of feeder lines has been started in the steppes of Kazakhstan.

The main purpose of all the new lines is the carrying of freight; passenger traffic is of secondary importance. In fact, railways have for twenty-five years carried about five sixths of the country's freight.<sup>18</sup> Production of freight cars has top priority. On important main lines freight trains may follow each other at distances of less than a mile. To accelerate freight movements, the main

<sup>18</sup> In 1954 the distribution of freight volume in the Soviet Union among major carriers was 84.5 per cent by railways, 6.3 per cent by inland water transportation, 5.1 per cent by maritime shipping, 3.2 per cent by motor vehicle transportation, and less than one per cent by air.

lines now have multiple tracks, and the government is making every effort to avoid cross hauls and to reduce the length of journey required.

The wider gauge of the Soviet trains makes border changes necessary. International trans-service, except to satellite countries, is virtually nonexistent. The Turkish, Persian, and Armenian borders are reached by separate lines, but traffic is light and no connections exist from across the Persian border to the newly built direct connection from Peking via Ulan Bator in Outer Mongolia to Ulan Ude on the Trans-Siberian line. The Manchurian border is crossed at several points.

*Waterways.* Bulky commodities, such as lumber, coal, cement, and salt, are the chief items of freight transported on rivers in the USSR. River transportation, as we have seen, played an important part in the economy of Russia in her early history; it has declined in importance under the Soviets. Though the total length of waterways that are navigable for part of each year is 71,000 miles, only 6.3 per cent of the total commodity traffic in 1950 was handled by them, and of this nearly half was carried on the Volga or its tributaries. Even though this river flows through densely populated and important economic regions, the total annual freight carried on it is relatively low. Some of the major rivers flow through sparsely settled lands into the frozen seas of the Arctic Ocean and are, therefore, of negligible economic significance. Probably the greatest handicap to river transportation is the freezing of rivers for long periods each year. Moreover, the uncertainty of the water level creates a great disadvantage in the scheduling of cargo shipments.

The many new canals completed in the last twenty-seven years should permit an increase in freight traffic. Among the important canals are the White Sea-Baltic, the Moscow-Volga, and the recently completed

Volga-Don canal, which now permits direct traffic from the Black Sea to the White Sea, that is, the full length of European Russia. According to recent reports specially built freighters will be able to carry goods over this new strategic waterway system from Rostov on the Don to Belomorsk on the White Sea in from ten to sixteen days.

Maritime transportation plays but a small role in the economy of the USSR, since many of its ports are frozen from three to nine months each year and thus face the same problems as those confronting the river transportation system. Nevertheless, the age-old desire of Russia to become an important maritime power has recently received impetus with the acquisition of ice-free ports in former East Prussia.<sup>19</sup> Most of the Soviet maritime shipping is limited to coastwise traffic, for foreign commerce is at present unimportant. Domestic commerce by ship is largely limited to local traffic within five regions: (1) the Gulf of Finland and Baltic Sea, (2) the Black Sea, (3) the Caspian Sea, (4) maritime Siberia, and (5) the Arctic coast. In the case of the last-mentioned region, as much as possible is made of the short summer season, during which traffic is possible over the northern sea route in the Arctic Ocean between Murmansk in the Barents Sea and Anadyr and ports south in the Sea of Okhotsk and in intermediary ports. Major ports in the USSR are Leningrad, Riga, Odessa, Batum, Baku, Astrakhan, Vladivostok, Archangel, and Murmansk. In many instances port facilities have recently been enlarged, ship-building yards fully utilized, and several foreign ships acquired, all indicating increasing interest in maritime transport in the USSR, despite the fact that most of the

<sup>19</sup> Two well-known Russian specialists discuss this problem from two different points of view: Robert J. Kerner, *The Urge to the Sea* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1942); and John A. Morrison, "Russia and Warm Water," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, LXXVIII (November, 1952), 1169-79.

country's major settlements and the preponderant amount of raw materials are not located along the coast.

At present, the commercial fleet of the USSR consists of 3,000,000 tons of modernized vessels. However, close to half of this tonnage is used in inland seas and along the northern sea route and is made up of ice breakers, tankers, and other specialized vessels. The entire fleet is not sufficient to supply the USSR with all the goods it imports, even though her volume of foreign trade is very small indeed.

*Highways and Airways.* Only in European Russia is there a semblance of a highway network, and even here it is not at all well developed. Except in and near urban areas, only a few main routes are paved. In Asiatic Russia roads largely supplement river transport, serve railheads, or are built in the desert or on permanently frozen soil where construction and maintenance are easy. The small number of motor vehicles in the Soviet Union requires but few paved roads.

A commercial airways map of USSR looks impressive, with *Aeroflot*, the state-owned airline, covering the country with a system of routes that serve most of the important population centers and that also push out into the remote regions of the country where other types of transportation are difficult or nonexistent. In fact, the airplane has become an absolute necessity in remote areas in northern European Russia and Siberia. Nevertheless, schedule frequencies and civilian airport facilities lag considerably behind those found in Western Europe.

#### THE FUTURE: STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS

The picture of the present geographic and economic forces of the Soviet Union shows, on the whole, a tremendous improvement and a strengthening of the economy of the USSR since the introduction of the first

Five-Year Plan. This strength is expressed in (1) primary emphasis on expansion of production of basic materials and engineering products, (2) a greatly increased mineral output, especially in Asiatic Russia, with deficiencies only in certain nonferrous metals, (3) a steadily increasing national income with industrial production its largest contributor, (4) the broadening of the productive base of the USSR by developments in Western Siberia and in northern Kazakhstan and the Volga Valley, which connect existing economic regions of the Urals with the Kuznetsk and the Urals with the Ukraine. One third of the gross industrial production now comes from the area east of the Volga River, (5) the opening up of new lands for the production of food for a rapidly increasing population, (6) manpower available for industries, increasing at the rate of 1,000,000 to 2,000,000 a year, with urban population growing at a rate of four per cent per annum (see table on page 223), and (7) less dependence on foreign goods and technological know-how. Based on the resource factors, the position of the USSR has obviously improved since the early 1920's.

On the other hand, the constant emphasis on production in heavy industry, especially war material, on the upkeep of large armed forces, and on the strict regimentation and curtailment of legitimate needs of its people has obviously strained the economy of the USSR. Recurrent statements by Soviet leaders reveal that they recognize this strain; they point to a large degree of defective production, to low labor efficiency, to an unusually large turnover in labor, managerial, and engineering personnel, and to deficiencies in food and livestock production. From the point of view of the USSR a breathing spell in the cold war was not only desirable; it was practically imperative. Stalin emphasized the government's intentions to move quickly and decisively in a power vacuum but to proclaim its peaceful

intentions whenever a condition of strength in the capitalistic countries of the world made quick and decisive moves on the part of the USSR impossible or too risky.

Basically, then, the USSR is a rich country, with the countries of the satellite area

in respect to (1) food production—too small a proportion of arable land to feed a rapidly growing population and to (2) transportation—too vast an area to be served despite the great improvements that have been made in railways and canals. The very size of the

Manpower in the USSR  
(In Millions)

	1928	1940	1946	1950	1954
Population	(152) <sup>a</sup>	(196) <sup>a,b</sup>	(191) <sup>a</sup>	(210) <sup>a</sup>	(216) <sup>a,b</sup>
Armed forces	0.6	4.5	(10) <sup>a</sup>	4.5	(4) <sup>a</sup>
Men, aged 15–59 in agriculture, forestry, and fishing	34.1	32.4	(28.5) <sup>a</sup>	(34.5) <sup>a</sup>	(35) <sup>a</sup>
Civilian nonfarm					
Labor force	9.6	(26.4) <sup>a</sup>	(28.2) <sup>a</sup>	(35.2) <sup>a</sup>	(37.4) <sup>a</sup>
Urban population, per cent	17	31		(37) <sup>a</sup>	38

SOURCE: Demetri B. Shumkin, "Russia's Industrial Expansion," *Fortune*, XLIII (May, 1951), 106–11. Research and Planning Division, Economic Commission for Europe, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1954* (Geneva: United Nations, 1955), pp. 64–78.

<sup>a</sup> Figures in parentheses are estimated.

<sup>b</sup> The recently published official statistical summary gives entirely different figures: Central Statistical Administration, *The National Economy of the USSR* (Moscow: State Statistical Publishing House, 1956). The 1940 estimate is given for total population as 191,700,000 and April, 1956, as 200,200,000. Percentage of urban population is given as 43.4 (87,000,000 people in 1956).

contributing to her strength.<sup>20</sup> As a producer of industrial goods, it now equals the total output of Western Europe, although it by no means has matched the productive output of the United States. Its growing industrial strength is, moreover, challenged by certain limitations of geographic nature. These limitations are especially noteworthy

state, including multi-national groups, has created special problems at the administrative level in reconciling local requirements with the standards set by the government.

Fear of a hostile world—whether or not that fear be justified—has caused the USSR to be keenly conscious of the need to build up its national security. To that end the government has organized buffer states, made herculean efforts to add to their economic strength, and labored incessantly to create disunity among non-Communist nations. These are the pillars of the USSR foreign policy (which will be discussed in the following chapter).

<sup>20</sup> For an evaluation of the contributions of the countries of the "shatter-belt" see George W. Hoffman, "The Shatter-Belt in Relation to the East-West Conflict," *The Journal of Geography*, XI (October, 1952), 265–75, also a very valuable congressional study, The Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress, *Trends in Economic Growth, A Comparison of the Western Powers and the Soviet Bloc* (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955).

### Study Questions

1. Name factors of geographic limitation within the Soviet Union.
2. What are the main national ethnic groups of the Soviet Union?
3. Draw a sketch map and indicate the main centers of the Greek Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and Moslem religions.
4. Note the similarities in the eastward expansion of the Soviet Union and the westward expansion of the United States.
5. What effect did the Tatar invasion have upon the Russian state?
6. Name the main vegetation zones in the USSR.
7. Name the main concentrations of mineral resources and list the most important minerals in each area.
8. Why is national planning of so great importance in the Soviet economy?
9. List the chief territorial gains of the USSR since 1917.
10. Describe the location and resources of the autonomous republics of the USSR.
11. Describe the limitations to further agricultural expansion in the USSR.
12. What is meant by "regional self-sufficiency"?
13. Explain the reasons why water transport plays such an insignificant role in the overall transportation picture of the Soviet Union.
14. List and explain the geographic factors of Russian strength and weakness.
15. Sketch the eastward migration in the Soviet Union since 1917 and give reasons for it

## CHAPTER FOURTEEN

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# *The Position of the USSR in World Affairs*

An earlier chapter discussed the United States as a nation which by virtue of its power holds a position of major importance in international relations; in this chapter we shall examine the USSR to determine why it alone of all other nations is in a competitive position with the United States.<sup>1</sup> The inevitable contest for power between these two giants is attributable to their conflicting ideologies and social philosophies as well as to their distinctive and opposite strategic and geographical positions. These two major states face each other across other states which are waning, both absolutely and relatively, in power—states that heretofore have made primary decisions in world politics. These latter states, with their power of in-

dependent decision making greatly reduced and without sufficient weight for a balance-of-power policy, must seek alignment with one or the other of the two superstates. It is certain that the compelling realities of geography and politics would in any event have moved the lesser states toward this position of dependence. Power based upon the great advantages of geographical size and location and enhanced by all the achievements attendant upon an advanced technology compels recognition; ideology provides the explanations and the rationalizations of alignments which power realities make finally certain.

The very location of the USSR in a position of dominance over the center of the major continent Eurasia, complemented by the strength that comes with the application of modern technology, assigns to that state a predominant power role of hemispheric and global magnitude. Add to this the fac-

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<sup>1</sup> See George B. Cressey, *How Strong Is Russia?* (Syracuse University Press, 1954), *passim*, for an admonition to avoid exaggeration of the present or future strength of the Soviet base.

tor of ideology, which dramatically promises the leading role in the Marxian revolution to the USSR, and the result is a unique and overriding power position. With respect to other geographic factors the position of the Soviet Union is enhanced rather than weakened and in all cases strongly influenced. The elongated shape of the Soviet political area and its great size provide a vast hinterland relatively safe from exterior attack. Moreover, power relations being what they are today, in any conceivable conflict between nations the USSR would enjoy mainly interior lines of communication. It is true that the relief of the land of the USSR, especially the absence of natural frontiers along the borders facing strong neighbors in the west, does not deter potential invaders—rather, it invites attack, but the great distances, the rigorous mid-continent climate, and the difficulties of transportation make the project of a military assault against the USSR through Eastern Europe a most hazardous, if not an impossible, undertaking. The areas relatively accessible from the West are the most important from the standpoint of population density and agricultural usability, and an invasion plan may appear to promise early and easy conquest of critically important components of Soviet power; but these opportunities must be weighed against the disadvantage to an invader inherent in the vast continentality of the Soviet land and the vigorous capacity of the Russian people for defense.

Except in the west, the land is guarded by natural barriers of water, desert, or mountains. From the standpoint of security these barriers are an advantage, but they also present disadvantages, for the outside world becomes relatively difficult of access for commerce or, even more important, for the exchange of ideas. A Soviet parochialism is the natural product, which, while it may be accompanied by a resultant cohesion of the peoples, denies to government and people alike the opportunity properly to know and

evaluate the forces of power outside the country. The isolation of the USSR in the vast reaches of Eurasia presents great obstacles for Soviet governmental and engineering skills. The very size of this state creates unusual and most difficult problems. Climate and topography are similarly ambivalent in their significance.<sup>2</sup>

The factors mentioned above place limits on the power of the USSR to exploit certain other natural advantages which she actually possesses. No nation possesses a greater self-sufficiency of resources, especially of minerals, although this fact should be viewed in proper perspective; ~~and~~ great advantages in pursuing goals in ~~international~~ relations derive from this fact. But even the USSR is not fully self-sufficient, nor are all its resources, minerals in particular, of high quality or easily accessible. In the power-political picture, therefore, the limits as well as the extent of Soviet power with respect to these factors must be emphasized. A remarkable effort has been made by the USSR during the past twenty-five years to develop its industry and economy through exploitation of its resources. Nevertheless, definite limitations on resources and, therefore, on economic development still pose major problems for the Soviet government. The question arises as to how deficiencies should be remedied. International trade may be the answer preferred. Direct aggression has been employed to add lands rich in needed resources to the Soviet state; acquisition of new resources may also be achieved through the exploitation of satellite states drawn into the Soviet orbit by geographic opportunism and the presence of a Red army.

Other factors and components in the Soviet power equation are the nature and the quality of transportation and communication facilities. The geography of the state

<sup>2</sup> See George B. Cressey, *The Basis of Soviet Strength* (McGraw-Hill, 1945), pp. 230-45.



is most important in conditioning these factors, so important in defense and in the exploitation of the home base. The size of the population, its quality, and its potential for growth are similarly important.<sup>3</sup> The ethnic factor likewise must not be overlooked. Peoples and races do possess diverse distinguishing qualities, in particular those which environment and experience have produced and are producing. Some observers have commented on the remarkable ethos of the Russian people. All these factors must be taken into consideration eventually in any study of the problem of survival. The Soviet peoples seem to be well conditioned to survive the rigors of life on their vast land.

#### PRE-SOVIET POLICY

Despite the far-reaching significance of the Russian Revolution in modern world history, it would be an error to assume that the USSR in its present international position can be considered apart from the pre-Soviet past. The caprice and arbitrary habit of the Czarist autocracy could not insulate it from the same influences that—in some instances enhanced and in others diminished—today exert pressure upon the USSR. A study of the growth and territorial expansion of the Russian state reveals underlying physical stimuli to that growth and expansion and also discloses basic historic trends that are present today as factors in the nation's international position (see map on page 229).

**EXPANSIONIST DRIVES—*Toward the Baltic.*** The Swedes remained dominant in the Baltic until Peter the Great was finally able to defeat them and by the Treaty of Nystadt (1721) establish a Russo-Finnish border practically the same as the one established following the Russo-Finnish War in 1940.

This treaty, by which Russia gained Ingria, Estonia, Livonia, and part of Karelia, gave her access to the Baltic, which she retained until 1918 when all these territories except Ingria were lost. For almost a century after 1721 the basic conflict with Sweden continued, but the Russian conquest of Finland in 1809 forced Sweden to recognize the permanency of Russian power in the Baltic area.

***Toward Central Europe.*** In the eighteenth century Russian power began to creep westward toward Central Europe. Poland more and more was forced to accept Russian political influence although the impact of Polish, and therefore European, culture on Russia was increased. The three partitions of Poland in the latter part of the century brought Poles and western Russians alike under the control of the Russian government and in turn brought Russian power into the heart of Europe. Thus, Russian influence upon Polish social relationships long antedates the Soviet period. As a modern medium of Russian penetration or intrusion into Central Europe, Poland is again playing an old role.

***Toward the Balkans and the Straits.*** Since the spread of the Slavs into the Balkan peninsula in the seventh century, the Russians have been racially related to many Balkan peoples and have developed traditions of policy which remain important today. The Russian drive toward the Balkans is closely related to the one toward the sea through the Straits. Conflicts among European powers to control the strategic waterway have for three centuries greatly influenced European history. Turkey, for hundreds of years the sovereign or suzerain power in the Balkans, inevitably figures centrally in the problem of expansion by the USSR in this direction. Continuously frustrated for centuries in this drive, the USSR today retains the tradition of ambition in the Balkans, at the Straits, and in the eastern Mediterranean.

<sup>3</sup> Robert Strausz-Hupé, *The Balance of Tomorrow* (G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1945), *passim*.

*Toward the Caucasus.* The Caucasus and Transcaucasia have served as another avenue for Russian expansion. Here, too, Russia encountered Turkish power. An incentive to Russian drive in this direction has been the desire not only to subdue the warlike mountain tribes that have harassed the Russian areas north of them but also to gain a strategic frontier that might be easily defended against attack. With the acquisition of Kars and Batum, the conquest of the general area was finally accomplished by Alexander II (1864).

*Toward Persia (Iran).* The USSR has access to Persia by way of the Caspian Sea, the Caucasus, and also the area once known as Russian Turkestan to the east of the Caspian and south of Siberia. Persia is inevitably the scene of a drive of the Russians whenever they seek to expand southward to the perimeter of Eurasia and the warm waters of the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Acquisition of power in this area would permit outflanking the Near East and the Mediterranean and would place important new resources, especially petroleum, within USSR control.


*Toward South Central Asia.* Turkestan and Central Asia south of Siberia have been the scene of a traditional Russian expansionist drive. Russia under the czars completed the conquest of the area in the nineteenth century and thus added to British alarm concerning the security of India. Anglo-Russian relations continued to deteriorate as Russian railway-building progressed in Turkestan and Russian pressure upon Afghanistan became greater. The Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907, however, eased the immediate conflict of interest.

*Toward the Far East.* The Russians began the conquest of the vast expanses of Siberia in the sixteenth century. By 1637 they had reached the shores of the Sea of Okhotsk, but it was not until 1860 that the Amur area

and the region around Vladivostok were acquired. In the Far East, Russia, strengthened by the building of the Trans-Siberian Railroad and by economic penetration into Manchuria, engaged in the race for spoils in that area promised by the weakness of the Chinese Empire. Continuing their imperialistic policy by penetration into Korea, the Russians so alarmed the Japanese that the latter resorted to war in 1904. Though decisively defeated, the Russians still maintained an active interest in the Chinese border territories of Manchuria, Outer Mongolia, and Chinese Turkestan (Sinkiang).

**MOTIVES AND BASES OF RUSSIAN EXPANSION—Area Concept.** By the end of the nineteenth century the Russian people had reached most of the natural frontiers available for the bounding of their domain if they were to stop short of the seas themselves and the control of all Eurasia. With a few minor exceptions all branches of the Russian people were by that time united within the Russian state.

The underlying factors in the expansion of the Russians are in large degree geographical and, as such, persistent. Given their lack of easy access to the oceans, except by routes either icebound during most of the year or subject to the domination of other powers, the Russians inevitably have sought, and undoubtedly will persist in seeking, more suitable outlets to the sea and the control of warm-water ports. Increasing access to the sea through her own or satellite ports enhances the prospect that the USSR may transform Eurasia into the most powerful naval base in the world. Already Russian naval strength is second only to that of the United States. Since 1945 the USSR government has expended \$33,600,000,000, or one fifth its total defense expenditures, on its navy; the product is thirty cruisers, 150 destroyers, 500 submarines, and 4,000 naval aircraft. The navy figures importantly in Soviet strategic thinking; Soviet



leaders are reputed to be protagonists of strength in sea power. Just as Britain faced the menace of German naval power prior to, and during, World War I, so, today, the United States—successor to Britain as the leading naval power in the West—faces the menace of Soviet naval strength which can operate from a much larger base than the Germans possessed and is much better prepared to escape from the “narrow seas” into a full-fledged contest for control of the oceans.

Faced by the knowledge that the USSR holds the firm belief that Communism should—and eventually will—be global and total in extent, other powers cannot, if they pursue their interests, but view Soviet expansionist attempts—seemingly conventional in historical perspective—with even greater alarm than they felt prior to the Revolution. Imperialism, either naked and unashamed or dressed in the garb of the conventional diplomacy of the nineteenth century, was a predominating fact in pre-Revolution Russian history, imperialistic motives and drives, cloaked with rationalizations of Marxist doctrine, also move the Soviet regime.

*Power Concept.* From earliest times the Russians have been in search of new resources and natural wealth needed to enhance their position. As a socialist state, the USSR has entered international competition to achieve the same goals. In fact, despite propaganda professions to the contrary, it is likely that in a socialist state, wherein the political motivation dominates all else, the drive to acquire new resources will be intensified. A high degree of consistency obviously exists in both Czarist and Soviet foreign policy, for in each case that policy is based on the logic of history and geography—something that it is not in the power of man to change.

The Communists, however, have contributed important variants to traditional Russian policy. There is much evidence

to indicate that contemporary rulers aspire to universal Communist rule. Moreover there has been a greater tendency toward a kind of paranoid isolationism based on suspicion, real or apparent, of the aims of the capitalist states. Opportunism has gone hand in hand with this isolationism, opportunism calculated to prevent capitalist powers from combining their efforts against the USSR. Finally, the Soviet state has political parties in other states working consistently in its interest—political parties that in fact make Soviet foreign policy their policy and provide reservoirs out of which to erect future Soviet regimes.

## THE SOVIET UNION IN WORLD WAR II

*PREPARATION*—The time from August 23, 1939, until June 21, 1941, may well be described, for the USSR, as a period of power-political opportunism. Whatever the genuineness of the Russian *entente* with Germany, it served as a factor in turning Hitler upon the West. The pact made it clear that the rulers in the Kremlin ranked the defense of the Soviet homeland above the prospect of a Nazi war against the West and even above the oft-proclaimed goal of world Communism. The great reversal in Soviet diplomacy caught Communists in France, Britain, and elsewhere by surprise, but the hard discipline of their leadership core soon enabled them to defend the Soviet program for “peace and defense.” During this period the USSR feverishly prepared for war. The Soviet leaders hoped that the agreement with Germany would hold, and they engaged in negotiations with the Reich, looking toward the division of the global spoils should the Western democracies be defeated. Molotov announced that relations with Germany had radically improved and “that the Soviet government was giving the Reich ‘practical cooperation’ and ‘political support in its efforts for peace.’”

On the other hand, Molotov criticized

United States intervention in Soviet-Finnish negotiations as a violation of neutrality and asserted that the lifting of the arms embargo "raised justified misgivings" as an aggravation of the European war. Old formulas were declared by the Soviet premier to be outmoded. He asserted that Germany was striving for peace; that Britain and France were seeking and prolonging war. He argued that the efforts to destroy Hitlerism were part of a religious war, but that wars to root out heretics and dissenters had gone out of fashion. He maintained that the war of the Allies against Germany was not the war of democracy against Hitlerism, but a struggle to preserve the material interests of colonial powers, whose efforts could only injure and maim the working class. Germany and Russia in taking territory were, he insisted, merely pursuing altruistic aims.

Mutual-assistance pacts were signed under Soviet pressure with the border states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in September and October of 1939. Polish territories were seized and incorporated into the Byelorussian and Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republics. A tense international situation in mid-1940 cloaked Soviet incorporation of Bessarabia, Northern Bucovina, and the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. In the fall of 1940 Soviet-German relations began rapidly to deteriorate. Though Russia signed a neutrality pact with Japan, an Axis partner, in April, 1941, Hitler launched his attack on the USSR shortly after.

**PARTICIPATION**—Simultaneous with the German attack on the USSR in June, 1941, Great Britain and the United States announced their support of the Soviet war effort. Great Britain and the USSR, in a formal agreement of July, 1941, pledged themselves to render each other every military assistance; this agreement was followed in May, 1942, by a twenty-year mutual assistance pact (repudiated by the USSR in May,

1955), providing for close collaboration during and after the war. Thus a period was inaugurated which lasted until August, 1945—a period of joint collaboration in the war effort against the Axis. As developments later proved, the wartime collaboration did not endure far beyond the war period. The *rapport* was never close enough to create new symbols and patterns of peace for the future. By the end of the period the wartime partners were at a breaking point. This historical experience demonstrated the extraordinary relativity of sentiments, ideas, and theories. Those who were optimistic at the time concerning the possibility of permanent collaboration between the Communist and non-Communist worlds were victimized by what Max Beloff has called the "realist" pattern of interpretation," which called upon the West to forget the revolutionary nature of this regime and to give undue weight to such events as the dissolution of the Comintern.

#### SOVIET POSTWAR POSITION

**GENERAL POSITION**—It is important to reassess the position of the USSR as it appears since the end of World War II. Basically this position is the result of interaction between two factors: Soviet expansionist tendencies as a new superpower and the changing character of the power pattern in European politics. The military weakness of Western European powers permitted the Kremlin leaders to hold and consolidate their territorial gains in East Europe and to prevent the unification of the two Germanies. The death of Stalin in 1953 marked an important change, both outside the USSR—in terms of greater strength of the West—and inside the USSR itself. Technological changes in the form of atomic weapons and revolutionary developments in aeronautics are important factors that must be introduced into any equation to calculate the extent of Soviet power in the over-all sense. Techno-

logical developments affect the defensibility of the Soviet frontier, the effectiveness of Soviet military and naval resources, and, not least in importance, the implications of Soviet geography, its size, location, topography, climate, as they bear upon the over-all global political equation.

Generalizations about the future are at best projections of the present situation and in any circumstance a hazardous attempt to relate many variables, the pattern of which no statecraft can truly fix in precise terms or forecast with accuracy. What we can say about the Soviet postwar position is that it attempts to maintain its power status short-of-war on the basis of co-existence with the West. Shifts in tactics, therefore, rather than a basic change in ultimate goals, are to be expected in the future.

**PERSISTENT FACTORS**—The period of deteriorating relations since World War II is one in which a conflict of powers, rather than a balance of power, has existed, since no third force has emerged or could emerge to perform the balancing function.

The period from August, 1945, to October, 1947, may be denoted as a time of Communist optimism concerning the imminence of world revolution in Eurasia. Optimism existed that Communist parties in the various states might be able to capture power through democratic means. This policy would permit enlarging the area already under Communist control. At the very least, with electoral and parliamentary victory Communist-dominated coalitions could quickly be established, which would enlist Social Democratic and other leftist parties who might be willing or be driven to preside over the demise of traditional democracy in those states. During this time the propaganda emphasis was upon international solidarity, especially with regard to relations among Communist parties. The delayed awakening of the non-Communist world to the fact that there could not be con-

tinued cooperation with the USSR assisted the Communists to make great advances in their plans. However, Communist aggressive expansionism finally stimulated an opposition, and this opposition, together with Communist failures in certain areas to achieve victory through democratic means, brought about a change in Soviet policy. A new period of militance ensued, which continued until after the death of Stalin.

The new period was inaugurated on October 5, 1947, with the announcement of the formation of the Cominform,<sup>4</sup> the organization of which had been decided upon at a meeting of representatives of national Communist parties in Poland in September. In addition to an increased emphasis upon militance, the new policy called for an accentuation of the right of national self-determination in states outside the Communist orbit as a countermove to United States leadership of the non-Communist alignment. Within the orbit area a new stress upon international Communist solidarity heralded increasing discipline. The immediate goal was the sabotaging of the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and, more recently, NATO, the Plevan Plan, and other proposals looking toward European coordination. The new militance called for consolidation in Eastern Europe, the application of the principle of "divide and conquer" in Western Europe, militant attack in Asia, and diversionary adventures elsewhere.

The consolidation in Eastern Europe was certain to create stresses and strains perhaps leading to an open break wherever, for geographical and military reasons, Moscow's domination could not be made complete. The expulsion of Marshal Tito and Yugoslavia from the Cominform in June, 1948,

<sup>4</sup> Unlike the Comintern, the Cominform, located at Belgrade, consisted of representatives of the Communist parties in Europe, organized for mutual advice and coordinated activity.

demonstrated both Soviet determination in the pursuit of the international policy of Communist solidarity and its correlative tendency to exacerbate cleavages rather than heal them in regions beyond the direct control of the Red army. The difficulty of healing cleavages among authoritarian dogmatists may be added to the problems of Soviet statecraft, a difficulty especially well illustrated by the case of Yugoslavia and perhaps some day to be demonstrated by Chinese defection.

In Western Europe the call for national self-determination met with some success, but it also created difficulties. For example, in November, 1948, Communists, especially in France, were called upon to sabotage the projected implementation of an Atlantic alliance. This attitude offended not only Western European nationalists in general but also Communist-influenced workers, who found their loyalties divided and their nationalism threatened. Soviet militance has brought the aroused United States into active resistance and thereby has still further deepened the crises that led to the adoption of a militant policy in the first place. On the death of Stalin in 1953, Soviet policy underwent a mellowing change; now, instead of its former militancy, it aimed at a relaxation of international tensions and a search for a *modus vivendi* with the West. Whatever the reasons for the shift, Soviet posture in Europe assumed a new form. In 1955 Soviet power was withdrawn from Austria, and at the same time the USSR indicated its intent to liquidate military bases on foreign soil. The latest phase cannot be assessed with any degree of finality, but its repercussion upon relations with the West is bound to be far-reaching.

#### SOVIET REGIONAL FOREIGN POLICY

In the period of relative isolation before World War II and coincident with the declared pursuit of collective security down to

1939, the Soviet government pursued a regional foreign policy expressed in a series of bilateral and multilateral treaties of various types with neighboring countries. Since 1939, first under the stress of war and later by taking advantage of the opportunities afforded by victory, that government has developed a regional foreign policy more ambitious in scope and depth—and clearer in its pattern.


It should be pointed out that during the two decades between the two world wars the Soviet government pursued a correct and constructive regional policy on the *conventional* level of international diplomacy; on the *unconventional* level the story was different. However, the fact that even then the USSR was engaged in planning a great conspiracy against non-Communist nations does not detract from the significance that should be given to Soviet action on the conventional level. The truth is that the USSR needed peace to consolidate its strength and, not least, to face the twin threat of a militant Germany to the west and an aggressive Japan to the east. Moreover, time was most essential to prepare the world proletariat for eventual revolution. It was deemed very essential to preserve the Soviet experiment until the next imperialist war developed or until subject colonial peoples began to revolt. Consequently, for the time being the Soviet leaders conducted their open diplomacy on a conventional basis, forging alliances and friendship pacts rather than serving directly the goal of world Communism.

**ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ORBIT AREA**—For the USSR to seek friendly neighbors is normal conduct, but the application of strategic advantage to force social revolution and abnormal regimes on neighboring states is, at the least, violative of the principles professed by Soviet statecraft on the conventional level of diplomacy, even though all the stratagems designed to achieve the ends

sought are approved by the theory of international relations as a whole. Since World War II the non-Communist world has been witnessing the increased disciplining of the non-Russian peoples who are living under the aegis of Soviet authoritarianism in its recent Marxist guise. Where social revolutions have been forced, as in Eastern Europe, the many peoples so disciplined have become recruits in a struggle for Communist expansion. Even violent uprisings, as in the case of the East German riots in 1955, the Poznań revolt in Poland during the summer of 1956, and Polish and Hungarian uprisings in the fall of 1956 have failed to shake

the Communist order. Whatever justification or explanation of the Soviet expansion of power Soviet leaders may advocate, the creation of the orbit area must be viewed as a quest for defensible frontiers and regimes oriented toward Moscow—a situation which the westward movement of the Red army made possible during World War II.

The states in the present or potential Soviet orbit area may be conveniently categorized. They cannot in all cases, however, be grouped geographically, for their political status and international positions may cut across a strictly regional classification (see map below).





*Germany and Japan.* The first group in the projected orbit area consists of the two major defeated enemy states, Germany and Japan. The latter at present is oriented toward the non-Communist world. Its situation, however, makes it an important target of Communist expansion, although a major deterrent is the assurance that the United States would fight overt aggression against Japan and would, no doubt, intervene to prevent an internal Communist victory in Japan. Germany, on the other hand, is the immediate focus of a struggle between the Communist and non-Communist worlds. The outcome of that struggle will determine not only the fate of Germany for years to come but also of Europe, for in an obvious sense Germany's political reconstruction and orientation are the key to the future of Europe.

The defeat of Nazi Germany removed a major competitor of Russia on the Continent. Western naiveté in not realizing thoroughly enough that catastrophic German defeat would leave a vacuum that Communist power would seek to fill is largely responsible for our present impasse. Originally, Germany was administered and occupied in four zones by the USSR, the United States, Great Britain, and France. Since the deterioration of East-West relations it is more appropriate to refer, on the one hand, to the Communist zone as the East German regime, where a puppet "people's democracy" has been established, and, on the other, to the West German Federal Republic, which was granted sovereignty in the spring of 1955 and admitted to NATO and the Western alliance. Both sides have been bidding for German support, attempting to find formulas for the achievement of the major German desire—reunification. But in the conflict of strategies and ideologies there are no compromises or conditions that hold much prospect of reunification unless one side or the other chooses to believe that a formula of words can be given substance. As for the USSR, it naturally hopes to add the

traditional home of socialism and the great reservoir of German industrial strength and scientific and technological *expertise* to the Soviet orbit. Soviet bids to Germans are, however, in conflict with the aspirations and feelings of other people in the orbit area who have felt German pressure and aggression. Germany presents a dilemma to the USSR as well as to the West. Will it be an imperial domain, a bona fide neutralized zone, a neutralized zone to be prepared for eventual Soviet domination, or will it remain divided as at present? The latter seems the alternative in prospect. Least of all can the Soviet government be expected to place its imprimatur upon a revived, unified, and sovereign Germany that is oriented toward the West.

Japan at the opposite extremity of the USSR is likewise important in the Soviet strategic picture. The Russians cannot fail to be seriously concerned with the political settlement made in the Japanese Islands—so close to the Soviet Far East and so important to control of the Western Pacific. In this area the military, economic, and political influence of the United States has been particularly strong since World War II. Although democratic principles and policy allowed Japan to establish an independent regime with growing autonomy, the Communists have been excluded from effective influence. The Japanese Communist party is illegal and has been driven underground. Only the most violent overturn of events will deprive the United States of predominant influence in Japan and transfer it to the Russians.

*China.* This country and its periphery are *sui generis* in the orbit area. They are properly included on the premise that all areas living under Communist regimes, unless they have explicitly broken with Moscow, acknowledge the superior authority of influence of that capital. Yet it is proper to refer to China's position in the Communist

world as unique, since for the first time a Communist regime has appeared that could compete with Moscow for control of the international movement, at least in Asia. Peking at the least may achieve a position of influence in relation to Moscow similar to that of Constantinople in relation to Rome. The division of the old Roman Empire into an Eastern and a Western empire not only led to a division of authority, it was also symptomatic of declining strength in the Roman world. Just so it might be with the Communist world. It is at any rate the possibility of disunity between Peking and Moscow that has produced disunity among the non-Communist allies in respect to their attitude toward China—between those who believe the Peking-Moscow disunity fundamental and assured and those who believe it neither assured nor likely to be fundamental. In any event, what occurs will be told largely in terms of the advantages Peking and Moscow can derive from close cooperation and association; in other words, the issue is more political than ideological.

Chinese-Russian problems persist with respect to the Chinese border regions. The situation in Manchuria was first regulated by formulas contained in the 1950 agreement. It is conceivable that the area might figure in a story of tensions, since it is so basically important to economic development in China as well as in Soviet East Asia. On October 11, 1954, however, a new agreement was announced, calling for the removal, in 1955, of Soviet troops from Port Arthur, an increase of \$100,000,000 in Soviet aid to China, and the dissolution of four joint Chinese-Soviet stock companies. All the items of agreement dealt with alleged points of irritation between the two countries. In addition to other statements of policy, plans were announced for the building of two new railways between the Soviet Union and Northwest China.

Outer Mongolia, by plebiscite, is "independent," but should a Soviet disposition ap-

pear to transform this puppet state into a republic of the USSR, as in the case of Tannu Tuva, a source of greater conflict would appear. For a time a Russian design to establish "autonomy" in Inner Mongolia was shown in the Soviet sponsorship of a Republic of Eastern Mongolia, but this policy has been reversed. The Chinese commitment in this area is greater than in Outer Mongolia, and to the extent that the Russians seek control there they will create correspondingly greater resistance.

Tibet has been brought under the aegis of Peking. As a border region it occupies a unique position, for it has not been, and could not be, so easily an issue between the two major Communist countries. Yet Tibet's location makes it an important avenue of access to India. Should some rivalry develop between Moscow and Peking for the control of the Asian revolution, Tibet might be an issue between the two, however, technological advances in the weapons of war have reduced the value of the mere possession of territory as an essential factor in successful aggression and expansion of power.

The thrust of Russian power south of the Maritime Provinces in Siberia involved it in the conflict of the powers over Korea, an outpost in eastern Asia. Toward the close of the nineteenth century Russia sought the valuable timber resources along the Yalu River and demonstrated imperialistic designs against both China and Japan. The Russo-Japanese conflict of 1904 began along the Yalu, and Russia eventually lost the war. Following 1917 Bolshevik Russia trained a nucleus of Korean Communists who in 1945 emerged to champion Soviet interests in Korea. The division of the peninsula at the 38th Parallel led to a military contest between the Soviet-sponsored republic to the north and the Western-oriented republic to the south. In 1950 the USSR, by sanctioning North Korea's attempt to unify the peninsula by force, even risked open war

with the United States. A challenge of this magnitude can be attributed to Soviet desire to control for Communism a strategic peninsula facing Japan and bordering the Maritime Province across the Tumen River.

*Greece, Turkey, and Persia.* Immediately following World War II three states that were potentially in the Soviet security zone and had actively or through neutrality supported the USSR in the war came under strong Communist pressure. Significantly all three lie to the south and southwest of European Russia and in Communist possession would provide the USSR with easy access to the sea—to the Mediterranean in the case of Greece and Turkey and to the Indian Ocean in the case of Persia. Moreover, Communist possession of these lands would constitute a damaging loss of Anglo-American control over the peripheral areas of Eurasia and would move the USSR far toward a capacity to make the great continent an overwhelming naval base. Remaining under Western influence, they obstruct expansion of the USSR southward in the Near and Middle East and deny to her the opportunity to exploit the control of the Balkans that presented itself particularly before the defection of Yugoslavia. Greece's proximity to the Straits makes her important to the USSR, and despite an agreement with Britain placing Greece in the British orbit of influence, Moscow, through her satellites Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, supported a Communist civil war in Greece aimed at bringing that country within the Soviet orbit. This threat brought the United States into firm action in support of the legitimate government in Greece and in support of Turkey as well.

Turkey has been forced to contest Russian ambitions for a longer time than has any other power. In negotiation with the Nazis in November, 1940, looking toward Soviet participation in a Four Power Pact with Germany, Italy, and Japan, the Soviet

government showed a willingness or desire to engage in a division of global spoils. In addition to indicating a desire for a sphere of control south of Batum and Baku toward the Persian Gulf, the Soviets asked for a base for light naval and land forces on the Bosphorus and Dardanelles and further indicated their readiness to employ military measures in the event of Turkish resistance to diplomatic overtures.

Persia, in contrast with Turkey, is less securely independent by reason of her own internal instability. Despite Persia's adherence to the Turko-Iraqi defense pact of 1955, her geographical position makes it much more difficult for her to receive assistance that might be offered in her behalf in the event of Soviet pressure. The greatest prospect for Communist victory in this area rests upon the chance of a successful civil war or internal revolution; and the activities of the Communist-dominated Tudeh party, the recurrent purges of Communist-influenced officers and men of the Persian army, and the depressed conditions of the millions of inhabitants suggest that one or the other is quite conceivable.

The Persian position in international politics is closely linked with that of Turkey despite different issues in the two countries. The Russian stake in the Middle East long antedates the Soviet period, and both Britain and the United States have interests in the area. The Soviet interest is linked to oil deposits and a desire for access to the sea through Persia and the Persian Gulf, possibly with a view to outflanking the Straits and the entire Near East. Moreover, Turkey and Persia both represent important goals in the construction of the glacis that the Communist leaders are attempting to develop as a defense for the industrial hinterland and as a possible springboard for further expansion into the vital Near and Middle East.

*Yugoslavia.* Yugoslavia is unique in this analysis. Russia has traditionally viewed

Yugoslavia (formerly Serbia) as a large Slav ally on the Adriatic and a counterbalance against pressures from the West. It was czarist support of old Serbia that touched off the war of 1914 at Sarajevo. Between the two world wars Bolshevik Russia lost its hold over independent Yugoslavia, but World War II once again brought Russia and Yugoslavia into closer relationship. Yugoslavia was among the states that supported the USSR during the war. Under the Communist government of Marshal Tito—an early Communist who had fought a determined fight as the partisan leader against the Nazis and other non-Communist forces during the war—it appeared to be safely within the Soviet security system. But there were significant items of difference. First, the Yugoslav Communists were a bona fide indigenous group who from the beginning had fought for Communism in their homeland. They did not return to Yugoslavia as carpetbaggers with the Russian army. They had, therefore, an opportunity to develop a kind of Communist Yugoslav nationalism. When in reaction to the European decision in early 1947 to look to United States security against Communism, the Soviets demanded and imposed a sterner discipline upon the satellites, Yugoslavia showed a resistance that orthodox Communists cannot tolerate, and, in 1948, Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform. Soviet tactical moves brought about a *rapprochement* in June, 1955, but Tito, the heretic, will never be secure, and news of conferences or the like that would seem to indicate a *détente* between Belgrade and Moscow should not, therefore, necessarily be interpreted as a prelude to a settling of main differences. The recently negotiated Balkan Pact, including Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey, represents for Yugoslavia a safer investment in security and constitutes a further barrier to Soviet outward movement on the Eurasian periphery.

*Poland and Czechoslovakia.* These two states through different types of regime supported the USSR during the war. Having gone through the intermediate transition period allowed by theory and practice, they are now thoroughgoing satellites, living under Russian-dominated Communist regimes. Even though, until their absorption in the orbit area, they may have diverged from Russia in religious and social respects, they have a racial affinity for Slavic Russia.

Poland's relations with Russia have been characterized for centuries by conflict and an historic ebb and flow of influence and power. Beginning in the late fourteenth century, the Poles, in union with Lithuania, came to dominate a large area of formerly Russian lands extending up to Smolensk and beyond. This historical fact was made the foundation for the extreme claims to territory put forward by Poland in 1919. Present-day international Communism constitutes a partial solvent of these age-old conflicts, but the extreme nature of the conflicts suggests also their tenacity—and, we may anticipate, *mutatis mutandis*, their revival. Following the Revolution, the Bolshevik government, in a decree of August 29, 1918, renounced all claims to Polish territory acquired by the Russian Empire in the partitions made in the late eighteenth century.

The history of Soviet-Polish relations during the interwar period was characterized by psychic and philosophical distance, with a deepening of mutual suspicions in the 1930's as Hitler entered the picture. The Treaty of Riga, March 18, 1921, was the basis of peace between the two countries until September, 1939. Both countries adhered to the Briand-Kellogg Pact. A pact of nonaggression was signed in July, 1932. They joined together in a convention for defining aggression on July 3, 1933, and in 1934 this pact was renewed until 1945. But the Nazi attack on Poland was the signal for a Soviet declaration that the impending Polish de-

feat was evidence of internal Polish bankruptcy. The USSR revealed herself fully capable of participating in a plot of ruthless external aggression even against the historic core of the Polish homeland. After the war the Soviet government hampered the actions and the return of the Polish government-in-exile in London and used the Polish disclosure of a Russian massacre of Polish officers as an excuse to sever relations with that regime and install a Soviet-dominated government in Warsaw. This regime was shaken by the uprisings in 1956 and possible movement toward a "Titoist" type of relationship with Moscow.

Czechoslovakia, until February, 1948, under Beneš and his National Socialist (non-Nazi) Party and the Social Democrats, strove to be a bridge between East and West. The naiveté of such an ambition was obvious from the beginning, for Czechoslovakian democracy could not survive in the presence of the Red army. As a price for their participation in the government, the Communists demanded control of key industries—those essential to the organization of the country. Communists as a rule regard their participation in a coalition only as a temporary accommodation, a step toward exclusive control, and in Czechoslovakia they were, from the start, preparing for the *coup d'état* of February, 1948. If we add to the resolute purpose and determination of the Communists the weakness of Beneš and his associates, the insecure loyalty of left-wing Social Democrats, and the widespread fear among the people of being abandoned by the West in 1947, the Communists' response with a coup is understandable and should have been anticipated. From that time until the present Czechoslovakia internally and internationally has been increasingly forced within the Soviet orbit.

*Finland, Hungary, Austria, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Albania.* Within the confines of

a zone that stretches along Russia's western frontier are five states—Finland, Hungary, Austria, Bulgaria, and Rumania—which as satellites of Germany were at war with the USSR. Other allied powers at war with Germany also have a claim to influence in these states by virtue of their victory and the subsequent peace treaties negotiated in the fall of 1946. The failure of the Communist regimes in Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria to honor the treaties have been important items of contention in the Cold War. Finland, of course, does not have a Communist regime; in fact, Communists have been excluded from participation in the government. Nevertheless, the Finnish position is inevitably overshadowed by its proximity to Russia, and the strength of anti-Communist and anti-Russian forces and sentiments at work in their country has not blinded the Finns to the realities of their situation. Their geographical position denies them any real opportunity to pursue Swedish-style neutrality; at any moment of crisis Finland will have to be listed as another state within the Soviet orbit.

The republic of Austria likewise was in an ambiguous situation. Until June, 1955, it was occupied by the same four powers that occupied Germany after World War II. For years the major powers sought to agree upon a peace treaty for Austria but failed until the USSR found it expedient to make concessions. One major reason for this delay was undoubtedly that so long as the Russians remained in occupation they had a formal right by treaty to maintain troops in orbit countries to the rear of Austria to guard the supply lines to that country. A new military organization of the Eastern European satellite countries in association with Moscow announced in May, 1955, compensated the USSR for accepting a peace treaty with Austria. The troops in Austria and Hungary by their position and presence secured one salient of the orbit area for the

Soviet state. The four powers signed a peace treaty for Austria on May 15, 1955, but the neutrality of Austria thus established was no doubt a neutrality in a Cold War that would be shattered should armed conflict begin. The East and West are clearly at grips in Austria.

In Hungary a *coup d'état* during 1947 placed that country firmly in the Soviet orbit, despite the fact that the last free Hungarian election had given the non-Communist Small Holders party an absolute majority of the votes cast. It cannot be denied that in Hungary there was a depressed peasantry; large-scale rural unemployment persisted as a source of discontent. One per cent of the owners possessed fifty per cent of the land. The bulk of the agricultural population, 3,500,000 in number, consisted of small landholders, landless laborers, and estate servants. The Communist problem has been to bridge the gap in living standards between rural and urban centers. In Hungary before 1941 there was little sign of Communist organization, although there was a strong current of radicalism among the workers of Budapest. Given the weak hold of Communism in Hungary itself, the Muscovite Communist organizers who were assigned the task of coordinating the country surely did not have their roots deep in the soil and culture of Hungary. Because of her position vis-à-vis the USSR, the case of Hungary does not bear comparison with that of Yugoslavia. Hungary's ties to Russia are so necessary for survival that no defection will significantly strain loyalty to Moscow. And the carpetbaggers will employ the root-and-branch techniques that will transform Hungary despite the obstruction of tradition or values.

The two other countries in this category, Rumania and Bulgaria, have experienced equally harsh treatment. They both are so located in the Balkan Peninsula that, especially with the presence of Red troops, acceptance of Moscow's paramount influ-

ence is inevitable. In these countries the larger estates of the boyars had been divided earlier, but a serious problem existed in overpopulation in the villages. The number of people per unit of agricultural land was three times greater than in Denmark, but the average agricultural output was only one third as great. Earlier governments had concerned themselves mainly with aid for peasants in middle and upper groups, leaving seventy to eighty per cent of the peasantry largely in distress. These poorer peasants were attracted to radical views by revolutionary slogans. In both countries dictatorships had existed before the war—after 1934 in Bulgaria and after 1938 in Rumania—but real liberty had disappeared before those dates. The parties that had existed, even the peasant parties, had shown themselves inept at solving social problems. In both countries the Communist regimes are seeking to promote rapid industrialization and to strengthen economic ties with the other satellite states.

Albania, a former satellite of Fascist Italy, may be placed in the same category as four of the five satellite states just discussed. It is not contiguous with the orbit area proper, and in the absence of war its surrounding neighbors will leave it largely undisturbed. In the meantime, Albania gives the USSR an outpost on the Adriatic and the central Mediterranean, much as control of the Ionian Islands gave it an outpost in the reign of Paul I (1796-1801).

*Afghanistan.* This land is not readily classifiable, but it lies within the Soviet security zone. It is in the path of a traditional Russian drive toward the sea and is also on the historic invasion route to India. Soviet-British conflict in the country developed early in the 1920's, with Afghanistan assuming importance as part of an Asian alliance projected by the Bolsheviks against British imperialism. The problem of Russian *émigrés* and escaped Indian rebels gave both

Britain and Russia pretexts for interference. The Afghans had occasion to remark that their country appeared to be the unfortunate goat between the lion and the bear.

With the withdrawal of the British from India, Afghan-Soviet relations assumed new interest. A boundary controversy between the Soviets and Afghans was settled in 1946. The Kushka district in the Afghan province of Herat, where Persia, Afghanistan, and the USSR meet, was claimed by both Afghanistan and the USSR. In June, 1946, by the terms of a Soviet-Afghan treaty, Kushka went to the USSR. Significantly, it is located within a hundred miles of the Turpul oilfields in Herat province.

*Other Areas of Soviet Interest* As one of the two major world powers, the USSR obviously has global interests, in particular wherever events give promise of social change favorable, or even unfavorable, to the USSR. These changes, whether engineered or merely fortuitous from the Soviet standpoint, may lead to an acquisition of territory or power by Communists in areas immediately adjacent to the Communist world imperial order or to acquisition of power in nonadjacent areas in which a threat against competitors of Moscow may be especially valuable to the USSR.

#### THE LARGER STRATEGY

It is important to describe Soviet involvement in the unfolding pattern of politics in the world at large as well as in the more critical areas already referred to. We may observe the fine, Machiavellian hand at work in the politics of all countries and regions, especially those in which local Communist parties taking orders from Moscow are already at work. As an example, in Indonesia the Communists fish in troubled waters and offer the prospect of cooperation through nonaggression pacts with Red China. An already neutralist government is invited to

form closer ties with the Communist world, and so strong are the memories of the Indonesians of colonial imperialism that the prospect seems inviting. Coming under the auspices of the Chinese, such offers emphasize the slogan "Asia for Asians." As everywhere, the orientation of political parties with respect to domestic and international Communism becomes a critical issue of politics, especially in countries that are increasingly impinged upon by Communist advances. The Communists advance in Indochina, and immediately in Thailand well-grounded fears arise that the effect of geographical contiguity with Communist regimes will be a massive infiltration and subversion. In particular, all countries with large resident Chinese communities find that they have potential sources of such subversion in their very midst.

The above references do not, however, suggest the full global extent of Soviet involvement directly, clandestinely, or indirectly in international or world politics. Such involvement can be measured in part by the steps taken to counter it. As the Asian situation from the democratic standpoint deteriorates under Communist pressure, such countries as Pakistan, with full awareness of the various political implications, welcome shipments of arms from the United States. Turkey, as aware as the United States of the meaning of the Soviet threat, calls for the inclusion of Iraq in the Turkish-Pakistan treaty arrangement for friendly cooperation, signed April 2, 1954. The problem of relations with the USSR is involved likewise in the Arab-Israeli and Suez Canal disputes. Here the USSR seeks to be divisive and uses opportunist tactics to exploit the turmoil to the disadvantage of the Anglo-American bloc. Such troubled spots present opportunities not only to press for advantage but to multiply the number of problems to be borne by an already overburdened Western statecraft. And the USSR can take advantage of many points

at issue between the Western Powers and states that formerly had colonial or semi-colonial status.

Throughout the length of Africa the conflict between the great antagonists also finds expression. For natives who have known the inequality typical of colonial rule, descriptions of the harshness of Communist rule cannot be very meaningful. And they have not come to the stage where the promise of intellectual freedom has strong appeal. The French in particular believe, no doubt with sound reason, that Communist agents in North Africa make use of the aspiration for nationalism to stir up trouble in the French possessions and thereby force the French to keep troops in Africa that are vitally needed elsewhere. With no intention to depreciate the moral appeal of nationalism, we may point out that these areas are of great importance to the defense of Western values; moreover, these so-called nationalist groups are often infiltrated by Communists who have ulterior purposes.

Communist activity in Latin America further illustrates Soviet concern with politics everywhere. In this area the immediate goal is, obviously, that of making it difficult for the United States to carry out its own policies. Beyond that goal, Communist statecraft aspires to fulfill itself by absorbing Latin America, just as it aspires to absorb every other society. This is not an entirely unique aspiration, but it is only in Communist theory that the aspiration is synonymous with inevitable achievement and one to be worked for. Much of the force and inspiration of Communism in Latin America is endemic and reflects local injustice; but no one can gainsay the organic relationship between Latin American po-

litical parties and the international Communist movement. Guatemala, Chile, Honduras, and Brazil have been the most critical areas of Communist operations, with the last-named country having the largest party in the Western Hemisphere.

The years following World War II have certainly afforded sufficient time to arrive at an over-all evaluation of Communist strategy. It is certain that the strategy has as its final goal the Sovietization of the world. Changes of tactics within that strategy during the Cold War may indicate changing Communist conceptions of the means available in the drive toward that goal. They may reveal changes in the timetable of its accomplishment; the means have been altered before. The timetable has been changed to accommodate apparent immediate necessity and ensure stability in the non-Communist world. But the goal remains fixed. To the Russians coexistence can mean only a stage in the triumphal march toward the final victory. The failure of the Communist ideology to embody a principle of limits enlarges the paradox facing realists, who, positing power as the basic component of security of the state, call for a vigorous fight against threats to security that never quite achieves security, "but which, in trying to do so, increases the necessity of accumulating power as a means of attaining more security."<sup>5</sup> The tragedy of the present atomic era lies in the fact that idealists have found no way to avoid this paradox of power or to devise an equitable security formula acceptable to the powers.

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<sup>5</sup> John H. Herz, *Political Realism and Political Idealism* (University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 24.



### Study Questions

1. Discuss the conflict of Soviet and Japanese power in the Far East.
2. Describe the course of Soviet expansion westward into Europe.
3. In what ways has Communist policy been at variance with the pre-Revolution policy?
4. Describe Soviet preparations, prior to June, 1941, for defense against attack from Germany.
5. What were the principal factors that led to Germany's defeat in its invasion of Russia during World War II?
6. Discuss the geographical elements underlying Russia's territorial expansion prior to World War II.
7. Describe the growth of Communist power in the first two years following World War II.
8. What have been the effects of Germany's defeat in 1945 on the Soviet power position?
9. Discuss Soviet-Chinese relations since World War II.
10. Describe the position of the East European states with respect to the Soviet Union in the years since 1945.
11. Discuss contemporary Russian foreign policy in the light of Mackinder's "Heartland" thesis.
12. Describe past and present relations between the Soviet Union and Persia.
13. How has the Communist ideology aided the expansion of Soviet power?
14. Analyze the concept that one of the major reasons for Russia's territorial expansion during the past several centuries has been the desire for warm-water ports.
15. Locate on a map the nations that are united militarily with the Soviet Union.

## *The British Isles*

The British Isles are separated from continental Europe by the English Channel, the width of which is only twenty-one miles at the narrowest point, in the Strait of Dover. In fact, Britain lies close enough to the Continent (London-Paris, 200 miles) to have been significantly involved in the long, complicated history of Europe, extending as far back as the Roman era some 2,000 years ago. Yet an insular position has been the means of preserving a culture and traditions quite apart from those of continental neighbors. Other than cross-channel rule by Henry II and his successors, Britain has never succeeded in establishing a permanent foothold on the mainland, nor have the isles been successfully invaded for nine centuries.

(In their world relations the British Isles are particularly fortunate. They lie in the dead center of the *land hemisphere*,<sup>1</sup> which means that no other place on earth is as fa-

vorably located in relation to all other land areas of the world. This nodal position has been effective in facilitating Britain's role as a sea power and in enabling her to build an empire and to form commercial ties throughout the world.)

The islands are divided politically into several units which do not entirely coincide with the obvious physical subdivision (see map on page 245). The major islands of Great Britain and Ireland have two distinct governments: (1) the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; and (2) the Republic of Ireland, which occupies eighty-three per cent of the western island.<sup>2</sup> Great Britain is further divided into England, Scotland, and Wales, national units with autonomy considerably greater than that

<sup>1</sup> That half of the earth's surface which contains a maximum (about eighty-seven per cent) of the land area.

<sup>2</sup> Terminology in distinguishing the island of Ireland (geographic division) from the Republic of Ireland (political division) may be confusing. The national term for the Republic of Ireland is Eire, but in most literature Ireland is used to designate this area, and from the context it should be distinguishable from the island of Ireland.

usually accorded minor civil divisions Scotland, for example, has its own administrative departments with headquarters at Edinburgh. Northern Ireland, although definitely a part of the United Kingdom in its

international relations, maintains its own parliament in Belfast. In addition to the two major islands, the British Isles include the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands, also locally autonomous units.

## GREAT BRITAIN

The island of Great Britain is about the size of the states of New York and Pennsylvania combined—small for an area which has been so dominant in world affairs. In latitude the islands extend from 50 to 59°, roughly equiv-

advantages of such a high latitude. The physical characteristics of the islands are similar to those of France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, and other continental areas.



alent to Labrador or the Kamchatka Peninsula, both lands too bleak and barren to support more than the most primitive of societies. The British Isles, however, share with Northwest Europe the influences of a marine location, a favorable wind belt, and a warm ocean current which offset the normal dis-

## PHYSICAL ASPECTS

**STRUCTURE**—The structure of both Great Britain and Ireland consists of highlands of old hard rock (granite, gneiss, schists, and slates), which in the recent geologic past have been stripped of their surface soils by glaciation. Around these rocky thin-soiled uplands extend lowlands of softer rock, chiefly clays, sandstones, and limestones. There are five major and two minor upland regions and three major lowland areas (see map on page 246). The uplands consist of the Scottish Highlands, comprising the Northwest Highlands and the Grampian Highlands and containing Ben Nevis (4,406 feet), the highest point in the British Isles; the more subdued Southern Uplands of Scotland; the Pennine Mountains, a long archlike formation extending south from the Scottish border into central England; the Welsh, or Cambrian, Mountains, a rugged upland mass covering almost all of Wales; and the Mountains of Ireland, forming a semicircle about the central Irish Basin. Less rugged topography is found in the Lake District of Cumberland and the old, worn-down hills of Cornwall in southwest England.

Of the lowland areas, the Scottish Lowlands is a section of upland which has


# BRITISH ISLES CITIES AND REGIONS

## CITIES

- More than 1,000,000
- 500,000 - 1,000,000
- 200,000 - 500,000
- Others

Scale of Miles

0 25 50 75 100



dropped between parallel fractures, forming a "graben," or rift valley, between the Highlands and the Southern Uplands. The existence of this unifying area in Scotland is in contrast with the situation in Wales where the central block of Welsh Highlands (or Cambrian Mountains) serves to disperse the population rather than unite it. This feature helps to explain the role of Scotland in the growth of Great Britain as contrasted with the less spectacular role of Wales. The English Lowlands, which occupies about one third of the area of Great Britain, lies on either side of the Pennines and extends to southern and southeastern England. To the east and west of the Pennines the Lowlands, though narrow, extends far enough north to provide routes to Scotland. South and east of a line joining the Bristol Channel and the mouth of the Tees River (Middlesbrough), limestones and clays form the surface, and these have been etched out by erosion into a succession of scarps and vales. In southeast England is the London Basin, a downfold filled with Tertiary sands and clays and topped by boulder clays. Here is the political focus of Great Britain, and here at a ford and early bridging point on the Thames stands London, guarding the stretch of the east coast most vulnerable to attack from continental Europe. The third lowland area is the Irish Basin, containing good agricultural soils but also many bogs from which peat is obtained for fuel.

**CLIMATE**—The climate of the British Isles, controlled by an insular location and further affected by the Gulf Stream, is characterized by cool summers (July, 55° F. in northern Scotland; 64° near London) and mild winters (January, 44° along the west coast; 38° in the eastern section). Prevailing westerly winds and frequent cyclonic storms result in abundant rain, especially on the west coast uplands, where elevated areas have over 100 inches annually. The lowlands of Great Britain receive between twenty-five and forty

inches, rather evenly spread throughout the year, with the maximum in fall and winter and the minimum in spring. Dull skies are a distinctive feature. On the average, clouds cover sixty-two per cent of the sky in spring—the brightest season—and seventy-five per cent in winter. This cool, humid climate resembles that of the adjacent parts of Europe and has a close counterpart in North America along the coasts of Oregon, Washington, and British Columbia.


**VEGETATION**—Forest was the original vegetation on Great Britain, but man's exploitation has reduced it to residual patches on the heaviest clays and coarsest sandstones. On the mountain blocks are open moorland and rough sheep pastures. Good-quality grassland, which covers more than half the total area of the west and central lowlands, supports an important dairy industry. Only the eastern coastal areas, with twenty-five inches of rainfall or less, are predominantly arable. East Anglia, the richest agricultural area, specializes in wheat growing, but even there cattle are numerous, fattened on root crops grown by rotation farming.

#### ECONOMIC ASPECTS

The structure and size of the British Isles have shaped Britain's economy into a specific pattern. To support a population of 53,000,000, Great Britain has for over a century emphasized industrialization at the expense of agricultural development. This imbalance between industry and agriculture indicates a dependence upon foreign trade—a source both of the nation's strength and of its weakness in world affairs.

The industry of Great Britain is based chiefly on local coal deposits and native iron-ore deposits, plus the ores that can be obtained from nearby countries on the Continent (see map on page 248). The main coal fields are near mountain ranges, particularly along the Pennines, on the edges of

the Welsh Upland, and on the Scottish Lowlands. All coal fields are close to the sea, a factor conducive to cheap transport and to the development of export trade. Major industries have tended to locate in proximity to the coal fields, and here are situated Britain's great Midland cities.



The geographic distribution is basic to the pattern of Britain's manufacturing areas. In the northeast, utilizing the coal of Northumberland and Durham and the iron ore of Northamptonshire, is an important iron-and-steel industry. One third of all ships are built in this district on the banks of the Tyne; engineering and chemical works are equally prominent. To the south are the York-Nottinghamshire coal fields that gave rise to the manufacture of textiles and other specialized goods: Leeds' wool, the Halifax worsteds, Sheffield's cutlery, and Derby's tool industry. West of the Pennines is the Lan-

cashire coal field supporting the manufacture of cotton textiles, machinery, glass, and chemicals. Manchester is the commercial center and Liverpool the port. Forty miles south, the North Staffordshire coal region has an old, established pottery industry which now imports its clay from southwest England. Further south, in the Midlands area, are many additional industries, including the manufacture of electrical goods, hardware, boots and shoes, automobiles, and cycles. Birmingham is the main center, though it is not on a coal field. To the southwest, the South Wales coal area supports an important steel and tin-plate industry.

Two major industrial districts are not directly linked with coal fields. The steel centers on the Lincoln and Leicestershire iron-ore deposits, which produce about 14,000,000 tons of steel a year, and London, to which industries producing clothing, boots and shoes, metal goods, and furniture, as well as printing establishments, and motion picture studios, have been attracted by a plentiful labor supply and marketing facilities.

In Scotland industry is concentrated on the coal fields of the Scottish Lowlands, particularly toward the west in the Glasgow area. Along the Clyde are famous shipyards; textiles and machinery are manufactured in the vicinity of Glasgow and Dundee. Despite the limited natural resources of Scotland, an effort is being made to locate industry in the lowland area in order to ensure maximum development of available resources.

## POPULATION

On the island of Great Britain live 53,000,000 people in an area of slightly under 90,000 square miles. The density of population in Great Britain—over 540 persons per square mile—is greater than that of the industrialized southern New England states. England alone has a population density exceeding that of either Belgium or the Nether-

lands, commonly considered the acme of industrialized settlement. London, with 8,000,000 people, is by far the largest city in Great Britain, but there are six other cities with a population of 500,000 or more. Birmingham (1,110,000), Glasgow (1,090,000), Liverpool (890,000), Manchester (703,000), Sheffield (513,000), and Leeds (505,000). Actually, sixty per cent of the people of Great Britain live in cities or urban clusters with over 50,000 persons.

### HISTORICAL SEQUENCE

Why should one of the great powers of the world have developed on this small island? This is an interesting problem for the political geographer. A survey of British history shows that three geographical factors have been partly responsible:

1. Insularity—a position detached from Europe yet near enough to share in all cultural developments of the Continent.
2. Favorable space relations—that is, an advantageous location for contact with the rest of the habitable world.
3. Uniquely located mineral resources.

From time to time these three factors have varied both in importance and in the kind of influence they have exerted, and these changes make it possible to divide British history into several eras, terminating for the purposes of this discussion with the outbreak of World War I in 1914. Developments after World War I are discussed in later parts of this chapter.

**BEFORE 1066**—The period in Britain prior to 1066 was one of cultural and racial immigration at a time when the area was at the outermost edge of the known world and its space relations were not advantageous. The movement of people in Europe was mainly from east to west, stemming principally from migrations originating in the steppes of Central Asia. All major routes from the east ended near Britain. Along the southerly route,

through lands bordering on the Mediterranean, came dark, long-headed Mediterranean people seeking the tin and gold of Cornwall and Wicklow. They left dolmens and stone circles such as those at Stonehenge and Salisbury as evidence of their movements and of their cultural affinity with the people of the Mediterranean. Later, by the same route, came the Romans and, still later, Christian missionaries. Just before the Roman conquest came the Celtic tribes and, later, from the coastal lowlands of the Baltic and North Seas came Angles, Saxons, Jutes, Danes, and Northmen. By the time the Normans arrived in 1066 the basic racial strains that were to form the English nation had already made their appearance.

**FROM 1066 TO ABOUT 1550**—From the middle of the eleventh to the middle of the sixteenth century Britain advanced toward political unity. A comparison of British political conditions with those in Germany, Italy, or France during this period demonstrates how greatly insularity facilitated this progress. Political power centered in the London Basin and was gradually extended over the southeast lowland to the Irish Sea. In fact, the expansion of the English-speaking peoples pushed the earlier inhabitants back until they were penned in by the western highlands. The latter folk, despite racial diversity, preserved the Celtic tongue, and a Celtic cultural zone came into being, linking together northwest Scotland, Ireland, the Lake District, Wales, and Cornwall. Once in control of the lowland, the English sought to subdue the people in the adjacent highlands. Cornwall and the Lake District were easily detached from Wales, with a consequent loss of their Celtic culture. Wales, more compact, offered greater resistance and, despite the lack of a focus where resistance could be organized, maintained its identity. The English, like the Romans before them, moved along the northern and southern coastal plains out of the settled areas and quickly subjugated the highland. But Welsh

culture, protected by the relief of the region, persisted in the isolated valleys, and today about two per cent of the population speak only Welsh, with another forty-three per cent being bilingual.

Scotland, in contrast to Wales, developed a natural settlement core in the Central Lowlands. This area, like eastern Britain, was settled by Angles, who drove the Celts into the north and west and established an English-speaking nation. Distant from the London Basin and well defended by the bleak Southern Uplands, the Scots successfully repelled all attacks from the south and retained their independence until the peaceful union of the crowns in 1607.

Ireland, despite the seas between it and Great Britain, fell under English domination between the twelfth and fourteenth centuries. An English-speaking aristocracy secured control of all the island except the extreme western seaboard. Although England was too preoccupied during the Hundred Years' War and the Wars of the Roses to maintain control, the Irish were too disunited to organize the island into a single state and to secure complete independence. Later, under the Tudors, Protestant England began a second conquest. Since Ireland had not been affected by the Reformation, this reconquest had all the bitterness of a religious war. Again English immigrants settled the conquered lands, and a large migration of Scots into Northern Ireland established a cultural minority that ever since has been a political problem.

In the period of nation making from 1066 to 1550 distinct geographic advantages favored Britain's growth as a power. Separation from the Continent by the English Channel reduced the danger of external attack; at the same time the proximity of England to the Continent had significant economic effects. Southern Britain faced Flanders, a node of medieval trade routes and a country in which a textile industry flourished early. English sheep, pastured on the chalk

and limestone grasslands directly across the Channel from Flanders, produced excellent wool much desired by the Flemish. Exports of wool to Flanders began, and soon English wool was being sold in northern Italy and the ports of northern Europe. Later the manufacture of woolen goods was started in East Anglia (worsted) and in the scarp-face valleys of the Cotswolds (broadcloth and serges), and cloth soon replaced raw wool as the chief export. By the fifteenth century British cloth improved in quality and soon surpassed the production of the Flemish textile industry. By the mid-sixteenth century Britain had established a firm foundation for industrial enterprise at home and appeared well prepared to engage in competition for overseas trade.

FROM ABOUT 1550 TO AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE—The age of exploration and the discovery of the New World transformed the space relations of Europe. Britain, till then tucked away in a corner of the Old World, suddenly found herself in the very center of the land surface of the globe. The gradual adjustment and the growing skill of her people in seamanship, industry, and trade now bore fruit. British sailors explored the new seaways, colonies were planted in North America and the Caribbean, and trading stations were scattered at strategic points throughout the Orient.

All European countries with an Atlantic frontage shared the new opportunities, but not all had Britain's advantages. Spain and Portugal, first in the field, through overexpansion and an adverse combination of political, economic, and social factors, quickly lost their initial drive and stagnated. Holland, a more vigorous rival, was hampered by its small size and the long struggle against Spain. France alone offered serious competition to Britain, and a duel between the two powers lasted down to 1815. But the odds were with Britain. Loss of Calais in 1558, the last remaining foothold on the Con-



continent, finally had freed Britain from continental ambitions and from the need of a costly standing army. Henceforth, British energies were concentrated in the colonial field, and British wealth was devoted to the building of a large navy. France, on the other hand, firmly embedded in the Continent, could not renounce territorial claims in Europe so easily, the French frontier to the northeast was a constant source of danger from invasion as well as a lure to ambitious French monarchs. With France preoccupied by conflicting interests at home, Britain triumphed in North America and India, and her first empire was established—an empire including eastern North America, several Caribbean islands, and trading stations in India and the Far East. But this empire lasted only a few years (1763–83). The loss of the American colonies brought the first empire to an end.

FROM 1783 TO 1870—Following the colonial wars in North America Britain once more met the challenge of France—then under Napoleon's guiding genius—and successfully led a coalition of powers (1803–15) to end the Napoleonic threat. With the close of the Napoleonic Era in 1815 England turned to her domestic problems while continental countries of Europe were involved in post-war reconstruction and the struggle for national unity. The United States was absorbed in its own westward expansion and the growing dissension between the North and the South.

Without fear of competition, either political or military, Britain forged ahead. At home, agricultural and industrial processes were completely reorganized. More and more attention was given to the efficient use of the land until the present agricultural pattern was established. In industry a more rapid and more far-reaching revolution took place. The use of steam power, made possible by the invention of machines using coal as a source of fuel for power, drew industry

from the rivers to the coal fields. Production expanded, foreign trade flourished, and overseas markets were staked out. The Industrial Revolution raised Great Britain to a dominant position in world commerce and industry.

Overseas, the acquisition of naval bases and coaling stations along the world's trade routes enabled British sea power to bring vast areas under the Union Jack. A second empire arose on the scattered relics of the first. Into the wide expanse of temperate lands poured a steady stream of English emigrants, especially into Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa—all areas of sparse population. In India, however, Great Britain took over control of a populous subcontinent from the decadent Mogul emperors. Britain also established trading ports along the African coast and along the east coastal area of China. Strategic in this imperial growth were the key strongholds at Gibraltar, Suez, and Singapore.

Through political control Britain reshaped the economies of colonial areas to fit her own pattern. The cloth industry of Northern Ireland had already been killed; by the nineteenth century the Indian trade in textiles shared the same fate. First, tariffs to protect Lancashire's development destroyed the British market for Indian calicos. Then, when Lancashire cottons invaded the Indian market, similar protection was denied the native industry. Various colonial areas supplied the raw materials for British industries, which in turn supplied needed manufactures for a world-wide market.

In world affairs Britain avoided foreign entanglements that might impede or obstruct peaceful development. Thus Britain tended to exploit her insularity to the utmost and withdraw into "splendid isolation." From the age of Queen Elizabeth to the end of the nineteenth century British foreign policy reduced to its simplest form is seen to have been successfully guided by three cardinal principles:

1. The preservation of a balance of power in Europe that would ensure no single power achieving hegemony in that Continent

2. The safeguarding of the independence of the Low Countries—that cockpit of Europe which if held by any great power, would menace the London Basin and threaten British control of the narrow seas.

3. The maintenance of naval supremacy and preservation of that freedom of the seas which would allow British trade to expand peacefully.

In general, the nineteenth century witnessed an era of Pax Britannica founded on the industrial strength of the Isles, the British fleet, and the world-wide British Empire.

FROM 1870 TO 1914—The year 1870 roughly marks the end of Britain's period of uncontested expansion. In the half century that followed, British imperial supremacy was seriously challenged in several areas. In Europe, Germany and Italy were at last unified, and in the Pacific, Japan emerged as a new power. Continental European and American industrial resources were being exploited and developed, and formidable rivals appeared in markets hitherto controlled by the British. As their trade expanded and their political ambitions grew, the new industrial powers of Europe increased their efforts to carve out empires in the colonial areas of Africa and the marginal parts of Asia. Britain also took part in this imperialist drive, and by 1914 emerged with an empire covering one fifth of the world land area and one fourth of its population. The new acquisitions were for the most part tropical lands, peopled by tribes with a primitive type of culture. Extension of political control over areas of this type raised perplexing problems of colonial administration, most of which are still unsolved.

Germany, more richly endowed in technology and skills than many of her neighbors, soon outstripped all competitors in industrial development. The search for a "place in the sun" brought Germany into conflict with British interests everywhere.

On the Continent the rise of German military power threatened to upset the delicate balance of power and to force Britain to leave her splendid isolation in favor of an alliance with old rivals—France and Russia. Exports from Germany were invading British markets all over the world. The *Drang nach Osten* (drive to the east), with the planned Berlin-to-Baghdad Railway, threatened Britain's commercial and political hold on the Near and Middle East, and the naval race jeopardized British supremacy on the seas. By 1914 the situation was critical. When at last the attack on Belgium threatened to establish Germany on the southern shore of the narrow seas, Britain declared war, not so much to protect a small nation against a powerful aggressor as to safeguard that basis on which for nearly three centuries British political and economic life had rested.

#### IMPACT OF GLOBAL CONFLICT

FROM 1914 TO 1945—The result of two global wars has been the virtual destruction of the basis of British supremacy and a changed pattern of power relationships, which have forced the nation to redefine its position. Quite apart from the wars, however, an unbalanced economy with an extreme dependence on foreign trade had already seriously impaired Britain's position as a world power.)

*Economic Development.* (Toward the close of the nineteenth century wheat from the farm lands of the New World appeared on the world market. Wheat from the Western Hemisphere was far cheaper than that grown in the wet climate and leached forest soils of Western Europe. Moreover, mechanized methods of cultivation increased the productivity and returns from lands across the Atlantic. Thus an agricultural crisis was precipitated.) France and Germany protected their agriculture by tariffs. Denmark re-

tained free trade and developed an export dairy trade based on imported fodder (Britain had previously decided against agricultural tariffs, preferring the free import of foodstuffs, for lower living costs meant lower production costs at home and greater competitive strength abroad. Nonetheless, free import of grain hit British agriculture badly, throwing large areas out of production.) Some abandoned grain lands were left in grass; others became estates of the new industrial aristocracy (By 1914 the drift of rural people to the towns had left only seven per cent of the population engaged in agriculture (compared with thirty-one per cent in Germany). More and more food was imported from abroad and paid for with exports of manufactured goods, with services, such as shipping, and with foreign investments.)

For many decades Britain had loaned other nations the capital with which to build railways, roads, and factories; by 1914 foreign investments amounted to \$20,000,000,000. It was largely (the earnings from these investments that enabled Britain to pay for a long list of imports and thus redress the foreign-trade deficit.) Furthermore, London, as the leading financial center of the world, earned large commissions for financial transactions. To this income were added the earnings of the British merchant marine, which handled a substantial part of world trade.

World peace was essential for such an economy to function. (War, which interrupted the flow of foreign trade, was a disaster in that it shut off overseas markets and devoured profits normally used to increase investments abroad and sustain the flow of imports. Britain experienced just such serious losses during World War I, when its former overseas markets were forced to find other sources of supply.) The prewar trade structure was not reconstructed after the war; previous markets were either in the hands of competitors or were supplied by

home industries behind high tariff walls. The British realized that drastic adjustment was imperative.

*Weaknesses.* A re-examination of the three factors that influenced the earlier stages of Britain's development so strongly shows that their importance began to diminish in the years following World War I. First, aerial warfare had reduced the strategic value of insularity, and economic separation from the continental market had become a handicap. Ports, such as Liverpool and London, had far smaller hinterlands than their continental rivals, such as Antwerp and Hamburg, which could tap the trade of regions much larger than the whole of the British Isles.

Second, in several ways the space relations of Britain were changed for the worse. Development of Pacific routes and the growing importance of Pacific nations detracted from the paramount importance of the Atlantic. In addition, the British agreement with the United States to accept parity in the ratio of capital ships marked the passing of British supremacy in sea power. Nearer home the appearance of a virtually independent and not too friendly Irish republic exposed the isles to the possibility of an enemy attack by sea and air power in event of war.

Last, the coal resources were gradually being depleted. Great reserves still remained, but long and often wasteful exploitation was necessitating deeper pits and higher mining costs at a time when competition from areas with newer and better equipment was becoming critical. Moreover, the world market for coal was diminishing as petroleum found greater uses in industry, sea-borne shipping, and the heating of homes. Of this new source of power, Britain had virtually none. Such drastic changes in fuel supplies cut British coal exports from about 100,000,000 tons in 1913 to 75,000,000 in 1930.

At the same time one must also bear in mind the great expenditure on armaments

and defense necessitated by the existence of the Commonwealth-Empire. From 1884 to 1931 Britain spent on armaments alone \$53,000,000,000; whereas the total value of colonial trade was only \$89,000,000,000. Between 1921 and 1931 the average annual expenditure on arms was \$590,000,000, a significant figure for that period.

*Strength.* Despite an unfortunate setback in her international position, Britain still had many assets. The first was the momentum attributable to an early start in industrialization, including long industrial tradition and experience, well-equipped training and technical schools, accumulated knowledge of foreign markets, and many long-established commercial links. After World War I Britain still retained over \$15,000,000,000 in foreign investments, and her shipping had been increased by the addition of the German mercantile marine as part of the peace settlement following the war.

A second asset was the Commonwealth-Empire (see table on pages 256-57). Within the limits of this great political structure one must distinguish between self-governing Dominions and dependent areas. In the former group the economically independent units often followed high-tariff policies in order to foster young industries. Nevertheless, they generally acknowledged Britain's political leadership for strategic reasons and shared defense costs. There was also an economic link. The Dominions tended to seek British capital and to use the London money market; in turn, British goods were given preferential tariff rates, and the large groups of citizens of English origin provided a ready market for home-country products.

In the dependent part of the Empire—that is, India and the Crown colonies—economic life was generally controlled to the advantage of Britain. This advantage held true, even though Britain had long advocated an open-door policy in colonial territories and, with minor exceptions, had applied it in her own.

The use of English as the official language, the linking of the currency to sterling, and the tendency, other things being equal, to give public works contracts to British firms all combined to preserve the favorable trade position between Britain and her dependent possessions. Moreover, the bulk of the trade between Britain and the Empire was carried in ships flying the British flag. Thus, the Empire was a great asset, important both for trade and for reinvestment of capital.

*Economic Dilemma.* The British economy needed revitalizing to offset a weakened world-trade position, stiff political competition, and heavy expenditures for defense measures. Two solutions could possibly alleviate the unfavorable situation.

First, there could be direct participation in world organization, entailing political and economic cooperation within the framework of the League of Nations and providing the initial step in the creation of a United States of Europe. This policy had many supporters, but the governing class, trained in the tradition of splendid isolation, viewed commitments in Europe as signs of weakness and as fraught with the dangers of entanglement.

Second, the solution might lie in the welding of the Empire into a self-contained economic unit, surrounded by high tariff walls. For a century British electors had consistently rejected tariffs and as late as 1923 had defeated the Conservative Government on that very issue. But under the pressure of the American high-tariff policy, Dominion demands and Conservative policies combined at the Ottawa Conference in 1932 to impose a preferential-tariff system and thus terminate an era of free trade.

This latter policy, however, was geographically, historically, and economically impracticable. First, the Empire was not, and could not be, a completely self-supporting unit; so trade with non-Empire areas was always essential. Second, the Dominions,

though eager to secure the British market for food and raw material, were much too eager to develop their own industries to remove all tariffs on British manufactures. Britain herself faced obstacles of greater magnitude. Only one third of her trade was within the Empire, the remainder was divided almost equally between Europe and the rest of the world. Immediate reorganization of such a trade pattern was impossible. Even had the Empire been able to supply all of the British necessities, the greater transport costs in bringing these products from distant points would have created serious deficits in trade balances. Moreover, tariffs on products imported from countries in which Britain had large investments would create difficulties in the interest payments that normally entered as export commodities rather than gold. So clumsy a policy benefited the Empire little, if at all.

*Geopolitical Dangers.* Changed conditions also forced Britain to devise new policies in the political field. Naval supremacy was forever lost. Even though friendly relations with the United States might be assumed, the naval programs of Japan and Italy were matters of grave concern. The life lines of the Empire were menaced, not only by the expansion of potentially hostile navies, but also by the possibility of attacks by land-based planes.

The Mediterranean route especially was endangered. Gibraltar no longer stood impregnable, isolated as it was in a hostile hinterland and threatened across the Strait by Spanish power in Morocco. The defensive strength of Malta, midway in the Mediterranean, was curtailed by the Italian fortification of adjacent Pantelleria. Britain's hold on the Suez Canal was similarly threatened by a rising tide of Arab nationalism and growing hostility throughout the Arab world. Altogether the Mediterranean route, the strategic life line of the Empire, seemed to be extremely vulnerable, and one group of

British strategists even advised its complete abandonment in event of war, with the re-routing of all trade from the East (about fifty per cent of the British total) around the Cape of Good Hope. Despite plans for redirecting traffic in this manner, Britain strengthened its Mediterranean possessions as bases from which an enemy could be harassed, military events in World War II proved the wisdom of this policy.

In Europe, British policy was vacillating and futile. The Treaty of Versailles had tended to "balkanize" Europe, a result that at first seemed to simplify Britain's traditional role as the balancer of the Continent. But with the spread of economic nationalism came the need for some form of international cooperation. The United States was not a member of the League of Nations. France, dominated by the age-old fear of the north-east frontier, was too preoccupied in keeping Germany weak. Britain, the obvious nation to assert leadership and give direction, did nothing.

In face of the magnitude of the task of postwar readjustment, Britain reverted to the defense of the status quo. Geographical insularity dominated British thinking. Thus Britain abandoned a strong European policy for one of greater Empire solidarity, and thereby opened the way for the rise of the Third Reich. Rather than take steps to prevent one power from dominating Europe, Britain remained militarily weak and viewed the threat of Bolshevik Russia as a counterweight to the rising power of Nazi Germany. British statesmen could not decide which menace was the greater; some even welcomed Nazi Germany as a possible anti-Bolshevik ally. Because Britain's leaders temporized, the nation once again was obliged to fight to break German domination of Europe.

POSTWAR BRITAIN—Victory in World War II solved none of Britain's economic or political ills. Indeed, the war merely accen-

## British Commonwealth and Empire Territories: Area, Population, and Political Status

<i>Territories</i>	<i>Area (in sq mi)</i>	<i>Population (latest estimate)</i>	<i>Political Status</i>
<b>Commonwealth areas</b>			
Australia	2,974,581	9,000,000	Dominion
Canada	3,577,163	15,000,000	Dominion
Ceylon	25,832	8,105,000	Dominion
India	1,269,640	376,750,000	Republic
New Zealand	103,740	2,088,000	Dominion
Pakistan	364,737	75,800,000	Republic
Union of South Africa	472,685	13,629,000	Dominion
<b>Africa</b>			
Basutoland	11,716	600,000	High Commission Terr.
Bechuanaland Protectorate	275,000	298,000	High Commission Terr.
British Cameroons	34,081	1,500,000	Trusteeship
British Togoland	13,041	416,000	Trusteeship
Central African Federation <sup>a</sup>			
Northern Rhodesia	288,130	2,071,800	Protectorate
Nyasaland	47,404	2,483,800	Protectorate
Southern Rhodesia	150,333	2,110,000	Self-governing Colony
Gambia	4,003	289,600	Colony & Protectorate
Gold Coast <sup>b</sup>	78,802	4,062,000	Colony & Protectorate
Kenya	224,960	5,947,000	Colony & Protectorate
Nigeria	339,169	30,000,000	Colony & Protectorate
Sierra Leone	27,925	2,000,000	Colony & Protectorate
Somaliland	68,000	640,000	Protectorate
Swaziland	6,705	210,000	High Commission Terr.
Tanganyika	362,688	8,196,000	Trusteeship
Uganda	93,981	5,425,000	Protectorate
Zanzibar and Pemba	1,020	274,000	Protectorate
<b>Atlantic Ocean</b>			
Falkland Islands (and dependencies)	4,618	2,200	Colony
South Georgia	1,600	1,500	
South Orkneys	240	—	
South Shetlands	1,800	—	
St. Helena and Ascension Island	81	5,070	Colony
Tristan da Cunha	38	275	Dependency of St. Helena
<b>Caribbean area</b>			
Bahamas	4,404	85,000	Colony
Barbados	166	221,000	Colony
Bermuda	21	39,300	Colony
British Guiana	83,000	459,000	Colony
British Honduras	8,866	72,000	Colony
Jamaica (and dependencies)	4,411	1,487,000	Colony
Cayman Islands	100	7,600	
Turks and Caicos	166	6,600	
Leeward Islands <sup>c</sup>			
Antigua	171	49,000	Presidency
Montserrat	32	13,000	Presidency

British Commonwealth and Empire Territories—*continued*

<i>Territories</i>	<i>Area (in sq mi)</i>	<i>Population (latest estimate)</i>	<i>Political Status</i>
<i>Caribbean area (continued)</i>			
St Christopher-Nevis-Anguilla	153	52,000	Presidency
Virgin Islands	67	7,400	Presidency
Trinidad and Tobago	1,980	678,300	Colony
Windward Islands			
Dominica	305	56,000	Colony
Grenada	133	83,000	Colony
St Lucia	238	84,000	Colony
St Vincent	150	72,000	Colony
<i>Far East</i>			
Brunei	2,226	53,000	Protected State
Hong Kong (incl Kowloon area)	391 <sup>d</sup>	2,250,000	Colony
Malaya, Federation of	50,690	5,888,600	Protected State
North Borneo	29,387	360,000	Colony
Sarawak	47,071	592,000	Colony
Singapore	224	1,121,000	Colony
Christmas Island	62	1,900	
Cocos-Keeling Islands	6	625	
<i>Indian Ocean</i>			
Aden (incl. Perim)	80	150,000	Colony
Aden Protectorate	112,000	800,000	Protectorate
Maldives Islands	115	93,000	Protected State
Mauritius (with dependencies)	809	530,000	Colony
Seychelles	156	38,000	Colony
<i>Mediterranean area</i>			
Cyprus	3,572	514,000	Self-governing Colony
Gibraltar	2.25	24,600	Colony
Malta and Gozo	122	317,000	Colony
<i>Western Pacific</i>			
Fiji	7,040	317,000	Colony
New Hebrides	5,700	53,000	Anglo-French Condominium
Pitcairn	2	125	Colony
Tonga	269	50,000	Protected State
Western Pacific High Commission Territories			
Gilbert and Ellice Islands	369	38,000	Colony
British Solomon Islands	11,500	99,000	Protectorate

<sup>a</sup> Members of Central African Federation under Act of July 14, 1953. The capital of the Federal State is at Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia.

<sup>b</sup> To become a Dominion in 1957 under the new name Ghana.

<sup>c</sup> The presidencies of the Leeward Islands formed a federation in 1871, which lasted to 1955, when it was announced that the federation would be abolished. The Secretary of State for Colonies announced the formation of new constitutions.

<sup>d</sup> Hong Kong Island is 32 square miles in area.

tuated and deepened the decline and readjustment in its power status, a transformation long evident between the two wars. The cost of the wars, amounting to one fourth of the national wealth, was just short of disastrous. Britain extricated itself with the greatest difficulty, being forced to adopt socialist measures at home and stringent controls over foreign trade. Nonetheless, the record of postwar recovery is most impressive. Within five years Britain settled foreign-debt accounts, owed principally to Canada and the United States, which totaled \$5,000,000,000. In the same period income from overseas investment, a major portion of which was liquidated during the war, returned to the prewar level. Also by 1950 Britain had recaptured its 1939 shipping tonnage of 22,000,000 tons, one third of which was lost in the war. Careful reconstruction policies gradually improved Britain's basic position in world trade.

Yet these achievements cannot overcome the more serious weaknesses in British economy. Dependence on imports, particularly from the dollar area, has continued to increase, and stiff competition is developing for markets abroad. A drastic change in the world price structure has thrown the whole export industry of Britain out of focus. The cost of imported items has increased at a greater rate than the income earned by manufactures exported. In effect, Britain in 1950 had to export eighty per cent more in volume than in 1938 to pay for the same volume of imports. Added to this drawback is the prospect of serious competition with West Germany, an efficient producer for the world market.

In part owing to war damages and the diversion of efforts into the reconditioning of factories, Britain lost markets through failure to deliver goods promptly. Competition with other countries is also keen. Recently, when certain Japanese cloth reentered the West African market, it was

offered at one fourth the price charged by the English for the same grade of material. Along with the ever-continuing trade deficit goes a defense expenditure that further adds to the deficit at a high figure of \$2,800,000,000.

*Present-day Economy.* What can Britain do? It seems clear that reliance can no longer be placed on either the old staples (for example, cotton textiles) or the high-quality goods produced by individual craftsmen for the cultured leisure class of Europe, as in prewar days. Britain's best markets today are in the newer countries which demand mass-produced goods: radios, television sets, refrigerators, automobiles, motor scooters. Among these newer products Britain must concentrate on those in which the cost of raw materials is a small part of the selling price. Jet aeroplanes, for example, which bring \$100,000 to \$200,000 for every ton of material used in them, are a better line than cars which bring only \$3,000. To develop these lines, however, requires heavy capital expenditure and a substantial outlay on research and the training of workers.

On the whole Britain's dependence on foreign markets is inescapable. It is unlikely that Great Britain can attain a balance in trade unless the volume of world trade expands and multilateral arrangements permit British goods to enter both sterling and non-sterling areas.

*Britain in the World Order.* Changing space relations since World War II have affected Britain and forcibly caused a different political attitude. London is now more remote from the great power centers of the world, for Washington and Moscow have come to the fore, whereas Berlin, Paris, and Rome are now secondary, rather than primary, in importance. Britain, then, might be said to occupy a peripheral position in respect to the bipolar centers of world power—that is,



Washington and Moscow. The geographic position of the Isles in relation to the Continent, formerly a source of security, in mid-twentieth century renders them vulnerable to external assaults. A continental land power overshadows the strength of an off-shore island, and sea power itself is no longer a determinant in world-power status. This situation has increased Britain's willingness to cooperate with Western Europe.

Only in 1940, with Churchill's dramatic offer of a union with France, did Britain reverse its traditional insularity. After the war, however, British leadership avoided political integration with the Continent, except for treaties of mutual cooperation with Western Europe.

In 1948 Britain joined France and Benelux in the Brussels Treaty Organization—a fifty-year alliance, with agreements to foster cultural and economic cooperation. Though this action may be considered merely a modern version of the traditional policy of protecting the Low Countries, it has saddled Britain with greater responsibilities than she has ever been willing to accept. Likewise the London and Paris Agreements for the rearmament of West Germany commit Britain to maintain troops on the Continent. However, Britain's willingness to accept commitments in Europe does not extend far, as is evident from her refusal to join the European Coal and Steel Community. This cautious attitude, productive of much disappointment in Europe, results from Britain's connection with the Commonwealth. All the Dominions have endorsed the concept of a Western European union along the present lines, but this does not mean that Britain can play a more active part on the Continent without weakening Commonwealth ties.

The Dominions, despite independence in respect to war and foreign policy, are closely associated with Britain. What would be their position if Britain joined a European

federation? The supreme allegiance of a Canadian or Australian would still be to the British Crown, but for an Englishman loyalty to the Crown would be superseded by loyalty to the new authority. In the councils of the united Europe, Britain would be a separate entity apart from the Dominions; from the Commonwealth standpoint Britain would be shackled by her commitments to the European government.

Similarly in economic affairs, Britain as a member of a European customs union would continue imperial preference to the Dominions only if they entered the union. But would the Dominions desire to be involved in Europe? And if they did so desire, would the continental powers welcome their entry and the resultant dominance of the British group?

There is also the proposal that Britain should lead a third bloc (the Commonwealth), and it is argued that in this capacity it should adopt the same attitude toward European unity that it adopted nearly 100 years ago toward Italian unity—friendly encouragement without active participation. A more extreme policy, advocated by some, favors a united Europe as the only possible third power bloc between the United States and the USSR, in which Britain would take the lead in unification.

Britain's indecision between these policies has held back European cooperation and, in retrospect, may appear as harmful as was its similar indecision in the interwar period. A further complication is the development of the Atlantic community. Membership in NATO has forged a link with the United States, and Britain may continue to gravitate toward stronger transatlantic relations. It is perhaps significant that the possibility of this has been discussed in British circles, one writer actually stating that though union with the United States is at present inadvisable, if danger of conflict lasts another century, such a union will be inescapable.

Thus Britain, close to, but not actually a part of, continental Europe and facing the Atlantic, finds its most difficult, persistent

political problems rooted in its space relations, which make several orientations possible but none inevitable.

## THE ISLAND OF IRELAND

### GEOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND

One third the size of Great Britain, or only slightly larger than West Virginia, Ireland is a central plain within a frame of mountains. The mountains are detached fragments of those in western Britain, and support the same natural vegetation. The lowland is formed of limestone over which lie impermeable glacial deposits. Absence of slope and poor drainage cause the numerous bogs for which Ireland is noted. Although the drainage is better near the coast and in the valleys of the highland rim, constant high humidity and cool summers favor grass rather than cereals. As a result, well over half the land of Ireland is in rough or permanent pasture, and forage crops in all parts support large numbers of cattle, horses, sheep, and pigs. These farm animals and their products are the main source of Ireland's wealth. Because lack of good transportation facilities has handicapped the dairy industry, beef cattle are more important than dairy herds. Of the few crops grown, potatoes and oats lead in production.

Ireland lacks important sources of power, and thus is handicapped both in industrialization and in surface transportation. Despite the abundance of peat (brown coal) in bogs that dot the Irish landscape, its inferior quality makes it unsuitable for industrial use in competition with English coal. Most of the industries that do exist are in Northern Ireland, linen (County Down) and shipbuilding (Belfast) ranking as the two most important. Elsewhere, there is only the processing of agricultural

products: bacon curing, butter and cheese making, brewing, and grain milling.

The population of 4,300,000—small in comparison with that of Great Britain—is mainly rural and widely scattered. Of the total, about 3,000,000 live in the Republic of Ireland and about 1,300,000 in Northern Ireland. The latter, as mentioned before, is a part of the United Kingdom. The density of population for the island as a whole is not high as measured against that of Western Europe, but it is much greater than that of Indiana or Michigan. Each of the two political divisions of the island has one metropolitan center. Dublin, capital of the Irish Republic (700,000); and Belfast, capital of Northern Ireland (450,000). Several secondary cities, all between 25,000 and 80,000 in population, lie along the sea-coast: Cork, Limerick, and Waterford in Ireland, and Londonderry in Northern Ireland.

In 1846 the island of Ireland had a population of 8,500,000, most of whom lived in the central and southern part of the island. Thus the present population is only half what it was in the middle of the nineteenth century. The decrease was primarily brought about by a great "potato famine." Because of heavy emigration to America, the United States today has an Irish population four times greater than that of the entire island of Ireland.

### HISTORICAL SURVEY

Early in the Christian era, Ireland consisted of five kingdoms (Ulster, North Leinster,

South Leinster, Munster, and Connaught), each under its own ruler. In the fifth century St. Patrick, who brought Christianity to the country, became its patron saint. By the seventh century the Irish had progressed culturally to the point where they were the most advanced group in northern Europe. During the next several centuries thereafter the country suffered a long series of disrupting invasions, from which the native Celts received an intermingling of Saxon, Norman, Danish, and English blood. In the middle of the twelfth century the Pope assigned all Ireland to the English Crown, and Henry II became "Lord of Ireland"; but native sectional rule continued, and English domination over the entire island became complete only in the seventeenth century. From that period down to the present century Irish Catholic tenant farmers have bitterly opposed the injustices and oppression of the absentee British Protestant landlords. Added to the constant upheavals growing out of internal racial and religious cleavages has been the continual struggle for freedom from the English Crown.

#### RECENT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

In 1920 Ireland was granted home rule, with the status of a Dominion. At the same time six Ulster counties of Northern Ireland were permitted to set up a parliament separate from that of Southern Ireland and to retain closer relations with Great Britain. In 1922 the twenty-six counties of Eire accepted Dominion status "for the time being," but the constitutional links were gradually severed.<sup>3</sup> In 1949, with the passing of the Republic of Ireland Act, Eire formally seceded from the Commonwealth, and the Irish Republic was proclaimed. It is now an independent, democratic state with a presi-

dent, a senate, and a house of representatives in control of its national life.

Northern Ireland also has its own parliament and a considerable degree of local autonomy, but the governor is appointed by Britain. The local government exercises wide powers in all fields save those affecting foreign relations and a few other reserved subjects, such as defense and communications (stamps and postal services). In addition, Northern Ireland sends twelve representatives to the British House of Commons.

With partition, the Republic has put special emphasis on developing its own national character. Erse (Gaelic) has been made the official language of the Republic, and a vigorous campaign to revive it has been carried on. As yet the success of this campaign is doubtful. Erse-speaking areas (that is, where over eighty per cent of the people speak Erse) are limited to a few sections of the west coast. In two thirds of the country less than twenty-five per cent of the people speak Erse, and though children are taught the language in the schools, they lose it quickly after leaving, especially when it is not used in their homes.

Religious differences between the two political divisions have been accentuated. In the Republic, Roman Catholics have steadily increased in number—89.2 per cent of the total population in 1871; 93.4 per cent in 1936; and more than 94 per cent in 1951. Cultural, and particularly religious, differences thus embitter relations between Ulster and the Republic. About one third of the people in Northern Ireland are Roman Catholic. The Catholic minority is too widely scattered to be incorporated into the Republic by a modification of the boundary, and the numbers involved make an exchange of minorities impracticable.

The Republic refuses to accept the partition of Ireland as permanent, and its new constitution applies in theory to the whole of Ireland. For its part, Northern Ireland, sup-

<sup>3</sup> The name "Eire" was adopted in 1937 in preference to Irish Free State. Though technically a Dominion, no one officially used the title.

ported by Britain, steadily refuses to consider reunion. This dispute dominates all political issues, both local and international. The Republic has raised the unification issue in the Council of Europe and has refused to join NATO so long as Northern Ireland

refuses to leave the United Kingdom and join it. Unless some solution can be found, there will remain a gap in the Atlantic defenses, and in the event of war Britain will again have difficulty in controlling Atlantic shipping routes off the west coast of Ireland.

### Study Questions

1. Define the terms: (a) United Kingdom, (b) Great Britain, (c) England, (d) British Isles, (e) British Empire, (f) British Commonwealth of Nations.
2. What geographical factors have influenced the distribution of population in Great Britain?
3. What is the Celtic Culture Zone? How did it come into being? Has it any importance in political geography today?
4. What were the chief results of contact between Britain and Europe before the sixteenth century?
5. Why did Britain outstrip all other western European nations in the race for colonies?
6. What were the three great eras of the British Empire? Did they differ in geographical character?
7. Why did the power of Great Britain in international affairs begin to decline after 1900?
8. What are invisible exports? Explain their importance to Great Britain.
9. How did World War I affect the economy of Great Britain?
10. What is meant by "Empire free trade"? Was it a satisfactory policy?
11. Define the term "space relations." How can space relations change?
12. Are the major differences between Eire and Northern Ireland environmental, cultural, or strictly political? Explain.
13. Are political and economic relations between Great Britain and the United States likely to become closer or less close in the future? Justify your answer.
14. To what extent has Britain's connection with the Commonwealth been an advantage?
15. Assess the importance of the English Channel in the political development of Britain.


## CHAPTER SIXTEEN

# *Fennoscandia*

The five countries of Fennoscandia<sup>1</sup>—Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Iceland—occupy a place in world affairs out of proportion to their relatively small population<sup>2</sup> and modest military strength (see map on this page). Their international influence is considerable for several reasons: a large number of their people have settled overseas, especially in the United States and Canada; the Scandinavian merchant fleets are prominent in world shipping; these small nations have much to show the world about stable, democratic government and the application of cooperative principles in production and trading; and, finally, they have made valuable contributions to the

<sup>1</sup> Name derived from Finland and Scandinavia. The term Scandinavia, or "Scandinavian countries," is used here to include Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Iceland. When Finland is to be included, the term "northern countries" may also be employed.

<sup>2</sup> The total area is about 510,000 square miles, and the population is 19,000,000.



arts and sciences and to technology. The world-renowned Nobel prizes, established by, and in honor of, a Swedish inventor and

industrialist, are a reminder of the pre-eminence of the northern nations.

Territories of the northern countries form a bridge across the Atlantic Ocean, stretching from Canada to north central Europe and the USSR. Excluding the outlying islands, the Fennoscandian countries form a fairly compact unit, covering about 1,300 miles from north to south and 700 miles from west to east. They surround the Baltic Sea on three sides and guard the entrance to that body of water from the North Sea. Fennoscandia stretches from southern Denmark, at a latitude of about 55° North, corresponding to that of central Labrador, to Norway's North Cape, 300 miles north of the Arctic Circle.

## SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES

Close historic ties and common cultural associations unite the peoples of the five nations. Except for Finnish, the Scandinavian languages are closely related to one another; the majority of the peoples are members of the Lutheran Church. There is an increasing tendency for the governments to coordinate their policies in trade, cultural affairs, social questions, industrial development, and international affairs. But, although similar in many ways, these nations have individual characteristics, determined in part by their different locations and physical environments. Thus their strategic situations are far from being identical.

## NORWAY

Norway lies open to the Atlantic Ocean and, as a result, is a maritime state. It is largely isolated from the mainland, since a high glaciated mountain range on the border between Norway and Sweden hinders communications between the two countries. On the west and north is a deeply indented coastline cut by long, narrow fjords, with scattered offshore islands. Confined largely to the coast, Norwegians became skilled fishermen and ideal recruits for the merchant marine and navy. The fjord coastline makes military invasion from the sea hazardous except at a few places where broad valleys run far inland. Level land suitable for cultivation is rare except in the south around Oslo and to the north near Trondheim.

Norway is strongly influenced by an oceanic type of climate, with a fairly small seasonal variation of temperature and rather heavy precipitation. Most of its 12,500 miles of coastline is ice-free throughout the year. Coastal Norway has the mildest climate of any part of the world of the same

latitude. In the far north summer days are very long, favoring agriculture in areas beyond the latitude normally adaptable to summer crops. At North Cape there is continuous daylight from May 15 to July 31; in midwinter the reverse is true—two months of almost complete darkness.

## ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES

Agriculture is more important in Norway's economy than the small cultivable area (three per cent) would suggest. Available agricultural land is intensively cultivated, usually in small plots, of which almost none are more than fifty acres in area, and most are less than one tenth of that size. Less than one third of the population lives directly off the land, and many farmers engage in other occupations as well. Sufficient dairy products, vegetables, and meat are produced for domestic needs, but grains are largely imported. Thus Norway is very dependent on overseas trade even for some essential foodstuffs.

Fishing, which is combined with farming in some areas, is of outstanding importance, but since the fishing is seasonal, there is much temporary unemployment in coastal areas. Nevertheless Norway, with an annual catch of 1,000,000 tons, is the leading fishing nation in Europe, and this industry accounts for one third of the value of Norwegian exports. The industry has been modernized since World War II, and many new vessels have been added to the fishing fleet. Whaling, in which Norwegians are specialists, is carried on mainly in the Antarctic. The whaling industry is important for several reasons: it offers highly paid, if seasonal, employment for seamen and technicians; it supplies needed fats and oils; and it brings considerable returns in foreign exchange from the export of whale products.

Forests, which cover about one quarter of the land area, represent Norway's greatest source of industrial raw material. The industry is concentrated in the southeast of Norway, where ample supplies of cheap electricity permit the processing of wood pulp, paper, and cellulose as well as of many by-products.

There are widespread mineral deposits in Norway, but few of them are at present of outstanding economic importance. Exploration for, and development of, minerals has been chiefly delayed by lack of capital. The largest mining company, located at Kirkenes in the northeast, not far from the USSR boundary, works a low-grade taconite iron-ore deposit, which is concentrated for export, mainly to Germany and Britain. At Mo, not far from the Arctic Circle on the west coast, an integrated steel plant is located near iron ore. Copper mining is also an extractive industry of note.

The processing of imported ores by means of hydroelectric power is very important. Examples are the refining of aluminum, in Sogne Fjord, and nickel, at Kristiansand, both from imported ores. An abundance of hydroelectric power accounts for a well-

developed electrochemical industry. The production of nitrates by means of the nitrogen-fixation process combined with limestone resources was one of its early enterprises. Concentrated deep in the larger fjords of the southwest coast, the electrochemical industry became an important target in World War II, especially when it was employed for making heavy water used in atomic research.

## TRANSPORTATION

The long, indented coast of Norway has an excellent system of water transportation. Fast cargo and passenger vessels make regular daily calls at important ports from Oslo to Kirkenes. From each of these calling points smaller vessels carry passengers, freight, and mail to outlying settlements, however small. Around seaports, such as Bergen, Trondheim, and Narvik, there is what amounts almost to a suburban water-bus service, using the fjords and sheltered sounds between the many islands as a highway. Traffic is not interrupted in winter because the seas do not freeze. Large industries are usually located on tidewater, sometimes at the head of a very long fjord into which large freighters and ocean-going passenger liners can navigate without difficulty.

Railway maps of Norway and Sweden illustrate clearly the influence of topography and land use on transportation. The irregular coastline and rugged terrain of Norway have made railway construction expensive, and operations are difficult owing to heavy winter snowfall, especially near the coast. There is as yet no railway connecting the far north with the south. At present the main line extends only as far north as the Arctic Circle (Lönsdal), although work is being done to continue it to the seaport of Bodø somewhat beyond. In the south, the railway routes are determined largely by the valleys that lead through the high pla-

teaus. Only the line between Oslo and Bergen climbs over the plateau for any considerable distance. Winter operation of this route is hazardous, and considerable lengths of wooden snow tunnels and permanent snow fences have been built.

Trondheim is a rail junction for lines running both north and south in Norway and eastward into Sweden, the latter utilizing a gap in the high mountain range that separates the two countries. An excellent harbor facilitates the status of Trondheim as a commercial center, and increasing use is being made of it in east-west shipments to and from Sweden. A second important railway link between Norway and Sweden lies still farther north, where the iron-ore port of Narvik is connected with mines in the Kiruna area of Swedish Lapland. The short Norwegian section of the line is, in fact, an extension of a Swedish government line running to the mines from Luleå on the Gulf of Bothnia. There is at present little likelihood that railways will extend farther north in Norway unless defense requirements make them imperative.

Norwegian highways suffer from many of the handicaps that beset the railways, but they are being rapidly improved and extended as buses and private automobiles become more numerous. Many fjords along

the coast interrupt the highway system, and ferries are required even on the main routes. The principal highway to the far north, which begins at Trondheim, is interrupted in this way at many points, but during summer months there is a regular express bus service as far north as Kirkenes near the USSR border. In winter, when some sections of the road are closed by snow, transportation is possible only by coastal vessels.

#### INTERNATIONAL TRADE

Norway's exports are mainly products of the sea and of its forests and mines. Imported in exchange ~~are~~ a great variety of essential items, including foods, fuels, manufactures, and raw materials for industry. The leading market and source of supplies is the United Kingdom, followed by the United States and Sweden. Because the value of goods imported is greater than that of exports, the difference must be made up by revenue earned by Norwegian shipping engaged in world-wide trade. This revenue is considerable, for today, despite wartime losses, Norway has the world's third largest merchant fleet, and four fifths of it is used in carrying goods not originating in, or destined for, the home country.

### SWEDEN

This country of 173,000 square miles is large by European standards, being twice the size of Great Britain. Surrounded by its Scandinavian neighbors, it is essentially a Baltic power, without coastline on the open ocean. Access by sea to its western coast lies through the relatively narrow Skagerrak Strait, separating Denmark and Norway. Its eastern coast on the Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Bothnia can be reached only by passing through waters close to Danish ter-

ritory. The warm waters from the Atlantic approach to the west permit Göteborg to carry on ocean navigation throughout the year. Exposure to warm summer and cold winter air masses moving from Eastern Europe makes the climate more extreme than that of Norway, especially since high mountains to the west exclude most of the milder Atlantic air. For the same reasons Sweden enjoys a drier climate than Norway. Stockholm, on the Baltic Sea, receives about one



third as much rainfall as Bergen, on Norway's Atlantic coast. The summer season in Sweden is thus more favorable to agriculture, especially to the ripening of grains.

Sweden has a 1,000-mile-long common frontier with Norway, and yet the two countries are physically quite different. The high mountains along the common border slope down gradually toward the east; but in the west, in Norway, they drop precipitously to the sea. The eastern slope is drained by many parallel rivers—ten of them more than 250 miles long—some of which reach the Gulf of Bothnia. The rivers are valuable for generating electric power and floating lumber. There is a strong contrast between the forested lands of northern Sweden and the fairly level lowlands in the south. The latter regions have been cleared for agriculture, especially near the large central lakes, along the seacoast, and in the extreme south. The open terrain of Sweden permits a more extensive transportation network than is possible in the rugged landscape of Norway. The indented coastline gives fairly easy access to the comparatively level interior. This is especially true where medium-sized coastal towns lie at river estuaries.

## RESOURCES AND INDUSTRY

**AGRICULTURE**—Only nine per cent of Sweden is suitable for cultivation, but agriculture is far more important there than in Norway. Farms are concentrated in favorable areas, especially in the southern province of Skåne, where about three quarters of the land is cultivated, and in the flat lowland region west of Stockholm, where about half the area is farmed. Forage crops and coarse grains are the leading products, but sufficient bread grains and potatoes are grown to make the country self-supporting in those commodities. Sweden also supports sufficient livestock to meet domestic requirements. Largely as a result of food shortages

suffered in World War II, the oilseed crop is being increased to provide edible fats. Most Swedish agricultural products are processed and distributed through cooperatives.

**FORESTS**—More than half of Sweden is covered by forests; lumbering is especially important in the north. The northern rivers which reach the Gulf of Bothnia are used to float logs—mainly pine, spruce, and birch—down to the mills near the sea. The rivers also supply the power needed for mill operations. Scientific husbandry in the use of forests through strict government regulations is a feature of Swedish economy. Lumber was for a long time Sweden's main export, but today the principal exports are forest products, such as paper, pulp, alcohol, and cellulose.

**MINERALS**—Mining is the oldest of Sweden's export industries; the country is outstanding in northern Europe as a producer of metals. The iron ores used in the production of high-quality steel within the country come from Grangesberg in central Sweden. In Lapland high-grade ores are mined, but largely for export by way of the ice-free Norwegian seaport of Narvik. A smaller amount is shipped, in the summer months, through Luleå on the Gulf of Bothnia. A traditional importer of Swedish iron ore, Germany takes most of the production, but some is also shipped for smelting to Belgium and Great Britain and a little to the United States.

**INDUSTRY**—Metal industries and engineering are outstanding enterprises in Sweden. High-quality iron and steel, variety of minerals, technical skill, and traditional inventiveness of Swedish craftsmen combine to make Sweden a leading manufacturer. The Bofors arms works has a long history, and its products are world renowned. High-quality cutlery and tools find their way to foreign markets as do also automobiles and

trucks, electric generating equipment, and a wide variety of electrical goods. Sweden has a small but advanced aircraft industry capable of equipping its own defense forces. Shipbuilding and repairing are active on the west coast. The forests provide a basis for the world-famous match industry. Textile manufacturing, using imported raw materials, is also important.

The extent of Swedish industrialization is not always apparent to an outsider; yet industry occupies almost two fifths of the population. It is largely decentralized; small cities and even country towns have factories and food-processing plants, but there are also important industrial centers, such as Stockholm, Göteborg, Eskilstuna, and Linköping. In contrast to Norway, Sweden could become almost self-supporting in view of its remarkable balance of industry, agriculture, mining, and forestry.

#### TRANSPORTATION

Unlike Norway, Sweden has a relatively close network of both railways and highways. Her advantage over Norway in this respect is due to the fact that in Sweden the population, especially in the southern and central parts, is more evenly distributed and the terrain is more favorable. The state operates the main trunk rail lines, most of which are electrified. The main railway centers are Stockholm, Göteborg, and Malmö, the latter with ferry service to Copenhagen to tie into the Danish rail system. In the far north and in other less densely populated areas, buses supplement the railways, thus providing some form of trans-

portation in all parts of the country. This adequate system of land transport, coupled with the fact that parts of the sea are frozen in the winter, prevents coastal shipping from attaining the importance it has in Norway. The north-south coastal highway, which parallels the inland coastal railway in eastern Sweden, is of considerable economic and military significance as a transportation link between Stockholm and the north. Sweden alone of the northern countries employs canals. The well-known Göta Canal links Göteborg, by way of the central lakes, with Stockholm and the Baltic. It is used by both ocean-going freighters and canal boats, but it is closed in winter.

#### FOREIGN COMMERCE


About one fifth of Sweden's imports are fuels, followed in importance by raw materials for the textile industry, automobiles, and other items, such as tobacco and coffee, which cannot be produced at home. Exports consist of forest products, which amount to forty-five per cent of the total, iron ore, and a variety of manufactured goods. Britain and West Germany are the chief markets, as well as sources of supply; the United States ranks third in imports. Trade with Eastern Europe is based on Sweden's need for Polish coal and metallic ores from the USSR. Because of its dependence on foreign trade, Sweden has kept its tariffs on imported goods low, and ninety per cent of the country's imports are duty-free. Earnings of the large Swedish shipping fleet are an important factor in balancing the nation's trade accounts.

### DENMARK

Denmark is in a sense an extension of the North German Plain and is also a southward extension of Sweden. In fact as recently as

the seventeenth century, Skåne in southern Sweden was under the Danish Crown. Denmark's outstanding characteristics are

due to its location and the origin of its land-forms. Lying as it does across the entrance from the North Sea to the Baltic, thus linking mainland Europe and Scandinavia, it is a meeting place of influences from both di-



rections. The location of the capital, Copenhagen,<sup>3</sup> illustrates well the strategic significance of Denmark as a whole. Situated on the island of Zealand, it guards The Sound (Oresund), the shallow entrance to the Baltic between Denmark and Sweden. Until less than a century ago, Copenhagen charged tolls on cargoes passing through

The Sound. The only deep-water channel into the Baltic lies through Danish territorial waters between Zealand and Funen, and it was to avoid the use of these routes that Germany constructed the Kiel Canal early in the twentieth century (see map on this page).

Except for the isolated rocky island of Bornholm, in the Baltic Sea, the Danish landscape is largely of glacial origin, nowhere more than 600 feet above sea level. The coast is mainly low-lying, with numerous shallow inlets. The sea has invaded the land, cutting much of this already small country into numerous islands. About two thirds of Denmark consists of the Jutland Peninsula; of the remainder, the most important areas are the islands of Funen and Zealand.

The intensively cultivated Danish landscape of today is a consequence of strenuous and intelligent farming methods. Much of the original terrain was not promising; areas of dune sand, heath, and swamp hampered agriculture, especially in Jutland, and reclamation of new farmland was essential. Reclamation is still in progress. The landscape is not conducive to land transport, but the long coastline is well served by ferry boats as well as coasting vessels.

#### AGRICULTURE

In proportion to its area, Denmark has more cultivated land than any other European country (about sixty-four per cent), and more than seventy-five per cent of the total area of the country is used for agriculture in some form. Since about ninety-eight per cent of the farms are smaller than fifty acres and two thirds of them are between forty and fifty acres, Denmark can well be called a land of medium-sized farms. Although formerly the country was an important producer of grain, the arrival of cheaper grains from new lands overseas a century ago forced a change to dairying and livestock.

<sup>3</sup> Meaning "trading harbor."

This change was effected by importing large amounts of the cheaper feed grains, a process which is still carried on. The Danish agricultural industry is an efficient system of converting relatively cheap imported feed into more expensive butter, bacon, and eggs for export.

More than any other country in the world, Denmark combines the benefits of large-scale purchasing and marketing methods with the operation of small farms through the use of cooperative organizations. These cooperatives have not only played a prominent part in raising the quality of farm products but have also trained the farmers in democratic self-government. Crop yields are among the highest in the world, attributable to scientific farming and the use of large quantities of imported fertilizers. Only about one quarter of Denmark's inhabitants work on farms, even though Denmark is usually regarded as a rural land. The majority of the population is engaged in industry and commerce, fishing, and the professions.

#### INDUSTRY AND TRADE

In Denmark more people are employed in industry than in agriculture, but because of the scarcity of industrial resources within its borders the country must depend on imports for the raw materials needed in manufacturing enterprises. Using imported commodities, Denmark builds ships and manufactures engineering equipment and a variety of smaller items in sufficient quantity to supply the home market and to account for about one third of all the country's exports. Many of the industries are small and depend on highly skilled workers; in Copenhagen, however, there are a number of large enterprises.

Denmark maintains a high standard of living largely through its extensive import and export trade. Agricultural products are the most important items of export. De-

spite wartime interruption and postwar adjustments, Britain is the most important customer, taking about two fifths of the total, with Germany second and Sweden third. Imports are mainly fuels, iron and steel, and feed needed for the highly specialized farming. Danish ocean-going shipping is engaged in world-wide trading and is an important source of national income. A large proportion of the vessels are medium-sized motorships designed to carry mixed cargoes on regularly scheduled routes.

#### TRANSPORTATION

Transportation is greatly complicated in Denmark by the many islands that necessitate ferries to provide uninterrupted communications. The main railroad from Esbjerg on the North Sea to Copenhagen, used by the London boat trains,<sup>4</sup> crosses two straits. The narrower one is now spanned by a finely engineered bridge, but the wider one—Great Belt, the main channel into the Baltic Sea—still requires a ferry. Traffic is sometimes seriously interfered with by ice, which in severe winters obstructs travel for four months, although icebreakers are normally employed to keep the route open. The main railroad southward from Copenhagen to Germany crosses the largest bridge in Europe to reach the island of Falster, whence a train ferry sails to the German coast. The Danish State Railway system is modern and efficiently operated. Highway construction is relatively simple and economical over the flat Danish landscape, and the roads are of excellent quality.

The sea, which so often interrupts the land traveler in Denmark, is at the same time a great asset in moving bulky cargoes that do not require speedy delivery. There is a regular system of coastal freight and

<sup>4</sup> Throughout Western Europe trains are scheduled so as to link ports and large cities conveniently, hence the term "boat train."

passenger vessels, which link the numerous small ports with main centers such as Copenhagen, Aalborg, and Aarhus. The Danish

island of Bornholm, in the Baltic Sea, is connected with the homeland by daily passenger and freight vessels.

## FINLAND

The topography of Finland in many respects resembles that of Sweden and Norway. The coastal lowlands of southern Finland are similar to those of Sweden on the opposite side of the Gulf of Bothnia, but the country receives its special character from the lake-strewn interior plateau, which includes large expanses of rock and glacial debris. Waters cover half of the area in some parts of the central lake district, with short rapid streams linking together a maze of large and small lakes.

Finland has an even more continental climate than Sweden, owing to the absence of the moderating effect of the Atlantic Ocean and the presence of the relatively fresh, shallow waters of the Baltic, which freeze readily in winter. The severity of the climate increases rapidly to the north, where winters are very cold and summers fairly hot. Snowfall is important to the economy, for it provides regular run-off for streams and in winter aids transportation by permitting the use of sledges. The northern areas are snow-covered from early December until late May, and even the milder southwest may have snow on the ground for the first four months of the year.

### AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY

Although two fifths of Finland's population make their living from agriculture and the bulk of the 4,000,000 people live in the relatively fertile lowlands, still barely one fifth of the national wealth is derived from agriculture. Farm productivity is relatively low because of the country's location near the northern margin for cultivation. Finn-

ish farms are usually small and nonspecialized. Three quarters of them have an area smaller than twenty-five acres, and about two out of every five are smaller than twelve acres. These holdings are very small indeed for an area where soil and climate do not encourage intensive farming. Efforts are being made to increase production by farm mechanization, greater use of fertilizers, and more scientific methods. Although able to produce a slight surplus of dairy products and meat, Finland needs to import some grain for bread and other food-stuffs.

In contrast to the natural handicaps she faces in efforts to expand her agriculture, Finland has excellent forest resources, which are the mainstay of its economy. Forests cover more than seventy per cent of the area, the highest proportion of any country in the world. The trees have a high rate of growth per year, well in excess of present consumption, and excellent forestry practices are followed. In Finland wood is used widely for fuel in homes, in industry, and on the railways; but the principal use is as a raw material in industry.

### INDUSTRY

Traditionally the most important Finnish industry has been the processing of wood for export as lumber, plywood, paper, pulp, and cellulose. One seventh of the world's exports of sawn lumber come from Finland, comprising about two thirds of European exports of that commodity. Finland is also responsible for about two thirds of Europe's plywood exports and about two fifths of its

newsprint. Before World War II other Finnish industries were engaged in producing consumers' goods for the home market, while machinery and other metallic goods were imported. Since then, reparation payments to the USSR in the form of manufactured goods compelled Finland to expand its metal and engineering industries. The completion of the reparation payments in 1952 left Finland with a heavy industry more than sufficient for its own requirements and with a surplus production for which overseas markets had to be found. The country lost about a third of its developed hydro-electrical power to the USSR, but this has been more than made up by new installations. There remains a good reserve of undeveloped water power, particularly in the south. Mining and processing of ores are not very important, although at Outokumpu is one of the largest copper mines in Europe. The important nickel mine near Petsamo was lost to the USSR in 1945.

#### TRANSPORTATION AND TRADE

The leading importers of Finnish goods are Britain, Germany, the USSR, and the United States, the first taking about one third of the total, and the Soviet Union, about fifteen per cent. About one half of the foreign trade, however, is distributed among a large number of countries. Imports come from the same group of nations that buy Finnish goods. More than four fifths of all exports are wood products; imports are principally the raw materials required for industry, and foodstuffs, machinery, and fuels.

The foreign trade of Finland has required a considerable merchant fleet. Owing to

wartime losses and reparations to the USSR, Finland's fleet lost about sixty per cent of its prewar tonnage. This has since been made up by new building, so that Finnish vessels are again engaged in world-wide commerce. Although only a few ports (Helsinki, Turku, Kotka) handle most of the country's imports, exports are shipped from many relatively small harbors scattered along the coast, as well as from the large seaports. Shipping is maintained in winter with the aid of icebreakers, but it is concentrated at a few ports.

The Finnish railway system originally formed part of the Russian system, and the tracks are still wide-gauge (five feet), so that trains cannot move between Finland and Sweden but can cross the Soviet boundary. In southern Finland there is a fairly close network of railways radiating from the chief seaports. In the north a line extends beyond Tornio to Rovaniemi, on the Arctic Circle, and then runs eastward to the Soviet border, where it is linked to the USSR system. Although the Finnish railroads are reasonably adequate, they have not been expanded or greatly improved for a number of years. They are, however, relatively unimportant, since most of the country's trade moves by water.

A good highway system extends throughout the country, and includes the Arctic highway running from Rovaniemi northward through Lapland, to Petsamo on the Arctic coast. Since the loss of the Arctic coast to the USSR, the road is now linked at two points with Norwegian highways running to the Atlantic coast. Other Finnish roads are connected to the Swedish highway system.

#### ICELAND

Although definitely Scandinavian in outlook, Iceland is remote from the other northern

countries, and it tends to act independently. An island of about 40,400 square miles,

situated just south of the Arctic Circle, its climate is not so severe as the location might suggest. The warm air associated with the North Atlantic Drift brings mild winters and cool summers, with fairly heavy precipitation. Much of the terrain is of volcanic origin, and there are still-active volcanoes, geysers, and warm springs. The latter are used as a source of heat in winter.

The population of about 140,000 lives in villages and small towns scattered around the coast, but more than forty per cent is in the capital, Reykjavik. About one third of the people live by farming, one sixth are fishermen. Farming is designed to produce as much food as possible for home consumption, but imports are still necessary. Some wool and meat is exported. Following a thousand years of cultivation in a damp climate, the soil has lost much of its fertility, and fertilization is essential. To meet this need, Iceland produces synthetic nitrates from the atmosphere. Output of nitrates is now sufficient to meet all local requirements and still leave some for export—a very welcome new source of revenue, inasmuch as more than ninety per cent of the country's exports have traditionally been fish. Since World War II an important proportion of Iceland's imports have come from the United States, and these have been financed largely

out of dollar grants and from defense expenditures. Iceland normally imports textiles and manufactures from Britain, food products from Denmark and Sweden, and oil from the Caribbean. Her best export markets are Britain, Germany, Denmark, the United States, and the USSR.

Iceland is governed by a parliamentary system that is more than a thousand years old. In the course of its history prior to World War II, Iceland came first under Norwegian and then under Danish sovereignty. In 1944 Iceland discontinued its association with Denmark and established a republic, but the two countries maintain friendly connections. Location of the island along the North Atlantic convoy route brought it into World War II despite the government's neutral policies, and Iceland continues to play an important strategic role in the air bridge between eastern North America and Western Europe. Iceland is a member of NATO, and there is a large air base at Keflavik, not far from the capital manned by United States forces. Early in 1956 the Icelandic government requested the withdrawal of these troops from the island, but later in that year, as a result of changing political and economic developments in Europe, Iceland agreed to permit continued United States occupation.

## FENNOSCANDIA AS A REGION

Frequent references have already been made to geographic factors that characterize the Scandinavian countries. Among these countries a friendly spirit has prevailed, one based not only on geographic proximity but even more upon similarities of language, religion, political institutions, and social legislation, on the long tradition of working together, and on the relatively easy movement of people from one country to another. Cooperative producing and trading organiza-

tions throughout Scandinavia are linked with one another. The Scandinavian Airlines System is owned jointly by Norway, Sweden, and Denmark. Passports are not required for citizens of any Scandinavian country to travel in the others, and since 1954 there has been a common labor pool, which also includes Finland. There has been a strong movement, especially since World II, toward the formation of a Scandinavian customs or economic union that would permit

the free movement of goods from one country to another.

Since 1952 there has been an annual meeting of a Parliamentary Council representing Iceland, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden, which drafts parallel legislation for the four countries. A close relationship also exists between the royal families of Norway, Denmark, and Sweden. The King of Norway is a son of a former King of Denmark (and is uncle of the present King),<sup>5</sup> and the Queen of Denmark was a Swedish princess.

### NATURAL RESOURCES

In natural resources and economic development the northern countries exhibit some uniformity, but also significant national differences. All of the countries depend on widely distributed international trade, not only to dispose of their own raw materials and manufactured goods abroad, but to provide essential raw materials, manufactured goods, foodstuffs, fertilizers, and animal feeds not available at home. Especially important in export trade are forest products, dairy products, and resources of the sea.

All five countries lie outside the main belt of coal-bearing rocks in Europe and therefore lack industrial fuels, except for wood and peat. Large quantities of coal and oil must be imported, from sources determined by the availability of currency, a factor which explains why Finland obtains its oil from the USSR. Norway is more favored than the others in that it possesses considerable coal resources in arctic Svalbard (Spitsbergen). Norway also has considerable hydroelectric potential, as do also Sweden, Finland, and Iceland, all countries with a combination of adequate precipitation and rugged terrain. Denmark obtains some of its electricity by submarine cable from Sweden, and plans exist for large-scale export of

power from Norway to both Sweden and northern Finland. This willingness to exchange resources is an additional example of the close economic and political relations of the northern countries.

Availability of cheap electricity in the northern countries has a strong influence on their industry. It plays an important part in the manufacture of wood products, which requires large amounts of power, especially in the three northernmost countries. It is extremely important also in metal smelting, especially of high-grade ferroalloys, and in the electrolytic smelting of iron to produce high-grade steels.

### PEOPLE

As a group the 19,000,000 people of the northern countries are fairly distinct from their neighbors—Russia to the east, Poland and Germany to the south. Isolation for many generations has tended to create a homogeneous block of a more or less distinct racial type and an even more uniform culture. Typically the people are “Nordic” in race, with fair hair, light complexions and blue eyes, somewhat elongated skulls, and above-average stature; these characteristics, however, are less noticeable in Denmark and eastern Finland. In the latter area racial mixtures from the east have modified the “Nordic” characteristics of the population. Icelanders, although of fairly homogeneous stock today, are less Nordic in origin because early migrants to Iceland included a considerable group of short, dark-haired people from western Britain.

LANGUAGE—Ties of language are strong in Scandinavia. The original common tongue of much of the area was Old Norse, now best represented by Icelandic. It developed into regional dialects, which became Swedish and Danish. In Norway, the language used by the court and educated classes is similar to Danish. During the past century a delib-

<sup>5</sup> Until 1944, the King of Denmark was also King of Iceland.



Area and Population of Fennoscandic Countries

<i>Country</i>	<i>Area (in sq. mi.)</i>	<i>Population</i>	<i>Capital City (population)</i>
Norway (Norge)	124,710	3,375,000	Oslo (461,000)
Sweden (Sverige)	173,436	7,150,600	Stockholm (762,000)
Denmark <sup>a</sup> (Danmark)	16,608	4,350,000	Copenhagen (975,000)
Finland (Suomi)	130,127	4,116,000	Helsinki (395,000)
Iceland (Island)	40,500	146,500	Reykjavik (59,000)

<sup>a</sup> Excluding Greenland

erate attempt has been made to revive and consolidate the rural dialects into a "New Norwegian" language which is taught in schools and used widely by the civil service. This urge to be distinctive in language contrasts with the general trend toward Scandinavian cooperation. Finnish is not related to Old Norse but is derived from languages originating in Siberia and represented in modern Europe only by Estonian and Magyar. There is thus a language barrier between Finland and the other northern countries, partly overcome, however, through the use of Swedish by almost ten per cent of the Finnish population. Especially in western Finland and in the large cities one hears Swedish spoken.<sup>6</sup>

#### INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND PROBLEMS

Although the northern countries are today an outstanding example of international cooperation, their relations have not always been so peaceful. In the sixteenth century Denmark and Sweden fought bitterly for many years, and Sweden also fought Russia and joined in the destructive Thirty Years' War (1618-48). The rise of more powerful states, particularly Prussia and Russia, overshadowed the importance of the northern states, whose resources were no match

for such opponents. A growing determination to develop their economies without foreign aggression reinforced the need to avoid military involvements on the Continent.

The northern countries were unable to avoid the interplay of power politics completely, but their responses to it did not follow a common pattern. Differences in location in respect to more powerful states and in accessibility to the Atlantic account for some lack of agreement on policies. The case of Sweden illustrates the point, since geographically and in foreign policy it stands midway between Finland on the east and the other northern nations on the west.

**NEUTRALITY AND WAR**—At the outbreak of World War I in 1914, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark issued a declaration of neutrality in accordance with their long-established policies, and, except for Finland, which in 1914 was part of Czarist Russia, the Scandinavian countries were not involved directly in that war. Between the two wars the Scandinavian countries joined the League of Nations and worked actively to further its humanitarian aims. Sweden loyally accepted the judgment of the League in awarding the Åland Islands in the Gulf of Bothnia to Finland, although the award provoked popular resentment for a time. As a group the northern countries hesitated to support the League's collective-security policy, believing that it might involve them in war. When, in 1938, it appeared certain that another European war would break out,

<sup>6</sup> Swedish is the official language on the Åland Islands, southwest of the Finnish mainland. One political party, the Swedish People's party, represents the interests of the Swedish-speaking minority in the Finnish Parliament.

they announced return to their former neutrality. World War II eventually involved Finland, Denmark, and Norway directly. These three countries were attacked and the latter two occupied by enemy forces. Sweden, on the other hand, remained neutral.

*World War II.* German armed forces occupied Norway and Denmark early in 1940. Seizure of Norway enabled Germany to interfere with the Allied supply route to Murmansk and to check the power of its eastern foe. Finland, after the tragic Russo-Finnish War of 1939-40, was quite willing to join with Germany in a war on Russia when Hitler decided to attack his former ally, Stalin. Although surrounded by the conflict, Sweden maintained its neutrality because of its isolation from the open ocean and through skillful diplomacy. Highly efficient defense forces, backed by an almost self-contained industrial economy, were also a factor. Swedish iron ore, essential to the German steel industry, was bartered for badly needed coal and oil. In the early war years, Sweden granted German troops transit rights to and from occupied Norway, but by 1943 Sweden terminated this traffic, and toward the end of the war public sympathy veered toward the Western allies.

*NATO.* Experiences in World War II have profoundly altered the international relationships of the northern countries. In 1948 Sweden proposed to Denmark and Norway a regional defense alliance that would have meant a break with traditional neutrality. The latter states, however, along with Iceland, joined NATO in the belief that only integration into a larger military scheme could offer security under modern conditions. Sweden has remained outside NATO, although popular sympathy is doubtless on the side of the NATO alliance, and consequently has needed to provide its own independent defense forces. In this she is aided by excellent shipbuilding facilities, aircraft

factories, and the Bofors armament works, which make Sweden the strongest of the northern states. Finland had, as a matter of practical politics, no alternative but to remain outside NATO. As part of the post-war settlement with the USSR, the Treaty of Mutual Assistance in 1948 requires Finland, in consultation with Russia, to repel an attack from Germany, or countries allied with it, and to refrain from joining any alliance or coalition directed against the USSR. Norway, Iceland, and Denmark all look west in their defensive arrangements; Finland, of necessity, looks east, and between them lies Sweden, not formally committed to either group.

*Growing Unity.* Despite their divergent policies in relation to defense, it would be a mistake to think that collaboration among the northern countries today is weaker than it was in the past. The whole tendency in economic, political, and cultural matters lies in the other direction, and we must assume that should war be avoided for a decade, there will be a continuous strengthening of the ties that bind together the peoples and governments of the five northern nations.

*INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES—Danish-German boundaries.* The national boundaries of the Scandinavian nations, in contrast with those in Eastern Europe, have on the whole been stable. Denmark lost the southern part of Jutland to Germany almost a century ago, but part of it was regained through a plebiscite after World War I. The line then drawn, about forty-two miles long, left a small number of Danish-speaking people in Germany and a similar enclave of Germans in the Danish province of Slesvig (Schleswig). In both cases the minorities are fairly treated. Except for the German frontier, Denmark's mainland and islands border the sea for a total of 4,600 miles.

*Norwegian Land Boundaries.* The borders of Norway have remained static since they

were established in 1905, when the country was separated from Sweden. The 1,500-mile land boundary with Sweden and Finland presents no serious problems, although the movement of Finnish reindeer into northern Norway during summer has made it necessary to erect a fence along the whole length of the 450-mile common boundary.

On the other hand, the new boundary between Norway and the Soviet Union, resulting from the allocation of Petsamo Province to the USSR in 1947, is a constant problem. Without much difficulty an agreement was reached to demarcate the 122-mile boundary and draw up regulations for its administration, since the new line followed the old. But the USSR has prevented all movement across the common boundary, which has caused some economic difficulty in the Norwegian part of the Pasvik Valley where the line cuts across long-established east-west trading routes. The Pasvik River is a potential source of hydroelectric power of great local importance, but it cannot be developed because the USSR is unwilling to collaborate in the project. At two points—Boris Glebein in the north and Janiskoski in the south—the USSR has enclaves on the west side of the river and maintains effective control over its use.

*Norwegian Coastal Limit.* In 1935 Norway extended its coastal jurisdiction beyond the traditional four-mile limit in order to control trawling on the valuable fishing grounds off the northern coast. This move to exclude foreign trawlers was finally challenged by Britain. The International Court of Justice in 1952 upheld Norwegian authority to exclude trawlers from the area. In 1953 Iceland adopted a similar policy, thus excluding foreign, particularly British, trawlers from the wide fjords of her coast. The USSR normally employs a twelve-mile limit off its coast to the east of Norway.


*Swedish-Finnish Boundary.* Sweden's land boundary with Finland extends in great part

along rivers, such as the Torne and Muonio, for a length of 335 miles. This boundary, which formerly separated Sweden and Czarist Russia, has been stabilized for a long time.

*Finnish-Soviet Boundary.* Finland's land boundary with the USSR has changed considerably since an independent Finland was established by the Versailles Treaty in 1919. Finland was granted the former Russian province of Pechenga (Petsamo) under the Treaty of Tartu, in 1920, thus gaining access to the Arctic Ocean through the port of Liinahamari near Petsamo. This territory provided a route for shipping lumber from arctic Finland, and a through highway, built in the late twenties, did much to develop the very large Finnish province of Lapland. During this period nickel was found in the Petsamo area, and a refinery was built near the Norwegian border; but production had not started when war broke out in 1939. Under the Moscow Treaty of March, 1940, which ended the Finnish-Russian war, Finland ceded a large part of Karelia, part of eastern Lapland, and a small area on the Rybachiy Peninsula in the far north, and granted a lease on Hanko Peninsula. After World War II the Peace Treaty of Paris, in 1947, largely confirmed the cessions of territory of 1940 and also transferred Petsamo Province to the USSR. Still later, in 1947, but independently of the Peace Treaties, Finland sold to the USSR a small area near Lake Inari in the Pasvik Valley for the location of power plants required to operate the nickel mines. The mines themselves were purchased by the USSR from their Canadian owners.

Apart from the permanent loss of territory already described, Finland granted a fifty-year lease to the Porkkala district, about twelve miles from Helsinki, for use as a Soviet naval base.<sup>7</sup> In return the USSR sur-

<sup>7</sup> In 1955, as part of its policy of amity and friendship, the USSR returned Porkkala to Finland.



rendered the naval base of Hanko. As a result of the settlement, Finland lost almost 18,000 square miles—twelve per cent of its total area (see map on page 278). Economically the loss included valuable forests, industries, and hydroelectric power sites. One consequence of the loss of 700,000 acres of valuable agricultural land was a campaign in Finland to reclaim forest and bog land on which to provide homes for some of the 400,000 displaced persons. This project has changed the pattern of land utilization in the southern part of Lapland.

**CIVIL AVIATION**—The relatively small area of the northern countries, coupled with concentration of the population in comparatively few large centers in the south and along the seacoasts, has not encouraged intensive development of domestic civil aviation. However, regularly scheduled airlines serve all important cities and extend to northern Sweden and, in summer, to the far north of Norway. Finnish airlines radiate from Helsinki to the rest of the country, with international links to both east and west. Scandinavia plays an important part in international civil aviation through the Scandinavian Airlines System, which is jointly controlled by the governments of Sweden, Norway, and Denmark. The line operates routes throughout Europe, to Africa, South America, the Far East, and across the North Atlantic to Canada and the United States. A pioneer in far northern flying, the line also operates a route from Europe to the west coast of the United States by way of Greenland. An extension to the Far East by this route seems probable.

#### OVERSEAS POSSESSIONS

**DANISH**—Greenland<sup>8</sup> and the Faeroe Islands, although somewhat farther away from Co-

penhagen than other Danish islands, are administratively part of the homeland. Together their populations amount only to about 55,000, and their economic resources are limited. Their undoubted importance is due mainly to their location in the North Atlantic, where in time of war they provide useful bases for shipping and important air patrol outposts. The growing importance of military and civil aviation in the high latitudes seems likely to enhance the status of Greenland.

**NORWEGIAN**—Svalbard consists of five large islands and many smaller ones in the Arctic Ocean, about 360 miles north of the north coast of Norway. Norwegian sovereignty was not settled until the signing of a treaty at Paris, in 1920, which became effective in 1925. Under it the signatories received equal economic rights in Svalbard but were forbidden to use the islands for defense purposes. The sole important economic resource is coal, which is mined by several Norwegian companies and by the USSR. Sealing, hunting, and trapping are also carried on from Svalbard as a base. The latest data give the population as 1,034 Norwegians and 505 USSR citizens.

Norwegian sovereignty over Jan Mayen, an isolated island 300 miles north of Iceland, was announced in 1929. This bleak little island is occasionally visited by fishermen and serves as a meteorological station of considerable importance in forecasting European weather.

In the Antarctic, Norway possesses two small uninhabited islands—Bouvet and Peter I—over which the Norwegian flag was raised in 1930 as a sign of incorporation into the Norwegian state. Norway also laid formal claim in 1939 to a segment of the Antarctic continent lying between 20° West Longitude and 45° East Longitude touching the Falkland Islands sector in the west and Australian territory on the east.

<sup>8</sup> For a more complete discussion of Greenland, see page 90.

### Study Questions

1. What is the strategic importance of Svalbard? In what way is this reduced because of treaty arrangements?
2. Summarize the differences in resources and industry of Sweden and Norway. How are these differences important in wartime?
3. Finland's postwar industries were expanded to provide reparations for the USSR. What effect has this had on the Finnish economy?
4. Why does Norway depend on fishing far more than does Denmark?
5. In what ways is Greenland important to the economy of Denmark?
6. What is the significance of Denmark's location from the Soviet point of view?
7. List Finland's territorial losses at the close of World War II. How did they influence that country's land use? Mining?
8. Northern Norway was strongly fortified by Nazi forces in World War II. Why was such a remote area important?
9. Finland's economy is closely tied to her forests. Explain this.
10. What part have cooperatives played in the prosperity of the northern countries?
11. Explain Sweden's absence from NATO. Why is Finland not a member?
12. Scandinavia and Alaska are located in similar latitudes. What similarities and differences are there between them?
13. Iceland, though neutral, was quickly involved in World War II. Why was this inevitable?
14. What railroad connections are there between the Soviet Union and the Scandinavian countries? What are their limitations?
15. Summarize the strategic importance of the northern countries in a world divided between "East" and "West."

## CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

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### *Benelux*

The Benelux<sup>1</sup> countries—Belgium, the Netherlands,<sup>2</sup> and Luxembourg—occupy a position of importance today in world affairs far out of proportion to their actual size and population. Few areas of the world are more densely populated; few areas have suffered more from recent conflicts and from foreign control; yet few areas enjoy as high a standard of living, as high a production level in agriculture and industry, or as great a consciousness of the need for new social and economic programs. Since the close of World War II the Benelux countries have been leaders in the drive for unity among the

nations of Western Europe. Their statesmen have undertaken a project for economic unity within their own area and have supported economic, military, and political programs that bind them with other free nations of the world. Their strategic location, complex internal structures, and prominence in the international field make the Benelux countries a truly vital subject for study in political geography.

#### PHYSICAL ASPECTS

**LOCATION**—The Benelux area is situated in northwestern Europe, with Germany to the east and southeast, France to the south and southwest, and the British Isles to the northwest, across a few miles of the North Sea from the Dutch and Belgian coasts (see map on page 282). Belgium and the Netherlands also lie at the deltas of two important rivers, the Rhine and the Meuse, which serve to link the Lowland countries with adjacent areas to the south and east. As a result of this strategic location the political, economic,


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<sup>1</sup> The term "Benelux," derived from BELgium, NETHERlands, and LUXembourg, has become a familiar designation for the three-nation area, especially since the establishment in 1948 of the Benelux Customs Union.

<sup>2</sup> The term "Netherlands" (originally from the Dutch word "Neder" meaning below) is often used synonymously with the name "Holland." The latter term, however, is also used in the names of two of the Dutch provinces. The term "Low Countries" generally refers collectively to the Netherlands and Belgium but not Luxembourg.

and social histories of the three Benelux countries are closely interwoven with those of their more powerful neighbors.

*Buffer Area.* A buffer position between France and Germany has been both a curse and a blessing to the peoples of this area. All three nations have at one time or another been involved in Franco-German struggles, for Benelux lies athwart the historic invasion routes between the two powers. The wars of Louis XIV and Napoleon were fought in part on the soil of these small coun-



tries. The Benelux nations were occupied by French forces under Napoleon from 1792 to 1813, and a brother of the French Emperor was for a time king of the Netherlands. Waterloo, final battleground of Napoleon's armies, lies but a few miles from Brussels, the Belgian capital. During World War I, Belgium and Luxembourg were involved in the struggle between France and Germany. Both countries were occupied by German forces for over four years. Holland succeeded in remaining neutral during this conflict, but in 1940, German armies again smashed at France, and all three countries were under Nazi occupation for more than four years.

Proximity to France and Germany has also

many advantages to offer the Benelux nations. Trade possibilities, for example, are enormous. The Benelux nations can furnish the French and Germans with agricultural commodities, textiles, machinery, and electrical goods. The Dutch in particular have prospered through the sale of fruits, vegetables, and dairy products to the densely populated adjacent industrial areas. Finally, the Benelux ports, especially Rotterdam and Antwerp, benefit tremendously from the rich hinterlands which they serve in France and Germany.

*Cultural Influences* Also important are the cultural effects of proximity to France and Germany. Language, religion, art, music, and literature from the French and Germans have moved across the open borders into the three small countries, enriching their cultures immeasurably. Travel to France and Germany is a simple matter for the Benelux peoples, and the continued intermixture of population acts as a bond linking these small nations to their powerful neighbors. Many Benelux inhabitants are bi- or trilingual, reflecting the close association of language in this area. The Protestant Revolution swept westward from Germany into the Netherlands in the sixteenth century, and the northern part of the country is still a bulwark of Protestantism in Western Europe.

*Advantages in the North.* Location on the North Sea is also of importance, particularly to Belgium and the Netherlands. The North Sea is one of the world's major trading areas; across its waters pass many of the great shipping lanes to and from Western Europe. Rotterdam and Antwerp rank among the ten leading ports of the world in volume of traffic handled. The North Sea is also an outstanding fishing area; the shallow Dogger Bank is particularly noted for herring, cod, and haddock. Both the Netherlands and Belgium have large fishing fleets to take advantage of their proximity to this vital food supply.



By the early seventeenth century, the Dutch had taken advantage of their North Sea coast line to develop a strong navy and merchant fleet and win for Holland a vast overseas empire in the Americas, Africa, and the Far East. Although this empire has today largely disappeared, the Netherlands retains a large merchant marine. Belgium was much later in developing its maritime activities. The African possessions were not acquired until late in the nineteenth century, and even today the Belgian merchant and naval fleets are not large.

Closeness to Britain, across the North Sea, has increased the involvement in world politics of the Dutch and Belgians. British influence has been strong in both countries, particularly during the past century and a half. It was partly at British insistence that at the end of the Napoleonic wars the European powers guaranteed the independence of the Benelux countries as a safeguard against future French aggression. Within the spirit of this agreement Britain moved troops into Belgium twice in the twentieth century in order to prevent a hostile Germany from controlling the North Sea coast opposite the British Isles. Since the end of the last conflict in 1945, Britain has been joined with the Benelux countries in several military and economic pacts.

*Other Locational Assets.* Two other features of their location are important to the development of the Benelux countries. First, Belgium and the Netherlands lie for the most part on the lowland of the North European Plain. Lack of relief simplifies communication and makes possible extensive use of canals. The level lands and fertile soils give both countries high agricultural potentialities. At the same time, however, absence of natural barriers has made this plain an historic invasion route for foreign armies, as the battlefields of Waterloo, Flanders, and Ypres can well testify.

Second, location at the mouths of the

Rhine and Meuse rivers has enabled the Dutch and the Belgians to establish great transshipment ports close to the North Sea. The rivers also provide extensive communication facilities within the countries themselves, particularly since, in their lower courses, these streams are fairly broad and have little gradient. In certain sectors, the meandering courses and shallow channels have been supplemented by the construction of lateral canals, which parallel the rivers and utilize them as a source of water.

*SIZE AND SHAPE*—The total area of Benelux amounts to 25,647 square miles (see table below). The area of the Netherlands has been increased slightly during recent years by the draining of areas lying below sea level and by the acquisition of land from Germany in 1949 as war reparations.

Area and Population of Benelux Countries

Country	Area		Population	
	No of Sq Mi.	Per Cent of Total	Number	Per Cent of Total
Netherlands	12,894	50.2	10,350,000	53.0
Belgium	11,754	45.9	8,650,000	45.0
Luxembourg	999	3.9	300,000	2.0
Total	25,647	100.0	19,300,000	100.0

The shape of the Benelux area is roughly that of a triangle with Germany to the east, France to the southwest, and the North Sea to the northwest. Two major extensions of Dutch territory along the Belgian frontier have given rise in the past to difficulties between the two nations. In southern Holland is a narrow twenty-five-mile-long tongue of territory separating Belgium from Germany. This extension, laid down in 1839, was designed to keep Prussia away from the Meuse River. The Dutch inhabitants of Limburg, as this section is known, have strong ties with their Belgian neighbors. The dominant religion is Catholic, the majority of the peoples speak both Dutch and French, and there is a daily migration of Dutch workers across


the frontier to Belgian factories. The Belgians have often coveted this Dutch strip, particularly in view of its effect on Belgian defenses against Germany. During World War I, when Belgium was overrun by German forces, the Netherlands remained neutral. In 1918 the Dutch permitted the retreating German armies to cross neutral Dutch territory and thereby escape capture by Allied troops. To forestall this eventuality in the future Belgian representatives at the Peace Conference argued for the cession of Dutch Limburg, but were unsuccessful in overcoming the opposition from the Dutch government.

A second extension of Dutch territory stretches westward along the North Sea coast in the province of Zeeland. Control of this area has enabled the Netherlands in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to close the mouth of the Scheldt River to foreign shipping. Since Antwerp lies upstream on the Scheldt, the Dutch action meant virtual strangulation of Belgium's sea-borne commerce. In the early nineteenth century the Dutch relaxed their blockade, and allowed shipping to pass up and down the river, providing taxes on each vessel were paid to the Netherlands. Today, no restrictions exist on Scheldt River traffic, although the Belgians often complain that the Dutch are lax in maintaining the channel and channel markers of the lower river.

**RELIEF**—Within the Benelux area are three major physiographic regions: the North European Plain, the Ardennes Mountains, and the Lorraine Uplands (see map on this page).

**North European Plain.** This lowland area includes all of Holland and about two thirds of Belgium. The elevation, except in the extreme south, is rarely above 100 feet. Within this plains area there are a variety of physical features, including the dune barrier, polders, sandy plain, and loess area. Along the North Sea coast of the Netherlands and

Belgium is a line of sand dunes, behind which great lagoons of salt water have formed. The dune barrier has been breached in many spots, either by channels of outflowing rivers, or by North Sea waves which have broken through the dunes during violent storms. In northeast Holland, the line of dunes is represented only by the flat, sandy Frisian Islands, a long chain which curves eastward to Germany.



The lagoons lying behind the sand barriers have gradually been drained by the Dutch during the past centuries, and the resulting polders with their fertile clay soils have been developed into major agricultural areas. Particularly are they valuable for the growing of rich grasses for Holland's dairy cattle. Fruits and vegetables are also produced on the polderland, and near the

city of Haarlem are the famous Dutch tulip fields. About one third of the present total land surface of the Netherlands lies below sea level. The dunes and protective dikes keep back the sea, although the waters still break through occasionally during storms, with a consequent flooding of the lowland areas. Rain water which collects in the polders must be pumped up and over the dikes into the sea or nearby rivers. For this reason, Holland was long dependent on windmills, although today the chief pumping agents are diesel engines rather than the wind.

In north-central Holland a shallow arm of the North Sea has been turned into a freshwater lake in order to permit reclamation of land for agriculture. In 1932, a dike was built across the mouth of the Zuider Zee; gradually the composition of its waters turned from salt to fresh, since the IJssel River and other streams entering into it brought in only sweet water. Meanwhile Dutch engineers began constructing dikes in IJsselmeer, as the new lake was known, enclosing large areas of shallow water. Eventually these areas were drained, and the resulting polders<sup>3</sup> have formed additional farmland for the crowded nation. At the present time a total of 170,000 acres have been reclaimed from the lake; future plans call for the reclamation of an additional 390,000 acres within the next few years. Large areas of shallow water also exist in northeast Holland between the Frisian Islands and the mainland, as well as to the southwest in the province of Zeeland. Ultimately these areas, too, will be reclaimed by the Dutch.

Belgium has only a small area below sea level, and reclamation projects in that country have been rather small. The nation has a considerably greater area of fertile soils inland from the seacoast than have the Dutch. The line of dunes along the Belgian

coast has prevented the formation of good natural harbors for that country. Ostend, a fishing and ferry port, is the only harbor directly on the North Sea. The inland ports of Antwerp and Ghent are connected with the sea by means of the Scheldt River.

Behind the polders in both Holland and northern Belgium is a sandy, infertile area. The northern sector of this area has been glaciated and is now covered by poorly drained peat soils, the peat is dug out, dried, and used as fuel.

To the south of the sandy region of western Holland and Belgium stretches a loess area made up of fertile, windblown material which provides extremely rich soil for the farmers of central Benelux. Average yields of wheat, hay, and other crops in this area rank among the highest of any part of the world. In the southern loess area elevations increase to 200–300 feet; in some cases, even more.

The northern plain is well drained by the lower portions of three major rivers—the Rhine, the Meuse, and the Scheldt. Near the German frontier the Rhine divides into two streams, the Lek and the Waal, which meander across the lowland to the North Sea. Other waterways converge on these two rivers as they flow across the flat plains of western Holland. The Meuse, in its lower course, flows first east along the southern edge of the Ardennes, then north to mark the Belgian-Dutch frontier, and finally west, paralleling the Waal to the North Sea. Northern and central Belgium are drained by the Scheldt and its tributaries. The floodplains of these rivers are marked by areas of fertile clay and recent alluvium on which fruits and vegetables are grown.

*Ardennes.* The Ardennes Mountains of southern Belgium and northern Luxembourg are a deeply dissected block, the summits averaging 1,500 to 2,000 feet in elevation. The area is heavily forested, and except in the river valleys, such as that of the Meuse,

<sup>3</sup> Lands reclaimed from the sea.

population is sparse. The mountain soils are thin and generally infertile. Most of the upland area drains into the Meuse system. With the exception of lumbering, economic activities in the Ardennes are limited. The rough relief serves as a protective barrier against hostile armies, although on several occasions the area has been breached by invading forces. In December, 1944, during the "Battle of the Bulge," Nazi armies smashed halfway across the Ardennes massif before being stopped by Allied forces near the Meuse River.

*Lorraine Uplands.* In southern Luxembourg and extreme southeastern Belgium are the Lorraine Uplands, the northeastern portion of the escarpments encircling the Paris Basin. Of the three escarpments of the Lorraine Uplands, the southernmost contains valuable iron-ore deposits, giving Luxembourg the basis for its present steel industry. The soils of southern Luxembourg, formed on the limestone bedrock, are generally of good fertility, and high yields of grains and fruits are realized throughout much of this sector. The Lorraine Uplands drain eastward into the Moselle River, itself a tributary to the Rhine.

*Political Effects of Relief.* Perhaps the outstanding effect of relief on the political pattern within the Benelux nations has been the separation of the indigenous population into various groups. This grouping is particularly true in Belgium, where there was an early division between the Belgae of the Ardennes—ancestors of the present French-speaking Walloons—and the Franks of the marshy lowlands—forerunners of the present Flemish. In northeastern Holland, the Frisians managed for many centuries to maintain their independence and their separate speech and customs within the protective framework of islands and marshes. Although now incorporated into the Dutch nation, they still retain many of their ancient customs.

**CLIMATE**—Northern Benelux experiences the cool summers and mild, wet winters of Northwestern Europe, farther south the climate is transitional between the Northwestern type and the warm summers and colder, drier winters of the Central European variety. In general, average mean monthly temperatures in January are above 32° F, and in July, below 70° F. In Holland and northern Belgium total annual precipitation averages about 30 inches; it is fairly evenly distributed throughout the region. In the Ardennes, precipitation is heavier, the annual total amounting to over 50 inches in certain parts of the upland.

Luxembourg is cut off from the maritime climate of northern Benelux by the Ardennes Mountains. Winters in the Grand Duchy tend to be colder and drier than along the North Sea, while summers are warmer. Nevertheless, the climate of all three countries is generally favorable to agriculture. The even distribution and general reliability of precipitation throughout Benelux, the five-to seven-month growing season, and the relatively high amounts of sunshine combine to produce good climatic conditions for the cultivation of crops.

**NATURAL RESOURCES**—In the Benelux countries as a whole are found iron ore, coal, and a small amount of petroleum, in addition, there are building stone, sand, clay, peat, some lumber, and a number of water-power sites. The iron-ore deposits are located in southernmost Luxembourg, they are a northern extension of France's rich Minette reserves in Lorraine. Utilizing these ores the Grand Duchy has developed an iron and steel industry. At the present time the country produces about 3,000,000 tons of steel a year. Belgium also has built up a steel industry, producing annually over 6,000,000 tons of steel, and ranks fourth among the steel producers of Western Europe.

At present Belgium produces about 30,000,000 tons of coal a year, or almost half as

much as France. The coal deposits lie in the Sambre-Meuse depression in the south-central sector and in the Campine to the east. The mines in the south-central sector have been worked for a long time, and today the more accessible seams have become exhausted and miners in this region are forced to work deeper, broken seams where mining is more hazardous. On the other hand, the coal deposits in the Campine are of recent exploitation. They are, therefore, able to yield greater quantities of coal and at a lower labor cost than the older mining region. This situation has resulted in a shift in the economic pattern; for whereas the former industrial center was in Namur, Charleroi, and Liège—in the French-speaking area of Belgium—industry has been gradually migrating to the Campine, which is in the Flemish-speaking sector.

Holland's coal deposits are in Limburg province. Production is only about forty per cent of the Belgian output, and the Netherlands is still a coal-importing country. At the end of World War II the Dutch requested access to German coal, either through annexation of German territory in which coal deposits exist or by German delivery of coal to the Netherlands as war reparations. As a temporary compromise, the Dutch are permitted in certain areas to extend their own coal mines eastward beneath German soil, thereby availing themselves of additional coal supplies without risking political friction with the German citizens.

Petroleum output in Benelux is extremely small and is confined to northeastern Holland. Building stone, sand, and clay are found in all three countries. Belgium and Luxembourg have moderate timber supplies, although at the close of World War I, Belgium demanded timber from the Germans as reparations, and in 1945 all three of the Benelux nations requested forest resources from Germany. Water-power potential also exists in Belgium and Luxembourg. The

Dutch, in times past, have made use of the wind for power; peat is also used for the same purpose in parts of Holland today.

### ECONOMIC ASPECTS

Belgium and Luxembourg are essentially industrial nations, utilizing their resources of coal and iron. Luxembourg is famous for its iron and steel, and Belgium for iron and steel, as well as textiles, chemicals, cement, glass, and ferro-alloys. Agriculture in Belgium and Luxembourg is primarily for home consumption, although the latter built up an export trade in sparkling wines. Belgium is also noted for its commercial activities, particularly in connection with the port of Antwerp.

Prior to World War II the Netherlands was predominantly an agricultural nation with widespread commercial interests and a large merchant fleet. The Dutch had built up an agricultural exporting system, specializing in dairy products, chocolate, fresh fruits and vegetables, and flowers. Industry centered largely on shipbuilding and the manufacture of high-grade specialties, such as electrical goods and diesel engines. Expansion of these and other industrial and commercial activities since the war has been a chief governmental objective in order to bolster the country's economy. The chief port is Rotterdam, followed by Amsterdam, on the shores of IJsselmeer. Although in some respects the economy of the Netherlands appears to complement those of Belgium and Luxembourg, there are many instances in which industries of the Benelux nations have been in direct competition with one another.

**FORMATION OF THE BENELUX CUSTOMS UNION**—In the years prior to World War II, many leaders in the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg had advocated the formation of a customs union for the Benelux region, thereby uniting and strengthening the econ-

omies of all three countries. The destructive effects of World War II provided a further incentive in this direction.

In a customs union, tariffs and other trade restrictions are removed on goods passing between the member states, and a common tariff policy is applied by the members on all goods entering the customs area from the outside. The result is that industries throughout the area are no longer protected by their own nation's tariff walls; instead they must face competition from all other industries within the customs region. Either they must produce goods of similar quality and cost as those of their competitors, or eventually be forced out of business. The greater potential market and the reduction in number of inefficient industries results in better and cheaper goods being produced within the customs area than is possible in small individual nations.

During World War II representatives of the Benelux governments-in-exile signed an agreement in London calling for the establishment of a customs union between the Netherlands on the one hand and the Belgoluxembourg Economic Union<sup>4</sup> on the other "as soon as possible" following the cessation of war. The so-called Benelux Union went into effect in January, 1948. Common tariffs were applied on all commodities produced outside the Benelux area. Certain restrictions were retained on the movement of goods into and out of the Netherlands, and a few of these restrictions still remain in effect.

An examination of some of the difficulties faced by the Benelux leaders may illustrate important aspects of the economic backgrounds of the three countries. The first problem to confront the planners of the union was the extremely uneven economic

levels of the three nations at the end of the war. Belgium and Luxembourg were liberated by Allied forces in the fall of 1944, there had been relatively little destruction in these two countries, and they were able to resume industrial production almost immediately. Antwerp served as an advance base for Allied forces and Belgium received Lend-Lease aid from the United States. During the war, the Belgian Congo had been supplying the Allies with raw materials, particularly uranium, and Belgium had built up a strong credit with the United States and Great Britain.

The Netherlands, on the other hand, was not liberated until the war in Europe ended in May, 1945. It was several years before the Dutch could recover their productive capacity because of the tremendous destruction wrought by the Nazis. They received no Lend-Lease, their East Indian Empire had been occupied by the Japanese—by 1945 it was in revolt against the return of Dutch rulers. As a result, Holland was an extremely poor nation in the postwar years, while Belgium and Luxembourg were prosperous. Under such circumstances, it was impossible at first to remove tariff barriers between the two areas.

A second and more deep-rooted cause for delay in completing the customs agreement lay in the economic competition between the two areas. Although prewar Holland was essentially an agricultural area, the Dutch by 1946 had recognized the necessity of industrialization to meet more of their local needs and to provide employment for their expanding population. Every year 40,000 new workers are added to the Dutch labor force as a result of the high birth and low death rates in the country. Such an increase could never be absorbed by agricultural activities alone. The logical answer seemed to be expansion of Holland's industries.

Naturally, many businessmen in Belgium and Luxembourg objected to the idea of

<sup>4</sup> Since the end of World War I, Luxembourg has been joined with Belgium in an economic union. Thus two, rather than three, economic units were actually involved in the Benelux plans.

Dutch industrialization, for this would cause competition with their own establishments. Existing facilities in Belgium and Luxembourg were, they claimed, of sufficient scope to supply the whole Benelux area with needed manufactured commodities. The construction of new plants would only lead to overproduction. Yet the question remained, if Belgium and Luxembourg supplied the Netherlands with industrial goods, what would the Dutch send back in repayment?

In the field of agriculture, conditions were somewhat reversed. High-grade Dutch products could undersell Belgian goods even in the markets of Belgium herself. Once tariffs were removed, Dutch dairy produce, fruits, and vegetables would flood the other two nations, forcing local farmers out of business. As a result, farm producers in Belgium and Luxembourg were cool to the idea of abandoning restrictions on agricultural produce entering their countries from the Netherlands.

A third field for competition lay in commercial pursuits. Belgium and the Netherlands derive a large share of their incomes from foreign commerce. In 1938 the Benelux countries and their colonies accounted for eight and a half per cent of the world's trade, placing the unit fourth among the trading powers of the globe. The most serious phase of the problem of competition concerned the North Sea ports of Holland and Belgium, a great share of the cargoes handled at both Rotterdam and Antwerp is dependent upon Rhine River traffic.

Rotterdam, on a branch of the Rhine, is more favorably located to handle this trade than is Antwerp. The Belgians have sought to overcome this condition by better port facilities, more rail connections with the hinterland, and port charges lower than those of Rotterdam. The resulting price war between the two ports has led to considerable bitterness and has resulted in respective government subsidizations of both harbors.

Within the framework of a customs union government intervention is forbidden. Either competition had to be free and unfettered, or some form of mutually agreeable trade allocation had to be arranged in order to allow these ports to exist on friendly terms within the Benelux organization.

In addition to economic barriers to cooperation within the Benelux union there are those of a political nature. The Dutch and Belgians have long displayed a somewhat suspicious attitude toward each other. Particularly is this attitude prevalent among the Protestant Dutch of northern Holland, who see themselves faced by an overwhelming Catholic majority in southern Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg. Likewise the French-speaking Walloons of southern Belgium are sometimes skeptical of aligning themselves with the Flemish-Dutch combination to the north and east of them. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that when the bill for the creation of Benelux was presented to the legislatures of the three countries there was no organized opposition whatever to its passage.

**FOREIGN COMMERCE**—The bulk of the foreign trade of the Benelux countries is with one another, with other nations of Western Europe, and with the United States. Holland's major trade partners, in order of importance, are Belgium-Luxembourg, Western Germany, and Great Britain, while those of Belgium-Luxembourg are Holland, the United States, and Great Britain. The two areas must import a large percentage of their food and raw materials, while in exchange they export finished products, agricultural specialties, and special services such as tourism and the handling of foreign cargoes at their ports. Belgium also earns credits from her colonial possessions in Africa.

**TRANSPORTATION**—Transportation facilities in the Benelux nations are among the most highly developed in the world. Most of the major rivers have been made navigable for

inland craft; these waterways are connected with one another by an intricate pattern of canals across the lowland areas. Among the most important canals are the North Sea Canal from the North Sea to Amsterdam, the Amsterdam-Rhine Canal, the New Waterway connecting Rotterdam with the North Sea, and the Albert Canal between Antwerp and the Meuse, which links Antwerp with the hinterland coal-producing area of Campine. For years the Belgians have pressed for a direct Antwerp-Rhine Canal, crossing Dutch territory, either in the west between the Scheldt and the lower Waal or across Limburg from the Meuse to the Rhine.<sup>5</sup> The Dutch have consistently refused permission for either waterway, and shipping to Antwerp must still pass through the Zeeland Islands and up the Scheldt. Over 9,000 miles of railway and a network of highways supplement the waterways of Benelux. Because of the high cost of gasoline, rail travel is utilized more often than automobile and truck transport in the movement of goods and people. In air travel, too, the Low Countries are advanced. Holland's KLM and Belgium's Sabena are among the largest international airlines in the world, Sabena serves Europe, the United States, and Belgian Congo while KLM connects Amsterdam with all continents. Overseas connections by water are also extensive. The Dutch merchant marine ranks sixth among those of the world, the Belgian merchant fleet nineteenth. Because of their great dependence upon foreign commerce, it is natural that the Benelux nations should be leaders in the drive for liberalization of world trade.

#### POPULATION ASPECTS

**AMOUNT AND DISTRIBUTION**—The total population of Benelux amounts to about 19,300,-

000 persons, approximately equal to the combined populations of New York State and New Jersey (see table on page 283). The average density is in excess of 760 persons per square mile. This fact taken together with the limited supply of natural resources makes the high standard of living prevailing in this area seem truly remarkable.

Under conditions of such density it is only natural that there be considerable urbanization. Fifteen cities in Benelux have over 100,000 population; four of these have over half a million (see map on page 292). Leading cities are Brussels, 1,323,394; Amsterdam, 852,080; <sup>6</sup> Rotterdam, 692,942, The Hague, 579,788; and Antwerp, 306,750. There are two major and three minor areas of extreme density, where the population per square mile averages close to 1,000 persons. In the Netherlands, the major concentration occurs in the Rotterdam-Hague-Haarlem-Amsterdam-Utrecht sector, where approximately thirty per cent of Holland's population is crowded into about one tenth of its area. In central Belgium nearly one quarter of the population total occupies the Brussels-Malines-Antwerp-Ghent area. Both regions are characterized by heavy industrialization, considerable commercial activity, and intensive agriculture. Taken together, these two areas contain eight of the fifteen major cities of Benelux.

Three other regions of dense population include the Arnhem-Nijmegen district of east-central Holland, where intensive agricultural production is carried on; the Limburg sector of southern Holland and eastern Belgium, an industrial area whose economy is based largely on coal deposits; and the Charleroi-Namur sector of central Belgium, the nation's older industrial area, where, again, the basis for industry is the extensive coal deposits.

In addition to present population densities,

<sup>5</sup> A Rhine-Meuse Canal, passing to the south of Dutch Limburg, would go through territory considered too hilly to make construction practical.

<sup>6</sup> Brussels is the capital city of Belgium. In the Netherlands Amsterdam contains the Royal Palace, but the Dutch Parliament meets in The Hague.



the Benelux nations are faced with prospects of an ever-increasing number of citizens in the years to come. Excess of births over deaths in the area amounts to about 190,000 persons per year. The Dutch birth rate is more than three times that of Belgium-Luxembourg. To counterbalance this annual increment, about 100,000 persons annually emigrate from Benelux, the majority of the Dutch going to Canada and Australia, and of the Belgians to the Belgian Congo. Relatively few immigrants now come to the Benelux countries. Immediately following the war, when Indonesia was lost, there was a considerable return of Dutch residents from that area, but this inflow has now dwindled to a very small number.<sup>7</sup>

In addition to emigration, possible remedies for overpopulation include (1) widespread birth control, (2) acquisition of additional land and resources, and (3) increased industrialization.

1. As in other parts of Northwestern Europe, the birth rates in the Benelux countries have been gradually declining in response to the impetus of urbanization. Holland's birth rate of twenty-two per thousand remains the highest of the three countries. Although Belgium-Luxembourg's annual increase of 40,000 persons is by no means large, when added to Holland's 150,000 it serves to place an added strain on the region's resources.

2. The Dutch have acquired additional territory through centuries of reclaiming land from the sea, but, in reality, this offers small relief for crowded conditions. Annexation of land from Germany has also been considered. In 1947 the Benelux nations unsuccessfully sought to acquire 1,900 square miles of German territory adjoining their own borders as reparations for war damage by the Nazi armies. Again, this would have been a poor solution to the pre-

vailing population problem. In addition to the political consequences of annexation, consideration had to be given to the fact that over 150,000 Germans already inhabited the area and would therefore have had to be provided for in the Dutch economy or deported.

Belgium has possibilities for colonial development in her rich Congo area and thousands of Belgians emigrate each year to this colony. At present the potentialities of the Congo for permanent white settlement are restricted largely to the highland areas; nevertheless many Belgians are willing to emigrate to this region and this should continue to prove a valuable factor in reducing overpopulation. Luxembourg experiences but little annual increase in its total population and does not share in the density problems of its two neighbors.

The Dutch government actively supported the emigration of 25,000 persons to countries abroad following World War II. One former outlet is now closed to the Dutch, namely the Netherlands East Indies, which under the new Indonesian government, bars Dutch immigration in any significant numbers. Opportunities for settlement and colonization are also limited in the Dutch possessions of Latin America. Surinam, located on the humid tropical coast of northern South America, offers few attractions to European settlers, while the islands of the Dutch West Indies can support only a relatively small population. Netherlands New Guinea, with its humid, tropical climate, also attracts few white settlers.

3. Finally, a solution for overpopulation, particularly in Holland, might be found in rapid industrialization, which would provide employment for the large labor force as well as manufactured commodities to satisfy the home market and to serve as a basis for export. The Netherlands, however, is surrounded by industrial nations, which already are large exporters, and Dutch-manufactured goods would have to compete with products

<sup>7</sup> Between 1945 and 1950 there was a net immigration of 91,000 from Indonesia.



from all of them—Belgium-Luxembourg, West Germany, Great Britain, and France. Nevertheless, the Dutch have turned to industrialization during the past few years as the only answer to their present problem, though well aware that the health of their industry will largely depend on the vitality of the over-all European economic system.

**LANGUAGE AND RELIGION**—Four major tongues are spoken within the Benelux area. Dutch prevails in the Netherlands, Flemish, French, and some German in Belgium; and German in Luxembourg. In addition, Frisian, an ancient tongue, is spoken as a second language by many persons in Friesland and Groningen provinces in northeastern Holland.

Language difficulties in Belgium have had their effect on the political life of that nation. In 1839, when Belgium became independent, population and wealth were concentrated in the southern and central, French-speaking parts of the country. Not until 1878 was Flemish recognized as an official language in Belgium, having equal status with French. Actually, since the birth rate is considerably higher in Flanders than in French-speaking Walloon, today about forty-six per cent of the population speak Flemish. Of the remainder forty per cent speak French, thirteen per cent (largely concentrated in the Brussels area) speak both languages, and about one per cent in eastern Belgium speak German as their major tongue.

In terms of religion Belgium and Luxembourg are overwhelmingly Roman Catholic. The Netherlands is divided—about sixty per cent of the population is Protestant, and forty per cent Catholic. The Catholics for the most part are concentrated in southern Holland. Since the birth rate among the Catholics is higher than among the Protestants, the religious make-up of the country is gradually changing, and it is estimated that within one generation the population of Hol-

land will be divided almost equally between the two.

**MINORITIES**—The principal minority element within Benelux is the nearly 70,000 German-speaking peoples of eastern Belgium. This group was included within Belgian territory as a result of two border changes. The first occurred in 1839, when Belgium received a portion of what was once the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg; German-speaking Luxembourg inhabitants, in this way, became citizens of the Belgian province of Luxembourg. The second addition came in 1920 when Belgium annexed from Germany the Eupen-Malmédy sector along the eastern frontier. This territory, which Belgium received as war reparations, has an area of 397 square miles. The population in the canton of Malmédy is largely French-speaking, while that in the Eupen area continues to speak German. Although in a minority, the German-speaking peoples of Belgium are treated on an equal status with other citizens, and no discriminations are shown against them by the national and provincial governments.

## HISTORICAL SUMMARY

The histories of the Benelux countries have been closely interwoven with those of their more powerful neighbors. Lying between two strong, antagonistic cultures, they have witnessed innumerable battles between forces which have sought to control the vital area. Time and again various sectors were joined together, often under foreign domination; on some occasions the entire area was united under one authority. But in each case where unification had been effected the forces of disunity eventually won out and the region was again split into two or more parts. The formation of the present Benelux unit is but the latest act in this continuing drama which extends back 2,000 years to the days when the Romans defeated the tribes

south of the Rhine and brought them under Roman power in the province of Gaul

Julius Caesar conquered the region in the middle of the first century B.C. The Romans were unable to subdue the tribes north of the Rhine, and that river became the frontier of Roman power. By the fourth century the Franks replaced the Romans as the ruling power in Gaul and founded the Flemish portion of what was to be Belgium. Control of the area was largely divided among local tribes until Clovis, the Frankish king, united the Low Countries and territories along the Loire for a short period. The first real unification of the Frankish kingdom came with the reign of Charlemagne, who was crowned emperor of the Holy Roman Empire on Christmas Day, 800

By the terms of the Treaty of Verdun in 843 Charlemagne's Empire was divided among his three grandsons. Charles received the western portion, from which the present French nation later developed; Louis was awarded the eastern area, out of which Germany eventually evolved, while the eldest grandson, Lothair, was given the central strip running from what is now the Benelux area south to the Mediterranean Sea. This "Middle Kingdom" of Lothair's, though it lasted for only a dozen years, has had a lasting effect on the political pattern of Western Europe down to the present time. Even today the region remains a transition zone between East and West, a collection of fragmented political units whose histories reflect the struggle for power between France and her eastern neighbors.

During the Middle Ages most of the Benelux area was split into small, assorted, feudal principalities. In the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries the Flemish cities of Bruges, Ghent, Ypres, and Antwerp rose to tremendous wealth and power as financial and industrial centers, concentrating particularly on woolen manufactures. At one time in the fifteenth century most of the "Middle

Kingdom" was reunited under the House of Burgundy, and in the following century control of the Benelux area passed to Philip II of Spain.

Under Spanish rule a crisis quickly developed. Philip goaded his subjects into revolt by heavy taxation, centralization of authority, and persecution of the non-Catholics, who were concentrated for the most part in Holland. In 1568 Prince William of Orange led a revolt against Spain. In the long struggle Belgium and Luxembourg withdrew from the contest, but the Dutch persisted for eighty years until the Treaty of Munster in 1648 recognized their independence. Foreign control continued in Belgium and Luxembourg until the early nineteenth century. Finally, at the Congress of Vienna (1815) the three Benelux countries were joined together in the United Netherlands, and placed under the rule of William I, the Dutch King

This attempted unification lasted only fifteen years. Religious and political differences between Belgium and the Netherlands were too strong to permit the success of such a venture and in 1830 Belgium revolted. Nine years later the nation's independence became official. Luxembourg retained personal ties with the Dutch King until 1890, but actually its independence also dates from 1839. The Grand Duchy was joined in the German *Zollverein*, or customs union, from 1842 to 1866, and again from 1871 to the end of World War I.

During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the three nations remained independent, each concentrating on its problems of economic growth and internal stability. Both Belgium and Holland developed democratic institutions under constitutional monarchies. The guarantee of Belgium neutrality (see page 283) and the fact that the great powers were preoccupied with struggles outside Europe helped to account for the independence of the small

states prior to the eruption of the global struggles of 1914 and 1939.

As a result of bitter experiences in two major conflicts the Benelux peoples emerged with a new perspective of world affairs. Turning from their traditional policy of isolation and neutrality, they now sought security through regional unification and international collective security actions. Although at times the "man in the street" lagged somewhat behind his government in the realm of international affairs, the fact remains that the three Benelux nations today stand out as leaders in the movement for West European unity. Apparently their statesmen have now grasped the truth that in order to survive politically in the present world, small nations that occupy strategic areas must unite their efforts toward economic and military security and must cooperate closely with the more powerful nations around them.

## POLITICAL FEATURES

**INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF THE BENELUX COUNTRIES**—The complex pattern of political elements within the Benelux nations reflects the long and varied history of this vital area. The absence of a really powerful unification movement until the rise of nationhood within modern times has resulted in the retention of many historic anomalies. Thus, frontier delimitations do not meet ordinary requirements of strategic consideration or compactness of territory.

*Border Problems.* Mention has already been made of the extensions of Dutch territory southward into Limburg province and westward along the North Sea coast in Zeeland. The people of Zeeland supported the Dutch struggle for independence in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and in 1648 Zeeland's present borders were delimited. The economic and political complications caused

by Dutch control of Belgium's outlets to the sea are still evident today, especially in Belgium's failure to obtain direct access to the Rhine River (see page 290). Unlike the Zeelanders, the people of Limburg took no part in Holland's revolt against Spain; that territory was added to the Netherlands centuries later as part of the European settlement in 1839. When Limburg's present borders were laid down, the Dutch retained a bridgehead on the left bank of the Meuse River, at the city of Maastricht. Surrounded on three sides by Belgian territory, this Dutch sector permits Holland to control both banks of the Meuse for a few miles, thereby complicating the problem of customs formalities, canalization, and water supplies in the area.

Another outmoded political arrangement exists southeast of Rotterdam, close to the Belgian border. Here, surrounded by Dutch territory, are approximately eighty small parcels of Belgian land. These exclaves, many of them less than an acre in extent, were retained by the Spanish in 1648 as part of the holdings of a certain nobleman. For over 300 years the Dutch have failed to gain control of these areas, and even today the Belgian flag flies over the territory, and the inhabitants, although several miles from the frontier, remain Belgian citizens.

Along the Belgian-German border, as laid down in 1922, several German exclaves also exist. These lie between the frontier and a Belgian-owned railroad, which crosses back and forth into German territory on its route between the Belgian towns of Eupen and Malmédy. Separated from their homeland by the Belgian right-of-way, the Germans inhabiting these exclaves have often appealed to their government to straighten out this anomalous situation. Following World War II control of these exclaves was awarded to the Belgians, as reparations for war damage, but to date only uninhabited portions have been occupied.

*Political Centers.* The political development of the three Benelux countries has centered about certain areas. During the late sixteenth century the Low Countries were split over the question of opposition to Spanish rule; the seven northern provinces united in defiance of control while the ten southern ones declined to support the revolt. Dutch opposition centered especially in the province of Holland, along the North Sea coast. Now divided into North and South Holland, this area today is still the administrative and economic center, as well as the most heavily populated portion of the nation. In the northeastern sector the Frisians, although supporting the revolution against Spain, insisted on their own political and cultural autonomy until late in the eighteenth century. The peoples of Limburg in southern Holland retain strong cultural and economic ties with the Belgians.

In Belgium, economic and political supremacy during the late Middle Ages lay with the city-states of Flanders. By the sixteenth century the Brabant sector, around Brussels, had developed into the leading area of the nation. Central and southern Belgium were centers of Walloon concentration; after the granting of Belgian independence industrialization in the Sambre-Meuse valley added to Walloon strength. Gradually, however, the Walloons began moving into the Brussels area, changing its character to that of a zone of ethnic transition. During the twentieth century Flanders and Antwerp have remained centers of Flemish culture, but Walloon strength has shifted southward to the provinces of Liège, Namur, Hainaut, and northern Luxembourg. With the present industrialization of the Campine area of northeastern Belgium, greater concentrations of Flemish peoples are developing in this sector, particularly in Limburg province.

The provinces in both Belgium and Holland antedate the existing constitutional governments and exercise a fair degree of au-

tonomous powers. Belgian communes and provinces are not mere divisions of the national government despite the unitary structure of government, in Holland the central government exercises considerable supervision over provincial affairs.

The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg has retained considerable homogeneity among its peoples. The city of Luxembourg, with its magnificent fortifications, was an historic military stronghold and a prize for which many armies have battled. The nation has suffered a number of major reductions in size since the seventeenth century, the latest of these occurring in 1839, when the region was split, the eastern portion becoming the Belgian province of Luxembourg. After the Nazi invasion of the country in 1940 the Germans decided to annex the Grand Duchy to the Reich, but in 1944 civil government was restored and the Duchy regained its independence at the end of the war.

**GERMAN BORDER RECTIFICATIONS**—In 1947 the Benelux nations put forth rather drastic territorial demands against Germany as compensation for war damage. The Dutch demanded 648 square miles—an area in which the population of 119,000 consisted almost entirely of German-speaking peoples. They wanted this land, first, because it contained oil, timber, and coal, and second, because it would enable them to reclaim several areas and carry out certain flood-control projects. Its acquisition would also shorten Holland's border length from 325 to 211 miles, and the Dutch would be able to guard more carefully against smugglers. The Belgians asked for eleven square miles, containing a German-speaking population of about 3,800. They desired timber and a chance to eliminate the German exclaves. Luxembourg asked for 140 square miles, in which lived approximately 30,000 Germans. It desired timber reserves and water power for a proposed dam on the Our River.

In March, 1949, a six-nation commission

of the Western Powers sanctioned a series of minor changes in the Benelux-German border. The total area involved amounted to only fifty-two square miles inhabited by 13,500 Germans. Of this total the Dutch received twenty-six square miles with a population of nearly 10,000. The most important of these areas was a sixteen-square-mile region in southern Limburg that contains valuable coal deposits. In April, 1949, the Dutch occupied the sectors awarded them. Belgium and Luxembourg, on the other hand, have occupied only small portions of the areas ceded to them, although the Luxembourg government has announced that it intends to exploit the forests in the area awarded to it.

Since 1949 little has been heard of the original Benelux claims. It is unlikely that these demands will ever be fully realized, particularly in the light of present German-Benelux cooperation. But the Dutch will probably keep their twenty-six square miles, although propaganda in West Germany occasionally revives the question of the justice of the transfers.

**COLONIAL TERRITORIES**—Overseas possessions of the Netherlands and Belgium were, until recently, concentrated in three areas: the Netherlands East Indies, the Belgian African colonies, and the Dutch possessions in the Caribbean and South America. The revolt of the East Indian islands in 1945 and their subsequent independence in 1949 cost the Netherlands seventy-three per cent of the area of its prewar empire.

During the seventeenth century Holland acquired control not only of her possessions in the East Indies but also of Ceylon, the Cape of Good Hope, and several important holdings in the Americas. Gradually much of this vast empire was annexed either by Britain or Portugal, but in 1989 the Netherlands overseas empire was still the fifth largest in the world. The Belgians, on the other hand, made no move to acquire a colonial

empire until 1885 when King Leopold II established himself as the sovereign of the new Congo State. The Berlin Conference confirmed this status and proclaimed the perpetual neutrality of the Congo Free State. The Belgian Parliament at first refused to consider the Congo as a colony of the country, and for over twenty years Leopold controlled it almost as his own private domain. In 1908, the territory was officially annexed to Belgium, adding an area seventy-eight times the size of the homeland. Following World War I, a portion of former German East Africa was mandated to the Belgians by the Allied Powers. The territory, now known as Ruanda-Urundi, is adjacent to the Belgian Congo. It is a United Nations Trusteeship and is united administratively with that area.

#### RECENT REGIONAL ASSOCIATIONS

The Benelux governments have supported warmly the various international economic, military, and political proposals which have been put forth by the Western nations. They are members of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, which from its inception in 1947 has worked to restore and maintain West Europe's economic stability. As important traders the Benelux countries have joined the European Payments Union in order to benefit from the arrangements for the convertibility of their currencies into those of other West European states. They are enthusiastic supporters of the Council of Europe, a cooperative body working toward a federation of European states. They are members of NATO and endorse its principle of collective security. In fact, the nucleus of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization originated with the formation of the Brussels Treaty Organization in 1948, in which the Benelux powers joined France and Britain in a collective self-defense system. Finally, the Benelux countries have joined with France, West

Germany, and Italy in the European Coal and Steel Community which provides for an international authority to regulate the coal and steel industries of the six nations. In reality the establishment of a single market

amounts to a customs union among its members. Recently Dutch representatives have suggested the creation of a complete Western European customs union which would cover all phases of the economy.

### Study Questions

1. What are the major hindrances to full economic unification of the Benelux area?
2. Describe the ethnic complexity of the population within the Benelux area.
3. How have the historic backgrounds of Belgium and the Netherlands differed from one another?
4. Describe the economic and historical importance of the Belgian loess plains.
5. On a world outline map locate the overseas possessions of Belgium and the Netherlands.
6. Why are Belgium and the Netherlands among the greatest trading nations of the world?
7. Discuss the causes of Holland's economic plight in the years following the end of World War II.
8. Describe the present economic dependence of the Benelux nations on France and Germany.
9. What is the relationship between the Benelux union and the Schuman Plan?
10. Describe Dutch efforts to reclaim land from the sea.
11. Discuss the present problem of population pressure in Belgium and the Netherlands.
12. Give evidence in support of the view that within the Benelux area old political patterns have tended to survive down to the present time.
13. Discuss the Dutch-Belgian conflict over shipping on the Rhine and Scheldt rivers.
14. What reasons can you give for the failure of the United Netherlands to survive as an integral unit?
15. Describe the eastward movement of the Benelux-German border since 1920. What were the bases for the 1947 claims by the Benelux countries against the Reich?



## CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

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# *France*


The French nation has long played a leading role in world affairs. Its strategic location on the western margin of continental Europe has in part been responsible for the position France has occupied in Western history during the past 2,000 years. To the north, France is separated by the narrow English Channel from the United Kingdom, which has been at various times in the past the nation's greatest enemy and on other occasions its closest ally. To the west the long Atlantic coastline has contributed to France's rise as a maritime power and its subsequent acquisition of what is now the world's largest overseas empire (see table on page 312). To the south, the nation borders the Mediterranean, a route of transit from Western Europe to North Africa and the Middle East, to the Indian Ocean, and beyond it to the countries of the Far East. Finally, to the east lie Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries, where the current process of economic and military cooperation, in the face of Soviet pressure, depends to a large extent

on the willingness of France to assume a role of leadership in the Western World.

### PHYSICAL FEATURES

**LOCATION**—Located in Northwestern Europe, France has the advantage of bordering on three major water bodies (see map on page 300). The Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and the English Channel, which leads directly to the North Sea, have all stimulated maritime development. Famous ports have grown up on the shores of these seas, each important in serving commerce with some particular region of the world—Marseilles on the Mediterranean for Indochina and the Orient; Bordeaux on the Atlantic for the east coast of South America; Le Havre and Cherbourg on the English Channel for North America. The remaining French boundaries are those in common with five countries (Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, Spain) and two microstates (Andorra, Monaco).

Much of the borderland separating France from her neighbors is mountainous, thus forming natural barriers against potential invasion. However, interconnecting valleys and intervening lowlands make the country vulnerable, particularly from the north and east. Especially weak in natural defense is the Franco-Belgian boundary across the narrow western extension of the great North European Plain; on two occasions in the present century France has borne the brunt of German onslaughts across these lowlands.



**SIZE, SHAPE, DEPTH**—The area of Metropolitan France amounts to 213,681 square miles, making it the largest nation in Europe except the USSR. In comparison with the United States, France is, of course, very small; Texas alone has a greater area. The capital, Paris, lies about 160 miles north-northeast of France's geographic center and about 120 miles from the Belgian frontier. This distance from Belgium has represented the limit of effective French resistance in the past three wars with Germany, for the capture of Paris has twice proved fatal to France's military and psychological capacity for resistance. In terms of internal politi-

cal control, a national capital should ideally be located equidistant from the borders, its force of attraction can then be exerted equally in all directions. Despite its off-center location, however, Paris is the undisputed political center of France, the hub of a railway system radiating to the outlying provinces, and the nation's leading economic area.

France has an almost hexagonal shape and is therefore relatively compact. The only major extension of foreign territory into France occurs in the east, north of Geneva, where the Swiss frontier projects about fifty miles westward into the main body of France. This compactness is a military asset, for it renders the nation's borders more defensible against foreign invasion. France also has the military asset of depth, which affords defending forces the opportunity for necessary maneuvers.

**RELIEF**—The diverse relief of France has contributed to political and economic differentiation throughout the country. In general, three types of landforms exist—Alpine mountains, as in the southeast adjacent to Italy; worn-down highlands and dissected plateaus, as in central France; and flat or gently rolling country, as around Paris or along the Mediterranean coast west of Marseilles. Significantly, the major part of the nation lies at an elevation of less than 700 feet; what highland areas there are do not form a continuous mass but are broken by numerous valleys and passes which facilitate transportation (see also page 306). The strong forces of provincialism which have developed in France partly as a result of landform diversity have been somewhat offset by the emphasis on consolidation of political control in Paris.

**CLIMATE**—The French nation enjoys three types of climate. That in the northwest is a marine variety, with mild, wet winters and cool, moist summers. January temperatures average about 40° F., July about 65° F.;

ample precipitation and considerable cloudiness occur throughout the year. Eastern France experiences the continental type of climate, characterized by warm, moist summers and cold, dry winters, with temperatures dropping in January to about 31° F. and rising in July to 65° F. Finally, southern France has a Mediterranean climate, summers are hot and dry and winters mild and wet. In Marseilles, a typical example, January temperatures average 44° F. and July temperatures 72° F. The advantages of such climatic diversity are obvious when considered in terms of agricultural productivity. Few parts of the country are too dry for agriculture, or (except for high mountain areas) too cold for cultivation. As a result about thirty-five per cent of the land is under cultivation; another twenty-five per cent is utilized as pasture land.

**NATURAL RESOURCES**—France is endowed with important mineral and power resources. Largely because of the famous Lorraine ore fields, the French nation ranks third among the countries of the world in annual output of iron ore. In addition to the Lorraine area, iron ore is also produced in small quantities in Normandy, in the eastern Pyrenees, and in the Massif Central, the uplands area in the south-central sector of the country. With respect to coal, France is less fortunate than in the case of iron ore. The greater part of the nation's supply comes from the northeast in the Lens-Valenciennes area, although secondary fields are also found in the Massif Central. In normal times France produces about two thirds of her annual coal requirements and must import the remainder. Domestic shortage of coal led to French demands for control of the Saar coal fields after World Wars I and II. Saar coal production at present equals about one quarter that of France. While the Saarland is joined in a customs union with France, the French have direct access to these deposits, and thus can reduce somewhat the annual

coal deficit. Additional minerals include bauxite, of which France is an important producer, as well as potash, rock salt, and pyrites (used in the manufacture of sulfuric acid). Water power has been utilized, particularly in central and southern France, to supplement power from coal. Approximately one half the electric power of the nation is produced from hydroelectric sources. Major power sites are located in the Maritime Alps and the Massif Central. Recent oil discoveries in the southwest will help to offset the nation's fuel shortage. Petroleum, copper, and ferroalloys (such as manganese and chromium) represent the principal limitations to France's industrial-resource base.

#### NATURAL REGIONS

France may be divided into fourteen natural regions, each with a landform pattern sufficiently characteristic to distinguish it from surrounding areas (see map on page 303). Six may be considered as "internal" in that they are totally within the confines of France, seven are "external" in that they extend beyond the French border into adjacent countries. Finally, the island of Corsica stands alone as a separate region.

*American Highlands.* In northwestern France are the American Highlands, an upland area averaging less than 1,000 feet in elevation. The region is drained in part by the Loire River and its tributaries. Along the rocky northwestern coast are the ports of Nantes, Brest, and Cherbourg, as well as many small fishing villages. The influence of the sea is reflected not only in the marine climate but also in the maritime activities of the population. The American area may be subdivided into Brittany, Normandy, and the region of the Poitou Hills. The coast of Normandy, lying across the Channel from Great Britain, was the scene of Allied landings and subsequent fighting during the early summer of 1944. Between the Poitou Hills

and the Massif Central lies the historic Poitiers Gateway, linking the Aquitaine Basin with the Paris Basin. It was in this area that Charles Martel and his Frankish army stemmed the tide of invading Moors at the Battle of Tours (732) and checked the drive of Moslem penetration into Western Europe.

*Massif Central.* In central France the Massif Central is an extensive upland area averaging 2,000 to 4,000 feet in elevation. Extremely complex in structure, this area consists of a deeply dissected eastern portion (Cévennes); a volcanic central sector (Auvergne); a limestone area in the west (Limousin), and an arid, karst region in the south (Causses). Because of the paucity of resources and general barren nature, the Massif has often been called the "poorhouse" of France. Its southern portions were the scenes of *maquis* resistance forces, which carried on guerrilla warfare against the Germans during World War II. Vichy, a resort town in the Auvergne, noted for its thermal springs, was for a time the capital of Unoccupied France during World War II.


*Paris Basin.* North of the Massif Central, occupying most of the drainage basin of the Seine River system, is France's primate region, the Paris Basin. Encircling it are a series of rather steep, outward-facing escarpments which have long served as natural defenses, particularly against invasion from the east. In the heart of the Basin is Paris, which with its cluster of suburban and outlying communities is one of the largest metropolitan areas in the world. This urban center makes the Paris Basin the economic and cultural, as well as the political, capital of France.

Paris itself is a transportation hub in three senses of the word: for the entire French Union, for the nation, and locally for the Basin itself; from all directions rail lines, both long-distance and commuter, as well as air-

ways and highways, converge on the city. Close to Paris, truck gardens vie with industry and commerce for possession of the rich lands of the Basin. But beyond, the landscape takes on a rural aspect, with broad expanses of wheat and sugar beets predominating as crops. The Paris Basin supports about one eighth of the population of France, most of whom live in Paris and its environs. Parisians are Paris-conscious; they consider themselves as a class apart from the people of the provinces—that is, all of France outside of Paris.

*Rhône-Saône Valley.* The Rhône-Saône Valley in eastern France is a structural depression, connecting the interior of the country with the Mediterranean. The Rhône River, flowing west from Lake Geneva, is joined at the city of Lyons by the Saône, flowing from the north. The valley is an historic corridor through which have passed peoples and armies as far back as records go. It was via this gateway that Romans carried their civilization northward into Gaul in the second century B.C. and through the Rhône-Saône Valley Allied armies drove northward from the Riviera in the final year of World War II. From Lyons southward, a string of cities follows the valley; among these are Vienne, Valence, Orange, Avignon, and Arles, some of which date back to Roman times.

*Mediterranean Plain.* The Mediterranean Plain stretches across southern France from the Spanish to the Italian borders and extends westward from the Mediterranean Sea to the Carcassonne Gap between the Massif Central and the Pyrenees. In the rocky area north of the Rhine Delta is the small city of Les Baux, near which are France's extensive bauxite deposits, and from which bauxite derived its name. East of Marseilles is the rocky, narrow Riviera with numerous cities and resorts strung along the coast—Toulon, Cannes, and Nice, as well as Monte Carlo



in the independent state of Monaco. West of Marseilles the coast is generally low and swampy, but inland is the important wine-producing region of Languedoc.

**Aquitaine Basin.** In southwestern France is the fertile Aquitaine Basin, facing the Atlantic and wedged between the Massif Central and the Pyrenees. The Basin was the scene of prolonged conflict between the French and English in the twelfth to the fifteenth centuries as England sought to establish territorial control in southwestern Europe. The great wheat-, corn-, and wine-

producing area is drained by the Garonne River, which flows past the port city of Bordeaux to the Bay of Biscay. Recently an oil gusher has been brought in at Parentis-en-born, on the flat moorland south of Bordeaux, signaling the beginning of a local petroleum industry. On the upper reaches of the Garonne, the city of Toulouse stands guard over the western approaches to the Carcassonne Gap, which connects the Aquitaine Basin with the Mediterranean Plain.

**Northeastern Plain.** Of the peripheral regions of France the first to be considered

is the Northeastern Plain, an area about one hundred miles in width at its narrowest point, lying between the Belgian Ardennes Mountains and the North Sea. Not only does this area lie across one of the historic invasion routes into France from the east, but along its coast are the gateway ports to Great Britain: Calais, Dunkirk, and Boulogne. The Northeastern Plain is the site of the nation's major coal reserves. Here the industrial city of Lille and other nearby smaller cities are dependent on easy access to coal for profitable production of iron and steel, chemicals, and textiles. During World War I four years of trench warfare wrought tremendous damage to this area, including destruction of many of the coal mines. Delayed reconstruction hindered French post-war industrial recovery for many years following the armistice, but by the 1930's the economic viability of this region had returned. In World War II little actual fighting took place in the Northeastern Plain area except the famous battle of Dunkirk in the spring of 1940, as a result of which British forces were compelled to withdraw from the Continent.

*Northeastern Highlands* South of the Northeastern Plain are the Northeastern Highlands, consisting of the eastern sections of the escarpments which encircle the Paris Basin. Situated along important rivers within the Highlands are the cathedral city of Reims and the battlefields of St.-Mihiel, Sedan, and Verdun, which figured prominently in the major military campaigns of World War I. The western sector of this region includes the provinces of Burgundy and Champagne, which are widely known for their wines, while dairying also ranks as an important economic activity in the area because of the grassy uplands. In the eastern part of the Highlands is Lorraine, with its iron ore deposits and industrial area. In the extreme northeast are the beginnings of

the Ardennes Mountains, which extend into Belgium.

*Vosges Mountains and Rhine Plain.* These regions lie for the most part in Alsace, which, together with eastern Lorraine, has changed hands four times in the past eighty years between France and Germany. The Vosges are forested uplands rising to over 3,000 feet in their southern portions; to the east stretches the broad, fertile flood plain of the Rhine River. Opposite the cathedral city of Strasbourg (prefecture for northern Alsace) is the Saverne Gap through the Vosges to Lorraine; through this gap pass rail, canal, and highway routes to the Rhine Valley. At the southern end of the Vosges range is the Belfort Gap, commanded by the fortified city of Belfort where a French garrison held out against the Germans during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. A canal through this gap links the Rhine and the Rhône-Saône systems, thus offering water connections between the North and Mediterranean seas. An important agricultural area, the Rhine Plain produces wheat, tobacco, and grapes, it also contains some of the world's greatest potash deposits, utilized for fertilizers and for the chemical industry. Northeast of Alsace is the Saar Basin, with its coal reserves and heavy industrial development.<sup>1</sup>

*Jura Mountains.* Between France and Switzerland are the low, folded Jura Mountains, noted for timber, dairy products, wines, and watchmaking. This picturesque region is sparsely settled, but water-power potential may eventually attract additional regional industrialization. At Porrentruy, a Swiss glacis extends northwest across the mountains into France. Important rail lines parallel the slopes of the Juras, while a trunk line from Paris to Bern (the Swiss capital) and another to Italy scale the range.

<sup>1</sup> The Saar Basin is now reunited with West Germany.

*Maritime Alps.* From Switzerland to the Mediterranean Sea the Franco-Italian border follows the crest of the Maritime Alps. In the northern section was located the Duchy of Savoy, an object of frequent controversy between France and Italy and now a part of the French nation. During the 1930's Mussolini made frequent public demands that France return Savoy to Italy. The rugged Alpine region consists not only of the main north-south chain itself but also of subsidiary ranges and foothills which extend westward in an irregular pattern to the floor of the lower Rhône Valley. The highest point in the entire European Alps is Mt. Blanc (15,781 feet), which is the nucleus of France's popular Chamonix resort area. Many other peaks exceed 10,000 feet, and in general the high slopes with their perennial snows offer vast opportunities for generating hydroelectric power, the falling water being characterized by the French as *houille blanche*, or white coal. The Isère and Durance rivers, which flow into the Rhône from deep in the Alps, are especially noted for their large-scale power projects.

*Pyrenees.* Separating France and Spain, but two thirds in the latter country, is the long, straight Pyrenees chain, which rises to more than 10,000 feet in the central part. There are but few passes across the mountains; the most practical routes from France to Spain and Portugal lie along the coastal plains at either end of the chain. The Pyrenees appear as an "ideal" natural barrier separating the two nations; nevertheless, a considerable number of people inhabit the mountain area, some of them close to the international border. At the western end of the Pyrenees, the Basques, an ethnic group with their own distinctive language and customs, are settled on both sides of the boundary. The close association between Basques living in one or the other of the two countries often complicates the task of border control. In the eastern Pyrenees,

between France and Spain, is the small independent state of Andorra.

*Corsica.* To the southeast of France, about 100 miles from the Mediterranean coast, is the island of Corsica, which was ceded to France by Genoa in 1768 and made a French department in 1815. Topography is rough, and elevations are largely above 1,500 feet, handicapping effective communications and impeding efforts toward industrialization. Along the east coast is a low, marshy coastal plain, hardly more favorable to human endeavor than the highlands. Nevertheless, the island supports 227,000 people<sup>2</sup> on its 3,367 square miles. Corsica exports wine, timber, and olive oil, thereby supplementing its economy, which is practically one of local self-sufficiency. As a matter of historical interest, the capital city, Ajaccio, was the birthplace of Napoleon Bonaparte.

#### GENERAL ECONOMY

The economy of France is fairly well balanced in terms of occupational diversity, with roughly one third of the working population engaged in agriculture, one third in industry and mining, and one third in commerce and the professions.

**INDUSTRY**—French industry includes both heavy manufactures and luxury items (gowns, watches, china, perfume). France's steel production amounts annually to over 11,000,000 tons (close to 14,000,000 if the Saar production is included). Northeastern France and the Paris Basin are two major industrial districts, the former specializing in iron and steel, chemicals, and textiles and the latter in luxury items, automobiles, and aircraft. Elsewhere in the country

<sup>2</sup> The population of Corsica at the time of the 1946 census was 268,000, but a 1953 estimate shows a much lower figure, indicating a continuation of the downward trend which has been evident for several decades.

iron and steel manufactures predominate in Lorraine, textiles and food processing in Alsace, and silk and electrochemicals in the Lyons District of the Rhône-Saône Valley. Secondary industrial areas include the upper Loire area of the Massif Central (iron and steel), the French Alps (aluminum), and Marseilles (food processing and chemicals). Some of the French industrial areas suffered serious damage during World War II, and it was only through assistance from the United States that the nation was able to regain its prewar industrial strength.

French officials are continually troubled by the specter of German industrial superiority. It was largely at French insistence that West German steel production was curtailed during the early years after World War II, and it is this same apprehension that caused France to insist on continued control over the economy of the Saarland. In February, 1953, France joined with Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries in the first stages of a European Coal and Steel Community in which tariff and other restrictions on the movement of coal, iron ore, and steel between the various nations will be removed. One of the principal benefits of this arrangement to France is that needed coal supplies, especially from West Germany, are made available.

**AGRICULTURE**—France has rich agricultural sectors, including such areas as the Paris and Aquitaine basins, the Rhine Plain, and the lower Rhône Valley. The annual wheat crop comes close to satisfying the home market. Oats, rye, and barley are important in areas of poorer soils or of less favorable climate than is required for wheat. Corn is grown chiefly in the Aquitaine Basin. Grapes, sugar beets, meat, dairy products, and wool are also produced in sufficient quantities for domestic needs.

**TRANSPORTATION**—*Internal.* France is well supplied with rail, highway, and waterway facilities. The rail system, one of the most

efficient in the world, covers 24,700 miles and is the longest among the nations of Europe (excluding the Soviet Union). The convergence of important rail and highway routes on Paris is indicative of the economic and political importance of that city in the nation's activities. Transportation lines linking major regions within France are facilitated by the existence of gaps, such as Poitiers, Carcassonne, and Belfort. The nation has over 5,000 miles of navigable waterways. Among the leading systems of rivers, canals, and canalized rivers are that in the northeast, connecting the Seine and its tributaries with Belgium and the middle Rhine; the Rhône-Saône system in southeastern France; the Loire system in the northwest, the Garonne system of southwestern France, and the Rhine with its tributaries in the east. Canals connect many of the separate systems with one another, thereby increasing the value of the country's waterways. A variety of agricultural and industrial products produced throughout France is consumed in the nation itself, and access to this market is facilitated by a well-developed transport system. France does not have a highly developed internal air net since adequate transportation is provided by surface facilities. Railroad schedules, for example, bring Bordeaux within five and one quarter hours of Paris, Lyons within four and one quarter hours, and even Nice within eleven hours. Air transportation in France is largely sponsored by the government, and in the past only a few futile efforts have been made toward the establishment of an air network linking major French provincial cities with each other and with Paris.

*External.* Overland connections with Belgium, Luxembourg, and Germany are not particularly difficult, but mountain barriers present a hindrance to transportation links with Switzerland, Italy, and Spain. Major rail routes between Paris and the countries



to the southeast funnel through the central Jura Mountains and through the Mt. Cenis tunnel in the Maritime Alps. Along the Riviera coast there are rail and road connections with Italy, and on the coasts at both ends of the Pyrenees there are like connections with Spain. Two other rail lines connect France with Spain, passing directly through the Pyrenees barrier by means of tunnels.

The French Merchant Marine totals over 3,500,000 tons, is fourth largest in Europe, and ranks sixth among the nations of the world. Le Havre, the leading seaport, and Cherbourg serve both the Atlantic and the English Channel traffic. Marseilles, the second port, lies on the Mediterranean. Bordeaux, Nantes, and Brest face the Atlantic, while Dunkirk, Boulogne, and Calais are on the English Channel.

Despite France's lack of any significant internal air transport, service to cities in the French Union and to foreign countries is impressive. The French national airline, Air France, has the greatest route mileage of any single air transportation system in the world and connects Paris with other major cities of Europe and North Africa, North and South America, the Middle East, and the Far East, including Australia and New Caledonia.

**FOREIGN TRADE**—Since the end of World War II France has had an unfavorable balance of trade—that is, it imports goods of greater value than those it exports. Major imports include petroleum, wool, cotton, coal and coke, and oilseeds; exports are cotton and wool fabrics, iron and steel products, automobiles, and luxury items. Most French commercial relations are with Algeria, the United States, Great Britain, West Germany, and French West Africa. In order to encourage foreign trade, France has taken a leading role in the formulation of plans designed to lower tariffs and other trade barriers between nations.

## HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

Three basic forces have been of particular significance in the history of the French state: (1) the struggle for centralization of political authority in Paris, (2) the resistance of France to political control by non-French groups, and (3) French territorial expansion in Europe and acquisition of overseas areas. The early unification of France and its continued existence as an independent political entity have been due in part to the close interrelationship of its various geographic regions, in part to the elements of cultural unity which have drawn the French people together, and in part to the absence of a strong secondary political center which could counter the centripetal forces exerted by Paris itself.

The earliest recorded inhabitants of France were the Celtic, Ligurian, and Aquitanian tribes who occupied the area prior to its invasion by the Gauls in the sixth century B.C. During the Gallic Wars (58–51 B.C.) Roman power was extended by Julius Caesar over much of what is now France, and the impress of the Romans is still in evidence in many aspects of French culture, such as language, administration, and laws. During the third century Roman power began to weaken in the face of pressure from Germanic peoples to the east; by 401 the last of the Roman legions were withdrawn from Gaul and the area was abandoned to the invading Franks.

In the centuries that followed the Frankish conquest, France struggled with the problems of internal unification and development. Strong rulers, such as Clovis in the fifth century and Charlemagne in the early ninth, managed to assert the power of the central government, but during much of the time from the fifth to the fifteenth century political authority was localized in the hands of powerful lords, rather than being concentrated in Paris. Local political units, such as Burgundy and Aquitaine, at times

achieved independence during this thousand-year period of French history, and not until after the Hundred Years' War with England (1337-1453) was political control over a unified France firmly established in the nation's capital.

The efforts of the English from the eleventh to the fifteenth century to control parts of the French mainland represented one of the major forces leading to centralization of political power within France itself. Although England was finally forced to abandon its holdings in France, the historic rivalry between the English and French nations continued until after 1870 when these states, faced with the rising power of Germany, became allies. In the centuries which followed the end of the Hundred Years' War, the French were engaged in the defense (and at times the expansion) of their eastern and southern borders and the development of a valuable overseas empire. However, the interminable struggle to be a dominant land power on the Continent as well as a leading sea power eventually overtaxed French manpower and resources. During the later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries France lost much of her overseas empire, particularly in North America and India, to the British, on the Continent, British and continental armies in 1815 succeeded in defeating the great French army of Napoleon, thereby ending France's history of military dominance in Europe.

The French Revolution, in 1789, marked the end of a feudal class system and the beginnings of modern constitutional government in that nation. In the century and a half that have followed the close of the Revolution, France has often been beset by internal disorders, and on several occasions autocratic governments have been temporarily established. Nevertheless, the revolutionary slogan of "Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity" has exercised considerable influence on French political thinking, and throughout much of the nineteenth and

twentieth centuries democratic ideals and form of government have survived in France.

The military campaigns by the French under Napoleon (1804-15) were followed by a period of internal reconstruction within France itself and by expansion of French power in North Africa and Southeast Asia. Despite the territorial losses that marked its defeat in 1815, France demonstrated remarkable recuperative powers and became strong enough to fight three major wars with Germany. Franco-German rivalry in the second half of the nineteenth century largely turned on economic competition and the determination of German leaders to outclass France as a continental power. After the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71) and the acquisition by Germany of the former French province of Alsace, together with eastern Lorraine, this rivalry was complicated by French desires to regain the lost territories and by German efforts to retain what they had won.

At the outbreak of World War I, in 1914, German forces struck at France for a second time in less than half a century. The four-year conflict was fought largely on French soil, and France suffered tremendous physical destruction and loss of life; thus, although Germany was ultimately defeated, the French nation emerged almost completely exhausted by the war. In 1940 the Germans invaded France a third time; the French nation was quickly overrun by German forces and for four years most of the defeated country was occupied by the enemy. Not until August, 1944, was Paris liberated by the Allies and the Free French forces.

French morale suffered a severe setback as a result of the national humiliation that attended military defeat and enemy occupation in World War II. This condition in turn, has been reflected in economic and political instability throughout the nation in the years following liberation and in slowness on the part of the French to utilize fully their country's considerable natural re-

sources and to seize the opportunity offered them of becoming a leading force for democracy in postwar Europe.

## POPULATION

The 1955 population of Metropolitan France was estimated at about 43,000,000. The nation's population growth has been slow during the past century; in 1861 the population totaled 37,000,000; in 1921 it was 39,000,000, and in 1939, 42,000,000.<sup>3</sup> The present birth rate for the country of nineteen per 1,000, together with a death rate of thirteen per 1,000, gives a natural annual increase of about 250,000 persons. The population density is approximately 200 persons per square mile, a low figure in comparison with the densities of other nations of Western Europe. Since France's population is increasing only slowly, there appears to be little danger that the nation will become "overcrowded" in the foreseeable future.

Since the end of World War I France has been troubled by shortages of young men. During that war nearly 2,000,000 Frenchmen lost their lives or were permanently disabled; in World War II more than 1,000,000 additional casualties were suffered. The result has been a labor shortage necessitating the importation of foreign laborers (especially Italians and Belgians) for work on the farms and in the mines; more than 1,000,000 foreign laborers are now resident in France. Most of these persons have a status of "temporary residents," and accordingly they play only a minor role in the political life of the nation.

France is a nation of towns and small cities rather than one of great metropolitan centers. Only twenty-four cities have a

population of more than 100,000 (compared with sixty-three in Great Britain). Of these, Paris has nearly 3,000,000 people (5 000,000, including the suburbs). The second city is Marseilles (661,000), followed by Lyons (471,000), Toulouse (269,000), Bordeaux (258,000), Nice (244,000), Nantes (223,000), and Strasbourg (201,000). Areas of dense population, in addition to the Paris Basin, include the northeastern manufacturing sector, the Lorraine industrial district, the Alsace Plain, the central Rhône Valley, and the Marseilles-eastern Riviera sector along the Mediterranean coast.

**ETHNIC FACTORS**—As a nation the French people are closely knit together by common ties of language, religion, and national origins. Nearly ninety-eight per cent of the population belongs to the Roman Catholic Church; more than ninety per cent speak French as their native tongue. Leading language minorities include the Basques of the western Pyrenees, whose ancient tongue is derived from a pre-Roman stock; the Bretons of northwestern France, who speak a variety of Gaelic; German-speaking persons of Alsace; Italians of the eastern Riviera; and inhabitants of the eastern Pyrenees who speak Spanish. There is also a small extension of Flemish-speaking Belgians in northeastern France, and, of course, many of the foreign workers living in France retain their national tongue.

Conflict among different nationalistic and linguistic groups is not so prevalent in France as in some other parts of Europe. It is true that along the borders there is a stronger manifestation of provincialism, and the Bretons, Basques, and Alsatians tend to favor a large degree of autonomy; but there is uniformly a spirit of patriotism and loyalty to the country. The most serious anti-national sentiments are expressed by the Spanish- and Italian-speaking residents and by some of the German-speaking peoples of Alsace.

<sup>3</sup> A steady decline in its birth rate in the nineteenth century troubled France because of the effect of the decline on the nation's status as a military power; the French have come to look upon their African colonies as an important reservoir of manpower for their armies.


**SOCIAL FACTORS**—Class divisions result in serious economic and political problems in French life. Despite a well-distributed population and a strong middle class, France suffers from great inequalities of wealth. A wealthy oligarchy has wielded economic power in the nation and has been able to thwart the efforts of the working class to share in a higher standard of living. A considerable part of the political dissension in France revolves around the efforts made by liberal political leaders to find an equitable solution to the country's economic ills and the determined efforts of conservative and reactionary elements to defeat reform. To the extent that the latter group has prevailed, the Communist party has strengthened its hold in the trade-union movement and has gained a following in the general elections. Strangely enough religion is also a powerful issue in French politics. Church and state were separated in 1905, but the Church question has not disappeared. Most Frenchmen are Catholics, but many are determined anticlerics in their attitude toward the political activity of the Church. There is much feeling in France that the Church is a reactionary force and an enemy of democracy. The religious issue generally cuts across economic and political lines and thus serves to complicate French politics.

#### POLITICAL-ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE

Metropolitan France is divided politically into ninety departments. In addition, northern Algeria is split into four departments, and one department each is assigned to the islands of Martinique and Guadeloupe (in the West Indies), to Reunion (in the Indian Ocean), and to the mainland territory of French Guiana (or Cayenne) in northern South America. The departments are subdivided into districts, of which there are 311, and these, in turn, into cantons. At the lowest level of political organization are

the communes, each of which is headed by a mayor. As a rule the departments are not based on either geographic or economic distinctions, they are largely artificial creations of the government. In a historic sense the ninety departments of Metropolitan France replace the thirty-nine ancient provinces into which France was once divided (see map on page 311). Brittany, for example, now consists of five departments, Normandy of five, Provence of three. Some present departments occupy exactly the same area as the former provinces, but the names are altered. Flandres is now Nord, Picardy is Somme, and Nice is Alpes Maritimes. One consequence of the political fragmentation noted above is that chances for the rise of powerful areas to thwart the authority of the capital city are significantly reduced. In fact, centralization of authority in Paris is so firmly established that orders and directions from the capital extend over matters of education, health, and public roads. Even local administration is largely a branch of administration from the center.

The French National Assembly is the supreme legislative body. Because of French fears of a strong central administrative figure, control over the cabinet is concentrated in the National Assembly, and the elective president is only a nominal chief of state. If, at any time, the French Premier fails to win a majority of the votes in the Assembly in support of his program he and his cabinet must resign and the President appoints a new administration. Because the Assembly is split into a half dozen or more major political parties, and coalitions, which are necessary to achieve a majority, are easily upset, Premiers have been remaining in office for less than one year, on the average. Such a situation hinders the development of a strong continuous policy; especially serious in recent years in France's relations with Indochina, Morocco, and Tunisia and in her handling of the Saar problem.



### EXTERNAL ASPECTS AND PROBLEMS

**THE FRENCH UNION**—Established in 1946, the French Union represents a reorganization of the old French colonial empire. The Union consists of Metropolitan France (mainland France and Corsica); Algeria; the Overseas Departments of Martinique, Guadeloupe, Réunion, and French Guiana; the Overseas territories, which include the former "colonies"; New Hebrides, a condominium shared with Great Britain; the

Trusteeship Territories of Cameroun and Togoland; the Associated States, comprising Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam in what used to be French Indochina; and the now-independent countries of Morocco and Tunisia. Excluding France, the Union has an area of 4,463,000 square miles and a population of 72,000,000.

Tunisia and Morocco ended their protectorate status in 1956 and now exist as independent nations, linked with France by the bonds of "interdependence." The de-

## The French Union: Area and Population

	Area (in sq. mi.)	Population
Metropolitan France (including Corsica)—90 departments	212,681	43,000,000
Algeria <sup>a</sup>	847,500	9,530,000
Overseas Departments		
French Guiana	35,041	28,000
Guadeloupe	688	289,000
Martinique	427	273,000
Réunion	965	274,000
Overseas Territories <sup>b</sup>		
Comoro Islands	650	166,000
French Equatorial Africa	953,800	4,441,000
French Oceania	1,554	63,000
French Somaliland	9,071	61,500
French West Africa	1,776,500	17,361,000
Madagascar and Dependencies	224,162	4,455,000
New Caledonia and Dependencies	8,548	65,000
Saint Pierre and Miquelon	93	4,600
Condominium		
New Hebrides (with Great Britain)	5,791	49,000
Trusteeship Territories (former Mandates)		
French Cameroons	166,489	3,077,000
French Togoland	21,893	1,030,000
Associated States		
Cambodia	67,000	4,100,000
Laos	91,450	1,500,000
South Vietnam	50,000	13,000,000
Morocco	153,870	8,004,000
Tunisia	48,362	3,700,000

<sup>a</sup> Northern Algeria consists of four departments: Algiers, Oran, Constantine, and Bône. The four Southern Territories are administered directly by the Governor General of Algiers.

<sup>b</sup> French India consisted of the enclaves of Chandernagor, Pondichéry, Karikal, Mahé, and Yanam. Chandernagor was turned over to India in 1949 and the four other areas were ceded to India five years later.

tailed political, economic, and military relationships between France and the two former North African territories represent

a complex problem which will be difficult to resolve, for, on the one hand, the peoples of Tunisia and Morocco are jealous of their newly acquired independence, while, on the other hand, many aspects of their national well-being will, for a number of years, continue to depend on close associations with France. Both countries continue to be dependent on France for economic assistance, for defense, and for personnel to assist in the operation of various economic and social agencies.

On the economic side the French Union is an asset to France in terms of resources and investment possibilities. Among the products of the Union outside of France are iron ore, wheat, wine, phosphate, sugar, rice, rubber, and cacao. The overseas areas represent opportunities for French investments and markets for France's products. More than half a million Frenchmen live in Morocco, Tunisia, and the various political units of Indochina, and thousands more reside in other units of the Union.

The overseas territories have also represented a considerable liability to France since the end of World War II in terms of money, manpower, and prestige. The costs of the war in Indochina and of the struggle in North Africa have generally outweighed the economic returns from these areas within recent years, and thousands of Frenchmen have been killed or wounded in the overseas countries. France's status as a major colonial power has suffered as a result of the nation's inability to cope effectively with the nationalist movements; and the need for French troops in Southeast Asia and in North Africa has weakened France's military contribution to NATO in Europe. One of the most pressing problems facing the French government is how to bring stability to the various areas that still remain within the Union.

ALSACE-LORRAINE—The border provinces of Alsace and Lorraine have been the scene of frequent territorial changes during the past

three quarters of a century. In 1871, following Germany's victory over France in the Franco-Prussian War, Alsace and the eastern portion of Lorraine were annexed by the Germans, although both areas had been a part of France for over a century. Many persons, especially in Alsace, were German-speaking, but their national sympathies lay largely with France. The famous Minette iron-ore reserves of Lorraine, included in the territorial transfer to Germany, were utilized by the Germans in their industrial build-up prior to World War I. The return of Alsace-Lorraine to France in 1918 was followed by the substitution of French for German in the schools. There was some agitation during the 1920's, especially in Alsace, for political autonomy, but the movement was unsuccessful. In 1940, when the Nazis subdued France, Alsace-Lorraine was reannexed by Germany, but four years later France again regained political control. In these many shiftings of political status the principal victims have been the local inhabitants, whose way of life suffers violent upheavals with each change. Like the peoples of Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Saar they are involved periodically in Franco-German conflicts, originating in Paris and Berlin, rather than in the border areas themselves.

**FRANCO-ITALIAN BORDER**—Territorial disputes between France and Italy, although of less magnitude than those between France and Germany, are nevertheless important in the political geography of the area. Mention has already been made of the former Duchy of Savoy, joined to France in 1860 but still claimed by many Italian nationalists. The Province of Nice on the French Riviera has had a similar history of conflict between France and Italy. In the days before World War II Mussolini included Nice with Savoy in his demands for territorial restitution on the part of France. After the war, France demanded certain minor changes in her mountain border with Italy. By moving

the boundary eastward, France, in 1947, gained control of several important passes, including the Little St. Bernard. In other areas hydroelectric stations and potential sites for new installations were acquired. The total area involved in the border changes came to 370 square miles and contained a population (largely Italian-speaking) of about 3,500.

**THE SAAR**—Lying to the east of Lorraine, the rich Saar district has been a source of French-German controversy following each of the two world wars. Since the population is predominantly German in speech and sympathy, and since throughout most of its history the area has been associated with the German states, extensive discussion of the district is included in Chapter Twenty-two, "The German Realm" (especially page 379).

**INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS**—Since the end of World War II, France has turned its efforts to strengthening its position on the Continent. As part of this move it has taken an active part in the various regional arrangements in Western Europe. First of all, France is an active member of the United Nations and one of the five permanent members of the Security Council. In its quest for national safety, however, France has not hesitated to build a more tangible system of alliances. /In 1947 France joined in a fifty-year military defense pact with Britain, designed to assure joint action against a revival of German aggression. In 1948 this pact was extended to cover the Benelux countries in a Western Union. France is also a cornerstone of the larger North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which seeks to coordinate defense efforts of the North Atlantic Community. France has even modified its objection to the economic revival of West Germany by accepting German membership in the European Coal and Steel Community (Schuman Plan). The French are also members of the Council of Europe, an advisory body working for

the creation of a politically united European Federation. France's fundamental need for international cooperation has never been seriously challenged at home, despite frequent changes in the composition of the national government.

French idealism in the realm of international affairs has, to a certain extent, come in conflict with the people's historic fears with regard to a resurgence of German power. Although the French have agreed to the formation of various economic and military arrangements in West Europe, they are still acutely conscious of the superiority

of German manpower and resources despite the over-all restraints on aggression implied within the framework of NATO or the enlarged Brussels Treaty structure. France is torn between fear of becoming a battleground in the struggle between the East and West and the possible menace of a militarized Germany. By geography and tradition, of course, France is oriented to the West, but the attendant complexities of a bipolarized world tend to foster a sense of indecision on the part of French political leaders and a consequent delay in the realization of strong French influence on the Continent.

## ANDORRA AND MONACO

Andorra and Monaco are two small, independent states that lie along France's southern borders. Andorra occupies a series of mountain valleys in the eastern Pyrenees between France and Spain. It has an area of 191 square miles, and a population of about 6,000, the majority of whom speak Catalan, a Spanish tongue. Recognition of Andorra's political independence dates back to the

thirteenth century. Monaco lies on the French Riviera, close to the Italian border. It has an area of 370 acres (about one half square mile) and a population of 25,000, with French as its official language. Monaco is joined economically with France and is noted principally for its postage stamps and its famous casino at Monte Carlo, the principality's only city.

## Study Questions

1. Diagram the natural regions of France and the connecting lowland areas.
2. Describe the major overseas life lines between France and the other units of the French Union.
3. Describe the political changes that have taken place in the French Union since the end of World War II.
4. List the advantages and disadvantages to France, the Saarland, and Germany, of the Saar's postwar economic association with France.
5. Discuss the physical, economic, and political advantages of the Paris Basin.
6. Analyze France's reluctance to participate to a greater extent in West European alliances against Communism.
7. Contrast Marseilles and Le Havre in terms of (a) types of cargoes handled and (b) leading countries trading with France through each port.
8. What are the political effects of the present type and distribution of population in France? In what ways might elements of the population represent a menace to the nation?
9. Discuss France's internal transportation system. What specific factors have favored the development of the network of waterways?



10. Describe problems of territorial control along the French-Italian border.
11. Discuss economic difficulties that might develop if the projected French-Italian Customs Union should go into effect.
12. What have been the economic effects in France of the granting of independence to (a) the Associated States of Indochina, (b) Tunisia, and (c) Morocco? What have been the military effects in each of these three cases?
13. Discuss the dilemma facing the United States in the political disputes between France and her former protectorates in North Africa
14. Discuss the degree of France's self-sufficiency in terms of food, mineral, and power sources.
15. Describe the forces tending (a) to unite and (b) to divide the French nation.

## CHAPTER NINETEEN

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# *Spain and Portugal*

The two countries of the Iberian Peninsula—Spain and Portugal—were once leading world powers with the largest territorial empires on the surface of the globe. As great nations of the past, they have contributed substantially to the political pattern of the modern world. Although no longer ranking as major powers, their activities still influence international affairs. The history of Spain and Portugal since 1930 substantiates this statement. Growing out of the overthrow of the Spanish monarchy and the proclamation of the Second Republic in 1931, the Spanish Civil War, from 1936 to 1939, became a dress rehearsal for World War II. New military ordnance was tested and new military strategy developed, both of which contributed to the plan of attack adopted in the early stages of World War II. Germany and Italy supported the authoritarian opponents of the Republic; other nations supplied material and troops to the Republican government. Since World War II, the government of Generalissimo Francisco Franco, the sole remaining Fascist dictator,

is still a stern reality to the Spanish people and a problem for the United Nations.

Across the boundary from Spain, Portugal, since the adoption of a new constitution in 1933, has been firmly guided by Dr. Antonio Oliveira de Salazar. He has lifted Portugal from a backward nation torn by internal dissension to one of stability—one in which improvement in living standards is being realized under a national program. Dr. Salazar's policy of neutrality kept Portugal from becoming embroiled in World War II, although Lisbon was widely known as a "listening post" for both Allied and Axis agents, and thus made easier the fulfillment of his program of internal progress.

### PHYSICAL ASPECTS

**LOCATION**—The Iberian Peninsula is the westernmost of three peninsulas in southern Europe projecting into the Mediterranean. The peninsula derives its name from the Iberians, the people who inhabited the area prior to the influx of Phoenician traders and

colonizers in pre-Hellenic times. The longitude of Cape Roca on the west coast of Portugal is approximately 9° 30' West, nearly the same as that of Ireland, 600 miles to the north; that of Cape Creus in the east is 3° 20' East Longitude. Marroqui Point (near Gibraltar), just above 36° North Latitude, is the most southerly of all the mainland areas of Europe, extending approximately ½° latitude farther south than Greece and 2° farther south than Italy.<sup>1</sup> The northernmost point, near Cape Ortegal, almost reaches 44° North Latitude. The latitudinal range of the Iberian Peninsula—36° to 43° 50' North—is the same as that on the United States eastern seaboard from Cape Hatteras, North Carolina, to Portland, Maine.

Both Spain and Portugal have possessions outside the peninsula which are component parts of the homelands. The Balearic Isles off the east coast in the Mediterranean make up a Spanish province. Portugal has two island groups in the Atlantic—Madeira and the Azores—which are considered component parts of the Portuguese homeland.

Located at the threshold of Africa, the Iberian Peninsula is the principal point of contact between the peoples of the two continents. Both Spain and Portugal have had very close relations with Africa, probably as close as, or closer than, their relations with the rest of Europe. The narrow width of the Strait of Gibraltar has facilitated migration of people from North Africa, whereas the Pyrenees Mountains in the north constitute a real barrier and have tended to isolate the peninsula from the rest of Europe.

Although Spain and Portugal have been classed as Mediterranean countries, they never dominated Mediterranean commerce as did the early powers to the east—Phoenicia, Crete, Carthage, and Rome. Being at the western end of the Mediterranean,

the Iberians were the last to benefit from Levantine trade and culture. Furthermore, the rugged terrain and the absence of easy land routes across Spain and Portugal from the Mediterranean lands to the Atlantic prevented the easy dissemination of eastern Mediterranean culture throughout the Iberian Peninsula. In the Age of Discovery, on the other hand, the peninsula's position on the Atlantic favored maritime activity on the open ocean. Sailing ships in the fifteenth century ventured southward along the west coast of Africa, later rounding the Cape of Good Hope; they crossed the Atlantic to the West Indies and the northeastern coast of Brazil. Thus the Iberian Peninsula became a center from which Spanish and Portuguese culture and influence were carried to many parts of the world.

**AREA AND SHAPE**—Spain and Portugal do not occupy equal areas of the Iberian Peninsula. Spain has an area of approximately 195,000 square miles, more than five times Portugal's area of 35,400 square miles. Spain is roughly equivalent in area to the four states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan; Portugal is equal in size to Indiana alone.

Rectangular in shape, with few protuberances or indentations, the peninsula lacks the type of hinterland that would support a network of communication lines tying together the whole peninsula. In Spain the concept of core areas applies to scattered regions favorable to development, especially Madrid in the heart of the country. This central position proved to be a natural point of convergence for a country-wide radial pattern of transportation, notwithstanding the inhospitable landscape about the city for miles in every direction. In contrast, Portugal, with an elongated shape paralleling the coast, has developed both politically and economically along its north-south axis of internal communications.

**RELIEF AND STRUCTURE**—The dominant relief feature of the Iberian Peninsula is the Span-

<sup>1</sup> The island of Crete, which belongs to Greece, extends about one degree farther south than does the Iberian Peninsula.

ish Meseta, a plateau that occupies sixty to seventy per cent of the area. Most of the Meseta is between 2,000 and 5,000 feet in elevation, although some small areas drop to lower altitudes. Primarily, it is the foundation or remnant of an old mountain system which has been subdued, by a long period of erosion and weathering, to the point where much of the surface is level to rolling. In the center of the Meseta is located Madrid, the capital of Spain.<sup>2</sup>

The most striking relief features are the mountainous areas in the northern, central, and southern parts of the peninsula. These mountains, in each region, constitute barriers to extensive transportation, however, routes around or through them have tended to prevent even the most remote areas from being wholly isolated. In another sense the mountainous regions are a blessing to the two countries, inasmuch as they are, in some places, exceedingly rich in mineral resources.

The northernmost mountain range of Spain consists of three different groups: (1) in the western corner are the Galician Hills, with a worn-down and subdued topography developed on an old rock structure, (2) to the east of the Galician Hills, in the central part, are the Cantabrian Mountains, which have a more irregular topography; (3) farther to the east are the high rugged Pyrenees, among the most lofty mountains in Europe, culminating in peaks 10,000 and 11,000 feet high. The Pyrenees rise rather ruggedly and abruptly from the neighboring lands both north and south to form the frontier between Spain and France. Although the actual boundary approximates the crest of the range, two thirds of the area of the Pyrenees is in Spain. Difficult to cross, they contribute to the isolation of the peninsula from the rest of Europe. Passage by rail from

France to Spain is limited to lines that follow the Atlantic and Mediterranean coastal zones or pass through two tunnels deep in the interior of the mountainous region. In north-west Spain the Galician Hills and the Cantabrian Mountains drop into the coastal waters to form harbors which are important commercial ports as well as fishing centers.

The Cantabrian Mountains are the principal sources of iron ore on the peninsula, normally producing about one half as much as Great Britain or Sweden. The nearby ports of Bilbao and Santander handle a significant proportion of the output, which is exported to more industrial nations. The best coal beds are also found in the same range, but their folded character means that the seams dip steeply and mining is difficult—one factor discouraging a strong iron-and-steel industry.

In the interior of the peninsula and rising well above the level of the Meseta are several mountain ranges, less continuous and lower than those in the north but in general parallel to them. The central Sierras extend eastward from central Portugal toward Madrid. The Sierra de Estrella, in east-central Portugal, is reported to have the most extensive deposits of wolframite (tungsten ore) in Europe. The Sierra de Gata, across the border in Spain, also contains wolframite deposits. The most prominent range of the central Sierras is the Sierra de Guadarrama, north of Madrid, which has been uplifted as a great central block that separates New Castile from Old Castile. Similar in structure to the central Sierras, but located at the south edge of the Meseta, is the Sierra Morena, which rises abruptly from the low Andalusian plain. This range of old folded rock formations is shot through with metaliferous veins. Here is the world-famous Río Tinto district, which has yielded copper for many centuries. Lead, mercury, silver, and other metals also abound and are being developed.

The ranges of the Sierra Nevadas in the

<sup>2</sup> In 1560 Madrid was made the capital of Spain by Philip II, largely because of its geographic location in approximately the center of the Iberian Peninsula.

south are the most alpine of the peninsula, rising to a height of 11,420 feet in Mt. Mulhacén. The ridges extend in a north-east-southwest direction and act as a barrier between the interior plateau and the Mediterranean coast, as well as between the plateau and continental Africa. The high and complex Sierra Nevadas are similar in structure to the Swiss Alps and, like them, have no outstanding mineral deposits, the only metal obtained in notable quantities is iron, found inland from Málaga and Almería.

Irregularly spaced around the coast of the peninsula are several lowlands of varying widths, each more favorable to human activity than the slopes separating them from the interior. Two of these lowlands face the Atlantic, one bordering Setúbal Bay and drained by the Tagus River, and the other extending into the Andalusian lowland drained by the Guadalquivir River. Seville and Cadiz are the two cities most significant in the latter area, and Lisbon is the focal point for the former. Along the east coast there are three coastal lowlands of sufficient area to support large cities. The narrowest lies to the north, where Barcelona, Spain's largest city, is wedged between the coast and the highlands of Catalonia. The Valencia Basin in the central coastal area is the largest eastern lowland, its key city of Valencia ranking third among Spanish cities. The Murcia-Alicante plain to the south extends inland through the Segura River valley and provides a breach into the Meseta.

**CLIMATE**—Of the environmental factors affecting the Iberian Peninsula, climate is one of the most dominant in influencing the character of the Spanish and Portuguese landscapes and the economic activities taking place on them. Yet the climate of some parts of the peninsula is in sharp contrast to that found in other sections. The mild marine west coast type of northwest Spain is not unlike that found in the British Isles and in Brittany in westernmost France, the

southeast coast of Spain has a pure Mediterranean type of climate, similar to that across the Tyrrhenian Sea on the shores of the Italian Peninsula, and the high dry Meseta Plateau of interior Spain reflects a continental type in many of its aspects, such as might be expected in a land much farther from the sea.

In Portugal there are sharp differences between the northern and southern parts of the country, roughly separated by the valley of the Tagus River as it angles northeastward from Lisbon to the Spanish border. North of this line is a strictly Atlantic climate, lacking strong seasonal contrasts of temperature and marked by heavy precipitation. To the south of the Tagus the influence of the Mediterranean takes over, with mild winters, hot summers, and rainfall so light that irrigation is needed for successful crop culture. To the north, population is dense, farms small, and agriculture intensively cultivated, to the south, population is relatively sparse, farm holdings large, and agriculture of the ranch and plantation type.

Except for the interior plateau, there is no part of Spain or Portugal that does not have at least some of the climatic qualifications necessary for a resort: mild winter, cool summer, blue skies and sunshine, and warm waters in which to bathe. San Sebastián in northern Spain across the border from Biarritz in France, the Balearic Isles off the east coast of Spain, and Estoril near Lisbon are examples of such areas which have been developed into internationally known resorts.

**VEGETATION**—Vegetation in Spain and Portugal is intimately dependent on the climatic conditions that prevail from region to region. Over much of the Spanish Meseta, where a continental climate with its negligible rainfall prevails, steppe and bunch grass provide pasturage for millions of sheep. The *esparto* variety of tufted grass is gathered and used in the preparation of cordage, shoes, baskets, and paper. In the Mediterranean climatic

region of southern Spain and southern Portugal is the cork oak, a broadleaf evergreen, which constitutes the principal source of cash income for the areas. The landed aristocracy of both Spain and Portugal have remained strongest in the drier lands where holdings are large and where, consequently, the raising of such crops as olives and cork oak and the pasturing of sheep and cattle can be carried on extensively.

**WATER RESOURCES**—Availability of water is probably the most important environmental factor influencing the location of Iberian people. This is especially true in Spain; Portugal, being on the windward side of the peninsula and receiving heavier precipitation, especially in the northern two thirds, is less critically affected by this factor. In Spain surface water resources are practically the only ones that have been utilized; subsurface water has scarcely been touched. Well-distributed rainfall in northwest Spain provides abundant run-off water, and there is little need for conservation; elsewhere the lack of surface water handicaps practically all activity. Although most of the peninsula suffers from the undependability of rainfall, near the highlands, waters can be diverted for irrigation purposes.

Besides supplying domestic needs and water for livestock, surface water is also used for water power. Each of the two nations of the peninsula has approximately 2,000,000 horsepower of hydroelectric energy available. Spain, with a much larger area and much less rainfall than Portugal, has developed about twenty per cent of her estimated water-power potential, whereas Portugal has developed an even smaller percentage of its potential.

#### HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

**GROWTH**—The Spaniards are a combination of peoples who became conscious of a national unity during their successful struggle

to expel the Moors from a substantial part of the Iberian Peninsula in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The Moors, who had conquered the peninsula in the early part of the eighth century, were finally driven out, with the fall of Granada in 1492. They had contributed substantially to the factors that were to make Spain a world power by encouraging a strong Spanish fleet as a means both of defending the coasts and of protecting trade. Moreover, it was the Moors who encouraged the study of navigation and the training of navigators, each actively contributing to the exploratory voyages through uncharted seas which were to follow in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

No natural geographic frontier separates Portugal and Spain. Historic circumstances account for the rise of Portugal as a political entity. Portugal, an outgrowth of old Spain, developed from a group of Iberians who inhabited the northwestern part of the peninsula at the time of the Moorish domination. In 1095, Alfonso VI of Spain granted the county of Portugal in the northern part of Iberia as a fief to Henry of Lorraine, a French count and a relative of the King. The successors of Henry steadily increased their holdings and finally gained sufficient strength to maintain a government and authority separate from that of the counties of León and Castile, two of the strongest neighboring provinces on the east. Finally, in 1139, Count Alfonso Enríquez assumed the title of King of Portugal and was recognized as such by the King of León and later by Pope Alexander III. As the Moors retreated southward, the King of Portugal extended his kingdom eastward to the Tagus River—which is still the boundary between Portugal and Spain—and, later on, westward to the Atlantic coast. The strength of Portugal was recognized by Spain, and the boundary between the two countries, particularly the northern section, has remained stable for about seven centuries.

Historic circumstances in the sixteenth cen-

tury combined to elevate Spain and Portugal to a position of world power. The ascendancy of the Iberian countries can in part be attributed to their favorable location at the western extremity of Europe and to the closing of commercial routes in the Near East by the Turks, a factor encouraging explorations westward toward the New World. With seafaring experience and navigational skills Portugal established profitable colonies in the rich area of the East Indies, and Spain exploited the gold and silver resources in the New World. Moreover, Spain's entrance into empire building coincided with the defeat of the Moors at Granada and the unification of Castile and Aragon. The influx of wealth and flourishing commercial growth not only strengthened the Spanish state but enabled its royal family to play a leading role in the political fortunes of the Low Countries and of Italy.

**DECLINE**—Spanish and Portuguese colonies gained in the New World by early exploration were lost not long after the independence movement by the English colonists and the establishment of the United States in 1783. For Spain the decline of her empire was due largely to the lack of manpower adequate for world-wide empire. Tremendous quantities of wealth had been brought from the American colonies to Spain, but that wealth was squandered in an effort to become a dominant political power in Europe. Colonial wealth was used to pay soldiers, to buy supplies, and to pay interest on loans made to Spain by other European nations. The extensive colonial empire of Spain was decisively brought to an end by the Spanish-American War at the close of the nineteenth century, and attention was then turned to internal problems rather than to the control and defense of far-flung interests.

Portugal did not fare so badly as Spain, but because of limited area and political power the nation was unable to compete for long with the northern European nations in

the race for colonial supremacy. Rather than compete against the growing maritime power to the north, Portugal joined Britain in a treaty of alliance in the seventeenth century and thus was able to retain a considerable portion of its colonial territory.

Despite its location as the most southwestern extension of Europe, the Iberian Peninsula did not become the maritime center for trade with the most actively growing sections of North America; instead, the Great Circle route from Northwestern Europe to North America received preference for transatlantic travel. Only in post-World War II air travel have the two countries regained some of their former importance on intercontinental trunk routes to Europe from North and South America.

#### PEOPLES OF SPAIN AND PORTUGAL

The Iberian Peninsula, slightly larger than France, has a population of approximately 36,200,000. The population of Spain is much greater than that of Portugal—27,800,000 as compared to 8,400,000—but in density of population the positions are reversed. There are about 240 persons per square mile in Portugal; in Spain there are only 140. Spain is predominantly a country of small, agricultural villages, over sixty per cent of the population being dependent upon agricultural activities. In Spain farmers live in clusters rather than in scattered farmsteads so typical of the American Midwest. Only in a few localities has manufacturing caused clusters of urban settlements to develop. Portugal, with its much denser population, is more urbanized than Spain, especially if one considers the closely spaced communities in the northern half of the country in which agricultural productivity is high.

**INFLUENCE OF EARLY INVADERS**—The Iberians are generally accepted as the people who dwelt in the peninsula at the time of Phoenician trade and colonization. Their back-

ground is obscure, but probably they were descendants of early Cro-Magnon people who later intermingled with Mediterranean and Celtic immigrants. The Basques, living in the western Pyrenees, are said to be descendants of one of these early tribes, which found sanctuary from subsequent invaders in the mountain valleys of the Pyrenees. From earliest times they have preserved their ethnic traits, kept their language, and steadfastly refused to submerge their nationality and language in the welding of a unified Spain.<sup>3</sup>

The Phoenicians are recorded as the earliest foreigners to reach the shores of the Iberian Peninsula. It is probable, however, that other people in the eastern Mediterranean had long heard of the deposits of tin and copper, for the Iberians are known to have used bronze from 1,000 to 2,000 years before the reported arrival of the Phoenicians in the eleventh century B.C. Later the Phoenician colony of Carthagina in northern Africa traded with the Iberians, the exchange being principally in minerals. The Greeks also attempted to share in the Iberian trade, but resistance from the Phoenician settlers and the Carthaginians restricted Greek commerce to the northeast coast, where evidences of Greek culture still remain.

Of all the foreign impacts that had lasting influence on the development of Spanish and Portuguese culture, that of the Romans was in many respects the most extensive. The Romans established control of the peninsula by 206 B.C. and dominated government and trade within the peninsula for over six centuries. Principles of Roman law, administration, and government were established on an enduring basis. The use of Latin as the dominant language was introduced by Roman conquerors. As in other Roman colonies, the building of roads, bridges, aqueducts, and other public im-

provements for the strengthening of military control contributed to the over-all economic development of the country. In fact, some of the Roman roads and aqueducts in southern parts of modern Spain are still utilized.

Other invading peoples followed the Romans. The Suevians, Alani, and Vandals successfully invaded Spain from the north, and each in turn reached the southern end of the peninsula. Later, the Germanic Visigoths appeared across the Pyrenees and advanced over eastern Spain. The Visigothic rulers in Spain (A.D. 409-713), already exposed to Roman influences east of the Pyrenees, largely preserved Roman law and the principles of Roman government and administration in southern Spain.

INVADERS FROM AFRICA—Moorish blood was the last great addition to the Iberian people. In A.D. 711 the Moors crossed the Strait of Gibraltar and conquered the Visigoths. Internally Spain was struggling to expel the Goths and was weakened by the persecution of the Jews. As a consequence, the Moors easily overran the major portion of the peninsula and brought it under control, and most of the peninsula south of the Pyrenees and Cantabrian Mountains remained under Moorish domination for approximately six centuries. The Moors contributed in many ways to the development of Spain and Portugal, as had the Romans before them. They introduced Asiatic irrigation and such new crops as rice, sugar cane, dates, oranges, figs, and almonds and improved livestock by selective breeding. Moslem architecture is still to be seen in various parts of Spain—in the famous Alhambra Castle in Granada, the beautiful mosque at Córdoba, and the many low, white buildings of villages scattered about the country.

The Moors did not seek to destroy the culture they found in Spain; rather, they improved upon it. To a degree they modified the social order by breaking up large estates, settling serfs on new lands, and according

<sup>3</sup> See also page 305.



better treatment to slaves. Further, the Jews were permitted to enter government service and contribute to the intellectual life of the country. Despite the notable contribution of the Moors to the life of Spain, a Christian-dominated political movement did eventually expel them in 1492.


### MODERN SPAIN AND PORTUGAL

**EVOLUTION OF THE SPANISH STATE**—A gradual self-consciousness of Iberian peoples began to emerge during the later period of Moorish control, from the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries. This span was the Age of Reconquest, when the native Spanish elements—kings, nobles, bishops—began to move into Moorish principalities and to oust their emirs. No grand design motivated the Spanish Christians, the movement was extremely slow, extending over a period of some four centuries. Political unity finally materialized in 1469 in the form of a dynastic union of two influential rulers—Isabella and Ferdinand—but to endure the consolidation had to weather an intricate and somewhat baffling sequence of civil wars, dynastic rivalries, and foreign intercessions on the part of French, Austrian, and English royalty.

The task of keeping Spain unified under single rule proved to be most difficult because of the separatist spirit of three political groups. First the people of northwestern Aragon and Catalonia, who had been under French influence, moved south along the eastern coast. There, finding it difficult to associate with people to the west because of intervening slope lands, they developed into what we know the Catalonians to be today—a democratic, energetic, and progressive people. Recent anarchist movements in Barcelona attest to their independent spirit in modern Spain.

The second political group was the people in the western Pyrenees and Cantabrian mountains, who moved southward over the Meseta. They were the progenitors

of modern Castilians, an aristocratic class, now steeped in the culture of the past, a fact evidenced by the traditions of Castilian language and literature. A land of castles, as its name implies, Castile is the heartland of Spain (see map on this page). The Kingdom of Castile led the historic movement of unification to completion.



The third group was the Galicians, in the northwest corner, who pressed southward along the western coast. Realizing their strength, they established the Portuguese nation and thus provided the foundations of that modern state. A part of the Galician sector now forms the Spanish provinces of Coruña, Lugo, Orense, and Pontevedra. The social customs and even the speech resemble those of northern Portugal, which is the southern part of former Galicia.

Consolidation of Spanish people into the modern state was the work of the two great kingdoms of Castile and Aragon, whose rulers in 1479 set up a dyarchical government under a single crown. National unity meant, in effect, the victory of the principle of absolute monarchy, a steady advance in economic improvement, the breakdown of feudalism, and the increasing strength of the king over the power of the nobility. Territorial unity, once achieved, permitted Spain to concentrate on the building of a powerful empire and thereby to establish the nation as a great world power in the sixteenth century.

**PORTUGUESE NATION**—Portugal is a small nation and lacks the population to man the industries and shipping necessary to maintain a great empire. Two main cores make up modern Portugal. The historic northern portion constitutes the first core. It has a flourishing farming population; it is Portugal's chief industrial sector; and it has the greatest nucleus of population. From Oporto to the coast radiate rail connections with Portugal's main north-south rail system. The other core is Lisbon itself, the capital and the chief seaport for the country's contact with world shipping lanes off the Atlantic coast of Iberia.

**LANGUAGES OF THE PENINSULA**—Fundamentally the Spanish and Portuguese languages are derived from Latin, which the Romans introduced as the language in government and commerce. So complete was the Romanization that Latin superseded local tongues and from this language there gradually evolved three definite variants of the Romance language group, conforming to the pattern of the three regions of political development in the unification movement. In the western group that found refuge in the Galician Hills and probably was influenced by the old Suevian culture, there developed the dialect that has grown into the modern Portuguese now spoken along most of the west coast. The central group, moving out from the Cantabrian and western Pyrenees mountains, founded the kingdom of Castile and fused the dialects of the Spanish Meseta into modern Castilian, the official language of Spain today. The northeast group, having settled in Aragon and Catalonia and even in southern France, were definitely influenced by the Provençal of France. As these peoples moved southward they developed a dialect that was distinct from Castilian due to the isolation of the coastal lowlands from the plateau. This dialect is the basis for modern Catalan, used almost exclusively in the province of Catalonia. Diversity of

language has prevented complete unity of the Spanish people.<sup>4</sup>

**RELIGION**—Spain and Portugal are Catholic countries—as they have been for centuries. Christianity was first introduced during the period of Roman occupation and survived both Nordic and Moorish invasions. With the defeat of the Moors and the crowning of Ferdinand and Isabella as sovereigns of Spain Christianity became firmly established—and intolerant. On the grounds that they were extirpating heresy the Christians persecuted both Jews and Moors, and drove many of both groups out of Spain. Since Jews and Moors were the most progressive people in Spain at that time, Spanish economy was greatly weakened.

#### THE ECONOMY

Agriculture is dominant in the economies of both Spain and Portugal; it is estimated that approximately seventy-five per cent of the population depend directly or indirectly on farming. Extensive mineral resources give both Spain and Portugal the opportunity to base some of their economy on the mining industry. Both nations have a large enough population to provide a good labor force for the manufacturing industry. However, the latter has scarcely been developed beyond that required for domestic needs of both nations. With few exceptions, exportable surpluses come from the soil, forest, mines and to some extent from neighboring seas rather than from the factory. Conversely, technical products and machinery constitute a large percentage of the imports. Although the peninsula was once the granary of the Roman Empire, great quantities of cereals and other foods are now imported to meet the needs of the population.

<sup>4</sup> Various movements have been initiated to gain for Catalan independence from Madrid's control or at least autonomy. During the early 1930's this area was, in fact, an autonomous state, but only for a brief time.

**AGRICULTURE**—There are two distinct types of agricultural activities—intensive cultivation of terrace lands and irrigated areas and extensive farming in most of the semi-arid country. The practice of intensive agriculture, as well as a great number of tropical and subtropical products, were introduced from Africa by the Moors, together, these were primarily responsible for the great progress made in wealth and culture during the Moorish era. On the semi-arid landscape of the Meseta and on its seaward slopes, extensive farming and ranching have long been practiced. It is here, naturally, that are found many of the great landholders who are influential in government and politics.

Five products dominate in the agriculture of the peninsula: wheat, olives, grapes, citrus fruits, and sugar cane. The land devoted to wheat and olive orchards constitutes about two thirds of all the cultivated land of the peninsula. Olives, olive oil, and wine are important export products of both countries. Citrus fruits, specifically the orange and lemon, are grown in subtropical areas. In the northwestern part of Iberia corn is also an important crop.

Throughout the peninsula agriculture encounters a number of handicaps. First, farming methods are still rather primitive; over the years there has been little improvement in methods of cultivation or in crop diversification, and yields are as low as, or even lower than, they were ten centuries ago. Second, there is a shortage of fertilizer to replenish or maintain the fertility of the soil; Spain does have a large reserve of potash but is without the nitrates and phosphates essential for the improvement of her soils. Third, the insufficiency and uncertainty of rainfall handicap the extensive culture of cereals and limit artificial irrigation; lacking natural water storage, the peninsula needs more artificial reservoirs in which to store flood waters to be used for irrigation in periods of drought. Fourth, much of the land is rocky and unfertile, and

even if water were available the ground would not be suitable for cultivation. Fifth, there is a lack of modern farm machinery, which is needed to bring the efficiency of the land up to modern agricultural standards.

**GRAZING**—Grazing is an industry older than agriculture on the Iberian Peninsula and one more suited to the semi-arid climate than is crop cultivation. Sheep have been herded for centuries, in early times both Rome and Greece obtained wool from Spain. A heavily fleeced type of sheep, the Merino, was developed on the plateau and later was introduced into wool-producing regions throughout the world. Early Spain was dominated to a great extent by the *Mesta*, a powerful organization of sheep herders who were concerned with the maintenance of untrammelled grazing rights for sheep during the northward and southward migration. In later years, as the inhabitants of the villages and cities fenced off the cultivated areas and gained sufficient strength to resist the *Mesta*, the power of that organization dwindled. Herds of beef cattle also range the steppe lands, particularly in the more humid sections of the Meseta. The most lucrative part of the cattle industry is the raising of bulls for the bull fights. Small indeed is the Spanish city without an arena for this type of entertainment, one which flourishes also in Portugal, but in a milder version. Much of the peninsular demand for meat is met by the slaughter of hogs, fattened primarily on acorns and other edibles found on the floor of the forest lands. Other animals are mules and horses, which together with oxen, are the principal beasts of burden.

**MINING**—The mining industry ranks second to agriculture in the economy of Spain and Portugal. It is estimated that Spain has reserves of some 9,000,000,000 tons of coal, including anthracite, bituminous, and lignite; but low industrialization and unfavorable

mining conditions keep production relatively small. Spain ranks first among the European countries in output of both lead and copper and, with Germany, leads in the mining of silver. The nation stands second in the world in the production of mercury, the mines of Almadén being most famous for this mineral. Both Spain and Portugal export wolframite, which is the source of tungsten, to steelmaking countries. In Spain mineral salts have become an important commercial commodity. In some places there are great beds of rock salt to be exploited, in other places sea water is the source of salt. Potash, in which Spain ranks as the world's second largest producer, is extensively mined on the southern slopes of the Pyrenees, both to supply local demand and for export.

**INDUSTRIES**—Most of the manufacturing and extractive industries of the peninsula are geared to supply local needs. Meal and flour mills that depend primarily on wind or mule power are scattered everywhere over the peninsula. Leather making, a heritage from the Moors, is centered in Córdoba, which is known for its cordovan leather. Brickmaking, using the clays of the Meseta and the alluvial lands in the south, is a widespread industry. Quarries, particularly of the granite bedrock useful for building material, are found almost everywhere.

The processing for export of crops grown in certain areas is of some importance. For example, Portugal converts much of its cork bark, of which it is the world's foremost producer, into products for export; in the southern part of the peninsula olives are canned or converted into olive oil for export; and wine making is a profitable industry in both Spain and Portugal.

Only two real centers of complex manufacturing exist in Spain. One center is along the northern coast where the presence of coal and iron in the Cantabrian Mountains has led to the development of some heavy

industry in the cities of Oviedo, Bilbao, Santander, and Irún. A second industrial area has grown up in Barcelona, fostered both by the presence of hydroelectric power and by the natural energy of the Catalonian people. Here is located the principal textile industry (cotton, woolens, and silk goods) of the whole peninsula, in fact, Barcelona is one of the great textile centers of all Europe. Across the border, despite national aspirations, the Portuguese effort to develop industry is seriously handicapped by the lack of a large home market and by trade barriers erected by foreign countries. The one advantage is in trade with its overseas colonies. Nevertheless, an effort is being made to industrialize the Lisbon area.

**MINOR OCCUPATIONS**—Less important industries on the Iberian Peninsula are shipping and fishing. It is strange to reflect that two nations that were once maritime powers now have only skeleton merchant fleets. Portugal has only a small number of sailing vessels, and Spain operates less than two per cent of the world's merchant marine. Many small fishing craft go forth from the innumerable small harbors in Portugal and northwestern Spain especially to catch tuna and sardines. The industry does not supply local demand and large quantities of fish must be imported from the North Sea area, although Portuguese sardines have a good reputation and are exported as a specialty.

**TRANSPORTATION**—The relief of the peninsula makes surface transportation extremely difficult (see map on page 327). The abrupt climb from sea level to the Meseta in most places handicaps contact between the coastal areas and the plateau, and the Iberian Peninsula does not possess centralized river systems with flood plains on which highways and railways could be built easily. Another handicap has been the weakness of the Spanish economy, which has provided but little stimulation for internal trade and transportation, the economy being itself

handicapped by the lack of capital and the meager exploitation of natural resources. Still another problem has been the absence of a unified plan for transportation within the peninsula. In addition, external considerations have prevented a direct link with the European rail system. The standard-gauge railways of France, for instance, end at the Spanish border, and change must be made to the broad gauge of the Iberian Peninsula. Furthermore, many of the railroads have no interconnection, consequently, there is much delay in the transportation between some of the leading communities. Although the Spanish railroads have been nationalized under the Franco regime, there is still but little improvement in the over-all picture. Spain ranks only sixth in Europe in total railway mileage, although it is the third largest nation on the Continent. Portugal has a relatively efficient rail system under government regulation.

The introduction of automobiles encouraged the building of highways, and between 1926 and 1933 Spain possessed one of the best highway systems in Europe. Most of the roads converged on Madrid—a fact that results from, and adds to, its importance as a national capital. The Civil War in 1936–39 severely disrupted the transportation system, and since then there has been insufficient financial support to keep the roads under even the most ordinary repairs.

For an area as rugged as the Iberian Peninsula airlines would seem to be the best solution to the transportation problem, but so far, in both countries, only a few good airfields have been built. Still, progress is being made and the Spanish airline, Iberia, now has scheduled flights from Madrid and Barcelona (though fewer flights from the latter city) to other large Spanish cities, the Balearic Isles, and the Canary Islands in the Spanish realm, as well as to various cities



of Western Europe. It is interesting to note that Iberia's transatlantic services from Madrid are largely to Spanish-speaking lands: Buenos Aires, Caracas, and Havana. The Portuguese Airlines TAP (Transportes Aéreos Portuguese) operates scheduled flights from Lisbon to Oporto, Madrid, Paris, and London, to Tangier and Casablanca in North Africa, and to Luanda in far-away Angola. Service to Rio de Janeiro is being planned—another indication of the ties of language.

**STANDARDS OF LIVING**—Poverty prevails among a great proportion of the Spanish people. Several factors are responsible for the generally low living standards. The gross national product is low, and the country is in only the early stages of industrialization. A considerable proportion of the wealth is devoted to the Church, which has taken but few steps to improve the health, education, and sanitary conditions of its parishioners.

Still another factor is the system of land tenure and the lack of modernization in farming practices. In only three sections of the country is land tenure such as to make possible fair distribution of the profit from the soil and to give each family a suitable income: (1) in the Basque provinces, where a farmer usually has sufficient land to support his family; (2) in Catalonia, where, although the land is less evenly distributed than in the Basque region, the variety of climate and soil is such that most of the population can find sufficient occupation throughout the year and rich and varied production results; (3) along the eastern coast, south of Catalonia, where most of the farms are small and individually owned. But in the two provinces of Castile and in much of the southern part of agricultural Spain (the total comprising perhaps two thirds of the nation) most of the land is held by large landowners. These large estates represent the economic power of the old nobility, and

neither the Church nor the Republic nor the present dictatorial regime has to date been willing or able to change the pattern of land ownership. It is in these areas that one per cent of the population possess possibly fifty per cent of the land, and fifty per cent of the population have no land at all.

Finally, Spain is still recovering from the great destruction created by the Civil War and the inflation during the subsequent period of readjustment. Prices are high while income of most of the laboring population is exceptionally low.

The tenure-of-land situation in Portugal is much better than that in Spain. Here there are many small land holdings, especially in the north, and individual ownership of property is encouraged. There are few large estates comparable to those in Spain. Vineyards, orchards of olives and oranges, cork-oak groves, and general farming indicate the intensive type of cultivation characteristic of Portugal. Only in the south and more rugged eastern part does the environment encourage the establishment of large estates so characteristic of the Meseta. Though the farmers may not be rich, they enjoy a much better living and have a more sanguine outlook on life than do the Spanish peasants.

## GOVERNMENT AND WORLD RELATIONS

**GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS**—Isolated behind the Pyrenees, Spain has tended to ignore or resist the impact of new sociopolitical movements. What was termed the "Constitutional Monarchy," from 1874 to 1931, resembled more the spirit of the Ancient Regime than that of a modern state. In 1923 the tide of the twentieth century finally caught up with Spain, and the next thirteen years led to three coup d'états. The first two were bloodless; the last one cost a million lives. The dictator, Primo de Rivera, installed in 1923, was unseated by the revolu-

tion of 1931, at which time a Republic was inaugurated with popular approbation. Although the new government registered considerable progress, it was seriously weakened by parties of the Left—liberals, socialists, communists, Catalan, and Basque separatists—and by parties of the Right, made up largely of landowners and certain Church and military leaders. In 1936 the Falange Party instigated a revolt against the Republican government. Aided by direct military support from Hitler and Mussolini, the Fascist groups plunged Spain into a bitter three-year civil war from which they emerged victorious to install the dictatorship of Francisco Franco<sup>5</sup> over the ruined and exhausted nation. During World War II Spain remained neutral and thus escaped the physical destruction suffered by most other parts of Europe.

Postwar Spain experiences the static security of a strong military government. Bureaucracy and authoritarianism radiate from Madrid. The Church continues to be a powerful influence. While the Primate of Spain supports the regime and exercises general surveillance over the nation's intellectual life, the Church has criticized the government on occasions and has advocated better social care and has endorsed housing schemes. But the realities of Spain remain: the stark contrast between wealth and poverty; the lack of a solid middle class to hold the balance between upper and lower groups; the gap between high living costs and low wages, the absence of fundamental economic reforms; and resistance to social revolutions.

Portugal, in contrast, offers an example of successful experimentation with author-

itarianism. The *Estado Novo* is a corporative state in which national life is organized into guilds, associations, and syndicates.<sup>6</sup> The whole structure is directed from the top, but Portugal's dictator, Dr. Antonio Oliveira de Salazar, has worked to improve the lot of the Portuguese. The small entrepreneur has been given a share in a constructive program that includes industrialization, hydro-electric-power development, better irrigation, and modernized harbor facilities. Although a smaller nation, Portugal has raised its living standards more effectively than has its neighbor Spain.

**COLONIES**—The colonial empires of Spain and Portugal<sup>7</sup> are but fragments of their former great expanses of territories. The colonies still belonging to Spain are of doubtful value to the national economy of that country, although in general they offer a certain potential worthy of development. The Canary Islands in the Atlantic is one of Spain's most valuable possessions.<sup>8</sup> Other territories belonging to Spain include Guinea (Rio Muni and the islands of Annobon, Fernando Po, Corisco, and Elobey) in west-central Africa, Rio de Oro on the African coast opposite the Canary Islands, and the enclave of Ifni in French Morocco.

Portugal has more extensive holdings than Spain on the continent of Africa. They include Portuguese Guinea, the islands of

<sup>6</sup> For details see Francisco dos Santos, *Un Estado Corporativo—La Constitucion Social y Politica Portuguesa*, Madrid, IER, 1945; Portugal, Secretariado da Propaganda Nacional, *Portugal, the New State in Theory and Practice*, Lisbon, SPN, 1938.

<sup>7</sup> Officialdom in Portugal recently changed from use of the word "Colonies" to "Overseas." The *Ministerio do Ultramar* handles colonial, or overseas, affairs.

<sup>8</sup> Spain took control of the International Zone (Tangier) across the Strait of Gibraltar on the African coast during World War II, but with the ascendancy of the Allied Powers was persuaded to restore it to international control. On the other hand, Gibraltar, although a part of the Iberian Peninsula itself, belongs to Britain rather than to Spain or Portugal.

<sup>5</sup> Franco is the Chief of State and Leader (*caudillo*) of the Spanish state. In 1947, however, General Franco proclaimed, under a Law of Succession, the restoration of a monarchy for Spain. A regency council is to select, in case of Franco's death, a king or a regent.

Príncipe and São Tomé, and the large areas of Mozambique and Angola. It also controls the Cape Verde Islands in the Atlantic Ocean west of Dakar. In South Asia and the Far East, Portugal has the small trading areas of Goa, Damão, and Diu on the coast of India<sup>9</sup> and Macao opposite Hong Kong on the Chinese coast. The nation still has a remnant of her East Indian Empire—the eastern part of the island of Timor. Portugal has had a more progressive colonial policy than Spain. Consequently, its colonial wealth and trade have been increasing in recent years, adding to the national income of the mother country.

**PRESENT WORLD POSITION**—The location of Spain and Portugal is still a favorable factor in their relationship to the rest of the world. The Iberian Peninsula cannot help being a steppingstone for commercial air transportation between America and the Middle and Far East and between Northwestern Europe and west Africa and South America. Air passengers passing through Portugal and Spain to and from other nations will help to maintain world contacts. Ocean liners call at Lisbon (and some at Vigo in Spain) en route between Northwest Europe and commercial ports on the east coast of South America and points east of Gibraltar. Although both nations were handicapped by restrictions on trade during the two world wars, they have benefited since, to some extent, by improved commercial relations with some of the victorious nations. Both nations retain influence in their remaining colonies and throughout South America, where the language of one or the other is spoken. For evidence of this, one need only examine the strong trade ties between Brazil and Portugal.

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<sup>9</sup> Since its attainment of independence, India has exerted considerable pressure on Portugal to withdraw from its three coastal enclaves, as the French have done in their possessions in India, but the Portuguese government has refused to do so.

Each nation has tried to capitalize upon its specific location south of the Pyrenees and at the western end of the Mediterranean. Portugal has been able to secure more advantageous relations with other nations because of its western location, Lisbon, for example, has become much more of an international airport than has any one of the principal cities of Spain. The Azores in the Atlantic have proved important Allied refueling bases for years and presently serve as mid-ocean air terminals.


Spain has traveled a more stormy road in postwar diplomacy. The pro-Fascist regime did not endear Spain to the victorious powers, even though Franco astutely avoided involvement in World War II. The United Nations, from 1946 to 1953, advised withdrawal of diplomatic embassies from Madrid and censured Franco. Even this ineffective moral condemnation, however, became less strong as strategic considerations began to overshadow moral scruples. In the effort to strengthen the military position of Western Europe against possible aggression from the East, the strategic importance of the Iberian Peninsula, protected as it is by the Pyrenees, was not overlooked. In 1953 the United States, therefore, entered into a ten-year agreement with Spain, by the terms of which the United States was to be permitted to build air and naval bases on Spanish soil. Spain was to receive, in exchange, considerable economic aid. While this aid is a transfusion of a kind, it is not a cure for Spain's economic ills. It is clear that greater industrialization, economic equality, and greater productivity are the keys to national well-being.

Portugal, both economically and politically, is better able than Spain to take a part in world affairs commensurate with its wealth and population. For this more favorable situation, Portugal would probably attribute much credit to her long friendship with the United Kingdom and the aid she has received from that country.



## GIBRALTAR

On the southern coast of Spain, just east of the Strait of Gibraltar, stands the famous British base of Gibraltar, guarding the shipping lanes eastward through the Mediterranean as well as the routes south along the African coast. Admiralty Harbor, 440 acres in extent, accommodates large vessels and serves as an excellent assembly point for convoys and mine sweepers in time of war. Gibraltar's usefulness as a storage base for coal, oil, and water and as a repair depot was amply demonstrated during the two world wars. British control of Gibraltar as a Crown Colony dates back to the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, when this strategic site was ceded to Britain following the War of the Spanish Succession. Gibraltar stands as a symbol of Spain's decline as a world power, a situation which the Spanish in the twentieth century are trying to correct. In 1927 Madrid proposed the exchange of Ceuta, its North African base across the Strait from Gibraltar, for the British fortress, but the offer was rejected by the British Govern-



ment (see map above). Despite recent popular outbursts in Spain demanding the return of Gibraltar, there seems little likelihood that control of the base will pass from British hands, at least not in the near future.

## Study Questions

1. Of what significance is location to the economic and political geography of Spain and Portugal?
2. Is the historical geography of Spain and Portugal more important in a study of world political geography than that of France? Why?
3. What circumstances within the Iberian peninsula led to the independence of Portugal?
4. What environmental and historical conditions enabled Spain and Portugal to rise to such world supremacy that they could and did divide the new lands of the earth between them?
5. In the decline of the two nations as colonial empires, Spain's loss was greater than that of Portugal. Why?
6. How has the character of the climate affected the agricultural economy of the peninsula?
7. What were the principal contributions of the Moors to (a) land utilization and (b) social progress?
8. How have the water supplies of the peninsula affected the distribution and social life of the people?
9. How did the mineral resources of the peninsula figure in the diplomatic maneuvering during World War II?
10. How do Spain and Portugal fit into the world air transportation network?
11. What contributions have Spain and Portugal made to the world's culture?
12. Since Britain's empire in the East has greatly

- declined, can she justifiably retain control of Gibraltar?
13. What would be the advantages and disadvantages of the union of Spain and Portugal into one nation?
  14. How can the standard of living of the majority of people in the peninsula be improved?
  15. What are the effects of latitudinal location on the climate of Spain and Portugal?

## CHAPTER TWENTY

# Italy

Demographic pressures, scarcity of natural resources, and strategic location are the factors that make the study of Italy of political significance in the contemporary world. Italy contains a population in excess of its ability to sustain a high standard of living within its limited territorial confines. A dynamic nationalist spirit refuses to accept economic stagnation with passive resignation and clamors for international understanding and assistance in alleviating the country's difficulties. Geographic location places Italy in the center of the Mediterranean basin at the narrow "waist" separating Sicily from North Africa and enables Italy to exercise considerable influence upon countries bordering *mare nostrum*.<sup>1</sup> Likewise the frontiers to the north bring it into close contact with France, Switzerland, Austria, and Yugoslavia (see map on this page). The interaction of these geographic and sociopolitical forces has generated explosive

responses which in their effects have not been limited to the Italian peninsula. In the past Italy has not hesitated to utilize



<sup>1</sup> During the period of the Roman Empire the term *mare nostrum* signified Rome's power and ascendancy within the Mediterranean region. Modern Italy has perpetuated this usage.

war as a means to aggrandize her own position, and in view of Italy's geographic orientation, a return to an aggressive foreign policy is not altogether precluded.

## HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

**THE ORIGINS OF MODERN ITALY**—The Latium plain, centering on Rome, constituted the core area upon which Roman power was founded. The Roman forebears of the modern nation used Italy as a base, or staging area, in the surge to world power and constructed an empire within the entire Mediterranean basin that endured for more than five centuries. Italy remained the center of that empire as long as its legions guarded the outlying territories and maintained a net of military highways that bound the extensive empire to Rome. The transfer of the seat of the empire to Constantinople in A.D. 307 signalized the decline of Italy, while the barbarian invasions of the fourth and fifth centuries brought an end to Pax Romana in Western Europe.

In the succeeding centuries the center of power shifted northward where rulers attempted to establish a Christendom under the title of the Holy Roman Empire. In the process Italy was absorbed by Charlemagne into his Frankish empire, which, however, proved ephemeral. A struggle for power between the Holy Roman Emperors and the Popes led to the formation in Italy of numerous small principalities, the incessant rivalries of which impeded centralization of power.

In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the city-states of northern Italy threw off the despotism of the princes. The growth of trade and commerce, along with the Renaissance movement, created an independent spirit in these city-states, especially in Genoa, Florence, and Venice, which often involved themselves in local wars as well as foreign wars with Turkey. The inevitable weaknesses of the city-states favored the dynastic aspirations of Spain and Austria, the powers of Europe, which dominated most of the peninsula for three centuries.

The Napoleonic era was substantially an interregnum which merely substituted

French hegemony for that of Spain and Austria. The French Revolution stirred the sentiment of nationalism among Italians, and the restoration of Austrian control after 1815 did not go unchallenged. Formation of conspiratorial societies and the rise of the Young Italy movement followed. Mazzini and Garibaldi became the popular leaders of Italian freedom and unity, and their activities, combined with the diplomatic skill of Count Cavour, a Piedmontese, led, in 1861, to the creation of an Italian Kingdom. Italian troops occupied Rome in 1870 and though the Pope took refuge behind the walls of the Vatican, Rome itself chose to join the union. Still under Austrian rule were the territories of Trentino, Venezia Giulia, Trieste, Fiume, Pola, and Zara—regions which were to become the *Italia Irredenta* in Rome's later foreign policy.

Once unified as a nation Italy turned toward empire building. Colonial activity largely centered in north and east Africa in competition with French and British colonization. As early as the 1860's a stream of Italians emigrated into North Africa in search of business opportunities and employment. Italian companies also cast covetous eyes along the coasts of East Africa. Abyssinia (Ethiopia) was to be the center of an Italian empire. Eritrea, on the Red Sea, became a colony in 1890, and in 1906 Italian Somaliland was carved out along the eastern tip of Africa. The attempt to enlarge these enclaves at the expense of the Ethiopian tribes drew Italy into a war with Abyssinia, which ended in the defeat of Italy in 1896. The thirst for more territory caused Italy next to turn its attention toward a troubled Turkey, and as a result of the war of 1911–12 Italy annexed Libya. As a price of Italian adherence to the Allied cause in 1915, Italy was promised territorial compensation along the Adriatic coast, in Asia Minor, and in Africa. These promises, however, were far from kept at the Peace Conference of 1919: in the Near East, Italy was forced to settle

for the Dodecanese Islands, including the island of Rhodes, in the north, *Italia Irredenta* was acquired, as well as the Austrian Tyrol, but Italian claims on the Yugoslav coast remained unsatisfied.

**FASCIST ITALY**—With the end of the war in 1918, inflation, unemployment, and the demobilization of troops created a revolutionary ferment within Italy. The nation's diplomatic rebuff at the Peace Conference caused a wave of nationalist hysteria to break out, culminating in the seizure of Fiume by mutinous troops and adventurers under the command of the romantic poet Gabriele D'Annunzio. The ineptitude of Italy's democratic government in dealing with difficult domestic problems created by the war led, in 1922, to Fascist violence and the Mussolini dictatorship.

Under Fascism, Italy sought to resolve its poverty in land and resources by state regimentation of its economic life and by territorial expansion abroad. Treading in the footsteps of the early Roman conquerors, Mussolini conquered Ethiopia in 1935-36 and added it to the new Italian Empire. In 1939, while other powers were concentrating on the German problem and a major European war was imminent, Mussolini seized Albania. But Italian desire to convert the Mediterranean into a *mare nostrum* clashed with Anglo-French naval power. As a countermove Italy joined the Axis front and in 1940 raised irredentist claims to the French territories of Nice, Savoy, Corsica, and Tunisia. In June, 1940, just at the time when France was obliged to surrender, Mussolini forced Italy into the war on the side of Germany. Allied invasion of Sicily and Italy in 1943 led to the surrender of Italian armies, and for two years northern Italy was a battleground for Germans and Allies. In the course of this conflict Italy's navy and air force were destroyed, her major cities were greatly damaged, and the African empire was taken over by Allied forces. With

the Fascist structure crumbling into ruins, Mussolini was quickly deposed, and Italy was forced to pay a heavy price for her participation in the war.

At the Paris Peace Conference of 1946 Italy renounced claims to all her possessions in Africa and in the Aegean; she also withdrew from Venezia Giulia, Istria, and the Dalmatian islands. The Italian Peace Treaty of 1947 transferred to France three small Alpine valleys in the vicinity of Tenda and three passes through the Alps (Little St. Bernard, Mt. Thabor, and Mt. Cenis). Trieste, together with a part of Istria, was declared to be a Free Territory under the supervision of the Security Council of the United Nations, Anglo-American and Yugoslav troops were to occupy this Free Territory. The remainder of Venezia Giulia, Istria, and the Dalmatian islands, including the cities of Fiume, Pola, and Zara, was to be occupied by Yugoslavia. In the process over 500,000 Italians were separated from the homeland against their will.

**POSTWAR PERIOD**—Since the war democratic Italy has devoted its energies to problems of internal reconstruction and reform, and, despite the bitterness caused by her territorial losses, has sought to live in peace with her neighbors. In active collaboration with the Western powers, Italy has been a supporter of unity schemes for Western Europe and is a member of NATO and of the European Coal and Steel Community. Although Italy was excluded from membership in the United Nations until 1955, its prestige was partly salvaged when the United Nations selected it as trust power over former Italian Somaliland for a period of ten years.<sup>2</sup>

## THE LAND

**EXTENT AND BOUNDARIES**—Italy comprises a 700-mile-long peninsula, the two large is-

<sup>2</sup> See also page 460.


lands of Sicily and Sardinia, and a number of volcanic islands and archipelagos. The elongated peninsula itself, with its area of 116,160 square miles, is no larger than the state of Arizona, it is larger than the United Kingdom, but considerably smaller than France. The maximum width from the French to the Yugoslav borders is about 350 miles, but in many places the peninsula is less than 100 miles wide. Italy lies roughly between 36° and 47° North Latitude, which corresponds to the distance from the southern boundary of Virginia to northernmost Maine. Rome is just as far north as New York City; Milan is in the same latitude as Montreal, Canada.

Most of Italy is bounded by seas—the Mediterranean, Tyrrhenian, Ligurian, Ionian, and Adriatic. Altogether the coastline—including that of the islands—is 5,625 miles long. In the north, Italy has common land boundaries with France, Switzerland, Austria, and Yugoslavia. Wholly surrounded by Italian territory are the two independent states of San Marino and Vatican City—a fact that gives Italy additional boundaries.

The Republic of San Marino occupies thirty-eight square miles of territory close to the Adriatic port of Rimini. This tiny state is an anomaly in modern times, yet its internal sovereignty has been respected since 1631. In external relations San Marino is a protectorate of Italy, and Italian currency is legal tender in the republic. Vatican City was accorded legal status as a sovereign state in the Lateran Treaty of 1929. Italy guarantees free access to and from Vatican City to all Church officials and diplomatic envoys in time of war and peace. Vatican City is a neutral state ruled over by the Pope of the Roman Catholic Church. Its territory comprises only 109 acres within the city of Rome.

**RELIEF**—Italy may be divided into three distinct regions: (1) the Alps and the Apennines, which form the mountainous backbone

of the country, (2) the wide and fertile valley of the Po River, which extends east-west in northern Italy between the Alps and the lateral ranges of the northern Apennines, and (3) the coastal plains that fan out from the Apennines westward toward the Tyrrhenian Sea and eastward toward the Adriatic. Mountains and coastal plains in continuation of the peninsular pattern are the relief features of Sicily and Sardinia (see map on page below).



Mountains form a dominant feature of the Italian landscape, they constitute thirty-eight per cent of Italy's area and are visible from nearly every place in the country. Within the mountainous landscape are found Europe's only active volcanoes: Mount Vesuvius near Naples, Mount Etna in Sicily, and Stromboli in the Lipari Islands. From the mountains to the valleys and plains lies a graduated series of hills which constitute an additional forty per cent of the total area. Level terrain is, therefore, relatively scarce in Italy, only about twenty per cent of the country's area being valley or plain. Much of the plain is the result of erosion

of top soil and vegetation from the slopes of the many hills.

Most of Italy's level terrain is in the valley of the Po River, a fertile region of comparatively recent alluvial deposit. Each year the Po River extends its delta into the Adriatic Sea. The coastal plains were similarly built up by the action of hundreds of streams and torrents rushing down the sides of the mountains toward the seas. Towns that were Roman ports 2,000 years ago may be ten to fifteen miles inland today. Man and science have hastened nature's process by draining off the stagnant waters of the marshes into a network of canals and transforming the swamps, bogs, and fens into fertile top soil.

In Italy reclamation of land has continued for many decades under the pressure for greater sanitation: stagnant waters that bred malarial mosquitoes have, for the most part, been drained. Since the 1930's integral land reclamation has been emphasized: reforestation, the terracing of hilly terrain and mountains, and the construction of irrigation dams and canals—all are being carried on with vigor. The law makes full utilization and improvement of agricultural land mandatory on the proprietor under threat of expropriation.

Although less than fifteen per cent of Italy's surface was originally arable, the toil of generations of Italians has by now made forty-three per cent of the total area usable for cultivation, an additional seventeen per cent for fodder and pasture, and another eight per cent for special tree cultures. In all, sixty-eight per cent of Italy is productive agricultural land despite the predominantly hilly and mountainous terrain. Of the remaining thirty-two per cent of the land surface, nineteen per cent is covered by forests, and only thirteen per cent is listed as uncultivated or unproductive because of sterility, presence of water courses, and constructions.

The most fertile regions of Italy are the

valleys of the Po, Arno, and Tiber rivers, the plains of Campania and Puglia, and the coastal strip of northern and eastern Sicily. Farms in these areas are among the most productive in Europe. Since intensive agriculture necessitates large numbers of laborers, these regions are very densely populated. Industries have also developed here to take advantage of an abundant labor supply. These regions of concentrated population form the core areas of Italy and the centers of the most politically conscious elements of the country. The Po Valley in particular has fathered the main political movements that have molded the character of the Italians—nationalism, socialism, fascism, and, recently, communism.

*Irrigation.* The intensive agriculture of the Po Valley is based entirely upon irrigation—a feature of the Po Valley for centuries. But the central and southern regions of Italy were, until recent decades, largely without benefit of science and technology. Irrigation was, therefore, made an important feature of Italy's ten-year plan to rehabilitate the southern regions and raise the standard of living of more than 17,000,000 people in this area.<sup>3</sup>

Irrigation is difficult in central and southern Italy owing to the absence of a system of rivers. There are few lakes in the south, little or no snow in the mountains, and low precipitation in most of this region. Moreover, the rain that does fall is largely wasted in torrents that gut the top soil and overflow

<sup>3</sup> This plan was elaborated jointly by the Italian government and the United States Economic Cooperation Administration in 1950. It established a fund known as The Fund for Southern Development, or *Cassa del Mezzogiorno*, utilizing both American contributions and Italian tax resources. The purposes of the fund are to intensify agricultural production and to expand industries in the south. It is hoped that this program, by reducing unemployment, by creating consumer income, as well as a greater volume of output, will relieve population pressures and allay political ill-will among the laboring and lower-middle economic classes.

the shallow channels of the rivers. Consequently irrigation in south-central Italy must be preceded by the construction of dams designed to collect into artificial lakes the water from the many torrents. Although a few projects have been completed in the south, many more must follow.

**CLIMATE**—Climate is Italy's greatest natural asset and boon to agriculture. Although it is common to regard Italy as the land of sunshine, Italians experience moderately cold temperatures, especially in the north. The higher mountains of the Apennines as well as most of the Alps are enveloped by snow several months out of each year. The Po Valley resembles central Germany in climate—hot summers and moderately cold winters separated by intermediary seasons of spring and autumn. The average winter temperature of the Po Valley is 34° F. Snow is common in the winter season, and the cold *bora* or *tramontana* winds that sweep down across the mountains from Eastern Europe occasionally force the thermometer down as low as 7° F. The Adriatic coast is slightly milder than the Po Valley. Italy's Tyrrhenian shores enjoy typical Riviera weather, with average winter temperatures between 45° and 50° F., and "cold" days that rarely drop below 30° F. Summers tend to be much cooler along the Riviera coasts than in the Po Valley, since the former region enjoys cool breezes from the sea. Occasionally, however, the subtropical *strocco* wind brings a sticky heat to these otherwise mellow regions.

Precipitation fluctuates widely in most parts of Italy. In some regions the variations in rainfall from dry to wet years may be as much as 300 per cent. There are also great contrasts from region to region. The shores of the Ligurian Sea off Genoa receive the heaviest precipitation, which sometimes reaches over sixty inches per annum. The driest areas are northern Sardinia, with only twenty-two inches for an average year; the

southern shore of Sicily, with an average of twenty-three inches, and the "toe" and "heel" of the peninsula, with an average of twenty-four to twenty-five inches of rain annually. In the vicinity of the Po Delta, the Po Valley does not receive much more than twenty-five inches of precipitation, south of Venice (Venezia) the average yearly rainfall is only twenty-eight inches. In most parts of Italy irrigation is essential, for in subnormal years the land becomes semiarid, while in rainy years the precipitation may be erratic and, unless runoff is controlled, extensive soil erosion may occur, moreover, it frequently happens that several summer months pass without any rainfall.

**RESOURCES**—Among the major countries of Europe Italy is the poorest in natural resources, and this poverty has driven her to many expedients. In addition to the conversion of waste and barren lands into productive farms by the Italian people, the government has had to undertake the construction of artificial lakes and a network of irrigation canals to compensate for the lack of a systematic hydrographic pattern. The lack of mineral fuels—coal and petroleum—in Italy's subsoil, as well as the lack of iron, copper, and tin, has compelled Italy to increase her exports to pay for the importation of these scarce items.

Italy produces about 1,000,000 tons of coal annually, most of which is mined on the island of Sardinia. Since it cannot be converted into coke, Italian industry must depend upon imported coking coal for the metal industries. As an additional source of fuel for nonindustrial purposes, 800,000 tons of lignite and peat are still being produced annually, although the consumption requirement during the war and postwar years approached as much as 3,000,000 tons. Charcoal forms yet another common combustible in Italy, particularly in the central and southern regions, where it is used by the poorer classes for heating and cooking. About



500,000 tons of charcoal are being produced each year in Italy. Still another fuel is methane gas, use of which is being expanded as new deposits are discovered in the Po Valley. In addition to widespread use as a household combustible, methane gas is being harnessed to thermal electric generators.

The bulk of Italy's electricity however, is generated by water power. Of the 30,000,000 kilowatt hours of electricity generated each year, eighty-five per cent is derived from water power. Hydroelectricity has been produced in Italy since the end of the nineteenth century for use by railroads and industry as well as for illumination. A notable example of the use of electricity by industry is found in the large metallurgical plants of Terni (just north of Rome), which employ electric furnaces.

Italy must import crude petroleum and lubricating oils in volume, for no oil deposits have yet been discovered in the country despite active drilling in the Po Valley. About 7,000,000 tons of petroleum are imported annually, principally from the Middle East and the United States. The Italian refineries now produce more gasoline than Italy can consume, so petroleum *products* are exported. Important American petroleum interests, including Standard Oil of New Jersey and Shell Oil, are foreign participants in the Italian petroleum industry. The Italian government also operates a public corporation known as AGIP, which competes with the foreign companies.

Because Italy is largely dependent upon imports of iron, steel, and coal, it has sought to obtain these commodities at nondiscriminatory prices from Europe and North Africa. The European Coal and Steel Community was created in 1952 for the purpose of making these commodities available to those who need them. It will enable Italy to operate her metallurgical industries on a competitive basis and to utilize her supply of foreign exchange more efficiently in the future. The success of a liberal trade and tariff pol-

icy within the Western European orbit may check the rise of Italian imperialist drives.

## PEOPLE

**ETHNIC AND CULTURAL CHARACTERISTICS**—Ethnically the Italians are derived from as complex a stock as any nationality in Europe, for Italy has been a melting pot of various strains for over 4,000 years. In the south the original Samnite stock tends to account for the short stature and swarthy complexion, while the northern Italians, descendants of the barbarian Goths and Visigoths, exhibit more characteristic Nordic features. Internal migrations and intermarriage in the north have produced a complex racial stock composed principally of Latins, Etruscans, Ligurians, Visigoths, Ostrogoths, and Huns.

Even the diet differs markedly from north to south, for the common staples of the former are rice and corn mush, while in the latter area *pasta*\* prevails. The north Italians consume more meats and animal fats than those in the south, who eat more vegetables than meat and insist upon olive oil for cooking.

**LANGUAGE AND RELIGION**—Not all Italians speak one language, for the exclusive use of the national language in the schools, the courts of law, the armed forces, the radio, and in the newspapers has not uprooted the dialects. The latter are still spoken freely, especially among the less cultured classes. These dialects tend to vary with the region; some, such as Sardinian, are quite distinctive. In addition to the national language and the dialects, French is spoken by about 150,000 persons in the small valley of Aosta near the French border province of Savoy, and there are some 350,000 German-speaking persons in the upper Adige Valley of the Trentino which borders on the Austrian

\* *Pasta* is an Italian word which collectively refers to spaghetti, macaroni, noodles, and other wheat substances prepared in innumerable ways.

Tyrol. Street names in Bolzano and Merano in the Trentino are in both Italian and German. These French and German minorities are permitted to use their own languages in schools and in the courts of law, as well as in the regional assemblies, which enjoy considerable self-governing powers.

Religion unites the Italians more than either racial origin or language. More than ninety-nine per cent of the Italians are registered officially as members of the Roman Catholic faith. There is a sprinkling of Protestants and Jews. Though nominally Roman Catholics, many Italians, especially those who live in cities, are strongly anti-clerical and even agnostic, it would seem that a part, at least, of the Italian religion is love for the elegance of ritual in the Catholic church.

**DEMOGRAPHIC FACTOR**—Italy has a population of approximately 48,000,000, about 5,000,000 more than the population of France, which has an area one and three quarters times as great. For the whole of Italy population density is 405 persons per square mile, but because of the influence of terrain and climate there are wide variations in density from one region to another. The small province of Naples, for instance, has a density of nearly 7,000 persons per square mile, while the province of Nuoro in central Sardinia contains fewer than 100 persons per square mile. It is significant that the most sparsely populated province of Italy has a density one and one half times greater than that of the United States. The areas of greatest concentration are, naturally, in those parts of Italy where agriculture is most intensive and industry most highly developed: Campania, Liguria, the entire Po Valley, Lazio, Puglia, and Sicily.


Italy's population is increasing annually by approximately 350,000 persons, or about 7.4 persons per 1,000, which is about half the rate of increase of population in the United States. The reasons for the decline

in Italy's rate of growth are (1) the birth rate has dropped from thirty to just over nineteen persons per 1,000 (which is slightly lower than that for the United States), whereas the death rate of 9.8 persons per 1,000 has remained somewhat more stationary; and (2) net emigration further depletes annual growth by about 125,000 persons.

Delayed marriage—dictated by economic insecurity and chronic unemployment—is the principal reason for the absolute decline in the birth rate. Although delayed marriage is more pronounced in the large industrial cities of northern Italy (Turin in particular), it is becoming noticeable in the towns and rural areas of the south as well as in the northern and central regions of Italy. There is no natural increase of population in the northern sector of Piedmont; the center of that region (Turin) would experience a net loss of population if it were not for migration from more populous areas. The regions that create Italy's surplus population are the northern region of Venezia and southern Italy—the very regions which in the past have exported millions of surplus people to North and South America.

Although nearly forty-eight per cent of the Italian population is dependent upon agriculture for its livelihood and income, all but a few million Italians live in towns and cities. Of the rural population, about three fourths, comprising day laborers and sharecroppers (*metayers*), reside in small towns of from 1,000 to 10,000 inhabitants; only the remaining fourth of Italian farmers live on isolated farmsteads.

**CITIES**—Just as rural population tends to decline in favor of city life, so city dwellers seem to gravitate toward the larger cities. Fifty years ago only twenty-five per cent of the Italians resided in cities of 30,000 or more inhabitants; today more than thirty-five per cent live in such communities. Italy has numerous large and growing cities.



Rome has 1,700,000 inhabitants; Milan, 1,300,000, Naples, 1,100,000, Turin, Genoa, and Palermo, more than 500,000 inhabitants each. Florence, Bologna, Venice, Catania, and Bari are in the 250,000–500,000 class, and there are a dozen more cities with populations in excess of 100,000 each (see map on page 341).

Rome, the "eternal city" that served as the center of a world empire and of Christendom for centuries, actually achieved its greatest growth in population within the past two decades. Its population is four times greater than it was in 1901 and three times greater than in 1921. Rome is growing more rapidly than any other large city of Italy mainly because of its importance as the political, administrative, and cultural capital of Italy. The existence of a large national bureaucracy accompanied, as always, by the growth of clerical functions, and the expansion of diplomatic and international agencies—for example, the Food and Agriculture Organization—have stimulated economic and commercial activity in Rome and the surrounding region of Lazio.

Milan is Italy's second largest city and the country's commercial and industrial capital. Its rate of growth has been less impressive than that of Rome, but Milan too has grown since 1901 by as much as two and one half times, and by more than fifty per cent since 1921. What Milan lacks of Rome's pomp and elegance is compensated for by its display of activity and efficiency, for here the major corporations and financial institutions of the country maintain their head offices.

Italy's third largest city is Naples, the historic capital of the south. Naples lost its primacy among Italian cities in 1922, and during the Fascist era was outstripped by the northern cities and seaports. Since 1945, however, Naples has made a remarkable recovery from the devastation of war and is expanding its volume of commerce and industry. Because of its strategic bay, Naples

has been made the seat of the NATO Mediterranean command.

Turin and Genoa are, respectively, the automotive center and the greatest seaport and shipbuilding center of Italy. Palermo is the industrial, commercial, and strategic hub of Sicily.

## ECONOMIC FACTORS

Limitation of resources in Italy has generated great population pressures, which massive emigration was able to contain from 1875 to 1915, and which Fascism attempted without success to resolve by means of territorial expansion. Italy's democratic government in the postwar period has taken steps to increase resources and productivity by stimulating a higher volume of investments in agriculture and industry. It is also attempting to widen and to facilitate its foreign trade to the end that Italian producers may both secure raw materials at equitable prices and gain markets for their exports. Both of these policies are intended to stimulate employment in Italy and to enable Italians to find gainful employment at home. Pending permanent economic recovery, however, those who wish to emigrate either permanently or temporarily are being assisted by the government.

The task that faces Italy's people and government is greater than that which confronted the United States during the depression in the early 1930's, for Italy must create additional physical resources before it can plan an economic recovery. The nation must somehow obtain capital needed to finance land improvements, the intensification of agriculture, electrification, and the development of new industries. If investment by foreign countries does not supply this capital, the government must encourage citizens to invest a higher ratio of their incomes in long-range securities that bear low interest. Although this policy, if successful, would mean a reduction in the living

standards of the upper- and middle-income groups for several decades, it would, within a decade or more, alleviate the unemployment problem and bring a sharp decline of want and misery among the masses, particularly those of the south. It would cut the ground from under the proponents of political extremism and dictatorship, strengthen democracy, and eliminate the causes of militarism and imperialism in Italy

**AGRICULTURE**—The total amount of land available to agriculture in Italy for both pasture and cultivated crops is 51,000,000 acres. This area must feed a population of 48,000,000 persons and supply nearly 23,000,000 persons with income on which to live. The land must be utilized as economically as possible, meaning that cash value must be emphasized. To expand industry Italy must import raw materials not available at home; and to get these materials essential to an improved economy, she must export from her surplus.

In their effort to strike a balance between specialized high-value crops on one side and staple crops on the other, the Italians have leaned heavily toward utilization of their cultivable land for staples. For example, grains, potatoes, and vegetables are cultivated upon 21,500,000 acres of land in a country that has only 32,500,000 acres of crop lands. To stretch the productivity of this acreage the Italians commonly grow these staples in the midst of olive, fruit, and mulberry groves or among vineyards.

Of the grains that are grown in Italy—wheat, corn, rice, barley, oats, and rye—only wheat must be imported in quantity to supplement national production. Italy produces 8,000,000–8,500,000 tons (280,000,000 bushels) of wheat annually, which nearly satisfies her requirements for bread flour; but about 2,000,000 tons of hard wheat and *semolino* flour must be imported annually to supply the *pasta* industries, since Italy's climate is not favorable for hard wheat. Italy's

rice crop on occasion is in excess of domestic consumption, and therefore as much as 250,000 tons can be exported.

Other agricultural shortages warranting attention include animal products—meats, hides, wool, bristles—as well as forest products and oil seeds. Pasture and forest areas in Italy are insufficient for domestic needs. On the other hand, the Italian agricultural economy includes an emphasis on such crops as grapes (basis of a wine industry as well as for table use), olives, mulberry leaves (for the culture of silkworms), sugar beets, tobacco, hemp, flax, nuts, and a variety of fruits and fresh vegetables. Despite the reduction of Italy's tiny fraction of unproductive land and the intensification of acreage yields, the tendency to encourage crop cultivation will keep Italy in constant short supply of animal products, lumber, and wood pulp.

**INDUSTRY**—Next to agriculture, which provides employment for 9,000,000 persons, comes industry with over 6,000,000 employees. Italy's principal industries may be grouped into manufacturing, mining, construction, transportation and communication, and public utilities. The first category is most important: over 4,000,000 persons are engaged in manufacturing a variety of commodities, chiefly from an annual output of 2,500,000 tons of pig iron and steel. Nearly every category of machinery and motors is made, including 120,000 passenger cars annually. Italian factories also produce a complete line of electrical goods, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, textiles, rubber goods, building materials, wood, leather, paper, metal products, and tobacco. Handicrafts are declining gradually as mass production methods spread; only eighteen per cent of Italy's manufacturing is performed in small shops by artisans.

A very high proportion of the industrial workers are organized into trade unions, for in Italy, as elsewhere, laborers have learned

that collective bargaining is their strongest weapon in keeping wages on a level with, if not ahead of, rising prices. The progressive rise of wages since 1947 has resulted in increased demand and a consequent increase in production. There have also been advances in technology and labor efficiency—(output per man hour of labor) with the result that more goods can be produced with a smaller labor force. While production figures have risen to about fifty per cent above 1938 levels in industry, the size of the labor force is gradually declining. In time, perhaps, availability of a skilled labor supply will stimulate the establishment of new industries that can substantially absorb Italy's 2,000,000 unemployed and 1,000,000 partially employed workers. Greater industrialization will enable Italy to become more self-sufficient, and thus to improve her status in foreign trade.

**FOREIGN TRADE**—Italy's volume of foreign trade has expanded to nearly \$4,000,000,000 annually. Of this, total imports are still slightly more than half despite the fact that exports also have risen steadily. Italy's annual trade deficit fluctuates between \$150,000,000 and \$300,000,000. This deficit must be met by what the economists call "invisible" earnings, such as tourist expenditures, remittances from Italian emigrants, earnings of Italian shipping and airlines, and profits on investments in foreign countries. In the postwar years United States economic assistance has provided Italy with several hundred million dollars annually to balance her trade deficit. Moreover, the expenditure of dollars in Italy by the United States through the MSA, Point Four, and other economic programs has contributed to the same end.

Italy's imports fall into three categories: (1) industrial raw materials, such as cotton, coal, petroleum, iron and steel, copper, wool, wood pulp and lumber, oilseeds and vegetable oils, hides, and rubber; (2) foodstuffs,

such as hard wheat and *semolino* flour, coffee, fish, and meats, and (3) machinery. The actual volume of machinery that is imported is very small and consists of articles whose demand is insufficient to warrant domestic production. Since the end of the last war Italy's largest supplier has been the United States, followed, in order, by the countries of the sterling area, Latin America, Germany, and Eastern Europe.

Italy's exports are chiefly industrial manufactures and foodstuffs. Textiles are the largest item, netting \$250,000,000 annually, followed by machinery and motor vehicles, metal implements, chemical and pharmaceutical products, rubber and electrical commodities, and, finally, numerous finished goods such as hats and leather products. The principal food exports are fresh, dried, canned, or preserved fruits, followed by vegetables and legumes, rice, cheese, cured meats, and olive oil. Italy's leading customers are the British Commonwealth countries, Germany, France, United States, Eastern Europe, and the Latin American countries.

**TRANSPORTATION**—The growth of industry and the urbanization of life have led to the mechanization of the greater part of Italian transportation. Especially since the end of the war, small motorized vehicles—running fifty miles per gallon of gasoline—are replacing the beast of burden for purposes of local transportation. Nevertheless, horses, mules, and donkeys used for the movement of merchandise and passengers are still frequently seen in southern Italy, especially in the small towns and villages.

The railways are the most important medium of transportation in Italy, for both freight and passengers. There are about 13,412 miles of track within Italy's present boundaries, averaging about one mile of track for every nine square miles—a rail density comparing favorably with one mile of track

per twelve square miles of the United States. The government owns and operates seventy-five per cent of the trackage, the remainder—mostly short lines—is privately owned. With the development of hydroelectric power, electrification of the railways is proceeding gradually. Some 4,545 miles of track were already electrified at the end of 1951, permitting a reduction in the country's total consumption of imported coal. Italy's railways handle more than 50,000,000 tons of freight each year and collect over 500,000,000 passenger fares. Although the heaviest concentration of lines is in the Po Valley, including the Piedmont, with Milan, Bologna, and Turin forming the chief hubs, there is a trunk line along each coast of the peninsula and a third one from Rome north to Bologna, which cuts through the central valleys of Lazio and Tuscany. Other important lines connect these northwest-southeast main lines, climbing over, or tunneling through, the Apennines. Both Sicily and Sardinia have major lines running fast trains between the larger cities and making connections through steamer service with those on the mainland. Air schedules in Italy have not cut deeply into the efficient rail service or into steamer service to the islands.

Next to the railways as important means of transportation are the highways. There are 13,440 miles of national highways,<sup>5</sup> 27,000 miles of provincial highways and roads, and 67,000 miles of city and town roads. Most of the national highways are surfaced with macadam and are efficiently maintained. The heaviest highway traffic is in the Po Valley, the centers of traffic being Milan, Bologna, Rome, Turin, Padua, Genoa, Verona, Livorno, and Florence. The number of motor vehicles is gradually increasing again, following the near exhaustion of the

prewar supply during the war period. There are well over 1,000,000 motor vehicles in use, and each year about 150,000 automotive units are added.

Water transportation continues to have a vital role in the movement of goods and passengers both coastwise and overseas. Despite the heavy losses of shipping that Italy suffered in the course of the war the government has rebuilt the fleet of freight and passenger ships to over 3,000,000 tons. The total volume of freight that is loaded and unloaded at Italian ports has risen from 10,000,000 tons in 1946 to 40,000,000 tons, of which about two thirds is carried on Italian ships.

Italy has two major airlines—Alitalia and the LAI. These lines combine schedules to operate throughout Italy and across the water stretches to Sicily and Sardinia and maintain regular flights to many points in Europe, northern and eastern Africa, and the Middle East. They also cross the Atlantic to serve Buenos Aires, Caracas, and New York, and service to South Africa and the Far East is being planned. Rome's Ciampino airport is the major center of operations of all airlines, both foreign and Italian, but Milan and Naples also have airports for inter-continental traffic.

#### POLITICAL FACTORS

Modern Italy has consistently demonstrated a preference for constitutional government. Its basic constitutions, except for the Fascist period (1922-45), have embodied democratic concepts of parliamentary government and political liberties. At the same time, however, paucity of resources and severe population pressures have generated volatile political ideologies and movements. The failure of the non-Fascist groups to unite their forces after World War I catapulted Mussolini and the Fascist party to power in 1922, although Victor Emmanuel remained

<sup>5</sup> In a few places there are *autostrada*, or express highways, namely, Turin to Brescia via Milan, Pisa to Florence.

nominal King and ruler. The final collapse of Fascism in 1945 resulted in a return to constitutional experimentation in line with Italy's liberal tradition.

World War II put an end to the monarchy. In 1946 King Victor Emmanuel abdicated, and a national plebiscite established a democratic republic in Italy. A new constitution, in effect in 1948, attempts to steer a middle course in shaping the country's future. Politically Italy is split into three main groups: Communists and left-wing Socialists on the left, conservative elements in the center, and Monarchists and neo-Fascists on the right. The Christian Democrat Party controls the government and, with coalition support, commands almost fifty per cent of the electoral vote. Its stability, despite postwar success of coalition governments, is weakened by the fact that it must seek support from the right or left to implement its policies. The Communists and left-wingers command about thirty-five per cent of the popular votes and the right-wing elements attract some fifteen per cent of the total. Success or failure of the democratic government will largely depend on its ability to push agricultural reforms, to improve housing conditions for the underprivileged, and provide jobs for the unemployed. Unless the demands for better living standards are met, social unrest will again give rise to extremist agitation which might mean a dictatorship of the right or left.

**TERRITORIAL PROBLEMS**—The ethnic complexity along Italy's borders, together with national ambitions for territorial expansion and power, has created several important problems for the nation. Italian settlements have long existed beyond the national boundaries—in the eastern part of the French Riviera, on the coastlands at the head of the Adriatic, and at points along the Dalmatian coast and on the Adriatic islands. Italian desire to dominate the Adriatic (thereby preventing the possibility of a

strong, hostile power occupying the eastern coast) has led to involvement in the affairs of Albania and to Italian occupation, between World Wars I and II, of certain islands off the Yugoslav coast, as well as the mainland port of Zara. Albania controls the eastern shore of the sixty-mile-wide Strait of Otranto at the mouth of the Adriatic. Between the two world wars, Italy controlled the Albanian port of Valona, and the strategic island of Saseno, guarding the Otranto Strait. Since 1945, however, Albania has been a Soviet satellite, and Italy finds herself faced by a hostile neighbor across this narrow waterway—the very situation she attempted to avoid.

Territorial problems along Italy's land borders involve three neighbors—France, Austria, and Yugoslavia. To France, Italy lost a number of small mountain areas following World War II (see page 313). With Austria, the problem dates back to the end of World War I, when Italy's border was moved northward to the crest of the Alps, and over 200,000 German-speaking persons in this area (known as the Tyrol) found themselves included within the Italian nation. Under the Fascists, strong measures were taken to "Italianize" these Tyrolese. Large numbers of Italians were transferred to the area, and the Italian language replaced German in the schools and in all public services. In 1939, 185,000 persons in the Tyrol elected to return to Germany, rather than remain under Italian control. The Italian Tyrol has since World War II become an autonomous region within the framework of the Italian state.

With Yugoslavia, the territorial problem involves the city of Trieste and the surrounding territory (see map on page 409). In the years prior to World War I, Trieste had been a port for the Austro-Hungarian Empire, although its population was largely Italian. Italians also lived further east, along the Adriatic coast, while in the uplands behind the coast the population was Slovene.



At the end of World War I, the new nation of Yugoslavia claimed Trieste and the region around it on the grounds that the Yugoslavs were heir to former Austro-Hungarian territory. Unlike Italy, Yugoslavia required Trieste in order to have an outlet on the Adriatic. But all of Trieste—the city and the Istrian Peninsula—eventually went to Italy, with the result that 500,000 Slovenes were included within Italian borders. Following World War II, Yugoslavia was able to secure the upland areas about Trieste with their Slavic inhabitants, as well as most of the Istrian Peninsula, but the coastal region, including Trieste and other territory to the east, was proclaimed as the “Free Ter-

ritory of Trieste” to be placed eventually under United Nations control. As a temporary measure, pending the exercise of United Nations authority, the Free Territory was divided, with Zone A, including Trieste, administered by the United States and Britain, and Zone B by the Yugoslavs.

When it became clear that United Nations supervision was an impractical arrangement, various proposals were put forward to solve the Trieste question. Relations between Italy and Yugoslavia remained strained until 1954, when, by mutual agreement, the proposed Free Territory was permanently divided, Zone A being incorporated into Italy, and Zone B into Yugoslavia.

### Study Questions

1. What were the areas of Italian expansion prior to World War I?
2. List the territories that formed the “unredeemed” lands for which Italy entered World War I.
3. What were the two principal policies by which Fascism attempted to resolve Italy's scarce land and resources?
4. To what extent was Italy punished for Fascist participation in the Axis partnership?
5. Identify the sea and land boundaries of Italy and estimate the length of Italy's total coastline.
6. What are the proportions of mountainous, hilly, and level terrain in Italy, and how much of the land is actually utilized for agriculture?
7. What assets and limitations has nature imposed upon agriculture in Italy, and how have the Italians sought to correct the limitations?
8. How does Italy rank in terms of resources, and what efforts have been made to improve Italy's access to vital resources?
9. How rapidly is the Italian population increasing through accretion and natural growth, and what factors are influencing trends in the birth rate?
10. Which are the six most populous Italian cities, and how do their locations compare to the core areas of Italy?
11. What are Italy's principal exports, and to which countries are they directed in order of importance?
12. What are Italy's principal agricultural (food and raw material) imports?
13. How extensive is rail transportation in Italy, and how does this rail net compare with that of the United States?
14. How significant is Italy's merchant marine, and what recovery has been made since the end of the war?
15. How is Italy divided politically, and what condition threatens governmental stability?

## CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

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### *Switzerland*

Politically, Switzerland is a stable, mature state where, for centuries, changes have been infrequent even though major political upheavals have taken place all about it. It was fear of internal disunity that first caused the Swiss to adopt neutrality as a cornerstone of their foreign policy and eventually enabled the nation to attain an enviable position among the countries of the world. As long as there were no major wars to disturb the European political picture Switzerland's neutrality was successfully maintained. With the advent of World War I, however, the nation's ability to exist as a small, neutral state was greatly reduced. World War II and the subsequent political instability in Europe since 1945 have further diminished the likelihood of strict Swiss neutrality. Thus, recent events have caused the Swiss people to re-evaluate their international outlook.

Neutrality, as the Swiss construe it, is not isolation; it is, rather, the policy of employing impartial cooperation in the establishment of peace in Europe and the world.

Thus the Swiss have been prone to adopt a foreign policy whose goal is "neutrality and European solidarity." The change in great power relationships in the world has in turn caused pronounced alterations in the political situation of internal Europe. The fact that the USSR, the United States, and the British Commonwealth of Nations are great powers of the moment, and the fact that they are also extra-European powers, has forced Western Europe to reconsider its own position and to strive toward unification as a single power bloc. This political situation may force the Swiss to reassess their own political orientation, for they are no longer a small nation caught between various European great powers. Rather, they are a nation deep in a European world of middle-sized powers that are trying to consolidate in the face of tension and friction among the world's great political units.

The Swiss were the first Europeans to demonstrate that peoples of different race, religion, language, culture, and tradition can live side by side in peace and unity if the

rights of all are treated with tolerance and respect

Switzerland first came into being at the end of the thirteenth century in the valleys about Lake Luzern, when the three forested, rural cantons of Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden through chosen delegates formed a political and military alliance to maintain mutual independence against all outside influences. The remarkable document concluded on that date contains most of the essential principles of later Swiss constitutions. However, the two basic principles of the present Constitution—internal democracy and external neutrality—were not formulated until 1848.

Adherence to these established principles has not always been easy. Many times during its historical development, Switzerland has been called on to make vital decisions on state policy, and although the republic has occasionally faltered, it has never lost sight of its goals—democracy and individual freedom. Today the twenty-two cantons of Switzerland are welded tightly into a country that assures a common governmental policy and essential liberty, without jeopardy to local culture and tradition.

#### GEOGRAPHICAL STRUCTURE

Switzerland is best oriented by locating it with relation to the great chain of Alps which arcs through the south central part of continental Europe from Mediterranean France to eastern Austria. Occupying the heart of this mountainous region, the little country both attracts, because of its nodal position, and repels, because of barriers in the form of strong relief. Countries on all sides—France, Germany, Austria, and Italy—share the Alpine topography, but only as peripheral areas. Switzerland's whole destiny is, and always has been, associated with the Alps, with which its physical identity is nearly synonymous. About sixty per cent of the country is in the high Alps, and the re-

mainder, though much lower, is a landscape dominated by the high elevations.

**MAJOR PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS**—The greater part of the Alps has elevations that range from 5,000 to 10,000 feet, and many mountain peaks rise well over 13,000 feet.<sup>1</sup> As a result of the extreme elevations much of the Alpine highlands consists of vast expanses of alpine meadows, snow fields and glaciers, and rock waste. Not only are the perpetual snow and sharp relief attractions essential to the country's large tourist trade; but they also provide a source of water supply that has made possible many important hydroelectric plants.

The Swiss Plateau, with the Alps to the south and the Jura to the west and northwest, extends from Lake Geneva to Lake Constance. Ranging from forty to fifty miles in width and approximately 180 miles in length, it varies from 1,200 to 1,800 feet in elevation. Although called a plateau, it is a region of rather variable relief, with many hills, lakes, and entrenched rivers. Easily traversed, it is vulnerable to mechanized invasion. On the Swiss Plateau the winters are cold, cloudy, and often foggy, but the summers are warm and rainy. Most of Switzerland's limited agricultural and industrial development, as well as her urban and transportation facilities, center in this region. It is the economic heart of the country and has always been the core area (see map on page 351).

Completely different from either the Alpine lands or the Swiss Plateau, the Jura Mountains are of intermediate elevation. The highest points reach 5,000 feet, but the crests are so regular in outline that they lack the scenic appeal of the Alps. Within the mountainous region are numerous valleys

<sup>1</sup> The highest point in the Alps is Mt. Blanc in France (15,782 feet), but several Swiss peaks approach this elevation: Weisshorn (14,804 feet), the Matterhorn (14,780 feet), Jungfrau (13,671 feet), and others.

and hillside slopes that support agricultural activities, especially the dairying industry widely known for its production of milk chocolate and cheese. Because of isolation and long disagreeable winters, the inhabitants have established home industries in various crafts, such as woodcarving and watchmaking, in which they have developed specialized skills.

**ROUTES AND PASSES**—In the central part of the Alps is a mountain knot known as the "Gotthard Massif," which geographically and militarily is the most important center of Switzerland. The Reuss, Rhine, Tessin, and Rhône rivers all have their origin in this high mountainous area, and each flows in a cardinal direction: north, east, south, or west. Together the valleys of the Reuss and Tessin rivers form a north-south route leading over the famous St. Gotthard Pass, providing the shortest and quickest rail connection between Germany and Italy. Perpendicular to this natural north-south artery, the Rhine and Rhône rivers occupy deep longitudinal valleys that are oriented essentially east-west and separate the Alps into two more or less parallel mountain chains. Traversed by a continuous rail line, the two valleys serve as arterial routes of travel in an east-west direction.

Because Switzerland is in some ways a transit country between northern and southern Europe, her many mountain passes, including the Great St. Bernard, Simplon, and St. Gotthard, have played an important role in the history of Europe. In addition to the movement of goods across them in earlier times, they were used by such military figures as Hannibal in his march against Rome, by the Germans in their many expeditions to the south, and by Napoleon in his war against northern Italy and Austria. All of the above-mentioned passes are more than a mile<sup>2</sup> above sea level; their use as pas-

sageways has been limited by the gradients of the approaches and by seasonal storms and heavy snowfall.


With the advent of railroads and technical developments in the field of engineering, tunnels have pierced the mountains. The St. Gotthard tunnel penetrates the Gotthard Massif, and the Lotschberg tunnel passes through the Bernese Alps and leads directly to the Simplon tunnel, which in turn pierces the Pennine Alps for a distance of more than twelve miles. Since these tunnels provide direct rail passage between Switzerland and Italy, the high mountain passes have decreased in importance. In the event that the tunnels should be destroyed during time of war, these passes would again have increased strategic importance.

The Jura Mountains of northwestern Switzerland, consisting of parallel ridges and valleys trending in a northeast-southwest direction, have a few transverse valleys which serve as routes of travel for highways and railroads leading into France. Express trains maintaining the fastest schedules between Paris and Rome run through these valleys.

The Swiss Plateau, in a broad sense, is also a passageway extending northeast-southwest across the north-central part of the country. It is a natural center of international routes. The heart of the rail and highway networks of Switzerland occupy this physiographic region uniting those parts of Western and Central Europe on either side of the Alps.

**BOUNDARIES**—Switzerland has both natural and artificial boundaries. In the south the Italo-Swiss border follows the crests of mountain ridges or crosses them with no regularity. At one point it reaches as far south as the northern slopes of the Po River basin less than thirty miles from Milan. Lake Maggiore, one of the famous Italian lakes, is partly in Switzerland and partly in Italy. From the eastern junction with the Italian

<sup>2</sup> Great St. Bernard 8,108 feet; Simplon 6,582 feet; St. Gotthard 6,935 feet.



border to the Rhine River the Austro-Swiss boundary runs irregularly across mountainous terrain in a general east-west direction. Northward to Lake Constance, Switzerland and Austria meet in the upper Rhine Valley except for a small wedge which embraces the tiny Principality of Liechtenstein. Turning westward where it meets Germany the border is open and follows the middle of Lake Constance and the Rhine River to Basel except where canton Schaffhausen forms a Swiss salient north of the Rhine. From Basel the Franco-Swiss boundary turns south-westward and for the most part follows the crest of the Jura Mountains to Geneva. Just as canton Schaffhausen is nearly surrounded by German territory, so canton Geneva is almost entirely encompassed by French territory. From Geneva to the Italian border the common boundary with France first follows the center of Lake Geneva and then the crest line of the French Alps.

Although seventy-five per cent of Switzerland's boundaries are mountain crests and in general serve as barriers, they are not always well suited to defense for they are broken by many lakes, rivers, and open valleys. From the politico-geographical viewpoint the weakest part of the Swiss boundary is in the northeast facing Germany, where only a river in a lowland valley separates the two countries.

#### HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

As was said earlier, Switzerland came into being near the end of the thirteenth century, not as a nation, but as a federation of states. Before that time the intra-Alpine region had attracted many European powers. The area had been conquered and held as a province by the Romans; it had been overrun by Germanic tribes; it had been made a part of Charlemagne's vast empire; and it had been maintained under the domination of Austria. Many different groups therefore

had a share in the development of the Swiss as a people and in their composite socio-political institutions.

**PRIOR TO THE SWISS CONFEDERACY**—The people whom the Romans found in the low plateau region between the Alps and the Jura Mountains were the Helvetians, a branch of the Celtic race; their country was known as Helvetia. The Romans did not expel the Helvetians from their land, though some of the latter did move across the Alps into northern Europe. As elsewhere in their conquests, the Romans introduced their own civilization, roads, buildings, law, and language.

With the decline of Roman power in the fourth century, and the withdrawal of their legions from Roman provinces, all of Western Europe, including Helvetia, became the prey of the Germanic hordes. Thus, by 600 A.D. the people in the area were a composite of three different peoples—the Helvetians, the Romans, and the Germans—and it is the descendants of these three who inhabit the Switzerland of today. In the southeastern part of the country live remnants of old Roman-Celtic settlers, who because of isolation in the high Alps were able to remain almost untouched by Germanic influences. This group, known as Rhaeto-Romans, still speaks the Romansch language, which is not far removed from Latin. Of the various Germanic tribes that invaded this Alpine region only the Alemanni of the north and central areas maintained the German language and culture. The Burgundians, another Germanic tribe that had settled in the west and south, gradually lost their language and became Romanized.

The rise of powerful rulers in West Europe naturally affected the fortunes of the Swiss peoples. The Frankish kingdom in the sixth century held large portions of Switzerland under its sway and gradually the tribal structure gave way to the principle of monarchic rule. Not until 800 A.D. did Charlemagne

succeed in incorporating the many Germanic tribes into the Holy Roman Empire.<sup>3</sup> This period of unity ended in 843 when Switzerland was partitioned along with the remainder of the Holy Roman Empire. West of the Aare River the Burgundian sector fell to Lothair and north of the Rhine Alemannia came under the rule of Louis, two successors to Charlemagne. Dynastic disputes and rivalries over patrimony soon caused power to revert to local aristocratic families whose rule proved to be arrogant and intolerant. Parochialism thus reduced the substance of the reigning emperor's power to a fictional supremacy.

During the thirteenth century the people in many individual valleys and cities became free of local feudal authority through the grant of imperial franchises which restored to them various rights and privileges. These communities formed the nucleus of the Swiss democratic system, for in them the citizens ruled themselves. Shortly after 1231 when the land of Uri around Lake Luzern was granted a charter, the enfranchised lands were claimed by Hapsburg dukes but without direct intervention in their internal affairs.

In 1273, in the absence of strong emperors, Rudolf of Hapsburg, a Swiss count who had old claims on the region around the "Vierwaldstatter See," opposed "free rule" and sent governors to assume control of Schwyz, Uri, and Unterwalden—three self-governing communities. The inhabitants resisted this act, and on August 1, 1291, delegates from the three valleys of Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden<sup>4</sup> met and concluded a pact of Everlasting Alliance (see map on page 354 for

Swiss cantons). This date marks the beginning of Switzerland as a nation.

EVOLUTION OF THE SWISS NATION—Contrary to the experience of other West European states Switzerland was formed not by unification but through aggregation. Accretion rather than amalgamation, heterogeneity not homogeneity, diversity rather than uniformity—these are the rubrics that depict the formation of the Swiss nation. At various times during the three centuries following the initial establishment of the Swiss Confederacy, other provinces joined the three original cantons. Luzern was fourth, followed by Zurich, Zug, Glarus, and Bern.<sup>5</sup> With the later addition of Freiburg, Solothurn, Basel, Schaffhausen, and Appenzell the Swiss Confederacy by 1513 embraced thirteen cantons known as the "Thirteen Old Districts." This territorial extent of the cantons was to remain unchanged for 300 years. Some of the cantons that joined the Confederacy were city areas that became rather powerful politically. The ensuing conflict between rural and city cantons<sup>6</sup> extended into the nineteenth century and almost led to civil war.

During its early existence as a nation Switzerland was forced to defend itself against Austria, with which, however, it signed a perpetual peace in 1474. In other wars against the Germans, French, and Italians, the Swiss acquired more territory, which was added to the Confederacy as the subject areas of Aargau, Tessin, and Waadt. Still other cantons were added as allied or associated areas—Graubunden, Wallis, and Geneva. Inhabitants of the latter were free, but in the Swiss state they did not have rights equal to those of the "Thirteen Old

<sup>3</sup> The Holy Roman Empire in 800 represented the concept of unity of Western Christendom united under the power of Frankish kings and sanctioned by the Pope.

<sup>4</sup> Waldstatte (forest place) is the collective noun applied to these communities; the term "canton," denoting a member of the confederation, came into use in the fifteenth century.


<sup>5</sup> For the sake of uniformity the German names of Swiss cantons are used in this chapter. The only exception is Geneva (Genève in French; Genf in German).

<sup>6</sup> Rural: Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden, Zug, Glarus, Appenzell. City: Luzern, Zurich, Bern, Freiburg, Solothurn, Basel, Schaffhausen.

Districts." No single covenant bound the confederacy as a unit, rather, by successive treaties there was formed a league of independent states. The lack of uniformity in government in the various cantons led to confusion. A central authority was lacking except for a Diet, and this served more as an intermediary between the cantons than as a central government.

Switzerland avoided involvement in the Thirty Years' War and succeeded in establishing its formal independence from the Holy Roman Empire at the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.

The French Revolution of 1789 struck a mortal blow at the established order in Switzerland. In 1798 the Swiss nation was conquered by Napoleon and made a French



In the early sixteenth century Swiss unity suffered a sharp eclipse owing to internal conflict and military reverses abroad. In a battle won by superior French forces at Marignano in 1515, confidence in the invincibility of the Swiss army was dissipated and the Swiss abandoned their efforts to add to their territories by force of arms. Though Swiss mercenaries continued to display their prowess abroad, the country itself was forced to withdraw from European politics and to adhere to a policy of traditional neutrality.

Napoleon's invasion of Switzerland, although resented by the Swiss, ultimately proved beneficial. The subject territories were abolished and transformed into six new cantons: St. Gallen, Graubünden, Aargau, Thurgau, Tessin, and Waadt. In 1814 the total was brought to 22 with the addition of Valais, Neuchâtel, and Geneva. Internal strife which had weakened the country for centuries gradually ceased, and Switzerland responded to the liberalizing forces of the French Revolution. The brief ex-



periment with a centralized state under the French soon gave way to democratic experimentation with constitutional government. After a period of confusion the adoption of a constitution in 1848 served to unify the country.

**CONSTITUTIONAL PATTERN**—The formation of a federal state under the constitution of 1848 marked a major change in Swiss political history. After 600 years of experience with a confederation in which cantonal sovereignty was a fixed principle, the twenty-two cantons still remained autonomous in internal politics and were united to one another under elastic rules of association. The original constitution was revised in 1874, but the basic principles of popular liberties and equality before the law continued unchanged and are still maintained today.

Compromise between those who advocated strong centralization and a large degree of cantonal autonomy is the key to Swiss governmental system. The result of this practice is reflected in a bicameral legislature in which the National Council represents the nation, and the Council of States is composed of delegates from the cantons. The Swiss have entrusted executive power to a Federal Council of seven members elected by the two chambers in joint session. This system is designed as a precaution against any possible dictatorship and to that end the president of the Confederation, serving a term of one year, holds no special power conferred by his post.

A firm belief in popular government led the constitution makers to provide for citizen participation in public affairs. Thus in some localities the citizenry transacts public business in the open public square, though the use of the ballot box is widespread in the nation. Oddly enough the extension of popular liberties does not include suffrage rights for women; attempts to gain this right for women have failed to overcome traditional prejudices.

Recognition of cultural differences is extended into the political sphere. It is customary for all language groups to be represented according to their numbers in the federal Council. The same arrangement applies to the two major religious groups, Protestant and Catholic. In this way, all parts of the country are treated equally and no minority language or religious group has cause for complaint.

#### HUMAN FACTORS

**POPULATION**—Switzerland with an area of slightly less than 16,000 square miles has a population of more than four and three-quarter million people unevenly distributed over the country. The most sparsely populated section is the broad Alpine region, south of a line drawn between the eastern ends of Lakes Geneva and Constance. Although this region comprises three fifths of the total land area, adverse physical and economic conditions limit the population to one fifth the total for the country.

The average density of population in the mountain cantons is about thirty persons per square mile. In the cantons of the Jura, where physical conditions are less severe, the population density is between thirty and 100 persons per square mile, and on the Swiss Plateau there are generally about 200 persons per square mile.

**Cities.** With the industrialization of the country there has been a slow, but gradual trend toward urbanization. Switzerland has five cities with a population of more than 100,000, most of which are in the plateau region. Several of them are well known either as educational centers or as the seats of institutions that have national or international interest. In many instances they are high in tourist appeal, particularly those that have attractive locations along the shores of Switzerland's picturesque lakes.


Bern (147,000), the capital, lies close to

the German-French language boundary. It is the only national capital in Europe that is greatly outranked in population by other cities in the same country. Zurich (390,000), the largest city, is the metropolitan center of German-speaking Switzerland. Because of its size and strategic location it is a focal point for railways and is the country's leading air transportation center. It has the country's only technical university Basel (184,000), situated on the Rhine River, serves as the leading port of entry for goods consigned to Switzerland. Its position in the valley of the Rhine near the junction of Switzerland, France, and Germany makes it also an important railroad center. It was formerly the home of the Bank for International Settlements. Geneva (145,000) was the site of the League of Nations and the International Labor Office. Since World War II it has been the scene of many international conferences. Just as Basel is a gateway to Germany, so Geneva is a gateway to France. Geneva's location in French-speaking Switzerland adjacent to France gives it a cultural life that makes the city more closely akin to Paris or Lyons than to Zürich or other German-speaking Swiss cities. Lausanne (107,000), picturesquely situated on Lake Geneva, houses the Supreme Court of Switzerland. Luzern (61,000), which is located on the Lake of Luzern, is the administrative center of Swiss railways. It is considered by many to be one of the most beautiful of Swiss cities.

Of the seven universities in Switzerland, four are located in the predominantly French-speaking cities of Geneva, Lausanne, Freiburg, and Neuchâtel. The remaining three are located in the predominantly German-speaking cities of Zürich, Bern, and Basel.

**LANGUAGES**—The Swiss are a multilingual people reflecting the diverse ethnic groups from which they have descended. Approximately seventy-two per cent of the popula-

tion speak German or Germanic dialects, twenty per cent, French, six per cent, Italian, and one per cent, Romansch (see map on this page). German is spoken by the inhabitants of the north, east, and central parts of the country. French is spoken in the western part and Italian mainly by the inhabitants of the canton Tessin. Some 45,000 inhabitants of the mountainous and relatively isolated southeastern canton of Graubünden speak Romansch. The Swiss government is trying to preserve this language, and in 1937 it was made the fourth national language of the country. In some places the French-German language boundary is surprisingly sharp, as in the city of Freiburg, where the lower part of the town is German-speaking and the upper part is French-speaking.



In spite of four languages, the Swiss state constitutes a strong political unit. No language is legally more important than the others. All laws and public notices are printed in three languages, and in the Parliament each speaker may use his native tongue. In order to maintain this equality of languages, all Swiss children must learn in school at least one language other than that spoken at home. In addition to native languages many Swiss have become familiar with English in order to facilitate the tourist industry. Signs of interest to foreign


visitors frequently are printed in German, French, Italian, and English

**RELIGIONS**—Diversity in languages never led to the dissensions and bitterness that grew out of religious differences. Switzerland, like other Christian European countries, was Roman Catholic down to the period of the Protestant Reformation that originated with Martin Luther (1483–1546) in Germany. The Reformation spread to Switzerland, first taking hold in Zurich under the leadership of a former Catholic priest, Ulrich Zwingli. By 1523, Protestantism had secured a hold in most of the city cantons. A few years later another reformer, John Calvin (from France), established himself at Geneva, and his religious doctrine gained acceptance in many other countries. Thus Zurich and Geneva both gained fame as religious centers.

Not all the Swiss, however, accepted Protestantism and from the sixteenth to the middle of the nineteenth century Switzerland was torn by religious quarrels and cantonal strife, and even by civil war which almost caused disintegration of the Confederacy. At times there were in fact two confederacies, one Protestant and the other Catholic, but the desire for freedom from external influences enabled the union to be re-established. Religious fires eventually burned out and in the nineteenth century an era of tolerance emerged. Since the adoption of the Federal Constitution of 1848, which included the guarantee of full religious liberty, harmony has prevailed.

There is no regional correlation between language and religion (see map on this page). Many German-speaking cantons are dominantly Roman Catholic, and many French-speaking ones adhere to Protestantism. Protestants, who comprise approximately fifty-eight per cent of the population, are predominant chiefly in Zurich, Bern, Waadt, Neuchâtel, and Basel. The Roman Catholics, who compose forty-one per cent of

the population, are dominant in the forest cantons of the Alps, Wallis, Tessin, Freiburg, and Luzern. However, no canton is completely Protestant or Catholic, and over a period of time there has been much intermixture of faiths, with resulting shifts in the religious zones.



**FOREIGN GROUPS**—A perennial problem confronting the Swiss is the large number of aliens within the country. Prior to 1914 foreigners formed fifteen per cent of the population, and although it has gradually declined by one half the percentage of foreigners is still one of the highest in Europe. Germans, Italians, French, and Austrians form the largest foreign groups, and are most numerous along the border cantons. Natural kinship ties and the lack of legal restrictions attracted the immigrants to these cantons. Since it is urban workers from other countries who generally migrated for occupational reasons, it is natural that the Swiss cities received the great majority of the immigrants. In certain cities these migrants make up as much as one third of the population, and in several valleys of Tessin they actually form a majority. The influx of aliens has not created in Switzerland the traditional European problem posed by minorities. Most of the immigrants enter upon useful employment and are easily assimilated in their cantonal communities.

The diversity of Swiss cultural heritage also expedites the process of absorption. As a result, irredentism posed no great danger to Switzerland in World War II. Naturalization is gradually reducing the proportion of alien residents, a process which is slow, however, owing to the high costs involved in securing Swiss citizenship.

### ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

**AGRICULTURE**—Approximately 22.5 per cent of the area of Switzerland is unproductive. Adverse climate, poor soil, and steep slopes have made it necessary to leave about ten per cent of the total land area in forest growth and forty-five per cent in Alpine meadows and grasslands. Of the three major regions of Switzerland, the relatively low Swiss Plateau has the lowest percentage of waste land, and it is here that agriculture is most intensively developed.

For the country as a whole less than twenty per cent of the land is arable. Other than on the Swiss Plateau the raising of crops is largely confined to several low-lying valleys of the Jura Mountains and the Rhône Valley, which have the most favorable conditions. Dairying and forestry are the dominant activities of the people in the Jura, although there are many vineyards on the southeastern slopes. Dairying, forestry, and a flourishing tourist industry distinguish the Alpine region.

Pastoral activities are common to all regions in Switzerland, but contrary to general belief the greatest number of dairy cattle is in the plateau region and not in the Alps. The interesting practice of driving cattle up the mountain sides in spring and down again in autumn (called "transhumance") enables the Swiss to utilize pastures on the Alpine slopes during the warm season when they are free from snow.

Owing to her relatively small arable acreage Switzerland is not self-sufficient in food supplies. Despite great pastoral ac-

tivities there is a serious deficiency in meat, for the greater proportion of the cattle are dairy breeds. Moreover, two thirds of the required grain must be imported. During World War II shipping was at a premium the world over and rationing of food was being practiced in all the Allied countries. Switzerland, therefore, was obliged to make fundamental changes in her agricultural program. She more than doubled grain and vegetable production and greatly increased the number of livestock and poultry. She thus hoped to diminish her dependence on imported foodstuffs. By her efforts she became almost sixty per cent self-sufficient in foods. Further to insure the flow of foodstuffs from abroad Switzerland created a merchant marine with registry of the vessels at Basel on the Rhine. Because of continued international tension since the war, the Swiss have maintained their high level of agricultural production, even though it involves the granting of government subsidies to the farmers.

When it again became possible—after the war—to import grain cheaply, Switzerland greatly reduced the acreage devoted to grain crops and also to vineyards, and greatly increased her production of vegetables, fruits, and dairy products. In these latter food items Switzerland is now almost self-sufficient, but she imports about two thirds of the grain required and a large proportion of meats.

**INDUSTRY**—A major resource that makes an industrial economy possible for Switzerland is the ability of the people rather than the possession of a bountiful physical landscape. Skilled workmanship, ingenuity, and boundless energy are mainstays of the country's enviable reputation in manufacturing prowess and quality production.

Deposits of coal are small and are located in remote areas. Moreover they are of such poor quality that they are of little importance. The country also lacks other useful

minerals, except building stone, sand, and clay. With such limited industrial resources Switzerland would seem destined to be a predominantly agricultural nation, nevertheless, about forty-five per cent of the people are engaged in industry, and in relation to its area and population Switzerland is one of the leading industrial (and commercial) nations of the world. The answer is to be found largely in the fact that Switzerland is blessed with a plentiful supply of potential waterpower, made available by heavy precipitation, snow-covered mountains, steep slopes, lakes, rivers, and streams.

Because nine tenths of all raw materials are normally imported, the Swiss cannot produce cheap goods that require much raw material in their manufacture. They must produce articles having a high value per unit of weight and thus sell their skill. As a result, Switzerland is famous for the manufacture of such commodities as fine watches, beautiful silk fabrics, high-grade cotton textiles, exquisite embroidery work, and electric motors.

While there has been a shift in the relative importance of some branches of industry—namely, a decline in the number of textile workers and an increase in the number of workers in the metal and chemical trades—the skill of the Swiss is still of major importance. Possession of the skills needed for the production of these goods is an outgrowth of Switzerland's policy of neutrality, a policy consistently followed since the sixteenth century. For this course led to the influx of refugees from neighboring countries who brought with them various crafts, such as watchmaking and silk weaving, for which Switzerland is world famous. Most of the country's manufactured goods are made for export, which is of primary importance to Switzerland in her effort to approach a balance of trade.

**TRANSPORTATION**—Railways, about ninety-six per cent of which are electrified, form the

backbone of Switzerland's transportation system (see map on page 351). Between Lake Geneva and Lake Constance main lines operate to link Western with Eastern Europe. Traverse lines tie in most of the towns and cities of the plateau. Elsewhere, rail lines are less numerous because of difficult topography. Main through-lines joining northern with southern Europe follow traverse valleys, climb over passes, and wind through tunnels. Over these railways Switzerland imports her food supplies and raw materials, and exports her manufactured goods. Where rail lines are lacking, the Swiss have constructed highways connecting one valley with another, including the famous Alpine postal routes, so that no town or village is really isolated except during the winter season of heavy snows.

Already before World War II an air transportation network over Europe was well developed—and in this development Switzerland played an active part; but in the postwar era this form of transportation has far surpassed all previous progress. At present both Zürich and Geneva are top-ranking air centers, with service not only to European points, but to the United States and the Far East. The Swiss national airline, Swissair, is prominent in schedules to and from the two air centers of the country, operating to New York and the Middle East as well as to numerous European cities. Tourist appeal in Switzerland adds to the frequency of service enjoyed by both Zürich and Geneva. It is interesting to note, however, that air schedules within Switzerland are nonexistent. Flights between Zürich and Geneva and from these cities to Bern have not in the past proved successful. Short distances and fast railway schedules rather than mountainous terrain have discouraged air service within the country.

**TRADE**—Switzerland ranks high among the countries of the world in international trade. Since Switzerland must import food for her

people and raw material for her industries, the country normally has an unfavorable balance of trade. Value of imports generally exceeds value of exports by fifteen to twenty per cent.<sup>7</sup>

The participation of the United States and Western European countries in Switzerland's foreign commerce far surpasses that of Eastern Europe and other areas. The United States is Switzerland's leading trade partner, followed by Germany, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom. These five countries together account for over sixty per cent of Switzerland's foreign trade. Before World War II about eighteen per cent of the nation's commerce was with Eastern European countries, but postwar trade with that section amounts to only five per cent of total exports and 4.3 per cent of total imports. Some of this trade with East Europe is designed to discharge Swiss funds which were expropriated in enemy states during World War II.

The generally unfavorable balance incurred by Switzerland is partly offset by foreign investments, banking and insurance services, and, especially, the tourist industry. The latter is so well developed that it normally attracts tens of thousands of visitors annually.<sup>8</sup>

#### INTERNATIONAL POSITION

**POLICY OF NEUTRALITY**—It is often stated that only large, powerful states can shape an active foreign policy and that small states, like bits of flotsam, are tossed about on the tide of great-power politics. Such has not been entirely the case with Switzerland.

<sup>7</sup> Only in 1945 and 1953 was the balance of trade favorable. In 1954 imports were 5.7 per cent higher than exports

<sup>8</sup> No accurate figures are available to show the annual income derived from the Swiss tourist industry. The United States Department of Commerce estimated that in 1952 American tourists alone spent over \$21,000,000.

For centuries Switzerland was a military power of considerable importance and its aggressive moves to the west and into northern Italy netted additional territory. Only after their defeat in 1515 did the Swiss adopt a policy of neutrality as a price of survival as an independent state.

Several factors strengthened Swiss determination to avoid the pitfalls of participation in Europe's traditional struggles and to chart a course of noninvolvement and isolation. Internally, religious schisms weakened the country and, in the sixteenth century, forced it to withdraw from international conflicts. The ill effects of internal turmoil continued to engrave the maxim of noninvolvement deeply into Swiss national consciousness. Geographic location, its landlocked position, and smallness of size all combined to make neutrality extremely useful and necessary to Swiss needs and interests. At the same time external powers came to accept the neutral policy of Switzerland as most beneficial to themselves. Since the country sat astride the invasion routes between west and east Europe, it was a bastion which neither antagonist would allow the other to dominate or occupy.

The dangers of perpetual neutrality in the twentieth-century world stem from several sources. The powers that guaranteed Swiss neutrality insisted during World War I that their recognition of this status depended on its observance by other belligerents. This interpretation Switzerland rejected as incompatible with true neutrality. The Swiss government has in fact relied on armed neutrality as the best guarantee of noninvolvement in times of danger. During both world wars Switzerland maintained trade contacts with both coalitions because of its dependence upon outside trade; by maintaining friendly contacts abroad, however, Switzerland exposes herself to a charge of lack of impartiality and to the danger of reprisals.

These hazards are overshadowed by more serious problems of the mid-twentieth cen-

ture. The revolution in the technology of warfare, especially the development of atomic weapons, has shattered the almost impregnable Alpine security that once safeguarded Swiss neutrality. It is now possible for an aggressor to subdue a small country despite the valor of its army or the vigilance of its militia. The harsh fact is that Switzerland no longer enjoys the locational advantage of a buffer state. It is true that the country escaped the ravages of the two world wars but this fortune was due less to Swiss neutrality than to the advantages that a neutral state offered to both contestants; for Switzerland afforded both antagonists opportunities for diplomatic intrigue and for the exchange of prisoners and the advantage of neutral mediation in certain types of disputes.

Whatever may be true about the strength of modern weapons, the fact remains that in the world today the economic interdependence of nations makes the concept of neutrality incompatible with reality. Between the two wars the very dependence of Swiss prosperity upon foreign trade forced an adjustment in Switzerland's interpretation of collective action as a member of the League of Nations. The great powers themselves gave Switzerland special dispensations and in The Declaration of London in 1920 excused it from any obligation to undertake military action in case of League action against an aggressor. Not only that, but in the Italo-Ethiopian dispute during the 1930's Switzerland refused to distinguish between the belligerents and applied sanctions to both sides. This the Council of the League also endorsed, thus reaffirming Swiss belief in the virtues of absolute neutrality. Neither risks, incongruities, nor the powerful political transformations within Europe's balance of power system has shaken Swiss faith in neutrality. So deeply rooted is it that the contradictory concepts "neutrality and solidarity" express the spirit of Swiss outlook toward the world order.

WORLD OUTLOOK—Swiss neutrality is in no sense to be equated completely with isolationism or to be construed as a total rejection of the outside world. Rather its aim is directed toward peaceful cooperation in times of peace and "armed watchfulness" in times of war. Pointed illustration of this is evident in the number of international organizations situated in this Alpine state. Geneva, as the site of the old League of Nations, now accommodates in its halls several agencies of the United Nations. Switzerland as headquarters for the International Red Cross has long given its support to humanitarian causes. During both world wars this neutral state cared for wounded prisoners of war, inspected prison camps for belligerent parties, and during World War II extended temporary asylum to some 80,000 refugees.

In the post-World War II period Swiss statesmen have worked actively in the reconstruction of Europe and for world peace. However, a careful distinction is drawn between economic cooperation and political schemes that involve military alliances or commitments incompatible with a neutral or nonpartisan position. Switzerland cooperated with the Marshall Plan and has participated in the OEEC designed for the economic betterment of Europe, but it has eschewed the Mutual Security program, under which the United States extended military assistance to its friends and allies. Likewise, Switzerland is not a member of NATO, nor has it expressed interest in the European Defense Community scheme of its neighbors. The desire to preserve its sovereignty has kept Switzerland from membership in the Council of Europe—an experiment in European integration exceeding military arrangements *per se*. Most ironical is the fact that this peaceful neutral is not even a member of the United Nations, although it does have membership in several associated agencies of the United Nations of a scientific or nonpolitical character. In

the struggle between the East and the West, Switzerland's policies fit within the framework of the Western world orbit, in its basic objective of preserving a democratic, free world order.

**DEFENSE**—A strong army and a firm belief in self-defense are the touchstones of Swiss foreign policy. Switzerland's military organization is adapted to its concept of freedom and democratic liberties. Both the central government and the cantons contribute toward the maintenance of a small but efficient army. Switzerland has a militia, rather than a large standing army. Each Swiss youth is obliged by law to start rifle practice when a schoolboy and at the age of twenty to enter military training for about three months. He must then serve for a period of two or three weeks each year for several years, with the possibility of being called to the colors for active duty during the time he is between eighteen and sixty years of age. Each militiaman keeps his military equipment at home and can be mobilized very quickly. In peacetime the active Swiss army consists of nine divisions of about 16,000 men each. In addition there are four mountain brigades, each consisting of about

12,000 men. Men of the mountain brigade are especially trained for high-mountain fighting to prepare them for the defense of strategic positions in the Alps. The Swiss mobilization of 1939, which called up 650,000 men, was completed in two days.

Switzerland has expended huge sums of money on fortifications in the Alps, the Jura, and along the Rhine frontier. During World War II, antiaircraft batteries were scattered all over the country, and they fired on both Axis and Allied aircraft. Tunnels, mountain railroads, and strategic places were mined, and barbed-wire entanglements were erected around lake shores to aid in preventing possible lake landings. Changing methods of warfare and experience gained during the past war have caused the Swiss to re-evaluate their military program. The new armament program is designed to close the gaps existing in their present defense system and to modernize their military units, thus making their army a more mobile unit. As the plateau is perhaps the weakest line of defense and normally open to an east-west drive, protective measures are being strengthened in this sector. Through these military preparations the Swiss seek to implement their national aspirations of neutrality.

## LIECHTENSTEIN

Liechtenstein, a tiny remnant of feudal Europe with a total area of sixty-five square miles, lies between Switzerland and Austria. Most of the 19,000 inhabitants are German in origin and speech and embrace the Roman Catholic faith. Although much of its terrain is mountainous, its interests are chiefly agricultural.

The Principality of Liechtenstein was founded in 1719 and formed part of the Holy Roman Empire. From 1806 to 1815 it was

included in the Rhine Confederation and later was part of the German Confederation. Since 1866 the little state has been independent, and since 1867 it has had no army. Until 1919 Liechtenstein was closely allied with Austria, but in 1921 it adopted Swiss currency, and since 1924 it has been included in the Swiss Customs Union. Today Switzerland administers both its postal and its telegraph systems.



### Study Questions

1. How have present-day great-power relationships affected Switzerland?
2. Has the Swiss concept of neutrality changed since the policy of neutrality was first established?
3. How does Switzerland's trade position in relation to Eastern European countries compare with that in relation to Western European countries?
4. What recent changes have taken place in the Swiss agricultural program?
5. Have there been any recent changes in the nature of Swiss industries?
6. How is industrial development expressed in the trend toward urbanization?
7. What cantons formed the nucleus of the early Swiss Republic? In what part of Switzerland are they located?
8. What is the average density of population in each of the various physiographic regions?
9. Why is Switzerland a country of four languages? How great a handicap to unity is this multilingual characteristic?
10. Is there any similarity in the maps of religion and language? Explain.
11. What degree of self-sufficiency does Switzerland enjoy in the production of foodstuffs?
12. Is Switzerland dominantly an agricultural or an industrial nation?
13. How does Switzerland try to offset her unfavorable balance of trade?
14. What physiographic characteristics do Zurich, Luzern, and Geneva have in common?
15. Account for the efficient railway pattern in a country as mountainous as Switzerland.

## *The German Realm*

The German ethnicum<sup>1</sup> occupies that strategic pivotal area of Europe upon which hinges the western Mediterranean extremity of the Eurasian continent. The inhabitants are wedged between Catholics speaking a variety of Romance languages and various groups of Slavic people of the great Eurasian plain, most of whom used to be followers of the Byzantine-rite Eastern Orthodox Church. Presently all of the latter have been absorbed either directly by the USSR or indirectly by its satellites. The Germans themselves are Teutons who since early times have inhabited and controlled most of Central Europe.

Though the German people have played a tremendously significant role in Western civilization, they have been singularly unsuccessful in establishing a single political organization encompassing all the German peoples. The nearest approach to such a state was Hitler's Third Reich, which crashed in defeat in May, 1945. Even the Third Reich, however, did not include the Swiss-

German group, which, having gained its independence from the German rulers centuries ago, has developed a Swiss nationality so distinctive in itself that it cannot be considered as belonging to a German political organization. Excluding Switzerland the Germans today are divided into three political bodies: West Germany, East Germany, and Austria (see map on page 365).

The two Germanies are not *de jure* products of the late war, independent Austria, however, is. The intent of the Allies in World War II was the defeat of Hitler and Nazism and the liberation of Austria, but not the division of Germany. The division is the *de facto* situation that has arisen from the quarrels of the erstwhile Allies and from the ensuing Cold War. In this chapter we shall discuss: (1) A *united* Germany as it developed prior to World War II; (2) the *two* Germanies—West and East—as they exist today; and (3) Austria. Although it was intended that there should be but one Germany following the war, its area was to have been smaller than that of Hitler's Germany.

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
<sup>1</sup> Ethnicum is the area occupied by an ethnic group.

According to the best estimate it was to occupy three fourths of the area of the Third Reich of 1937.<sup>2</sup>

The major portion of the territory lost by Germany is in the east, where a radical boundary change places the new Polish border along the Oder and Neisse rivers. Among other things, the westward shift of this boundary eliminated East Prussia—the detached German area east of the troublesome Polish Corridor. Elsewhere boundary changes are far less radical. The most vexing question as to western boundary changes has been the problem of the Saar region—one of the important issues involved in the rapprochement of West Germany and France.

The area of West Germany is 96,300 square miles, with a population of 51,000,000 people. East Germany occupies 46,600 square miles and had, in 1954, a population of slightly over 17,000,000 persons. Austria occupies nearly 32,369 square miles with hardly 7,000,000 inhabitants. In the discussion of the *de jure* Germany in this chapter, its area will be considered to be that of Germany in

1937. It is in reference to the boundaries of 1937 that restoration of Germany as a state becomes meaningful today.



## DEUTSCHLAND (GERMANY)

### HISTORICAL FACTORS

**BEFORE UNIFICATION**—Germany was the last great power of Europe to achieve political

<sup>2</sup> The ratios of postwar Germany to prewar Germany have been evaluated as follows (based upon 100 per cent for the prewar area, as of January, 1938):

	Per cent
Area .....	76
Population .....	86
Rural population .....	80
Urban population .....	90
Industrial population .....	90
Industrial output .....	93
Steel production .....	97

L. A. Hoffman, "Germany: Zones of Occupation," *Department of State Bulletin*, XIV (April 14, 1946), 599-607.


unity and national existence. The dissolution of what remained of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806 had left the numerous German states in a chaotic condition, which, however, could not have been expected to last indefinitely; for Germany, a geographical entity, was eventually to become a national state. It was not until the close of the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71) that the German Reich, with the Prussian king William as its emperor, was established.

**POLITICAL UNIFICATION**—A unified Germany—a cohesive, geopolitical reality—appeared at a momentous time. On the continent no powers were left to match her. Defeated Austria, wedged within the Slavic pincers

and *Italia irredenta*,<sup>3</sup> needed the support of the Reich to maintain her own existence. Centuries of war undertaken to gain for her the domination of Europe had bled France and temporarily checked her power. Russia, a vast expanse of land, had not then developed industrially and was not strong

mainly preoccupied with internal problems of reconstruction. The Reich was thus born into a era of quiescent imperialism but, nevertheless, on the threshold of a sudden drive for overseas territories and influence.

The belated unification of Germany, however, proved to be a handicap in the eco-



enough to challenge the growth of the Reich. Britain could be counted as a potent foe, but her attentions were focused for the most part upon the economic and political consolidation of her far-flung empire. Across the Atlantic the United States had just emerged from a destructive civil war and was

<sup>3</sup> *Italia irredenta* (unredeemed Italy) referred to areas, primarily controlled by Austria and adjacent to Italian territory, in which the population was mainly Italian.

economic and political evolution of the Reich. This fact is an important geopolitical factor in the shaping of world events. The Reich's access to the North Sea was limited to a narrow zone between the base of the Jutland Peninsula and the northern coast of the Netherlands. Furthermore, Germany could not gain control of the outlet of her master stream, the Rhine. Finally, by the time the Reich began to attempt colonization outside of Europe, most of the suitable areas had

already been staked out by the other powers. All these factors played an important role in the subsequent political history of the Reich and of the world (see map on page 366).

#### LOCATION FACTORS

From the factor of location Germany has derived much of its potency as a political area in international affairs. Lying between 47° and 55° North Latitude, the country is in the general zone of cold temperate climate, just as is Canada. This high latitude, however, which of itself might adversely affect the growth of the Reich, is compensated for by other favorable factors. Germany is situated near the western edge of the largest land mass of the world, in the belt of the westerly winds, and near the coast washed by the warm Gulf Stream, thus the climate of Germany is relatively mild, particularly in the western sector of the country, and favorable to the German economy.

With reference to the Eurasian continental land mass, most of Germany occupies the western extension of the great interior lowland that stretches unbroken from the heart of Asia to the Atlantic. This lowland, offering the least resistance to the movement of people, had become one of the chief avenues of westbound migrations. In early times wave after wave of migrants pushed over this wide route into Europe. But by the middle of the thirteenth century, the westbound migration from Asia ebbed, and a reversal took place, which manifested itself in the slow reconquest by the Germans of the plain east of the Elbe. This eastward movement of the Germans culminated, in 1795, in the third partition of Poland. The eastward progress of the Germans suffered a setback at the end of World War I when Poland was given its independence. Hitler, however, reconquered Poland, and it was a part of the Reich till 1945. With Poland today a Soviet satellite and possessed of territory once an integral part of the Reich, we

see a reversal of the earlier development of Germany eastward and a resurgence of Slavic expansion toward the west.

Germany's location with respect to the ocean is a serious handicap: access to the open sea can easily be blocked in wartime, or under threat of war, at either the Strait of Dover or at the northern narrows of the enclosed North Sea, and its longer shore line is on the bottled-up Baltic. Mainly to overcome this handicap, the Germans built the Kiel Canal in 1895, cutting through the narrow neck of land at the German-controlled base of the Jutland Peninsula.

Germany, including the Saar, which rejoined the Reich by an overwhelming vote during the plebiscite in 1935, had slightly over 180,000 square miles in 1937. It was one of the largest European countries, though only two thirds the size of Texas. Thus, although the Reich counted as a large state in Europe, in world relations it was a small country. Awareness by the German leaders of the limitations imposed upon the state by its small area, in comparison with that of other world states and empires, led them to demand *Lebensraum* for Germany.

Not only the size but the frontiers of the Weimar Republic, after World War I, were unsatisfactory to the Germans. Neither on the east nor on the west was there a satisfactory natural boundary. Even in the southeast, where the Bohemian Mountains formed the border with Czechoslovakia, they had been penetrated by German groups and hence were not an ethnic boundary. The international boundary between Bavaria and Austria is of long standing, and the peoples on either side have become adjusted to its existence. The Swiss frontier, even if not an ethnic boundary, is a cultural one and therefore a logical one. The Franco-German frontier is one of those constantly shifting boundaries so common in Europe.

Though there is no general peace treaty involving all of Germany which defines its boundaries, the *de facto* boundaries based

upon the zones of occupation set up after World War II are much simpler than any boundaries which Germany had previously had. On the east, Germany is bounded by a relatively straight line running along the Oder and Neisse rivers and crossing the Oder at its mouth to include Stettin in Poland, under the name of Szczecin. The Soviet Zone between the Oder and Elbe rivers forms East Germany, roughly a quadrilateral area extending north from Czechoslovakia. West Germany, which was occupied by the Allies, is made up of the rest of pre-Hitler Germany, extending all the way to the Rhine.

#### PHYSICAL FACTORS

**TOPOGRAPHY**—The German land is characterized by two great topographic features: northern Germany forms a part of the broad Eurasian plain; central and southern Germany occupy a considerable portion of Europe's central uplands.

The physical features of the area of Germany bordering on the North and Baltic seas have both facilitated and retarded the development of the country. Rich fishing grounds and an abundance of wood, other forest products, and amber stimulated trade; the estuaries<sup>4</sup> and lagoons provided sheltered harbor sites; and the long streams furnished access to the hinterland. On the other hand, the marshy and wooded character of much of the land in northern Germany, along with the poor quality of the sandy soil, has greatly retarded the development of intensive agriculture. The area has proved more suitable for exploitation by large estates than by small peasant holdings.

A most significant factor in shaping the present topography of the plain was the recurrent continental glaciation. The glaciated surface of northern Germany, es-

pecially of the Baltic Zone, is dotted with lakes and has extensive heath and marshes. These, combined with dense forests, presented formidable barriers to the movement of an enemy and often served as a refuge for displaced people.

Southern Germany occupies the central portion of Europe's upland core, a region consisting of mountains, valleys, plateaus, and basins. It includes only a fringe of the Alpine system to the south, being confined mainly to the outer ring of older highlands that extends from the Central Plateau (Massif Central) of France through southern Germany to the Bohemian Mountains of Czechoslovakia. Among its major subregions, the rift valley of the Rhine and the Rhine Gorge have been significant in the historical development of Germany as well as of all of Western Europe. These two Rhineland areas formed the cradle land of the Germans. Together with the Rhône-Saône Valley, the Rhine Valley was the main avenue through which civilization spread from the Mediterranean into Europe.<sup>5</sup> Another significant subregion was the Alpine, or Bavarian, foreland dominated by the Danube. The Brenner Pass, leading northward to Innsbruck in the Austrian Tyrol and thence to Munich, was the chief link between the Mediterranean world and the German highlands.

The great diversity of the German area, caused by the physiographic structure of the land, tracts of infertile soils, dense forests, and the fourfold drainage system of the Rhine, Danube, Weser, and Elbe rivers, tended to divide human interests. In addition, the early rulers, centrally located in the highlands, tried to control the lowlands—the area between the North Sea-Baltic lowland, the Po Valley, and, to a lesser degree, the Rhône-Saône Valley. This ambitious

<sup>4</sup> An estuary is a drowned river mouth, caused by the sinking of the land near the coast.

<sup>5</sup> Griffith Taylor, *Environment and Nation* (The University of Chicago Press, 1936), pp. 64, 97, 189, 199, 206, 288, 318.

plan, however, failed and resulted only in their loss of control of the Mediterranean parts and in their diminished authority within the German realm.

The political separation of the true Alpine regions from the Reich does not mean that they are not inhabited to a considerable extent by German people. Starting roughly from a line drawn from Basel to the Simplon Pass and extending eastward, the people of the northern and central Alps are Swiss-German and Austro-German. This belt of population continues as far as the gateway between the Alps and the Carpathians in the northeast and the Dolomites and the middle Drava Valley in the south. Thus, German ethnic groups control the Simplon, St. Gotthard, and Brenner passes, leading to the northern Mediterranean. To the east they control the Vienna gateway on the Danube and the foothill route leading along the eastern edge of the Alps through the Peartree Pass into the Adriatic basin. The acquisition of the southern portion of this outlet by Italy and Yugoslavia, in 1919, removed the last vestiges of Germanic rule in the Mediterranean realm.

To the west, ever since the emergence of the French nation, German control of important passes and gateways on her western borders has been on the wane. These changes evidence a gradual displacement of German political and ethnic influences in the Mediterranean realm, which, in reverse, somewhat parallels the German expansion beyond the Elbe.

Whereas during the later days of the Holy Roman Empire, *Urdeutschland* (German homeland) focused on what is now southern Germany, especially the Rhineland, the center shifted to the Hapsburg domains of the Alpine lands. The unifying core of modern Germany, however, has evolved on the lowland, with Brandenburg as its heartland. Either by a slow process of peaceful acquisition or by conquest in war, the lowland became unified. The ultimate aim of the Nazi

rule was the continuation and completion of this process by a final unification of the Reich through a radical reorganization of the internal structure of the country and the inclusion of all contiguous ethnic groups of Germanic people outside the Reich; this would have achieved the organization of an all-inclusive, complete Germany.<sup>6</sup>

**CLIMATE**—The climate of Germany as a whole is stimulating and favorable for the development of a high level of civilization. The German winters are relatively mild. With the exception of Pomerania and East Prussia, all of Germany (1937 boundaries) has an average January temperature of 30° F. or higher. During the summer almost all of the country has an average temperature between 64° F. and 70° F. Along the western margin of Germany the frost period is about seventy days; at the eastern extreme it is 150. This contrast is especially significant in agricultural production. The longer growing season in the west permits the growth of valuable crops that would not ripen within the shorter growing period of the east.

The amount of precipitation varies from about forty inches in the west to twenty in the east. In the west the distribution is rather uniform throughout the year, with a high percentage of cyclonic precipitation. Toward the east a steady decrease in the percentage of precipitation in winter accompanies a decrease in the proportion of the cyclonic type. From the agricultural point of view, therefore, the east, both because of the shorter growing season and the smaller amount of precipitation, is less productive than the west.

**MINERALS**—In 1937 Germany was fortunate in having control of a large share of the carboniferous belt of Europe, lying just at the outer edge of the uplands and extending

<sup>6</sup> Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf* (Reynal and Hitchcock, 1939), p. 601.

from Belgium through Germany into Poland and Russia. The most important coal fields of Germany were in the Ruhr-Rhine region, the Saar basin,<sup>7</sup> and the Upper and Lower Silesian fields. Aside from coal, Germany had large deposits of lignite, which, because of a low carbon content, was inferior to bituminous coal. This low-grade fuel assumed a greater importance in Germany than in any other industrial nation, although its use was limited. Of the coal fields, the Ruhr region was by far the most important. Because of its excellent, strategic location on the Rhine and at the edge of the upland, this region has easy access to the sea, to the plain, and to the Lorraine iron ore farther up the Rhine. Its location, coupled with its coal mines, has made the Ruhr district the most highly industrialized spot in the world.

Thus Germany had coal, but with the exception of potash, was deficient in other mineral resources. Nitrates were produced on a large scale from the free nitrogen of the air. This production was carried on by means of the Haber process, a typical German ersatz invention necessitated by the blockade during World War I. The most serious loss incurred through the Versailles Treaty of 1919 was that of the Lorraine iron-ore deposits, which left the iron-and-steel industry of Germany overwhelmingly dependent upon foreign ore. The general lack of mineral resources has been a cardinal point in determining Germany's foreign economic and political policy. That policy was one of territorial expansion—more *Lebensraum*—and of world-wide trade expansion, until the German people should enjoy a political and economic realm that would afford them the same economic independence as that enjoyed by the United States and the British Empire. In final analysis this would mean the spoliation of neighboring states in

Europe and the acquisition of colonies in other continents.

#### HUMAN FACTORS

Although the population in Germany is homogeneous, there are definite differences among the various groups of which the nation is composed. The most striking difference is that between the south German and the Prussian groups. The cleavage is revealed in cultural traits, in religion, and in racial descent. The Prussians tend to be military-minded, Protestant, and Nordic; the south Germans are more easy-going, literary-minded, Catholic, and of the Alpine race with some admixture of the Mediterranean. South Germany once belonged to Rome, and Roman influence upon the culture and civilization there is discernible even today.

As the new German state emerged so did a new German—the “Westerner.” Reared in great industrial centers, such as the Ruhr, or in humming ports, such as Bremen or Hamburg, he reflected the spirit of the by-gone Hansa. International, often cosmopolitan, in his attitude, he was the antagonist incarnate of the provincial, narrow-minded Prussian landowner. He backed the moderate policy of restoring friendly ties with France and Britain.

Throughout the country the density of population is high. On the average, it amounts to 360 persons per square mile, with the industrial areas exceeding 500 and the Baltic glacial belt ranging between sixty and 125 persons per square mile. The dense population has exerted a heavy pressure upon the resources. Only through the most frugal use of their resources and commerce in a world of unhampered trade could the German people really hope to profit by their industry.

With disunity among German states persisting long after other nations had developed into strong cultural and political entities, the German people were bound by

<sup>7</sup> From 1919 to 1935 the Saar was under the jurisdiction of the League of Nations, and the mines were under French control.



conflicting loyalties. However, sectional division and loyalty slowly gave way to national loyalty, and the unity and existence of the Reich became an accepted fact. The emerged modern nationalism demanded the complete unification of *all* Germans into one national and political entity. The "Gross-deutsch" idea spread beyond Germany and assumed considerable strength even before 1918, especially in Austria. The prohibition in the peace treaties following World War I against a union of the two German states met severe and serious criticism, especially since both the Germans and the Austrians considered such a prohibition a flagrant violation of the Wilsonian principle of national self-determination.

Adolf Hitler justified his early foreign policy of aggrandizement with the contention that common blood belonged in a common Reich. After the collapse of Germany in May, 1945, this Hitlerian idea underwent some transformation in the hands of the victorious Allies. It was deemed advisable to eliminate German minorities in the new states created by the peace settlement in order to prevent recurrence of German irredenta demands. Thus German minorities were expelled from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Rumania. Almost 10,000,000 people were involved in this liquidation of the "Auslanddeutsche" problem. Whether or not such actions can be justified is debatable; but two facts are significant: first, that some German minorities who had lived for several centuries in other countries and had enjoyed the hospitalities of their hosts willingly became tools in the hands of Hitler; second, that for all practical purposes there are no such minorities left in the Soviet European satellites today.

#### ECONOMIC FACTORS

**AGRICULTURE**—Generally speaking, German agriculture is intensive, scientifically conducted, and productive—especially in the

west, where natural and economic conditions are most favorable; it is unquestionably one of the basic industries of the country. About two thirds of the land is devoted to agriculture, the remaining third being chiefly in forests. Of the agricultural land, about three fourths is under cultivation and one fourth is in pastures and meadows. The chief crops of Germany are forage, grain, and root crops. A third of the arable land is devoted to hay and a fourth to rye, chiefly in northern Germany, where soils are poor and sandy and the climate cool, wet, and cloudy. These conditions are also ideal for the growing of potatoes, in the production of which Germany leads all Europe. Potatoes are used in Germany principally for the manufacture of industrial alcohol. In southern Germany the leading crops are wheat and barley. Germany's most productive field crop is sugar beets. Minor crops include hops, tobacco, grapes, and fruits.

**INDUSTRIES**—Utilizing their human and material resources and taking advantage of a pivotal location, the Germans, after their unification in 1871, became so strongly industrialized that they seriously challenged the economic world domination of Great Britain. The expansion of manufacturing was based mainly upon resources found within the confines of the country in the period of the German Empire (1871–1918). Great coal fields served as the bases for the expansion of the iron-and-steel industry, especially in the Ruhr, the Saar, and Upper Silesia. This basic industry supplied the material for the machinery industry, for the manufacture of rails and rolling stock, for shipbuilding, and for other constructional industries.

A second development came partly from the utilization of the enormous potash deposits—largely as a source of fertilizer materials—and partly from the chemical industry. The effort of the Nazi regime to

make Germany more self-sufficient forced the German chemical industries into trying to find domestic substitutes for those things that Germany lacked. They developed a number of ersatz materials and subsequently became leaders in the creation and production of synthetics.

Because of the desire for efficient use of the lignite deposits, which could not bear the cost of transportation, lignite was used to generate electricity locally, and the current was distributed by a system of interlocking transmission lines. Germany became electrified to a large extent as a response to this technique, and there developed a high-ranking electrical industry.

After World War II Germany could hardly be reduced to a "pastoral level of existence." It possessed seventy per cent of Europe's coking coal reserves and normally produced twenty per cent of the metallurgical coke of the world, accounting for an iron-and-steel production amounting to one third of Europe's total. Its chemical industries were second only to those of the United States. In order to force Germany to provide its own livelihood, the Allied powers had to reverse their original policy and seriously encourage the re-establishment of German industry. Thus the industrial potential added greatly to the strategic importance of Germany and led, in part at least, in 1949, to the recognition of the West German Federal Republic by the Western Powers and, in 1955, to the invitation to West Germany to participate in Western economic and military organizations.

**TRANSPORTATION**—Germany's industrial development could not have taken place without an excellent transportation system. This system is a well-planned coordination of water and overland routes. There are 6,000 miles of rivers or canalized rivers and 1,400 miles of canals proper in use. About one fifth of Germany's merchandise, consisting

largely of iron ore, coal, and coke, moves on waterways.

The most important waterway, of course, is the Rhine, its traffic exceeding that of the entire Mississippi-Missouri system. In addition to the facilities for inland navigation, Germany built a strong merchant marine. After the collapse of the Third Reich the Germans were compelled, as they had been in 1918, to transfer their ocean vessels to the Allies. (Thus the luxury liner *Europa* became the French *Liberté*.) During the occupation the Allies prohibited the building of seagoing vessels.

Prior to World War II the German railroad system was excellent. Its density was 18.6 rail miles per 100 square miles of land and 5.6 rail miles for each 10,000 inhabitants—highest on the Continent. However, much of Germany's 34,000 miles of roadbed and a large proportion of her rolling stock were destroyed during the war. Owing to the ever-increasing use of highway and air transportation, there are no plans to rebuild all the destroyed trackage; but the rolling stock had, by 1953, been rebuilt to about seventy-five per cent of its 1936 level.

Really large-scale road building in prewar Germany began only with the rise of the Nazis to power. Most of the roads were built for military purposes, and they were excellent. Since the war the road-building and -repair program of West Germany has progressed satisfactorily. In 1951 there were 79,635 miles of roads, of which 1,320 miles were *Autobahnen* (superhighways), 15,132 miles were highways, and 30,780 miles were first-class roads. The balance belonged to the secondary-road category. There were almost 3,000,000 motor vehicles registered, including 1,400,000 motorcycles. Thus, in comparison with other countries of Europe, the use of trucks, buses, and passenger autos was relatively high, but greatly below that in the United States. Roads in East Germany form a relatively dense network, but



the superhighway system started there before World War II has not been finished.

### THE TWO GERMANIES

The political vacuum created by the unconditional surrender of Germany in 1945 could not exist for long. The victorious powers immediately established military governments in the four occupation zones—American, British, French, and Russian—into which Germany had been divided in 1944. At the Potsdam Conference in July, 1945, the powers agreed to retain the division of Germany into four zones but to treat Germany as a single economic unit and through the Allied Control Council shape a common plan that would lead to a unified Germany. In practice the Four Powers never agreed on the implementation of their objectives and inevitably allied unity was shipwrecked upon the rocks of the East-West controversy, in which Germany with its people and industrial potentialities was the prize. What could not be done in unison was done separately, and each side thereby established a Germany of its own creation. In 1948 the United States, Britain, and

France facilitated the formation of a German Federal Republic, with Bonn as its capital. In the East Zone at Berlin, Soviet authorities likewise established their model—the German Democratic Republic (see map on page 373 showing the two German states). Both East and West still talk about a treaty creating a reunited Germany, but the chances of concluding such a treaty in the near future seem most unlikely.

Despite the fact that a united nation has not yet legally emerged, the two Germanies are still one people and differ from each other only in having separate economic and political organizations. It is probably safe to predict, however, that if the Soviets continue to dominate East Germany a few years longer, the difference between the two sectors will become basic; while West Germany will be an integral part of Western Europe, East Germany will be completely sovietized. In West Germany democratic ideas seem to have taken root. With the aid of the Western Allies, especially of the United States, the West Germans have recovered rapidly from the devastations of the war and have become the strongest and most prosperous among the European nations.

### BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND (FEDERAL REPUBLIC GERMANY)

The name given officially to West Germany is in itself significant. By preserving the name *Deutschland* (Germany) rather than call the state *Deutsche Bundesrepublik* (German Federal Republic), the West Germans have openly declared that it is the Federal Republic which is the legitimate successor of the previous Germanies. Hence the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) is a temporary unit under duress, but legally a part of Germany, to which they apply the term *Gesamtdeutschland* (total Germany). The fact that to the American mind such

hairsplitting in nomenclature may not mean much does not alter the reality that in the German situation the question of legality is a particularly important factor.

### POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

As already noted, the Allies never worked out a unified plan for postwar Germany; hence the four occupation zones in which military governments were established soon became airtight compartments. As early as 1945, Allied authorities encouraged self-

government and permitted local and state administrative organs to flourish under the supervision of military authorities. By 1946 Western authorities even endorsed the creation of a central German administrative machinery to provide a common approach to German problems. It was then a natural step to the convening of the constituent assembly and the adoption of a Constitution by the Bonn Assembly on May 8, 1949. Control of domestic affairs passed into German hands, while the Occupation Statute reserved to the Allies control of foreign affairs, disarmament, trade, and relations with Soviet authorities in Berlin.

The constitution adopted at Bonn created a Federal Republic which approached the structure of the Weimar government but in which considerable authority was vested in the *Länder*, or German states. To avoid the dangers of a strongly centralized state, the autonomy of the *Länder* is greater than that common to most other federal states (see table on this page for complete list of states of West Germany). The organization of the *Länder* is similar to that of the federal government, except that the German

states have no chief officers and operate with unicameral legislative bodies.

#### ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

With the formation of a West German government at Bonn, economic conditions improved to a remarkable degree. The Marshall Plan and the subsequent economic-assistance policies of the United States were of major importance in the rehabilitation of West Germany. By 1950 industrial production exceeded the 1936 level, and it continues to increase. In 1949, in order to allay the fears of France that Germany might regain its economic power through exploitation of the resources of the Ruhr, an International Authority (composed of the occupying powers, the Benelux countries, and West Germany itself) was set up. It placed restrictions on German rights in the Ruhr region; but in July, 1952, with the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (the Schuman Plan), all restrictions on German steel production were rescinded, and the International Authority gradually lost its control.

The States of the Federal Republic

Description and Name		Capital	Area (in sq. mi.)	Population (in thousands)
(German)	(English)			
Bundesland Baden-Württemberg <sup>a</sup>	Federated State Baden-Württemberg	Stuttgart	35,750	6,640 <sup>b</sup>
Freistaat Bayern	Free State of Bavaria	München (Munich)	70,549	9,185 <sup>c</sup>
Freie Hansestadt Bremen	Free Hansa City Bremen	Bremen	404	590 <sup>b</sup>
Freie & Hansestadt Hamburg	Free & Hansa City Hamburg	Hamburg	288	1,675 <sup>b</sup>
Land Hessen	Hesse	Wiesbaden	8,150	4,324 <sup>c</sup>
Land Niedersachsen	Lower Saxony	Hannover (Hanover)	47,310	6,797 <sup>c</sup>
Land Nordrhein-Westfalen	North Rhine-Westphalia	Düsseldorf	13,106	13,196 <sup>c</sup>
Land Rheinland-Pfalz	Rhineland-Palatinate	Mainz	19,828	3,142 <sup>b</sup>
Schleswig-Holstein	Schleswig-Holstein	Kiel	15,664	2,459 <sup>b</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Baden-Württemberg, combining the former states of Baden, Württemberg-Baden and Württemberg-Hohenzollern, was established on May 25, 1952, based upon a plebiscite held in March of the same year.

<sup>b</sup> 1952 estimate.

<sup>c</sup> 1950 census.

**FOREIGN TRADE**—The continued upgrade of industrial activity helped in the re-establishment of Germany's foreign trade. One of the chief items in the import trade is foodstuffs. The Federal Republic, although actually exceeding the level of agricultural production attained in 1936 in both crops and livestock, still needs to import half of its food requirements. The loss of East Germany has aggravated the food shortage, as is clearly indicated by the fact that, while in 1936 cereals accounted for only 1.1 per cent of the imports in West Germany, in 1948 they rose to twenty-eight per cent, and even in 1952 they amounted to twelve per cent. Raw materials form the second group of imports, accounting, in 1936, for 37.3 per cent of the total, but decreasing to 34.8 per cent in 1952. The export trade is dominated by industrial products, which represent 97.8 per cent of the value of all exports, with no appreciable change in the percentage distribution of exports between prewar and postwar years.

Though the items of foreign trade between 1936 and 1952 did not change to any great extent, the direction of trade underwent radical changes. The Federal Republic follows a Western orientation, which prevents her trading freely with the countries behind the Iron Curtain, some of which were previously good customers. In 1936 the United States, Canada, and the Marshall Plan countries supplied 46.6 per cent of West Germany's imports. This figure increased to 63.9 per cent in 1952. In the same period the satellite countries' share dropped from 16.6 per cent to five per cent. Imports from Russia shrank from fourteen per cent to none at all. The picture is similar in the case of exports. To compensate for the loss of Eastern trade, the percentage of exports to the United States and Brazil doubled, and exports to Marshall Plan countries increased from 53.2 to 62.8 per cent.

## CITIES AND PEOPLE

Though the political situation improved and economic conditions rose beyond the levels of 1936, not everything developed satisfactorily. The losses in urban population are large, but not until the ruins are cleared away and the reconstruction of housing facilities is completed can one expect substantial metropolitan growth. At the present time, in the combined areas of East and West Germany there are eleven cities with a population of more than 500,000, and there are more than forty others with 100,000 or more inhabitants (see table on page 377 for a list of metropolises).

The refugee problem presents another difficulty. The *Auslanddeutsche* question<sup>3</sup> has been settled, but not so the problem of refugees from East Germany. The federal government permits only those whose lives had been endangered in East Germany to enter legally. Yet, even as late as 1952, 287,000 East Germans migrated into West Germany, if one can call that dangerous undertaking of breaking through the closed frontier "migration." About seven per cent of these immigrants consisted of released POW's from the USSR and Germans expelled from those parts of the country in the east which were annexed by Poland and the USSR. No less than 77.5 per cent of the population increase of West Germany between 1946 and 1952 was the result of the in-migration of refugees! In absolute figures the population increased from 40,780,000, in 1946, to 48,306,000, in 1952, or by 7,929,000 persons; of these, 6,142,000 represented the net number of refugee in-migrants.

<sup>3</sup> German minorities residing outside the borders of the Third Reich, particularly to the east and south, were in the course of World War II resettled within frontiers of the German state.

## German Metropolises

City	Population (in thousands)		Gain + and Loss —	Location	Primary Functions
	Prewar	1950			
Berlin	4,332	3,337	—995	North German Plain	Capital and leading metropolitan center
West Berlin	—	2,147 <sup>a</sup>	—		
East Berlin	—	1,190	—		
Federal Republic					
Hamburg	1,682	1,606	— 76	North German Plain— Lower Elbe Valley	Leading German port
Munich (Munich)	828	832	+ 4	Bavarian Plateau	Bavarian capital and leading city of southern Germany
Köln (Cologne)	768	595	—173	Rhineland	Transportation center
Essen	660	605	— 55	Ruhr District	Steel (Krupp Works)
Frankfurt-am-Main	547	532	— 15	Rhineland	Central manufacturing
Dortmund	542	507	— 35	Ruhr District	Industrial center
Düsseldorf	541	501	— 40	Ruhr District	Industrial center
Stuttgart	480	500 <sup>b</sup>	+ 20	Bavarian Plateau	Industrial center
Democratic Republic					
Leipzig	702	608 <sup>c</sup>	— 94	Saxony	Trading and publishing center; fairs
Dresden	625	468 <sup>c</sup>	—157	Saxony	Rail center and Elbe River port, in vicinity Meissen the famous porcelain center

SOURCE: *Demographic Yearbook*, 1952. United Nations.<sup>a</sup> 1952 estimate.<sup>b</sup> Estimated figure.<sup>c</sup> 1946 estimate.DEUTSCHE DEMOKRATISCHE REPUBLIK (GERMAN  
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC)

The German Democratic Republic (DDR) is another of the puppets of the USSR. In the fall of 1946, after the East-West split, an election was held and a constitution adopted declaring that "the self-governing community is the basis of the democratic order." Even in these early days the Soviet Military Administration (SMA) pushed the *Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands* (SED) <sup>a</sup> into dominant position.

<sup>a</sup> Social Unity Party, a coalition of the Communist party and the Social Democrats.

## POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

With the formation of the DDR in 1949, the sovereignty of which was fully recognized by the USSR, in May, 1954, a completely centralized government was established. A "constitutional reform" was passed by the party conference of the SED in 1952. Although it preserved outward democratic forms, it completed the abolition of any real democratic government, the secret ballot, and the *Länder* (East German states) as political units. In the place of these civil divisions

a Soviet type of government was established with an exceedingly strong centralization of power. Fourteen *Bezirke* (districts) replaced the *Lander*. Besides the central ministry and the praesidium, the district councils, the *Kreis* (subdivisions of the districts) councils, and community councils were supposed to govern the country, but actually the SED controls East Germany.

#### ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

With the end of the war in 1945 the Allies were determined to prevent the use of German industry for military production. As the Western Powers agreed in 1946 to permit the retention in Germany of the industrial capacity sufficient to produce one half of the output for 1938, industrial plants were dismantled and production was cut back. In the USSR Zone, however, the Russians were fully intent on exacting reparations by removal of capital equipment and goods out of current production. The Russians took forty-five per cent of machinery and ship-building equipment, forty-three per cent of precision machinery and optical products, forty-one per cent of electrical equipment, thirty-five per cent of diesel oil production, and thirty-one per cent of the gasoline. Finally in 1951 the USSR determined that the balance of reparations due to them was \$3,170,000,000 and divided it into fifteen yearly payments. As a result of these measures ten per cent of East Germany's annual production goes into reparations. Added to these drains on her economy is the cost of the occupying army. After East Germany was recognized as a sovereign republic by the USSR, the occupying forces were still kept there for—according to the Russians—"defense" purposes.

Owing to depreciation of their currency and other handicaps, industrial production in East Germany fell far below 1936 levels—to 42 in 1946, with 1936 = 100. Not until 1951 did it rise to 97. In 1952 it reached

109, thus exceeding prewar levels. East Germany lacks high quality coal, iron ore, and other industrial raw materials. It is further handicapped by the low productivity of the miners who produce per capita only 130 tons of coal per annum in contrast with 230 tons per man employed in 1936. The demand for iron and steel products prompted the Russians, in 1949, to return three dismantled steel rolling mills which they earlier had taken from Germany. Increased output of iron and steel products received primary attention in the first East German five-year plan.

**FOREIGN TRADE**—Strained international relationships adversely affect East Germany's foreign trade. Natural markets in the West are almost completely shut off. The main items of export are fertilizers, coal and coke briquettes, machinery, and textiles. Imports consist of foodstuffs, raw materials, metal goods, and chemicals. As a counterbalance to the Marshall Plan the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance was established by the USSR in 1949 and East Germany joined this Council in 1950. As a result the country's economy became fully integrated with the overall Soviet economy and the various five year plans.

#### CITIES AND PEOPLE

By the boundary lines established after World War II, several important industrial centers were left outside East Germany. These included Breslau and the three large Baltic ports of Stettin, Danzig, and Königsberg (the latter city going to the USSR; the others to Poland). Berlin itself was divided between the Soviets and the Western Allies, and today East Germany has only the poorer section of this once famous city. Of other cities of metropolitan size East Germany retains only Leipzig and Dresden.

The population of East Germany is less than before the war, even though augmented



by refugees and repatriates from beyond the Oder-Neisse areas. This decrease results, as discussed previously, from the large-scale migration into West Germany. Except for "protective" USSR forces and hosts of Rus-

sian officials the population now is practically all German, this is explained by the fact that the new boundary between Germany and Poland lies well within the German ethnicum.

## THE SAARGEBIET

The Saar area covers just under 1,000 square miles and has a German-speaking population of about a million. It became a bone of contention in 1918 when the Saar was transferred from Germany to the League of Nations' political control and to France's economic control. Its plebiscite in favor of returning to Germany in 1935 was one of Hitler's few bloodless victories. At the end of World War II in 1945 France took over not only the control of the Saar mines but the political control of the area as well. In 1947 the Saar area, enlarged by eighty-one annexed German communities, received a "constitution," according to which the Saargebiet was declared to be autonomous and independent from Germany. Economically the area became a part of France.

The significance of this small area lies in its great coal deposits and in its flourishing iron and steel mills. In this respect the Saar complements France, which is poor in coal and rich in iron ore. From an economic point of view France's aspiration to control this region could be justified. But the area is German; unlike Alsace-Lorraine, it never had been a part of France. Even after 1918

the Saar was under the League of Nations rather than France, and with a definite time limit established for holding a plebiscite to decide its fate. It was decided that despite the acceptance of economic unity with France the area's political independence would be maintained and the final disposition of the matter would be settled by the German peace treaty.

By the Saar Convention of 1950 France took over the Saar coal mines for fifty years and assumed the responsibility for the defense and diplomatic representation of the Saar state; right was also reserved to intervene in the area's internal affairs. Inevitably a pro-French government took over in the Saar Republic and opposition parties were suppressed. Naturally this state of affairs was unpopular with the inhabitants, a majority of whom are Germans. The 1955 (negative) vote against placing the Saar under international control left no doubt as to the unpopularity of French dominance in the Saar. In view of the aggravated relations, both France and Germany agreed in 1956 to a political integration of the Saar with Germany within a period of three years.

## ÖSTERREICH (AUSTRIA)

### HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE

Ever since its foundation in 1918 the Republic of Austria has never quite recaptured its historic importance as a power in Europe

and as the center of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire. Three major geographical factors underlie Austria's history. First is its central location on the continent. Austria, particularly the Vienna Basin, is the most


centrally located area on the European peninsula. The second factor is its Danubian location. After World War I there was considerable thought given to the concept of setting up a unified structure among the Danubian countries. This theory was mainly advocated by German geopoliticians as a revival of the earlier *Drang nach Osten* (push toward the east) policy; it was put forward to justify German aspirations during the Hitlerian regime to gain control of southeastern Europe. It took the late Paul Teleki, the Hungarian geographer, to point out that the scheme of Danubian federation goes against national sentiments, but that there is a "Valley Europe" along the mighty stream—a route over which conflicting ideas, peoples, and armies have moved since time immemorial.

The implications of Austria's central location are apparent at least in one phase of Austria's history. In the Christian era Austria as *Ostmark* (East March) was twice established, once by Charlemagne against the Avars and a second time by Otto the Great against the Magyars. After the latter event it remained an eastern bulwark until the Hapsburgs attained imperial dignity, and in the effort of enhancing their family domains, wrested *Ostmark* from Ottocar, the Czech king, who in the thirteenth century had extended his rule over it. Hence Austria became the family dominion of the Hapsburgs and with their ascendancy the aspirant leader in the creation of a Germanic state. Its function as an *Ostmark* was again demonstrated during the repeated Turkish sieges of Vienna, where the invading armies marched along the Danubian route toward their hoped-for conquest of Christendom. Twice they besieged the city, but each time were driven back from this outpost of the West.

The Vienna Basin is not only a part of the Danube Valley but also lies on the great route which runs from the North European Plain via the Moravian Gate and Morava

Valley through the Basin itself and the Semmering Pass into the Po Valley and the Adriatic. The crossing of the north-south and east-west routes in the European heartland greatly emphasized the nodality of Austria. Ottocar tried to establish a strong central empire from the fortress-like Bohemian Plateau, controlling not only the Moravian Gate but also most of Austria, particularly the east-west Danubian way and the trans-alpine routes leading southward to the Adriatic. Rudolph of Hapsburg, with the aid of Hungary, defeated the Czechs, and Ottocar himself was slain in the battle. After three centuries of struggle the Hapsburgs finally succeeded in bringing Bohemia and the Moravian Gate securely under their rule and laid the foundation for the emergence—in the second half of the nineteenth century—of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Although the Austrians (a German people) and the Hungarians (Magyars) were distinct racially, the merger was a realization of the fact that this whole area, which is the juncture of the Danubian route and the north-south Moravian route, is logically a geographical unit (see map on page 381).

The third geographic factor affecting the history of Austria is the fact that, though it has a strong central location as far as the continent is concerned, it is peripheral to well-defined physical and cultural regions on the European peninsula. Austria occupies the outer ranges and part of the foreland of the great Alpine system, which delimits the northern border of the Mediterranean realm; it is at the southern and eastern extremities of the old, worn-down mountain and plateau system in Central Europe; and finally it forms the westernmost of the great basins of the Danubian "Valley Europe," leading to the Black Sea and through the Caspian Sea into Asia. Culturally Austria is on the northern margin of Catholic Mediterranean Europe. This southeastward extension of the Germanic peoples represents a splitting wedge which acts to divide the



Slavs into a northern and a southern branch; to the east of this wedge is the alien Magyar nation.

The history of the area reflects the above-mentioned locational influences. During Roman times the Danube was the *Limes* of the Empire. Austria was the northern bulwark of Mediterranean culture and the Roman Empire with Vindobona (Vienna) an important fortress guarding the southward-leading routes against potential barbaric invasion. Under the Hapsburgs Österreich was not able to serve as a nucleus of an effective German unification. Combined with the Hungarian Basin, it formed the basis of an effective economical organization which, however, was torn asunder by the peripheral qualities of the region and the nationalist tendencies that beset the area with its culturally diversified inhabitants.

Thus, in the past, Austria existed as one of Central Europe's geopolitical realities, but, since 1918, shorn of all her potentialities, the Republic has existed on a negative basis. It lost control of the Morava Valley-Moravian Gate route. The large regional economy of

which Vienna was the nerve center was shattered. The infernally ingenious adjudication of the western margin of Hungary to Austria made political and economic co-operation between the two Danubian countries impossible. This discordant element, together with the French-sponsored prohibition of union with Germany, left Austria the most aimless of European countries. Mussolini, before his collaboration with Hitler, guaranteed Austria's independence as a buffer against Germany and as a wedge which split the alliance that France had forged around Italy's protégé Hungary. Under Italian advice and pressure, the problem of Burgenland (former Hungarian territory) was shelved, and Austria and Hungary took up friendly relationships.

Hitler finally overcame Mussolini's suspicions about German aims and, after the Axis had been established, could with impunity march into Austria and absorb Österreich into the Greater German Reich. The area was needed by Hitler as part of a pincer to crush Czechoslovakia and also as a transit road toward Hungary and the Balkans.

Thus Austria, instead of being a bulwark of protection, became, in the hands of Hitler, a vantage point in his unification plans for all of Europe.

### ECONOMIC ASPECTS

Aside from the international political problems Austria faces serious economic challenges. One of them is the result of the mountainous character of the country which not only reduces the available arable land but has some unfavorable climatic effects, such as the reduction of the length of the growing season, excessive rainfall on the windward slopes and too little on the leeward slopes, heavy snow cover, and unfavorable winds. On the other hand, the natural environment offers a large potential water power, some of which has already been developed, mineral resources, and fine forests; it also accounts for the lucrative winter and summer tourist industry. An important effect of the mountains is the focusing of major routes, such as the Brenner and Peartree passes, and the Inn and Enns valleys, which have helped in the development of such important trading centers as Innsbruck, Graz, and Klagenfurt.

Since 1945, mainly with the help of the United States, Austrian industrial development and power production have made great strides. Electrical power can now be developed on an ever-increasing scale. Austria has excellent iron-ore deposits, as well as bauxite, salt, gypsum, and other non-metallic minerals. There is also a fair supply of petroleum, but coal deposits are lignite rather than bituminous. By the use of these fuels and imported coal supplemented by hydroelectric power, however, the Austrians have established a progressive industrial economy. Leading manufacturing industries of the country include wood, paper, textiles, steel, aluminium, chemicals, and electrical equipment.

Under American influence agriculture is being modernized, especially along the lines of rural electrification, the mechanization of agriculture, and more intensive farming. Thus higher yields per acre are being realized—a matter of great importance in a country with Austria's limited extent of arable land. Animal industries, particularly dairying in the Alpine regions, also have an important place in the agricultural economy.

The disruption in 1918 of established economic ties played havoc with the financial life of the country, culminating in the failure of the great Kreditanstalt<sup>10</sup> in 1931. At present the country still suffers from the ill effects of World War II occupation, particularly in the former Russian sector. Also, the drawing of the Iron Curtain seriously interfered with Austria's normal flow of foreign trade to the east. Yet in many respects Austria is actually better off than would be expected.

### CITIES AND PEOPLE

Between the two world wars there was a readjustment in the distribution of population. Vienna, the imperial city of gaiety and laughter, of fine artists and famed musicians, lost its emperor and its empire. A painful process of readjustment was necessary in order to scale down the population of this Danubian metropolis to the point where it could be supported on a greatly reduced economy. The other cities of Austria, being more intimately tied to their own hinterlands rather than to an entire empire, fared much better. In postwar times a significant change has been the shift of the population from the east to the newly industrialized western portion. Thus, today the majority of

<sup>10</sup> A private banking system in Vienna trading in short-term loans from Paris and London banks. French withdrawal of credits as a weapon against the proposed Austrian Customs Union with Germany caused this sensitive institution to collapse.

the Austrians live in the western, rather than in the eastern, sector.

### POLITICAL STATUS

At present Austria once more enjoys an independent status as a republic within its 1937 boundaries. Under the Austrian State Treaty of 1955, Allied military occupation ended, but Austria is bound to remain neutral between the East and West, rather than serve as a bastion of the latter. Whether the detached position is to endure against the evidence of history invites speculation. A Mediterranean affiliation is out of the question in modern times, even with all his dreams of a modern Roman Empire, Mussolini had to give up Austria. That leaves only two possible alternatives to its present status, and one or the other will ultimately have to be accepted by the Western Powers:

(1) the realization of Austria's nodality by the re-creation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the form of a Danubian confederation or (2) the withdrawal of the prohibition of Austria's reunion with Germany. The first solution is highly problematical. The second might well be considered seriously. The Austrian Germans are mostly conservative, by rejoining Germany they could exert a balancing effect upon that country's internal and external policies, which would be especially important if the two Germanies were reunited. In such a case, Austrian conservatism could conceivably balance whatever lasting influences the Soviets may have exerted upon East Germany. Of course there is a possibility of an ultimate European unity, and in such an event Austria, especially Vienna, might again become the cultural and economic center of Europe as it was at the zenith of Hapsburg power.

### Study Questions

1. Contrast population and economic structure of East and West Germany
2. Discuss West Germany's economic recovery since 1945.
3. What were the major elements of Germany's physical environment that slowed Germany's unification?
4. Describe Germany's territorial problems at the end of World War II
5. Describe the division of Berlin and the economic future of West Berlin as an enclave within East Germany
6. Which are the chief navigable rivers and canals of Germany? Name the important cities along them and the leading industries characterizing each city.
7. List ten of the most important mineral resources of the world and show in what proportion Germany can produce these from local mines.
8. Describe the refugee problem in Germany in the period since the end of World War II
9. In what areas of Europe were there strong German minorities that maintained their national consciousness? For what political developments were they responsible between the two world wars? What happened to them after 1945?
10. What has been the role of the Saar District in international politics from 1918 to date?
11. List the historic and geographic forces that tend to bind Austria and Germany together
12. Describe the political and economic effects of Austria's neutral status.
13. Why is the Rhine the most important inland waterway of Europe?
14. What are the chief results of Germany's physical location?
15. Discuss the reasons for Germany's territorial expansion under Hitler, and map the areas that were annexed after the beginning of 1938.

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## *Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary*

In the last several decades, the area between Germany and what is now the USSR has frequently been termed a "crush zone" or a "shatter belt." Such a designation implies that it is a region of political instability where no large political body could maintain itself without sooner or later being broken up. Prior to World War I, this "shatter belt" concept did not exist, for much of the area was occupied by the Austro-Hungarian Empire. By 1919, however, the zone, extending from the Arctic Ocean to the Aegean Sea, had been divided politically into several nations, some of which—Albania, for example—comprised only small numbers of people; even Poland, the most populous nation, had a population of less than 30,000,000. Because of the existence of much more populous Germany and Russia on either side of this zone, small populations in the countries within this "shatter belt" have on occasion proved to be a source of great weakness.

Since the Middle Ages the Germans have expanded eastward in recurrent periods of migration, called with admiration or with disapproval, the *Drang nach Osten*. Russian history, on the other hand, has been characterized by a drive from the landlocked interior toward the open sea. Though other nations also have been in the path of one or the other of these drives, we are concerned in this chapter with three nations—Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary—whose habitat lies directly in the path of both German and Russian movements (see map on page 385). Like other historic national units in this area (Ukraine, Lithuania, White Russia), the trio of states discussed here have in the past been politically submerged: Poland during the period of partitions from the end of the eighteenth century to 1919; Hungary and Czechoslovakia, into the Hapsburg Empire, for even longer periods. On the other hand, each of these three nations

has also experienced periods of political strength during which it in its turn dominated weaker neighbors

At present the orientation of "crush zone" wavers between complete Soviet domination in the area and some degree of independence under a form of national Communism. The uprising in Poland in 1956 forced Moscow to adjust its policy toward Poland, while the revolution in Hungary demonstrated two limits to Moscow's adjustment

signals from Moscow in all essential policy matters. has ruled in all these countries The youth has been steeped in the Communist ideology to the exclusion of the ideology of the West. It was intended that awareness of older cultural ties with the West would eventually become dim and blurred. At the same time, stronger economic ties with the USSR were forged as industrial, mineral, and, to some extent, agricultural production were being geared to the Eastern market. Any rapid reorientation of the economies of these countries to the West tends to become more difficult as time passes



in the satellite area: basic form of Communist government could not be changed and withdrawal from the Soviet orbit could not be tolerated. Meanwhile, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary are, for all practical purposes, parts of the Soviet orbit. Whether the emergence of a unified Europe and the influence of the United States will restore their buffer status may be revealed only in the future. The upsurge of national spirit encounters a decade of Communist statecraft in which political institutions have been patterned in the image of their Soviet prototype. A single party, ever alert for

#### PHYSICAL FEATURES

Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary make up a block of territory located in the geographical heart of Europe. Although the physical make-up of the area is far from homogeneous throughout, it lacks any marked extremes within its boundaries. Between the extensive lowlands of the Central European Plain and the Hungarian Plain in the Danube Valley, the three countries are bisected from east to west by a belt of higher relief that ranges from the undulating landscape of the Bohemian Basin to the Tatry Mountains, the culminating range in the Carpathians (8,737 feet). Thus, Czechoslovakia in the middle is much more complex from the standpoint of physiography than the other two countries, but southernmost Poland and northernmost Hungary share small areas of the higher and varied relief. In fact, the physiographic features in the area have had a part in the affixing of the political boundaries.

Climatically, the area becomes more continental as one goes from west to east. The effect of latitude is less apparent than longitude, because of the ameliorating influence of the Atlantic in preventing extreme temperatures either in summer or winter. Any pronounced effect of elevation is limited to

the Carpathians themselves, although Hungary does have some protection against cold masses of air moving southward and south-eastward from the Arctic and from the wintertime high-pressure areas of Eurasia's deep interior. Rainfall is moderate (twenty-two inches at Warsaw and twenty-six inches at Budapest) but sufficiently effective for humid-type farming throughout the area.

#### INTERRELATIONS OF THE THREE NATIONS

Although the USSR has bound each of these three nations to itself with strong ties, similar relations do not exist among the three themselves. During the period 1918-45, Czechoslovakia was not on friendly terms with either Poland or Hungary. The two latter nations had no conflict, as they did not border each other, but cultural relations were at a minimum. At present nothing is heard of national rivalries or of suppression of national minorities in the three nations. The Soviet Union would not allow such conflicts among its satellites to come out into the open. Some of these conflicts have indeed disappeared, especially those arising from the fact that these countries formerly ad-

hered to different political groupings led by rival powers. Expropriation of the large Magyar estates in Czechoslovakia is no longer considered a hostile act against a minority but is viewed as an act against the common class enemy. Exchange of populations has removed many irritants, but it has not completely eliminated the desire for restoration of former conditions.

There are, however, indications that some of these age-old conflicts have disappeared only from the surface. It seems doubtful that Poland has unequivocally renounced its claim for the Czech-held Teschen area in eastern Silesia, and it is probable that Hungary will in time reopen the quest for its "natural" boundaries on the crest of the sparsely inhabited Carpathians, repudiate its "artificial" alignment in the plain, and demand the return of the Magyar expellees to the parts of Slovakia where they had lived for many centuries. Such "nationalist" and "Titoist" deviations from a policy dictated by Moscow's interests have been punished, but the resurgence of old nationalist aspirations in Poland and Hungary proves how deeply rooted such feelings are.


### POLAND

#### BOUNDARY CHANGES

Poland has only three neighbors—the Soviet Union in the east, Germany in the west, and Czechoslovakia in the south. It has the area of some of the large western states of the United States, such as New Mexico, but a population larger than that of New York and California combined. In comparing maps of the Polands of today and before 1939 it appears as if a giant has moved the entire country more than a hundred miles to the west. Such an unusual shift of an entire country and the associated westward migration of

its population can be largely attributed to a topographic situation marked by the absence of barriers to the east and west. Poland lies almost wholly in the Central European Plain, which extends from the English Channel through the Low Countries, northern Germany, and Poland and merges finally into the Russian Plain. In the south, uplands and mountains form a fairly definite limit to the plain. Poland has rarely exerted its influence to the south across the Carpathians. However, its southern provinces (for example, Galicia) were, at times, connected with the powers of the Danube





Basin—in the Middle Ages and again from 1772 to 1918. The “natural fortress” of the mountain-rimmed middle Danube Basin seemed to require a protective shield, or glacis, to the north.

In the north the presence of the Baltic Sea restricted the expansion of Poland. During several centuries Poland did not extend northward to the coast but had its border in the infertile, low, morainic ridges that parallel the Baltic coast. The ridges are a relic of the Ice Age and mark one halt in geologic times of the receding Scandinavian icecap.

Poland's contacts to the north were complicated by the existence of large groups of German-speaking people along the Baltic coast—descendants of early settlers who had been attracted to this area by the dominion of the Hanseatic League over the Baltic Sea. When the Polish nation was strong, it succeeded in reaching the Baltic Sea along the Vistula, thereby cutting off from the main body of Germany the German-dominated land farther to the east. In the twentieth century this situation existed between the two world wars. However, the story of the Polish Corridor and the Free State of

Danzig is not a happy one.<sup>1</sup> At present Poland has reached the Baltic Sea on a broader front than ever before, and the Oder, as well as the Vistula, is now an important route to the sea from the mining and industrial centers at the foot of the Carpathians. Gdańsk, Gdynia, and Szczecin (formerly Stettin) are important Polish ports, but their value is impaired by their location on a sea whose narrow exits are dominated by Sweden and Denmark.

Because of this general east-west orientation of the main physiographic features of Poland, movement in the plain—peaceful traffic as well as the movements of armies and of migrations—has always tended to flow in an east-west pattern. Comparatively, the northward-flowing rivers have never been major obstacles to such movement and rarely have served as political boundaries. Slowly flowing rivers generally tend to act as unifiers rather than as dividing factors. The present Oder-Neisse line had not previously served as a political boundary for 900 years.

#### SHIFT OF CENTER

The oldest center of the Slavic tribes that later became the Polish nation was apparently in the Pripet Marshes, a wilderness ideally suited as a refuge area for a small band of loosely organized, unwarlike fishermen. From such an inconspicuous homeland the Polish tribes spread over the plain. Christianity came from the west, and the first church and political center were established near the western boundary in Poznań-Gniezno. In the fourteenth century, Kraków, near the head of navigation on the Vistula, became the capital of a strong Poland

and, with its strong ties to the west and south, served as the gateway for the entrance of the Italian Renaissance. Later, in a Poland with strong interests in the east and on the Baltic coast, Kraków's location near the western boundary became less desirable, and Warsaw, also on the Vistula but more nearly in the center of the nation, became the capital. Since World War II the movement of Poland as a whole to the west has accentuated even more the advantages of Warsaw's position near the geometrical center of the country. However, the distance from the Soviet boundary is short, and Poland's exposure to pressure from the east is obvious.

Poland today, compared with prewar Poland, is smaller in size (121,131 square miles compared to 150,000) and in population (26,000,000 compared to 33,000,000). This loss of area and people does not necessarily mean a diminution in strength and power. The Polish state of today has a more compact shape and a much broader seacoast (see map on page 387). The loss in population is due not only to war losses, totaling 6,000,000 dead (including the extermination of 3,000,000 Jews), but also to the expulsion of Germans and the loss of eastern areas inhabited by White Russians and Ukrainians. These losses of non-Polish groups have possibly strengthened the coherence of the state. The shift of the boundaries has the further advantage that the vital Upper Silesian mining and industrial area is no longer on the frontier but has an interior position. In addition, the rich portion of Upper Silesia that formerly belonged to Germany has been added to Poland.

#### ECONOMIC FACTORS

**RESOURCES**—The Upper Silesian area is one of the richest and most productive districts of Europe. Iron-ore deposits are associated with coal deposits, although not adequate to build up a strong heavy industry, and Poland

<sup>1</sup> The creation of the Polish state in 1919 involved a corridor to the sea which separated Germany from East Prussia and incidentally isolated a sizable German minority within the corridor. Danzig, a Baltic port, was essentially an enclave of Germans. It was to reunite these Germans with the Fatherland that Hitler launched his attack on Poland in 1939, thus bringing on World War II.

imports iron, especially from Sweden for its industrial needs. In the same areas are lead and zinc. The southern part of Poland is rich in sodium and potassium salts, basis for a thriving chemical industry. Poland also has oil, but most of the Galician oil fields are now in the USSR, only the western end of the field is Polish. To the resources already mentioned should be added the large forests, mainly in the east, and good agricultural soils in the west, center, and south. (In the westward shift of the country, some of the richest forests and best agricultural soils were lost to the USSR.) There are also poor districts in Poland, such as those among the sandy soils of the moraine ridges to the north and in the mountain valleys of the Carpathians.

**INDUSTRY**—Despite substantial natural resources the unhappy history of conquest, partition, and foreign rule has retarded the development of Poland's industry. The oldest Polish industry is textiles, centered on Łódź in central Poland. Before World War I this industry produced for the large Russian market, but in 1918, when Poland became independent and Soviet rule was established in Russia, the Polish textile industry lost this market, nor could it compete successfully with high-quality production of Western Europe. Adjustment to the changed conditions was a slow, painful process, and it was not quite accomplished when World War II broke out to spoil what progress had been made. It is not unreasonable to expect that a readjustment in the textile industry to the Eastern market will be somewhat easier. As for the highly developed heavy industry of southwestern Poland, eastward orientation may also be easier because its products are used for reconstruction and industrialization in both Poland and the USSR.


Poland can profit much in her economy from the ship wharves in the north that were taken over from Germany; also from the chemical industry, youngest of the large-scale Polish enterprises. The principal

handicap for all industries is the lack of skilled manpower, a lack resulting not only from rapid industrial expansion but also from the calculated extermination policy of the Nazis. The textile industry apparently suffered most from this policy because the greater number of its skilled laborers were Jews.

As in all Communist-dominated countries, private industry is destined to disappear. It was not seriously curtailed during the period of the reconstruction from 1947 to 1949, but a considerable portion passed under state control during the operation of the six-year plan of 1950 to 1955. The state took charge of the industries in former German areas, where about one third of present Polish industry is located, and of the factories where former owners had perished, thus facilitating the process of government domination. Throughout the nation state planning now dominates the field of industrial enterprise.

**TRANSPORTATION**—When Poland re-emerged as an independent nation in 1918, it inherited three railroad networks which had been integrated into the Russian, German, and Austrian systems. Since that time all lines have more or less been welded into a national pattern, although the discrepancy between Polish and Russian gauges proved to be an obstacle. The only new railroad construction since 1918 has been a line from Upper Silesia to the new Polish port of Gdynia, built to divert transports of coal from Danzig (now Gdańsk) and from Stettin (now Szczecin). These two former German ports are now in Poland (see map on page 390).

A sparse network of good highways covers Poland in a system that extends throughout this part of Central Europe. Western Poland inherited the fine German roads, including superhighways (*Autobahnen*) from Berlin to Szczecin, Frankfurt on the Oder, and Wrocław (formerly Breslau). In the country several rivers are navigable, augmented in commercial importance by short stretches of



canals in the southeast. These waterways add to the importance of Poland's three major Baltic ports of Gdynia, Gdańsk, and Szczecin. Air transportation centers on Warsaw, for both international and domestic services, although frequencies of schedules do not compare favorably with those of Western European countries.

#### REPOPULATION OF WESTERN PROVINCES

When World War II had ended, 9,000,000 Germans fled from the area east of the Oder-Neisse line, taken from Germany after World War II, or were expelled by the Poles. Only about 1,000,000 of the former inhabitants are estimated to have remained, many of them

Poles or bilingual people in Upper Silesia. Today the former German area is repopulated and has reached almost eighty per cent of its prewar population, a growth made possible partly by an agreement between Poland and the USSR to exchange Ukrainians and White Russians who were in Poland for 4,000,000 Poles who were in the USSR. Almost 2,000,000 of these Poles were moved into the western provinces. The population of Lvov, for example, was moved as a unit to Wroclaw. About 2,500,000 persons came to the new provinces from the overpopulated areas of central and southern Poland, where many had eked out a marginal existence on tiny farms.

In these newly settled western provinces it

was relatively simple to start agriculture again in great mechanized units (called *kolkhozy*) after the Soviet pattern. Also, the reconstruction of the destroyed industrial cities proceeded with surprising rapidity and apparently with efficient organization. The smaller provincial towns in the western provinces, however, often have only a fraction of their original population. The influx of Poles into this area continues, but at a slower pace than in the immediate postwar years. The Polish government claims that these western provinces will become a stronghold of Communism because most settlers enjoy better living standards here than they formerly had.

#### THE EMERGENCE OF A "PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC"

A Communist-dominated coalition government came into power in the wake of the USSR armies, and although this government commanded a USSR-trained army, the transformation into a "people's republic" came only gradually and more slowly than in other satellite states. The Polish Communist government could disregard neither the strong Polish army in Italy and England nor the active resistance at home. It also had to

be cautious in its attitude toward the Roman Catholic Church. For centuries religion had been more important than language in determining nationality. Nor could the new government wipe out memories of former independence or stifle completely the spirit of nationalism. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Poznań riots of 1956 favored the rise of "Titoism" and strong defiance of Soviet domination. Whether Moscow can adjust its satellite relations to accept the demand for "socialism with independence and friendship with the USSR" only time can answer.

West Germany, together with the Western Powers, has never recognized the Oder-Neisse line, although Soviet East Germany has. The USSR has hinted that under certain conditions it may favor a return of former German areas to a Communist Germany. It is just this eventuality that binds Poland closer to the USSR. Throughout several centuries the common fear of Germany had led Poland to maintain close ties with France, and French cultural influence and that of other Western nations had been very strong in Poland—at least stronger than Russian influence. This old alignment appears now to have been replaced by a new one.

## CZECHOSLOVAKIA


#### SIZE, SHAPE, AND PHYSICAL FEATURES

Czechoslovakia is one of the five major European countries that have no direct access to the sea.<sup>2</sup> Internationalized rivers, especially the Elbe to Hamburg and, to a minor degree, the Danube to the Black Sea, can only to a certain extent compensate for this lack.

Even in our air age economic pressure can easily be brought to bear with telling effect upon such a landlocked country. Czechoslovakia stretches eastward from a core area in the very center of Europe, wedgelike into Eastern Europe (see map on page 392). In the west it has a long common boundary with highly developed Germany, while to the east it touches the USSR in Carpatho-Ukraine,<sup>3</sup> one of the most backward areas

<sup>2</sup> The others are Austria, Switzerland, Hungary, and Luxembourg. The tiny states of Andorra, San Marino, Vatican City, and Liechtenstein also have no seacoast.

<sup>3</sup> Ruthenia, or Podkarpatska Rus, was transferred to the USSR under the Moscow Treaty in 1945.



of Europe and of the USSR. Poland in the north, Austria in the southwest, and Hungary in the southeast are other neighbors.

Czechoslovakia is a small country, only the size of the state of New York, but it extends in an east-west direction a distance equivalent to that from New York City to Detroit. It consists of three distinct historical and physiographical units.

**BOHEMIA, CZECH CORELAND**—Bohemia is a very fertile basin surrounded on all sides by hills and low mountains. In the past and even at present these uplands in the southwest have been densely forested and form a sparsely inhabited protective zone around the core area. The political boundary was fixed here rather early and remained fairly stable in spite of shifting population and political fortunes.

In the Middle Ages, Germans settled in the forested uplands—partly in quest of unoccupied land, but primarily for the mineral wealth there. Many mineral deposits have been exhausted, new ones, such as the uranium mines near Jáchymov, have been

opened. Since the Germans first came into direct contact with the Czechs, there has been continuous national friction along the frontier, and the language boundary has shifted to and fro. The Nazi regime particularly exploited the national feeling of German minorities in Sudetenland<sup>4</sup> for the purpose of undermining the Czech government. It was not until 1945–46, when almost all Germans were expelled, that, for the first time in history, the political boundary became the language boundary.

On the other hand, Western civilization from the time of Christianity to the advent of modern industry came to the Czechs primarily through contact with the Germans. Close cultural ties led to mutual appreciation, but other Western nations played a secondary role, namely, Italian influence in music and architecture, English religious ideas, and French democratic ideals. It is

<sup>4</sup> Sudetenland is the general name given to the upland area surrounding the Bohemian Basin on the northeast, northwest, and southwest. The term derives from the Sudeten Mountains in this area.

significant that most of the time, especially during recent decades, there was no cultural differential between Germans and Czechs such as that which existed between Germans and some other Slavic nations and which led the Germans to advance the doctrine of their own racial superiority.

**MORAVIA, A CORRIDOR**—Although situated east of, and outside, the upland perimeter, Moravia has been demographically united with, and politically dependent upon, Bohemia throughout history. It is essentially the wide corridor between the Bohemian Massif and the Carpathians. This corridor connects the Central European Plain, especially Silesia, with both the lowland along the upper Danube and the Hungarian plains where they meet in the Vienna Gate. A southern fringe of Silesia, important because of its coal deposits, belongs to Moravia.

**SLOVAKIA, JUNIOR PARTNER**—It is a moot question for the outsider whether the Slovak language should be regarded as a dialect of the Czech language or as a separate tongue. The existence of such a dispute is, however, indicative of a distinctive national consciousness among the Slovaks, based on an independent history. In the USSR-sponsored Košice Agreement of 1944 the Czechs recognized the separate nationhood of the Slovaks.

Slovakia lies within the great Carpathian arc, and its natural focus is southward on the Hungarian Plain. Its rivers open into wide embayments of this plain, while only a few mountain passes lead into Moravia and Bohemia. It is no coincidence, therefore, that this area was under Magyar rule for 900 years. After the collapse of the Hapsburg monarchy, Prague became the center of the united Czechoslovak state because of its undisputed position as center of the Czech nation.

The leading cities of Slovakia lie on the border of the plain. The Slovakian capital, Bratislava, looks down the Danube and at one time, under the name of Pressburg,

served as a German outpost toward the east. It was also capital of Hungary, under the name of Pozsony, in the days of Ottoman rule in that country.

**TERRITORIAL PROBLEMS**—At the Moscow settlement in 1945, Czechoslovakia won a small area of thirty square miles from Hungary for expansion of the industrial metropolitan area of Bratislava, but in the same year she was forced to cede her province of Ruthenia to the USSR. Ruthenia, a former Hungarian territory, had been attached to Czechoslovakia in 1918 as an autonomous province. At that time its Ukrainian majority had been separated from the Ukraine by Polish territory. The union with Czechoslovakia appeared to be a kind of temporary trusteeship.

It seems improbable that Germany will lay claim to the formerly German-speaking areas. Whether or not it may demand, in one form or another, that the Germans be allowed to return to the Sudeten area is an open question, but the threat of such a demand serves to bind Czechoslovakia to the USSR. There was no uncertainty about Polish claims for the Teschen area and Hungarian claims for at least southern Slovakia, these claims were loudly voiced until Communism engulfed all three countries.

#### INTERNAL WEAKNESSES

During its short existence (1918–39) the Czechoslovak republic suffered from internal weaknesses. The two peoples united in it were closely related, but contrasting historical and cultural development hindered a genuine unity. Slovakia had long remained a culturally backward area under Magyar rule, Bohemia and Moravia were among the most industrialized countries of Europe and possessed a highly skilled, numerous working class. Slovakia had no significant industry under the Magyar rule, and development progressed slowly during the republic. Il-

literacy was high; access to advanced positions in administrative, military, and economic activities was very limited for Slovaks who were not ready to accept Magyarization. Petty politics and priesthood opened the only roads to advancement for the more ambitious and gifted sons of Slovak peasantry. Thus, the Roman Catholic Church became closely identified with Slovak nationalism, while its hold in the Czech areas was less strongly rooted.

Not only are cultural differences a source of weakness, the elongated shape of the country is not conducive to more than a loose union, to say nothing of the fact that it is strategically dangerous. Moreover, the geographical structure of the whole country leads to divergent agricultural problems not yet reconciled. The Communist government has abolished the historical units and created small uniform administrative districts in order to overcome traditional separatism. However, even the Communists had to concede a nominally autonomous Slovak National Council and Executive Board of Commissioners within the Slovak territory.

#### ECONOMIC FACTORS

**NATURAL RESOURCES AND INDUSTRY**—Czechoslovakia unites in a small space numerous natural resources. Large deposits of good-quality coal and sufficient deposits of iron ore are the basis of a heavy industry. Other minerals, such as gold, silver, lead, and limestone, are of secondary importance. Radium and uranium have come to the fore only in the twentieth century. Agriculturally Czechoslovakia is also well endowed; the fertile basins and plains normally produce grains, potatoes, sugar beets, dairy products, grapes, and hops beyond national needs, and hence they contribute to the country's exports. Most hill lands and mountains are in forests, and although war damage was great, the outlook for timber production is still good. On the basis of this natural wealth

a dense, diligent population evolved, which in the Czech parts turned early to mining and manufacture

Czech industry is the most highly developed of any among the satellite countries. Prior to 1945 industry was located only in the western provinces, and it was closely integrated with the Western market, since many of its products, such as glass, china, and lace, find little demand in an Eastern market. Revival of these industries seems unlikely, for the skilled labor employed in them was mainly German. The expulsion of German labor following World War II has also created difficulties in the textile and leather industries. On the other hand, heavy industry, such as the production of steel, rails, weapons, ammunition, and tractors, has benefited from the opening of trade with the USSR and the satellite countries, including China. The same is true for many consumer products, such as shoes, cutlery, and woollens. The five-year plan (1949-53), which followed a two-year recovery plan (1947-48), had as its goal the gearing of Czechoslovakian industries, especially those created in Slovakia, to the Eastern market. In 1937 Czechoslovakia obtained only 1.1 per cent of its total imports from the USSR and 2.5 per cent from Poland; and in turn it exported 0.9 per cent and 2.6 per cent, respectively, to these countries. The share of the other countries of the Soviet bloc was likewise of small magnitude. On the other hand, in 1952, 70.6 per cent of the Czechoslovakian imports came from the USSR, the satellite countries, and China, and sixty-eight per cent of its exports went to these countries. This reorientation to new markets means, in many instances, a shift to cheap mass production and further entails a deterioration in the quality of goods available within the country. Apparently Czechoslovakia has to deliver more products to Communist markets than would be available for export if the high prewar standard of manufacture were to be maintained.



**AGRICULTURE**—The Germans who were expelled from Czechoslovakia in 1945 had, unlike those in Poland, been living largely on the less desirable land. To replace them, therefore, meant taking Czech peasants from more fertile areas, and compulsory resettlement was necessary until about one fourth to one fifth of the rural population from the interior of Bohemia and Moravia had been moved to farms that were formerly German. Areas vacated by the Czechs were apparently given to Slovaks and Magyars from Slovakia, thus relieving population pressure in overcrowded agricultural districts and liquidating the Magyar majority in the border areas. Repopulation has advanced slowly and seems to be connected, to a large degree, with the program of collectivization. Greatest success in this respect has been registered in the least developed regions, particularly Slovakia, where fifty per cent of the lands were collectivized.

On the whole, economic planning has not raised production figures to a high level. Whereas prior to 1939 Czechoslovakia was almost self-sufficient in foodstuffs, and food items constituted only thirteen per cent of its total imports, since 1948 the country has had to rely on the Soviet bloc for food supplies, and food items constitute thirty per cent of total imports.

**TRANSPORTATION**—The transportation network of Bohemia and Moravia was originally focused on Vienna, that of Slovakia on Budapest. The reorientation in the west on Prague after the Czech nation had been established in 1919 was accomplished rather smoothly, but Slovakia still shows the impractical pattern of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Despite a location in the center of Europe, Czechoslovakia is by-passed in both the north and the south by major east-west rail lines. Only the northeast-southwest route through the Moravian corridor is of primary importance. German designs on the country in 1939 aimed at control of the

transport lines converging on Prague, which would give the Nazi Army an open road into southern Europe.

Since the country has no seacoast and no important navigable rivers other than the Elbe penetrate it, the transportation pattern necessarily focuses largely on rail and highway systems. However, airlines in Czechoslovakia, with Prague as a center, have attained some importance. Internationally the Czechoslovakian capital is on a network enmeshing Vienna, Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin, and other European capitals. Domestically it ties in with several smaller cities.

#### HUMAN PATTERN

**POPULATION CHANGES**—Bohemia and Moravia account for 8,000,000 of the country's 12,500,000 people. The present population pattern, especially in areas from which minority groups have recently been removed, is known only in a general way. Western Czechoslovakia was a densely populated area in 1945. At present some areas, especially small rural market towns, are semideserted. The Czech areas in Bohemia have the Western European demographic pattern of low birth rate and low death rate. Although recent figures are unavailable, there is no reason to assume a radical change in this pattern. On the other hand, the eastern part of the republic has a high birth rate and, despite a high rate of mortality and relatively sparse settlement as yet, is rapidly growing in population. This situation is one of the underlying causes of the tension between Czechs and Slovaks.

**MINORITY PROBLEMS**—Until 1945 Czechoslovakia, in addition to the Czech-Slovak tension, was harassed by a number of minority problems. The expulsion of the Germans along the western fringes and the cession to the USSR of Podkarpatska Rus, with its mixture of Ukrainian-Magyar-Jewish-Rumanian population, have eliminated most of these

problems. The Magyar settlements in southern Slovakia apparently no longer exist, since many Magyars were exchanged for Slovaks formerly living in Hungary and others were resettled in the west.

A Polish minority formerly existed in Czechoslovakian Silesia, a small, but densely populated and economically important region of the country. In the peace settlement of 1919 the city of Teschen was divided between Poland and Czechoslovakia. In 1938 the Poles again occupied this entire area but had to withdraw from the Czech sector under USSR pressure at the end of World War II. Poland, however, received the German-speaking area of Klodzko (Glatz) in German Silesia, to which the Czechs had well-founded claims, since it lay within the upland perimeter of Bohemia.

#### TRANSITION TO A "PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACY"

The coup d'état of February, 1948, converted Czechoslovakia into a satellite people's republic and ended its brief existence as a Western democracy. In effect, this transformation thrust Soviet power into the center of Europe. The shift in the balance of power was one of major proportions, for, as was said earlier, Czechoslovakia is, of all the satellites, the most highly industrialized and best developed. For half a century Czechoslovakia has had a proportionately large working class. At the end of the nineteenth century, this class was largely influential in the Social-Democratic Party and in other parties that united socialistic ideas with nationalism. In time the social-

democratic parties adopted an evolutionary outlook and became more democratic and less Marxian. Nonetheless, events in 1948 swept the moderates out of office.

Several factors strengthened the cause of Communism. Reaction against German occupation and oppression between 1939 and 1945 had led to a radicalization of large numbers of workers, who thus became more receptive to Communist propaganda. The memory of Munich, at which France and Great Britain had sacrificed Czechoslovakia to Hitler, made a Western orientation very unpopular. Communist party members and sympathizers, therefore, composed a sizable proportion of the population, at the election in 1946 the Communists had thirty-eight per cent of the votes. With the Red Army near its frontiers, the republic looked to Moscow for its security. As reconstruction progressed, the Communist hold over the masses seemed threatened, but the Communists still had a large popular backing in the nation. In no other country had the Communist revolution such solid working-class support as here.

Although the advent to power of the Communist party marked an orientation toward the Communist orbit, the effect of the change upon the nation's well-being is difficult to assess. Division of large estates formerly owned by Germans and Magyars could not take place, for large estates had already been liquidated prior to 1948. But far more effective steps were taken in the abolition of all provinces in favor of new administrative units and the carrying through of a program of collectivization in industry, commerce, and banking.


## HUNGARY

#### LOCATION AND BOUNDARIES

Hungary is one of the smaller countries of Europe, with an area comparable to that of

the state of Indiana. Since 1918, except during World War II, Hungary has been confined to the open plains in the center of the Carpathian Basin. This area is the one

which in the ninth century attracted the nomadic Magyar horsemen and from which they raided far to the west, north, and south. Later they became sedentary. Although they extended their immediate rule up to the summits of the Carpathians, the traditional Magyar settlement area remained the open plain, on which trees are rare and which is in some parts true steppe (*puszta*) country. The mountain rim and, in periods of expansion, the foreland as well served as natural walls against invaders up to and including World War I. The collapse of the Central Powers in October, 1918, meant the loss of this protective barrier, for both Czechoslovakia and Rumania extended their respective territories by crossing the mountains into the Hungarian Plains. In 1945 the cession of Ruthenia from Czechoslovakia to the Soviet Ukraine placed the USSR power across the Carpathians and on the borders of Hungary (see map on this page).



Only two broad natural avenues lead into the Hungarian Plains. From the west is the Vienna Gate, route of the Crusaders and of German armies—whether they came to help defend Hungary or to besiege it. From the Aegean Sea easy passes lead northward through the Morava Valley. The Turkish invasion followed this route, and from this direction modern Yugoslavia has expanded into the plain. Yugoslavia has incorporated also the Croatian country, which in more or less pronounced dependence had been an

annex to Hungary since the eleventh century. It was through Croatia that Hungary in the past had a corridor across the Dinaric Mountains to the Adriatic Sea, the loss in 1919, of this access to the Adriatic has enhanced the value of the Danubian route to the Black Sea. The Danube waterway was never of great economic importance because of the difficulties of accessibility, the undeveloped economies of most of the areas about the Black Sea shores, and the political fragmentation of the Danube Basin. Also, the gorge of the Iron Gate, where the Danube passes between the Carpathians and the Balkans, has always been a serious obstacle to river traffic. Now, perhaps, the Danube will become an important transportation link between the USSR and Hungary, because of economic development within the Soviet bloc and closer political unity in the areas served by the lower portions of this river.

#### ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

As a satellite state, Hungary's economy is closely tied to the Soviet orbit. Like Poland and Czechoslovakia, it had a five-year plan from 1950 to 1954, in which industrialization was a chief objective. However, Hungary, because of relief and climate, is best suited to farming and pastoral pursuits. Specifically, wheat growing and extensive cattle raising have proved to be optimal activities in the natural grasslands of the broad Hungarian lowland drained by the Danube and its tributaries. Mineral resources are limited, although there are some deposits of coal, iron, and bauxite. Occasional forested hills rise above the plain and, together with riverine forests, provide a modest supply of timber. Nonetheless, in such an environment any strong development of industry is extremely difficult to achieve.

**RURAL AND URBAN CHANGES**—Attention has been given to rural Hungary. In 1945 there were land reforms in which landed estates were divided to give land to an additional

twenty-five per cent of the nation's farmers. But such a division meant that sixty-five per cent of the total farming area became restricted to holdings of ten acres or less, not generally efficient as economic units. The problem of agrarian overpopulation has been aggravated because the Soviet attempt at industrial expansion has so far failed to absorb surplus farm workers. The typical Communist program of collectivism has not progressed rapidly because of the strength of the peasant farmers, and in 1953 there was an easing up in the formation of collectives.

In the cities, especially in Budapest, an effort was made by the Communists to facilitate industry by providing space for the workers at the expense of former officials, merchants, aristocrats, owners of factories, and other nonlaboring classes, thousands of whom were deported to remote villages. In the commercial field, Hungarian-Soviet companies were created for the management of shipping on the Hungarian rivers and for the exploitation of oil and bauxite. Over-all plans tend to be those of the USSR, who control the supply of heavy equipment and tools. Nevertheless, it has sometimes been necessary to make certain concessions to Hungarian interests in order to make the satellite policy more palatable.

**TRANSPORTATION**—Transportation in Hungary revolves around Budapest (population, 1,500,000),<sup>5</sup> capital and major center of the country in all respects; no other Hungarian city can claim more than about one tenth as many people. Railroad and road systems converge upon Budapest, although they fit into the larger pattern of transportation in Central Europe. As a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire prior to and during World War I, the Hungarian lowlands served as the hinterland to Budapest, but they

formed only one of the regions within a larger national economy. Thus, since no new rail lines have been built since 1917, the railroad pattern in Hungary often does not conform with national boundaries. For example, in the southern part of the country there is a tendency for rail lines to focus on Belgrade and Zagreb in Yugoslavia, as well as on Budapest.

Like Czechoslovakia, the Hungarian nation has no seacoast, but in inland transportation facilities it is more fortunate. Both the Danube and Tisza rivers provide excellent north-south stretches of navigable water, and at present a canal is being constructed from Szolnok to just south of Budapest to connect the two rivers. Air traffic in Hungary more or less duplicates the patterns in Poland and Czechoslovakia. Budapest is the center of both international lines (schedules to Prague, Warsaw, Kiev, Belgrade, and Vienna) and domestic lines (schedules to Debrecen, Szeged, Szombathely).

#### HUMAN PROBLEMS

**POPULATION**—During the past turbulent century, Hungary has experienced a rapid change in the composition of its population. In the mid-1850's probably not more than one third of its population was Magyar; by the time of World War I this percentage had increased to about half. The growth in Magyar population was aided by Magyarization of minorities, that is, minority groups were denied, in large part, their own schools, and greater opportunities for advancement within the nation were held out to them by the government if they would adopt the culture and customs of the Magyar people.

The collapse and territorial losses of 1918 left Hungary a Magyar national state, but significant minorities still survived. Since World War II most of these minorities have disappeared: Germans by expulsion and Slovaks and southern Slavs by exchange. The Jews, largely Magyarized before World

<sup>5</sup> Buda, an old, historic city, is on the right bank of the Danube, the new Pest, on the left. Budapest is one of the few places where bridges cross the Danube.

War II, had been decimated by Nazi slaughter. Although Hungary has become increasingly Magyar, there are still many Magyars left outside Hungary—the largest number in Rumania, and smaller groups in all neighboring countries in those areas which belonged formerly to Hungary. Whatever their true numbers, they are still a potential basis for irredentist claims. Whether Soviet policy will only divert attention temporarily from territorial claims or will succeed in fusing the masses of all these countries into an ideological unit cannot be foreseen.

**MAGYARIZATION VERSUS PAN-SLAVISM**—The Magyars speak an Asiatic language to which Finnish and Estonian are similarly related. This language is, however, the only feature reminiscent of the Asiatic origin of the Magyar people. Inter-marriage with neighbors, absorption of subject peoples, and foreign ruling groups have left the Magyars a type hardly distinguishable from those of neighboring nations. The consciousness of a different origin, history, and civilization was, however, very vivid at least until the victory of the Communists. When the Magyars settled in their present home, they split the southern Slavs from the northern ones. Together with the Austrian Germans and the Rumanians, a non-Slavic zone extended across the entire Slavic Eastern Europe. Hungary occupies its crucial center. After the emergence of Pan-Slavism, the Magyars felt called upon to perform a historical mission in keeping these two parts of the Slavic world apart. Now, for the first time, the situation seems thoroughly changed. The Yugoslavs stand apart from the Slavic brotherhood and Hungary has itself become a member of the Soviet bloc. Russian is taught in Hungarian schools, and everything Russian is regarded officially as worthy of imitation.

**RELIGION**—The Communist government had a difficult struggle with the Catholic Church.

Though officially the majority of the population belongs to this church, it commands strong loyalty only among peasants, artisans, and the Catholic part of the former aristocracy. The workers were mostly lukewarm or even hostile to the clergy. Nevertheless, the Communists had to close monasteries and nunneries and try the single Hungarian cardinal in court before they could feel reasonably safe from Catholic influence. They had an easier task in achieving influence in the Reformed Church, the faith of a numerous minority with strong nationalistic leanings.

**SOCIAL EVOLUTION**—In Hungary nobles and large landowners were able to retain their estates longer than in any other European country. The Bela Kun revolt in 1919, briefly successful as a Bolshevik revolution, was quickly followed by a return to the *status quo*.<sup>6</sup> In the years following this revolution, however, even the reactionary Hungarian regime had to agree to a land-reform program. Land taken from the large estates was divided into such small plots that the new owners were forced to work on the large estates for their livelihood. The old aristocracy and the Catholic Church, which had owned immense estates from feudal times, remained the ruling group. Hungary continued as a kingdom, but in place of a king a member of the nobility became regent.

Between the poor peasants and the estate owners there developed a middle class of independent farmers, merchants, industrialists, professional people, and lower officials, which, although small in number, slowly acquired increasing importance. Many of this middle-class group were Jews, whose number was cut approximately in half toward the close of World War II, when the

<sup>6</sup> The November uprising under Kun's ruthless direction led to the creation of a Soviet republic, but a counterrevolution in March, 1920, ended the workers' state and installed Horthy as a regent.

Nazis, through a group of quislings, introduced their methods of mass murder; also in this group, among the independent farmers, were many Germans, who, however, were expelled at the end of the war. It was inevitable that the old aristocracy would lose its economic basis at the end of World War II. Thus, only small groups remained in a position to withstand the Communist pressure during the early postwar years. It is surprising that the coalition of the independent peasants, the clergy, and the small Social Democratic party was able to delay the complete Communist victory so long. Only in 1949 did Hungary become a people's republic and pattern its government on the model of a proletarian dictatorship. The hard core of the Communist party has dominated the government through its control

of trade unions and influence over the small peasant landholders' party.

**RESURGENCE OF NATIONALISM**—Despite the stamp of Communist dictatorship in Hungary, the flame of nationalism apparently is far from extinguished. Following the uprising in Poland in the wake of the Soviet "moderation" policy, Hungary launched a nation-wide revolt in 1956 to overthrow Communism within and to expel Soviet troops from its territory. Since the new regime called for an end to Soviet domination and introduction of free elections and full independence, the Soviet leaders ruthlessly suppressed the revolt with Red Army troops and tanks. Even so, the USSR was inclined to favor a "national Communist" government provided it remained within the pale of the Warsaw military alliance system.

### Study Questions

1. Which languages are principally spoken in the area discussed in this chapter and in each case to which group of languages do they belong?
2. What is the justification for the terms "shatter belt" and "crush zone"?
3. By what means did the landlocked nations of eastern Central Europe try to win access to the sea?
4. By what means are these three nations—Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary—bound to the Soviet Union?
5. What are the advantages of an eastern orientation for the industries of these three nations?
6. For what reason is the adherence to the Catholic Church associated with a Western orientation?
7. What is the importance of Upper Silesia within Poland?
8. Why has the southern boundary of Poland been more stable than the other boundaries?
9. What is the importance of the large rivers for Poland?
10. How is the tension between Czechs and Slovaks to be explained?
11. What are the reasons for the low cultural level of Slovakia?
12. What is the peculiar importance of Czechoslovakia for the Communist bloc?
13. Why can Hungary be called the Danubian nation par excellence?
14. Why are the present boundaries of Hungary unsatisfactory?
15. How did Hungary become a national political entity?

## CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR

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### *The Balkan States*

The geopolitical significance and character of the Balkan area may be seen in the application to it of such terms as "The Powder Keg of Europe," "The Cockpit of Europe," and "The Gateway to Europe," and from the consideration of the term "Balkanization" as synonymous with political fragmentation and disunity. No finer examples of the application and consequences of a number of principles in political geography can be found than in the physical and human checkerboard known as the Balkan Peninsula.

Geographically defined, the Balkan Peninsula is that part of Europe extending from the head of the Adriatic Sea southeastward around Greece and then through the Dardanelles and Bosphorus approximately to the mouth of the Dniester River. The northern boundary of the Balkans, though indefinite, is commonly interpreted as the northern frontiers of Yugoslavia and Rumania. Thus the Balkan countries are generally considered to be Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Albania, and Greece (see map on page 402). The small part of Turkey lying in

Europe is certainly part of the Balkan area but is discussed in Chapter 27, "Turkey and the Straits."

As probably the world's supreme example of physical and political disunity, the Balkan area demands, above all, an analysis pointed toward an explanation of the disunity. No one factor is even primarily responsible; only within the complex of the interrelated factors is the key to the politico-geographical personality of the Balkans to be found. Landform complexity has encouraged ethnic complexity; valley routes have invited through-movements of peoples and armies; ethnic mosaics have brought cultural conflict; and so on, through a score of similar interactions. Broadly speaking, the bases for Balkan disunity may be divided into two classes: internal and external.

#### INTERNAL BASES FOR DISUNITY

**PHYSICAL BASES**—Most fundamental of all reasons for Balkan disunity is the pattern of (1) the mountains, which have served as

barriers to peoples and influences; (2) the valleys, which have served as passageways and lines of settlement; and (3) the basins, which have become centers of economic development, dense settlement, and political power.



With the exception of three main areas—the extension of the Hungarian Plain into northeastern Yugoslavia and western Rumania, the Walachian Plain—Moldavian Plateau of Rumania, and the northern plateau of Bulgaria—the entire Balkan region is dominated by mountainous topography. Ridges from 6,000 to 7,000 feet in elevation are characteristic of the entire structural framework. An ordinary relief map will reveal that along the west side of the peninsula mountainous terrain extends from the Julian Alps in northwestern Yugoslavia through the Dinaric Alps to the Pindus of Greece and, in fingerlike ridges forming peninsulas, on out into the Mediterranean. In Rumania the Carpathians swing southward and curve erratically westward through the Transylvanian Alps and then reverse their structure to bend eastward again, as the Balkan Mountains,

through central Bulgaria. Separating Bulgaria and Greece is the rugged Rhodope Plateau. Scattered among these dominant ranges are scores of less-known mountain masses, which complete the ruggedness of the area.

Nestled among the ranges and rugged hills are numerous basin areas, many of which are quite isolated from one another or from other lowlands. Such basins have afforded intensive economic development, especially in agriculture, and many of the major towns and cities of the Balkans are centered in these basins. More important as areas of intensive development, however, are the larger plains and plateau areas already named and the broader valleys and basins. But no one of the basins or of the plains areas within the Balkans proper has been endowed with sufficient size, resources, and accessibility to encourage a political development adequate as a strong core area for a powerful state. Certainly no core area has permitted sufficient development for any one state to establish control over the entire Balkans and to be able to defy outside interference.

Despite the ruggedness of the many mountain barriers, there are a few natural passageways through the labyrinthine ranges. These routes are a strategic element in Balkan geography. The Danube Valley itself is an inviting route, with the Kazan Gorge through the mountains between Yugoslavia and Rumania, terminating at the eastern end with the Iron Gate.<sup>1</sup> Equally important is the celebrated Vardar-Morava Corridor, extending from the mouth of the Morava (in the Danube Valley below Belgrade) over the divide at Skoplje (the former Üsküb) and down the Vardar to its mouth near Salonika. Also of importance is the branch

<sup>1</sup> Iron Gate is a gorge on the Danube River between Rumania and Yugoslavia. It is two miles long, contains rapids, and physiographically separates the Hungarian Plain from the basin of the lower Danube.



route from the Morava Valley, extending from Niš through the Sofia Basin and down the Maritsa Valley to Istanbul. In the far northwest, Peartree Pass (or Croatian Gateway) has long been the passageway between the Po Basin and the Danubian Plains. Other less continuous routes are utilized locally, but these four passageways have for centuries been of significance for through-movement of goods, peoples, armies, and ideas. They have also attracted avaricious outside powers desiring control of the passageways, or at least temporary use of them, for aggressive purposes. The Berlin-to-Baghdad Railroad, for example, at the turn of the nineteenth century crossed the Balkans, and early in World War II Nazi armies swept through the Vardar-Morava Corridor to break Greek resistance.

**HUMAN BASES**—In addition to these physical bases for the disunity of the Balkans, there are also human bases, often the two are closely related. Foremost and most fundamental is the ethnic complexity—the jigsaw of languages, kinship sentiments, religions, customs, social patterns, and other cultural institutions. For hundreds of years before the tenth century, different peoples migrated through and into the Balkan area, bringing their respective languages and mores. Not until the decline of the Ottoman Empire approached were the broad outlines of the ethnic pattern of the Balkans generally set. After World War I one of the greatest population exchanges in modern history took place between Greece and Turkey. Even after World War II, small islands of peoples disappeared in exchanges of minorities.

The situation of the Balkans in the midst of the convergence of several strong religious influences has produced a religious complexity consistent with the other complex aspects of the area. The pattern consists of Roman Catholicism in the northwest; Greek Orthodox (chief religion of the Balkans) in southern Yugoslavia, Rumania, Bul-

garia, and Greece, Moslem in Albania, parts of Yugoslavia, and scattered areas in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Greece, and Protestantism in Transylvania among the small remaining German colony.

**POLITICAL BASES**—Logically enough, the ethnic and political disunity in the Balkans, in conjunction with attempts by outside powers to exert control over the area, has brought wars and territorial conflicts in rapid succession. The perennial Macedonian problem,<sup>2</sup> which flared into active conflict just after World War II, largely as the result of Communist agitation, is just one example of the fact that "the powder keg of Europe" has a low igniting temperature. The weakening of the grip of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans and the gradual establishment of successive independent states inevitably meant a succession of conflicts among the new states for maximum territorial extent and political influence. The First Balkan War broke out in 1912, with Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece uniting to force out Turkey, "the sick man of Europe." Seven months later the topsy-turvy situation in the Balkans brought on the Second Balkan War, in which Serbia and Greece, joined by Rumania and Turkey, fought Bulgaria. The desires of Balkan countries to work out their own problems and to maintain their respective national identities conflicted with Austria's attempts to extend its hegemony in the Balkans. Serbian resistance in this vortex of power conflict brought about the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand at Sarajevo precisely one year after the outbreak of the Second Balkan War. One month later Austria declared war on Serbia, and in the following week Europe was aflame with World War I.

The drawing and redrawing of new boundaries in the Balkans as the result of succes-

<sup>2</sup> See page 419 for a discussion of the Macedonian problem.



sive wars has inevitably produced continuous territorial disputes. The following areas, discussed in some detail in later sections, are either in active dispute or have been in dispute during the last few decades (see map on this page): Trieste and the Istrian Peninsula, between Italy and Yugo-

slavia; the Klagenfurt Basin, between Austria and Yugoslavia; parts of the Baranja, Bačka, and Banat, among Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Rumania; the eastern Hungarian Plain and Transylvania, between Hungary and Rumania; the Bucovina, between Rumania and the USSR; Bessarabia, between Rumania

and the USSR, the Southern Dobruja (Dobrogea), between Rumania and Bulgaria; Thrace, among Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey, with the Thracian coast of Greece especially desired by Bulgaria, Macedonia, among Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Greece; the Northern Epirus (Ípiros), or southern Albania, between Greece and Albania, the tiny island of Saseno, between Italy and Albania; the Dalmatian coastal town of Zara (Zadar) and several coastal islands, between Yugoslavia and Italy, and the Dodecanese Islands, among Turkey, Italy, and Greece.

As might also be expected, such disunity has had an impact on the economic development of the Balkans. Despite at least a modest wealth in mineral resources, the overwhelmingly dominant economic activity in all the Balkan countries is agriculture, and even that, in many areas and in many respects, is in a retarded state. Trade among the Balkan countries and with outside areas has suffered because of suspicion of one another and lack of proper transportation facilities through the rugged landscape and disputed areas.

#### EXTERNAL BASES FOR DISUNITY

The internal bases for disunity in the Balkans are closely related to powerful influences from the outside. In many cases the actual key to turmoil in the Balkans is found in the clashing interests of powers outside the Balkan Peninsula. In such respects the cross-

roads nature of the Balkans is of major significance. The Balkans are, along with Anatolia, a strong link between the Middle East—with its connections with Africa and southern Asia—and Europe. At every hand in the Balkans the mingling of European and Asiatic peoples and cultures can be seen.

An over-all survey of the relative location of the Balkans with respect to political influences reveals that, especially from a historical perspective, the peninsula is ringed with states whose political interests focus on the intermediate Balkan Peninsula: Italy to the west, Austria and Germany to the northwest, Hungary to the north, Russia to the northeast, and Turkey to the southeast. During the centuries of Turkish rule, the Balkan area was systematically plundered and oppressed to such an extent that economically and culturally, as well as politically, it is only now beginning to emerge from the effects of the ordeal. Outside powers that have exerted strong influence in the Balkans include others not located in the Balkan periphery: Britain, with her interest in the welfare of the eastern Mediterranean and the Straits as well as in a European balance of power, has long concerned itself in Balkan affairs; to a lesser extent France also has played a role in the Balkans, especially in Rumania;<sup>3</sup> and in recent decades the United States has become increasingly watchful of Balkan developments, especially through its economic and military aid to Greece and Yugoslavia.

### YUGOSLAVIA

Yugoslavia typifies many characteristics that are Balkan: it has great ethnic diversity, has been beset with political turmoil, has many areas isolated from other regions, and has been, since World War II, both a Soviet satellite and a strong opponent of Soviet

control. The term "Titoism" has come to be a symbol of national Communism.

<sup>3</sup> Between the wars France showed considerable interest in Rumania as a guardian of the Danube estuary and as a link in its Little Entente alliance system.

## LAND

The three geographical factors of location, size, and shape make Yugoslavia a transition land between Central Europe and extreme southeastern Europe, with all that the term implies. These same three factors make Yugoslavia the only Balkan state sharing common boundaries with all other Balkan nations. In addition to these four neighbors, Yugoslavia also borders on Hungary, Austria, and Italy, and with all seven countries it has had traditionally strained relations. The Adriatic coastal zone is narrow and is virtually cut off from the interior by the formidable terrain, Yugoslavia is, therefore, essentially an interior state. As the largest (99,181 square miles) of the Balkan countries, Yugoslavia would seem to possess an adequate base for a viable nation, especially in view of its resources.

As has been shown to be true of the Balkans in general, the landforms of Yugoslavia have profound political implications. The only extensive plains areas are in the northeast. They are the relatively broad valley of the Sava River; the Danubian Plains, comprising parts of the Baranja west of the Danube; Bačka, between the Danube and Tisza; and Banat, east of the Tisza. These plains and the adjacent areas to the west are the granary of Yugoslavia and are the most densely populated parts of the country. Along the Adriatic coast, mountains rise precipitously from the highly irregular shore and extend inland as a cavernous and pitted limestone plateau (Karst). Settlement and agriculture are possible only in the large structural and solution basins known as *polja* (sing.: *polje*). The few roads and rail lines crossing the Karst to connect the coast and the interior follow serpentine routes and cannot be used for fast traffic. Thus the coast and the hinterland are poorly integrated. Throughout central and southern Yugoslavia are heterogeneous mountain lands of rugged character.

East-west routes through the rough terrain are virtually lacking; but the Vardar-Morava furrow, mentioned earlier, forms an excellent north-south passage from the Danube Valley to the Aegean coast, and from Niš on the middle Morava the Orient Express line to Istanbul extends southeastward. Thus Yugoslavia has complete control over strategic parts of all three of the great routes through the Balkans, and Belgrade and Niš are rail junctions of great significance (see map on this page).



Only a few miles away from these through routes, the mountains shelter isolated settlements in which dwell peoples fiercely independent in philosophy, many of whom were driven into isolation by invaders. The mountains have thus served as retreats from which the people have later emerged to reassert their control over the land they left. Such was the case during World War II, when Yugoslavs retreated into the moun-

tains before the advancing Germans, who were then unable to conquer them in the rugged fastnesses.

Except for the petroleum resources of Rumania, the mineral wealth of Yugoslavia is greater than that of any other Balkan country. Among the unusually varied resources, however, most of the deposits are relatively small in quantity, a fact that inhibits commercial exploitation. Even so, there are enough minerals to encourage the Yugoslav determination to broaden the country's economic base by utilizing domestic ores for at least a modest industry. Copper ore is a principal asset, with famous mines located at Bor, southeast of Belgrade. There is appreciable production of lead and zinc; and manganese, antimony, and chromium are mined in sufficient quantities for sizable exports. With the acquisition of Istria after World War II, Yugoslavia gained the Idrija mercury deposits, which are among the world's best. Yugoslavia is one of Europe's leading producers of bauxite. In mineral fuels, however, the country is deficient, albeit there is limited production of both petroleum (in central Croatia) and low-grade coal. The shortage of coking coal retards utilization of the scattered iron-ore deposits that do exist, although improved transportation facilities would make the better deposits more accessible for large-scale exploitation.

## PEOPLE

With a population of more than 17,000,000, Yugoslavia has a slightly larger number of inhabitants than has Rumania, the second most populous Balkan country.

The most significant human aspect of the country's political geography is the ethnic complexity, the jigsaw of different linguistic-cultural groups. The very name given the state for the first decade following World War I—Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes—reveals the existence of the three

dominant groups even as to the order in which they rank numerically. There are in addition, however, minorities that complicate the ethnic pattern still more: Magyars (Hungarians) in the northeast, Rumanians in the Banat and the Timok valleys in the east, Bulgarians in the southeast, the controversial Macedonians in the south, Vlachs (a Rumanian shepherd people) in the southern mountains, Albanians in the south and southwest, and a few Turks, Jews, Germans, and Italians, although many Germans and Italians were expelled after World War II. Furthermore, the Serbs include such subsidiary groups as the Bosnians, Hercegovinans, and Montenegrins, who, although Serbian in language and culture, have long felt a sense of apartness because of their different historical experiences and associations.

Obviously, such linguistic-cultural differences, in conjunction with different historical-cultural influences, and in addition to resentment against the aggressiveness of the Serbs, result in centrifugal political forces, as is often the case in a multinational state. After 1945 the new government attempted to meet the challenge through federation.

## POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

As is true in varying degrees in all the Balkan states, the recency of the formation of the state naturally influences politico-geographical developments in Yugoslavia. Created only in 1918, Yugoslavia was designed to incorporate the South Slavic peoples residing in the pre-World War I kingdoms of Serbia (under Ottoman rule before 1878) and Montenegro and the former Austro-Hungarian imperial provinces of Croatia, Slavonia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, and Dalmatia, and to include parts of Styria, Carniola, the Baranja, Bačka, and Banat. The separatist feelings of the three primary groups increased until, in 1929, the king impatiently renamed the state Yugoslavia, "Land of the

South Slavs." The decade of the 1930's was a succession of political crises because of Serb-Croat dissensions and other disruptive factors. In 1941 the shaky state was quickly overrun by the Nazis and by mid-1941 divided in part into the puppet states of Serbia, Croatia, and Montenegro and partly distributed among Italy, Hungary, and Bulgaria. Yugoslav guerrillas withdrew to the mountains and harassed the Germans to good effect.

But then the old group hatreds flared anew and were reinforced by struggles among the ethnically complicated right, center, and left political philosophies. At times there was more fighting among the various groups within the Yugoslav guerrillas than between the guerrillas and the Germans. Most bitter was the struggle between Mikhailovich, leader of the chetniks, and Tito, leader of the Communist partisans. At the end of the war Tito emerged as the strong man of Yugoslavia, and by the end of 1945 he had abolished the monarchy and set up a Communist state in full collaboration with the USSR.

**FEDERAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT**—The trend toward federation evident before the war and the absolute necessity of finding some solution for the internecine conflicts produced a federal form of government, reflected in the state's new name: The Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. Six "republics" were set up, corresponding approximately to the areas occupied by the major ethnic groups (names in parentheses are the respective capitals): Serbia (Belgrade), Croatia (Zagreb), Slovenia (Ljubljana), Bosnia and Hercegovina (Sarajevo), Macedonia (Skoplje), and Montenegro (Titograd).

Despite Tito's defection from the Cominform in 1948 and his serving of notice that he had no intention of being dominated by the Soviet Russians, Communist principles were still followed throughout the govern-

ment and the economy. Thus "Titoism" is the prime example of national Communism. It is significant that Soviet Communist principles were modified or even violated to take into account local conditions. In form, the government is republican, with a constitution and a bicameral parliament, but the Communist party monopolizes the real political power by holding all key posts.

**RELIGIOUS GROUPINGS**—The religious groupings in Yugoslavia are another reflection of the influences that have affected the country and are another disruptive factor in the country's political unity. The Eastern, or Orthodox, rites entered from the southeast during the time of the Byzantine Empire. Orthodox influences were followed by Moslem influences after the fifteenth century, with the onslaught of the Ottoman Turks. From the northwest came Roman Catholic influences, especially in those areas dominated by the Austro-Hungarian Empire. As a result, today Yugoslavia is fifty per cent Orthodox, thirty-seven per cent Roman Catholic, and twelve per cent Moslem. The true significance of the percentages, however, lies in the fact that the Roman Catholics are concentrated among the Slovenes and Croats; the Moslems, among the Bosnians, Albanians, and some of the Serbs, and the Orthodox, among the remaining Serbs. Thus religious differences intensify ethnic differences.

## ECONOMY

The national economy of Yugoslavia may be generally described as relatively retarded. Seventy per cent of the population are engaged in agriculture, pressure of rural population, lack of investment capital and training of farmers, and reluctance on the part of agricultural producers to change from their outmoded techniques of land utilization result in the over-all low level of agricultural activity and production. About one third of

the arable lands is farmed collectively; except in Macedonia private farmers continue in the upland areas, where large-scale agricultural practices are not feasible.

Other phases of the economy are on an even lower level than agriculture and play a minor role in the national economy. However, Yugoslavia is attempting systematically to diversify its economy and to utilize domestically more of the raw materials it produces. Some improvements have been made, but achievement of a balanced economy in Yugoslavia is a long-term endeavor.


### TERRITORIAL PROBLEMS

The several territorial disputes in which Yugoslavia has been involved with neighboring countries tend to upset any movement toward equilibrium in the Balkans.

**TRIESTE**—Until its settlement in October, 1954, the most important dispute was that over Trieste (see map on this page). The key elements in this Italo-Yugoslav dispute over Trieste were (1) the fact that Trieste is the best port with the best connections with the hinterland not only for much of Yugoslavia but also for a substantial portion of the middle Danube Basin, as well as for part of northern Italy; and (2) that, whereas Yugoslavia was given the former Austrian province of Carniola (Slovenia) after World War I, the western half was detached and given to Italy. The interior of the Istrian Peninsula is inhabited primarily by Croats and Slovenes, but the west coast and the city of Trieste are—or were—primarily Italian-occupied, although the populations are intermixed in many localities.

After World War II, the Allies and the USSR agreed that the former enemy country of Italy should surrender virtually all of her gains of 1919 in the Istrian area to Yugoslavia, including the islands of Cherso (Cres) and Lussino (Losinj) west of Istria, the Dalmatian coastal city of Zara, and the island

of Lagosta. The disposition of the city of Trieste and the surrounding zone was such a troublesome problem that the area was set up as the Free Territory of Trieste and put under official UN control, rather than under the control of either Italy or Yugoslavia. Yugoslav forces later occupied the southern part (Zone B) of the Free Ter-



ritory, but United States and British forces remained in Trieste itself and in the surrounding area (Zone A) to protect it against a Yugoslav coup. The 1954 London agreement assigned Zone A, minus a tiny strip of territory, to Italy, and Zone B to Yugoslavia.<sup>4</sup> So ended that phase of the Trieste problem.

<sup>4</sup> The accord terminated military governments in Zones A and B, provided for a free port at Trieste, and contained provision for the protection of minorities in the respective areas.

**MACEDONIA**—Probably the second most significant territorial dispute in which Yugoslavia has been concerned is that regarding Macedonia, an indefinitely delineated political region located primarily in southern Yugoslavia and the adjoining parts of Bulgaria and Greece. The essence of the Macedonian problem is likewise twofold: (1) the ethnic affinities of the Macedonians and (2) control over the strategic Vardar Valley. There is little disagreement that the Macedonians are Slavic, although the biological and ethnic mixture is a complex one. Bulgaria particularly claims special rights in Macedonia, maintaining that the Macedonians are Bulgars.

**THE KLAGENFURT BASIN**—A third dispute concerns the Klagenfurt Basin in the Austrian province of Carinthia, a region claimed by Yugoslavia after each world war on the ground that thousands of Slovenes had crossed the Karawanken Range and settled in the valley of the Drava around Klagenfurt. After World War I a plebiscite was held in part of Carinthia to determine the wishes of the inhabitants, and, despite the large number of Slovenes, the vote was in favor of the area's remaining with Austria. Yugoslav claims after World War II have received no serious support.

#### POLITICAL PATTERNS

Disuniting geopolitical factors are found at nearly every turn in Yugoslavia: landforms divide large regions from one another, and

basin is separated from basin, the ethnic pattern is the most complex to be found in all the countries of Europe, except the Soviet Union, and the groups are antagonistic to one another; some peoples in various border zones are antinational and harbor strong sentiments toward neighboring nations, religious conflicts add to the confusion. No one core area holds the loyalty of the people, rather, there are many core areas centered in the areas occupied by the different peoples. The capital, Belgrade, with a half million people, is the traditional and present capital of Serbia. Located at the confluence of the Sava and the Danube, it occupies an eccentric and exposed position to the north and east, however, no other Yugoslav city has Belgrade's advantages.

Why, then, does Yugoslavia survive and retain territorial integrity? Several facts help answer that question. The South Slavs fiercely desire their own state, separate from the non-Slavic nations around them, and the Yugoslavs have long disliked the Bulgars, despite the linguistic kinship between them, thus their salvation lies in maintaining their own state. The strongest South Slav group, the Serbs, have brought to realization their old dream of a Greater Serbia. In both world wars, most of Yugoslavia's peoples were on the winning side. The state's territorial and resource bases are adequate. Federation has relieved many internal tensions. With a tacit guarantee of independence from the Western Allies, Yugoslavia, with a sizable army, looks forward not only to survival but also to a continuing progress.

### BULGARIA

#### LAW, PEOPLE, AND ECONOMY

In contrast to Yugoslavia, Bulgaria is the smallest (42,796 square miles) of the major Balkan countries; only Albania is still smaller.

Bulgaria also has a considerable degree of ethnic and religious uniformity; it was an empire a thousand years ago; it has aggressively but frustratedly attempted to incorporate surrounding lands within its fron-



tiers, it is still a Soviet satellite. Despite their Asiatic biological origins, the Bulgars are, like the Yugoslavs, South Slavs in language and customs.

Because of its landforms, Bulgaria, located astride the east-west Balkan Mountains, is a typical example of an *à cheval* state. It is remarkable that, despite the *à cheval* character of the state and the numerous sharp regional divisions, there is a high degree of political unity among the parts of the country. Most thwarting in its barrier influence on Bulgarian expansion is the Rhodope Plateau in the south. Had this highland not existed, it is logical to assume that Bulgars would have settled the Aegean coast, and that Bulgaria would now have direct access to the Mediterranean. The Rumelian Basin has proved to be an important Bulgarian asset, since through it passes the great trunk line of the Orient Express, already mentioned in the section of Yugoslavia, extending from Niš through Sofia and Plovdiv to Istanbul.

In total population (7,310,000), as in territorial extent, Bulgaria exceeds only Albania among the Balkan countries, although the population of Greece is but slightly larger. In view of the physical nature and limited assets of the country, the density of 171 persons per square mile is quite high, resulting in considerable poverty among the predominantly agricultural population.

Bulgars constitute approximately ninety per cent of the population, the largest minority group being Turks. Between the wars Bulgaria permitted voluntary emigration of the Turks; since 1945 she has resorted to forced emigration and thereby further reduced the number of Turks in the country. The only other ethnic complexity is introduced by a few thousand Rumanians and by the Macedonians in the southwest; as has been mentioned, however, the Bulgars consider the Macedonians as belonging to their own group.

The religious division is not nearly so com-

plex as it is in Yugoslavia. Even so, in addition to the eighty-four per cent of Orthodox members, approximately eleven per cent of the population is Moslem. Most of the latter are Turks, but there is one well-known group of Islamized Bulgars—the Pomaks—located in southwestern Bulgaria.

The national economy exhibits two principal characteristics: an overwhelming predominance of agriculture, with much grazing, and Communist domination of all phases of the economic life. Mineral resources are limited and hence offer little encouragement to industrialization based on domestic raw materials. Since the overthrow of Turkish control, Bulgaria has been a nation of small farmers, most of whom cultivated their own small farms created from the large estates that existed under the Turkish regime. After 1945, however, collectivization under the Communists saw more than half the peasant holdings incorporated into collective farms. In such circumstances it is impossible to believe that the independent Bulgarian peasant enjoys Communist control. Attempts to diversify the economy have had some small success, but the limited geographical basis for industry does not facilitate the development of manufacturing.

#### POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Bulgarian state government extends back 1,200 years. In the ninth and tenth centuries the Bulgarian Empire included a large share of the southeastern Balkans and even extended into Hungary. After several decades in the Byzantine Empire, Bulgaria again emerged as a kingdom, to survive for two more centuries. Then it disappeared for five centuries (1396–1878) under the shadow of Turkish control. Actually, not until 1908 did Bulgaria again achieve complete independence as a kingdom. In less than five decades since then, Bulgaria has been involved in four wars through attempts to ex-

pand her frontiers. After the First Balkan War she attained her greatest size as a modern state and possessed part of the prized Thracian coast on the Aegean, only to lose part of the territory in the Second Balkan War. Because she joined the Central Powers in World War I in an attempt to expand westward and southwestward, the remainder of the Thracian coast was lost to her, and Bulgaria became a state not much larger than she had been in 1908. In World War II Bulgaria joined Germany in hope of gaining Macedonia and the Thracian coast, but again her plans were frustrated.

In addition to the perennial Macedonian dispute, in which Bulgarian influences have played such a significant role, as discussed in the preceding section on Yugoslavia, there are two other territorial disputes in which Bulgaria has frequently been involved. The southern Dobruja, almost entirely Bulgarian in population, was taken by Rumania in the Second Balkan War and retained by her after World War I until, in 1940, she finally released it to Bulgaria, who then retained it after World War II. The other territorial dispute has, on the contrary, not been settled to Bulgaria's satisfaction. To control the Aegean outlet that extends westward from the mouth of the Maritsa through the port of Alexandroupolis (Dedeagach) to the mouth of the Mesta (Néstos) is one of Bulgaria's burning ambitions. She has refused Greek overtures granting free access to Alexandroupolis and remains an intransigent

claimant of western Thrace and a bitter enemy of Greece.

With the entry of Soviet armies into Bulgaria in 1944, Communist influence was reinforced and gradually was able to become dominant. In 1946 a Communist-held plebiscite abolished the monarchy, the young king Simeon II went into exile, and a people's republic, later under complete Communist control, was established. Thus, Bulgaria became a full-fledged Soviet satellite country.

The will for national existence and even for territorial expansion is strong among the Bulgars. Pride in nationality and national history and the memory of the great days of the Bulgarian Empire are powerful influences in Bulgaria's long range geopolitical thinking. The location of the capital, Sofia, in a large basin in the central mountains indicates the intent to have the present core balance north and south. The Slavic ties between Bulgars and Yugoslavs are submerged beneath political enmity, an enmity which was intensified by the withdrawal of Yugoslavia from the Soviet bloc. Bulgaria's traditional bitterness toward Greece and Turkey continues. The Slavic tie with Russia has been strengthened by the inclusion of Bulgaria in the Soviet sphere; but the actual feelings of the Bulgars for the USSR have presumably changed, since the Bulgars can now see that the friendly overtures (that is, Pan-Slavism) made by Russia in the past have not been entirely altruistic.

## RUMANIA

A politico-geographical analysis of Rumania quickly reveals a marked territorial instability in the seventy-five years that Rumania has been independent of Turkish rule. Added to the two core provinces of Walachia and Moldavia after World War I were Bes-

sarabia on the northeast (from Russia), the Bucovina on the north (from Austria), and Transylvania and the eastern edge of the Hungarian Basin—southern Maramures, Rumanian Banat, and Crisana (from Hungary) (see map on page 404). In 1940, after a

Soviet ultimatum, Rumania surrendered Bessarabia and the northern Bucovina, in the same year Hungary took northern Transylvania, the Maramures, and northern Crisana, and Rumania returned the southern Dobruja to Bulgaria. After World War II Rumania recovered territory surrendered to Hungary, but in the treaty of 1947 she surrendered claim to the territories ceded to the USSR and Bulgaria immediately before World War II.

## LAND

Very much the same influences have operated in Rumania as have operated in the areas to the south and southwest, although the country's location has brought it into more intimate contact with the USSR and Hungary. Turkish influence too, though a little more indirect, has still been a powerful factor in Rumanian geopolitical evolution. Thus Rumania is Eastern and Central European as well as Balkan in character. In size and population, it is second to Yugoslavia among the Balkan countries: 91,654 square miles; population, 16,200,000.

The geographical regions of Rumania are rather definite in pattern. Between the Danube and the Black Sea is the Dobruja Plateau, hilly in the north and rolling steppe in the south. Immediately north of the Danube is the flat to undulating Walachian Plain, merging northward into the foothills, which, in turn, give way to the rugged Transylvanian Alps. This range curves northeastward and then, as the Carpathians, bends northwestward, crossing the Rumanian frontier into the USSR. To the east of the Carpathians lies the somewhat dissected plateau of Moldavia; to the west of them and north of the Transylvanian Alps is the hilly to rolling basin of Transylvania. Along the western edge of Rumania is the easterly extension of the Hungarian Basin. As a result of the pattern of landforms, Rumania, like

Bulgaria, may be considered an *à cheval* state, lying as it does astride the curve of the Carpathian-Transylvanian Alps arc—the dividing effect of which will be pointed out later.

## MINERALS AND INDUSTRIES

The great mineral resource of Rumania is petroleum, of which she produces more than any other European country except the USSR. Since 1934, however, production has been gradually declining from a peak of 8,500,000 tons in that year to about 5,000,000 tons in 1950. The principal producing region is around Ploesti on the southern flanks of the Transylvanian Alps north of Bucharest, other production comes from Moldavia, the Maramures, and Transylvania. The largest natural-gas fields in Europe outside the USSR are found in southern Transylvania and support a fair regional industry. Modest coal and iron-ore deposits in the southwest have given rise to a small steel industry. The country also produces lead, zinc, gold, and silver. But it is the important petroleum resources—which at various times have been controlled by German, British, and American interests and now, of course, by the USSR—that are of the greatest geopolitical significance.

## PEOPLE AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

The historical origin of the Rumans, usually called Vlachs (cf. Walachians) in the Balkans, is a matter of great dispute and of considerable importance, largely because it affects the validity of Rumanian claims to Transylvania. At the dawn of history in this region the Roman Emperor Trajan, in A.D. 100-106, defeated and conquered the Dacians, who had established a considerable kingdom in Walachia and surrounding regions. However, in less than two centuries Roman withdrawal was forced by barbarian

tribes advancing into Europe from the east. One of the important points in Rumanian history hangs on whether all the Daco-Roman population of Walachia withdrew to the south of the Danube with the retreating Roman legions in 275, not to return for a thousand years, or whether a substantial number remained in Walachia and in Transylvania. There is strong evidence that the forebears of the Rumans did indeed remain in the mountains after Roman withdrawal and thus preceded the Szeklers, Magyar (Hungarian) frontier guards, who arrived in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. This controversy notwithstanding, it is plain that the Rumans are a mixed people biologically; and the Rumanian language is basically a modified Old Latin dialect with many Slavic words, especially in the rural language. Thus Rumania is an island of Romance language surrounded by Slavic and Magyar languages.

The ethnic composition of the population of Rumania was made a great deal more complicated after World War I with the incorporation of the various territories already enumerated. The core kingdom of Walachia-Moldavia was almost solidly Rumanian, although the Dobruja contained many Turks, Bulgars, and others. After 1918 the country was beset with minority problems, and the treatment of minorities brought a great deal of criticism both from the League of Nations and from the neighboring countries whose peoples were being oppressed. None of the minorities had the group power evidenced by non-Serb groups in Yugoslavia. Territorial changes after World War II, as well as population exchanges, have somewhat simplified the ethnic pattern in Rumania. Nevertheless, there are still several minority groups that are significant in the geopolitical picture: Szeklers and Saxons (Germans) in Transylvania, Magyars all along the western border, and smaller numbers of Turks, Tatars, Gypsies, Serbs, Armenians, Greeks, and Jews.

In tracing the highlights of governmental development in modern times, one must go back to the ebb in the migration of peoples that occurred after the Magyars settled the Hungarian Basin. Walachia and Moldavia rose in the latter thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, and by playing off Turkey, Hungary, and Poland against one another they were able to survive Turkish blows until 1462, when Ottoman control—indirectly exercised—became established. The darkest period in Rumanian history occurred during the Phanariote period (1711–1821), when Greek merchants and bankers—called Phanariotes because of the quarter (Phanar) of Constantinople in which they lived—absolutely drained the country's wealth, while governing it for the Turks. The oppression of the peasantry and the robbery during this period, as well as the countermeasures—lying, cheating, and stealing—adopted by the Rumanians affected the country so profoundly that it has not yet fully recovered. Although Turkish control was indirect, it continued with only brief interruptions until united Walachia and Moldavia in 1877 declared themselves independent of all Turkish control. Greatly expanded territorially after 1918, Rumania remained a kingdom until the Communist government forced the abdication of King Michael on December 30, 1947. After that Rumania was lost behind the Iron Curtain as a full-fledged Soviet satellite.

The country has an overwhelmingly agricultural economy, with agriculture employing more than eighty per cent of the actively engaged population. Possibly the Communist attempts to industrialize the country will permit Rumania to make profitable use of her fair resources and diversify the economy. By way of improving transportation and of permitting river boats to circumvent the swampy lower course of the Danube, Rumania, in 1953, began constructing a Danube-Black Sea Canal from Cernavodă on the Danube eastward to the coast.

## TERRITORIAL PROBLEMS

Probably the most pressing territorial problem facing Rumania has apparently been solved for the foreseeable future with the absorption of Bessarabia into the USSR. This ethnically complex territory, with Moldavians, Ukrainians, Jews, Great Russians, Bulgarians, Turks, and other minor groups, was long a theater of conflict between Turkey and Russia and passed under Russian control in 1812. In 1918 it declared itself a republic, and the Diet voted for its incorporation into Rumania as an autonomous province. Russia declared every intention of recovering Bessarabia and succeeded in doing so by an ultimatum to Rumania in 1940. Bessarabia was then established as the greater part of the Moldavian SSR. Also in 1940 the USSR demanded and took the northern part of the Bucovina—which Austria had held from 1777 until 1918, and which had been given to Rumania in 1918 by the Treaty of St. Germain—although its people were Rumanians, Ruthenians, Germans, and Poles.

The problem of Transylvania has been a perplexing one for centuries. The most recent flare-up actually started with the indignation and bitterness of Hungary over the severe territorial losses it suffered in the Treaty of Trianon (1920). If Hungary could see any justification in the transfer to Rumania of Transylvania, it could not accept the transfer of the eastern edge of the Hun-

garian Basin—the eastern Banat, Crisana, and the Maramures. The seizure by Hungary, in 1940, of the northern part of Transylvania reopened the problem, although Hungary returned the seized territory in 1945. There was evidence in 1954 that the part of Transylvania occupied by Szeklers and Germans was organized as an autonomous region within Rumania with its center at Târgu-Mureș. The dispute with Bulgaria over the southern Dobruja has already been explained.

Thus the state that has attempted to maintain a political territorial home for the Rumanians concentrated in the core areas of Walachia-Moldavia and in the Transylvanian Basin has found its struggle for survival difficult even now that the former Turkish enemy has gone. With many assets, including a strategic position as guardian of the passes through the Transylvanian Alps and the southern Carpathians, Rumania has yet to find a formula for a completely independent sphere of action. In terms of total population, territory, resources, and will to national existence, it has a sufficient basis for political and economic viability. However, individual morality, especially among people in high places, must rise above the traditional level that was excusable under Turkish control but can only hurt an independent Rumania. So long as Rumania is a Soviet satellite, it can only accept the fate of other countries in the Soviet bloc and await the relaxation of Soviet Communist control.

## ALBANIA

With an area of approximately 11,100 square miles and an estimated population amounting to about 1,200,000, Albania has the smallest territory and the fewest inhabitants of all the Balkan countries. Its territory is slightly less than that of either Belgium or the Netherlands.

Except for a narrow, malarial coastal plain and one or two inland basins, notably that around Korçë (Koritsa) in the southeast, Albania is incredibly mountainous and lacks the connecting valleys found in the Alpine areas of Switzerland and Austria. As a result, communications are poorly developed,

and groups are completely isolated from one another. The unit of group consciousness is the tribe, or clan, rather than the entire national group.

Ethnically, the Albanians are divided into two main groups: the Ghegs—tall, independent in philosophy, and clannish—north of the Shkumbi River; and the Tosks—shorter and more like the Greeks temperamentally as well as physically—south of the Shkumbi. Furthermore, hundreds of thousands of Albanians live in Yugoslavia and Greece, as well as in southern Italy. Most Albanians (sixty-five per cent of the total population) are Moslems, who in Albania are called Arnauts. The Christian Tosks (twenty-three per cent) follow the Orthodox rites, and the Christian Ghegs (eleven per cent) are Roman Catholics.

Backwardness characterizes all Albanian institutional developments. Ninety per cent of the people are engaged in agriculture, and of these, two thirds are engaged in a grazing economy; less than twelve per cent of the land is in crops and orchards. The present Soviet-dominated Communist government is attempting to broaden the Albanian economy, but significant industrial and commercial development is hardly to be expected.

Politically, the Albanian realm has been under outside control throughout history. It was first created as a definite state in 1913, after the First Balkan War, mostly at the insistence of Austria and Italy. The former desired to prevent Serbian expansion to the Adriatic; the latter preferred a weak na-

tion across the strait from its southeastern tip. Italian influence increased in kind and degree until finally, in 1939, Albania was incorporated into the Italian Empire, and the Italo-Greek War in 1940-41 was fought largely in southern Albania. Toward the end of World War II, Communist influence quietly increased, until theoretically free elections in 1945 placed the Communists in full control as the monarchy was abolished and a people's republic proclaimed in Tirana, the capital. After the defection of Tito's Yugoslavia in 1948, Albania was isolated from the rest of the Soviet bloc.

Two territorial disputes in which Albania has been involved deserve mention. The tiny isle of Sazan (Italian: Saseno) at the mouth of the Bay of Vlone (Italian: Valona) was given to Italy after World War I, thus permitting Italy to control both sides of the Strait of Otranto. After World War II, however, Albania regained the island and converted it into a fortified Gibraltar of the Adriatic. The second dispute is that over southern Albania, or northern Epirus, claimed by Greece.

Thus Albania presents an interesting politico-geographical aspect. Lacking an effective core area, created as a state more because of desires by the Great Powers for a weak buffer state than because of undeniable national aspirations, continually dominated from without because of inability to exercise independence of action, Albania stands today as the only Communist state not lying behind the continuous Iron Curtain surrounding the Soviet bloc.

## GREECE

Greece occupies the southernmost extension of the Balkan Peninsula and is largely a land of subpeninsulas and islands. Like Denmark, it is a good example of a fragmented peninsular-insular state. The very long and

ragged seacoast and the numerous islands in the Aegean Archipelago are the result of submergence of the lower valleys near the coast and subsidence of mountain blocks on the mainland. Such a coastal outline re-

flects the nature of the interior landforms of Greece, which, like Albania, has a very high percentage of its area in mountains. There are no truly large plains areas comparable to those of Rumania and Yugoslavia, although there are some delta plains and former lake bed plains scattered over the country.

#### PHYSICAL FEATURES

Even though settlement in the mountains is amazingly dense, it is the basins and plains that have, since antiquity, served as settlement cores, giving rise to city-states in classical times. Separated from one another by unbroken mountain walls, the basins communicate best with each other by sea, and the lack of rail connections and roads in Greece is striking.<sup>5</sup> The massive Pindus forms an especially marked barrier between the eastern and western sides of mainland Greece. The generally fair climate, affording excellent visibility, and the island steppingstones in the Aegean have long combined with the repelling interior to encourage the Greeks to utilize the sea. The rugged landforms reduce the usable portion of the area—51,182 square miles, of which nearly 10,000 square miles are accounted for by the islands—to only one fourth of the total area. The very dry Mediterranean summers, especially in the south and in the east, are an additional impediment to high agricultural yields.

Greece is seriously deficient in the mineral fuels as well as in hydroelectric capacity. It has modest deposits of bauxite, magnesite, iron pyrites, lead, zinc, chromite, and manganese, all of which are actively exploited. Mining activities, however, are on a small scale either because the deposits are small

or because they have been mined for so many centuries.

#### PEOPLE AND CULTURE

The Greeks, both those of Greece itself and those in the Mediterranean lands around Greece, have displayed a remarkable continuity, culturally and physically, through the centuries. It is a tribute to the vitality of Greek culture and especially of the Greek language that the country has absorbed thousands of immigrants—particularly South Slavs, Albanians, Turks, and Vlachs (Rumans)—without serious difficulty. Modern spoken Greek is, of course, quite different from classical Greek, but the written language has a similarity that is surprising in view of the more than 2,000 years separating the periods.

In the country's total population of 7,600,000 the Greeks represent nearly ninety-five per cent; ethnic minorities are thus few in over-all number but include Turks, Macedonians, Albanians, Vlachs, Bulgarian Pomaks, and Jews. Only the Macedonians and Albanians form appreciably compact areas of settlement. Minorities have been reduced somewhat through population exchanges and by Nazi extermination of Jews during World War II.

The over-all density of 150 people per square mile is extraordinarily high in relation to the character of the land; the density actually rises to nearly 800 per square mile of arable land. Emigration by the Greeks from the rather poor Greek peninsula has characterized the history of the area; the decreasing opportunity for emigration indicates serious economic pressures to follow if the traditionally high birth rate continues—especially in combination with a decreasing death rate.

#### POLITICAL ASPECTS

In regard to Greek government, it is of significance that Greek concepts of democracy

<sup>5</sup> After World War II two Greek national airlines set up a relatively dense air net, with frequent schedules from Athens to all important cities of the peninsula and to Crete.

have for centuries been of capital importance in Western civilization. Despite the ups and downs of democracy in the country, politics remain a burning issue; no Greek village is so isolated that it does not have vigorous political discussions in the streets and coffee houses.

Though the glory and power of the city-states of classical times in Greece seemed to disappear under first the Macedonian rule and later the Roman conquest, still Greek culture and political thought re-emerged as powerful influences in the Byzantine Empire. Shortly after the Ottoman capture of Constantinople in 1453, the land of Greece also disappeared in the Turkish shadow, not to reappear until nearly four centuries later, when, in 1830, Greek independence was won. During the century following independence the territory controlled by the Greek state gradually expanded from the core of the Peloponnese (Morea) and the area north and east of the Gulf of Corinth (Sterea) to include the Ionian Islands in 1864, Thessaly in 1881, Crete in 1908, Greek Macedonia in 1913, western Thrace in 1920, and finally the Dodecanese Islands in 1947. Governmental developments during the same period displayed marked changes: although Greece was a kingdom from 1830 until 1924, the kings' tenures were uncertain, with expulsion, assassination, and deposition terminating various reigns. In 1924 a plebiscite set up a republic; in 1935, another plebiscite restored the monarchy; in 1946, a third plebiscite continued the monarchy. Such erratic developments reflect the volatile character of Greek political life and are indicative of the strong undercurrents that frequently rend Greek politics. Lack of unity within and among the many parties often results in votes of no confidence in the government and almost invariably necessitates a resort to coalition administration.

Although Greece was spared the fate of its sister Balkan countries in being absorbed into the Soviet bloc, the most vigorous action

was required after 1944 on the part of both the Greeks and their allies, especially Britain and the United States, to resist Communist aggression. The importance of the strategic location of the country was aptly demonstrated in the interest taken by the United States and other Western allies in preserving Greek independence. Such interest was manifested in direct aid and in the inclusion of Greece in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The "Truman Doctrine" for reinforcing Greek and Turkish will to resist Communist inroads was the United States' answer to activities that might have made Greece an earlier Korea.

Before real stability can be brought to Greek political life, the low level of the national economy—the lowest in Europe—must be substantially raised. The geographical environment offers little encouragement in any of its aspects; it will require a superhuman effort on the part of the Greeks to build the foundations for a stable economy that will ameliorate the country's abject poverty.

#### TERRITORIAL CLAIMS

Most of the Greek territorial claims and external designs against Greek territory have already been discussed, but some additional recognition of the Greek point of view is necessary. The Macedonian question, discussed in connection with Yugoslavia, exhibited its explosive quality during the civil war of 1946–49, when Macedonian separatist sentiments were fanned into flame and were united with Communist aims. Unwisely repressive Greek treatment of the Macedonians was pointed out by the Balkan Commission in the United Nations. With the withdrawal of Yugoslavia from the Soviet camp and with the common bond of anti-Soviet feeling to unite them more closely than ever before, Greece and Yugoslavia have actively attempted to reach an understanding regarding their many problems, including that of



Macedonia. Bulgarian desires in both Macedonia and western Thrace contributed to the Bulgar support of anti-Greek forces during the civil war. However, there is little evidence that Bulgaria will force any *de jure* boundary changes. The increasing rapport between Greece and Turkey has apparently extinguished all Greek pretensions to additional territory in Thrace or, even more certainly, in Asia Minor. The crushing defeat of the Greeks in the early 1920's and the surrender of Greek enclaves in Anatolia in the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), as well as the Greek-Turkish population exchanges subsequent to 1923, marked the end of Greek control over the coast of Asia Minor with its traditional center of Smyrna (Izmir). Greek claims on Epirus in southern Albania have been somewhat softened, but further dispute may be expected in the future.

The territory that Greece has most per-

sistently demanded in recent years is the island of Cyprus, annexed by Britain from Turkey in 1914 and made a colony in 1925. Since 1945 Greece has backed the Cypriot movement for union with Greece (*enosis*). The population is overwhelmingly Greek, with a Turkish minority. As has often been the case, the Greek Orthodox religion has been the medium by which consciousness of Greek nationality has been maintained. The union of Cyprus with Greece is opposed by both the British and the Turks. The British fear that if they relinquish their control of Cyprus, they may eventually lose the use of their military base there. The Turks are concerned about the status of the Turkish population on the island if the Greeks gain control. They also are troubled about the possibility of a left-wing government coming to power in Athens and controlling Cyprus forty-two miles off the Turkish coast.

### Study Questions

1. What are the core areas of each of the nations in the Balkan area?
2. Discuss transportation problems in the Balkans.
3. Why have Yugoslavia and Greece been able to avoid becoming Soviet satellite states?
4. Discuss Soviet control since World War II over the economies of Bulgaria and Rumania.
5. Describe Albania's strategic position with respect to Yugoslavia, Greece, and Italy.
6. Analyze Greece's strategic position as a member of NATO.
7. List the major forces of unity and diversity in Yugoslavia.
8. Map the important waterways and mountain passes in the Balkans.
9. Discuss the historic boundary problems of Greece.
10. Describe the location and functions of the capitals of the various Balkan States.
11. List the major ethnic groups in the Balkans and indicate their location on a map.
12. Discuss the mineral and agricultural resources of the Balkans with reference to the various countries in which they are located.
13. What role has Transylvania played in Rumania's history?
14. What heritages of Turkish control still remain in the Balkans?
15. Discuss the roles played by Turkey, Russia, and Italy in Balkan politics during the past century.





## *The Continent of Africa*

Africa with its vast dimensions, impressive resources, and varied cultures is a continent that stands on the threshold of new national growth and development. As the last remaining important colonial domain of the European countries, it is engaged in a struggle with nationalism, Communism, and Western interests. Economically the greater part of Africa is underdeveloped, with much of its natural wealth as yet unexploited and with a low standard of living for the great mass of the population. The social structure of Africa is characterized by broad cultural differences which often lead to conflicts, but recent improvements in transportation, in production techniques, and in opportunities for education are leading not only to a better economy with greater utilization of manpower but also to a better understanding between the native peoples and those of European origin.

Africa, which has an area of approximately 11,500,000 square miles, physically joins the great Eurasian land mass; hence it has a location of strategic importance. In area

second only to Asia among the continents, Africa is almost four times the size of the United States. In latitude the continent extends almost equal distances north and south of the Equator, four fifths of it lying between the Tropic of Cancer and the Tropic of Capricorn. Because of a huge westward bulge in the northern half, Africa is 4,500 miles wide from east to west, only 500 miles less than its length from north to south. The continent is remarkably compact, with a relatively short and regular coastline, but there are few large embayments suitable for harbors. It has great depth, parts of the interior, such as central Sahara or east central Belgian Congo, are more than 1,000 miles from the nearest coast.

In many respects, Africa must be considered in conjunction with Europe and Asia, with which its history has always been associated. The close proximity of Africa to Europe across the narrow Strait of Gibraltar and to Asia through the land bridge of the Isthmus of Suez and the added fact that all three continents enjoy direct access to the

Mediterranean have led to trade, conquest, and settlement between Africa and the adjacent continents since earliest times. But, in general, the Sahara has served as a barrier to the southward movement of peoples and their culture from the Mediterranean, the part of the continent south of the Sahara has, to a large extent, been oriented to the oceans, especially east Africa, which has looked to the Indian Ocean for its trade with, and settlement from, Asiatic countries.

Three major water bodies adjacent to Africa—the Mediterranean, the Atlantic Ocean, and the Indian Ocean—afford world trade routes and further link Africa with Europe and Asia. An early trade route between Western Europe and the Far East was down the west coast of Africa, around the Cape of Good Hope, and into the Indian Ocean. Later, the construction of the Suez Canal made possible the shorter route through the Mediterranean. Most recently Africa has been put in close touch with Europe and southwest Asia by the airplane; today a dense network of commercial routes ties together important points in the three continents. In addition, the great western bulge of northern Africa, which is about 1,800 miles from the most eastern part of South America, has become a transit area for planes between Europe and such points as Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, and Santiago. During time of war military air bases in northern Africa would be of tremendous strategic value for operations in Europe and Asia.

#### PHYSICAL FACTORS

**SURFACE CONFIGURATION AND DRAINAGE—**Topographically most of Africa is a vast plateau bordered, in most places, by coastal plains. Above the plateau surface, in widely separated areas, mountains rise. Large basins, some of interior drainage, are typical of the plateau surface. Most of the rivers flow from the plateau to the coastal plains through gorges or over cataracts, thus pre-

venting navigation from the oceans to the interior.

In general the plateau is higher in the south and east than in the remainder of the continent. In the south the average elevations exceed 3,000 feet; in the southeast the Drakensberg forms an escarpment of more than 6,000 feet. Characteristic of this part of the plateau are numerous mesas and rocky hills. In the east, much of the plateau has an elevation of more than 4,000 feet. Here great steep-sided north-south trenches known as rift valleys dissect the surface. On the floors of the rift valleys are numerous lakes, of which Lake Victoria is the largest. Mountain peaks, such as Kilimanjaro (19,565 feet), Kenya, and Ruwenzori, are common in this part of the plateau. Southeast of the African mainland the large island of Madagascar is also typically plateau-like in character. Elsewhere than in the south and east the African Plateau drops to between 1,000 and 3,000 feet above sea level, and some areas in the Sahara are even below sea level. Typical of the Sahara part of the plateau are mesas, rocky hills, stony surfaces, and large basins, other areas are made up of extensive sand dunes.


Mountains and coastal plains actually form but a small percentage of the surface of the continent. The Atlas Mountains in northern Africa, along with the elevated plateaus of the Shotts, are the largest group of highlands; other mountains of importance are the Tibesti and Ahaggar in the Sahara Desert and the Cameroons in Equatorial Africa. Most of the coastal plains are continuous, although they may range from less than a mile to fifty miles in width. In some places the coastal plains extend to the plateau; in others a belt of foothills lies between the coastal plain and the plateau edge.

The rivers of Africa are important for navigation and irrigation and as either developed or potential sources of hydroelectric power. The six major rivers of Africa—Orange, Limpopo, Zambezi, Congo,

Niger, and Nile—drain more than half of the continental surface (see map on this page). Much of the remainder is drained by streams which flow into basins of interior drainage. The navigable portions of the Zambezi, Congo, Niger, and Nile are important links in the transportation system of the continent. Irrigation works have assumed great economic importance, especially in the vicinity of the Nile and Niger rivers and, to a lesser extent, near the Orange River. The large volume of flow in the rivers from the heavy

rainfall of the tropics and the numerous suitable dam and reservoir sites together give Africa a tremendous water-power potential, estimated to be a third of that of the whole world.

**CLIMATE AND VEGETATION**—Africa is the most tropical of the continents. The Equator is so close to both the northern and southern extremities of the continent that cool temperate climates are experienced only on high parts of the plateau and in the mountains



Climatic zones tend to reflect their latitudinal position and to merge gradually into one another because of the relatively uniform surface and the absence of mountain barriers. Annual precipitation ranges from more than 100 inches in the tropical rain-forest areas to negligible amounts in the low latitude deserts, but high temperatures are common throughout most of the continent. In general, the same series of climatic zones project from the Equator but northward to the Mediterranean and southward to the Cape of Good Hope.

The major climatic zones from the Equator poleward are tropical rain forest, tropical savanna, hot desert, and subtropical. The tropical rain-forest zone along the Equator has rain and a monotonously high temperature throughout the year and supports a dense, almost impenetrable, forest. North and south of the rain-forest belt the tropical-savanna zones, with tall grasses and clumps of trees, are characterized by wet and dry seasons. The margins of these zones that approach the Equator have a long wet season and a short dry season; the remainder of the zones have a short season of rainfall and a long dry season. The vegetation changes gradually from savanna to tall tropical grasses as higher latitudes are reached. Poleward from about 18 degrees north and south of the Equator hot desert zones become apparent. In the north is the Sahara, the largest desert in the world, in the south is the Kalahari, which though much smaller than the Sahara, is its climatic counterpart. The northern and southern extremities of the continent are in subtropical zones. Summers are dry, except in the area east of Capetown, which is humid throughout the year. The vegetation consists mainly of evergreen broadleaf trees and shrubs in the dry-summer subtropical region and of broadleaf deciduous trees in the more humid zones.


Large sections of the coasts within the tropics are rainy, enervating, and subject to numerous diseases; the dreaded tsetse fly

in particular has plagued tropical Africa with sleeping sickness. In contrast with the tropical coasts, the high plateaus of southern and eastern Africa are drier and more healthful and have greater seasonal temperature ranges.

## HUMAN FACTORS

**POPULATION AND CITIES**—The population of Africa is slightly more than 200,000,000. This total includes 500,000 people of recent immigration from Asia and 5,000,000 of European origin. The remainder are the native races, the largest number of which by far are the Negroes. The population density for the whole of the continent is approximately seventeen persons per square mile on about one fourth of the world's land area, as compared to a world density of 42. In the Nile Valley and Delta, the population density is about 1,200 persons per square mile and in parts of Nigeria it exceeds 300; these densities contrast strongly with those found in the large desert and tropical-forest areas of Africa, which, in fact, are virtually devoid of people.

Africa is not highly urbanized; indeed, the entire continent has fewer large cities than either Great Britain or West Germany (see map on page 427). Altogether, only some dozen African cities have populations exceeding 250,000. Cairo, the largest, has a population of more than 2,000,000, followed by Alexandria with about 1,000,000; both are located in the area of dense settlement along the Nile in Egypt. A third is Johannesburg, inland metropolitan center in the Rand of the Union of South Africa, with somewhat more than 750,000 inhabitants. Oddly enough, Johannesburg greatly surpasses in importance both Pretoria, the capital of the Union, and Capetown, the largest port. Casablanca, Atlantic seaport in Morocco, completes the list of cities that have a population of 500,000 or more, although Dakar in French West Africa is coming up fast as one



of the major cities of the continent. Continued economic development of Africa will doubtless see a more rapid urban growth and will lead not only to increased population of existing cities but to the emergence of other urban centers from what are now only secondary settlements.

**PEOPLE AND LANGUAGE**—It is difficult to identify and separate scientifically the main stocks of African peoples because of the inevitable process of migration, fusion of

racial types, and mixture of foreign populations. Still, it is useful to speak of ethnic groups where in a broad sense language characteristics and cultural traits form a pattern of distribution. Leaving out of consideration the people of European origin, recent immigrants from India, and the Malayo-Polynesians of Madagascar, we can divide the peoples of Africa into five major groups: the Bantu Negroes; the Guinea and Sudanese Negroes; the aboriginal Negro, a



group which includes the Hottentots, Bushmen, and Pygmies, the mixed Hamite-Negro; and the non-Negroid, including the Hamites and Semites. The distribution of languages in modern-day Africa tends to obscure group relationships, but distinct language characteristics are found among several of the groups.

The Bantu Negroes live in most of the area south of the Equator and speak related but distinctive languages. These people are divided between settled agriculturalists and hunter-pastoralists. The Eastern Bantu are excellent cultivators and agriculturalists and are considered one of the most progressive peoples of Africa. Even before coming under British influence, they had evolved a political organization resembling a constitutional monarchy. Likewise, the Central Bantu are mostly agriculturalists, but they practice a shifting cultivation, and some of them are still seminomadic. The Southern Bantu, greatly influenced by the penetration of people of European origin, have been integrated into a corresponding economy and live on farms and in towns and work in mines. Tribal organization has been disrupted in much of the Southern Bantu area.

The Guinea and Sudanese Negroes range eastward from West Africa to the eastern coast of Sudan on the Red Sea. They are essentially small cultivators and were formerly grouped into kingdoms. This large group does not form a linguistic unit in the same sense as do the Bantu people, for the Sudanese Negroes, though they all speak a Sudanic language, use many varieties which differ so greatly from one another that a relationship between them has not been definitely established.

Aboriginal Negroes frequently inhabit isolated areas and form a relatively unimportant group of people with primitive Negroid characteristics: Hottentots, who formerly inhabited southwest Africa; Pygmies of the Congo; and Bushmen of the Kalahari, nomadic hunters who have benefited little

by contact with other cultures but are slowly blending with other peoples. The Hottentots have a distinctive language, but the Pygmies appear to use the speech of their neighbors.

The mixed Hamite-Negro peoples are scattered mainly in the eastern and central portions of Africa. Also included in this group are the Nilotes of the Sudan, a tall cattle-rearing people who introduced many arts to the southern Hamites. A common factor among these people is their use of a distinctive language and grammar in the Hamitic group.

Of the non-Negroid group, the Hamites and Semites are in many areas an admixture of peoples, and the distribution of culture and language is complex. In North Africa as a whole the greater number of people speak Arabic rather than a Hamitic language. The dominant Hamitic stock includes three branches: the Eastern in Ethiopia and the Somali peninsula; the Western, to which the Tuareg and Ahaggar of the Sahara belong; and the Northern, where the Berbers of the Barbary Coast and the Copts of Egypt are the principal representatives. In general, the whole northern coastland is inhabited by Arabs, Berbers, and mixed races, belonging to the white category. For over 2,000 years the history of these North African peoples has been closely linked with that of other groups within the Mediterranean Basin.

**SOCIAL CHANGES**—The disparity in numbers between the indigenous population of Africa and peoples of European origin is a factor of considerable weight in the socioeconomic development of the continent. Not only have the white people acted as a dominant minority in the political matters, but European immigrants and settlers have introduced a standard of life that has modified the primitive culture of native communities. The growth of cities and towns and the expansion of commerce from the coastal areas

inland have left few native Africans wholly untouched by Western influences. Contacts between government officials and the people multiplied, Western goods found their way into native village stores, and the offer of employment and wages in the mines and cities created mobility in the population. The impact of Western influences gradually disrupted the tribal cohesion, undermined the authority of the village elders, and left in its wake the problem of social maladjustment of a changing society. Noticeably within the past fifty years the youthful population has been seeking a new status patterned upon the Western standards of life, with a corresponding decline in the rural arts and native crafts and in the vigor of native institutions.

#### ECONOMIC FACTORS

Much of Africa is yet in the primitive stages of economic development; yet in places material advancement has been sufficiently rapid to by-pass many of the steps that normally need to be taken in the attainment of a modern civilization. For example, Dakar is presently undergoing a period of expansion whereby an up-to-date city with fine new buildings is emerging in a land otherwise largely lacking in architectural construction common to Western Europe and the United States. Again, in Ethiopia a modern air-route network is superimposed upon a landscape that has only the crudest sort of surface transportation. Although the idea and the funds for such development primarily originate in Europe or America, the results are signs of the times in Africa, and there is promise that the continent will continue to benefit from such an influx of new techniques and ideas. Less spectacular and much more common, of course, is the long, sluggish uphill pull of the masses of people themselves who till the soil or seek to develop resources in the face of world competition.

**AGRICULTURE**—Most of the agricultural production of Africa consists of food crops grown for home consumption. The continent also produces and exports significant amounts of the world's supply of cacao, palm oil, sisal, and cotton, for countries in Central Africa a single item or two among these commodities may constitute three fourths of their exports. Principal food crops in Africa are millet, sorghum, yams, sweet potatoes, beans, and peanuts—notably different from those of the world as a whole, where grains such as wheat, rye, oats, barley, rice, and maize are of major importance. For the crops already mentioned, production could be increased in parts of Africa by the clearing of new land, the use of disease-resistant plant stocks, increased irrigation, and mechanization, measures that have been long delayed in this part of the world.

The use of machinery in Africa involves a great change in agricultural practices, for large numbers of the people still can be classed as gatherers of wild fruit and roots, hunters, or farmers of shifting cultivation; nevertheless, in some parts of tropical Africa mechanization has been successfully introduced. There are, however, areas in Africa in which the introduction of machinery might not prove an answer to land problems. For example, some plowed lands have suffered severe erosion, and soils after continuous and prolonged cultivation tend to require long periods of rest to re-establish their fertility. Moreover, in areas such as the densely populated Nile Valley and Delta, where hand labor is extensively utilized, large farm machines probably would not prove worth while unless there should arise new demands for labor in industry and commerce. Mechanization in irrigation would, of course, help in the pumping and distribution of water. Finally, experience in the mechanization of agriculture has shown that under the tropical conditions prevailing in Africa greater technical knowledge and skill are required than in, say, America. The

British learned this in the recent peanut, or groundnut, scheme in East Africa.<sup>1</sup>

**MINERALS**—Africa has many minerals of significance to world trade, as indicated in the table on this page. The continent has almost a monopoly in the production of diamonds and produces considerably more than half of the world's supply of gold and cobalt. Africa is also an important producer of phosphates, chromium, manganese, and copper. The Belgian Congo is one of the chief sources of uranium ore, the base for radium as well as for atomic power. Deposits of iron ore, bauxite, and tin ore are known to exist, but there are deficiencies in coal, petroleum, lead, and zinc. Recently petroleum companies have been exploring the possibilities for oil in the northern Sahara.

Mineral production is of great importance in the economic development of Africa, at present accounting for a large part of the export trade of the continent. This mineral wealth has also been the cause of rivalry among European nations, each of which has attempted to gain control of it. Finally, mining has had social effects on the natives, to whom the mines afford the opportunities to earn money wages, and tribal organizations are often disrupted when the natives leave their villages to go to the mines in search of work.

**INDUSTRY**—Industrial development in Africa is not to be compared with that commonly found in Europe and North America. Lacking is the proper endowment of iron ores, coal, and oil that heavy industry requires. On the other hand, Africa has great water-power potential, which could be a source of

energy for future industrial development. Because of the increasing number of wage earners in all parts of the continent and the desire for Western goods, there is a widespread and increasing demand for modern consumers' items. In fact, many of the large cities are producing limited consumer products from local raw materials. The problems faced by industry may differ greatly from area to area, but in general they arise from lack of industrial capital, unreliable labor supply, poor transportation, inadequate supplies of many primary raw materials, and a shortage of technologists.

Minerals of Africa

<i>Mineral</i>	<i>Chief Producers</i>	<i>Percentage of World Production</i>
Pyrethrum	British East Africa	100.0
Columbrum	Nigeria	99
Uranium	Belgian Congo	90 <sup>a</sup>
Industrial diamonds	Union of South Africa, Belgian Congo	98
Cobalt	Belgian Congo, Northern Rhodesia, Morocco	80
Gold	Union of South Africa, Belgian Congo, British West Africa	55
Manganese	Gold Coast, Union of South Africa	25
Copper	Northern Rhodesia, Belgian Congo, Nigeria	20
Tin	Belgian Congo, Nigeria, Northern Rhodesia	20

<sup>a</sup> Estimated; figures not available.

Some areas of Africa, however, have industrial development of considerable importance. In the Union of South Africa, the iron-and-steel industry has grown rapidly since World War I, and the country at present appears to be near self-sufficiency. Southern Rhodesia has large textile mills, a

<sup>1</sup> In 1947 the British government inaugurated a program which ultimately was to result in the planting of 2,000,000 acres with groundnuts in Tanganyika in order to ease Great Britain's deficit in fats. The venture was not entirely successful, but it did contribute to the knowledge of the problems of commercial agriculture in Central Africa.

machine-tool industry, and a large steel plant. Egypt looks to industrialization as a means of supporting the dense population of the Nile Valley and Delta, and already much money has been invested in plants for the manufacture of textiles, glassware, soap, fertilizers, leather, metal works, pottery, sugar, and cigarettes. Light industries are also being developed in Nigeria.

Lack of capital resources is one of the reasons why Africa is an underdeveloped continent. This lack is reflected in the average annual per capita income of about \$75, a very low figure when considered from a world standpoint. In addition, European colonial investments, totaling some \$5,000,000,000 since World War II, tend to be concentrated in the production of agricultural products for export and in mineral enterprises serving the European market.

**TRANSPORTATION**—Improved transportation facilities are necessary before any marked economic advance can proceed in many parts of Africa. The term "Dark Continent" was applied to Africa at an early period of exploration, when rivers were the sole means of transport and cataracts in the streams prevented explorers from going far into the interior, hence, most of the continent remained unknown. Now sparse railway nets, especially in North Africa and the Union of South Africa, are not to be discounted in analyzing economic development in Africa. On the other hand, large areas, mainly the desert regions and central tropics, are difficult of access and often depend upon animal power or human portage as the chief means of moving goods. Nevertheless, railway and highway construction are slowly proceeding, and these, along with utilization of navigable portions of streams, enhance the development of such areas as the copper belt of the Katanga and Northern Rhodesia, the tin fields of Nigeria, and the Gezira irrigated croplands of Sudan. Some-

what special, and certainly paradoxical, to the continent is the superimposition of an air-transportation network extending to virtually all habitable areas of consequence. Despite this modern touch in the development of Africa, the average native in the solution of his own immediate transport problems may not be reached by the shiny aircraft he sees overhead.

The transportation systems of Africa were in many cases developed for individual countries and politically allied nations and applied to areas of limited extent. For strategic purposes, as an example, a European country, or interests within it, might build roads and railways that would connect only the coasts they occupied with the hinterlands. As a consequence, there is no network of railways or all-weather highways of continental dimensions to afford a uniform type of transportation, and frequent transloading may be necessary in the shipment of goods. A Cape to Cairo railway has never been realized, but it is possible to travel between the two points by a combination of railway, highway, and boat. The railways and navigable waterways became the main arteries of commerce, with the highways serving as feeder lines.

In recent years, however, trucks, buses, private automobiles, and airplanes have been assuming great importance in African transportation. In fact, the construction of all-weather roads is more significant than that of railways. The present trend toward increased road construction is evident especially in the French possessions, the former Italian colonies, and much of British Africa. Air transportation has placed otherwise almost inaccessible areas within reach, provided direct communication between countries, and enabled some specialized freight to be handled speedily. Yet, despite these developments, much of Africa, including productive and potentially productive areas, is still inaccessible.

## HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

Such expressions as "Darkest Africa" and the "Unknown Continent" do not apply to Africa as a whole; nor is it correct to think of Africa as peopled almost wholly by Negroes. Northern Africa, even before the dawn of the Christian era, was an important part of the civilized world, and Egypt particularly was the seat of a civilization predating the Greek and Roman eras. Across the northern part of Africa, Phoenicians, Greeks, Romans, and, later, Moors spread the cultures of the ancient world. It was the Africa of the Sahara and particularly Africa south of the great desert that remained practically unknown until the fifteenth century.

To Europeans and Asiatics the part of Africa south of the Sahara was unknown till the Renaissance brought in its train the great age of exploration and discovery. In search of an all-water route to the Indies, navigators sailed down the western coast of Africa in the same century that witnessed the discovery of America. But whereas the Europeans found in the Americas wonderful harbors and rivers that made possible easy exploration of the interior, in Africa they found few indentations in the coastline and no easy approaches to the interior by river. So, while the two Americas were drawing large numbers of European settlers, the central and southern parts of Africa were being neglected; even today there are scarcely 5,000,000 persons of European origin in the whole continent. Other factors, of course, than ease of exploration enter into the explanation of the slow development of Africa as compared with that of the Americas. Whereas English, French, Swedes, Dutch, and Spaniards went to the Americas to *settle*, to find new homes, Europeans were interested in Africa south of the Sahara first as the source of slaves and always as an area to be exploited for natural wealth.

Only in the past century have there been

progress in the modernization of Africa south of the Sahara and growth of modern ways and standards of living. Today there are beautiful, smart cities in French West Africa—Abidjan, for instance—and strong independent governments, such as the Union of South Africa. But even today we cannot speak of Africa as a whole as a *unit* in civilization, in economics, or in political development. An outstanding fact is that, although Africa was well populated when the Europeans first appeared on the scene and although the natives are still a vast majority of the population, the European minority and foreign capital must be depended on for any progress toward economic and cultural well-being in this huge continent. And the prospect, despite obstacles that are mentioned elsewhere in these pages, is fairly bright, for Africa has great natural resources and an almost unlimited potential for hydroelectric power.

Today's map of Africa pictures the extent to which European nations have exploited the continent south of them. There are, to be sure, independent nations—Ethiopia, Liberia, Egypt, Union of South Africa, Libya, and others recently made, or in the process of becoming, independent—but important areas bear such names as French Equatorial Africa, Belgian Congo, and Spanish West Africa. So, although the two Americas are, with a few minor exceptions, made up of wholly independent states inhabited largely by people of European origin, Africa has remained a vast area of exploitation. The Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, French, English, Belgians, and others gained a foothold on the continent and have continuously jockeyed for the possession of colonial territory and all that this possession implies: resources, strategical position, markets, manpower, prestige. Much of the history of Africa is made up of the struggle for colonies and the shifts in ownership through exploration, commercial penetration, and war.

**EARLY HISTORY**—In northern Africa civilization was developed at an early period of history. In the Nile Valley and Delta 5,000 to 6,000 years ago Egyptian civilization was already well established, showing signs of social integration and material advancement. About 1100 B.C. the Phoenicians had a trading post on the coast of Africa, and some 300 years later they founded Carthage near the site of the present city of Tunis. Greek traders reached the shores of Africa about 1000 B.C., but the principal Hellenic colonies were not established until a much later date. In 146 B.C. the destruction of Carthage by the Romans ended the Third Punic War and led to the consolidation of Roman control along the entire Mediterranean littoral.

In the seventh century of the Christian era Moslem or Arab incursions, which swept out of Arabia across Egypt, had a great and lasting effect on the northern part of Africa. Completely modifying the cultural influence of the Phoenicians, Greeks, and Romans, these incursions drew the northern African peoples into closer cultural and political relationships with the Arabs to the east. By the beginning of the thirteenth century even most of the Sahara and Sudan had been converted to Islam.

As mentioned earlier, none of these Mediterranean civilizations extended southward to breach the great Sahara barrier. Thus two regions on the continent tended to develop through the centuries quite independently of each other, the southern one long delayed because of its isolation from outside generative influences. However, inhabitants south of the Sahara retained their tribal organizations and joined together to form federations and confederations of states by the time the first Europeans arrived.

**EUROPEAN DISCOVERIES AND EXPANSION**—The opening of Africa south of the Sahara to the outside world really began in the fifteenth century. European countries interested in

both exploration and trade made claims to different coastal areas of Africa. At this time the first Negroes were brought from western Africa by the Portuguese to work in Spain and Portugal, and a lucrative slave trade with Europe was established. As Portuguese exploration moved southward along the western coast of Africa, a string of forts was established to protect this trade. From this early period to the present time the only Portuguese territory to be retained along the Guinea Coast are Portuguese Guinea and the islands of São Tomé and Príncipe.

From 1530 on, British traders visited western Africa, but they did not establish their first trading post, a fort on the Gambia River, until the early seventeenth century. French claims date from 1637 in Senegal, West Africa, although merchants from that European country had made voyages and established trading posts along the Guinea Coast more than two centuries previously. Other claims followed, including Réunion and Mauritius (the latter now British) in the Indian Ocean and several areas in what is now French Equatorial Africa.

Spain, originally excluded from Africa by the Papal Line of Demarcation in 1493 and the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494, which defined Spanish and Portuguese spheres, obtained rights in Spanish Guinea and the islands of Fernando Po and Annobon in the late eighteenth century but did not continuously occupy them until the mid-1900's. In almost all cases Europeans confined themselves to coastal port areas for purposes of trade and relied on sea routes for communication with the homeland.

These initial acquisitions and their implications created little interest among the European countries, and it was not until the end of the eighteenth century that any significant change took place in the attitude toward Africa. By this time contact and trade with far-away Asia was becoming important, and the African west coast was

followed in the only plausible sea route. Trade vessels had to round the Cape of Good Hope to reach India and the East Indies, and the Capetown harbor became a port of call. The Dutch East India Company allowed Dutch immigrants to settle in the Cape area. During the Napoleonic wars the British occupied the Cape to keep open the sea route to India, and after the peace treaty of 1814 they retained it. When England abolished slavery in 1833, the Dutch, or Boer, farmers received what they considered inadequate compensation for their slaves from the British. Their discontent on this score, together with other sources of friction between the two groups, eventually resulted in the Boers' beginning their great trek from Cape Colony to the interior of the continent. Some of the Boers crossed the Orange River and later set up the Orange Free State, others established what was to become the Transvaal Republic. By 1854 the political areas of Cape Colony, Transvaal, Orange Free State, and Natal, which eventually became provinces of the Union of South Africa, were broadly defined. South Africa, in contrast with tropical areas, thus came under the control of Europeans who staked out homesteads in the area and settled there permanently.

**PARTITIONS**—Down to 1875 European powers had claimed sovereignty—if we except Cape Colony and Algiers—over only one tenth of the continent of Africa. But for the next forty years, until the outbreak of World War I, the scramble for territory mounted in intensity as rival powers, largely through diplomacy, ironed out conflicting claims among themselves and annexed vast territories. The impulse to this drive is attributable to a combination of factors: adventurous spirit, missionary zeal, need for raw materials, and sheer national exuberance. In the wake of pioneers and private companies nations planted their flags and claimed sovereignty over vast tracts of land. The net result

was that by 1914 most of the continent had been partitioned among European states, each of which thus acquired territory and populations much greater than the mother country itself possessed.

*In the Interior.* Beginning at the end of the eighteenth century vigorous efforts were made to explore the interior of Africa. Mungo Park (Scotch), David Livingstone (British), and Henry Stanley (British, but sent by the *New York Herald* to Africa to search for Livingstone) are three well-known names associated with these adventurous missions which were to help open up the Dark Continent.

At the height of the scramble for colonies in the last half of the nineteenth century it was evident to all that something should be done by interested European nations to arrive at a modus operandi in Africa. Accordingly, Leopold II of Belgium, in 1876, called a conference at Brussels to deliberate on methods to be adopted for further exploration—and civilization—of Africa. The conference was well attended by representatives from European countries, but it soon became clear that international rivalries made cooperation on many problems at this time quite impossible. It is worth noting that in 1884 the Congo Free State was established by Leopold II and remained his personal domain until 1908, at which time it was annexed to Belgium as Belgian Congo.

*In the East and the West.* East Africa, which had been under the nominal control of the Sultan of Zanzibar, was claimed by both Germany and Great Britain. After a period of political maneuvering, Germany succeeded, in 1885, in establishing the colony of East Africa. But meanwhile, the British Imperial East Africa Company, having secured a strip along the coast by grant from the Sultan of Zanzibar, was able to thwart German ambitions and took over Uganda in 1893 and Kenya in 1895.

Following French defeat in the Franco-

Prussian War (1870–71), French interest in African lands was revived, especially in the western and central parts, and in Madagascar. The areas that we know as French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa started to take form at this time because of penetration and control of these huge blocks of territory in the western half of the continent. In 1896 Madagascar officially became a French colony, with trade limited exclusively to the mother country.

At the Berlin Conference of 1884–85, Britain's interest in Nigeria was confirmed, German claims were restricted to the Cameroons and Togoland, both of which were separated from the Gold Coast in 1888. Germany also annexed Southwest Africa. Nearby, Portugal, holding long-standing claims in Mozambique on the east and Angola on the west, hoped to fill out the intervening territory. Germany planned to consolidate its rule across the southern area from the west to the east coast,<sup>2</sup> but, in 1890, by the terms of the Heligoland Treaty, Germany gave up these aspirations in Africa, including claims in East Africa, in return for Heligoland, a strategic island in the North Sea. The bulk of the interior country drained by the Zambezi was taken over by Cecil Rhodes's South Africa Company and afterward was formed into Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia.

*In the North.* After the fall of the Roman Empire the lands of North Africa were controlled, first, by rulers of the Arab Empire and, later, by the Ottoman Empire. In 1830 the French fleet bombarded Algiers in an effort to crush the Barbary pirates and in the process established French influence over Algeria. Then on the pretext of checking border incursions from the east, Jules

Ferry sent a military expedition into Tunisia to achieve "pacification" of the country. As a result France forced the Bey of Tunis to accord the French a privileged position in commercial matters. To the west, Morocco was the object of imperial rivalry among France, Spain, Great Britain, and Germany. Not until after a series of international crises and diplomatic arrangements involving the Algeiras Conference of 1906 did France bring Morocco under its control. According to the Franco-Spanish treaty of 1912 an area 200 miles along the north coast and sixty miles inland was designated as a Spanish zone, the remaining area forming the French Zone. Actually the Treaty of 1912 established a French protectorate in which the sultan retained nominal power while the French Resident General exercised real administrative authority. To the east, Libya, long a part of the Ottoman Empire, fell under Italian rule after the Turkish defeat in the Italo-Turkish War of 1911–12.

Egypt was a vassal state of Turkey until the outbreak of World War I; after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 it became of great strategic importance to the British. Reckless extravagance on the part of the Khedive and the growth of foreign indebtedness provoked the Arabic uprising. Basing their action on the prevailing internal disorder, the British, in 1882, undertook military intervention in Egypt. Much earlier than this, Egypt had extended its control southward over the Sudan, and many Egyptians had settled in that area. When in 1884 the Sudanese revolted against Egyptian rule, the British again intervened militarily both to put down the revolt and to evacuate the Egyptians from the Sudan. After initial defeats, the British forces defeated the Sudanese, and an Anglo-Egyptian condominium for the Sudan was established (January, 1899).

The area of northeast Africa adjacent to the Arabian Peninsula, commonly referred to as the "Horn," was partitioned at a rel-

<sup>2</sup> German plans for a *Mittelafrika* stretching from the Sahara in the north to the Zambezi River in the south did not become known till 1914, but German imperialists dreamed of a German African empire long before that date.



actively late date in the colonial history of Africa, the beneficiaries being the French and the Italians. In 1862 the French acquired the port of Obock across the Red Sea from Aden in Arabia and occupied it in 1884. When the port of Aden was closed to French warships, the French constructed the port of Djibouti, a better harbor on the African coast, and later built a railway inland to Addis Ababa. The coastal region known as Somaliland in time was divided among France, Britain, and Italy. French Somaliland was to be a foothold in the attempt to reach the Nile waters. The part of the Somali coast farther east was administered by the British government as a protectorate. Italian interest in the Horn dates from the establishment of Eritrea as a colony whose boundaries were defined in 1889-91. To extend the Italian empire southward, certain Somali ports were leased, in 1892, from the Sultan of Zanzibar and later, in 1905, bought outright when Italy assumed control of Italian Somaliland.

**WORLD WAR I TO WORLD WAR II**—Africa was the scene of much activity during World War I. In 1914 the British formally declared Egypt a protectorate; and during the war the Suez area of Egypt was invaded for a short time by the Turks. In 1914 Germany surrendered Togoland unconditionally to British and French forces; in 1916 the Cameroons were likewise surrendered. In 1915 German Southwest Africa surrendered to forces from the Union of South Africa. German East Africa, later called Tanganyika, was conquered in 1918 by British forces. Many of the soldiers who fought with the Allied African forces were themselves Africans—inhabitants of the various European colonies—who, after the war, took back new ideas to their native villages.

By the Versailles Treaty that followed World War I Germany was compelled to renounce all rights and title to its African colonies in favor of the Allied powers. The

powers then divided the colonies among themselves as mandates under the jurisdiction of the League of Nations. Southwest Africa was entrusted to the Union of South Africa under a Class C mandate, which provided that the territory should be administered as an integral part of the mandatory power, but which also held the mandatory power responsible for promoting the moral and material welfare of the peoples. Togoland was divided as a Class B mandate between Britain and France with parts of the mandate joined to the Gold Coast and part to Dahomey, respectively. Class B mandates were separately administered, but again the mandatory power was responsible for promoting the moral and material welfare of the people. The Cameroons, a Class B mandate, were divided between the British in Nigeria and the French in Equatorial Africa. Also under a Class B mandate the greater part of German East Africa passed to Britain and became what is now known as Tanganyika. A small strip of the German colony, however, was added to Belgian Congo, likewise under a Class B mandate, and to the south the small "Kionga Triangle," captured from Portugal, was restored to that country.

In addition to the mandates, other political areas had their status changed between World War I and World War II. In 1922 Egypt became an independent kingdom, but Great Britain still retained certain rights deemed vital to its imperial interests. In 1936 the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of alliance provided for the ending of British military occupation in Egypt, the recognition of special British interests in the defense of the Suez Canal Zone, and the continuation of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan condominium. Southern Rhodesia in 1923 became a self-governing colony of the British Commonwealth and during the next few years most of the British and French African colonies were given increased range of legislative power. In contrast to the trend toward in-

dependence or self-rule, Ethiopia, with large undeveloped resources, was invaded and conquered by Fascist Italy in 1935-36, and the territories of Eritrea, Somalia, and Ethiopia were subsequently combined to form Italian East Africa.

**WORLD WAR II AND THE POSTWAR YEARS—**Africa, especially its northern portion, was a very important military theater in World War II. In June, 1940, Italy declared war on Great Britain, and British Imperial forces invaded Ethiopia; during May, 1941, Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia re-entered his capital at Addis Ababa, and by November of the same year the country was cleared of Italians. In 1940-43 North Africa was the scene of bitter fighting before the Allied nations finally defeated German and Italian forces. The African east coast was endangered with the fall of Singapore in 1942 and the entry of the Japanese into the Indian Ocean. The west coast ports of Africa became strategic sea and air bases and protected an Allied air transport command service across Africa to the Persian Gulf.

Following World War II the United Nations established the trusteeship system as a successor to the League mandates. As a result of new trust agreements by former mandatory powers, all mandates except Southwest Africa became trusteeships. The Union of South Africa, refusing to submit a trust agreement to the United Nations, continued to administer Southwest Africa as a mandate. The same terms as had been stipulated under the League of Nations were agreed upon, namely, to report annually and to promote native welfare, with the added right of the administering power to fortify the trust territory.

Since World War II great interest has been shown in the development of Africa. In 1945 the British Parliament endorsed a colonial development and welfare scheme of ten-year duration and voted funds for the project. Most of this money was to be

spent in the African colonies for the promotion of education, health, and improved transportation services. In eastern Africa the British undertook cultivation of some 30,000,000 acres of land largely uninhabited up to this time because of the ravages of disease and the dreaded tsetse fly. France had similar problems of colonial welfare but because of instability at home was handicapped in the promotion of remedial measures.

The interest of the United States in Africa emerged as part of its Technical Cooperation Program, popularly known as Point IV, which was concerned with assistance to underdeveloped regions of the world. In addition to funds advanced under this program, other appropriations have been made by the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) and, since 1951, under the Mutual Security Agency (MSA). These combined funds have made possible the undertaking of large projects. Road building has probably been of prime importance; but geological surveys and mineral development have been undertaken in many areas, and, in certain locations, soil conservation, reservoir construction, locust control, and port development have been introduced.

Political changes since World War II have taken two directions: administrative consolidation of colonial areas and a noteworthy step in some cases toward native self-rule and independence. Progress toward independence in the whole continent is still slow and beset by difficulties. Creditable progress in intercolonial consolidation has been demonstrated by both Great Britain and France. Former separate French colonies from Lake Chad to Mauritania and from the Guinea Gulf to southern Algeria were welded in 1946 into one political unit, French West Africa. On the British side, an East Africa High Commission was formed, January 1, 1948, to provide for the administration of services common to the East African colonies of Uganda, Kenya, and

Tanganyika. Among other things, this central body assumed the operation of all government railways and lake steamships, the supervision of all air, postal, and telegraph services, and the control of an amalgamated customs establishment. A Central African Federation was likewise established by the British in March, 1953, affecting Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The Federation has virtual self-governing status, with each of the three territories retaining control on local matters. In the west, the colony of Gold Coast prepared the way for independence in June, 1954, when it attained a self-governing status pending its dominion status in the Commonwealth within a period of three years. Until pending dominion status is reached in 1957, it has complete home rule.

Similarly in the east, Sudan moved toward self-rule as a result of an Anglo-Egyptian agreement signed in February, 1953, which provided for self-government in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and for self-determination by the Sudanese within three years. Within the allotted period Sudan set up a parliamentary government, replaced foreigners in the administrative service with Sudanese, and proclaimed its independence in 1956. Less orderly is the course of political development in Kenya. Demands by Kikuyu tribesmen that 12,000 square miles of Kenya, reserved for Europeans, be turned over to the natives led to disorder and terrorism. The Mau Mau society, a secret anti-white organization, climaxed sporadic

acts of violence in the colony by killing the Christians among their fellow Kikuyu tribesmen as well as white settlers. The three-year reign of Mau Mau terror took 11,000 lives before the terrorists were isolated in the highlands and brought under control.

In North Africa a new state appeared on the ruins of the former Italian empire. Following the war, Libya, Eritrea, and Somalia were governed until 1950 by the British Military Administration and later by the British Civil Administration. In 1950 Italy was allowed to re-enter and administer Somalia as a United Nations trusteeship, Libya became independent on December 24, 1951; and in September, 1953, Eritrea was united with Ethiopia in a federation, under which Ethiopia controls currency, foreign affairs, and trade for both, while Eritrea handles its own domestic issues.

At present the established independent countries of Africa are Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Liberia, Libya, and the Union of South Africa, having a combined population of about 67,000,000, or thirty-one per cent of the total population for Africa in about twenty-five per cent of the continent's area. In addition to these six independent countries already identified, French protectorates over Morocco and Tunisia have been ended, and the two North African territories are working out the details of their new relationship with France. Britain's Gold Coast is also approaching self-rule. The following chapter discusses these embryonic political entities.

### Study Questions

1. How has Africa's location influenced her development? How has the Sahara hindered it?
2. What are the principal topographical characteristics of Africa? Name four important mountain ranges or groups.
3. Name the six major rivers of Africa and discuss their importance. How is navigation hampered in Africa?
4. Describe the major climatic zones and the general pattern of climate distribution in Africa.

- 5 Explain the wide range of population density within Africa.
6. Describe briefly the five groups of African peoples, with special reference both to their languages and to their geographical distribution.
7. How has transportation changed the African way of life?
8. How could production be increased in parts of Africa? To what extent is mechanization of agriculture possible in Africa?
9. What are Africa's principal minerals? What are her major mineral deficiencies?
10. Why is industrialization of little significance in most of Africa? What problems does industry face?
11. Discuss Africa's transportation problems and the ways some of these problems have been met.
- 12 Discuss some of the limitations of early African civilizations
13. What is the significance of the Cape of Good Hope in the development of South Africa?
14. Explain the relative effects of World War I and World War II on Africa.
15. What major political developments have taken place in Africa since World War II?

## *Africa—Regional Aspects*

A study of the origin and development of political areas or countries in Africa reveals extremely fascinating but complex politico-geographic sequences. Much of the political map of Africa today is the product of political maneuvering, historical circumstances, and unique combinations of physical, economic, and human factors. Not uncommonly the claims of the European countries to African territories have been based on nothing more than the possession of a mere strip of coast from which economic and political penetration into the interior originated. Numerous boundaries extend inland almost at right angles to the coastline without regard to the natural and cultural environment, creating, as a consequence, many disputes and administrative problems. African tribal organizations and systems of law and justice have been brought into sharp conflict with Western concepts of democracy and with European law.

The barrier effect of the Sahara has led to contrasting historical and political backgrounds in northern and southern Africa (see maps on pages 451 and 442). North, or Mediterranean, Africa is part of the Moslem world; south Africa, except in areas where there are dominating minorities of European origin or scattered groups of Arabs or Indians, is primarily the land of Negro and Negroid populations. North Africa has been in contact with Europe and Asia from the very early period of Mediterranean civilization; southern Africa, although European countries established trading posts and forts along its coasts five centuries ago, has really been in contact with modern civilization for little more than a hundred years. North Africa had clearly defined political divisions centuries ago; it is only within the last century that southern Africa, and especially the interior, has been partitioned off into independent states, colonies, and mandates.

## INDEPENDENT COUNTRIES

In spite of its size Africa has fewer independent areas and a greater preponderance of colonial territories than any other continent. The countries that are independent are of considerable importance in the process of new-nation making. To those formed prior to World War II—the Union of South Africa, Ethiopia, Liberia, and Egypt<sup>1</sup> must be added the postwar-independent countries of Libya<sup>1</sup> and Sudan (see map on page 444). In addition, the Gold Coast and parts of North Africa are in the process of being recognized as independent countries.<sup>2</sup> These areas have broad differences in historical background and vary greatly in economic, social, and political development. In all cases, however, they have been strongly affected by Western nations, especially by Britain, Italy, and the United States.

## UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

The Union of South Africa is a self-governing member of the British Commonwealth of Nations. It was established in 1909 by a British Act of Parliament, just a few years after the conclusion of the Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902). The act joined together into one country the British provinces of Cape Colony and Natal and the two Boer territories, Orange Free State and Transvaal (see map on page 442). The structure of the new government parallels that of other British dominions, but it has the provision that only Europeans can be elected to the

parliament. It also provides that there shall be two official languages in the country. A later act (1936) gave a pseudo representation to the natives—pseudo in that the natives should be represented only by men of European origin.


**SOCIAL PROBLEMS**—The population<sup>3</sup> of the Union of South Africa in 1951 was approximately 13,000,000. Of these, 2,700,000 were white persons of European origin; 9,000,000 were natives of Bantu stock; 900,000 were "Colored";<sup>4</sup> and there were also about 300,000 Asiatics. The 2,700,000 of European origin included the British and the Afrikaners, the latter term applied largely to the descendants of Dutch colonists. It is obvious that a country with such a mixture of peoples must face many serious political and social problems. One problem is how to secure unity between the English-speaking peoples and the Boers whom the English conquered. Another problem is that of preserving white supremacy in a country where the white people constitute only about one fifth of the total population. This second problem is complicated by the fact that the Afrikaners are different in culture and background from the English and have always openly resisted efforts by the English to effect assimilation, reacting with suspicion and even hostility toward British ties. In general, however, they have united with the British in the determination to maintain white supremacy. Thus the most influential of the Afrikaners have sought to curtail the voting privileges of the large native population and of the 300,000 Asiatics in the country.

<sup>1</sup> Egypt and Libya are discussed in Chapter 28, "The Arab States and Israel."

<sup>2</sup> Great Britain agreed, in 1956, to extend independence to the Gold Coast, with dominion status, upon completion of arrangements early in 1957. Morocco and Tunisia achieved independence in 1956 but still retain certain military, economic, and political ties with France.

<sup>3</sup> For population figures, areas, and types of governments of political areas see the table on page 456.

<sup>4</sup> The "Colored" are a mixture of Bantu and white stock, forming a social class between the whites and natives.



The 10,000,000 non-Europeans in the population—the Africans—can be divided into three groups of about equal numbers: (1) the tribal natives living in the reserves (about forty per cent of the natives), (2) the squatters or laborers on farms belonging to white citizens; and (3) the urban dwellers who have no tribal obligations. How to handle this vast majority of the population without jeopardizing white supremacy has been the paramount political and social problem of the Union since it was established.

One solution proposed by extreme members of the Nationalist Party, which became influential about 1948 and has the objective

of a republic outside the Commonwealth, is *apartheid*, that is, physical segregation of the races. And, in fact, the general trend in South Africa is toward residential segregation of the three groups—white, native, and Colored, with the Asiatics included in the last-named group. In July, 1950, a Group Areas Act was passed by the Union Parliament, whereby persons of one group are forbidden to own or occupy property in the controlled area of another group, except by special permit. Most of the Colored group are confined to the Cape area, where they formerly acquired franchise rights. A strict application of the *apartheid* policy is being

found impractical, and there is considerable opposition even to the Group Areas Act because it interferes with the economy, for much of the labor in the cities, on the farms, and in domestic service is performed by natives. The problem remains a vexing one. Whatever the solution may be, South Africa is determined not to accord to non-Europeans any share in the political life of the nation, white supremacy must be maintained, and the African must be relegated to a permanent status of inferiority.

**PHYSICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS—**Topographically much of the Union is a nearly level to rolling plateau that stretches across the southern end of Africa, characterized by seaward-facing escarpments and, in places, by relatively narrow coastal plains. A large part of the plateau lies in the basin of the Orange River, together with its main tributary the Vaal. Only the northern half of the Transvaal comes within the drainage of the Limpopo. Although the coastal plains have relatively high temperatures and are frost-free throughout the year, parts of the plateau are high enough to make frosts a likely occurrence for a period of more than 100 days a year. About two thirds of the country receives less than twenty inches of rainfall a year, and half of this area receives less than ten inches. Mainly in the eastern part of the country the precipitation exceeds twenty inches, and crops can be grown without additional water supplies. Agricultural development has proceeded steadily in spite of such handicaps as inadequacy and irregularity of rainfall, poverty of soils, soil erosion, low and irregular yields, and unsatisfactory labor.

The Union of South Africa has vast mineral wealth. The Rand, or Witwatersrand region of Transvaal, which includes the city of Johannesburg, is the greatest single gold-producing area of the world. For many decades South Africa has led in world production of gold; at present it produces about

fifty per cent of the world gold output. Diamonds also are important in the Union, the most famous diamond mine being located at Kimberley. More recently, uranium has become an important product. South Africa supports a vigorous iron-and-steel industry, which marks this country as the only industrial state in Africa. This industry presently supplies two thirds of the Union's steel needs, with its present rate of growth in steel production, the Union promises to become self-sufficient in steel products despite the increase in demand. Of material advantage in this latter trend are the Union's extensive fields of bituminous coal, especially in Natal.

South Africa has a well-developed railway and road network corresponding closely with the pattern of relief. Railways connect the principal ports of Capetown, Port Elizabeth, East London, and Durban with points in the interior. All railways and harbors are owned and controlled by the Union government. Since World War I there has been considerable expansion of motor roads and the use of motor transport, similarly there has been extensive construction of airfields and a great increase in the use of the airplane.

#### SOUTHWEST AFRICA

From Capetown the Union of South Africa administers the large desert territory assigned to it in 1919 as a League of Nations mandate. Southwest Africa, with an area of 317,000 square miles, is inhabited by 368,000 natives, but its economic life is dominated by some 50,000 Europeans. Between the two world wars, as a Class C mandate, Southwest Africa was treated as an integral part of the Union. Basing her claim on this fact and further on the geographic contiguity of the two areas, the Union government, in 1946, expressed its desire to annex the mandate. Severe criticism in the United Nations, however, pre-



vented this step, still, the Union of South Africa has refused to convert the territory into a United Nations trusteeship. In 1949 the Union government provided for the representation of the mandate in the Parliament of the Union.

In Southwest Africa the scarcity of water makes the cultivation of crops almost impossible, and the productive parts of the area are used mainly for livestock. In some places subterranean water can be reached only by the digging of deep wells.


The mineral wealth of the country is of increasing importance; ores of vanadium, tin, lithium, lead, copper, and zinc are being mined, and the area producing diamonds has been steadily expanded. The chief port of Southwest Africa is Walvis Bay, an integral part of the Cape of Good Hope Province administered by South Africa; it is linked by railway with the main South African system at De Aar.

## ETHIOPIA

The kingdom of Ethiopia, actually an ancient empire,<sup>5</sup> occupies the northeast sector of the continent. Ethiopia has grown out of a combination of kingdoms that have been reduced to the status of provinces, as have other parts of the country which previously enjoyed some autonomy. Its rise to independence and nationhood dates from 1896, the year the Emperor Menelik defeated the Italian armies at Aduwa. In 1953, Eritrea, which had been an Italian colony for sixty-seven years, was federated with Ethiopia as an autonomous unit; it is represented in the Ethiopian Parliament and Federal Council.

The ancient kingdom of Ethiopia was landlocked, cut off by small states from the Red Sea. Since its federation with Eritrea it has a coastline of about 670 miles. Ethiopia proper is a high plateau marked by numerous volcanic peaks. The country has

important economic resources, many of which are still underdeveloped. With fertile soils in many sectors and extensive grazing lands, Ethiopia is particularly adapted to agriculture and stock raising. Coffee constitutes more than a fourth of the country's export trade, and hides and skins are about equally important. There is the possibility of vast mineral wealth, including gold and silver. Other minerals are known to exist, and Ethiopia already has proved to be an important source of platinum. The coun-



try reaped the benefits of engineering and industry during the Italian occupation before World War II. Many first-class roads were built, rivers were spanned by bridges, and large sums of money were poured into the country. At present transportation and communication are being aided by loans from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and modern industrial enterprises by American and European firms are under way. The United States government has shown interest in the development of Ethiopia through aid programs designed to utilize economic resources more fully and to improve education.

<sup>5</sup> The historic name of the kingdom is Abyssinia.

Ethiopia has a complex social structure. Despite inroads made by the Moslem religion, the rulers of the country have preserved the Coptic Christian religion and the Amharic language. More than half of the population are Gallas, a pastoral people of Hamitic origin; other groups include Nilotics, Falashas, Somalis, Negroes, Arabs, Indians, and Tigreans.

In Eritrea the coastal lowlands that stretch along the Red Sea, are hot and malarial but the adjacent plateau has considerably lower temperatures and is more healthful. Much of the population is nomadic, engaged in livestock raising and the collection of gums and resins. The chief wealth is in livestock; salt is the second important product. Modern developments in the country are to be credited mainly to the Italians who built roads, railways, and irrigation works in the lowlands and introduced telephones. Most of the trade passes through Massawa, the largest port, and Assab; these ports as part of the federation will undoubtedly serve to increase the foreign trade of the formerly landlocked Ethiopia.

## LIBERIA

The Negro republic of Liberia, a densely forested tropical area, is unique in origin and development among the countries of Africa. Its origin dates from the efforts made in 1821 by the American Colonization Society to establish a home for freed slaves on the west coast of Africa. In 1847 it became a republic, with a constitution which, similar to that of the United States, provides for a president, a senate, and a house of representatives. However, electors must be Negro and must own property; the latter requirement excludes great numbers of potential voters.

The Americo-Liberian Negroes, who settled mainly in a narrow coastal belt, were alien to the native-born of that region, and there was little contact between the two

groups. For more than a century the Liberian government exercised only nominal control over interior areas, but during World War II President Tubman initiated a policy planned to secure equality of citizenship throughout the country and to lessen the tension between the two groups. Nevertheless, the government today is administered to a large extent by the Americo-Liberian Negroes who, variously estimated to number from 12,000 to 25,000, constitute less than one per cent of the total population. Some 60,000 non-American Negroes living near the coast have acquired the culture of the Americo-Liberians and no longer are under tribal discipline.

Both agriculture and mining are important in the economy of Liberia. The staple food crop for domestic consumption is rice; rubber and palm kernels are high on the list of exports. There is a significant production of gold and of iron ore, the latter being especially important at Bomi Hill. Gold deposits as well as diamonds are known to exist in Liberia. At the present time explorations are being carried on in hopes of discovering the presence of other minerals in the country.

Economic conditions in Liberia are improving rapidly, and it is mainly with United States technical and financial aid that Liberia's resources are being developed. The modern period of development may be said to have started in 1925 with the coming of the Firestone Company, which at that time was given a large land grant for rubber plantations; today the company constitutes an important element of the Liberian economy. Later developments include the construction by United States military forces during World War II of the Robertsfield Airport, which is now being used regularly by three international airlines. Following World War II the free port of Monrovia was opened, together with a road inland to the Bomi Hill iron-ore mines and another to French Guinea.

## SUDAN

On January 1, 1956, the premier of Sudan hoisted the tricolor flag and lowered the British and Egyptian flags. Thus did the new republic demonstrate its independence and signify the termination of the condominium that marked fifty-seven years of bitter rivalry between Great Britain and Egypt. Independence for Sudan is merely the beginning of an arduous struggle to maintain its existence and strive for greater economic progress. Just as the north and south portions of the country differ in physical topography, so cultural differences separate the two. The pagan and semi-Christian Nilotic people of the southern part of the country have threatened to revolt if the government of Sudan is controlled by the Moslems of the north; this issue is a possible threat to the existence of an independent state.

Sudan extends southward from within the Sahara to the borders of the tropical-forest regions. In general, the Sudan, like Egypt

in the north, has as its most important physical asset the irrigation waters of the Blue Nile and the White Nile, both of which have their sources beyond the border of the country.

Parts of the Sudan are making rapid economic progress. Agriculture is the mainstay of the economy of the country, with emphasis principally on cereals for human consumption and on cotton as a cash crop and the major export of the country. The latter is grown extensively, especially in irrigated areas such as the Gezira Plain, which receives its water from the Sennar Dam on the Blue Nile. The Sudan is the principal source of the world supply of gum arabic, which comes mainly from the province of Kordofan. The economy is also strengthened somewhat by the exploitation of some mineral resources.


Khartoum, an interior city on the Nile, is the political and commercial center of the country. Port Sudan, since its completion as a modern port on the Red Sea in 1926, handles more than four fifths of the foreign trade.

## BRITISH TERRITORIES

In general, the British in their African dependencies have followed a policy of indirect rule that gives support and guidance to native policies and institutions, defends and vitalizes tribal life, and helps tribal leaders adjust their local administration to modern conditions. The British system is designed to promote self-governing territories which may, if they so elect, remain members of the British Commonwealth. Colonial representatives do not sit in the British Parliament at Westminster (see map at top of page 447 for location of British territories).

### DEPENDENCIES IN WEST AFRICA

The British part of West Africa consists of the Gold Coast, Nigeria, the British Togoland and the Cameroons, Gambia, and Sierra Leone. Although the term British West Africa may be used to designate this area, it is not a unit politically, as illustrated by the trust territories of Togoland and the Cameroons. Nevertheless, attempts at co-operation among the countries have been made, such as the West African Council in 1945 and the later West African Interterritorial Conference in 1951.




**GOLD COAST**—In June, 1954, a new, virtually self-governing state, the Gold Coast, was formed by consolidation of the former Gold Coast Colony, Ashanti, and the Northern Territories. It has a constitution that provides for an all-native legislative assembly. Recent political growth of the Gold Coast is closely bound up with its economic development. Cacao is the all-important product, of which the Gold Coast produces about two thirds of the world supply. Other important exports are gold, manganese, and bauxite. The last-mentioned commodity is presently being worked only at Awaso, but other deposits are awaiting the completion of hydroelectric-power works. The Gold Coast has a deep-water harbor at Takoradi.

**BRITISH TOGOLAND**—The former German colony of Togoland was divided between the British and the French. The western third, now known as British Togoland, is administered as a UN trusteeship (for this and other UN trusteeship territories see map at the right). It is attached administratively to the Gold Coast. The eastern section of the former German colony is also now a

UN trusteeship, but it is attached to the French colony of Dahomey.

Agriculture is concentrated in the wet coastal area, where intensive farming produces sugar, copra, and tapioca. In the hill regions are the pastoral lands inhabited by the Ewes, a tribe of about 1,000,000 people who occupy some 10,000 square miles and also are settled in both the Gold Coast and French Togoland. In 1947 the Ewe leaders favored the unification of the two Togolands, but opinion in the territory continued divided between unification and union with the Gold Coast. In May, 1956, a plebiscite held under United Nations auspices finally settled the question in favor of integration with the Gold Coast, the merger to be effective when the latter achieves its independence.

**NIGERIA**—Nigeria is a colony and protectorate centering on the lower basin of the Niger River, between Dahomey to the west and the Cameroons to the east. Largely as a commercial venture, an old African trading company developed the area in the 1850's and won the protection of the British Crown



in 1886. It was not until 1951, however, that a larger role in government was accorded the natives by a new constitution. Agitation among labor unions and nationalist groups for greater autonomy still continues. Especially in southern Nigeria demands are made for quick self-government and independence. But the Moslems in northern Nigeria object to this move, knowing that they are exceeded in numbers by the pagan and semi-Christian elements in the south. Therefore they prefer the continued protection of the British. Nevertheless, Nigeria is progressing rapidly toward competence for statehood; in this, the development of communications and the existence of a varied economy play a major part. Peanuts, palm kernels, palm oil, cacao, and tin ore are all important export products. Possession of the only worked coal mines in West Africa is also a valuable asset. Both Lagos and Port Harcourt are important ocean ports and serve a large hinterland.

**BRITISH CAMEROONS**—East of Nigeria are the British Cameroons, a trusteeship administered from Nigeria. This region is mainly agricultural, but it is still far less developed than Nigeria despite fertile soils and recent building of roads and railways and re-equipment of seaports.

**SIERRA LEONE**—Sierra Leone, a colony and protectorate, has its economy focused around Freetown, which is one of the finest seaports in British West Africa, with an excellent harbor and a naval coaling station. Important products are palm oil, palm kernels, iron ore, and gold.

**GAMBIA**—Gambia is a small area sandwiched between French Senegal to the north and Portuguese Guinea to the south. The core in the colony, an area of thirty square miles, centers around the seaport of Bathurst and along both shores of the Gambia River. Inland the remainder of Gambia, some 4,000 square miles, is a protectorate ruled by na-

tive chiefs. Peanuts are the principal export product.

## BRITISH EAST AFRICA

British East Africa comprises Kenya, Tanganyika, Uganda, British Somaliland, and the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba. In January, 1948, an East African High Commission was formed by the British, consisting of the governors of Kenya, Tanganyika, and Uganda, to provide for the administration of services common to these three territories but not involving any political federation or fusion of the existing governments. There is also a Customs Union linking the three countries together for trade purposes.

**KENYA**—Kenya consists of a colony and protectorate fronting on the Indian Ocean for 200 miles and extending inland as far as Uganda and Lake Victoria. The most important economic activity in this predominantly agricultural country is centered in the south, with production for export coming principally from lands owned by European farmers. Among the chief plantation crops are coffee, sisal, and tea, but an important export is pyrethrum, which is used as an insecticide. Mineral resources are mainly gold, silver, and sodium carbonate. The port of Mombasa is the terminus of the Kenya and Uganda railway, and Kilindini is one of the finest landlocked and sheltered harbors on the east coast of Africa.

Kenya, with only 30,000 people of European origin, has been the scene of terrorist activities of the Mau Mau (see page 438). Conferences looking toward increased representation of the native Africans in political affairs are under way.

**UGANDA**—The protectorate of Uganda, with less than 4,000 people of European origin, is chiefly agricultural. Large herds of cattle, sheep, and goats are the basis for an important trade in hides and skins. Mineral resources, except those of the metal tantalum,

have scarcely been tapped. Important deposits of copper have been discovered in the Ruwenzori region, but exploitation of minerals has been hindered by the high cost of transportation to the coast. The development of the means of transportation is playing an important part in the opening up of the protectorate.

**TANGANYIKA**—Tanganyika, a trust territory since 1946, was formerly a part of German East Africa. Of the total population of 8,196,000, people of European origin comprise about 18,000, with Indians an important minority group, as they are also in Kenya and Uganda. In addition to food crops, the principal products are sisal and cotton, but in two thirds of Tanganyika agricultural production is hindered by the tsetse fly and insufficient water. The mineral industry has made enormous progress, diamonds in the Shinyanga District are the leading product. Dar es Salaam, the leading port, is connected by rail through Tabora with both Lake Tanganyika and Lake Victoria; however, the present railways and highways are not adequate for opening up the country.

**BRITISH SOMALILAND**—British Somaliland, a protectorate on the Gulf of Aden, is primarily a grazing country with a relatively large nomadic population. As far as is known, mineral resources, except for salt, are virtually nonexistent.

**ZANZIBAR AND PEMBA**—Zanzibar and Pemba, two islands off the east coast, constitute a protectorate under the nominal rule of a sultan, but the area is actually governed by a British Resident. The main industry is the production of cloves, of which this region supplies the bulk of the world demand.

#### FEDERATION OF RHODESIA AND NYASALAND

The landlocked Federation of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasa-

land came into being in July, 1953. Under its constitution the federation has virtual self-governing status, and each of the three territories retains autonomy on local matters. The railway systems of the three states are connected and are also linked with the railways of the Union of South Africa in the south and of the Belgian Congo and Angola in the north and with the Beira Railroad in the east. The last-mentioned line runs 200 miles to the coast through Mozambique. The states have common radio, airline, and statistical services. Only about 170,000 of its population of more than 6,000,000 are Europeans; another 45,000 are Asiatics.

**SOUTHERN RHODESIA**—Southern Rhodesia is a self-governing colony with a total population of over 2,000,000, of whom 145,000 are white settlers. The country is rich in gold and other minerals and, in addition, has proved to be an ideal agricultural country. The output of gold, coal, asbestos, and chrome ore is considerable, in fact, Southern Rhodesia is one of the world's leading producers of chrome ore. Possessing the basic requirements of modern industry—coal, iron, metals, water power, and, moreover, a good climate—Southern Rhodesia has come to the fore industrially; notable are the Gatooma textile mills and the machine-tool industry of Salisbury. The development of highways has to a considerable extent obviated the necessity for further railway construction. Of critical significance in the affairs of Southern Rhodesia is the apportionment of land between the natives and the settlers, whereby 48,000,000 acres are reserved for 69,000 Europeans, and only 28,000,000 acres, for 1,400,000 natives.

**NORTHERN RHODESIA**—Northern Rhodesia is a protectorate which, though it is twice as large as Southern Rhodesia, has only one fifth as many white settlers. It consists of a high plateau covered with thin forests, suitable for farming and grazing, but most of the area is undeveloped except for large

farms and mining towns. About one fifth of the country is in native reserves. The country is rich in minerals and is one of the world's largest producers of copper and cobalt. Deposits of coal have been found near Kafue and rich iron-ore fields are being explored at Lusaka. Owing to high earnings from mineral exports, Northern Rhodesia is able to employ larger funds than its neighbors for native education and social welfare. However, serious social and economic problems have arisen here as a result of the drift of native labor to the tobacco plantations and the western copper belt or to Johannesburg.

Railway lines link the mining centers together. There is also a line that runs south from Lusaka to Victoria Falls and north to Sakania in the Belgian Congo. Livingstone is a key airport in the federation and for southern Africa, serving the Rhodesias both domestically and internationally.

**NYASALAND**—Nyasaland, a protectorate, is primarily an agricultural country. Some mineral deposits—bauxite, for instance—are known to exist, but so far they have not been developed. Much needed hydroelectric power could be developed on the Shire River. In 1935 a bridge was constructed across the Zambezi at Chindio, which gives direct rail connection between Lake Nyasa and the seaport of Beira. The country has some excellent highways and several airfields.

#### BRITISH SOUTH AFRICA

British South Africa, outside the Union of South Africa, is administered by a High Commissioner who is appointed by the British Crown and who is responsible to the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations. Under him are three Resident Commissioners, who administer the native territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland.

**BASUTOLAND**—Basutoland, a reservation set

apart for the natives, allows no white man to live in its country with the exception of missionaries, government officials, and a few traders with special licenses. All land is communally owned. Stock raising is the most important enterprise. There is only one railway, and there are very few highways. Under the system of hereditary chieftainship, progress is limited, and economic conditions resulting from isolation have led to the retention of many of the undesirable features of native African life.

**BECHUANALAND**—Bechuanaland is almost entirely a native territory engaged mainly in cattle raising and dairying. It is one of the least "opened up" countries in Africa, large parts of it have never been surveyed. Since nearly half of the country is desert, one of its greatest problems has always been poor water supply. One of the most important public works has been construction by the British of large dams on native reserves and the boring of a system of wells. The only mineral resources so far developed are gold and silver, the center of the mining district being Francistown. Handicapping development are very poor transportation facilities. The country is inhabited mostly by Bantu tribes, except for about 2,000 Europeans and an equal number of Asiatics.

**SWAZILAND**—Swaziland, guided by its own Paramount Chief but administered by a British Resident Commissioner, is almost entirely agricultural and pastoral. Large numbers of cattle are exported. There are no railways, and the lack of them has seriously hindered the development of the country. Highways generally are not good; nevertheless, motor buses and trucks maintain a well-organized service and do much to promote the economy of the country.

#### MINOR BRITISH TERRITORIES

Minor British territories are islands in the Atlantic Ocean—Ascension, St. Helena, and Tristan da Cunha—and in the Indian Ocean

—Mauritius and the Seychelles. All the islands at one time or another have had significance either as ports of call, havens of refuge, or cable, meteorological, and radio stations, and for a brief period it appeared that the islands would be important in the

field of air transport, especially when American forces during World War II constructed Wideawake Airfield on Ascension Island, but the ever-increasing speed and range of modern aircraft have resulted in the by-passing of many such island steppingstones.


## FRENCH TERRITORIES

As we have just seen, the British have followed a policy of setting up local self-governing institutions in their African territories; French policy has been different (for location of French territories, see map on page 453). The French have aimed at rapid assimilation of their possessions in Africa with the French nation itself. To this end they have admitted representatives from their colonies into the French Assembly at Paris, the territories gaining representation in proportion to their importance and the stage of their development. Where native chieftains carry considerable weight with local people, French policy tends to cloak them with authority or direct their activities. The use of the French language in the schools and administration is an important cultural feature of French policy.

### FRENCH NORTH AFRICA

The three countries of French North Africa—Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia—together make up an almost entirely separate entity, cut off as they are from central and southern Africa by the Sahara (see map on this page). The high, rugged Atlas Mountains extend through all three and further orient them toward the north. In all three countries of North Africa economic activities are concentrated largely along the coastal areas. The countries are predominantly agricultural, and much of the production results from their having a Mediterranean type of climate, with winter rains, and from irrigation waters received from the mountains.

Most of the population, which has practically doubled in the past thirty years, is a





mixture of Moslem peoples of Arab and Berber stocks, with a considerable number of French, especially in Algeria. During this same period mineral production has increased from virtually nothing to a level of world importance, notably in iron ore, phosphates, and manganese. Road and port construction has also increased considerably. In contrast to this rapid economic advancement, social change and education have moved more slowly. France has been very conscious of the problems of North Africa and has striven to keep the economy apace with the increasing population. French capital has expanded the food, textile, construction, chemical, and metallurgical industries, and the government has encouraged trans-Mediterranean trade relations, with the result that there is now a rather extensive exchange of products between the two areas.

On the political side France has, since 1945, encountered strong nationalist movements among the Berbers and the Moslem peoples in all three countries. In part the agitation for self-rule and independence is inspired by Arab propagandists located in Cairo, but French reluctance to remedy the economic distress of the native Moslem and tribal groups, as contrasted with the fairly well-to-do position of the French settlers, has served to aggravate relations between France and its North African territories.

**ALGERIA**—Algeria, a French territory four times the size of France, is divided, for purposes of government, into northern and southern parts. The northern part has four separate departments, each sending a senator and deputies to the National Assembly; the southern part is administered directly by a Governor-General. Politically Algeria has been closely associated with France, but there are, however, nationalist elements within the country the majority of whom are pressing for full independence from France. To meet these demands, the French Assembly in September, 1947, enacted a law

that gives Algeria a larger measure of self-government than she had enjoyed before, including a provision for the establishment of an Algerian assembly. Despite these overtures, a nationalist rebellion broke out in November, 1954, which has merely intensified the fears and antagonisms between the 8,300,000 Moslems and the 1,200,000 French inhabitants. France has demanded military submission of the rebels as a condition of further reforms and the grant of equality for the Arabs, a factor which has prolonged the struggle for "pacification" of the area.

**MOROCCO**—Morocco, an empire in which the Sultan exercises supreme civil and religious authority, was, until recently, divided into the French and Spanish protectorates and the Tangier International Zone.<sup>6</sup> In the French area the French government did not fully attend to the social and economic needs of the country's 8,000,000 people. The native population is largely illiterate; but this condition is being corrected, for trade schools and agricultural training centers have been considerably developed since 1945. The economic status is being helped by heavy investments made by the United States in airfields and other installations.

The fact remains, however, that Frenchmen, who account for only five per cent of the population, not only have dominated the industrial and commercial life of the country but outnumber the Moroccans in education, the professions, and top government positions. The agitation for greater autonomy altered Morocco's relation with France. On November 18, 1955, Sultan Mohammed V proclaimed the end of the French protectorate and the beginning of a new era of independence. In a joint declaration, March 2, 1956, France not only affirmed its recognition of Morocco as an equal and sovereign partner but pledged itself to transfer the administration to the new gov-

<sup>6</sup> Spanish Morocco and Tangier are discussed later.

ernment at Rabat, to assist in the building of a national army, and to aid in the field of foreign relations. The execution of this program will test the success of French policy of redefining its interdependent relationship with Morocco.


**TUNISIA**—Tunisia, another former French protectorate, projects its northeast extremity into the Mediterranean to within ninety miles of Sicily. The people, ninety per cent of whom are Moslems, are ruled by the Bey of Tunis. As a concession to nationalist agitation for independence, France signed a Convention in 1955, which accorded a large measure of internal autonomy but with the High Commissioner controlling defense, security, and the financial interests of France. In 1956 the French announced the termination of their protectorate over Tunisia. Naval and air bases at Bizerte give evidence to the area's strategic importance to France.

#### FRENCH WEST AFRICA

After World War II Senegal, Mauritania, French Sudan, French Guinea, the Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Dahomey, and the Niger, all forming a continuous area, were joined together in the Federation of French West Africa, with its capital at Dakar. The trusteeship territory of Togoland and Cameroons remain outside the Federation. Each territory of the Federation is administered by a Governor, responsible to a High Commissioner, who is at the head of the Federation at Dakar; also each territory elects deputies (African or French) who reside in Paris and sit in the National Assembly, thus allowing the African deputy to play an important part in the government of France itself.

From the Gulf of Guinea coast inland are forest and swamp land, followed by savanna and scrub, for about 700 miles to the Sahara. Agriculture is not of the plantation type; rather, it is based on native-owned and

native-worked plots. Insufficiency of capital investment, acute shortage of labor, and long drought periods are primary reasons for relatively small commercial output. Moreover, modern irrigation works have not been in use long enough to show any considerable effect, primitive irrigation works are, however, an important factor in the country's economy.



The people may be divided into two main groups: the Moslem peoples of the north and the pagan and semi-Christian peoples of the south, although each group has penetrated into the realm of the other. The peoples of the north are broadly of Arab, Berber, and Fulani stock; those in the south are mainly Negroes. Each Negro village, as a rule, is peopled only by members of a clan, that is, a group of families descended from a common stock. The white population of French West Africa is estimated at more than 50,000, concentrated mainly in the larger coastal cities, especially in Dakar.

Since World War II there have been rapid changes in French West Africa. New building and modernization have taken place in

Dakar, one of the most important ports in the French Union, with an estimated 30,000 people of European origin living there in 1950, changes in Abidjan were likewise extensive, with the opening to traffic of a deep-water port. During the same period there was a marked increase in coffee production and in such industries as cement and lime making, brewing, shoemaking, and, in Senegal, the extraction of peanut oil on a large scale. In French Guinea a strong development in the mining of iron ore and bauxite has taken place through private enterprise. Social services and public works, however, are financed by the Metropolitan Government of France.

#### FRENCH EQUATORIAL AFRICA

French Equatorial Africa is divided into the four territories of Gabun, Middle Congo, Ubangi-Shari, and Chad. The country as a whole is administered by a governor-general and each territory by a governor. Adjacent to French Equatorial Africa is the trusteeship of the French Cameroons, administered by a High Commissioner. In the south of French Equatorial Africa are 300,000 square miles of tropical forests, rich in timber, northward there are savanna lands and parklike forests that extend gradually into the Sahara. The population of about 4,400,000, mostly Negro, with only 17,000 Europeans, is relatively small in view of the size of the country. Precious stones, gold, copper, lead, and zinc are found in this area; high-grade manganese was discovered in 1953. The most important exports are cotton, wood, gold, palm oil, and rubber. An obstacle to economic development is the tremendous distance of 1,500 miles from the north to the south of the country. However, since the country occupies a key position with reference to transcontinental air traffic, capital has been invested in airfields and better roads, with the result that transportation facilities have been improved, especially since World War II.

**FRENCH CAMEROONS**—The French Cameroons, a former German colony, are a trust under the United Nations (see map on page 447). The French have improved the port of Douala, constructed a railway to Yaoundé, and built more roads. The plantations for coffee, oil palms, and cacao produce significant amounts for export.

**FRENCH TOGOLAND**—French Togoland, also a former German colony, is a UN trusteeship territory, though France in 1956 took steps to make it a republic in the French Union. The natives are generally at a low stage of cultural development, and the area is important economically only because of its small export of agricultural products, principally cacao, cotton, and palm kernels. Lomé, on the coast, is the capital and only seaport.

#### OTHER FRENCH TERRITORIES

**MADAGASCAR**—The island of Madagascar lies 240 miles off the east coast of Africa. A territory larger than France, the island is about 980 miles long and 360 miles wide at its greatest breadth. A French high commissioner administers the territory, which is represented by deputies in the French Assembly. More than 3,000,000 acres are under cultivation, but plantation agriculture is still on a small scale. Rice is the principal food crop, but the quality is poor and the yield low. The island has large forests rich in tropical products, and although mineral resources are largely undeveloped, Madagascar produces significant amounts of graphite and quartz crystals. The French have given the people of Madagascar a large degree of self-rule and have contributed funds for the education of the natives—and their conversion to Christianity; still, there are symptoms of unrest, especially among the Hovas, which erupted into the nationalist outbreaks of 1947. Attached to the government of Madagascar is the prosperous dependency of the Comoro Islands.

**RÉUNION ISLAND**—Réunion Island, in the Indian Ocean 420 miles east of Madagascar, has belonged to France since 1643. It is densely populated and produces significant amounts of sugar and rum. As an overseas department, it is entitled to representation in Paris by two senators and three deputies.

**FRENCH SOMALILAND**—French Somaliland, on the Gulf of Aden, has little economic importance other than its possession of the port of Djibouti, which is the terminus for the railway to Addis Ababa. Hides, skins, and salt are the most important products of the country.


## BELGIAN TERRITORIES

### THE BELGIAN CONGO

The Belgian Congo is almost entirely in equatorial Africa, lying in the shallow Congo River Basin, much of the surface is below 1,600 feet in elevation (for location of Belgian, Portuguese, and Spanish territories, see map on this page). The country has only a very short coastline on the Atlantic Ocean

resources. The Katanga, one of the richest fields of copper known in the world, has an industrial and commercial significance far surpassing that of any other African region except the gold-producing Rand in the Union of South Africa. Other mineral ores in the Katanga are gold, tin, cobalt, columbium, cadmium, tantalum, silver, and radium. Diamond fields in the southwestern part of the country produce more than 6,000,000 carats a year, mainly industrial diamonds, of which the Congo is one of the world's largest producers. One hundred miles northwest of Elisabethville, in southeastern Belgian Congo, is the rich Shinkolobwe mine, which produces more than half of the world supply of uranium ore and an even larger proportion of the world supply of radium. Vast tropical forests cover about 25,000 square miles, from which valuable wood products are obtained. The principal agricultural products are palm oil, cotton, palm nuts, coffee, cacao, and rubber.

Because of the need arising from economic development, parts of the Belgian Congo have been provided with relatively good transportation. Toward the end of the nineteenth century the lower Congo was opened to transportation by the construction of a portage railway between Matadi and Leopoldville. Before World War I a combined river-and-rail route to expedite transport between the Middle Congo and Katanga Province was constructed; later, a direct railway route from Katanga to the Atlantic was completed via Angola. This



at the mouth of the Congo River. The population density is less than fifteen persons per square mile and very irregularly distributed; the non-African population is less than 100,000 persons, most of whom are of Belgian origin.

The Congo is extremely rich in natural

## Political Divisions of Africa

<i>Country</i>	<i>Area (in sq. mi.)</i>	<i>Population</i>	<i>Form of Government or Status</i>
<b>Independent countries</b>			
Egypt	386,198	21,941,000	Republic
Ethiopia, incl. Eritrea	390,020	19,260,000	Kingdom
Liberia	43,000	2,750,000	Republic
Libya	679,358	1,340,000	Kingdom
Sudan	967,500	8,764,000	Republic
Union of South Africa	472,494	13,153,000	Self-governing member of Brit. Common.
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,938,570</b>	<b>67,208,000</b>	
<b>British Territories</b>			
Ascension	34	170	Dependency of St. Helena
Basutoland	11,716	600,000	Protectorate
Bechuanaland	275,000	298,000	Protectorate
British Somaliland	68,000	640,000	Protectorate
Gambia	4,005	289,600	Colony and protectorate
Gold Coast <sup>a</sup>	78,802	4,062,000	Partial self-governing state
Kenya	224,960	5,947,000	Colony and protectorate
Mauritius Island	720	501,415	Colony
Nigeria	339,169	30,000,000	Colony and protectorate
Northern Rhodesia <sup>b</sup>	290,323	2,072,000	Protectorate
Nyasaland	47,404	2,484,000	Protectorate
St. Helena Island	47	4,900	Colony
Seychelles Islands and dependencies	156	37,100	Colony
Sierra Leone	27,925	2,000,000	Colony and protectorate
Southern Rhodesia	150,333	2,110,000	Self-governing colony
Swaziland	6,704	210,000	Protectorate
Tristan da Cunha	38	280	Dependency of St. Helena
Uganda	93,981	5,425,000	Protectorate
Zanzibar and Pemba	1,020	274,000	Protectorate
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,620,337</b>	<b>56,955,465</b>	
<b>French Territories</b>			
Algeria	847,500	9,530,000	Government-General of Algeria
Comoro	650	166,000	Dependency of Madagascar
French Equatorial Africa	953,800	4,441,000	Overseas territory
French Somaliland	9,071	61,500	Overseas territory
French West Africa	1,776,500	17,361,000	Overseas territory
Madagascar	224,162	4,455,000	Overseas territory
Réunion Island	965	274,000	Overseas department
Morocco <sup>c</sup>	153,870	8,004,000	Interdependence-independence
Tunisia <sup>c</sup>	48,362	3,700,000	Interdependence-independence
<b>Total</b>	<b>4,014,880</b>	<b>47,992,500</b>	
<b>Belgian Territories</b>			
Belgian Congo	904,757	11,259,000	Colony

Political Divisions of Africa—*continued*

<i>Country</i>	<i>Area (in sq mi)</i>	<i>Population</i>	<i>Form of Government or Status</i>
<b>Portuguese Territories</b>			
Angola	481,351	4,168,000	Overseas province
Azores Islands	888	286,800	Part of Portugal
Cape Verde Islands	1,557	147,328	Overseas province
Madeira Island	308	280,000	Part of Portugal
Mozambique	297,731	5,846,000	Overseas province
Portuguese Guinea	13,348	523,000	Overseas province
São Tomé and Príncipe	372	60,159	Overseas province
Total	795,555	11,311,287	
<b>Spanish Territories</b>			
Canary Islands	2,807	564,273	Part of Spain
Ifni	741	35,000	Colony
Spanish Morocco	18,009	1,082,000	Protectorate
Spanish Guinea	10,852	198,663	Colony
Spanish Sahara	105,000	40,000	Colony
Total	137,409	1,919,936	
<b>United Nations trusteeships</b>			
British Cameroons	34,081	1,500,000	United Kingdom, administered by Nigeria
French Cameroons	166,489	3,077,000	France
Ruanda-Urundi	19,536	3,835,000	Belgium, administered as part of the Belgian Congo
Somalia	194,000	1,000,000	Italy
Southwest Africa <sup>d</sup>	317,725	418,000	Union of South Africa
Tanganyika	362,688	8,196,000	United Kingdom
British Togoland <sup>e</sup>	13,041	416,000	United Kingdom, administered by Gold Coast
French Togoland	21,893	1,030,000	France
Total	1,129,453	19,472,000	
Tangier Zone <sup>f</sup>	225	100,000	Autonomy under statute
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>11,541,186</b>	<b>216,218,188</b>	

<sup>a</sup> Formerly a colony and protectorate, since 1954 a partially self-governing state composed of the former Gold Coast colony, Ashanti, and Northern Territories.

<sup>b</sup> Along with Southern Rhodesia, a member of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland

<sup>c</sup> Tunisia and Morocco ended their protectorate status in 1956 and now exist as independent nations, linked with France by the bonds of "interdependence."

<sup>d</sup> A mandate of the League of Nations, the Union of South Africa has refused to accept a United Nations trusteeship.

<sup>e</sup> Being merged with Gold Coast.

<sup>f</sup> Merged with Morocco in 1956.

latter is to be supplemented by an all-Belgian line also to the coast.

Belgian policy in Africa somewhat resembles that of the French in that native chiefs are accorded their authority by the government. However, the Belgians encourage the use of local languages rather than enforcing the use of the tongue of the mother country. The Congo is administered by a governor-general, residing at Leopoldville, assisted by a Government Council composed of state officials.

#### RUANDA-URUNDI

The territory of Ruanda-Urundi, composed of districts formerly a part of German East Africa to the west of the Belgian Congo, was ceded after World War I to Belgium as a mandate of the League of Nations; the area is now a UN trusteeship. In 1925 it was united administratively with the Belgian Congo under a vice-governor. Ruanda-Urundi is inhabited principally by Africans engaged in the cultivation of crops and in cattle raising.

### PORTUGUESE TERRITORIES

Portuguese territorial policy has been to reduce administrative commitments to a bare minimum. Uniformity of administration has been achieved only recently, with the transfer of political authority from chartered companies to the government. Government in overseas territories is usually administered directly by a governor and assistants sent out from Portugal. In general, Portuguese territories in Africa have relatively large groups of mixed European and African parentage who are recognized as belonging to the European population. Practically no European colonization has taken place in the interior of two of the territories, Angola and Mozambique, and large parts of these countries are still unsurveyed. However, in 1953, a six-year improvement plan was instituted in both territories, which includes hydroelectric and irrigation projects, improvement of railways and port facilities, and the creation of basic heavy industries. The economies of the Portuguese African territories have been geared almost entirely with that of the mother country itself.

#### ANGOLA

Angola is the largest of the Portuguese territories. By a system of railways it is pos-

sible to cross the continent of Africa by train from Benguela on the coast of Angola to Beira on the coast of Mozambique, a rail trip of about 3,000 miles via the Rhodesias. Angola is also connected by railway with the Belgian Congo, Northern and Southern Rhodesia, and the Union of South Africa. Diamonds and other minerals are being mined in increasingly large quantities. The partial opening up of the interior has made it clear that the country has great potentialities, and the development of resources has only just begun. Lobito is an important Atlantic seaport for shipping raw materials. Along the coastline north of the mouth of the Congo is the small Cabinda enclave, administered as a detached portion of Angola.

#### MOZAMBIQUE

Mozambique, with a unique importance because of the transshipment of goods through its territory to and from adjacent interior countries, is now giving more attention than formerly to the development of its own resources. Transport of exports and imports through Beira and Lourenço Marques has given these well-equipped seaports greater importance than would have been possible

from Mozambique's trade alone. Among the country's crops a leading one is sugar cane. The output is small, but it is showing a steady increase. The sugar from the cane is mainly for export. Mineral resources, including gold, silver, uranium, and asbestos, are only beginning to be developed. The country provides a great reservoir of labor for work in the mines of neighboring Transvaal.

#### PORTUGUESE GUINEA

Portuguese Guinea is one of the least developed parts of West Africa, with poor drainage and bad health conditions. Typical of the country, which has heavy rainfall, are

numerous swamps, low-lying bushland, and thun forest.

#### OTHER PORTUGUESE HOLDINGS

Administered as a part of Portugal are (1) Madeira, a large volcanic island with a mild climate, and (2) the Azores, mountainous islands in the North Atlantic. Overseas provinces of Portugal are the fifteen dry Cape Verde Islands and the islands of São Tomé and Príncipe, the latter two forming one province under a governor. In September, 1951, the United States, in agreement with Portugal, gained the right to establish air bases in the islands. This move brought the strategic Azores into the North Atlantic Treaty System.

### SPANISH AND OTHER TERRITORIES

Following the loss of the Philippines and West Indian colonies at the end of the last century, Spain turned her attention to the acquisition of territory across the Strait of Gibraltar in Africa. In general, the governments of these areas are administered directly by Spanish officials. Commerce is insignificant except for imports, much of which come from Spain, and the territories offer few investment opportunities.

#### SPANISH MOROCCO

Prior to 1956 Spanish Morocco was a protectorate and administered by a khalifa as a representative of the Sultan of Morocco, while the Spanish were represented by a high commissioner. In view of the political changes in French Morocco, Spain has agreed to surrender its protectorate relation in the Spanish zone and recognize the sovereignty of Sultan Mohammed V. The country is not self-supporting; it must import foodstuffs, mostly from Spain and from the

former French Morocco. The pastoral highlands afford wool, hides, and skins, but such forestry and mineral resources as exist have been little developed. Although not included in the protectorate, Alhucemas, Ceuta, Chafarinas, Melilla, Peñon de Velez, and the enclave of Ifni are under Spanish sovereignty.

#### SPANISH SAHARA

Spanish Sahara, located on the Atlantic coast south of Morocco, includes Río de Oro and Sekia el Hamra, and, along with Ifni, is administered by the High Commissioner of Morocco. The permanent population amounts to about 40,000, supplemented during the rainy season by an estimated 30,000 nomads who enter with their flocks. Río de Oro, mainly a flat, practically waterless desert, has excellent fishing along its shores; the coast provides a fairly safe harbor which has considerable value from a strategic standpoint.



**SPANISH GUINEA**

Spanish Guinea comprises Rio Muni on the mainland and Fernando Po and several other small islands. Spanish Guinea is small and, in general, undeveloped, however, there are important timber resources, and coffee and cacao are grown for export. Rio Muni has potential value because in its forests are many valuable woods and a large number of oil palms. Fernando Po, with extensive coffee and cacao plantations, is structurally comprised of extinct volcanoes.

**CANARY ISLANDS**

The volcanic Canary Islands in the Atlantic, consisting of seven main islands, are ad-

ministered as part of Spain. In addition to their strategic value, the islands have an extensive tourist trade.

**SOMALIA**

Somalia, a United Nations trusteeship assigned for a ten-year period to Italy, starting April, 1950, extends along the Indian Ocean from the Gulf of Aden to the Juba River. Only a little more than 4,000 of the total population of more than 1,000,000 are Europeans. Much of the land is semiarid to arid, and consequently cattle raising is the principal activity. The Italians established large sugar cane and banana plantations along the Juba and Shebeli rivers. The capital and principal port is Mogadishu.

**TANGIER ZONE**

The Tangier Zone, with the seaport and adjacent territory, has only 225 square miles, but its strategic location, commanding the entrance into the Mediterranean, outweighs its size. Tangier was a focal tension area in the Moroccan Crisis of 1906-11, which involved France, Spain, and Germany. To resolve the conflict, in 1923, France, Spain, and Great Britain drew up a convention providing for Statute of the Tangier Zone. Under the convention the Tangier Zone was

demilitarized and internationalized. Actually the zone was ruled by diplomatic representatives of nine states: France, Spain, Britain, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, Portugal, and the United States. A statute in 1953 provided for a committee of control, composed of the nine countries, and an international assembly that has legislative powers. Three years later international control of Tangier was terminated and the area was incorporated within Morocco.

**Study Questions**

1. Why have boundary disputes and administrative problems been numerous in Africa?
2. Discuss the effect of the Sahara on the historical and political background of Africa.
3. Review the social and political structure of the Union of South Africa, particularly as to the policy of "apartheid."
4. Point out the value to Ethiopia of Eritrea's ports.
5. How is Liberia unique in origin among the countries of Africa? How is her political structure changing?
6. Describe the economic problems within the British, French, and Italian UN trusteeships.

7. Compare British and French territorial policies in Africa.
8. Describe the political structure of British West Africa.
9. Discuss the economic progress of the Sudan
10. Contrast the economic, social, and political structure of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland with that of British South Africa.
11. Discuss the political structures of Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria?
12. What changes have taken place in French West Africa since World War II?
13. Discuss the natural resources of the Belgian Congo.
14. What is the unique importance of Mozambique in relation to the trade of adjacent countries?
15. In general what is typical of the economic development of the Spanish territories?

## *Turkey and the Straits*

The modern Turkish state is closely linked with the Straits and their narrow water passages, the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. The geopolitical strategy of the eastern Mediterranean, even of the entire Middle East, depends in large part upon control of the Straits, where the land route between Europe and Asia intersects the water route connecting the Mediterranean and Black seas. It has been Turkey's lot to maintain this commanding position, which in the past was involved in a continuous succession of international agreements and treaties. Statesmen from Western and Central Europe frequently intervened directly in the internal affairs of Turkey, and Russia continued to exert pressure toward the Straits for access to the Mediterranean. It is a tribute to Turkey—not only the present republic, but Turkey as the political heart of the former Ottoman Empire—that the Straits never fell into other hands.

Aside from the Straits and its strategic significance, Turkey itself has a location favoring a dynamic role in world politics. The

three continents of the Old World come together in the eastern Mediterranean, giving the country a position in the heart of the greatest land mass in the world, a position, however, easily accessible because of the pattern of the narrow seas in this area. In both world wars Turkey figured prominently, not as a great power, but as a link in the route to riches in and beyond the Middle East. More recently, as a member of NATO, it has been playing an important role in securing the Middle East against Communist aggression.


At present Turkey as a transit area to the East cannot be considered as one of the great commercial routes of international importance, even though its position as the land bridge from Europe to Asia may suggest such a role. This east-west land route, broken only by the narrow Dardanelles, has not been able to compete successfully with the water route through the Suez Canal to the south. Starting about 1930, airline interests from countries of northwestern Europe established routes through the Mid-

dle East to India and beyond, but Cairo and Alexandria, not Istanbul, became the great transit air terminals. Since World War II some intercontinental air routes pass through Turkey, but Cairo in Egypt has maintained its high rank as an air center, although challenged since 1951 by Beirut in Lebanon. Further, the north-south water route northward from the Mediterranean through the Straits has virtually become a commercial dead end, terminating at Istanbul. Without a flow of trade into and out of the Black Sea, originating from, or destined to, Russia and the Danubian countries, the Straits cannot be an important commercial waterway.

the small wedge-shaped segment of the Balkan Peninsula east of the Maritsa River. It has frontage on the Black Sea, the Aegean Sea, and the connecting Straits, it has land boundaries in common with Bulgaria for 124 miles and with Greece for 127 miles, sharing with the latter country the politico-geographic region known as Thrace. In fact, Turkey in Europe is sometimes referred to as Turkish Thrace.

The area of Asiatic Turkey, or Anatolia, is coextensive with the Asia Minor peninsula.<sup>1</sup> More than one half of the boundary is formed by the Black, Marmara, Aegean, and Mediterranean seas. In the east, however,

### MODERN TURKEY



The republic of Turkey is divided into two natural divisions—European and Asiatic—by the historically important waterway comprising the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara, and the Bosphorus (see the map above). The country's total area on both continents is 296,185 square miles, but of this area only a small part—about one thirtieth—is in Europe.

European Turkey today is about the size of the state of New Hampshire, making up

Turkey is blocked in by neighboring states: on the north by the USSR for 367 miles, on the east by Persia for 290 miles, and on the south by Iraq and Syria for 235 and 490

<sup>1</sup> Asia Minor as a geographic area is poorly defined in its southeastern extremity. Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and what is now Israel have been included as a part of the peninsula by some writers. The term "Anatolia" is frequently used in referring to Asia Minor, but some geographers apply it to the upland areas only, that is, the Anatolian plateau.

miles, respectively. Although the latter three neighbors of Turkey are independent, they have in the past served as bases for the extension of spheres of influence of Western powers into Turkey; conflicting interests between Turkey and these neighboring states have, at times, resulted in considerable border friction.

Only in recent decades have the boundaries of Turkey become stabilized. The last change took place in June, 1939, when Alexandretta (Hatay) was acquired from Syria (this country was then subject to a French mandate) and given to Turkey by France as payment of a twenty-year-old Turkish claim and as a token of friendship in an atmosphere of tension. In 1945 the Soviet Union agitated for territorial control of Turkish

Armenia, adjacent to the Soviet republics of Armenia and Georgia, and even for land as far west as, and including, Trebizond, but without success. In 1953 they publicly disavowed these claims.

The study of the political geography of Turkey must necessarily delve into major aspects of that important state. First, the area of the Straits itself, as one of the critical waterways of the world, can be studied as an example of geostrategic location. Second, the history of the breakdown of the extensive Ottoman Empire and the emergence of the modern Turkish republic must be dealt with principally as factors of the political area. The remainder of this chapter is devoted to these two prime issues—geostrategic location and political area.

## THE STRAITS

A series of deep-water passages—the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara, and the Bosphorus—collectively make up the Straits (see map on this page). Separating Asia Minor from Europe, this narrow waterway more than 200 miles in length forms a highly strategic link between the otherwise landlocked Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Along with the Suez and Panama canals, it is one of the three most strategic water links in the world and consequently throughout history has had a tremendous bearing on relationships among nations. Control of the Straits by Turkey has given that nation an undue share of political limelight and has made it susceptible to international tension.

### PHYSICAL ASPECTS

From a physical standpoint the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus are drowned river valleys deep enough to be navigable by vessels of every type and draft. The Dardanelles are twenty-five miles in length; the Bosphorus,

sixteen miles. Of the two passages the Bosphorus is narrowest, averaging about a mile in width, but at some points it is less than one half mile wide. In the interconnecting Sea of Marmara, however, the maximum width exceeds forty miles. From global shipping lanes the Black Sea can be reached only through the Straits; but vessels normally using the Suez and Panama canals, which are of utmost world importance, could ultimately reach their destinations by other, though more devious, water routes.



The Balkan and Anatolian regions form a continuous highland area from Europe into

Asia, interrupted only by the depression in which lie the drowned river valleys and the intermediate sea. In fact, the restricted width of the Straits has long made this region a natural land bridge between Asia Minor and Europe, similar to the bridge between North Africa and Europe formed by the Strait of Gibraltar.

The Straits area served also as a bridge for the exchange of goods and ideas between the peoples of Central and southeastern Europe and southern Russia to the north and east and the Middle East to the south and east. As a specific example, it once was a commercial gateway to the fertile, mineral-rich region that lies between the Ural and Carpathian mountains. The excellent river system of this vast European plain served even in ancient times for the transportation of goods from the Baltic Sea to the Straits. With the realignment of the trading area as a consequence of the Communist postwar satellites' orientation toward Moscow, the flow of trade through the waterway has greatly decreased. Thus, commerce is largely limited to that flowing from the Mediterranean into and out of Turkey itself.

## ISTANBUL

The strategic and commercial significance of the Straits is symbolized by the great city and port of Istanbul. A population of 1,000,000 makes it not only the leading metropolitan center of Turkey but the largest city of the Balkan Peninsula. Moreover, there is no other city so large in any of the countries in southwestern Asia. Located at the southern end of the Bosphorus, on the European shore, the city's site was originally selected about 658 B.C. as a trading port by a Greek named Byzas.<sup>2</sup> This particular site

has been endowed with a number of specific advantages. First, it was, until the advent of modern weapons, relatively easy to defend. Second, no other site in the southern Black Sea area offers a comparable natural harbor. Third, a number of diversified products in the vicinity fosters trade. Thus, as it was inevitable that an important city develop at some point along the shores of the Straits, it is little wonder that the site where Istanbul stands was chosen.

The two sides of the Bosphorus at Istanbul are not connected by bridge or tunnel, this probably accounts for the fact that the metropolis never spread to the Asiatic shore. Across from Istanbul older Uskudar and newer Haydarpasha are independent communities, the latter having become the railroad for Turkish lines in Asia Minor.

Even in ancient and medieval times the port of Istanbul served as an important center for trade. Merchants from many lands came with their goods, such as amber, skins, and hides from Russia, metals and grain from Central and Western Europe, and slaves from Africa. When, during the latter part of the nineteenth century, world-wide trade greatly increased, Istanbul, too, became an important modern trade center. Although Austria-Hungary shipped most of her commodities to the Near East via Trieste and Germany used the port of Hamburg, the Danube River carried bulk commodities from Central Europe to the Black Sea and Istanbul, where cargoes could be transferred to larger vessels. During the period 1870-1914 Russian import and export trade dominated commercial activity in Istanbul, although British, French, Austro-Hungarian, and German vessels were utilized in conveying most of the traffic. Trade in and through the Straits was hard hit by the dismemberment of the Austrian and Turkish empires (1918). The establishment of numerous national states in the Danubian region split trade into many individual units, and each state sought a port best fitted for

<sup>2</sup> The original name of Istanbul was Byzantium. Constantine, the Roman Emperor, decided in A.D. 330 to use the city as his new capital and named it Constantinople, by which it was known until the establishment of the new republic of Turkey.

its specific needs. Russia's shrinking export and import trade after 1919 also had much to do with the fact that Istanbul was eventually outranked by Salonika and Piraeus in volume of traffic handled.

The status of Istanbul as a trade center may well undergo further changes. The future of Trieste, the stability of northeastern Greece and its port of Salonika, and the predominant political and economic influence and interests of Russia in the Danu-

bian countries will materially affect traffic through the Straits. However, the strides being made by the Turkish government to industrialize and to develop commercially will foster Istanbul as a port, where about seventy per cent of Turkey's foreign trade is normally handled. Finally, any effort on the part of the Soviet Union to develop trade relations with or through the Mediterranean area would be reflected in Istanbul's greater importance as a transit port.

## THE TURKISH NATIONAL STATE

### HISTORICAL EVOLUTION

An understanding of modern Turkey is impossible unless we first consider the great Ottoman Empire that dominated the Middle East from the late thirteenth century until the early part of the twentieth. The ruling house, started by Osman I, gave its name to this empire. Founded on the dynamic Moslem religion with its belief in conquest, the young power thrived by virtue of military prowess. At the height of its vitality in the sixteenth century the sprawling and loosely knit empire bore very little resemblance to the compact and highly nationalistic Turkish republic of today. Yet it was out of the residue of Ottoman territory, as it cracked to pieces, that the Turkey of today emerged as a state possessing a vitality that startled the world and at the same time demanded its respect.

**THE OTTOMAN ERA**—The Ottoman Turks first appeared in history early in the thirteenth century. Driven from their homes in Central Asia by the Mongols under Genghis Khan, a horde of several thousand persons settled in Asia Minor under the protection of the Seljuk Turks, to whom they rendered fealty. But at about the turn of the fourteenth century under capable leadership they

asserted their independence and founded the Ottoman Empire. Areas were captured in Asia Minor and southwestern Europe which had previously been held by the Seljuk Turks or by the Greeks. With spectacular success Ottoman rulers nibbled at the Byzantine Empire and, in 1453, captured Constantinople, its capital. For well over two centuries each sultan in turn enlarged the empire through conquests.

In its most opulent period—the sixteenth century—the empire extended from the vicinity of Vienna in the heart of Europe to the southern entrance to the Red Sea and from western Algeria in Africa to the Caspian Sea in Asia (see map on page 467). In addition to these vast land areas, the Ottoman regime completely dominated the Aegean, Black, and eastern Mediterranean seas and thus controlled most of the world's commerce at that time. For several centuries the Ottoman Empire was the largest in the world (excluding the Orient), postdating the great days of Imperial Rome and predating the British Empire. As a Mediterranean power, it retained some prestige until after the turn of the present century.

During the last two centuries of its pre-eminence, however, the Ottoman Empire suffered a steady decline, and it finally broke apart as one result of World War I. The





weaknesses of the empire are traceable to three fundamental causes: (1) a general deterioration brought about by internal corruption and demoralization; (2) the formation of separate political entities, especially in the Balkans, where various national groups struggled for independence; and (3) the gradual but persistent pressure exerted by outside powers for political rights, economic advantages, and control or possession of specific areas within the empire. Major losses of territory were suffered when, after the peace settlement in 1919, European nations took slices of the Ottoman Empire as colonies or as mandated areas.

To the northwest the disintegration of Ottoman control was essentially effected in the nineteenth century by Balkan peoples who established independent governments. Greece won its independence by 1832. A combination of ebullient nationalism and protective assistance from Austria and Russia accounted for the rise of Serbia, Rumania, and, later, Bulgaria as separate states. Finally, in 1913, as Turkish power continued to recede, even the small principality of Albania gained independence. From the north, Russia pushed into Ottoman territory in the eighteenth century and steadily secured possession of the northern shores of the Black Sea, including the Crimean Peninsula.

In northern Africa the British and French vied for supremacy. In the west the French secured Algeria, in 1830, and Tunisia, in 1881. In the east the indebtedness of a spendthrift Khedive of Egypt to European bondholders, plus the completion, in 1869, of the Suez Canal, spurred England and France to intervene in that country. For a time Anglo-French interests dominated Egypt. This dual control existed for over a decade. When forcible intervention seemed advisable to both governments, however, the French for domestic reasons left the task to the British, who somewhat belatedly recognized the strategic value of the

canal as a "highway to our Indian Empire." Much later, in 1912, as a result of a war, Libya was taken by Italy, and in 1914 final ties between Egypt and the Ottoman Empire were severed (see map on page 468). Although these losses eliminated Turkey as a strong Mediterranean power, they did not impair her influence in the Straits.

To the southeast in Asia the crumbling empire retained virtually all of the Arabic Middle East until 1918. At the close of World War I, however, the Arab areas, except in parts of the Arabian Peninsula, came under the influence of Britain and France. Syria and Lebanon were mandated to France; Iraq, Palestine, and Transjordan were mandated to Britain; and much of Arabia, although tinged with British influence, was already working out its own salvation.<sup>3</sup>

Stripped in this fashion of approximately nine tenths of its former area, Turkey as a sovereign power stood ready to topple into obscurity. The birth of Turkey as a republic is a striking though paradoxical sequel to the decline of Turkey as an empire.

**THE TURKISH ERA**—Evidences of a rejuvenated Turkish nation appeared long before the Ottoman Empire finally expired. In 1908 a revolution, fomented by a group of nationalists known as the Young Turks, activated a movement best described by their slogan, "Turkey for the Turks." Fifteen tumultuous years were to pass, however, before an independent Turkey on a firm footing was to evolve in an area politically frustrated and weary of war.

In 1914 Turkey entered World War I on the side of Germany. Results were disastrous, and Turkey paid in consequence. In 1920, two years after the cessation of hostilities, the Treaty of Sèvres, between the Allies and the tottering sultanate, imposed further penalties upon an already crushed

<sup>3</sup> See Chapter 28, "The Arab States and Israel," for a much more detailed account of these Middle East states.



empire: Greece was to receive eastern Thrace, exclusive of Istanbul, and the Smyrna region; Italy was to be given Adalia (now Antalya), the southwestern sector of Asia Minor, amounting to about one fourth of Turkey's total area; France was to have the Cilician segment of southern Asia Minor adjacent to Syria, and the Straits were to be placed in the hands of an international commission. Even the remaining portion of Turkey in northern Anatolia was to be divested of complete internal control. In addition, the Sultan was to retain his position strictly as a puppet. The Armenian inhabitants, a Christian minority, were assured their independence, while the Moslem Kurds, a nomadic people, were to become autonomous. At this point the future status of Turkey seemed completely dependent upon the whims of European statesmen, indeed, had the harsh provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres been fully realized the Turkish state might have disappeared as a political entity.

The growing force of the nationalists, led by the capable Kemal Ataturk, successfully counteracted the political humiliation wreaked upon Turkey. Taking advantage of Allied rivalries and war weariness and profiting from Bolshevik arms and gold, Turkey made an astonishing recovery. In 1922 revived military strength was used to drive the Greek army from Smyrna. In the following year in a resurrection of political prestige, Turkey won an improved world position as measured by the Treaty of Lausanne between the Turkish nationalists and the Allies. The issues discussed at the Lausanne Conference and the demands made by Turkey evidenced an ambitious nation's claim to be granted an honorable existence. Her demands were (1) repudiation of the Treaty of Sèvres; (2) recognition of a Turkish nationalist government; (3) the establishment of boundaries that did not rob Turkey of "rightful" territory; and (4) correction of the evils of foreign interference in in-

ternal affairs. For the most part Turkey gained her objectives, but there was still some disagreement over Italy's continued possession of the Dodecanese Islands,<sup>4</sup> over the boundary line between Turkey and Iraq, which was finally settled in 1926 with the Mosul oil district, in which Britain was interested, going to Iraq, and over Alexandretta, which was retained by France as a part of Syria until 1939.<sup>5</sup>

The Treaty of Lausanne marked the completion of Turkey's newly won independence and set the stage for the nationalists to establish a firm government. In the same year the Turkish state officially became a republic. One year earlier the Sultan had been deposed, but the caliphate, an archaic religious institution, was not abolished until 1924. Kemal Ataturk was elected president in 1923, an office he held until his death in 1938. During his regime he carried out an extensive program of reform, including modernization and industrialization of the country. His stewardship signals the rise of modern Turkey and his career till his death is closely linked with the nationalist movement. As early as 1908 he had subscribed to the nationalist cause as a military leader, in fact, the period 1919-38 in Turkey is known to some historians as the "Era of Mustapha Kemal (Ataturk)."

Turkey appealed to the signatories of the Treaty of Lausanne for the right to refortify the Straits. As a result the multilateral Montreux Convention, drawn up in 1936, abrogated a number of the provisions in the Treaty of Lausanne relating to the Straits, abolished the international control of the Straits, and authorized Turkey to militarize

<sup>4</sup> After World War II the Dodecanese Islands passed from Italian to Greek sovereignty. Since some islands in the group are within sight of the Turkish mainland it cannot be certain what future claims may be made.

<sup>5</sup> Alexandretta is now known as Iskenderun. Likewise, Alexandretta Bay is known as Iskenderun Bay, where a strategic port is being constructed with the help of American engineers.

the former demilitarized zone along the Straits. Through the troubled war years following Ataturk's death in 1938, President Ismet Inonu, faithful friend and colleague of the great Turkish leader, carried on until 1950 in much the same vein as his predecessor.

Prior to and during World War II the young republic strove to maintain a delicate balance in her relations with two great armed camps. In the late 1930's the country was automatically drawn toward Germany by the Nazi economic tentacles which reached through the Balkan Peninsula to the natural resources of Asia Minor. The need of the Reich for material in preparation for war made her Turkey's best customer and thus stimulated a program of industrialization. Before the outbreak of hostilities, however, Turkey had decided against the aggressor nations and, in 1939, concluded a mutual-assistance pact with Britain and a nonaggression pact with France. Despite economic relations with Germany, Turkey's "two million bristling bayonets" were designed to serve as a check to Nazi expansion into the Balkans. In this way the cause of the Allies was enhanced by the closing to Axis troops of a possible intercontinental land passage through Turkey. Turkey's alert military policy more than offset for the Allies the delivery of war goods to Germany made by Turkey during the first war years. Finally, in 1945, having previously broken off diplomatic relations, Turkey declared war against the Axis nations, thus gaining a place with the victorious Allies in shaping the peace settlement. By virtue of having thrown her weight on the winning side, postwar Turkey escaped any territorial losses or restrictive penalties.

Since the end of World War II the Turkish republic has become part of the defense pattern of the Western democracies. Beginning in 1947 aid from the United States was designed to strengthen Turkey's military po-

sition and improve its economy. By far the greater share of the foreign aid was allocated for the military, but economic aid proper was not neglected.<sup>6</sup> By the end of 1952 nearly \$250,000,000,000 had been expended for improving agricultural production, industrialization, new transportation facilities, and other aspects of national welfare. Military aid has included the strengthening of the Turkish army, navy, and airfields. Britain, too, has maintained a military mission in Turkey. In April, 1949, Turkey, along with Greece, became a member of the Council of Europe and two years later was accepted as a party to NATO. In connection with these defense measures it is interesting to note that the headquarters of the Southeast Europe Land Forces are located in Izmir. In September, 1951, Turkey demonstrated its pro-Western orientation by voting with the Great Powers in the Security Council's censure of Egypt for its partial blockade of the Suez Canal. In early 1953 a significant Defense Alliance was signed by Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia.

Within the past decade the republic of Turkey has definitely become associated in many of her activities, both internal and external, with the United States. This new interest on the part of Turkish statesmen denotes a marked shift from Turkey's prewar international relationships, which were largely confined to the European powers and their machinations in the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East.

#### PHYSICAL LANDSCAPE

The natural environment of Turkey is generally inhospitable, though not sufficiently so to preclude material advancement by an energetic people. Adverse sur-

<sup>6</sup> Economic aid under the Marshall Plan was first administered by the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), which at the end of 1951 merged military with economic assistance and became the Mutual Security Agency (MSA).

face features seriously impede human development over large areas, cultivated land presently amounts to less than one sixth the total area of the country.

Long serving as a land bridge between the cultures of Europe and Asia, Anatolia nevertheless has a surface not well adapted to travel between the two continents—hence the success of the Aegean water route circling Asia Minor to the south. The climate is harsh, but with hampering rather than intolerable temperature and precipitation conditions prevailing over the greater part of the land. Mineral resources are present in appreciable quantities, and since the establishment of the republic the Turkish people have made rapid strides in the task of utilizing these resources for the benefit of the nation as a whole.

**RELIEF AND ITS INFLUENCE**—Topographic structure in Asiatic Turkey generally conforms to an east-west alignment. Lowlands, mountain ranges, an extensive plateau, and a massive mountain knot give a distinctive and somewhat symmetrical pattern to surface features. The elongated central portion of Anatolia is a well-defined treeless plateau, averaging around 2,500 feet in elevation in the west and gradually increasing to more than 5,000 feet in the east. The Pontic Mountains in the north and the Taurus Mountains in the south separate the plateau from the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea, respectively. Elevations reach 8,000 to 9,000 feet in the Pontic and 10,000 to 11,000 feet in the Taurus Mountains. On the east these two mountain systems fuse to form a mass of irregular highlands, including the Armenian knot, which make the entire eastern fourth of the country preponderantly mountainous. In the extreme eastern part of Turkey, near the point at which Soviet Russia and Persia meet, is the culminating altitude of Mt. Ararat (16,916 feet). On the west the Pontic and Taurus ranges do not converge to enclose

totally the central plateau by a mountain rim, but rather extend fingerlike projections into the Sea of Marmara and the Aegean Sea. Much of the irregular coastline of western Turkey as well as the waterways making up the Straits were formed by the partial submergence of these rugged areas into the sea. In the Aegean Sea numerous islands fringing the coast (including the Dodecanese) are partly submerged fragments of Turkish ranges. The Anatolian plateau likewise descends to the sea in the west, forming an irregular zone of hill lands interspersed with river valleys.

Along the entire coastal margin of Asiatic Turkey are lowlands, although they do not form a continuous belt. In many places the mountains descend abruptly to the sea, and at varying intervals areas of flat land usually are identified as the lower sections of river valleys. The most extensive of the lowland areas are along the western shores, but the clearly delineated Cilician Plains in south central Turkey also deserve mention. These peripheral flat areas are focal points of human activity.

European Turkey is hilly country drained by the Maritsa River and its tributaries. On the west it is well forested and only thinly inhabited; on the east near the Maritsa the land is fertile and intensively cultivated, and population is more dense.

Across the Straits in Asiatic Turkey the nature of the relief gives the country a dual physical environment with corresponding cultural responses. First, the marginal lowlands, including the Straits area, have, owing to ease of access, been the scene of many and conflicting cultures over the centuries. The Aegean region of Asia Minor, for example, became Hellenized as early as the first millennium B.C. Second, the relatively barren plateau and isolated mountain areas have retained a distinctive cultural unity from historical era to historical era. The Turkish peasant, beneath his twentieth-century veneer, lives much as he did under the

Ottoman sultans. To many Turks this austere landscape represents their historical and traditional home.

Despite the economic advantages offered by coastal regions, the real political coreland of Turkey is in the Anatolian uplands. On the desolate plateau the Ottoman Turks first banded together in the thirteenth century to found the Turkish Empire, and here remained the Turkish "homeland" throughout the pulsations of strength that carried in all directions and swept over much of southwestern Asia, southeastern Europe, and the northern fringe of Africa. A land unfit for sedentary occupations nurtured a hardy people, dependent upon animals and ever moving in search of grass. It was little wonder that the toughest soldiers of the Ottoman Empire came from the harsh environment of the Anatolian highlands.

**CLIMATE**—The climate of Turkey shows wide variations from region to region, variations due in large part to relief and to distance from the ameliorating influence of the Mediterranean. The Anatolian plateau is steppe-like in its climatic characteristics, closely related in this respect to the semiarid lands of Soviet Central Asia. Icy winds sweeping southward from Russia make the winters bitter cold. Snow covers most of the area for three months or more each year. In marked contrast, the summers are hot, and their dryness reflects the scant annual rainfall of less than ten inches over much of the area. Agriculture is limited to irrigable areas; elsewhere, the prevailing occupations are pastoral, based upon the native grasslands. The continuous search for adequate grazing lands long ago established nomadism as a leading way of life on the plateau.

The southwest coastal region has a pure Mediterranean type of climate. Other coastal sections are also Mediterranean in climate but modified in one respect or another by exposure to winds, relation of land to water bodies, and configuration of the sur-

face. Rainfall over most coastal lowlands ranges from twenty to thirty inches per year, but along the eastern part of the Black Sea coast it exceeds 100 inches. The coasts of the Black and Marmara seas are subject to cold winds, which may come from the north or may sweep down from the plateau and mountain areas of Turkey itself. In contrast with interior Turkey, the coastal plains have a climate that favors most lines of human endeavor.

### CULTURAL ASPECTS

A common racial background is not responsible for the national unity of the Turkish people. In fact, the term "Turkish" is generally conceded to be linguistic rather than ethnological in its implication. Citizens of modern Turkey trace their ancestry to a wide variety of European and Asiatic peoples, including Armenians, Mongols, Arabs, Greeks, Albanians, and Circassians. Racial distinctions are thus much less effective in the identification of Turkish people than are religious factors, a single language, and a common feeling of national consciousness—all the result of a unique historic and cultural evolution. The homogeneity of the Turkish people coincides to a remarkable degree with the political boundaries of the state. Thus in a sense the frontiers of Turkey follow ethnographical lines.

Existing racial minorities do not seriously affect the over-all political stability of Turkey, although they give rise to problems in certain districts, principally in the eastern periphery of the country. Still, it must be recognized that minorities might have posed real problems had not Turkey and Greece affected a large-scale exchange of population.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Under treaty arrangements more than 1,000,000 Greeks left Asia Minor between 1923 and 1930 in exchange for 400,000 Turks who were living in Greek territory.

**POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS**—The 1950 population of Turkey totaled 20,900,000. In decided contrast, the population of the area once held by the Ottoman Empire at its peak *now* contains more than 150,000,000. The latter figure is roughly comparable to the population of the entire United States, whereas the former is equivalent only to that of New York and Massachusetts.

The population density for Turkey as a whole slightly exceeds seventy persons per square mile, about one and one half times that of the United States but much less than that of most European countries. The people are unevenly distributed over the land, for approximately one half live in the narrow coastlands and the other half on the spacious Anatolian plateau.

In addition to differences in population densities, the coastal and plateau environments reflect marked contrasts in the living habits and standards of the people. The heavier concentrations of population along the coasts, especially in the west, have been moderately susceptible to Western ideas and techniques and have had the direct advantages of world commerce. The population of the more isolated regions in the interior, on the other hand, with its large proportion of seminomadic people, has tended to remain self-contained despite attempts made from without to modernize them.

Over the country as a whole about one fifth of the population lives in urban centers. Along the coastal zone in Asiatic Turkey this ratio increases somewhat, whereas in European Turkey the proportion jumps much higher because of the presence of Istanbul, which alone accounts for about three fifths of the entire population in that area. Of the five largest cities of the republic, four are on the coastal lowlands: Istanbul (1,000,000), Izmir (230,000), Adana (118,000), and Bursa (100,000). In addition to Ankara (287,000), the capital, several medium-sized cities (50,000 to 100,000) are scattered about the Anatolian plateau as regional centers: Eski-

sehir, Gaziantep, Kayseri, Konya, Erzurum, and Sivas.

Transferring the Turkish capital from Istanbul to Ankara in 1923 was an attempt to bolster national independence by an appeal to the deep-seated love of the people for the source of their heritage. Since its inception as capital the highland city has grown in population from 50,000 to its present size. Ease of access permits Ankara to be important commercially as well as administratively; but Istanbul is without question the nodal point of the country's commercial coreland.

**LANGUAGES AND MINORITIES**—Minorities within Turkey are best indicated by the distribution of language groups. People speaking non-Turkish languages as their mother tongue are largely concentrated in the eastern part of the country and comprise slightly more than ten per cent of the total population.<sup>a</sup> The largest linguistic minority group speaks Kurdish, accounting for 7.5 per cent of the population. The second largest linguistic minority, forming a little more than one per cent of the population, speaks Arabic. Smaller groups speaking their own language are Greeks, Circassians, Armenians, Lazis, Jews, and Georgians in that order of numerical importance.

Of the various linguistic minorities only two have created serious internal pressure on Turkey since the establishment of the republic. The Kurds are essentially backward mountaineers and nomads concentrated near the Persian and Iraqi borders. Motivated by their Moslem fanaticism, they at first revolted against Ataturk's strong Turkification program, but when strongly suppressed they accepted sedentary existence within the Turkish nation. Along with Kurds of neighboring countries, they have longed for the establishment of a Kurdistan.

<sup>a</sup> Turkish language statistics are from the 1945 census.

state, centering on the core area of their homeland in the Taurus Mountains region of eastern Turkey and the Zagros Mountains region of western Persia. An attempt to gain independence—never seriously considered in Turkey itself—was made in the 1945 San Francisco Conference but did not succeed.

The Armenian people, a second, though smaller, group, have survived from ancient times as a race without a state. Their dream has long been a country of their own, but despite discussion to this end at the Peace Conference in 1919, the dream has failed to materialize.

As a nationalistic measure in the early days of the republic, President Kemal Atatürk enforced the use of the Latin alphabet in the Turkish language. The underlying motive, both educational and modernizing, was to rid the state language of foreign words—especially Arabic words—because of implications that were alien to the Turkish state. Arabic characters had been used for centuries, and the instance of an entire people relearning its own language in another vehicle of writing testifies to the vigor of a determined leader and the enthusiasm inherent in the Turkish population.

**RELIGION**—The religious pattern of modern Turkey is simple and offers no political complications of import. More than ninety-eight per cent of the population are Moslems, with Christians and Jews predominating among the remaining faiths. During the six centuries of Ottoman rule religion served as a dynamic factor in political functions. The sultan also carried the title of caliph (successor of Mohammed). His dual temporal and spiritual role made the peoples of the entire Moslem world his potential subjects, although the long-envisioned dream of a great Pan-Islam was never actually realized. After the sultan was deposed in 1922 and the caliphate abolished in 1924, the new state divorced itself from Islam as a device of po-

litical control, although the people retained their Moslem faith. In fact, laicism is expressly written into the constitution as proof of this new national concept of religion. Illustrative of full cleavage between state and church in the Turkish republic was the total prohibition of the fez as a religious, spiritual, and political symbol. In modern Turkey nationalism has largely taken the place of religion as the motivating force of political activity.

#### NATIONAL ECONOMY

The advances of Turkish economy since the establishment of the republic have been accelerated by the elimination of "extraterritorial rights" for European nationals. Known as "capitulations," these rights worked against Turkey during four centuries of the Ottoman era.<sup>9</sup> In principle, they meant that Turkey had no political jurisdiction or economic control over subjects of outside countries who lived or traveled in the Ottoman Empire. In practice, the capitulations meant that foreigners exploited Turkey unmercifully to their own advantage and virtually strangled any effective economy that the Turks themselves might have effected. Some foreign governments went so far as to operate their own post offices on Turkish territory, and the entire transportation pattern of the country was developed in accordance with designs foreign powers might hold for enlarging their own empires in the Near or Middle East. France, Britain, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia were leaders in the abuse of extraterritorial rights in Turkey. The assumption by the Turks of responsibility for their own economy in the early 1920's was a major step in making it possible for the Turkish people

<sup>9</sup> Capitulations, dating from the treaty with France in 1535, while a convenient arrangement for the sultan, later became a serious liability to Ottoman rule. The term is derived from *capitula*, or chapter-headings, into which the document was divided.



to throw off the shackles of an unfortunate heritage and to undertake reforms that have proved of material benefit to the rejuvenated state.

**BASES FOR AN ECONOMY**—Always a mainstay in Turkish economy, agricultural production has come to hold even greater importance within the past two decades and today engages more than three quarters of the population. Government encouragement, including the introduction of scientific methods, has in some areas doubled and even trebled agricultural production. Since 1948 American aid has further stimulated the improvement of agricultural techniques and increased crop yields.

In Turkish agriculture attention is divided among staple cereal crops, commercial specialty crops, and animals and animal products. Wheat and barley lead in acreage, but tobacco, cotton, sugar beets, olives, figs, grapes (raisins), and filberts enter trade channels and so are better known. Lowland areas in the vicinity of the Aegean Sea and the Sea of Marmara are the most productive centers for commercial crops, many of which are exported. Sheep, goats, cattle, horses, mules, and buffaloes are numbered in the millions; animals rather than crops support the bulk of the population on the Anatolian plateau. Besides supplying local needs, the pastoral industries furnish mohair, wool, skins, and hides as surplus commodities.

Large reserves of certain minerals provide the basis for a stronger Turkish economy. Since 1935 the government has been instrumental in sponsoring systematic mining operations, including the opening up of coal fields in the northern mountains by constructing rail spurs to them. Iron ore, chromite, and lignite are mined in appreciable quantities, and a number of other minerals are known to exist: copper ores, manganese, magnesite, lead, meerschaut, borax, sulfur, and emery. The recent effort to modernize industry in Turkey benefits from such a variety of minerals, and the

country's economy is accordingly stimulated.

The state plays an important role in developing industry in Turkey. A major objective has been to approach self-sufficiency in manufacturing by direct state support, for it is contended that private enterprise lacks sufficient capital.<sup>10</sup> The government seeks to promote the utilization of available resources by scientific methods, with accent on the fabrication and processing of innumerable types of less complex consumers' goods. By 1952 industrial output had risen to 170 per cent of the prewar level. Industrial development is encouraged not only in the larger cities but also in the central and eastern portions of the Anatolian plateau where conditions are less favorable to agriculture. In the country as a whole thousands of factories, most of them relatively new, are pouring out items of everyday use in significant quantities, including processed agricultural commodities, textiles, chemicals, paper, cement, and glass. Despite the advance in industry shown by statistics, however, it must be realized that Turkey is still a long way from actually becoming "industrialized" in a modern sense of the word. Factors handicapping the effort to promote an industrial economy include high cost of management, inefficiency of plants operating under state control, and lack of technical training for the labor supply—all reflecting the shortcomings attributable to government subsidy.

**TRANSPORTATION**—In addition to adverse surface conditions, political jockeying on a wide international scale gave the new republic of Turkey a poor start toward a serviceable transportation system. The existing rail pattern is largely the unfortunate result of choices made by foreign interests; the routes developed were those that would meet the needs and ambitions of states other than Turkey. As early as the 1860's plans were laid in Central Europe to push a rail-

<sup>10</sup> "Etatism" is the term applied to a state-directed industrialization program.

way southeastward to Constantinople (Istanbul). The German project to obtain concessions whereby the Persian Gulf could be reached by rail gave rise to the catch phrase "Berlin to Baghdad."<sup>11</sup> Control of such a line would enable the Germans to compete with the British lifeline to the Middle East. Started on a significant scale late in the 1880's the railway reached Ankara in 1892, but not until World War II was Europe (and Turkey) linked to Baghdad and the Persian Gulf at Basra. Ironically, it was the British who finally completed the project—to use against the Germans.

With the elimination of foreign intervention (the capitulations), Turkey has been able to add a number of railway lines to the skeleton network inherited by the republic in the early 1920's. Nevertheless, rail routes are often devious, and the network has tremendous gaps which handicap national development.

Supplementing the railways are numerous highways, although they do not as yet comprise an adequate nation-wide network. Some are military roads, some serve as

"feeders" to rail lines. Since 1948, however, an intensive road-building program has been under way, and old roads are being repaired and new ones constructed.

In 1930, when air routes were being pushed by the British, Dutch, and others from European capitals to India and the Far East, the Turkish government refused right of transit over its territory. Just three years later, however, a Turkish State Airline (Devlet Hava Yollari) was inaugurated, which has continued to flourish, and presently nineteen cities throughout the country are included in the air net. International services have recently been started by the same airline that connect Istanbul and Ankara with Nicosia and Beirut. Turkey no longer closes her airlines to aircraft of other countries, and about a dozen foreign lines now reach Istanbul directly, most of them regional in character and limited to service in the Middle East. Istanbul also lies on two or three intercontinental trunk lines, which connect it with some of the world's leading cities—Paris, London, Rio de Janeiro, New York, San Francisco, and Tokyo.

## POLITICAL ASPECTS OF TURKEY AND THE STRAITS

The crux of the Straits problem faced by Turkey is that within this particular area political spheres of interest clash. The rise and fall of the extensive Ottoman Empire was definitely tied in with the political intrigues of the Straits. Through tumultuous years the destinies of Balkan countries were closely related to events attendant on the waning power of Ottoman Turkey. The Danube River by the direction of its flow

southeastward accentuated this relationship Austria-Hungary, until the end of World War I, and Germany, until the end of World War II, sought to extend their interests through the Balkans and into the Straits area. Consistently for scores of years Russia and Great Britain were principals in a political conflict over the Straits, which became traditional: Russia seeking to move in and out of the Black Sea undisturbed in time of peace and war; Britain safeguarding a lifeline through the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal and a land route to the Persian Gulf. More recently the obligations of the United States as a great power and its economic interests

<sup>11</sup> The idea of the Berlin-to-Baghdad railway project was originated by Austria-Hungary to block Russia in the Balkans, and subsequently it was taken over by the Prussians in order to build an empire.

in the Middle East have markedly increased its concern with the future of the Straits.<sup>12</sup>

Today, located as they are between a highly nationalistic Middle East and a Communist Balkan bloc, the Straits continue to be an important issue in international politics. Significant to note is the decreasing number of states involved in formulating the balance of power in this area—a factor which makes the problem less complex. Soviet pressure on the Straits is met by influence of the Western democracies in the Middle East—particularly in Turkey itself which has been incorporated into the over-all defense pattern.

In final analysis it is necessary to evaluate the strategic position of the Straits with re-

spect to new weapons. Whereas the Straits were formerly the only passage between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, planes can now cross this zone at will. Jet planes and rocket-propelled missiles lessen the distance between the Black Sea nations and the Mediterranean. The atomic bomb could quite possibly make the Straits of but little value in time of war. The position of Turkey, therefore, as guardian of the Straits has radically changed. Furthermore, an increase in Turkish industrial establishments and a consequent increased dependency upon foreign trade to maintain a steady flow of raw materials tend to make her rely today more than ever upon world order for continued control of the Straits. Attempts at self-sufficiency plus economic and military aid from the United States constitute measures to insure that this control remain intact. Only by incorporating Turkey into an integrated defense plan can the Western democracies depend upon that country as a bastion against pressure from the north.

<sup>12</sup> International regulation of the Straits forms a complex pattern of Great Power rivalry down to the Montreux Convention (1936), which affirms Turkey's right to fortify and protect the waterway. See J. T. Shotwell and F. Deak, *Turkey at the Straits* (Macmillan, 1941).

### Study Questions

1. What is the political relationship to modern Turkey of (a) Thrace, (b) Armenia, and (c) Alexandretta?
2. How did the Ottoman Empire get its start? How extensive did it become?
3. What was the effect of World War I on the Ottoman Empire?
4. Could Turkey's position during World War II be regarded as strictly neutral? Explain.
5. What products can Turkey best expect to export? What imports are most needed?
6. How has the unity of modern Turkey been affected by (a) language, (b) religion, and (c) race?
7. Discuss the position of the Straits in the light of modern strategic developments.
8. Is European Turkey to be considered more Asiatic than European? Why or why not?
9. Describe Turkish relations with the Arab League nations.
10. Discuss Turkish-Russian border problems since 1878. Include developments relating to the Armenian peoples.
11. In what respects is Turkey (a) an asset and (b) a liability as a member of NATO?
12. Discuss the basic elements of Turkey's economy. What practical steps might be taken to improve it?
13. Why was the Straits question of political interest to Austria-Hungary?
14. Trace the steps whereby Turkey gradually regained control of the Straits after World War I. Discuss her position today with respect to control.
15. Briefly compare the climatic characteristics of the Anatolian Plateau with those of the southwestern coastal district of Asiatic Turkey, and show how these have affected the respective economies.

## *The Arab States and Israel*

The world has long recognized that there is something distinctive about the lands that touch the eastern Mediterranean and extend on into Asia. Yet, no name for the area has ever been universally recognized, nor have any definite boundaries of the region ever been accepted in all quarters.

**TERMINOLOGY**—Most of the names that have been given to these lands reflect a European point of view and are based on relative location rather than intrinsic characteristics. Hence, to some specialists, the Near East refers to lands in Asia that are immediately adjacent to the Mediterranean and near to Europe; the Middle East is southwestern Asia as far as, but rarely including, India; the Far East faces the Pacific and is farthest from Europe. Other authorities, including many Americans, tend to drop the term "Near East" entirely and use "Middle East" to identify the lands reaching from Egypt and Turkey to, perhaps, Pakistan.

In this study the attention is focused on the independent Arab states and Israel—a

substantial part of the Near East, or Middle East. These independent Arab states are Egypt, Libya, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Iraq (see map on page 481). There are other Arab lands filling all of northern Africa westward from Libya to the Atlantic Ocean; but the Arabic-speaking peoples who live there have not yet achieved complete political sovereignty. (See the discussion of these regions in Chapter Twenty-six.)

Paradoxically, the people of Europe and the Americas seem to be more familiar with the ancient life of the Near East than with the contemporary scene. Religious traditions and secular history have deep roots in the region. Even the Anglo-Saxons identify the history of ancient Egypt and Babylon as essentially part of their own history. Few people, however, associate Nineveh or Babylon with modern Iraq or the Bethlehem of Biblical times with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Not many persons in the West have noted the building of hydro-electric power plants near the Sea of Galilee

or considered the possibilities of finding oil along the traditional route that Moses followed. Yet, these are essential features of the contemporary situation.

**CROSSROADS AND OIL**—Together with Turkey, the Arab states and Israel have a special importance because they constitute bridge lands interconnecting Europe, southwestern Asia, and Africa. Since ancient times, armies and traders have moved back and forth over this bridge area from continent to continent. As one example, at the time of Columbus merchants were concerned about the transport of silks and spices from the Orient to Europe via the eastern Mediterranean lands.

Today these bridge lands are crossed or bordered by some of the world's most important highways of trade and travel. The Suez Canal is a critical link in one of the world's great sea routes, and any attempt to impede a free flow of traffic through it is viewed as a breach in international welfare. Again, almost all planes that fly regularly between Europe and eastern Africa or between Europe and southern Asia or the Far East stop at one airport or another in the bridge lands. Obviously this crossroads location adds enormously to the strategic importance of the region in both peace and war.

Until recently the world's attention was attracted to the Arab states and Israel chiefly on account of historical religious associations and strategic location. Now another great attraction has been added—oil. Experts estimate that possibly seventy-five per cent of the world's petroleum reserves lie beneath the surface of southwestern Asia (including Persia).

Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that these are lands of international friction. For many years nations outside the area have competed for influence in the region under consideration or for control over parts of it. Internal strife, riots, and open warfare have

been almost continuous since World War I. Further, the presence of oil deposits has done nothing as a lubricant to ease the tension.


## PHYSICAL PATTERN

Within the Arab states and Israel as a bloc there is a striking correspondence in patterns of land, rainfall, population density, and, to a lesser extent, political organization.

**LANDFORMS AND RAINFALL**—A simple outline of the land pattern shows that a bold mountain range rises along the western margin of the Arabian Peninsula and appears to be continued along the eastern edge of the Mediterranean. Other highlands, mostly lower and less extensive, occur in scattered locations. In some places there are great dunes of sand, forever shifting with the wind. Elsewhere there are vast areas resembling rough, rocky pavements and broad low valleys filled with soft earth materials brought by streams from the higher lands. In the region as a whole, however, most of the surface is relatively featureless plain or plateau.

In the main, these are desert lands. In fact, only two relatively small areas get rainfall in excess of twenty inches annually, both of which are in mountainous areas: one in southwestern Arabia and the other along the eastern margin of the Mediterranean where prevailing winds are forced upslope and drop their moisture. Adjacent to the mountain areas and along the coast of Libya are slender ribbons of land receiving between ten and twenty inches of rainfall. Elsewhere in the entire Near East region rainfall averages less than ten inches annually, normally insufficient for agriculture without irrigation.

Only two major river systems exist, the Nile and the Tigris-Euphrates. Each has its origin in a more rainy highland area outside the limits of the Arab states and Israel.



In both systems the rivers flow across the desert lowlands to the sea. The Euphrates has its source in the mountains of Turkey and flows southeastward through Syria into Iraq, forming a great arc of rich land from northern Israel to the Persian Gulf, which is frequently referred to as the "Fertile Crescent."

**BOUNDARIES**—The recently created nation of Israel shares boundaries with Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt. To a large degree these boundaries represent military positions at the time of cease-fire agreements, consequently, the boundaries, at places, pass through localities of relatively dense settlement. Almost everywhere else the boundaries between states are in the empty lands, seemingly as remote as possible from the heartlands of the nations involved. In the mountain areas the national political boundaries tend to follow the water divides or other surface features, as in the case of Turkey, Persia, and Yemen. Elsewhere, boundaries appear as straight lines drawn through vast, thinly settled, desert areas. Nowhere else in the world, except in the Sahara, do the national boundaries make such a bold geometric pattern on the political map.

This geometric pattern of boundary lines in the deserts has produced some inconsistencies. For instance, the boundary line as drawn may bisect a tribal area. When this happens, the tribal tradition proves stronger than the national; the tribes ignore the national boundary lines and pursue their traditional rights to move freely from one section of their traditional grazing lands to another, unhampered by the lines someone has drawn on a map. In some instances the tribesmen in theory assume new nationalities when they cross these national boundaries in the desert, but from a practical point of view this political aspect has but little significance.

## PEOPLES AND RELIGIONS

**POPULATION PATTERN**—The population pattern is consistent with the arrangement of mountains, rainfall, and rivers. A cultural map shows only four major population clusters. One follows the winding Nile and widens to coincide with the Nile Delta. Another appears in the highlands at the eastern end of the Mediterranean, including Israel, Lebanon, and part of Syria. A third concentration follows irregularly along the Tigris-Euphrates Valley in Iraq. The fourth is in the mountains of southwestern Arabia. Nearly everywhere else the lands, being dry and unproductive, are sparsely populated.

The settled areas in the river valleys have supported well-advanced civilizations from earliest times. Each of the major river valleys is still the nucleus of a separate nation, present-day Egypt and Iraq. The highlands along the Mediterranean coast are the birthplace of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—three living faiths, and historically the area was marked by the rise of small nations embracing distinct cultural units. Despite the spread of Arab culture and religion out of the desert lands, the people in the mountains to this day have preserved their own ancient beliefs and customs against the tide of national unity.

**ORIGINS**—The more evident contrasts between Arabs and Jews are cultural, not racial. Both peoples are Semitic in origin, the chief survivors of ancient Semitic groups which included the Babylonians, Assyrians, and Phoenicians.<sup>1</sup> The Hebrew and Arabic languages are closely related, being considered as variants developing from a common speech of very early times, much as Spanish and Italian developed from Latin.

Through the centuries, the ethnic stock

<sup>1</sup> For a scholarly review of the origins of Semitic peoples and language, see Philip K. Hitti, *History of the Arabs* (Macmillan, 1940), pp. 3-13.

and language of both Arabs and Jews have been modified by contact with other peoples. One occasionally sees Arabs who are almost Negroid in appearance, indicating perhaps an ancestry that included a Negro slave. Many Jews look more European than Semitic. The nomad or Bedouin Arab has lived in greater isolation than his brethren along the Mediterranean coast. A great segment of the Arab world has resisted the influx of Western ideas.

**THREE RELIGIONS**—The ancient Hebrews established firmly the idea of one God, as recorded in the Old Testament. The Christian faith essentially accepts this tradition but adds the New Testament record focused on the life of Jesus. The Moslem faith adds a third tradition and a third book, the Koran. The Koran draws extensively on both Jewish and Christian traditions, but it insists on the primary validity of the later revelation by Mohammed. At the present time Lebanon is almost equally divided between Moslems and Christians. The other Arab states have only small minorities of Christians. A few Moslems still live in the predominantly Jewish state of Israel, and small minorities of Jews are scattered about in the Arab states.

Religion and civil government have a close association in the Moslem tradition.<sup>2</sup> Originally the ruler of the state was also a religious leader. Rather recently the idea of secular government has gained some ground; yet, at many levels the older concepts persist. One authority notes that in Egypt a religious organization must confirm any action by a court of law that involves capital punishment. Saudi Arabia and Yemen approach the theocratic form of government. The laws within nations here may vary according to the religion of the citizens, especially laws having to do with inheritance, marriage, and the family.

## RURAL AND URBAN CULTURES

**NOMADS**—Since earliest recorded times, nomads have lived in the deserts of the Near East. The total number of nomads is not large, representing perhaps one fifth of the total population of the region, but they occupy most of the land in the area, making a scant living from their flocks of, primarily, camels, sheep, and goats. Contrary to popular belief, the nomads, or Bedouins, are not aimless wanderers. Each tribe has its own particular territory. Within that area a definite pattern of movement has been developed to take advantage of seasonal changes in the grazing lands. A certain area of good grass may be reserved for later months, with no danger that another tribe will use it in the meantime.

The separate tribes are essentially autonomous political units, each recognizing, however, a relatively vague allegiance to the nation. Seldom do all the people of a large tribe meet in one locality, since it would be difficult to find enough food and water for all their livestock within a limited area. The ordinary "village of tents" seen so frequently in the desert represents a clan of related families, which is only a part of a tribe.

Little by little the nomadic population is declining, largely for economic reasons.<sup>3</sup> Until about fifty years ago the Bedouin economy was based largely on income from the sale of surplus animals or animal products, tribute money from lesser tribes or settled villages, and loot from raids. In addition, the tribes had the benefit of their livestock resources for food, clothing, tents, and transportation, a practice which continues, but not to the same degree as formerly. Raiding, however, is seldom practiced any longer, and

<sup>2</sup> See the summary in W. B. Fisher, *The Middle East: A Physical, Social, and Regional Geography* (Dutton, 1952), pp. 105-12.

<sup>3</sup> This summary is based on *Preliminary Report on the World Social Situation* (New York: United Nations, 1952), pp. 150-51. This volume presents a remarkably good survey of the underdeveloped areas of the world.



there is little income from loot or tribute. Moreover, the market for camels has declined severely with the introduction of truck transportation along the desert margins and even across the desert. To add to their economic problems, costs have risen sharply for the simple tools, cotton cloth, tea, coffee, and the few other products that even the desert nomad wants to buy from traders. The camel-herding tribes might counteract these unfavorable economic trends by shifting to the raising of more goats and sheep, since the market for wool, cheese, and meat, despite the poor quality of these commodities, has not declined so much as that for camels. Such a transition, however, might change the whole pattern of migrations and the organization of the clans and still not meet the needs of all the people.

In recent years some Bedouins have left their tribes to find employment in the army or police force, coincident with the development of a stronger nation. Thousands of others have been employed by the oil companies as guards, guides, truck drivers, and regular workers in oil drilling units and refineries. Some desert people also have become construction laborers and factory workers in the growing cities. In many localities, nomads are becoming farmers, although it is a blow to pride to abandon the relatively free life of the open desert to become a slave of the soil. With this trend toward sedentary life, the older tribal organization tends, of course, to disintegrate, and economic classes tend to be emphasized.

**FARMERS**—Only a very small portion of the land in the Arab states and Israel is cultivated. It is reported, for example, that in Iraq, Jordan, and Egypt, no more than four per cent of the total area is used for growing crops. Moreover, much arable land may lie fallow in alternate years. In Israel a larger proportion of the national holding is usable for crop production, but there still remain large areas of grazing land and waste-

land in that country. Some experts believe that much more land could be cultivated in both the Arab states and Israel. The successful use of the less productive land, however, could result only from greater technical skills and greater capital investment than the present society in the Arab states and Israel possesses. Although many thousands of acres of now unused land could be made to grow an occasional crop of grain, it would be found that the expenditure, at prevailing prices, for labor, seed, and water would be substantially greater than the value of the crop when harvested.

Small though they are, the farm lands provide the most important source of livelihood in this region as a whole, more than half of the population of the Arab states and Israel make a living directly from agriculture. The remainder of the population is divided almost equally between nomads and city dwellers.

*Crops and Productivity.* In the scattered farming areas of the Arab states and Israel the main crops are cereals. Among these, wheat and barley are the leaders, but there is significant production also of corn, millet, and rice. The Mediterranean type of climate, which prevails in most of the Near East, is characterized by winter rains and summer drought. Corn and rice are distinctively summer crops, grown under irrigation. Wheat and barley, commonly planted in the autumn, grow during the mild rainy winter and are harvested in advance of the hot, dry summer.

All the farming areas have some production of fruits and vegetables for local use. This pattern is familiar in areas of subsistence agriculture. Certain localities, however, have developed important commercial production of olives, figs, and other fruits. Israel, for example, has become noted for its citrus fruits, mostly exported to Europe, and Iraq dominates the world market in dates. Among the few commercial non-

food crops grown in the Arab states and Israel, Egyptian cotton stands out as the only one that is a significant competitor in world markets.

Throughout the Arab states, farm income is low. In some instances, notably Egypt, the production per unit of land may be high, owing to very intensive cultivation. Yet, even here the productivity per farm worker is extremely low. In many Arab countries erosion has become very serious, and insects are a constant menace. Adequate tools and fertilizers are lacking in most places, and seed is often not available for growing improved varieties of crops. It is true that Israel has made substantial progress both in scientific agriculture and in farm income, but in the Near East as a whole, both productivity per unit of land and productivity per worker are extremely low.

*Land Tenure in Arab States.* The pattern of land ownership in the Arab states is one of the most complex in the world, representing a major obstacle to improvement in agricultural practices. In many areas, the land code has been inherited almost without change from the days of the Ottoman Empire. In vast areas there exist no recorded title deeds to land.

Authorities recognize many different types of land ownership, among which four are prominent. *Mulk* land is that which is privately owned and may be used as the owners desire. *Miri* land is owned by the state and is leased to individuals. In actual practice these two types are quite similar, since the *miri* can be held indefinitely, can be sold, and can be inherited. In both instances the tendency is for the effective owners to lease the land to "share tenants," who generally pay exorbitant rents, possess no written lease, and may be dispossessed after one year.<sup>4</sup>

This practice discourages any long-term planning for improving the land. Moreover, the high rent keeps the farmer so poor that he must turn to moneylenders in order to live from harvest to harvest, which further limits his prospect of ever having more than a bare subsistence.

A semicollective type of land ownership, known as *masha*, is found especially in Jordan and Syria. Under this system each member of the village has a general claim to a share of the village lands, but not to any specific plot of land. Every few years all the land is reallocated to the people then living in the village in order to adjust to changes of tenancy due to death or intermarriage in the village. This practice also greatly discourages any serious attempts at improving the land, since each farmer knows that in just a few years the plot he is presently cultivating will go to someone else.

*Waqf* land represents the fourth form of tenure and is important especially in Egypt. Land in this category has been dedicated to some special charitable or religious purpose; it therefore comes under state control and is subject to many restrictions. The beneficiaries may inherit their rights, with extreme fragmentation resulting after several generations. Moreover, the land ordinarily cannot be sold or exchanged for more economic use.

*Land Tenure in Israel.* The farmers of Israel, like those in the Arab states, all live in villages and go out daily to the surrounding fields to till the soil. The villages of the small percentage of Arab farmers still in Israel resemble those in the Arab states. The villages of Jewish farmers, who are products of various cultures and traditions, are of several different patterns. Some rural Jewish communities have been established on the basis of private ownership of land and the attendant freedom of the owner to manage the land as he will. At the opposite extreme are the collective farms,

<sup>4</sup> An excellent analysis of these aspects of land tenure appears in Doreen Warriner, *Land and Poverty of the Middle East* (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1948).

known as *kibbutzim*. In between are various other types of settlement, each with its own distinctive practices regarding land holdings and employment.

About one third of Israel's farmers belong to the *kibbutzim*.<sup>5</sup> Each *kibbutz*, or collective community, is governed locally by a general assembly composed of all the members. As a unit, the collective owns all the property, receives all the money from products that are sold, and dispenses goods and services to members as they need them. All members pool their labor under the direction of the *kibbutz*. Most workers change jobs frequently, working under the direction of experts permanently in charge of certain activities. There is no pay check for anyone; reward takes the form of sharing in the total resources of the community.

Cooperative farms are also prominent in Israel, representing various degrees between the independent farm and the *kibbutz*. Some cooperative farms permit hired labor; others do not. Some are rather closely associated with the labor movement, others are not. Yet, all represent some combination of free enterprise and cooperative effort.

*Water.* In all parts of the Near East and with all types of farm organization the lack of water is a constant critical problem. As a result much of the area is a desert, and productivity of land even within the settled areas is severely limited. Some areas are able to grow crops with the help of seasonal rainfall; but such farming tends to be precarious, and yields are low. In irrigated areas, too, the apparent shortage of water tends to accentuate the pressure of the population on the land. The population grows, but the water supply does not.

**MINERAL RESOURCES**—Petroleum is the one giant resource in this part of the world.

True, there are other resources. Israel produces potash from the Dead Sea and good clays and phosphates from the land. Egypt has found potentially important deposits of iron ore in an isolated locality. Other countries have found, or hope to find, these or other minerals in exploitable quantities. But the production of all these minerals is dwarfed by petroleum, which according to any measure is the outstanding mineral resource of the Near East.

**FOREIGN EXPLOITATION OF OIL**—In 1908, when oil was first discovered in the Near East, not one of the countries possessed technological resources adequate for production on a large scale. Hence, a scramble by outsiders for oil concessions resulted. Both the British and German governments were actively involved from the beginning, although after World War I holdings of the latter were turned over to the French.<sup>6</sup> Beginning in 1928, certain American oil companies, with the active encouragement of the United States government, became participants in the oil development of the Near East. It is interesting to note that these cooperative agreements involving the American companies provided that the participants be subject to the jurisdiction of the British courts.

Among the Arab states, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq are the major producers, each having a daily average of approximately 600,000 to 850,000 barrels. Much of this oil is transported to the seaboard by pipeline, in the building of which some political difficulties were encountered, since some of the lines necessarily cross international boundaries. Engineering problems also were significant; for the new pipeline, which is at least thirty inches in diameter, reaches across the Arabian Peninsula for more than 1,000 miles. It takes

<sup>5</sup> See the optimistic story of Israel presented by Emil Lengyel, *Israel: Problems of Nation-building* (Foreign Policy Association, 1951).

<sup>6</sup> Details from a memorandum *Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) and Middle East Oil Production* (Standard Oil Company [N.J.], 1954).



more than 5,000,000 barrels of oil merely to fill the pipeline (see map on this page).

*Political Significance.* Modern petroleum developments have been extremely significant to the political status of the Arab states. Direct revenue from oil has tended to stabilize local governments. Moreover,

the new industry has greatly augmented local employment, and this, in turn, has stimulated many associated local enterprises. These developments in oil have involved the local governments in formal agreements with Western governments and foreign oil corporations and provided contact with Western

ways of living. Certainly, the oil resources have given new prestige and power in world affairs to nations that otherwise would still be poor and weak.

**TOWN, CITY, AND INDUSTRY**—Towns and cities are not new in the Near East. Familiar names from ancient times include Babylon, Baghdad, Damascus, Jerusalem, and Cairo. Most of these old cities remain today as flourishing urban centers; other names represent relatively recent development: Tel Aviv, Haifa, Beirut. Hundreds of smaller places with unfamiliar names serve

to-do Arab landowners, who because of their wealth have become very influential in the city, some taking prominent positions in government. Funds drawn from the rural areas have recently been invested in modern industrial and commercial enterprises. Although numerically small, this influential class of entrepreneurs has come to dominate most of the Arab countries, both economically and politically. The middle-class people of town and city—those engaged in trade, the professions, and civil service—are growing in numbers and influence, but as yet

The Arab States and Israel: Area, Population, and Political Status

<i>Political Unit</i>	<i>Area (in sq. mi.)</i>	<i>Population</i>	<i>Capital</i>	<i>Political Status</i>
Egypt	386,198	21,941,000	Cairo	Republic; British Protectorate ended in 1922
Iraq	116,000	5,100,000	Baghdad	Hashemite Kingdom, British mandate terminated in 1932
Israel	8,048	1,700,000	Tel Aviv	Proclaimed a republic in 1948
Jordan	37,700	1,250,000	Amman	Hashemite Kingdom; British mandate ended in 1946
Lebanon	3,474	1,257,000	Beirut	Republic, end of French mandate proclaimed in 1941 <sup>a</sup>
Libya	679,358	1,124,000	Tripoli	Monarchy. King Idris Al-Senussi; independence established in 1951
Saudi Arabia	714,500	6,000,000	Riyadh	Absolute monarchy
Syria	72,560	3,250,000	Damascus	Republic, French mandate ended in 1941 <sup>a</sup>
Yemen	75,000	5,000,000	San'a	Absolute monarchy

<sup>a</sup> Withdrawal of French troops in 1946.

as regional centers of trade and government. Altogether, about one fourth of the people of the Arab states and Israel live in these towns and cities. In the agricultural villages and the nomad encampments there are but few doctors, dentists, and school teachers; life is simple and hard. Like conditions are found in the poorer sections of the cities. But in the newer residential and the central business districts there are now many evidences of the modern world. The symbols are familiar: school, doctor, hospital, newspapers, telephones, radios, and so on.

The cities have attracted many of the well-

they do not represent a major force in national affairs. In fact it is a third group—the army officers—which seems to provide greatest competition to the traditional ruling class made up of families of landowners.

Each of the Near East countries is proud of its new industrial plants, but handcraft or cottage industries still employ many more people than do the modern factories.<sup>7</sup> Typically these handcraft industries are

<sup>7</sup> See Fisher, *op. cit.*, pp. 206–14; also see *Preliminary Report on World Social Situation, loc. cit.*, pp. 158–9.

small, family enterprises, employing few if any outside workers. The products include metal utensils, simple textiles, rugs, soap, dried fruits, and tourist souvenirs. Local materials are used almost exclusively. Hourly income is low and may be getting lower, as these handcraft workers face more and more competition from imports and from new large-scale industries in their own countries.

The modern industrial development features textiles, chemicals, petroleum products, light metal commodities, foodstuffs, and cement. In textiles, cotton is outstanding, especially in Egypt, which uses its local long-staple product. Israel has an extraor-

dinary variety of manufactures, from footwear and furs to razor blades and false teeth. Generally speaking, manufacturing has been handicapped by lack of mineral resources other than petroleum, by lack of capital, and, on occasion, by the instability or restrictions of government. There is an effort to attain self-sufficiency in manufactured goods, but this goal has not been achieved in any of the Arab states or Israel. All of these countries still must import machinery, automobiles—both passenger cars and trucks—cloth, and a wide variety of other manufactured goods. In return they export petroleum, livestock, and agricultural products.

## EGYPT


For several reasons Egypt ranks foremost among the Arab states. With more than 21,000,000 inhabitants, it has the largest population. It has the most strategic location, occupying, as it does, the land bridge between Africa and Asia and controlling the vital Suez Canal (see map on page 490). And it has the Nile River, a wonderful economic asset. Most of the peasants of Egypt probably are descendants of the early Egyptians, but the city dwellers constitute a mixture of many Near East peoples. About ninety per cent of the population is Moslem; the balance, chiefly Christians of various sects.

### HISTORY

Egyptian history spans several millennia, dating back in recorded time to about 3000 B.C. Egypt has a distinctive civilization centered on the life-giving Nile Valley, but it did not escape the influences of the Fertile Crescent and of other cultures as well. The premodern era may be characterized by several impacts under Egyptian society: (1)

the intrusion of Hellenistic culture following the conquests of Alexander the Great in the first century B.C.; (2) the Christian influences in the urban centers which survive among the Copts to this day; and (3) the spread of Islam, which brought an Arab culture into Egypt. Penetration of Arab culture has left an indelible impression on modern Egypt, although it did not destroy Egyptian identity or wipe away earlier influences. Even a long era of Arab rulership and the conquest by the Ottomans in 1517 failed to suppress completely Egyptian national identity. Modern Egypt begins with the Napoleonic period and the rise of Mohammed Aly, who, in 1806, established himself as master of Egypt, thereby detaching Egypt from the Turkish Empire.

The story of the Suez question is the focus of international power rivalries. First France won the concession to construct the canal in the 1850's, while Britain opposed the French. In 1882 British troops occupied Egypt after Britain had bought stock in the Suez Maritime Canal Company and stayed even after Egypt became inde-



pendent in 1922. Only Egyptian nationalism and the rise of the new Egyptian Republic combined to bring about the withdrawal of British forces in 1954.

The abdication of King Farouk, in 1952, and subsequent establishment of a republican government to replace the monarchy at the time gave promise of local stability and confidence in the future. Also, the settlement with Britain, which guaranteed Egyptian control of the canal, seemed to be a step in the direction of accord in the Middle East. However, Egyptian nationaliza-

tion of the Suez Canal Company in 1956 once again created sharp conflict over the status of the arterial waterway, and the subsequent British and French military occupation of the canal zone precipitated a major international crisis.

#### ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

The above-mentioned events have certainly high-lighted Egypt's role in world power relations. But the issues at stake have not resolved, nor will they resolve, some of

Egypt's basic problems, especially those related to population pressures and scarcity of arable land and water supply.

**POPULATION AND CROPS**—The desert occupies 96.5 per cent of Egypt, leaving only 3.5 per cent, most of it along the Nile, for agriculture. The Nile Valley is rich land, producing high yields of cotton, corn, wheat, rice, millet, barley, beans, clover, and other crops. These great crops, however, do not spell wealth for Egypt. The peasant farmers in this country are among the poorest in the world—poor in terms of money, health, and education. One great problem is that there is not sufficient arable land to support the population. At the time of Mohammed Aly, Egypt had a population of about 2,500,000, not much more than a tenth of the present count. The rural density of population is about 1,500 per square mile of cultivated land—almost a world's record.

About eighty-five per cent of the Egyptians own no land, hence the majority of the peasants work as sharecroppers or day laborers.<sup>8</sup> Of those who do own land, 1,300,000 own only about half an acre each. Some 63,000 persons own all the rest of the cultivated land. One estimate is that 1.5 per cent of the population gets half the total national income, leaving the other half to be divided among 98.5 per cent of the people. Under the Republic the government has limited land ownership to a maximum of 200 acres per family and alleviated the poverty of the peasants in many respects, but the pressure of population still persists.

In modern times the peasants have been helped by the construction of dams for perennial irrigation. Under this system water can be stored and released as needed all year, making crops possible during the dry summer months and adding greatly to

the productivity of the land. New land has also been brought under irrigation, and commercial fertilizers have been introduced. Yet, the increase in production has not kept pace with growing population. The peasant's average real income is probably less today than it was a century ago. Recognition of this fact led the revolutionary regime, in 1955, to propose the construction of the Aswan High Dam, a project which is estimated to add thirty per cent to the irrigated crop land and \$1,000,000,000 to the annual national income. With the cost estimated at \$1,200,000,000, refusal of the United States and Britain to extend financial assistance to the Egyptian government for this construction was a major factor in the Suez crisis of 1956.

**CITIES AND INDUSTRY**—Recent industrial developments have helped a little, but only a little, in providing alternative employment. Textiles have taken the lead over other industries, which include the processing of agricultural products and the manufacture of cement. Generally speaking, Egypt is lacking in fuels, although almost enough petroleum is produced for home consumption. Cotton leads in exports and largely provides the essential foreign exchange for substantial imports of coal, machinery, fertilizers, and other essential needs. There seems little hope that Egypt will become economically self-sufficient in the near future.

Alexandria, on the Mediterranean at the edge of the delta, is Egypt's chief port, and the gateway to the outside world. Cairo, the capital and largest city, is at the head of the Delta, where it has much better connections with Alexandria than with the Suez area. In this connection it is significant to note that the Suez Canal itself is remote from the entire Nile Valley coreland of Egypt, separated from it by a hundred-mile stretch of desert. The canal ports of Port Said and Suez facilitate canal traffic more than they serve Egyptian commerce.

<sup>8</sup> Details on land tenure and income from John S. Badeau, *The Emergence of Modern Egypt* (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1953), pp. 34-35.



## LIBYA

The federal kingdom of Libya, most of which is desert, was the first country to receive independence under the aegis of the United Nations. A former Italian colony on the Mediterranean coast of Africa west of Egypt, it is about one fifth the size of the United States but has a population of little more than 1,000,000 people. Most of the inhabitants are Moslems, but an estimated 44,000 people of Italian origin have remained in the country, primarily in the city of Tripoli and in adjacent coastal areas. At the Libyan National Assembly in 1950, Amir Mohammed Idris el Senussi was chosen King of all Libya, and thus were unified the three areas of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan.

Geographically the country consists of three east-west zones: the well-watered Mediterranean zone; a semidesert zone utilized for grazing and dry farming; and a desert zone containing some fertile oases. The Mediterranean zone is most suited for cultivation and hence is the most densely pop-

ulated. It is divided into two areas, Cyrenaica and Tripolitania. In Cyrenaica are the coastal towns of Benghazi, Tobruk, and Derna; in Tripolitania the leading center is Tripoli. Outside the Mediterranean zone, the principal resources of Libya are pastoral, although there is a minor development of minerals. In the coastal areas are concentrated most of the country's meager transportation and communication facilities.

Libya receives aid from the United States, Great Britain, and France to finance the government, to provide equipment, and to raise economic and educational standards. The United States maintains the strategically located Wheelus Air Base near Tripoli. By a treaty entered upon in July, 1953, Libya granted rights to Great Britain to maintain military bases for twenty years in exchange for financial aid. Libya was admitted to UNESCO in November, 1952, and was accepted in March, 1953, as the eighth member of the Arab League.

## ISRAEL

The hills and valleys that border the southeastern corner of the Mediterranean have seen many peoples come and go and come again. Two thousand years ago the Romans extended their power over this area and sought to control the Hebrew people who had then made it their homeland. From time to time oppressed inhabitants tried to revolt against the Romans but were not very successful. After serious uprisings and the destruction of Jerusalem by the Romans in A.D. 70, large numbers of Jews fled the country in what became known as the Diaspora, or great dispersion.

## THE PAST

During the Middle Ages, few Jews remained in Palestine, and the remaining local inhabitants had become converts to Islam. Ultimately the area became part of the Ottoman Empire and remained so for 400 years. After World War I, when the Turkish regime had finally been shattered, Palestine became a British mandate under the League of Nations. It was then that thousands of Jews came to Palestine from various parts of the world. In 1948 the establishment of a new nation—Israel—was proclaimed.


Under Turkish rule Jews and Arabs had lived side by side in Palestine with no especial difficulty. Under the British mandate, however, tensions became sharp. Palestine was inhabited predominantly by Arabs, who, noting the upswing in Jewish immigration and the talk about a new Jewish state, became fearful lest in time they might lose control of what they considered their homeland. The Jews meanwhile feared that they might be forced to relinquish this foothold in Palestine. Riots and bloodshed followed as the tide of immigrants poured in from war-torn Europe, to be met with a rising spirit of Arab nationalism. Even the partition of Palestine under the United Nations, in 1947, failed to calm the disturbed people in the Middle East. In fact, the Israeli proclamation of independence brought open warfare between the neighboring Arab states and Israel. Within a year, the United Nations arranged a cease-fire agreement, which stopped large-scale fighting, but for years the countries remained officially at war, with Israel essentially sealed off from normal political or trade relations with its neighbors.

### THE PRESENT

New maps show the boundaries of Israel as enclosing an area somewhat more restricted than Palestine, but including 1,700,000 population (see the map on this page). More than half of the 8,048 square miles of land lie in the dry south—the Negeb. Jerusalem, which Israel claims as its capital, is divided between Israel and Jordan. Israel has several ports on the Mediterranean Sea, and to the south Elath provides an outlet on the Gulf of Aqaba.

When the United Nations announced its plan to partition Palestine, thousands of Arabs fled from the land which was destined to be part of the Jewish state, and others fled during the fighting. In 1948 these refugees numbered 750,000; by 1956

the number had grown to about 900,000, the majority of them living in makeshift camps near the armistice line, unable to return to their old homes and unable to find



livelihood in the Arab states. Minimum care for the refugees is being provided by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency.

The military lines drawn under the armistice agreements scarcely offer Israel much

hope of friendship or security with the adjacent Arab countries. In the east, the line bisects farm lands belonging to Arab refugees camped in the new border area; near Lake Huleh, Syrian patrols have interfered with the land reclamation program; and along the Egyptian border at Gaza and El Auja, frequent raids and clashes endanger the temporary, makeshift demilitarization zones. This friction culminated in the Israeli invasion and occupation of the Sinai Peninsula in the fall of 1956.

An estimated 150,000 Arabs remained in Israel after 1949, but they comprised only a small fraction of previous Arab population. These Arabs of Israel continue to live in separate villages, dependent chiefly on simple agriculture. They have the right to use their own language in government offices. In matters pertaining to religion separate courts are set up for the Moslem Arabs and for the small number of Christian Arabs. There is evidence that the Arabs in general have been making some progress in agricultural technology. But they remain an unassimilated minority people, whose future presents an enigma in a politically unstable area.

#### THE FUTURE

The nation of Israel faces some difficult problems arising from the diversity in background of the Jews who have come, and are still coming, to this new home. About half of the settlers are from Europe, one third, from Asia; one sixth, from Africa; and a very small number, from the Americas. Naturally each group brings its own customs, language, distinctive religious emphasis, and political philosophy. This heterogeneity is reflected in the splinter parties in the single-house parliament. Also manifest are ideological differences, especially in such matters as observance of the Sabbath and the content of the school curriculum. About forty-five per cent of Jewish children attend schools

where the curriculum has no special religious or political accent. Almost thirty per cent are enrolled in craft schools with a strong socialist emphasis. Approximately twenty-five per cent attend religious schools. In spite of all these differences, however, the people of Israel have demonstrated a substantial unity based on the common elements in their history, the sharing of common problems, and the dream of a strong, enduring Jewish nation.

Modern Israel is predominantly an urban nation. Scarcely thirty per cent of the total population, including both Arabs and Jews, live in rural settlements. Since few of the immigrants were farmers, it has not been easy to develop an agricultural society. Moreover, there is a great shortage of water, and although irrigation has been extended substantially in recent years, there still is not enough arable land to support all the people of the country. Many proposals have been made that would lead to an increase of both arable land and hydroelectric power. Probably the most important of these proposals is one to divert the waters of the Jordan River from their course to the Dead Sea out over the thirsty land, perhaps even to parts of the Negeb. In the same project it is proposed to lead waters from the Mediterranean to the Dead Sea. Since the Dead Sea is almost 1,300 feet below sea level, the drop would provide a great amount of power. Both Israel and Jordan, however, lay claim to the waters of the Jordan River. As a result of continued hostility between Israel and the Arab States no progress has been made on joint implementation of these plans.

Manufacturing has grown substantially since the early days of the Jewish settlements. Some planners dream of Israel's becoming a great workshop, patterned after Switzerland, to take advantage of its position at the crossroads of continents. Only the future can tell whether or not these hopes will materialize and to what extent. One obvious obstacle is that Israel is extremely

poor in fuel and other mineral resources. The largest single aggregation of minerals is found in the waters of the Dead Sea: chiefly sodium chloride, potassium chloride, magnesium chloride, and calcium sulphate. Neither petroleum nor other minerals have yet been found in appreciable quantities. Moreover, the clash with the Arab states has sealed off adjacent markets, sources of raw material, and even the flow of oil through pipelines from Iraqi fields to Haifa. Nevertheless, Israel has succeeded in producing a wide variety of light manufactured prod-

ucts. Such industry is a promising development and points to a real possibility that, if peace prevails in the Near East and in the world, Israel may become, for its size, an important manufacturing nation.

Currently the leading exports of Israel include citrus fruit and various citrus by-products, polished diamonds, and chemicals. Imports are such as are needed to meet the wants of people coming from Western nations—food grains, machinery, petroleum, coal, sugar, beverages, vegetable oils, and animal products.

## JORDAN

Prior to World War I, Turkey was in virtual control of all the Arab lands in southwestern Asia, with the exception of the central and southern portions of the Arabian Desert; but at the end of that war she was deprived of all the Arab possessions. The Hejaz and Yemen appeared as nominally independent states along the west coast of Arabia; Syria became a French mandate under the League of Nations, and Iraq, Palestine, and Transjordan became British mandates. All mandates of Arab lands in the Near East, however, have now been abandoned. Syria has been divided into two independent states—Lebanon and Syria. Israel, Iraq, and Jordan are fully independent. The Hejaz has been incorporated into Saudi Arabia, and the independence of Yemen is fully recognized.

In this complex Arab area in southwest Asia, Jordan (formerly Transjordan) has faced extreme difficulties since World War II. One king was assassinated; another, deposed. After the war with Israel, Jordan incorporated within its own territory most of the predominantly Arab portions of the former Palestine. At one stroke this augmentation of area trebled the population. Previously Jordan had a population estimated at only

400,000, but the newly acquired lands had a permanent population of about 400,000 and an additional population of at least 450,000 Arab refugees who had fled from the territory held by Israel. For years this refugee problem has plagued Jordan, as it has Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon, which also have received refugees from Palestine.

The eastern and southern parts of Jordan are typical desert lands, but in the uplands of western Jordan the landscape is more favorable to human endeavor. Here are found many farm villages, terraced hillsides, and fields of wheat, barley, or fruits. These western lands are sufficiently high and near the sea to get a fair share of the rain-bearing winds from the Mediterranean.

Jordan, like Israel, has hoped to find oil or other important mineral resources somewhere within its boundaries. So far, little other than phosphates has been discovered. Exports of grains, fruit, and phosphates are much too small to pay for the needed imports of fuel, cloth, and machinery. The account is balanced, however, by funds which constitute essentially a grant from Britain, who by treaty is permitted to maintain military air bases in Jordan.

## SYRIA

The sovereign republic of Syria exhibits most of the general physical characteristics of the Arab states outlined on earlier pages. The total population is approximately 3,250,000, the majority of whom are Moslem Arabs. There are, however, almost 500,000 Christians, as well as other less numerous sects.

Damascus, capital of Syria, is one of the oldest existing cities in the world. Even in ancient times it was a metropolis in an oasis, supported by adjacent farm lands and by the trade of the caravan routes that focused on the city. Today trucks, buses, and airplanes are seen more often than camel caravans, but the routes still focus on Damascus, a crossroads city in a crossroads country.

Syria is dominantly an agricultural nation. Most of the farmers live in the western mountains near the sea or at the edge of the desert plain east of the mountains in the great oasis that surrounds Damascus. The Bedouins frequently camp near Damascus, trading in the city and sometimes renting pastures for their flocks in the oasis.

Most of the farm land in Syria is owned by

absentee landlords who live in the cities and whose agents visit the villages only at harvest time to take their share of grain directly from the threshing floor. Typically the sharecroppers are deeply in debt, have no security in lease, and cannot claim compensation for improvements made on the land. Still poorer are the laborers who work for hire.

One special problem in Syria, as in other Arab lands, is control of irrigation. In many communities the allocation of water is administered by local authorities who keep no records but carry out the distribution according to long-established customs. In other localities there are privately owned or collectively owned irrigation systems. In some places, much more land could be irrigated from water that is now being wasted. A coordinated plan for use of water resources would help to solve these problems. In particular the great Jezira tract eastward toward Mesopotamia holds out promise of flourishing settlements if the irrigation problem can be solved.

## LEBANON

Lebanon is perhaps the most prosperous of the Arab states. It has had especially close cultural and economic ties with Europe for many years. There appears to be less of a problem in land tenure, with a type of peasant farming that at least faintly resembles that in Europe. Some of the villagers in Lebanon supplement their income by working in the towns. Many villagers receive added income in the form of remittances from relatives residing in the United States, a factor of considerable import to the economy of this small republic. Tourists from a wide area seek escape from summer heat by

visiting the mountains of Lebanon. Partly because of its strategic location, Beirut, capital of Lebanon, has become a major gateway for trade involving not only Lebanon, but Syria, Jordan, and Iraq as well. When Syria lost Lebanon, it lost its best-developed seaport area.

Lebanon is almost entirely a mountainous country bordering on the Mediterranean and is fortunate in receiving beneficial winter rains. Many slopes are terraced and intensively cultivated. Exports of such agricultural products as fruits, cotton, hides, and skins reflect this agricultural pattern, which

perhaps offsets a noticeable lack of valuable minerals.

Until it became an independent republic in 1946, Lebanon was considered a part of Syria. Yet, in effect, Lebanon has been almost autonomous for many years, even under the Turks. One reason for this is the difference in the people, for Lebanon is the only Arab state in which about one half of the population is Christian. Christian communities, of which the Maronites are

the predominant sect, have persisted in this area since the time of Christ. Because of this religious factor France established itself as a protector of the Christians during the Ottoman rule. Lebanon works closely with other Arab states in matters of regional interest, especially with respect to the Israeli problem, but its stand on world problems tends to be more moderate and conciliatory than that of most Arab nations, and it has been an area of stability in the Arab world.

## IRAQ

From the dawn of recorded history great civilizations flourished along the Tigris and Euphrates rivers comparable to those along the Nile. In the millennium before the Christian era Babylon, Assyria, and Nineveh formed centers of highly developed empires and civilizations. More land in the Tigris-Euphrates Valley was under cultivation in ancient times than today. Evidences of very early irrigation techniques employed by the Babylonians and the Assyrians can still be found; but now the canals that they built are filled with silt, and the earthen dams are broken down. Moreover, river levels have changed and less land is well watered.

Mesopotamia fell under the sway of Arab invaders in the seventh century, and Baghdad served as the capital of a flourishing Abbasid Empire for six centuries. Weakened by Mongol invasions in the thirteenth century, the shattered lands finally fell under the Ottoman rule, which ended with British occupation in 1918. The modern nation of Iraq appeared as a British mandate in 1922, although the boundaries of the oil-rich province of Mosul were finally fixed under the auspices of the League of Nations in 1926. In 1932 Iraq was recognized as an independent state with the termination of its

mandated status and its entrance into the League of Nations.

Always the rivers have provided the essential water for economic survival, and always life along the rivers has been in sharp contrast with the nomadic life in adjacent deserts. Baghdad, capital of Iraq, is, like Cairo, a riverbank city. The modern government, however, aided by revenues from oil, has undertaken extensive new projects designed to save large areas from floods, bring water to many new districts, provide hydroelectric power, and thereby greatly increase the total amount of land devoted to crop production.

Traditionally Iraq has been an agricultural nation. Major crops include wheat, barley, cotton, vegetables, and fruits. In the north, some grains can be grown with winter rainfall; everywhere else farming depends on irrigation. The irrigated date gardens near Basra produce about eighty per cent of the world supply of this commodity.

The great new resource in Iraq is, of course, oil, which dominates the exports, exceeding by far both barley and dates. The government gets fifty per cent of the profits from oil production. Plans are under way for use of the natural gas which hitherto has been largely wasted.

## SAUDI ARABIA

Most of the Arabian Peninsula has never been under the effective control of any foreign power. Even the Turks attempted to control only the coastlands and the sacred cities. Arabia first became a unified autonomous country in 1926, when Ibn Saud, a former tribal chieftain, united the scattered tribes, absorbed the kingdom of the Hejaz (with the holy cities of Mecca and Medina), and created the absolute monarchy Saudi Arabia.

Officially there are two capitals, Riyadh and Mecca, the former political and the latter religious. Tens of thousands of faithful Moslems make the pilgrimage to Mecca each year. This influx of travelers adds substantially to state revenues, but it creates major problems of water supply, transportation, and health.

Although Arabia is generally thought of as a land of nomads, more people in that country are supported by agriculture than

by pastoral pursuits. This is true despite the fact that there are no perennial rivers in Arabia; wells and springs in oases must be depended on for irrigation.

Saudi Arabia has recently become one of the leading oil producers in the Near East. Income from oil has helped develop port facilities, roads, railways, and airports. The oil companies have drilled deep wells for water, thereby adding substantially to the irrigated area. Nomads have been encouraged to settle down, and new techniques in agriculture are being introduced on experimental farms. The impact of new ideas about medicine, education, and science is effecting a disturbing influence upon a Wahhabi society—one of the most conservative sects in the Moslem world. Inevitably these developments will tend to have far-reaching effects on the course of affairs in Saudi Arabia and on the entire Near East sector of the world as well.

## YEMEN

The absolute monarchy of Yemen, part of the old Ottoman Empire, is without doubt the least known of the Arab states. Recently a seaport has been improved, and geologists are exploring for minerals, especially oil—the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow in the Near East. Small amounts of coffee, dates, hides, and skins are exported occasionally. The Yemen crop best known to Westerners is mocha coffee, which thrives in this particular environment.

Electricity, telephones, and automobiles are relatively rare in the kingdom of Yemen, and foreign visitors are definitely discouraged as a result of government policies.

Yemen is a mountainous land that has more rainfall than any other part of the Arabian Peninsula. The capital, San'a, at an elevation of more than 7,000 feet, enjoys a relatively cool climate. Agriculture is the major source of livelihood for the 5,000,000 people of the nation.

## DEPENDENCIES ON THE ARABIAN PENINSULA

Various dependent areas fringe the southern and eastern margins of the Arabian Peninsula. Strictly speaking, Aden is a small British colony with an area of seventy-five square miles, a key way-station and military base on a strategic ocean highway. The Aden Protectorate (112,000 square miles) extends British control eastward along the coast and into the Arabian Desert.

The seacoast from Aden to Iraq is occupied by Oman, the Trucial States, Qatar, Bahrein, and Kuwait. All are so-called sheikdoms, presumably independent with re-

gard to local affairs but committed to British "protection" in foreign affairs, an arrangement dating from the nineteenth century. The discovery of oil added enormously to the wealth and influence of Kuwait, Bahrein, and Qatar, the first of which has the impressive output of about 800,000 barrels daily. Only a few nations in the world have so large a production. Fortunately for Kuwait, a substantial portion of the oil royalties has been used for education, medicine, and the general economic development of this small sheikdom.

## ARAB UNITY OR DISUNITY

The late nineteenth century witnessed a remarkable growth in Arab nationalism. The center was Syria, at that time under Turkish rule. Later the Arab renaissance served to align the Arab peoples against the Turks during World War I. There were many detours before freedom was achieved, and then it was the freedom, not of a united Arab people, but of many separate Arab states with a separate nationalism in each area—in Iraq, in Egypt, and in Saudi Arabia. The Pan-Arab idea, however, was not lost, and finally, in 1945, it came to partial realization in the organization of the Arab League. Actually the threat associated with increased Jewish immigration may have contributed to a sense of emergency that brought the League into existence. The seven original

members were Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Yemen. Libya joined the League in 1953; Sudan, in 1956.

Ten years after the Arab League's conception, it was apparent that the League had served in a limited measure to facilitate discussion and action. The Arab states are experimenting with various forms of co-operation, especially with regard to the Israeli question, on which there is considerable unity of views. The Arab League has been unable to agree on a common stand on the larger question of security in the Cold War. In fact, Iraq negotiated the Western Baghdad Pact while Egypt joined Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen in a military coalition opposed to the North Tier defense scheme.



### Study Questions

1. Explain why a crossroads location adds to the importance of (a) Egypt, (b) Lebanon, (c) Syria, and (d) Israel.
2. Give illustrations to show that the population pattern in the Middle East is consistent with the arrangement of mountains, rainfall, and rivers.
3. Discuss the relations between organized religious groups and political authority. Illustrate with reference to both the Middle East and other countries.
4. Outline the problems faced by the nomads in adjusting to a changing world economy.
5. Contrast various group interests in the political control of any one Arab state (military, commercial, landowners, farm workers).
6. Distinguish among several patterns of land ownership in the Arab states. What are the associated problems?
7. Characterize the various patterns of land tenure in Israel. Indicate apparent advantages and disadvantages of these types of land tenure to new immigrants.
8. Explain why the increase of population is a major problem in both the Arab states and Israel.
9. How may the geographic bases of the Suez Canal clash with political issues arising in the Middle East?
10. Libya has a very large area in comparison with its population. In what ways may this condition be (a) advantageous and (b) disadvantageous?
11. List the major problems of the nation of Israel, and indicate what some of the possible solutions are.
12. Consult recent periodicals with reference to the problem of Arab refugees. What are the political barriers to solution of the problem?
13. List major similarities and contrasts between Syria and Lebanon. Then use the lists in characterizing each nation.
14. Explain how the discovery of oil brought basic changes to the economy and society of (a) Iraq and (b) Saudi Arabia.
15. Trace the development of nationalism in the Arab states and Israel from the time of the Ottoman Empire to the present day.

## *Persia and Afghanistan*

Persia<sup>1</sup> and Afghanistan occupy an area in southwestern Asia that has lain in the path of migrating groups for thousands of years. As each wave of people moved out from regions north or northwest of China, they eventually were drawn to the water and the grazing lands east of the Caspian Sea in the area of the Oxus<sup>2</sup> and Jaxartes rivers, and some of them settled in the area. A period of peaceful tenure was always followed by the approach of another group, not yet weakened by years of sedentary life. After each invasion, the displaced peoples had two routes of escape open to them: down through Afghanistan to the plains of India or along the slopes of the Kopet Dagh and the Elburz Mountains and out into the basins

of Persia. In their travels they were forced to stay close to the mountains, for here only could they find the water and grasslands necessary to maintain themselves and their animals.

With the political development of Eurasia in the eighteenth century, great continental migrations ceased. Seaways to the south of Asia supplanted the old land routes, and Persia and Afghanistan lost much of their former importance. The British, however, because of their interests in India and their water route to the East, still paid close attention to the affairs of both nations. The Russians, with their historic inclination toward expansion, competed with the British for influence in the region. Persia and Afghanistan, offering few resources except location, became buffer areas between rival powers.

The discovery of oil in Persia in 1908, however, and its subsequent development resulted in the focusing of world attention on the Persian nation. Again, Britain and Russia vied for influence in the country. Under

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
<sup>1</sup> In 1935 Iran was adopted as the official name of the country, but in 1949 the government of Iran used Persia as a designation in foreign languages. Persia is the title used in this chapter.

<sup>2</sup> Oxus is the historic name for this river and is still widely used. The official name is Amu Darya (Darya meaning "river"). Likewise, the Jaxartes River is now known as the Syr Darya.

normal conditions, about eighty per cent of Western Europe's oil requirements now come from the Middle East, and Persia, as the area's leading producer, has assumed a role

of great significance. In contrast, no major resources have been developed in Afghanistan, and that country still remains in a semi-isolated state.

Location, however, is still of major importance to both nations. Russia's attainment of world-power status has meant increased pressure along the northern borders of Persia and Afghanistan, while Britain's withdrawal from India in 1947 reduced the counter-pressure from the south and east. Partly in order to bolster defenses against Communist expansion, the United States has in recent years attempted to extend its own influence into this sector of the Middle East. Two great world forces, one commanding the heartland, the other striving to consolidate control of the periphery—a situation foreseen by Mackinder—have come into conflict.



## PERSIA

The Persian nation lies at a strategic crossroads of southwestern Asia, separating Russia from the warm-water ports of the Persian Gulf and separating Turkey and Iraq on the west from Pakistan to the east. American plans to forge a defensive link against Russian expansion southward already include both Turkey and Pakistan; thus the position of Persia at this vital junction point is one of great significance (see the map above).

The area of the nation is 629,345 square miles—as large as the combined areas of Spain, Portugal, France, Italy, Switzerland, Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands. Within the nation there is considerable diversity of relief, climate, and natural resources.

### PHYSICAL RESOURCES

A most distinctive feature of Persia is its mountainous terrain, which includes many high ranges, some of them almost surround-

ing the country and others extending across it from the northwest to the southeast. Even the interior land surface lies at an average elevation of more than 1,000 feet. In the northwest a high plateau known as the Armenian Knot extends into Persia, where it breaks into two lofty ranges: (1) the Elburz Mountains, which swing in a great arc around the southern end of the Caspian Sea with many peaks reaching a height of 12,000 feet, and (2) the Kurdistan Uplands, which extend southeastward as the Zagros Mountains and continue as the Fars Ranges along the Persian Gulf. Bordering the Arabian Sea is the Makran Range, which extends into West Pakistan as a great and nearly uninhabited barrier. Much of the drainage of the southern mountains goes into enclosed basins to the north and into longitudinal depressions within the mountains themselves.

A series of basins, all more than 5,000 feet above sea level, form a corridor from the northwest of Persia to Pakistan. Between

this corridor and the Khurasan Desert—a large area 800 miles long and 100 to 200 miles wide in central Persia—are the Kerman Ranges, or plateaus, parts of which are 14,000 feet high.

Northeastern Persia is separated from the steppe lands of Russia by the Kopet Dag, a continuation of the Caucasus on the western side of the Caspian Depression. Along the eastern border of the country the Khurasan Mountains extend southward as far as the Seistan Depression, near which Persia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan converge.

Persia has few areas that can be called lowlands. The Seistan Depression is 1,500 feet above sea level. Lowland areas along the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf are narrow except for the plains of Khuzistan, where the Karun River flows toward the Persian Gulf. One other lowland area of importance is the Caspian coast north of the Elburz Mountains.

The latitudinal location of Persia between 25° and 40° North Latitude, the vast bordering mountain ranges, and the irregular topography all exert considerable influences upon the climate. During the summer, hot, dry winds blow in from the direction of Africa on their way to the Asiatic low-pressure area. In winter, cyclonic areas from the west bring rain with temperatures that are low in the north but somewhat modified in the south. The effects of these wind conditions are varied by the topography. The windward sides of the mountains receive rain and snow, while the valleys or basins get most of their water from rivers and wells or tunnels which tap the ground-water table. Only on the Caspian coast and in northwestern Persia is the rainfall more than forty inches annually. Over most of the country precipitation varies between four and twenty-four inches.

## ECONOMY

The close relationship between economic and political factors within a nation is clearly

demonstrated in the case of Persia. The development of the nation's oil resources has had strong repercussions not only on Persia's internal politics as various groups have sought control of the revenues but also on the country's position with respect to other nations. Any weak country that possesses a valuable resource finds itself involved in world political developments. Within recent years there has been a growing tendency for large groups of impoverished workers within a nation to discover their political power and to threaten the stability of the government itself, if nothing is done to alleviate their distress. In Persia, as in many other areas, this popular discontent may lead to the eventual installation of a Communist regime, which will ride to power on wild promises of material benefits to the poor. The proximity of Russia along Persia's northern border could provide support for such Communization efforts.

**AGRICULTURE**—Basically, Persia has an agricultural economy with very low levels of production. Only about twelve per cent of the land is under cultivation or used for pasture, although a considerably larger area could be made available if water supply were increased and if fertilizers and machinery were more extensively utilized. More than eighty-five per cent of the people derive their livelihood from agriculture and grazing, yet with the type of equipment available these workers are able to produce only about two thirds of the food required to provide an adequate diet for the people of the nation. For a country that must rely on the products of its land not only to feed itself but also to supply raw materials for its industries and commerce Persia has paid surprisingly little attention to the development of agriculture.

*Crops and Methods of Cultivation.* Winter wheat and barley are the chief crops and are mostly consumed by the farm population. A little fodder and a few root crops are grown for work animals, but there is little dairying. Because the soil is dry, at least

half of the land under cultivation lies fallow each year. For the most part the land is farmed under an undiversified, nonintensive system of cultivation. The scantiness and irregularity of rainfall cause marked fluctuation in the returns from nonirrigated lands; one or two years of drought seriously disturb the economy of the country. Intensive farming is restricted to relatively small areas where water for irrigation is available. Most of the irrigated land is planted in cash crops—cotton, citrus fruit, sugar beets, dates, and other fruits and vegetables. Crops that are destined for export naturally receive more attention and attract greater investment than others.

*Land Tenure.* More than two thirds of the cultivated land is held in large estates. The laws governing the treatment of agricultural workers are passed by a law-making body (*Majlis*) that consists of large landowners and merchants. The wealthy landowners let out their land for cultivation to peasants, who live in small villages. By ancient custom produce of the land is divided into five parts: one fifth each to the owner of the land, to the provider of water, to the animal used for plowing, to the seed, and to the labor. Since the landowner often possesses the water right and provides the seed, he may take three fifths of the crop. The peasant who does the work is usually in debt to the landowner, no matter how hard he works.

*Land Reforms.* Since 1935 various programs have been undertaken to increase the amount of land under cultivation, the productivity per acre, and the general living conditions of the peasants. Most of these projects have been initiated by the national government, but their net effect in terms of the country as a whole has been very small. A few large estates have been broken up and sold to peasant cultivators, governmental decrees have been issued ordering landowners to increase the share of the

crops that is to be given to those who do the work, and model villages have been established. However, large-scale land reform in Persia has yet to be carried out.

*Nomadism.* About 2,000,000 Persians are seminomadic, they provide the country with its livestock products. Since the areas they inhabit do not provide sufficient forage for permanent pasturage, these seminomadic peoples must move their livestock each year between summer and winter pastures. The tribes represent an element of instability in the country's organization, not only because of their continual movement, but also because they owe their allegiance first to the local khan and only second to the government. Attempts by the Persian government to organize the tribes by assigning them certain grazing areas and by limiting their movements have proved largely unsuccessful, for the pasturage is insufficient to maintain their livestock. When in past years epidemics broke out among the people in the encampments, most of the governmental restrictions were withdrawn. Doubtless, in time, the building of roads and the use of automobiles and other machines will greatly reduce the incidence of nomadism in Persia.

*PETROLEUM*—Persia may have important mineral resources, but with the exception of petroleum there has been little exploration or development. The four main fields of petroleum are in Khuzistan and are connected by pipeline with the refinery at Abadan. One other field, really a part of the Khanaqin area of Iraq, is at Naft-i-Shah, west of Kermanshah. The oil of this latter field supplies the needs of Persia; that of the other fields goes into foreign commerce.

The Anglo-Persian Oil Company was the first of its kind in the Middle East. In 1901 an Australian financier obtained a concession from the shah for drilling in a large area, which included most of Persia except the northern provinces. It was not until 1908

that an important producing area was discovered. On the basis of this well, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was formed, the name later being changed to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Several years later, the British government bought 52.5 per cent of the stock.

The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company made extensive investments in southern Persia: the largest refinery in the world was set up on Abadan Island, extensive housing projects were provided for the workers; and more than a dozen schools and two hospitals were built, fully equipped, and staffed. Royalties paid to the Persian government constitute a large portion of its total revenue and have been increased several times.

*Nationalization Problem.* The exploitation of Persia's oil resources has been accompanied by several major problems. During World War II the Russians negotiated for concessions in northern Persia similar to those enjoyed by the British-controlled Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in the south. The Persian government has itself periodically demanded higher royalties from the Anglo-Iranian Company, and, in 1951, Persia's oil industry was nationalized. Termination of the concession and dispute over the amount of compensation to be paid the British for their investments in the country led to a virtual British blockade of oil shipments by sea from Abadan refineries; for the hundreds of tankers that carry the oil away from Abadan are almost all British-owned, and the London government ordered them to cease operating. For nearly three years only a trickle of oil flowed from Persia; and because of the loss of royalties, the results of the oil blockade were extremely serious. In 1954 a new government was installed at Tehran, a mutually satisfactory agreement was signed with the Anglo-Iranian Company, and plans for full-scale production and export of Persian oil were drawn up. Since then production has risen steadily.

**INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT**—Although Persia is essentially an agricultural nation, about 200,000 persons are engaged in manufacturing, based mainly on textiles and food processing. Cotton and wool are the leading textiles. Much spinning and weaving of wool and of silk is done in homes or small workshops equipped with hand wheels and looms. The famous Persian carpet industry is likewise carried on to a large extent in homes. Industry on a larger scale is restricted to sugar refining, flour milling, and the manufacture of tobacco products; there is practically no heavy industry of any kind in the country.

Many of Persia's industrial plants are owned and operated by the government, but most of these are being run at a heavy loss, since there is little incentive to attain a reasonable standard of efficiency. Tariffs imposed on imported manufactured goods largely necessitate the use of goods of domestic manufacture, which are generally inferior in quality and higher in price because of the protective tariff. The result is a general low standard of living. The attraction of industrial wages has led thousands of agricultural workers to abandon the farms and to migrate to the cities. Thus the countryside has lost much of its labor supply, while the city populations have become swollen beyond their capacity to afford productive employment. Many of these unemployed workers have joined the anti-government mobs in Tehran and other Persian cities.

**TRANSPORTATION**—Persia has approximately 1,760 miles of government-operated railways of which 1,572 miles are of standard gauge. The longest line, that between Bandar Shah and Bandar Shahpur, known as the Transpersian Railroad, covers a distance of 1,041 miles. This railway proved of immense value to the Allies in World War II, for it enabled them to send large amounts of supplies to the USSR at a time when they were desperately

needed. The line from Tehran to Mianeh is to be extended to Tabriz, where it will connect with the railway to Julfa on the Soviet border. Plans also include extension of lines from Tehran through to Meshed and from Tehran through to Yezd. The rough topography of Persia makes railway construction throughout the country very costly.

The country has nearly 17,000 miles of highways, but before World War II only one stretch of a few miles was asphalted. The road from Ahwaz to Kazvin was asphalted by the Allies in order to carry supplies to the USSR during the war, and recently other major highways have been rebuilt and asphalted. A highway is planned to connect Shiraz with Isfahan.

Air transportation within Persia and between Persia and other nations has undergone considerable expansion within the past few years. Iranian Airways, the government-owned national airline, connects Tehran with nine smaller cities, as well as with Karachi in Pakistan and Kuwait on the Arabian Peninsula. Other international lines connect the Persian capital with Western Europe, Baghdad, and Moscow. In a nation where surface transportation facilities are difficult to build and maintain, the movement of passengers and freight by air seems destined to continue to expand.

**TRADE**—In the towns cloth, utensils, salt, and household items are sold. Trade in textiles and rug weaving is well developed, but the poverty of the people generally restricts the domestic market. Lack of good roads and the fact that population settlements are widely scattered are also deterrent factors to trade.

In foreign trade the chief export items are carpets, fruits, grains, sheep, and skins; imports consist of chemicals, steel products, cars, and electrical equipment. Prior to 1939 Persia maintained a favorable balance of trade, but since the war the balance of

trade, excluding petroleum, which falls into a separate category, has been unfavorable. The government has attempted to remedy the deficit through quota control of imported materials and drastic limitations on the importation of luxuries. Foreign trade with neighboring countries, with the exception of the USSR, is small because these countries produce similar products. Moscow has arranged several barter agreements with Persia, and, despite certain drawbacks, the USSR is still a principal market for Persian exports. British-Persian trade, both exports and imports, has also increased considerably in recent years. Trade with the United States has increased significantly since World War II, having almost tripled the volume of prewar years.

## POPULATION

Except in the larger towns no census of population has ever been taken. The official estimate is about 19,200,000 inhabitants. There is great variation in population density owing to the unequal distribution of natural resources. People tend to be concentrated in areas where water is available for agriculture or in mining, industrial, and commercial centers. The greatest population concentrations are found in the northern part of the country and in Khuzistan to the south. Leading cities include Tehran, with more than 1,000,000 inhabitants; Tabriz, capital of Azerbaijan, with about 300,000; Isfahan and Meshed, with about 200,000 each; and Shiraz, with 125,000 (see map on page 507). Abadan, the oil-refinery center, has a population of about 100,000, largely associated with the oil industry.

**MINORITIES AND TRIBES**—Although the Persian race is a distinctive strain and has endured for centuries, not all Persians belong to the same stock. The tribes, accounting for about ten per cent of the population, form distinctive groups, which preserve



their own customs, languages, and organization. Religious minorities add to the complexity of the nation. In western Persia the peoples are Kurds, Armenians, and Turks. About 800,000 Kurds live south of Azerbaijan, in close contact with their tribal compatriots across the Zagros frontier in Iraq.<sup>3</sup> Some 50,000 Armenians, occupied chiefly with commerce and finance, are divided between Azerbaijan and Isfahan. South of the Kurdish areas dwell the Lurs and Bakhtiaris—about 500,000 in all—who in the past have influenced governmental affairs in Tehran. In the Fars region there

are the Qashqais and the Khamseh, who also are influential in national affairs. In the Khuzistan region there are Arab tribes, many of whom have drifted into the oil industry, while the Khurasan area, in the northeast, has a mixture of Turkmen and Kurds. Baluchis, who belong to the Afghan race, inhabit the Seistan Basin to the east. Around Lake Urmia in the northwest live some 25,000 Assyrians, a Christian remnant of the once powerful Nestorian church. The Jews, who in this nation are less numerous than the Armenians, live principally in the cities and have been entirely absorbed into their communities.

<sup>3</sup> For further information on the Kurds, see Westermann, "Kurdish Independence and Russian Expansion," *Foreign Affairs*, XXIV (July, 1946), 675-87.

**LANGUAGES AND RELIGIONS**—Modern Persian, a language related to the Indo-European family, is the great unifying force in Persian



history. It has remained unchanged through centuries of invasions, and its continuity accounts for the permanence of Persian history and culture. The Persian language is not used exclusively, however. The largest body of non-Persian speaking people is made up of an estimated 2,000,000 Turkish-speaking people, a majority of whom are in Azerbaijan and the frontier areas to the north. The Kurds are largely of Aryan stock, and their language belongs to the Indo-European stock, related to Persian and Turkish. The Lurs and Bakhtiari speak dialects closely allied to Turkish and about 300,000 Arabs speak the Arabic tongue. In the eastern fringes one hears Pushtu and an archaic form of Dravidian spoken by the Brahuis. Despite this diversity the Persian language is dominant, since it is used in government circles and in the educational system of the country.

Persians are divided in religion as well as in language. Islam, the present religion, dates from the Arab period of the seventh century. For national reasons, Persia officially adopted the Shi'ite branch of Islam as its state religion. Many of this branch's religious centers are located in southern Iraq, which is also of the Shi'a faith. The ancient Zoroastrian faith still claims some 20,000 adherents. Tolerated is the new religion of the Bahais, whose followers number around 100,000. Religion—the root of the social structure and ethics in Persia—varies with the minorities. The large Kurdish elements are Sunnite Moslems, contrary to the Persian majority. Most of the Armenians belong to their national church, whose headquarters are in Armenian SSR. The Assyrians, in turn, follow their Nestorian Creed, and the Jews preserve their own faith. The government has tolerated these religious minorities and even allotted them special representation in the national parliament.

## HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The history of Persia is one of rising and falling empires and incessant struggle between native rulers and foreign invaders. First, about 1500 B.C., the Indo-Aryans, moving out of their original home between the Oxus and Jaxartes rivers in central Asia, penetrated areas now occupied by Persia and India. Then in 900 B.C. the Persians moved in and settled on the plateau. After periods of rule by Assyrians and Medes, Persia succeeded, between the sixth and fourth centuries B.C., in creating a "world state," but the empire founded by Cyrus the Great disintegrated before successive defeats inflicted by Alexander in 331 B.C., by Seleucus in 312 B.C., and by the Parthians in 129 B.C. When Rome conquered Greece in 143 B.C., and extended its power to embrace all the eastern Mediterranean, conflict broke out between Rome and Persia. This struggle lasted until about the middle of the seventh century of the Christian Era. Then, in 636, Persia, exhausted by this long conflict, was conquered by the Arabs and made a Moslem province. In the tenth century, the Seljuk Turks, and, in the thirteenth century, the Mongols swept over Persia. From 1514 to 1720, Persia was engaged in incessant struggle for survival against the Ottoman Empire.

In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries Persia has felt the impact of the West. One form of this influence has been the steady economic penetration by British, Russians, Germans, French, and, most recently, Americans. Another evidence of Western influence was the adoption of a constitution, in 1906, and the institution of a parliamentary government, in 1925. Despite these advances, Reza Khan Pahlevi, was able, in 1921, to seize power and set up a dictatorship, which endured until the beginning of World War II, when the country was occupied by Britain and Russia. At that time the old shah abdicated and was succeeded

by his son, Mohammed Reza Pahlevi. In spite of the vicissitudes of history, the unity of Persian culture has been maintained throughout the centuries.

#### POLITICAL ASPECTS

Persia is a constitutional monarchy based upon the Constitution of 1906 and the Supplemental Law of 1907. Vital legislative matters are entrusted to a National Assembly (*Majlis*), whose members are elected for two-year terms by secret ballot. There is a senate, partly elective and partly appointed by the shah, but it is far overshadowed by the *Majlis*.

The function of government is symbolized by the shah, but it is actually performed by a cabinet presided over by a prime minister who, though appointed by the shah, is responsible to the *Majlis*. The cabinet consists of ministers of the various administrative departments, who must resign whenever the two chambers give them a vote of no confidence. The judicial system is based on the French model with district courts and a supreme court. All government activities center in Tehran, the capital.

The country is divided into ten provinces and various subdivisions, down to village units. The provinces correspond with the ancient provincial district units; they are administered by governors direct from Tehran. Until recent times central authority diminished in proportion to the distance from the capital, and native tribal chieftains still are influential in many outlying provinces.

The course of constitutional government has not squared with the theory. In the early stages the power of the shah overshadowed the parliament, and from 1921 to 1941 there was a suspension of civil liberties and of popular government. The return to constitutional rule in 1945 was marked by rapid cabinet changes and by a struggle for power between the Shah and Prime

Minister Mossadegh. Despite the power exercised by Mossadegh for a time, the Shah still represents the unity of the nation and with the support of the army has been able to thwart the overthrow of the monarchy. Nevertheless, economic distress and mob violence since the war attest to the instability of Persia's political institutions.

**INTERNAL PROBLEMS**—Several basic problems challenge the nation. Extreme centralization and a topheavy bureaucracy not only drain the Treasury but deaden initiative and public morale. Weaknesses in the social structure contribute to the abuse of political power. The peasantry is largely exploited by the ruling class, composed of wealthy landlords and merchants. Since the rich refuse to pay adequate taxes, the expenses of government fall mainly on the mass of consumers, who, already burdened with high taxes, must endure ever-higher living costs. There is no middle class to lend stability or to provide political leadership. Ninety-five per cent of the people are illiterate and as a result are not an effective force in the political life of the nation. Some steps toward economic reform have been taken recently, but these are entirely inadequate to meet the country's needs.

**INTERNATIONAL POSITION**—As a weak power area Persia has long been the scene of British and Russian rivalry. Its strategic location on the perimeter of the USSR places it in the arena of power politics. In the Caucasian sector, to the north, Persia has steadily lost territory to Russia during the past century and a half. The central Asian frontier east of the Caspian Sea has never been clearly defined, and throughout Persian history it has been an uneasy border zone. British influence in the southwest is concentrated on the Persian Gulf and the oil resources.

Whenever Russia and Britain combine their forces, Persia disappears as an inde-

pendent state. The agreement of 1907 divided the country into Russian and British spheres, with a neutral Persian area in between the powers. In World War I Persia was the scene of foreign military operations carried on by Russia, Turkey, Germany, and Britain; in World War II, the USSR, Britain, and the United States effectively occupied the country. In both cases Persia regained its independent status only with considerable difficulty. To avoid such domination, Persia turned to third parties for assistance: between the wars, to Germany, since 1945, to the United States.

Persia has steered a middle course between the Soviet and the Anglo-American blocs. A basic treaty was negotiated with Moscow in 1921, which set the pattern for Persia's relations with her northern neighbor. Article 6 of this treaty gives the USSR the right to send its forces into Persia should

it become a base for anti-Soviet operations. Soviet armies occupied northern Persia in World War II and instigated an autonomous Azerbaijan Republic, which collapsed when the Red armies withdrew from the area in 1946. Since 1955 Persia has been friendly toward Moscow in trade matters but joined the Baghdad Pact for security reasons.

Persia requires foreign financial aid, which the Western powers have extended on a limited scale. The Seven Year Plan—a bold national development project designed in 1949 to raise the standard of living—has yet to be implemented. A major objective in Persia's postwar foreign policy has been to attain emancipation from British imperialism; the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company is a step in this direction. At the same time, however, Persia recognizes the benefits to be derived from friendly economic arrangements with the West.

## AFGHANISTAN


Afghanistan occupies an area of 250,000 square miles in the interior of southwestern Central Asia. On the north is the USSR; on the west, Persia; and on the east and southeast, Pakistan, which prevents access to the sea. From Khyber Pass (see map on page 511) to the Persian boundary the distance is about 600 miles; the distance between the extreme northeast and southwest is approximately 960 miles.

The number of people who occupy this area is estimated to be about 12,000,000; concentration of population is restricted to places where there is enough water for irrigation or of grass for livestock. Such places are the regions of Mazar-i-Sharif in the north, Herat in the west, Kandahar in the south, and Kabul in the east. Geographically, Afghanistan occupies a strategic position in the rimland of Asia.

### PHYSICAL FEATURES

The principal topographic feature is the rugged mountains of the Hindu Kush range and its extensions which cover most of the country. The Hindu Kush, projecting from the main ranges of the Pamirs, has served to divert the westward movement of great migrations from eastern Asia and to protect the southward routes into India. Only in western Afghanistan, where the mountains become low foothills, is it possible to find an easy passage from north to south. To the south of the Hindu Kush an immense plateau slopes toward the Arabian Sea; on the north are the dry steppes of Badakhshan and the plains of Bactria along the Oxus River.

In an arid country the waters from the melting snow of the Hindu Kush make up for the scarcity of rainfall. Northward-



flowing rivers empty into the Oxus or sink into the Kara Kum sands of the Turkmen Republic. The Kabul River, rising in the eastern part of the Hindu Kush, flows eastward to the Indus, while, to the south, the Helmand River, rising west of Kabul, flows southwestward to the swamps of the Seistan. The irrigation water and hydroelectric potentiality of these rivers may have profound influence on the future development of Afghan economy.

The climate of Afghanistan is chiefly continental. The country lies between 30° and 38° North Latitude, about 450 miles from the Indian Ocean. Temperatures vary considerably because of Afghanistan's location and the unusually irregular elevations. Ka-

bul, with an elevation of 6,000 feet, has a mean temperature of 76° F. for the warmest month and 27° F. for the coldest. Afghanistan is mostly arid, with great irregularity in the amount of precipitation from year to year. The northeastern portion has some rainfall during each month, but the wide plains of the north and of the southwest have rainless summers.

#### ECONOMY

**AGRICULTURE**—Afghanistan is an arid country, but there is sufficient water for irrigation. As more water is made available through new irrigation projects, vast areas, both north and south of the Hindu Kush,

will be able to support many thousands of families.

Afghan farmers are skilled in using time-tested methods in the production of wheat, cotton, corn, sugar beets, and fruit, but chemical fertilizers are not used, and crop rotation is seldom practiced. A steel plow is a rarity; and oxen, mules, and horses provide power. Fruits and nuts have received primary consideration because they are export products. Production of essential foodstuffs, primarily cereals, has generally been sufficient to meet domestic requirements. Roughly ninety per cent of the Afghan people are engaged in agricultural and pastoral pursuits, and eighty-eight per cent of the country's exports are agricultural and pastoral products. The need for a broad economic-development program is clearly indicated by the low productivity in agriculture and the low average income of the people.

Afghanistan is fundamentally a pastoral land with scattered areas of irrigated agriculture. Camels, horses, and sheep graze on the plains; Badakhshan and Afghan Turkestan are famous for horses. Fat-tailed sheep are valued for their meat and fat; their wool and skins are used for clothing. Karakul lamb skins, for which Afghanistan is world famous, number several millions annually.

**MANUFACTURING**—Manufacturing in Afghanistan consists of light industries designed to supply the nation with necessity goods and to decrease expenditures for imports. As in Persia, textiles and food processing are the two major types of industry. Domestic raw materials, such as cotton, sugar beets, hides, lime, and clay, are available, as well as power sources both from Afghanistan's two coal mines and—more important—from her great hydroelectric potential. These raw materials and power sources have, however, undergone little development. Long distances from world markets and high transportation costs

serve to protect the local market from outside competition, but the same factors also limit the nation's capacity to export manufactured goods. Although there is little prospect that Afghanistan will develop heavy industries, expanded production of light industries is looked for to supply the increased consumer demands within the country.

**MINERALS**—In the past Afghanistan has never been important for minerals, but new development plans now include projects for exploration of the country's resources. There are indications of good coal deposits in the Hindu Kush. The existence of petroleum in northern Afghanistan has long been known and various surveys have been made by exploration companies. When the time arrives for production to begin, it has been made clear that petroleum concessions will not be given to non-Afghan groups. An important iron-ore deposit located near Kandahar is being developed into an iron industry to produce building equipment. Some chromite and talc have been mined and shipped to the United States. Salt is mined in quantity and the salt tax is allocated to further mineral development.

**TRANSPORTATION**—Afghanistan has no railways, but a sparse network of highways joins all the principal centers. Although many of the roads are in poor condition, regular bus service is maintained on them. Camel and donkey caravans are still important in the internal trade. There is no Afghan-operated airline, but foreign-owned lines connect Kabul with such outside centers as Jerusalem, Moscow, and New Delhi, as well as with several centers within Afghanistan itself.

**MODERNIZATION PROGRAM**—The Afghan government recognizes the need for modernization in agricultural techniques as well as in its limited industrial enterprises if national productivity is to compare with more progressive states. The plan outlined in 1932

aimed at the installation of irrigation works, textile factories, and the introduction of machinery for the extraction of sugar from sugar beets. Actually little progress was registered until after World War II, when Afghanistan solicited aid from outside the country in its efforts at a modernization program. The Morrison-Knutson Company, an American firm, was employed to construct a large irrigation project in order to increase the acreage under cultivation by some 800,000 acres. The Helmand River project, involving the construction of a large dam, is designed to serve thousands of families—many of them seminomadic—and resettle many of the latter on land. Obviously Afghanistan is largely dependent upon foreign sources for technical equipment, tools, and machinery—a heavy drain on its limited resources. Both the United States and the USSR have extended loans to Afghanistan in an effort to assist the modernization program.

**TRADE**—The principal commercial cities are Kabul, Kandahar, Mazar-i-Sharif, and Herat. Kabul and Kandahar are primary distributing points for imports from and via Pakistan, Mazar-i-Sharif and Herat, for goods from the USSR and Persia. The bulk of foreign trades moves through Karachi in Pakistan. To the United States Afghanistan exports its karakul skins, to India it sells fruits and nuts. Exports to the USSR consist mainly of wool, and imports are petroleum, sugar, and cotton piece goods. Within recent years, partly in response to territorial problems with Pakistan, an increasingly large proportion of Afghan foreign trade has been with USSR.

## POPULATION

By reason of geographic location the area of the Hindu Kush has for centuries served as a crossroads of many migrating peoples, and the present races are, therefore, a composite

of a number of diverse elements, which in the course of time have become absorbed into an older stock to form a fairly recognizable type. The early Indo-Aryan immigrants found Dravidians and elements of still older races. On the Indo-Aryans were superimposed Greeks and Scythians, Kushans and Ephthalites, Mongols and Turks. Some of these races have kept aloof and retained their native customs, others have merged into the general population and have lost all traces of their ancient ancestry.

**ORIGINS**—The origin of the principal element in the Afghan population is veiled in obscurity. The physical characteristics of the *Afghans* seem to show them to be of the Turko-Iranian type, with a mixture of Indian blood among the eastern tribes. Their original habitat was the country lying around the Sulaiman Range on what is now the western border of Pakistan, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries they penetrated the Kabul area. The Afghans occupied only a portion of the country, but among the clans that composed the tribe the Durani gained predominance when their rulers carved out the Durani Empire in the eighteenth century.

**PEOPLES**—Among the various groups making up the peoples of the nation, several are outstanding. The *Pathans*, sometimes called the true Afghans, originated around Kandahar and spread toward Peshawar on India's northwestern frontier. It is the Pathans who contributed Pushtu, the language spoken by one third of the population. The *Ghilzais*, probably of Turkish origin, inhabit the country around Ghazni and Kandahar, while the *Tajiks*, a nonnomad race of Persian origin, are settled chiefly around Kabul and the valleys of the Panjshir and upper Oxus River. The *Hazaras*, believed to be descendants of Mongol Tatar regiments brought into the country by Genghis Khan, inhabit an immense tract of central Afghanistan. In addition, there are the *Kafirs*, Mohammedan

peoples of undetermined origin, and various Turkish tribes, such as the *Uzbeks* and *Turkmen*. It is out of this conglomeration of races, languages, and religions, that Afghan rulers have endeavored to fashion a modern state. The term Afghan is applied broadly today to include any inhabitant of the country regardless of race or origin. As part of the consolidation process the government has adopted Pushtu as the national language and the Sunni form of Islam as the state religion.

### HISTORIC EVOLUTION

A stormy history marked the course of Afghan development. In successive stages the territory was ruled by foreign empire builders, divided into petty states, dismembered by stronger neighbors, and finally, in 1747, consolidated as a modern kingdom. During the time of Alexander the Great, Afghanistan, with Persia, fell under Greek domination; this was followed by Scythian and Parthian rule. The rise of Arab power in the seventh century brought the Islamic faith and placed western regions of Afghanistan within the Moslem Empire. A powerful Turkish dynasty ruled between 997 and 1030. Local dynasties flourished, only to be overwhelmed by the Mongol conquests from the north in the thirteenth century. For two centuries Afghanistan was largely divided between Persia and the Mogul Empire of India. To the north the Uzbeks made further incursions from Central Asia into Badakhshan. A decline in the power of Persia and India in the eighteenth century offered Afghans an opportunity to found a native dynasty.

In 1722 the Persians were expelled from Kandahar. Subsequently, through military conquests the Afghan state was extended eastward into the Punjab and Kashmir, to the Caspian on the west, and to the Oxus River in the north. Part of this territory, especially in the eastern and northern sec-

tors, was eventually lost as dynastic quarrels and conspiracies reduced the scope of Afghan rule. Internal dissensions in the nineteenth century opened the way to the extension of British and Russian influence in Afghanistan. Anglo-Afghan wars between 1838 and 1919 served to perpetuate disunity. In the course of the Third Afghan War, in 1919, King Amanullah negotiated several treaties with European states and established his country's independence from foreign control.

Following a visit to Europe in the 1920's, King Amanullah attempted to introduce Western ideas, but his efforts soon produced a revolt, in the course of which a rebellion, in 1929, forced him into exile. A few months later Nadir Khan, a cousin of Amanullah, ascended the throne as Nadir Shah. He believed in modernization, but he recognized the necessity of effecting changes gradually. Many of the innovations he favored have been, or are now being, put into effect. In 1933, Nadir Shah was assassinated, and his son Zahir Khan was proclaimed king. Zahir was educated in Europe and speaks French and English. With the aid of his uncle and the support of three other brothers of the former king, Zahir has steered a course toward progress and modernization.

### GOVERNMENT

The nation is a constitutional monarchy in which formal power is vested in a king and a parliament of two houses. Despite the provision for an elective body, authority remains concentrated in the royal family. The prime minister is named by the ruler and is responsible to him rather than to the parliament. The central power has continuously remained within one tribe, although it has shifted from one subgroup of this tribe to another, and, as a result, the government operates on a stable level. Reforms are not pressed too rapidly. Land

ownership is not a serious problem, since early in the nineteenth century vast holdings were broken up and divided into smaller plots. There are no political parties, no labor unions, and few cooperative organizations. A law provides for the publication of independent papers, but most of the press in the country is under government control.

**INTERNAL PROBLEMS**—Afghanistan faces two major problems: the need for more abundant food and the need for social evolution. It must raise the level of productivity if it is to meet home demand and at the same time have a surplus for export. The standard of living must also be improved. Solution rests on the following steps. (1) Additional land must be made available for seminomadic tribes. (2) Technological development must be strengthened through an improved education system. (3) Potential oil fields in the north must be exploited to provide the country with fuel and thus to decrease costly importation of oil from the USSR. (4) Oil and hydroelectric facilities must be developed to provide power for new industries. (5) There must be a greater degree of industrialization to provide employment for those who now crowd the towns and cities. Afghanistan faces a multitude of problems in its goal of modernization; it seems to have made a promising beginning in the solution of those problems.

**INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS**—When Afghanistan emerged as an independent nation, in 1919, a basic element in her foreign policy was to maintain favorable trade relations with other nations, especially her neighbors, and to obtain international economic assistance.

Afghanistan's relations with Pakistan are openly strained over the question of the Pushtu tribes (Pathans). The roots of the dispute can be traced back to 1893, when Sir Mortimer Durand proposed the so-called

Durand Line as the geographical boundary between Afghanistan and India. Afghanistan accepted the line as its eastern border. This line, however, left to India an area occupied by Pushtu-speaking tribes, a people closely akin to the frontier Afghans. These Pushtu tribes, though a part of India, enjoyed a sort of tribal autonomy. When, in 1947, Pakistan and India became separate nations, the Afghans, demonstrating an irredentist aspiration, instituted a move to set up an autonomous nation for their kinsmen, to be known as Pushtoonistan. Afghanistan's motives were not wholly altruistic; it regarded the area occupied by the Pushtu as a possible buffer state between itself and Pakistan. At any rate Afghanistan has been loath to see this area under the control of another nation. Border skirmishes and propaganda warfare still continue over the debatable area. In retaliation for the Afghan government's refusal to end the border incidents, Pakistan has halted the movement of much of Afghanistan's foreign trade through Karachi, the Pakistan seaport which is also the chief outlet for Afghan trade with the West.

Because of its difficulties with Pakistan the Afghan government has accepted various forms of support from the USSR. In 1946, before the border issue had arisen with Pakistan, the Afghans granted the USSR control of the Kushka sector at the meeting point of Persia, the USSR, and Afghanistan. Later, the Soviets stepped up their campaign of extending economic aid to Afghanistan and of improving trade relations with that country in order to counter American military aid to Pakistan. In 1955 the Afghan government accepted a loan of \$100,000,000 from the USSR, thereby tying the nation's economy more closely to the Soviet economy. So once again Afghanistan is caught in the cross-current of Asian power politics.



### Study Questions


1. Locate Persia and Afghanistan. Describe the topography and climatic conditions, pointing out the major influences on climate, of each country.
2. Locate on a map the population clusters of each country. What controls the location of those clusters?
3. Why, in view of the physical conditions, are most of the people in each country engaged in agriculture? What is the trouble with the Persian agricultural situation? Why are not the same conditions found in Afghanistan?
4. Can you think of any reasons why the common people of Persia might (a) accept or (b) resist Communist domination?
5. Explain the interest of the West and of the Soviet Union in Persia and Afghanistan.
6. Give a brief summary of the petroleum problem in Persia, bringing out factors influencing the Persian and British governments
7. Describe Persia's transportation system and contrast it with Afghanistan's.
8. Discuss the land tenure problem in Persia.
9. Discuss the economic and political effects of the nationalization of Persia's oil industry in 1951.
10. Analyze the manufacturing industry of each country with regard to (a) raw materials and (b) its effect upon the economy.
11. Name the minorities of Persia and locate their principal habitats
12. Locate the habitats of the most important tribes of Afghanistan.
13. Describe the situation on the Pakistan boundary of Afghanistan.
14. Compare the governmental organizations of Persia and Afghanistan.
15. Make a list of the internal and external problems of Persia and Afghanistan.

## CHAPTER THIRTY

# *India and Pakistan*

The India Independence Act of 1947 accounts for the creation of two new states in the subcontinent of India. What had until then formed a single administrative unit of the British Indian Empire was partitioned into two Dominions: the Union of India<sup>1</sup> and Pakistan. With an area of 1,500,000 square miles, extending from 8° to 37° North Latitude and from 61° to 98° East Longitude, this great region, in excess of 2,000 miles in either direction, is entitled to be called a subcontinent (see map on this page). Though latitudinally it is bisected by the Tropic of Cancer, the shape of the country is such that more than two thirds

is in the temperate zone. Yet it is considered to be a tropical country because of its civilization and climate



<sup>1</sup> Recent political changes have resulted in some difficulties of nomenclature, since a part of the former region of India now retains the name India. In this chapter it should be clear to the reader when India denotes the entire subcontinent or the historical region. The present political entity of the Republic of India is expressed as the Indian Union or India. In 1951, India became a sovereign independent republic within the Commonwealth of Nations, Pakistan was proclaimed a republic in January, 1956.

SPACE RELATIONS—India forms an integral part of Mackinder's "world island," that is, the Eur-African-Asiatic land mass, the most important single geographic unit of the

world. Britain lies at the northwestern extremity of this land mass, and India, along its southern periphery, in spite of this enormous distance between them, India until recently was a dependency of Britain.

The southwest and the southeast of India border on the Indian Ocean; the frontiers to the north are the Himalayas. These lofty mountains lie far above the levels of permanent habitation and, backed by the high plateau of Tibet, comprise what is probably the world's most formidable natural frontier. But in the extreme northwest of India, in the hinterland of Kashmir and beyond, the ranges become lower and narrower, with a few passes that permit fairly easy access. Afghanistan has always held the landward gates of India, great numbers of people have passed through them, and the dynasties of India have changed many times as a result of the accessibility of these gateways. In the deep valleys of the northwestern mountains in India live hardy and fanatical Moslem tribesmen. These people, living in barren surroundings, derive a major share of their livelihood from raids on passing caravans or on settled lowland areas. They are completely illiterate and easily roused to religious frenzy.

Of the land routes into India, the highways through Afghanistan from Herat and Seistan, which lead to Quetta in Baluchistan, are the only avenues for military approach that are not barred by difficult terrain. In the past, little use was made of this open highway, probably because of the inhospitable Thar Desert; but today this desert can be crossed by rail, and Quetta, at the head of the Bolan Pass, becomes a citadel of first-rate importance—perhaps of even greater importance than Peshawar at the head of the historic Khyber Pass. However, the oldest and most persistently trodden route was the Makran coast to the west, by which the Dravidians entered India. Commanded from the sea, this route could be utilized only by those who

controlled the Persian Gulf and the seas beyond

In the East, the heavily forested mountain ranges of northern Burma and eastern Assam, although barely more than 10,000 feet in elevation, have been both a secure protection to India and a great barrier to intercourse by land. Beyond lies South China with some of its populous valleys separated from those of Assam and Burma by about 600 miles of mountainous country. Even here, however, the Brahmaputra Valley, piercing Bengal province, provides an entry into India from the east. In the future this frontier may be cut by well-developed routes.

Among all the oceans of the world, only the Indian Ocean has been named for a country, a factor attesting its great importance in the early history of the country. India lies near the northern limits of this ocean and thus is easily accessible by sea; moreover, it is in close proximity to the shortest and most direct of the shipping routes between Europe and the Far East. India's size and population, among other factors, make it by far the most dominant among the countries bordering the Indian Ocean. Because of its central location among the three southern peninsulas of Asia, India has been accessible by water from both the east and the west. Greek, Jewish, Christian, Moslem, Parsee and, in recent times, European influences have poured in from the west, while Chinese influences have come from the east. But from India itself the main movements were eastward; there was none toward Central Asia or to the west.<sup>2</sup> In former times, India was entered from the northwest by land, then came the European contact by sea, and of late "the gates of

<sup>2</sup> Perhaps it is because the contented social philosophy of Hinduism, with its emphasis on fate and ahimsa (nonviolence), is not adaptable to the rigorous conditions of the desert and semidesert environment that the Indian influence could not spread westward.

India have become water gates and the way to India the way of the sea."

The position of India is particularly significant with regard to world air routes. Because of the almost insurmountable barrier to the north and the absence of large islands in the north Indian Ocean, all air routes from Europe to the Far East and Australia tend to converge on Karachi and Calcutta. The devious South African route is the only alternative to this air lane, but it passes through regions less developed and is, therefore, a poor competitor of the Indian route.

### HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

**PRE-BRITISH ERA**—Waves of invasion have poured into India through the passes in the northwest, some of the more important being that of Alexander the Macedonian in 327 B.C. and those of the Arabs starting in the eighth century. Islam began to spread widely in India from 1000 onward; in 1398 came the Mongol conquest under Tamerlane, and in 1526, Babur, a descendant of Genghis Khan and the fifth in descent from Tamerlane, founded the powerful Mogul Empire, which at its zenith embraced the whole sub-continent of India. As Mogul power was being consolidated in the north, India was already exposed to European influences in the form of Portuguese, Dutch, French, and English traders.

In 1498, with the arrival of the three small vessels of the Portuguese Admiral Vasco da Gama at Calicut, the penetration of India by European traders from overseas commenced. In the sixteenth century, the Portuguese established a trading port in Goa, and for a hundred years, in spite of the fact that they had no large land empire, they maintained a virtual monopoly of all oriental trade through the strength of their navy. The remnants of their possessions—a total area of 1,496 square miles—are found along the west coast today as pockets of Portuguese India

in Goa, Diu, and Damão. By 1658 the Dutch, who followed the Portuguese, had expelled the latter from most of their eastern possessions, they in their turn were routed by the French. The English were really the last-comers, but in the bitter contest for supremacy over the Indian region, it was British sea power that finally won out, toward the close of the eighteenth century, and the French were left with only the five small pockets of Chandernagor, Mahé, Karikal, Yanam, and Pondichéry, altogether totaling 196 square miles.

**BRITISH ERA**—The British originally came to India for trade rather than for conquest, and their first concern was to establish warehouses along the coast. The British East India Company entered into commercial relations with the local rulers. The *first phase* of their treaty-making activities (1757–1813) confined British interests to trading in and around the territories where they possessed factories<sup>3</sup> and settlements. Political conditions in India were far from suitable for any peaceful trade. The decline of Mogul rule in 1707, although attended by the fiction of imperial authority at Delhi, in fact created a cycle of despotic rule and disintegration, local wars, and anarchy far and wide. Most prominent in this era was the uprising in the south of the *Mahrattas*, a Hindu confederacy, and the flowering of separate independent dynasties, particularly in Hyderabad, Mysore, Bengal, and Oudh. Thus, whenever there were disturbances, the East India Company found it necessary to employ police to guard their possessions and this practice gradually developed into the use of small armies to aid political favorites of the British among the native rulers. Successive events, partly accidental and partly

<sup>3</sup> In this chapter the word "factories" is used in the less commonly known meaning to denote an establishment for factors and merchants carrying on business in a foreign country.


manipulated, gave the East India Company and its militarily supported native rulers increased political control.

During the *second phase* (1813-57) the march of events, especially after the shattering of Mahratta power, led to the emergence of the British East India Company as the dominant power in India. Even though native rule existed in central and western portions of the subcontinent, company rule was unbroken between Madras and Calcutta along the east coast. In the north the rich Ganges Valley, once the center of Mogul rule, also came under British control. Only the northwestern and northeastern frontiers remained exposed to incursions of unruly tribesmen. Between 1818 and 1858 the consolidation included the area around the Bay of Bengal and the strategic area of Sind in the Indus Valley. In all, British India increased its holdings by 150,000 square miles of territory. Despite the impressive scope of British power and influence in 1840, it must be remembered that British rule did not extend over the entire subcontinent. Native States survived, varying in size and importance, under local rulers who had the title of Nizam or Nawab. As Native States they maintained treaty relations with Britain. The lack of strong central government in India itself, as well as the absence of a sense of national unity, prompted the East India Company, basically a chartered trade company, to exert political influence in the area.

The *third period* (1857-1947) witnessed the demise of the East India Company and the transfer of governmental powers to the British Crown under the Act of 1858. This transference was preceded by the bloody but short Sepoy Mutiny of 1857, which left a legacy of bitterness and resentment against British authority. Under the new system of control the crown governed India through a governor-general and an elaborate system of administration. In a legal sense there were two sovereign entities: British India and the territories of the Native States. On

the whole, British rule marked an era of security and a singleness of administration previously unknown in India. Still, Britain left the Native Indian States largely autonomous in local affairs, although largely dependent on the British rulers in external affairs. Only in the economic field did the English government interfere in the internal administration of these States; otherwise, their administration was left to the princes themselves, some of whom were pleasure-loving autocrats, and others, enlightened statesmen.

**INDEPENDENCE**—With the rise of Indian nationalism in the 1870's the demand for self-government became more and more pronounced, and in 1917 it became the accepted policy of the British government to hand over the administration by gradual stages to Indians. By the Act of 1919 responsible native ministries were introduced in the provinces, and in 1935 self-government was further extended with a provision for the union of British India and the Native States into a federal form of government. This act had not been implemented when World War II intervened, and in 1942 Parliament offered complete self-government to India under certain specified conditions. This offer, however, was rejected by the two leading political parties—the Indian National Congress and the Moslem League. The conditions were not satisfactory to the Hindus, and a unified state was opposed by the Moslems, who, being a minority in the total population, could always be outvoted in a national parliament. The rift between the Congress, headed by Gandhi and Nehru, and the League, led by Jinnah, became so wide and irreconcilable that Gandhi, who had always stood for the unity of India, saw that unity was impossible and finally agreed to partition. In an unexpectedly improvised and hurried fashion, on August 15, 1947, two independent Dominions were created on the basis of the religious populations: the Do-



minion of Pakistan, where the Moslems are in the majority, and the Union of India, where Hindus predominate. The delicate task of drawing the line of demarcation between the two states was the work of two Partition Commissions, which operated in Bengal and the Punjab, respectively. The division by religious groups worked out most unfortunately for Pakistan, for part of its territory is in the west and northwest of the subcontinent and part is in the east, with the Indian Union lying between.

#### POLITICAL UNITS OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN

Pre-partition India, as already indicated, consisted of two geographic divisions: British India and the Native States. The British Crown inherited the domain of the East India Company and added to it territories on the northwestern and northeastern frontiers. Prior to 1947 British India constituted fifty-five per cent of the land area of the subcontinent and seventy-five per cent of its population. A major part of British India comprised the eleven governor's provinces and six chief commissioner's provinces, the latter of less significance. The Viceroy, representing the English Crown, ruled over Madras, Bengal, Assam, Bihar, United Provinces (Uttar Pradesh), Central Provinces, (Madhya Pradesh), Punjab, North-West Frontier, Sind, Bombay, and Orissa. The Native States, forming an odd geographical puzzle on the map,<sup>4</sup> existed largely as accidents of history.

It was British policy to maintain the status quo in India rather than to change the position of the Indian princes. Thus the astounding number of 562 states, covering an

area of 715,964 square miles and having a population of about 95,000,000, existed at the time of the partition of the country into the Indian Union and Pakistan. In size some of the states scarcely deserve the name, whereas Kashmir, Rajputana, Baroda, Hyderabad, Mysore, and Travancore compared favorably with the governor's provinces in size and importance. As a rule autocracies prevailed in the Native States, and economic conditions were medieval. Only Baroda, Travancore, and Mysore showed any marked progress in social welfare. The Independence Act gave the Native States the option of joining one or the other of the two Dominions. The new emphasis on statehood eventually led to the accession of most Native States toward either the Indian Union or Pakistan, as geographic position (and religion) seemed to indicate.

**STATES OF THE INDIAN UNION**—Present-day India is a consolidation of former British India and Native States. The architects of integration were Lord Mountbatten and Sardar Patel, whose skillful negotiations brought the Native States within the constitutional framework of India. In fact, by January 26, 1950, when India became a republic, all the Native States, except Hyderabad, Junagadh, and Kashmir, elected to join India. The process of integration—patelization of India—was not uniform in all cases. Some states merged with provinces contiguous to them, others merged themselves into larger, viable units; still others became administered areas of the central government. The consolidation process involved several changes in nomenclature, as is evident in the table on page 523. For example, the former area of United Provinces became Uttar Pradesh; the Central Provinces and Berar became Madhya Pradesh; Cooch Behar joined West Bengal; and Rajputana States merged to form Rajasthan. The net result is that the constitution recognizes four categories of states: Part A

<sup>4</sup> The Native Indian States are difficult to map because of the great irregularity of their boundaries and the small size of most of them. For detail, the student is referred to the excellent map of India of the National Geographic Society (published in 1946), showing British India contrasted with the Native States

states are the old governor's provinces plus Andhra, the tenth unit, Part B states include 275 states known formerly as the Native States; and Part C and D states are small enclaves, or islands, like Nicobar and Andaman, that require administration by the cen-

tral government. These categories also denote degrees of executive authority exercised from Delhi. less control in Part A and Part B states, and direct administrative control in the case of the other two (see map on page 521).

Union of India: Area and Population of Constituent States <sup>a</sup>

<i>Name of State</i>	<i>Capital</i>	<i>Area</i> (in sq. mi.)	<i>Population</i> (in millions, 1951)	<i>Density of</i> <i>Population</i>
<b>Part A states</b>				
Assam	Shillong	85,012	9.0	106.4
Bihar	Patna	70,330	70.0	572.0
Bombay	Bombay	111,434	36.0	322.7
Madhya Pradesh	Nagpur	130,272	21.2	163.1
Madras (including Andhra)	Madras	127,790	57.0	446.2
Orissa	Bhubaneswar	60,135	14.6	243.5
Punjab E.	Chundigarh	37,378	12.6	338.2
Uttar Pradesh	Lucknow	113,409	63.2	557.4
W Bengal	Calcutta	30,775	24.8	806.2
<b>Part B states</b>				
Hyderabad	Hyderabad	82,168	18.7	227.0
Madhya Bharat	Gwalior/Indore	46,478	8.0	171.1
Mysore	Bangalore	29,789	9.0	307.7
Patiala and East Punjab States Union	Patiala	10,078	3.5	346.7
Rajasthan	Jaipur	130,207	15.3	117.4
Saurashtra	Rajkot	21,451	4.1	192.9
Travancore-Cochin	Trivandrum	9,144	9.3	1,014.9
<b>Part C states</b>				
Ajmer	Ajmer	2,417	0.7	286.9
Bhopal	Bhopal	6,878	0.8	121.6
Bilaspur	Bilaspur	453	0.1	278.4
Coorg	Mercara	1,586	0.2	144.6
Delhi	Delhi	578	1.7	3,017.4
Himachal Pradesh	Simla	10,452	1.0	94.1
Kutch	Bhuj	16,724	0.6	33.9
Manipur	Manipur	8,628	0.6	66.9
Tripura	Agartala	4,032	0.6	158.5
Vindhya Pradesh	Rewa	23,603	3.6	151.4
<b>Part D states</b>				
Andaman and Nicobar	Port Blair	3,215	0.03	9.6
<b>Total India</b>	<b>Delhi</b>	<b>1,269,640</b>	<b>356.8</b>	<b>281.0</b>
<b>Kashmir</b>	<b>Srinagar</b>	<b>82,358</b>	<b>7.7</b>	<b>(47.5) <sup>b</sup></b>

<sup>a</sup> On November 1, 1956, the 27 states were reduced to 14, the major change being the redivision and disappearance of Hyderabad. This consolidation emphasized linguistic factors.

<sup>b</sup> Estimated.



PAKISTAN—The Partition Commission created two units that form the Pakistan state. The northwestern unit was carved out of North-West Frontier Province, Baluchistan, Sind, and the western parts of the Punjab, with a total area of 307,000 square miles. The other unit, in the northeast, includes East Bengal and the Sylhet district of Assam, with an area of 54,000 square miles. Several Native States acceded to Pakistan, as is shown in the table below, but they increased the population of Pakistan by only five per

outside both Dominions. Junagadh, however, was merged with India on November 9, 1947, to become part of Saurashtra. Kashmir offered to enter into standstill agreements with both India and Pakistan and actually entered into an agreement with Pakistan on August 15, 1947, as far as railway, postal, telegraphic, and commercial communications were concerned. Later Kashmir acceded to India, an accession which has caused interminable conflict between the two states.

Divisions of Pakistan: Area and Population <sup>a</sup>

Name of State	Capital	Area (in sq mi)	Population (in millions, 1951)	Density of Population
West Pakistan, composed of former units				
Baluchistan (incl. Amb, Chitral, Dir, Swat)	Quetta	134,002	1.17	8.8
North-West Frontier Province	Peshawar	39,259	5.90	150.0
Punjab and Bahawalpur	Lahore	79,716	20.65	259.0
Sind and Khairpur	Hyderabad	56,447	4.93	87.0
East Pakistan				
East Bengal	Dacca	54,501	42.06	777.0
Total Pakistan	Karachi	364,737	75.84	208.0

<sup>a</sup> October 14, 1955, marked the creation of the province of West Pakistan, a merger of former provinces, and the province of East Pakistan, one already in existence.

cent. West Pakistan stretches northward from the coastal plains on the Indian Ocean to the slopes of the Himalayas in north India. In the latter regions the tribal territories are largely autonomous. The states of Swat, Chitral, and Dir have acceded (8,800 square miles in area), but they have retained hereditary rights. Pakistan has extended *de facto* authority to Gilgit and a large part of Baltistan, formerly feudatories of Kashmir. The most important rulers in these states are the mirs of Hunza and Nagar, who control an important route into Central Asia.

Junagadh (a small state in Kathiawar), Hyderabad, and Kashmir at first remained

Hyderabad, the second largest of the Native States, entered into a standstill agreement with India for one year and asked for an extension of time in 1948. The Moslem ruler of this state faced a violent conflict between the local *Razakars*, a group of Moslems pledged to uphold Moslem power to the last, and the Hindu majority, who instigated the so-called Maratha uprising. To restore peace, India intervened, and after a 100-hour war, the ruler capitulated. Now Hyderabad is part of India, with the former ruler, the Nizam, being appointed the *Rajpramukh* (governor). Mysore, another large Native State, had practically the same experience as Hyderabad.

## UNION OF INDIA

### PHYSICAL FACTORS

**STRUCTURE AND TOPOGRAPHY**—Physiographically India can be divided into three units: (1) the peninsular regions of the Deccan in the south, an ancient tableland, (2) the extra-peninsular mountains of the Himalayas and allied ranges in the north, and (3) the Gangetic lowland between them, a Pleistocene formation resulting from the sedimentary deposition of the Ganges and the Brahmaputra rivers.

1. The Deccan plateau is triangular in shape, with its apex in the south in the Nilgiris (Blue Mountains) and its base lying in an east-west direction along the Satpura-Vindhya ranges. The Vindhya and the Satpura slope steeply to the south but much more gently to the north. Taken as a whole, these two systems have no crests more than 500 feet higher than the level of the surrounding tracts, but until recently they have been a significant barrier separating the Aryans of the north from the Dravidians of the south. The Western Ghats, running near to, and parallel with, the coast, form a continuous and imposing scarp that permits access to the interior only through a few passes, or ghats.<sup>5</sup>

Between the Western Ghats and the Arabian Sea is the Malabar coast, studded with lagoons and backwaters and abounding with the rich coconut palm. The Eastern Ghats, unlike the Western Ghats, are far from being continuous, the main rivers (Godavari, Kistna, and Cauvery) cut across them and reach the Bay of Bengal in deltas, all of which are connected by a coastal lowland. This lowland presents an imposing vista of

green rice lands and palm groves, it is, moreover, par excellence, the land of magnificent temples and decorative monuments of Hinduism.

2. The Himalayas are not a single continuous chain or range of mountains, but are, rather, a series of parallel ranges intersected by enormous valleys and extensive plateaus. Their width varies from 100 to 250 miles; the length of the central axial range of the Great Himalayas is 1,500 miles. The individual ranges present a steep slope toward India and a much gentler one toward Tibet.

3. The alluvial lowland of the Ganges and Brahmaputra rivers stretches right across India, with a width ranging from 90 to 300 miles. It comprises the richest and most populous regions of India, but topographically it presents a monotonous aspect of flatness.

**Coastline.** The coastline is uniform and smooth with few indentations, consequently there are few sites for good ports. Among the ports of the west coast, Bombay<sup>6</sup> and Cochin alone have good natural facilities for harbor development. At Bombay the island of Salsette, which forms a bay comparable to New York harbor, and at Cochin the backwater (Vembanad Lake) provide safe anchorage throughout the year. On the east coast there are even fewer sites for seaports. In the selection and growth of Calcutta as a port political factors were important considerations, coupled with the fact that the Europeans preferred the drier climate of the east coast to that of the west coast. Madras, in the southeast, owes its growth principally to the fact that it com-

<sup>5</sup> The three important passes are the Thalghat, the Bhorghat, and the Palghat; all of them are being used by railways at the present time for access to the interior from the coast.

<sup>6</sup> Bombay is said to be derived from two Portuguese words—*Bom* meaning good and *Bahia* meaning bay; it is still known as Bombahia.

mands a long stretch of coast and has easy access to the interior.

**CLIMATE**—The great size of India and its diversities of relief coupled with its remarkable range in latitude result in striking contrasts in climate. Extreme variations are to be found in temperature and rainfall. Sweeping generalizations are likely to be misleading unless variations are noted. Nevertheless, there is an all-pervading regularity of climate dictated by the dominance of the tropical monsoon—the seasonal wind that changes its direction from northeast to southwest in summer. More than eighty per cent of the rainfall of India, both regionally and seasonally, comes during this time of year.

In the winter months of December and January, the northwestern parts receive some cyclonic precipitation of a drizzling type, and in the months of September, October, and November, the east coast gets its rain from the retreating monsoon. Because the monsoon rain comes in torrents, it is less penetrating than precipitation in the temperate regions, with the result that heavy soil erosion takes place. Furthermore, there is a remarkable variability in time and space of monsoon rains in any one year and in the amount of rainfall received from year to year, a factor that often produces conditions of drought or of flood. The tracts most susceptible to famine as a result of drought are the Carnatic, the Punjab, and western Uttar Pradesh (United Provinces). Freedom from drought is most marked in Assam, Bengal, and the Malabar Coast.

#### ECONOMIC ASPECTS

New India faces economic problems of the first magnitude. To show progress, indeed to survive as a modern state, India must solve its agricultural dilemma; that is, it must meet the threat of famine and overpopulation while forging ahead with its industrial-

ization program. To increase the productivity of the nation merely to the point of subsistence of its millions of people, India must give attention to improved techniques in cultivation, to seed selection, and to animal husbandry. Efforts to achieve increased productivity are, however, complicated both by customs affecting land tenure and family unity and by Hindu rites and taboos that change only very slowly.

India also must industrialize if it is to raise the national standard of living and must develop a degree of self-sufficiency to become a viable state. To achieve this, the government, through central planning, must earmark funds for capital development and still satisfy the demand for consumers' goods. Obviously a balance in the allocation of natural resources must be struck if the new government is to continue the middle course in creating a free society.

**AGRICULTURE**—A major problem in India is the high percentage of agricultural population. In 1951, out of a total population of 357,000,000, 249,000,000 were dependent on agriculture. The increasing pressure of population on the soil involved many farmers in debt, resulting in the emergence of a class of landless laborers whose numbers jumped from 20,000,000 in 1901 to 45,000,000 in 1951. This group has become a pawn of political propagandists. A real solution is to find alternative employment for them in industry and other vocations.

Although more than seventy per cent of the population is dependent on agriculture, large numbers of people frequently have little to eat, and still larger numbers rarely enjoy a balanced diet. During the past fifty years the tremendous increase in population has outstripped available food supply and resulted in permanent conditions of famine. India has about 270,000,000 acres of cultivated land; it is said that double cropping can increase this figure by 35,000,000 acres.

The per capita acreage is only 0.8, a poor figure by any standard.<sup>7</sup> Of the cultivated area seventy per cent is devoted to food crops, principally rice and millet and some wheat. The lack of capital for extensive cash crop farming drives the peasant to grain production, the least lucrative of all the arable systems, and the poorer people commonly exist solely on the cheaper millets.

There are actually two types of agricultural zones in India, the wet and the dry, each with its specialized crops. The wet zone is characterized by rice, sugar cane, jute, and tobacco, the dry zone, by wheat, millet, cotton, and barley. The forty-inch annual isohyet is usually considered the boundary between the two zones. The mountain tracts, with heavier rainfall, are the regions of plantation crops, that is, tea in Assam and the Nilgiris and rubber in Travancore. The most important cash crops are cotton and jute, but both are of poor quality; more than eighty per cent of the cotton is short staple, and the entire jute crop is of a low grade. The better quality cotton—the American upland variety of medium-staple length—is cultivated in the Punjab and Sind, but these provinces are now a part of Pakistan, and India is deprived of this valuable crop. Moreover, the Ganges-Brahmaputra delta has a practical monopoly in the cultivation of jute, and the regions of good-quality jute are restricted to the eastern portions of the delta—but this region also has been ceded to Pakistan.

Since the manufacturing industries in both cotton and jute are located in India, the loss to Pakistan of the regions growing the raw materials has created an economic problem of first magnitude. The problem was ag-

gravated when, in September, 1949, Pakistan refused to agree with India on the devaluation of the Indian rupee. Because of this refusal, the Indian manufacturers were obliged to pay higher prices for cotton and jute imported from Pakistan. India, therefore, is now concentrating on the production of high-quality cotton and jute at home. But this, in itself, though giving stimulus to the cultivation of cash crops, has diminished the production of cereals and thereby made the food famine in the country still more acute.

Methods of cultivation might appear to be primitive, but they are not so inefficient as they seem. Agriculture in India is incapable of mechanization because of the small size of individual holdings. The productivity of the soil cannot be increased without improving the soil itself, hitherto, the Indian farmer has followed the way that requires the least amount of capital—letting the lands lie fallow. Before conditions can be greatly improved in India, there must be a change-over from subsistence farming to effective economic farming, and this can be accomplished only if individual holdings are made much larger. Only through social reforms can this improvement be realized.

**IRRIGATION**—Irrigation is an important factor in augmenting agricultural production in India. Although irrigation has been practiced since ancient times, credit for the widespread expansion of canal irrigation must go to the British for their construction of such giant schemes as the Ganges, Jumna, and Sarda canals in the north and the delta canals in the south. Fortunately there is in India a huge source of irrigation water from indigenous sources, such as wells and tanks. During the past two decades there has been a significant development of tube wells in Uttar Pradesh, where alone there are now 2,500 such electric wells, each capable of irrigating 1,000 acres.

<sup>7</sup> In the Middle West of the United States, it is estimated that proper nourishment for a cow requires about four acres of land. However crude it may appear to be, this comparison is to some extent a measure of the difference in economic standards between India and the United States.

The Indian government is now heavily engaged in carrying out national development projects in the various states designed to promote irrigation agriculture. On this page are tabulated facts of four major projects, illustrating the scope of this type of work. When all projects now in progress have been completed, the country will have an irrigated area of approximately 75,000,000 acres—a surface about equal in size to all of Italy.

POWER AND MINERAL RESOURCES—India is rich in many minerals, both metallic and nonmetallic. Prominent among the first group is a large iron-ore reserve, for which estimates run as high as 8,000,000,000 tons, largely found in the northeast in Bihar, Chotanagpur, and Madhya Pradesh. India is equally well endowed with manganese, estimated at about 60,000,000 tons, found mainly in Madhya Pradesh and Orissa. One of the richest sources in the world for tho-

Irrigation and Power Projects in India and Pakistan

<i>Name of Project</i>	<i>River</i>	<i>State Where Located</i>	<i>Total Area Irrigated (in million acres)</i>	<i>Total Power Generated (in million kw-h)</i>	<i>Cost</i>
<b>India</b>					
Bhakra-Nangal	Sutlej	N E Punjab	(3 6) <sup>a</sup>	(1 20) <sup>a</sup>	\$350,000,000
Damodar Valley scheme	Damodar	Bihar and W Bengal	1 026	0 30	\$250,000,000
Hirakud Dam	Mahanadi	Orissa	1 9	0 30	\$210,000,000
Tungabhadra project	Tungabhadra	Andhra	0 7	0 17	\$110,000,000
<b>Pakistan</b>					
Lower Sind barrage	Indus	Sind	2 5	0.010	
Thal development	Indus	Punjab	1 5	0 300	
Taunsa barrage	Indus	Punjab	1 4	—	
Ganges-Kobadak	Ganges	Bengal	2 7	—	
Warsak	Kabul	North-West Frontier Province	0.065	0 150	

<sup>a</sup> Figures in parentheses are estimated.

ANIMAL HUSBANDRY—India has enormous numbers of livestock: 150,000,000 cattle, 43,000,000 buffaloes, 40,000,000 sheep, and 47,000,000 goats. Total milk production, however, is disproportionately small; the average yield of the Indian cow is as low as 500 pounds a year, as contrasted with 7,000 for Denmark and 3,500 for Australia. This meager production in India is the result of animal starvation, for most of the cattle depend for food on rice straw, which is far from nutritious. The great number of cattle in a country that is incapable of feeding them properly is due to the teaching of the Hindu religion that animals should not be slaughtered for any purpose whatever.

rium, important in atomic projects, is on the sandy beaches of Travancore. In nonmetallic minerals, nearly three quarters of the world's mica is produced in the Hazaribagh and Gaya districts of Bihar and the Nellore district of Madras.

Of coal India has total reserves of about 40,000,000,000 tons, but coal of coking quality is limited—only 2,500,000,000 tons. The bulk of these coal resources are the Gondwana (Jurassic) coals of the Chotanagpur plateau, mainly in the valley of the river Damodar, within 150 miles of Calcutta. Smaller fields are found in the valleys of the Godavari, Wardha, and Wainganga rivers. Annual coal production has been increasing

and is now about 35,000,000 tons, of which ten per cent is exported, mainly to Pakistan, Burma, Malaya, Ceylon, and Hong Kong.

With respect to oil resources the position of India is not good. The only areas that have yielded oil are the fields of Assam, probably an extension of the Burmese oil fields. Refining capacity is being increased, and three new refineries, with a total capacity of about 4,000,000 tons, are under construction, two at Trombay (near Bombay) and one on the east coast.

To offset this deficiency in oil, good progress is being made in the development of hydroelectric power. Since rainfall in India is seasonal and subject to wide variations from year to year, this development necessitates the construction of large storage reservoirs. The cost of such construction might prove prohibitive were it not for the fact that the reservoirs can also be used for irrigation purposes. Most of the electric power projects in India serve the urban areas, only a few extend into the rural regions. It is estimated that new power projects will double the present 600,000 kilowatts of energy. The advantages of a mobile form of energy in a land of villages, where more than eighty per cent of the population is rural, are immense. The development of rural communities not only would relieve local unemployment but would check the exodus to congested cities and thus mitigate the overcrowded condition of the urban centers.

**INDUSTRIES**—India is still in the agricultural stage, with less than fifteen per cent of the working population engaged in organized industries, trade, and transportation. In fact, there are approximately only 3,000,000 laborers employed in organized industries.\*

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\* A distinction is made here between organized industries and cottage industries. The total number of workers in the rural cottage industries has been estimated to be about 20,000,000, about six to seven times as many as in the organized industries.

Several cottage industries engaged in the manufacture of metals, cotton cloth, jute, and sugar functioned widely in the old days, but in the late nineteenth century, partly because of foreign control and partly because of stiff competition from more industrialized parts of the world, these industries were completely crippled. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, there has been some development along modern lines. Iron and steel industries have sprung up in four centers, by far the largest at Jamshedpur about 150 miles west of Calcutta and in close proximity to the Chotanagpur coal fields. Two centers, at Kulti and Burnpur, are near the coal fields, and the fourth is at Bhadravathi in Mysore, very far from any coal field but near iron ore and dependent on a local supply of charcoal. Still, in recent years India has also begun to produce machinery, tools, and Diesel engines and gives promise of further industrial expansion.

It is likely that ancient India was the country where cotton was first manufactured. Even today, there is a large handloom industry, which produces more than 1,000,000,000 yards of cloth and employs as many as 2,000,000 workers, by far the largest of the cottage industries. The textile industry is more than a century old and is the largest single industry in the country. With more than 11,000,000 spindles and 200,000 looms, it has an annual production of about 4,500,000,000 yards of cloth. In recent years, India has again become an exporter of cloth, the total quantity varying between 500,000,000 and 1,000,000,000 yards annually. Exports go mostly to Pakistan, Malaya, Ceylon, and East Africa. The need for better varieties of raw cotton is one of the main problems of the industry.

Another fiber-manufacturing industry is found in the jute mills of the Calcutta area, which produce about sixty per cent of the world total. Most other manufacturing industries of consequence involve the processing of agricultural products, as, for example,

sugar refining, which amounts to 1,400,000 tons annually.

**TRANSPORTATION**—Over India is superimposed a transportation network that ties the various regions of the country together. In a comparison with other countries fringing the southern margin of Asia, the rail, highway, and air nets of India show up well (see map on page 531). Although the 34,000 miles of railways reach most parts of the country, the statistics, when broken down to mileage per 1,000 persons or per 100 square miles of territory, do not compare favorably with those in Western Europe or the United States. Since independence India has constructed 1,000 miles of new lines, and work is now in progress for several hundred additional miles. The areas of greatest railroad mileage are, naturally, those of dense population, such as the Gangetic lowland and the east coast from Calcutta to Tinnevely in the south. The absence of a west coastal line between Bombay and Cape Comorin at the southernmost point of India seriously handicaps transportation in that area. Recently railways were nationalized to form one system.

India has lagged in the development of highways, although it is usually possible to drive from one important center to another throughout the country. Out of a total road mileage of about 260,000, which amounts to only 0.22 mile per square mile of area, or less than 0.75 mile per 1,000 people, only one third are properly surfaced. Furthermore, since the main roads run parallel to railways, they are not effective feeders.

The five major ports of India are Calcutta, Bombay, Madras, Cochin, and Vizagapatam, of which the last two are naval centers. A new port at Khandla is in process of being developed to handle trade that formerly went to Karachi in Pakistan. These major ports serve foreign trade. In addition, about 200 minor ports supplement India's inland transportation facilities by carrying on coast-

wise traffic. In earlier times the inland waterways also served for trade, but their use has not been great since the advent of the railway. All together the ports of India handle about 20,000,000 tons of cargo; plans under way should increase this figure by a third.


A nationalized airline, formerly made up of six companies, connects most of the leading cities and regional centers of India. However, planes are small and schedules not sufficiently frequent to indicate heavy air traffic. India also has its own international airline, extending eastward to Tokyo and westward to London. In addition, about ten other international airlines call at Calcutta or other Indian cities en route from the Western World to the Far East or Australia.

#### POPULATION AND ETHNIC FACTORS

**POPULATION**—India has about two per cent of the land surface of the globe, but it has nearly one sixth of the population of the world, which is in excess of the combined population of the United States and Russia. In 1901, the population of the area which corresponds to what is now the Union of India was only 235,000,000, but by 1951 it had increased to 357,000,000. In recent years the annual rate of growth has been about 1.5 per cent, which has meant an increase of about 50,000,000 every decade—slightly less than the entire population of the United Kingdom and equal to nearly a third of the population of the United States. Various factors have contributed to this population growth. Hinduism sanctions large families, and the Hindus accept this religious dictate in a literal sense as a binding commandment.\* Hinduism, moreover, favors

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\* *Putra* in Sanskrit means son and is traditionally supposed to be derived from *put*, the hell to which the sonless are banished, and *tra*, meaning to save; thus, *putra*, or son, assures a man of freedom from hell.





the male offspring as a means of perpetuating family heritage and of assuring support for the parents in old age. The birth and death rates have both been extremely high. Owing to improvements in medical facilities, however, better public health measures, prevalence of peaceful conditions, and effective famine relief measures, the death rate during the past thirty years has fallen substantially, and there has been a sharp increase of births over deaths.

No less significant than the increase of population is its highly uneven distribution. Although the average density is 281 per square mile, actually sixty per cent of the area has a density of only 160 and supports less than twenty per cent of the total population. One third of the population, however, is concentrated in less than six per cent of the land area, with average densities in excess of 640 per square mile. In an agricultural country such as India, the density of population should really be calculated not in terms of the gross area but in terms of the cultivated area. On this basis it is found that the entire coastland and the Gangetic lowland—the more intensively cultivated tracts—have densities of between 2,000 and 3,000 people per square mile of cultivated land.

Upsurge in population has created an increasing shortage of food per capita. If population growth is allowed to continue without planned controls, such a heavy population is bound to be checked in time by natural catastrophes, such as starvation, disease, and violence. Evidence in demographic studies suggests that overpopulation can be avoided or largely mitigated through birth control or by the creation of a desire for better standards of life—the latter of which would itself cut down the birth rate. Both are taking root in India.

**RELIGION**—By far the most important religions in India are Hinduism and Islam, the former accounting for as many as 303,-

000,000 and the latter for 35,000,000, as of 1951. In prepartitioned India, Moslems formed 24.3 per cent of the total population, but now they constitute only ten per cent, nevertheless, it must be remembered that in India there are still 35,000,000 Moslems, constituting the largest communal group. Next in India come the Christians, about 8,000,000, the bulk of whom are found in the south. Other communal groups are: Sikhs, about 6,000,000, tribal peoples, about 2,000,000, Jains, about 1,600,000, and several smaller groups, such as the Parsees, Jews, and Buddhists. It should be noted that in India politics and religion were so closely wedded that religious differences affected the entire structure of the state, and finally led to partition.

**LANGUAGES**—According to a linguistic survey of India there are 179 languages prevalent in the country, but of these only fourteen are significant. Hindi, Urdu, Bengali, Oriya, Marathi, Gujarati, Kashmiri, Punjabi, Nepali, Assamese, Telugu, Tamil, Kannada, and Malayalam. Legislation has made Hindi the official language, with permissive provision for continuing English until 1966. Of late, there has been a persistent demand for reallocation of the states on a linguistic basis, and to this end the state of Andhra was carved out of the former state of Madras, in October, 1953, uniting all those parts in which Telugu is predominantly the spoken language. There is still a popular cry for the creation of linguistic states like Maharashtra and Kannada, and a government commission has been studying this possibility.

#### OTHER TERRITORIES

Vestiges of French and Portuguese empires in India survived beyond independence and partition. Of the five French enclaves Chandernagor joined India in 1949, but Pondichéry and other areas were not trans-

ferred to Indian sovereignty until November 1, 1954. Portugal has stoutly refused to surrender its "State of India," as Goa and the enclaves are called. These territories are considered as integral parts of Portugal and down to 1956 their inhabitants had not responded to an Indian-inspired "Liberation" movement.

To the north of India are the three quasi-independent, landlocked states of Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim, situated along the lower reaches of the Himalayas. Of the three Nepal, with an area of 54,000 square miles and a population of about 6,500,000, overshadows the other two in importance, it has had a turbulent but independent history. Bhutan, 18,000 square miles in area and with a population of 300,000, is seven times the size of Sikkim and twice as populous.

All three have entered into treaty relations with India, and their political existence is closely associated with their large neighbor. Nepal has accepted an offer of Indian

assistance in the event of aggression. India, moreover, has granted loans to Nepal for exploitation of its natural resources, for hydroelectric-power development, and for construction of roads, buildings, and airports.

Bhutan, under the Treaty of 1949, is obliged to be guided by India in its external relations, including defense, but its internal autonomy is guaranteed and the Maharajah wields power through tribal chiefs. India pays a sizable subsidy to Bhutan to finance new roads that will link the state with India.

Sikkim, likewise, according to the Gangtok Treaty of 1950, is an Indian protectorate and India is in charge of its external affairs, communications, and defense, internally Sikkim is completely autonomous. With the occupation of Tibet by China, both Bhutan and Sikkim became especially important to India, for the people of Bhutan are related to the Tibetans and the principal routes from India to Tibet are through Sikkim.

## PAKISTAN

### PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY

The physical features of West Pakistan and East Pakistan, separated from each other by more than 1,000 miles of Indian territory, are in marked contrast. West Pakistan, partly mountainous and partly riverine, bounded on the west by the Hindu Kush and Sulaiman mountains, is a continuation of the arid and the semiarid regions of Persia and Afghanistan. The rainfall is not only scanty but variable, the annual average being twenty-one inches at Lahore, nine inches at Karachi, and less than five inches at Jacobabad. In summer temperatures are very high, recordings of 120° F. being quite frequent, while the winters are cold with frosty nights.

East Pakistan, on the other hand, is largely

a delta plain through which the lower Ganges and Brahmaputra rivers meander. It is a fertile plain, annually inundated with rich silt, where agriculture suffers not from a lack of water but from periodic floods. Dacca has a rainfall of seventy-five inches, and Sylhet, 160 inches. The annual range of temperature is not nearly so great as in the west.

### ECONOMIC ASPECTS

**IRRIGATION AND AGRICULTURE**—The rich agricultural lands of West Pakistan are almost entirely dependent on irrigation, the Indus with its five tributaries serving as the prime source of water. The canal systems irrigate as much as seventy per cent of the crop area in the Punjab and about eighty per cent in

Sind.<sup>10</sup> The Lower Sind (Sukkur) barrage—the great dam across the Indus in Sind—irrigates 6,000,000 acres, the lower Chenab canal accounts for half as much. In view of the new irrigation schemes in progress (see the table on page 528) and the large areas of land still to be developed, West Pakistan apparently has an assured agricultural prosperity. In East Pakistan conditions in these respects are just the reverse, for there no more land is available, and prospects of potential development are discouraging.

West Pakistan produces dry crops, such as wheat, rice, and cotton, the East concentrates on rice and jute. As in India, food crops dominate, and agriculture is typically subsistence farming. The West is normally self-sufficient in wheat and has a slight surplus of rice for export from the irrigated Sind Delta; the East is a food-deficit area, and as population increases, the situation is becoming more critical.

Pakistan enjoys virtually a monopoly in jute production: 7,000,000 bales of jute, about seventy-five per cent of the world crop, comes from the Ganges-Brahmaputra Delta of East Pakistan; and 1,500,000 bales of cotton, nearly six per cent of the world production, from the Indus Basin of West Pakistan. Both are of excellent quality. The Indian jute mills, as noted before, are now dependent on this source. Indian cotton mills, however, may find it profitable to seek raw materials even as far away as Egypt and the United States rather than purchase from Pakistan at unfavorable prices, as they actually did in 1951.

**POWER AND MINERAL RESOURCES**—Pakistan has no mineral resources of consequence other than oil, salt, and chromite. Oil seepages have been found in the vicinity of Attock, Mianwali, Rawalpindi, Kohat, and

at various places in Baluchistan, probably indicative of an extension of the oil fields of Iraq and Persia. A new natural-gas field has been discovered in Sui, and prospecting is in progress. The annual production of oil is about 1,200,000 barrels, just enough to meet twenty per cent of the demand.

Pakistan lacks coal deposits, but some lignites are known to exist in West Pakistan. The lack of power has been recognized as the principal factor retarding development of industries, and Pakistan is now endeavoring to develop hydroelectric projects and to industrialize itself rapidly. At the time of partition, the total power capacity was only 76,000 kilowatt-hours. The water-power potential is about 6,000,000 kilowatt-hours and the several projects when completed will increase the country's output by 600,000 (see table on page 528), an eightfold increase over the output in 1947.

**INDUSTRIES**—As we have seen, Pakistan grew cotton and jute, and India had the textile mills. Since partition, Pakistan has sought to become more industrial, and India has sought to become less dependent on Pakistan for raw materials for her mills. At the time of partition Pakistan had only sixteen cotton mills, with 167,000 spindles and 4,300 looms; now there are about 400,000 spindles and 9,000 looms, and still more mills are being built in both East and West Pakistan. By 1957 Pakistan hopes to be self-sufficient in the manufacture of cotton textiles. In jute manufacture, also, phenomenal industrial development is taking place, new mills are being constructed at Narayanganj and Khulna. The baling capacity of the mills was 2,000,000 bales in 1947; it is now more than double that. All the other industries, such as leather, sugar, cement, fertilizers, chemicals, and electrical goods are receiving governmental aid.

**TRANSPORT**—Partition gave seven out of the nine major railway systems to India; two others—the Northwestern and the Assam-

<sup>10</sup> Contrast this with East Pakistan, where only eight per cent of the cultivated area is irrigated.

Bengal railways—were divided between the two nations. Rolling stock was allotted on a mileage-traffic basis, but the workshops entirely on the basis of location, with the result that the Mogulpura works in Lahore and the Saidpur works in East Bengal were assigned to Pakistan. West Pakistan has 6,100 miles of railroad, of which 5,360 is broad gauge, and East Pakistan has 1,700 miles, of which 1,200 is narrow (meter) gauge.<sup>11</sup> The lack of facilities in the Saidpur workshops to repair the rolling stock of broad-gauge lines created much difficulty.<sup>12</sup>

There are 58,000 miles of highways: 36,000 in West Pakistan and 22,000 in East Pakistan. Of these totals only about ten per cent are adequately surfaced for all-season travel. In East Pakistan, in 1951, no two district capitals were connected by good roads. During the season of floods, roads throughout East Pakistan may be under water, necessitating reliance on waterways as a means of surface transport. In West Pakistan the drier climate permits long-distance travel, but over inferior roads. It is expected that in the next five years there will be a nationalized road system in West Pakistan.

West Pakistan has a first-class port at Karachi, which has developed remarkably. In 1947 it had 1,250,000 tons of shipping; now it handles more than 4,000,000 tons. In the area which is now East Pakistan trade prior to partition was largely oriented to Calcutta, the only other port being Chittagong, which handled less than 500,000 tons. Upon partition the entire picture changed; Chittagong developed so rapidly that it now handles more than 2,000,000 tons, including a large part of the exports of jute and tea.

In addition, a new river anchorage with an annual capacity of 500,000 tons is being developed at Chalna on the Pussur River as part of the system of docks at the mouth of the Ganges.

Pakistan has two domestic air services, one from Karachi and Lahore to Dacca and another interconnecting Karachi, Quetta, Lahore, Rawalpindi, and Peshawar. Many of the principal airlines of the world (Pan American, BOAC, KLM, and Air France) touch at Karachi, which has a first-class airport. Dacca also is becoming an international air stop on the way to the Far East.

## HUMAN ELEMENT

**POPULATION**—Pakistan, with a population of 76,000,000, is the largest Moslem state in the world. Although West Pakistan has an area six times as great as that of East Pakistan, it has a population of only 32,000,000 as compared with nearly 44,000,000 in East Pakistan. Both West and East are predominantly rural; the urban population in East Pakistan is as low as four per cent and in West Pakistan eighteen per cent. For the nation as a whole it is only ten per cent, exactly the same as in India. The trend in the growth of population is almost identical with that of India, but the distribution is very uneven, with density variations even greater than those in India. The average density for Pakistan is 208 per square mile, but between the West and the East a great disparity exists. Thus, for Baluchistan the figure is 8.8; for West Punjab, 300; Sind, 91, North-West Frontier Province, 150, West Pakistan, 110; and East Pakistan, 777. As in India, the density per square mile of cultivated land is in many parts well over 2,000. For all of Pakistan the per capita acreage is 0.65, which breaks down as 0.74 in the West and 0.58 in the East.

As in India, an ethnic problem exists: West Pakistan is homogeneous, ninety-seven per cent of the population being almost en-

<sup>11</sup> The broad gauge is 5 feet 6 inches in width; the narrow gauge is only 1 meter, or 3 feet 3½ inches, wide. The narrow-gauge road connects with Indian railway lines in the northeast.

<sup>12</sup> Since December, 1953, railway services between India and West Pakistan, which were discontinued on partition, have been resumed—a happy augury for both countries.

tirely Moslem; in East Pakistan there are 9,000,000 Hindus, or more than twenty per cent of the total. At the time of partition the Hindus in the East numbered 12,000,000, but communal violence between Hindus and Moslems, as well as economic pressures, forced many of the Hindus out of East Bengal into Calcutta. The Delhi Pact of 1950, guaranteeing minority rights in the new states, eased the tensions to some extent, but it did not resolve the basic animosities between the conflicting groups.

**EAST VERSUS WEST**—From the basic data already supplied, it is impossible to predict whether Pakistan as a nation can successfully overcome the diversity of its geographic and human elements. Geographically the two parts are located latitudinally at the extreme ends of the subcontinent. Climatically, agriculturally, and economically they are different, and even their peoples have little in common except that both groups are followers of the Prophet. West Pakistan is wheat-eating and Urdu-speaking; East Pakistan is rice-eating and Bengali-speaking.<sup>13</sup> West Pakistan looks westward to its ancestral homeland and to Mecca and Medina, the holy cities of Islam, East Pakistan is largely inhabited by local converts from Hinduism who have no such genealogy or ties to link them with the Middle East. In consequence, a spirit of regional separatism led to the repudiation of the Moslem League Party in the 1954 elections as a protest against strong central government rule from Karachi. It remains to be seen whether the

natural influence of geography will not finally outweigh the religious affinity.

The attempt of the central government to create a balance of political forces between the East and the West is obviously an intricate and difficult undertaking. Even the proclamation of an Islamic Republic and Constitution in January, 1956, failed to resolve the inherent rivalry between the two regional sections. No doubt federalism represents the best compromise between centralization of power, on the one hand, and the principle of regional autonomy, on the other. An attempt to establish political equality between the two areas materialized in 1955 when the provinces of West Pakistan were merged into a single unit to match the political unity of the East.

**NORTH-WEST FRONTIER**—Not only is there lack of real unity between West and East Pakistan; the former has a most perplexing problem on its northwest frontier. West Pakistan is made up of three groups: the people of Sind, the people of Punjab, and the Pathans. The Pathans, a Pushtu-speaking people, live along the northwestern frontier. They number about 3,000,000 and evidence a fairly independent spirit. Across the border dwell about 5,000,000 other Pushtu-speaking people under Afghan rule. The boundary line itself between Pakistan and Afghanistan, as fixed in 1947, is more or less indefinite, and the fact that the Pathans are a nomadic people adds to the difficulties of maintaining a clear line of demarcation between the two countries. A movement has been developing to unite the Pushtu-speaking people of both Pakistan and Afghanistan into an independent Pushtoonistan. For Afghanistan's attitude on this vexing problem see the discussion on page 515.

<sup>13</sup> In the beginning, Urdu was the only official language of Pakistan besides English, but there were such vehement protests from the East that Bengali was also made an official language.

## INDO-PAKISTAN PROBLEMS

In the wake of partition, there was tremendous bloodshed. The Hindus and the Sikhs, on the one hand, and the Moslems, on the other, engaged in armed conflicts that resulted in the loss of about 300,000 lives and led to one of the greatest migrations of mankind in history. Nearly 8,000,000 people moved across the newly formed boundaries in each direction. Consequently, for the first few years there was a complete dislocation of agricultural, industrial, and commercial life in both countries. By now, however, thanks to the unstinted labors of the governments, the displaced persons have, for the most part, been rehabilitated in their new environment. It is not to be expected that all the rents in the economic fabric have already been repaired, but considerable progress has been achieved, and a problem that appeared insoluble is on its way to solution.

### IRRIGATION ON THE SUBCONTINENT

Before partition, the irrigated area in all India was 72,000,000 acres, of a total cultivated area of 298,000,000 acres, that is, twenty-four per cent of the cultivated area was irrigated. On partition, India possessed 251,000,000 acres of cultivated land, of which 48,000,000 acres, or nineteen per cent, were irrigated. By the partition, both India and Pakistan gained some advantages from each other. For instance, Pakistan profited in that much of the land she gained was irrigated from canals that had been constructed by the British, especially the canal tracts of the Punjab and the Smd, and thus India was deprived of some of the more valuable tracts of irrigated lands. On the other hand, as a result of the partition, India received the lion's share of the mineral resources of the subcontinent; for example, the

iron and coal deposits and the attendant steel industry of southern Bihar have no counterpart in Pakistan.

By the boundary line fixed by the partition between India and Pakistan the irrigation system was actually dismembered. To illustrate: three tributaries of the Indus River—the Ravi, the Beas, and the Sutlej—have their lower reaches in West Pakistan, but the upper reaches are in the parts of Kashmir which presently are under the control of India. Moreover, the source of the Punjab canal system, which utilizes the waters of these rivers, is also in Indian territory. West Pakistan must depend, therefore, upon the good will of India for the maintenance of a uniform and regular supply of water.

Pakistan has demanded a modification of the boundary line, one that would make her less dependent on India for sources of water. Pakistan has also expressed the fear that the construction of the Bhakra-Nangal Dam would deprive her of her legitimate quota of Sutlej waters. India in turn has replied that this project had been under consideration long before partition and was not an afterthought of partition. This impasse illustrates the great need for a more comprehensive approach to the irrigation problem. Any permanent solution will require mutual good will and a respect of each other's rights.

### SUPPLIES AND COMMUNICATIONS

As mentioned earlier India depends on Pakistan for cotton and jute; she is also dependent on Pakistan for raw materials for her leather industries. On the other hand Pakistan in some instances depends on India for electrical energy from the Mandi powerhouse and for coal, cotton goods, and supplies of mustard oil. In the field of com-

munications, partition cut across established networks. The East Pakistan frontier cuts across the railway system that was constructed to link the outer parts of Bengal with Calcutta, thus leaving East Bengal with no outlet and West Bengal with no through and direct connection to Assam. Both of these disadvantages arising from severed communication systems have now been overcome, the former by the further development of Chittagong as a port, and the latter by the construction of new rail lines by-passing Pakistan territory.


### DEFENSE

The problem of defense for India is perhaps the most intricate, with Pakistan holding the keys to the gates of India both in the north-west and, to a limited extent, in the north-east. The boundary between the two countries, whether in the east or in the west, runs for the greater part of its course along a smooth agricultural plain, with no natural features of any strategic value that could be converted into a frontier fortress. Furthermore, New Delhi, the capital of India, and Calcutta, its largest city, are near the frontiers and hence are exceedingly vulnerable in the event of war between the two states. Because of its vulnerability India would not be averse to further boundary changes or to the strengthening of its ties with small kingdoms to the north.

### KASHMIR

A source of intense rivalry between India and Pakistan is the state of Kashmir, which occupies a commanding strategic position in the northwestern part of the subcontinent (see map on this page). To Pakistan the need to control this state is self-evident on economic as well as strategic grounds. To India, Kashmir is a question of prestige and the maintenance of established authority inasmuch as the ruler is a Hindu who, on Octo-

ber 27, 1947, acceded to India. Following the partition of 1947, armed invasion of Kashmir by Pakistani tribesmen was quickly countered by the dispatch of Indian troops to the scene. The ensuing conflict between the two nations ultimately resulted in a cease-fire agreement and, in 1948, intervention by the United Nations. Mediators have since failed to find a formula acceptable to both, especially on the issue of withdrawal of troops and the holding of a plebiscite, and the cease-fire line arranged in 1949 therefore represents the division between the two antagonists. Pakistan forces hold the western fringes up to Srinagar, the summer capital, from which roads and communications lead into West Pakistan. India controls most of Jammu, including the winter capital, and eastern sectors of Kashmir



Kashmir has an area of 82,258 square miles. It contains the administrative states of Jammu and Kashmir, which consist of Kashmir and Jammu provinces, the administrative districts of Ladakh, Baltistan, and Gilgit, and Poonch Jagir, a dependency. On a cultural-religious basis partition of the territory would give Leh and the southern and

eastern portions of Jammu, with Hindu majorities, to India, the northern and western areas, largely Moslem, would go to Pakistan. Meanwhile, despite its accession to India, Kashmir occupies an autonomous status and in November 17, 1952, chose to establish a republic.

### CEYLON

Off the southern coast of India lies Ceylon, formerly a Crown Colony, which on February 4, 1948, attained independence and Dominion status in the Commonwealth of Nations. Often called "the jewel of the Indian Ocean," the island of Ceylon is separated from India by a narrow strait, barely twenty-five miles wide. Its central area is mountainous, rising above 8,000 feet in parts; encircling this area are low-lying coastlands.

**PHYSICAL ASPECTS**—Ceylon is situated very close to the Equator, it therefore has high temperatures throughout the year, except in the mountains, and abundant precipitation. But the heavy rains brought by the monsoons fall principally on one third of the island in the southwest; the other two thirds are a dry zone. As a result, the southwestern corner of the island is the heart of the economic life of Ceylon; here live seventy per cent of the population.

**RESOURCES**—Ceylon has a well-developed plantation industry in coconuts, tea, and rubber, although the island is, in net, an importer of foodstuffs, especially rice from the mainland. The mineral resources are poor, but they include some graphite, gem stones (such as rubies and sapphires), and iron ore. There is no coal. Colombo, with a population of 425,000, is the chief city and capital and, lying directly on the Europe-Far East trade route, is the leading port of call in the Indian Ocean.

**POPULATION**—Compared with India, Ceylon is underpopulated; the total population is

8,100,000 in an area of 25,300 square miles. Nevertheless, it is startling to realize that the little island has nearly as many people as Australia! The statement that Ceylon is underpopulated needs some modification, the cultivated areas are under severe pressure to support the bulk of the population, and in these areas the density is very high—7,000 people per square mile. Moreover, in these regions the population is growing at the rate of 28 per cent annually. Racially and culturally there are two main groups of inhabitants: the Tamils, about 1,500,000 in number, who are descendants of the early immigrants from southern India; and the Buddhists, numbering 5,600,000, in the south, an indigenous people, speaking Singhalese. To make racial matters even more complicated, there is a third element, a large contingent of Indian Tamils, about 1,000,000, who have been recruited for work on tea and rubber estates during the past fifty years and who now demand rights of citizenship.

**INTERNATIONAL POSITION**—The regional position of Ceylon in Asia gives it international importance. Recently Ceylon was chosen as the site for a conference of representatives from India, Pakistan, Burma, Indonesia, and Ceylon, known as the Colombo Plan. This conference focused world attention on these new Asian states and on Ceylon.

In the summer of 1956 the government of Ceylon announced that the nation would follow the example of India and Pakistan and become a republic. An additional indication of the loosening of ties between Ceylon and Britain may be found in the Ceylon government's decision to terminate its agreement with London under which the British were permitted the right to maintain a naval base at Trincomalee in the north-eastern part of the island. As a result, Britain is left with no major naval base between Singapore and Mombasa on the east coast of Africa.



**MALDIVE ISLANDS**

A group of tropical isles, the Maldives, lie 400 miles southwest of Ceylon and support a population of only 93,000 (see map on page 517). After centuries of existence as a sultanate, the local government was set up as

a republic in 1953; but in the following year, owing to a shortage of food supplies, the sultanate regime was re-established. The islands continue to be united politically with Great Britain as a protectorate; economically, however, they maintain close ties with the self-governing state of Ceylon.

**Study Questions**

1. Explain how the natural features of the border lands of India have affected her political and economic development.
2. Describe the coastline of India and explain why India has not become an important maritime nation.
3. Analyze the regional and seasonal incidence of rainfall and show how this is related to the famine regions of the subcontinent.
4. What are the different modes of irrigation practiced in India? What geographical factors control them?
5. Analyze the role of irrigation in India and Pakistan.
6. What are the major multipurpose projects of India? How are they expected to improve the economic condition?
7. Discuss the economic and other problems consequent on the partition of India.
8. Describe the major crops of India and Pakistan (rice, wheat, millet, cotton, jute, and sugar cane) and show how geographical factors control agricultural activity.
9. Analyze the factors that influenced the location of, and account for the growth and development of, each of the following industries: coal, iron and steel, cotton, jute, sugar, fertilizers, cement.
10. Examine the power resources of India and Pakistan and assess the power problems with respect to industrial development.
11. Describe the transportation systems in India (rail, road, canal, and air) and indicate the trend of future development.
12. Prepare a table showing the races of India and their distribution.
13. What are the major problems confronting Pakistan as a result of its location?
14. Discuss the position of India as a buffer between Communist Russia and China.
15. Discuss the reorganization of the Native States on a linguistic basis.

PART FIVE

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*Eastern Asia*  
*and*  
*Australia*



## CHAPTER THIRTY-ONE

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# *China*

China is the heart of the Orient, and around it international politics of the Far East are shaped. Russia, Japan, Korea, Vietnam, Burma, and India are on its immediate periphery. From farther afield British, American, French, and other Western interests have circled south of the Asian continent or crossed the Pacific to reach China's coast and penetrate her commerce and politics. In recent decades the Far East has proved to be, after Europe, the area of the world's most turbulent politics. Recent outstanding events show China involved in international tension and conflict, often as one of the principals. The Manchurian Incident,<sup>1</sup> the Pacific phase of World War II, and the Korean War are three major examples. Frequently, it is true, China has been only a passive or an unwilling participant in the political upheavals on its soil—or *for* its soil; but since China is the second largest country

in area in the world and has one fourth of the population of the world, it cannot, whether willing or unwilling, escape the active interest of other major powers both near and far.

In the postwar era the political geography of China has been completely changed in pattern by virtue of Communist control since 1949. In 1945 the Chinese emerged from the war on the side of the victorious Allies, and the Japanese, who had overrun much of the country during eight years of all-out warfare, had been driven out. A "new China" was forecast. This newly liberated nation was spoken of by the Western World as one of the Big Five and was expected to assume a stellar role in establishing and preserving peace on the eastern margin of the Asian continent. This bright promise, however, had no opportunity to be realized. Agrarian Communism, already bursting out of its cave headquarters in the northwest, was able to surge over the entire country and completely displace the existing government. Thus engulfed by a political phi-

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<sup>1</sup> The occupation of Manchuria in 1931 by the Japanese as the result of an alleged explosion on the railway at Mukden.

losophy entirely different from that of an earlier day, China ceased to exist in the old traditional sense and began to take on the characteristics peculiar to the typical Communist government; orientation toward the USSR was rapid, while ties with Western powers were cut to a minimum. For the United States the political transition in China ushered in a paradoxical sequence of events on the shores of the western Pacific: the United States had vanquished Japan, its formidable rival in the Pacific, only to find China, a former ally, suddenly looming up across the narrow seas as an unfriendly power.

China's new role has been superimposed upon centuries of tradition, and it is too soon properly to evaluate the result. In the following discussion a summary of historical highlights will be followed by a description of the politico-geographic aspects, together they should present the basic facts underlying the situation found in modern China.

#### HISTORICAL FOUNDATION

**DYNASTIES OF IMPERIAL CHINA**—China has had a long and eventful history. From pre-historic times until the fall of the Manchus in 1911 one great dynasty followed another, and in each there was a period of stability during which Chinese culture advanced. But between the fall of one dynasty and the rise of the next there were normally periods of decadence marked by great chaos and civil strife. The various dynasties, or civilizations, were centered, for obvious agricultural advantages, in great river valleys. As early as 1500 B.C. a fairly advanced civilization was known to exist in the basin of the Hwang Ho.<sup>2</sup> Even in the earliest of these

dynasties—the Shang—scholars were already writing with Chinese characters, and bronze was being worked as a metal.

Despite the complexity of Chinese history, it is possible to draw evidence of politico-geographic relationships from the succession of events in the great dynasties. The following examples represent several such relationships which have been effectual in the development of the Chinese state and which in some cases are still apparent in present-day China.

**Chou Dynasty.** In the Chou Dynasty, lasting from about 1100 to 200 B.C., was illustrated in some measure the early influence of China's physical setting upon her history. Pronounced feudalism, with its political decentralization so common through Chinese history, began in this dynasty. Because of the huge area and the hindrances to transportation and communication it became the custom of the imperial government to tax provinces rather than individuals. To raise any stipulated sum, the governor of each province would in practice demand from the officials under him a somewhat larger amount, keeping the difference. Each official in descending rank would follow the same technique. In modern China this procedure was widely used by the so-called "war lords" in areas under their control. That such a system could have existed so long may be attributed to the fact that the Chou Dynasty was the longest-lived in Chinese history; thus its influences acquired great initial impetus. The Chou Dynasty more than doubled the area controlled by the Chinese, expanding from North China southward and taking in a considerable portion of the Yangtze Valley.

**Chin Dynasty.** The state of Chin, with its capital in the valley of the River Wei (a tributary of the Hwang Ho), aggressively expanded from a comparatively small nucleus. The impress of this little state was so great upon future China that even the

<sup>2</sup> Hwang Ho is the Chinese equivalent of Yellow River, with "Ho" referring to a shallow river in contrast to "Kiang," which means deep river, as illustrated in Yangtze Kiang

name for the Chinese state was quite possibly derived from Chin. That so much developed during this dynasty is especially remarkable, since it lasted only a part of the third century, B.C. It is further remarkable that, except for the final few years, there was only one ruler, Shih Hwangti. In uniting the warring feudal states he was responsible for creating what might for the first time be called a real China. Territorially, the realm was expanded considerably, especially to the south and along the coast, even beyond the boundary of present-day China.

Probably the best-known work of this "first emperor" was the building of much of the Great Wall across China's northern frontier. Starting from the sea northeast of Peking, the Great Wall extended westward for about 1,300 miles, as the crow flies, into the province of Kansu.<sup>3</sup> Although the wall was constructed to keep out invaders from the north, it did nothing more than emphasize the preoccupation of the Chinese with their land frontiers. When the rainfall beyond the Great Wall increased to the extent that crops could be grown, colonists from China pressed into Mongolia for more than a hundred miles, while the nomads retreated to grasslands farther north. As the climatic cycle progressed and the rains failed, the farmers retreated southward, and nomads in search of grasslands invaded the area inside the Great Wall. These periodic invasions were, in fact, of sufficient strength to be responsible for some of the infusion of blood from various Mongoloid subdivisions in the evolution of the present Chinese.

*Han Dynasty.* The first direct contacts of China with Central Asia were made during the Han Dynasty which, roughly, covered the last two centuries B.C. and the first two centuries of the Christian Era. In this period Chinese expansion reached out to in-

clude the present Sinkiang, probably almost to the point of meeting Occidental culture coming from the west. Caravan routes across Asia linked China with civilizations in India, Persia, and the Western World. Not only was there expansion to the west, but also to the north where penetration was made into what is now southern Outer Mongolia, southern Manchuria, and northern Korea.

*Yuan (Mongol) Dynasty.* In the late thirteenth century and the first half of the fourteenth century the Mongols came into power in China. Internal disunion had nullified the effect of a physical environment ordinarily capable of protecting a people by isolation and brought about an invasion almost as if by invitation. It was during this Dynasty that the famous Marco Polo (1254-1323) visited China and stayed more than twenty years.

*Ching (Manchu) Dynasty.* In the latter part of the Ching Dynasty (1644-1911) the attention of China for the first time was attracted to the sea coast. However, it was primarily because of European influences that trade routes by sea supplemented the long-established caravan routes overland into and through inner Asia. That the Chinese have never been a seafaring people may be accounted for in part by geographic factors—in this case, area, location, and topography. The great expanse of China and the everlasting struggle against floods and famines kept the people so preoccupied that they made little effort toward seaward adventures. Further, the Chinese coastline, especially the northern section, is not well favored with natural harbors. The Chinese have suffered immensely from the lack of a navy, notably during their two wars with Japan, first, in 1894-95, and later in the third and fourth decades of this century. The usual naval strategy of meeting an invader at sea and of threatening his communications was thus unavailable to the Chinese. Chi-

<sup>3</sup> The Great Wall of China is said to be the only work of man on the face of the earth that could be viewed from Mars.

nese boating has concentrated upon the numerous rivers and canals for which China has been physiographically endowed.

**CHINA AS A REPUBLIC**—The Manchu Dynasty came to an end by revolution in 1912. In its place was set up what is often referred to as the democratic "Republic of China." It is doubtful, however, whether the government so designated deserved that title, and the term is even less applicable to the present Communist government on China's mainland, for in a republic power is based upon the people operating through their freely elected representatives. Whatever the justification of the designation, the Republic of China existed on the mainland from 1912 to 1949, that is, until Chiang Kai-shek was forced out of China and carried his "Republic" to the island of Formosa (Taiwan).

The causes of the revolution that overthrew the Imperial Dynasty were both economic and political: results of overpopulation and the great floods illustrate the former, foreign influences were primarily responsible for the latter. Foreign factors were positive in that they gave Western ideas to the leader of the revolt—Dr. Sun Yat-sen—negative in that the failure of the Imperial Dynasty to resist the foreign penetration of China caused the people to lose faith in such a weak government.

The history of the Republic was definitely chaotic, the period being dominated by extremely decentralized rule in the hands of various war lords. The traditional lack of a real centralization of government, due in part to China's size, diversified topography, and poor communication, had asserted itself again.

A somewhat greater unity was achieved by Chiang Kai-shek in 1928 with the establishment of the government, under a new constitution, at Nanking, the so-called "southern capital," with its central location. The new constitution provided for what was in effect a one-party dictatorship, that of the Kuomin-

tang with Chiang Kai-shek at the head. There was no provision for an elected legislature, nor was there a Bill of Rights. For twenty-one years Chiang Kai-shek remained in power, despite an inefficient, graft-ridden government and foreign influences that amounted to control of much of China's economy. However, eight years of war, with Japanese armies marching deep into the heart of China, and, later, a constantly increasing pressure from Chinese Communist armies in the north proved too much for the Kuomintang. At the end of September, 1949, the Chinese Communist party, after defeating the remnants of Chiang Kai-shek's forces, lost no time in establishing the so-called "People's Republic of China." At this time the Communists also reached back a short distance into history to revive the name Peking, "northern capital" (in place of Peiping) for that city in North China and also to restore it as a capital city—their capital this time.

**FOREIGN RELATIONS**—Initial visits to China by the Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, English, and Americans were made from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries. In the wake of these early voyages it became apparent to the Western nations that the Chinese Empire, with its great internal weakness of government, was a power vacuum into which they could move with impunity. A long coastline and the navigable rivers—the Hwang Ho and the Yangtze Kiang—constituted a standing invitation to the invaders. In 1842 the British took possession of the island of Hong Kong and, shortly thereafter, of the city of Kowloon on the opposite mainland (see map on page 547). In 1898 a ninety-nine-year lease on the hinterland of Kowloon (called the "New Territory") gave the British a Crown colony of 391 square miles, which to date has not been relinquished. Late in the nineteenth century France and Portugal, in the south, and Germany and Great Britain, in the north, gained


control of large areas in China. Since World War I all these holdings, except England's Hong Kong and the Portuguese city of Macao on the coast south of Hong Kong, have been restored. Apart from actual occupation of territory in China, the Western nations after the middle of the nineteenth century established Treaty Ports, in which special commercial and political privileges virtually put Chinese trade into their hands.<sup>4</sup>

While the Western Europeans were gaining territory and trade relations in China by sea, the Russians, in their eastward movement, were pressing against her by land. By the middle of the nineteenth century Russia had become very aggressive with China and dealt with her in an obtrusive manner, which, however, failed to be recognized internationally to the same degree as inroads upon Chinese territory by Western powers. In 1858-60 Russia took from China the Amur area, which came to be known as Russia's Maritime Territory. It is here that the city-naval base of Vladivostok was later founded.

Since that time, Russia has been destroying China's integrity in one way or another, although most of her aggressive action has been confined to the peripheral territories of China. Soviet relations with Communist China have been, superficially at least, on a basis suggesting partnership or equality, rather than as an aggressive enemy. Among political developments has been the signing of a treaty of "Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Aid." The key provision in this treaty is a military alliance of these two major Communist powers, ostensibly as a joint defense against aggression by Japan or by any state allied with her (including the United States).

China has not only been the victim of ag-

gression from European powers, she has also had most unhappy relations with her maritime neighbor Japan. That newly aggressive Island Empire, overpopulated, with scant arable area and limited natural resources, saw in China's vast territory the answer to her need for raw materials and in China's millions of people a market for the products of her new industries. In 1870 Japan embarked on her course of despoiling China by



putting to an end the joint suzerainty the two countries had held over the Liu Chiu Islands (Ryukyu in Japanese) and by incorporating these islands into her own empire. From that time until 1937 Japan continued to rob China of territory—Formosa, Korea, Manchuria, and Jehol. Moreover, she incessantly exacted trade privileges from China.

With the coming of World War I, and the preoccupation of the European powers with problems in their own area, Japan presented China with the "Twenty-One Demands," which, had they been acceded to completely, would have had the effect of making China a protectorate of Japan. However, influenced by diplomatic representations made by the United States on behalf of a weak China, Japan dropped some of the more

<sup>4</sup> The International Settlement at Shanghai in effect represented a foreign government operating on the soil of China. Extraterritorial treaty privileges were not terminated until the 1940's, they were largely responsible for China's latent hostility toward the West.



severe demands. But with the historic Manchurian Incident, in 1931, Japan launched its effort to detach the rich mineral land of Manchuria and to establish a forward outpost toward the Yangtze Valley.

In 1937 Japan decided to take advantage of China's great economic potential to supplement her own meager natural resources and, accordingly, opened a full-scale war against China Proper. This grandiose military venture was partly successful, for China lost her more accessible area, although by resort to guerrilla warfare she was able to retain the rugged interior. A provisional capital was set up by the Chinese government at Chungking. The Sino-Japanese struggle quite naturally merged into World War II and was terminated when the Japanese surrendered to the Allies in the late summer of 1945. At this time the Republic of China not only regained the eastern half of China Proper from Japan but also received the surrender of Japanese armies in Manchuria and Formosa.

#### PHYSICAL FEATURES

China is continental in its dimensions. With an area of more than 3,750,000 square miles, Greater China<sup>5</sup> is larger than continental United States and Mexico together. On the North American continent China would reach from the southern part of Alaska to south of Mexico City. Peking, Shanghai, and Canton are comparable in latitude to Philadelphia, Jacksonville, and Havana, respectively. No part of China Proper, however, is farther north than New York City.

**RELIEF**—The great diversity of landforms in Greater China is a fundamental influence in the cultural and economic life of the country. Knotty mountainous regions, broad plateau areas, expansive lowlands, and nar-

row river valleys play equally important roles in the physiographic pattern of the area. Nevertheless, the complex nature of surface features does not prevent a division into broad topographic regions, each with its own distinctive type of terrain and its accompanying cultural response.

*Western Areas.* In Tibet—location of the fabled Shangri-la—high plateaus encircled by high mountain ranges render the region practically inaccessible and serve as a barrier both to trade and to transportation and block any effective diffusion of culture from without. In this area, known as the “roof of the world,” elevations range from 12,000 feet above sea level to peaks more than twice that height, the average being 16,000 feet.

North of the high, rugged Tibetan area, in the northwestern part of Greater China, the terrain merges into a relatively low but barren plateau interspersed with hills and mountains. Here it was vast distances and extensive desert or semidesert stretches, rather than forbidding elevations, that restricted Chinese overland commerce into, and through, the area to what could be carried by long caravan trains. The present ambitious program of road and railway building by the Communist government is an attempt to overcome these severe physical handicaps.

*China Proper.* The southern half of China Proper is preponderantly mountainous, but its elevations, typically from 4,000 to 6,000 feet, are much lower than those of the Tibetan highlands to the west. Despite rugged relief this area is extremely well peopled. River valleys and small coastal plains provide some level land capable of intensive utilization; additional arable land becomes available as Chinese farmers crowd up the mountain slopes as far as terracing is possible. The largest lowland is the valley of the Si Kiang, which flows past Canton and Hong Kong into the sea. Regions of dense settlement, however, are usually isolated

<sup>5</sup> See page 557 for discussion on place-name terminology.

from one another, there is no modern mode of transportation except the airplane

In the north, mountain chains trail seaward from the massive Tibetan highlands. Relatively high and complex in the west, these chains divide and subdivide as they extend eastward, decreasing in altitude to the point where they lose their identity as mountains before reaching the coast. The only marked exception to this pattern is the rough Shantung Peninsula, on which mountains extend for 100 miles into the Yellow Sea. Between the mountain chains of northern China Proper, the Yangtze Kiang and the Hwang Ho form valleys that become spacious lowlands near their mouths. Tremendous populations are clustered along or near these streams, and in the valleys are many of China's great cities.

*Northeast* In the northeastern part of Greater China is Manchuria, a huge lowland plain extending north and south between mountainous borderlands. It has no dominating river like the Yangtze or Hwang, but otherwise resembles a great longitudinal valley. Level terrain helps to explain why this area has by far the best developed rail network in China.

**CLIMATE**—The pattern of climate in Greater China shows remarkable variety. Great size and diversity of relief each contribute heavily to climatic types, which help or hinder the human quest for livelihood. Latitude ranges from south of the Tropic of Cancer to the northern part of the temperate zone, providing broad temperature differences. In turn, the tremendous extent westward from the ocean—the source of moisture for rainfall—produces wide variation in precipitation. A significant role played by relief shows in the high elevation of mountainous regions, bringing about lower temperatures and likewise influencing the rainfall because of exposure to moisture-bearing winds. Cyclonic storms and monsoon winds, both laden with great

quantities of moisture, tend to strike the southern, rather than the northern, coastal sections, with the result that rainfall decreases from south to north as well as from east to west.

In southeast China, owing to continuous warmth and copious rainfall, a high degree of agricultural utilization is possible throughout much of the lowland areas. Along the extreme southern coast the average temperature for the coldest month of the year stays above 60° F., and the total rainfall may exceed eighty inches on the more exposed slopes. To the north and west the climatic factor becomes steadily more adverse to the Chinese farmer. The winters are longer, limiting the growing season to one crop per year north of the Yangtze Valley, in comparison with two, and even three, crops during a single growing season in the south. Rainfall not only diminishes toward the north and in the interior but becomes more undependable. In the North China Plain droughts causing famine are common, but during some years there is unusually heavy rainfall which produces as much devastation to food crops as the droughts and may cause tremendous loss of life and property.<sup>6</sup>

Throughout the interior of China the moderating effect of the ocean is missing, making summers hot and winters cold. Of greater import to human development, however, is the lack of rainfall. Beyond the western margins of China Proper the landscape is semiarid at best and often arid to the point of being totally inhospitable. Only isolated pockets in which irrigation water is available present exceptions to the sparse populations that prevail in the expansive interior reaches of Greater China.

**MINERAL RESOURCES**—The inventory of physical resources possessed by China includes

<sup>6</sup> In July and August, 1954, flood waters from the Yangtze and other rivers were reported to have covered six per cent of all the cultivated lands of China.

soil, natural vegetation, and minerals. When measured in such terms as millions of tons or thousands of square miles the listing gives a total that sounds important, in terms of resources per capita, however, the figures are less impressive. Moreover, the inability of the Chinese in many instances to utilize mineral resources efficiently definitely limits their economy. But for centuries, the Chinese have utilized to the fullest extent their precious soil; in doing so, however, they have almost denuded the timber and other natural plant growth from accessible regions. Only mineral resources, including falling and flowing water, remain as potential that holds any real promise of further development on an appreciable scale.

Chinese and foreign interests alike have made numerous surveys and estimates as to existing quantities of coal, metals, petroleum, and water power. Coal reserves are tremendous; China is said by non-Communist sources to rank fourth in the world in this source of power. Although coal deposits are scattered throughout the Chinese provinces, about eighty per cent of them are concentrated in Shensi and Shansi. Manchurian coal fields, although worked extensively during and since the Japanese occupation, probably contain no more than two per cent of the total Chinese reserves. In iron ore the future holds less promise, for the most careful estimates place total reserves at only about one twentieth of those of the United States. Most of the mining now takes place in the Yangtze Valley northwest of Hankow and near Chungking. The large deposits in southern Manchuria, although actively exploited by the Japanese, are low in metallic content.

Estimated petroleum deposits are modest; however, fields in the provinces of Kansu and Sinkiang are being actively exploited in the Communist drive toward industrialization. Oil-bearing shale in Manchuria and the possibility of making synthetic gasoline from coal hold further promise in this field.

Potential hydroelectric energy runs high, especially in the more rainy mountainous areas of South China. Increasing attention of the Communist government to river control includes provision for the development of power along with irrigation and prevention of floods.

China has varying amounts of many other minerals, although tungsten, tin, manganese, and magnesite are receiving most attention at present. In most instances actual production of Chinese mineral resources is negligible when compared to the existing deposits. Only Japanese exploitation in Manchuria and the extraction of metals from a few accessible deposits in China Proper have dug deep into the stock of mineral wealth. Industrial objectives of the Communists are pointed toward utilization of these resources, the remote as well as the accessible.

#### ECONOMIC TRENDS

The entire economic pattern of China has been, and is being, transformed under the Communist regime. In so far as possible the changes presently taking place follow the Soviet pattern: accent on heavy industry, increasing control of the state over agriculture, and general economic improvement of the country in ways that will marshal resources and provide the means for national investment and military effectiveness. In some ways this routine is parallel to that of the USSR of a generation ago, although there is an effort to sidestep costly mistakes. On the other hand, the resources and population of China do not in all cases lend themselves to an established five-year plan of the Soviet type. For example, the pressure of population on the land allows very little margin for the acquisition of the capital goods needed to mechanize agriculture, to build installations for heavy industry, to develop an effective transportation net, or otherwise to convert a primitive economy into a modern industrial one—all objectives

that are easier to attain in the USSR, with its greater resource potential and lack of population pressure. Nevertheless, the Communists are using every method at their disposal to push ahead with this type of program on a colossal scale even in the face of physical shortcomings and human opposition.

**AGRICULTURE**—About three fourths of the population of China look to the soil for their livelihood. For countless generations the intensive cultivation of arable land has supported hundreds of millions of people. However, despite the traditional skill of the Chinese farmer in intensive cultivation, his output has hardly been enough to provide himself and his family with the barest minimum of essentials for sustenance. The average farm has been computed to consist of about three acres—many are less than one and a half acres—to support the entire family group. Floods, famines, and civil wars have regularly taken their toll in human misery.

Upon this impoverished agricultural economy the Communists have laid the groundwork for collectivized farming. Mutual-aid teams and producers' cooperatives are intermediate steps, and a true landlord class is being eliminated by a "land reform program" for redistribution of farm acreage. It is hardly conceivable that without heavy investment in fertilizers the present agricultural production on this type of landscape can be markedly augmented. Of more promise is the possibility of opening up to cultivation some 20,000,000 to 30,000,000 acres in northern Manchuria. In the semiarid west, also, new lands may in time be brought under the plow by development of irrigation projects.

Crop types and agricultural techniques can be changed less rapidly than political policies. Wheat, rice, and millet, which are the three most important food crops, continue to occupy in about equal proportions more than two thirds of the total cultivated

area of the country. North China, with its low, unpredictable rainfall and short growing season, is primarily a land of wheat and small grains. In the semiarid area to the northwest dry farming and animal husbandry take precedence over intensively cultivated crops. In contrast, South China, including the Yangtze Valley, is known broadly as the rice region. Other crops, grown both for local consumption and for commerce, are raised throughout the country but are found in greater quantity and greater variety toward the southeast. Increasingly heavier rainfall and a longer growing season in this section favor agricultural production; this advantage is offset, however, by greater population density.

The principal Communist aims to alter the existing agricultural pattern revolve around greater production of those items best suited to an industrial economy; for example, more wheat to feed a greater labor force, more cotton for increased textile manufacture, and commodities to export or to exchange for capital goods.

**INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT**—China has, to date, never been an industrial nation. Although many basic resources for industrialization are present, a number of serious handicaps have militated against the realization of that potential which does exist. Only industries to produce local needs were developed, such as cotton textiles, cement, salt, flour, and cigarettes. Perhaps the principal handicap has been lack of adequate transportation facilities to assemble resources, to distribute products, or to develop any appreciable commerce beyond a limited number of accessible cities on the coast or along navigable waterways. The only exception to this picture has been Manchuria, where the Japanese after 1932 went some steps further and expanded an iron-and-steel industry capable of bolstering their military machine.

The Communist government has an-

nounced its intention to industrialize China to the point where it will produce seven tenths of the nation's needs (as compared to only one tenth before the war with Japan). Much effort and numerous plans are being brought into play to accomplish this ambitious goal, the accent rather obviously being on stepped-up production of coal and steel. Although the country is well endowed with coal, its quality may be inferior. Nonferrous metals are plentiful, including enough iron ore for any short-run plans if it can be made accessible. In addition to the established iron-and-steel center at Anshan in southern Manchuria, there are others, either operating or in process of development, at Tayeh on the Yangtze, at Paotow on the Hwang Ho, at Taiyuan in the heart of Shansi, and at Chungking in Szechwan. Along with the heavy construction industries, production of machinery and textiles is being pushed by the government, with factories being installed in many cities. Finally, production of routine consumption goods, such as paper, cement, flour, and sugar, is also being carried forward and in most cases shows an increase over output in prewar years. Because of the need for heavy investment the development of additional electrical power is lagging behind the general industrial advance.

**TRANSPORTATION**—Physical barriers and great distances have long handicapped transportation in China. Only in Manchuria and northeastern China Proper has there been developed any semblance of a rail network (see map on page 553). Coastwise shipping can touch but a few ports, and inland waterways of importance are limited to the lower Yangtze River and several canals in the north. Since 1929 the airplane has offered some relief to the situation, but only for a very small segment of the population.

The Communists clearly realize that an effective transportation system is essential to the building of a modern industrial econ-

omy. Consequently, they are adding new railways and highways to the existing pattern, especially in the more remote regions of the west in order to connect the Chinese rail system to that of the Soviets. To this end an east-west rail line west of Lanchow is being built eventually to reach Urumchi and then to link up with the Turk-Siberian line at Alma Ata. In 1953 a line was opened up between Chungking and Chengtu and is now being extended northward to the line mentioned above and southward to Kunming in Yunnan. Another line is planned to tap Ulan Bator, capital of Mongolia. Other lines of less spectacular dimensions have been and are being projected. But railway building progresses slowly because of the large number of tunnels and bridges which have to be constructed.

The highway system of China includes but few paved, all-weather roads. There is no network that might exert a unifying influence over the country, usually it is impractical to drive from one large city to another. However, in the arid or semiarid west, where road building is relatively easy over plateau surfaces, the Communists have some impressive-sounding projects under way. One highway from Lhasa into Yunnan is being built from both ends toward the middle. Another is to pass from Lhasa to a yet unspecified point in Sinkiang.

Two noteworthy projects in water transportation are the improvement of deep-sea ports in South China, so that Hong Kong can be by-passed, and a harbor development at Tangku, east of Tientsin.

A sparse air transport network centers upon Peking, with lines extending to Nanking, to Kunming via Hankow, to Canton via Hankow, to Harbin via Mukden, and to Chungking and Chengtu via Sian. In addition, three international routes also radiate from Peking, reaching Chita, Irkutsk, and Alma Ata, all in the USSR.

At present railways, automobiles, power-driven boats, and aircraft serve but a small



percentage of the total population, and it is unlikely that this situation can change rapidly in the near future. Human porters, crude two-wheeled carts, and tiny river and canal craft all reflect the extent to which mechanical power is lacking. Even animal power is at a premium, and the average Chinese coolie or peasant has no choice other than the use of his own body to meet his transportation needs. Such primitive methods, although cheap by the hour or day, still are expensive by the mile and curtail long-distance marketing.

**FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS**—Prior to World War II the foreign trade of China was mainly with the United States, Great Britain, Japan, and Germany. Export trade was for a time largely limited to tea and silk, but it was later expanded to include numerous unprocessed agricultural items and some minerals. Imports consisted largely of commodities demanded for simple needs, such as kerosene, raw cotton, yarn, and thread, cotton cloth, wheat flour, sugar, paper, and chemicals. These basic commodities were universally needed and were not too expensive for purchase by relatively large numbers of people with low incomes. In addition, capital goods had to be imported.

Under Communist control foreign-trade contacts have radically shifted. First the USSR and then other countries of the Soviet bloc have gradually replaced the Western nations which, with Japan, practically monopolized trade with China in pre-Communist days. In fact, trade with the Communist bloc jumped from twenty-six per cent, in 1950, to seventy-two per cent, in 1952. Accompanying this about-face in the regional trade pattern are also some sharp commodity shifts. China still exports what she can—foodstuffs, agricultural raw materials, and minerals—but has drastically cut down on the importation of consumers' goods in favor of machinery, metals, mineral oils, chemicals, and other industrial raw ma-

terials, including raw cotton for the growing textile industry. This new pattern could hardly be otherwise, adhering as it must to Soviet relations and over-all Communistic concepts.

## POPULATION

Few journalists can refrain from the use of the expression "teeming millions" in writing of the population in China. The hundreds of millions of people living in China represent between twenty and twenty-five per cent of the inhabitants of the earth. The average Chinese peasant or city worker struggles to eke out a living from the tiny bit of soil allotted him or from his meager share of the country's other resources. From a synoptic view, the problems of individuals merge into the problems of the nation. Living standards can be substantially raised only when a national pattern of economic existence and security converts the basic population units, such as the family or the community, into productive units of the total economy. This point Dr. Sun Yat-sen, founder of modern China, expressed as the principle of national livelihood. In time it became recognized that the solution to these serious economic problems must be directed from the top—the government. At least until today no ruling body has proved itself capable of coping satisfactorily with the low level of productivity. Communistic policy of land reform and five-year plans grapple seriously with productivity needs, but only time will show whether or not the plans will improve the lot of the average Chinese worker.

**DISTRIBUTION**—An accurate census of all the people in China is virtually impossible. In 1953 the Peking government conducted a nation-wide census and revealed the total figure for Greater China to be 567,000,000 inhabitants. The most reliable pre-Communist figures for the same area amounted

to approximately 110,000,000 less than the 1953 total! In Western quarters this discrepancy raised questions concerning the reliability of the Chinese statistics.

The above estimate of 567,000,000 made by the government includes 6,000,000 inhabitants in Inner Mongolia and 1,275,000 in Tibet. The Chinese also counted in peripheral and other areas some 35,000,000 of their countrymen, including 7,500,000 in Formosa and 11,750,000 living overseas, bringing the grand total up to 602,000,000.

The distribution of population in Greater China is extremely uneven. In relation to the capacity of the land to support people, however, the population is spread rather uniformly over the different regions. The farmer of the Yellow Plain in the north would not fare much better, if at all, were he to go to crowded Canton in the south or to arid Ninghsia province in the west. The same relative scarcity of resources would prevail at either point. We need only to compare our desert wastes of Nevada and Arizona with the highly productive crop lands of Illinois and Iowa to understand the variance in population densities. As in the United States, however, so in China it is possible that irrigation projects can be opened up in the western provinces to support larger populations. Manchuria offers some hope of increased production and greater population density through improvement in farming techniques.

**CITIES**—China has a number of large cities despite the preponderance of rural dwellers. Shanghai, with more than 6,000,000 persons, is by far the largest urban community and certainly stands as one of the world's half-dozen largest cities. Its location in the lower Yangtze Valley, mid-way along the Chinese coast, plus a site near the mouth of a navigable river, has given it every advantage for growth and development as the country's leading commercial and industrial center.

Three other cities approach or exceed 2,000,000 in population: Peking, the new "North Capital"; Tientsin, port for the North China Plain, and Mukden, commercial and industrial center for southern Manchuria. Although not in Chinese territory, Hong Kong<sup>7</sup> likewise falls among cities of the 2,000,000 class. Ranging between 1,000,000 and 1,500,000 are the cities or city clusters of Canton, southern port at the mouth of the Si Kiang, Nanking, "Southern Capital" of the former Republic; Harbin, metropolitan center for northern Manchuria, Dairen (along with Port Arthur), gateway to Manchuria, Hankow and its satellite cities of Wuchang and Hanyang, middle Yangtze port and crossroads in the heart of China Proper; and Chungking, upper Yangtze center and capital of China when the Japanese overran the eastern provinces. Most of the provincial capitals are metropolitan centers for the political areas they serve.

**RACIAL CHARACTERISTICS**—The difficulty of penetrating Chinese territory before the advent of modern means of transportation prevented racial mixture on a large scale. In the heart of China Proper the ethnological uniformity is remarkable in view of the number of people involved. Although many types of Chinese cultures sprang up in the various provinces, homogeneity with respect to human nature, philosophical ideology, a consistent written language, and certain physical traits are easily recognizable throughout. Only in the western regions of Greater China, in the southwestern part of China Proper, and in Manchuria are there

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<sup>7</sup> The British Crown Colony of Hong Kong includes the thirty-two-square-mile island of Hong Kong as well as territory on the mainland (Kowloon with three square miles and an additional 356 square miles known as the "New Territories"). The true urban center is the city of Victoria located on the island of Hong Kong. The term Hong Kong is popularly used to designate the city of Victoria and its port area, which extends to Kowloon.



significant numbers of non-Chinese peoples. The 1953 census listed slightly more than 35,000,000 people as belonging to minority groups, of which the Rung, Uigurs, Moslems, Yi, Tibetans, Miao, Manchus, Mongols, Pu Yi, and Koreans each number more than 1,000,000.

Remote location and local interests allowed the natives of Sinkiang, Tibet, and Mongolia to remain virtually independent from direct Chinese political control. In the hill and mountainous regions of southwestern China, aborigines, such as the Miao, have remained dormant politically, although in some areas they actually outnumber the Chinese residents. In general they occupy the more backward sections where they were evidently driven by the ambitious Chinese. More than 2,000,000 Manchus, remnants of the racial stock dominating the region of Manchuria before the influx of the Chinese, live in that area. There are more than 1,000,000 Koreans living in Manchuria, who crossed the border of their own country in search of a more bountiful livelihood. Until repatriated, the 500,000 Japanese in Manchuria were the result of a fourteen-year attempt on the part of Japan to colonize the puppet state of Manchukuo, which was set up in China's northeastern provinces. This group served as a "flying wedge" in assailing China in the 1930's.

Whether or not the non-Chinese peoples of Greater China can properly be considered minorities, the fact remains that they do not present the racial problems commonly associated with minority groups in Central Europe. Internecine wars in China have in the past reflected political, rather than ethnological, differences. In the Communist plan, *Tungs, Tibetans, Manchus, and other racial groups fit into the political structure much as the Uzbeks, Kirghiz, Georgians, and Armenians fit into the Soviet system in the USSR. All groups fit into the national scheme of development but may adhere to their own cultural traditions and local habits.*


**RELIGION**—The three indigenous religions of China are Confucianism, with its outward practice of ancestral worship; Buddhism, which actually came from India, and Taoism, which copied most of the ritual of Buddhism. Most individual Chinese, strange as it seems to people of the Western world, do not consider it inconsistent to be devotees of, and to profess, all three of these religions. One reason for this apparent anomaly is that the Chinese tend to consider Confucianism and Taoism as political philosophies rather than religions. Before the installation of the Communist government, Christianity was spread in China by missionaries of many branches of the religion. In 1951 over 600 Christian missionaries were withdrawn from China.

**LANGUAGE**—A single written language common to all Chinese people would seem to offer the advantages of unification, but the difficulties inherent in a language with 40,000 characters have made it almost impossible for the Chinese to distribute the printed word in sufficient volume to reach the mass of the population. It is also likely that the inability to utilize this written language properly has contributed to the growth of the many dialects, especially in the more remote mountainous areas.

The most important dialect spoken in China is the so-called "Mandarin," basis for the modern "national language," which covers China Proper in, and north of, the Yangtze River Valley. In various other parts of Greater China there are about forty-five dialects, including those used by non-Chinese peoples. In the southeastern provinces, where communities are frequently separated by topographical barriers, inhabitants in neighboring towns or cities may not be able to understand one another. Under the Communist regime steps have been taken to simplify the written language in a drive toward greater literacy and as a method of strengthening support for the new order.

## POLITICAL FRAMEWORK

In the past the term *China* has had two meanings. *China Proper* referred to the eighteen old provinces south of the Great Wall, whereas *Greater China* corresponded roughly to the old Chinese Empire of the Manchu Dynasty, including China Proper and the four dependencies of Manchuria, Mongolia, Sinkiang, and—before 1878—Tibet (see map on this page). Since 1949 Communist China has conformed rather closely in delineation to the former concept of Greater China except for Outer Mongolia, which, in 1924, became a Mongolian People's Republic. Also excluded in the new concept are Formosa, the Pescadores, and certain other islands off the coast of China, although the Communist government lays claim to them. Claim is likewise made to numerous areas along the boundaries that China has in common with Burma, India, Kashmir, Afghanistan, and even Communist Mongolia.




**INTERNAL DIVISIONS**—Internal administrative boundaries in Communist China have been subject to considerable shifting as the government has sought, on one hand, to centralize control and, on the other hand, to establish local autonomy along the lines of the Soviet system of autonomous areas

within the union. The country is divided into twenty-five provinces plus the special division of Tibet and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (see map on page 558). Within the provinces are some fifty-eight secondary autonomous areas, set up to correspond to minority groups, such as the Mongolians, Tibetans, Miao, Chuang, and Koreans. Most of these second-order civil divisions are on the western fringes of the country.

At one point early in their regime the Communists superimposed six major regional divisions over the provincial structure in order the better to wrestle with the problem of closer state control over an enormous expanse of territory (see map on page 559). Also a number of large cities were given autonomous municipal status directly under the central government. (By 1954, however, only Peking, Tientsin, and Shanghai retained this distinction.) These examples of rapid changes in governmental control illustrate an instability of internal civil divisions, failing, to date at least, to follow any traditional pattern.

**POLITICO-GEOGRAPHIC ASPECTS OF OUTER AREAS**—The Chinese Communists are attempting to spread their authority evenly to the most remote corners of the huge country. Such centralized control has been rare in the history of China, both because of the remoteness of the outer areas and their contrasting environments. The following sketches indicate a few outstanding politico-geographic aspects of Manchuria, Sinkiang, and Tibet, as well as of Mongolia, which has long been associated with China.

**Manchuria.** Manchuria has been an arena of conflict among China, Russia, and Japan. The area is about 400,000 square miles and has a population of about 40,000,000, equivalent to one fifth of the area and one fourth of the population of the United States. As a strategic salient in the northern half of the Far East, it is a focal point of attention in



the international politics of Pacific affairs. Several events attest to its importance.

(1) Russia has made military objectives of the ice-free ports of Dairen and its neighbor Port Arthur.<sup>8</sup> (2) The Chinese Eastern Railway, across Manchuria from east to west, serving as a short-cut of the Trans-Siberian Railroad to Vladivostok, was completed in

<sup>8</sup> These ports constituted the reason for the Kwangtung Leased Territory of over 1,000 square miles at the tip of the Liaotung Peninsula, which was leased by China to Russia in 1898. The territory was in turn taken over by Japan in 1905 after that country won the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5). Since 1945 the status of these ports has been exceedingly nebulous. The USSR, as witness the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950, has been trying to give the appearance of transferring some measure of jurisdiction back to China while, in effect, retaining control.


1903. This railway, with the southward extension to the tip of the Liaotung Peninsula of a railway called the South Manchuria, was merged, in 1945, into a single system called the Chinese Changchun Railway. The Russians and Chinese were to exercise joint control over this system for some years; however, in 1950 the Russians promised to transfer complete control to Communist China. (3) From 1931 to 1945 Manchuria was controlled by Japan and by virtue of its industrial resources and agricultural surpluses contributed to that country's military efforts before and during World War II. (4) More recently, Manchuria served as the staging area for Chinese Communist soldiers and supplies, which were poured against the United Nations armies in the Korean War from 1950 to 1954.

*Sinkiang.* Sinkiang is in some ways an extensive transition area between the heart of China and the USSR. Centuries ago its east-west string of oases was the busy pathway of caravan routes into and out of the Orient,<sup>9</sup> today the same line of communication is increasingly important as a major artery through western China and Kazakhstan to link Communist China with the USSR west of the Urals. Adding to the significance of the arid and semiarid stretches of Sinkiang is the development of mineral resources, including petroleum, and of irrigation lands. It is interesting to note that in 1950 the Russian and Chinese Communist governments signed an agreement providing for the exploitation of the natural resources of the area.

*Tibet.* Tibet is perhaps as remote from the paths of modern civilization as the interior of the Arabian Peninsula or the frozen wastes of the Polar North. Traditionally, the area is divided into Nearer (Inner) and Farther (Outer) Tibet. The former exists as two Chinese provinces (Sikang and Tsinghai), and it is the latter, with its high and almost inaccessible plateau, that conforms to the popular conception of the area.

Farther Tibet was occupied by troops of Communist China in 1950 and made a Special Region under the Peking government. A promise was made to grant the area a status equivalent to that of Inner Mongolia; that is, it was to be an Autonomous Region. It was also agreed to respect the existing political system, but Chinese control over the Tibetan army and foreign affairs and the weakening of the power of the Dalai Lama and the traditional cabinet would seem to indicate the reduction of the area into a Communist puppet state.

*Mongolia.* Mongolia, geographically, is best described as a true nomad land. This vast



area, in modern atlases usually referred to simply as Mongolia, is about twice the size of Manchuria. Traditionally its nomadic inhabitants have felt pressures from both Russia and China. Though nominally a part of the Chinese Empire, Mongolia fell under Russian influence at the time of the Chinese Revolution in 1911. By the end of World War I Russia obtained China's recognition of an autonomous Mongolia and at the same time prepared a privileged position for itself. The country has been divided traditionally into Outer and Inner Mongolia. In the 1920's Outer Mongolia, with a population of about 1,000,000, was subjected to such Soviet penetration that a Mongolian People's Republic under Soviet sponsorship was set up. Only in 1946, however, did China officially relinquish her claim to this former dependency. The location of the Gobi Desert in the southern part of Mongolia tends to orient the country's economic relations toward the north. Nevertheless, a north-south route from Tsining in China to Ulan Bator, capital of Mongolia, was reported to have been completed in 1955.

Tannu-Tuva, the northwest portion of Outer Mongolia, lies within the basin of the Yenisei, which drains northward through


<sup>9</sup> The Central Asian highway entered China at the Jade Gate near the western end of the Great Wall.

Siberia. Originally under Chinese sovereignty, this territory was annexed by the USSR in the 1940's. Inner Mongolia has continued to remain an integral part of China

and now makes up the provinces of Ninghsia, Chahar, and Suiyuan, the latter containing Kweisui, capital city of the Autonomous Region.

## FORMOSA

The island of Formosa, called Taiwan in Chinese, is located about 100 miles off the east coast of China opposite Foochow and Amoy (see map on this page). It has a special political significance in that along with the nearby Pescadores, it is the only remaining home of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government. At the time of the seizure of mainland China by the Communists in 1949 the Generalissimo and his followers set up a provisional government in Taipeh.



Formosa is about 14,000 square miles in area, comparable in size to the state of Maryland, and since 1950 supports in excess of 7,000,000 persons. That the island is overcrowded there is no doubt, especially

in view of the influx of refugees from the mainland as the Communists gained control. In 1949 there were approximately 1,400 persons per arable square mile, comparable to other densely populated spots in Monsoon Asia. This figure is about three times what it was in 1905 and forty per cent higher than in 1935. Cities of Formosa have increased in like proportion. Taipeh now numbers 500,000 people (211,000 in 1927), while Tainan and Takao each has more than 200,000 inhabitants.

The Tropic of Cancer bisects Formosa, signaling a semi-tropical temperature regime. A marine location and sharp relief ensure sufficient precipitation for agricultural production. Thus, the lowland areas making up the western third of the island, along with small sections along the east coast, are very favorable to human habitation. From 1905 to 1945 the island was Japanese and benefited by virtue of a sure market for tropical and subtropical products, especially sugar cane. After 1945 the Chinese, upon regaining Formosa, at once established trade relations with it, and Chinese entrepreneurs replaced those from Japan and continued to stimulate the economy. Since 1950, however, the island has suffered by the severing of these ties, and in the face of great odds has had to seek world channels for its external commercial relations.

Formosa has a close political and military liaison with the United States, but otherwise its prospects are discouraging. It is isolated commercially and menaced politically and militarily by its giant neighbor

across the Formosa Strait. The retention of Quemoy and Matsu, offshore islands opposite Amoy and Foochow, exposes the Nationalist government to invasion from the

mainland. Probably only the presence in Formosa waters of the United States Seventh Fleet has so far saved Formosa from being taken over by Communist China.


### Study Questions

1. Which geographic factors seem to have been most important in the earlier history of China?
2. Discuss the history of imperialism in China.
3. In terms of real democracy is there any basic difference in the governmental structures of Nationalist China as it was on the mainland and the Communist regime?
4. In what areas of Greater China did the Russians concentrate their earlier imperialistic efforts?
5. What seems to be the main theme of the Communist regime in China with reference to centralization or decentralization?
6. Do you think it is possible that the main factors leading to the overthrow of the Nationalist regime on the mainland might also operate against the Communist government?
7. Would you consider the island of Formosa important to the defense of the United States? Explain your position.
8. How do the geographic differences between North China Proper and South China Proper contribute to different economic activities?
9. Contrast the influences on economic development of the caravan routes in the old Chinese Empire and the sea approaches to the country.
10. What does the Communist regime in present-day China hope to gain by the emphasis on railroad and highway development?
11. Why could Manchuria be called the "pioneer fringe" of modern China?
12. Explain the Soviet Union's great interest in the Sinkiang area of China.
13. Can Tibet ever be an integral part of the Chinese nation? Explain your answer.
14. Contrast the roles of Inner and Outer Mongolia in the political development of modern China.
15. Point out the strengths and weaknesses of China's claims for additional territory on its periphery.

## *Burma, Thailand, and Indochina*

Peninsular Southeast Asia consists of Burma, Thailand,<sup>1</sup> Indochina, and Malaya, forming a vast intermediate zone between the Indian subcontinent to the west and China to the northeast (see map on this page). This chapter is limited to the first three of these countries, which fall into a natural regional bloc. A discussion of Malaya is included in the chapter dealing with the extensive Indonesian Archipelago (also referred to as the Malay Archipelago), since Malaya is separated from the rest of the Southeast Asia mainland by a long, narrow isthmus, and its history and economic outlook are closely associated with the surrounding seas.<sup>2</sup> Burma,

Thailand, and Indochina have not only had their growth and development limited by India and China but have all, in one way or another, been overshadowed by them for centuries.



<sup>1</sup> The historic name of Siam was changed in 1939 to Thailand and the term was made official in 1949, with Thai ("free") being applied to its people.

<sup>2</sup> Since World War II it has become standard practice to use the term "Southeast Asia" to include Burma, Thailand, Indochina, Malaya, Indonesia, and the Philippines. In prewar days some writers on geography referred to this huge area as the "Far Eastern Tropics." Alternatively, many authors have adopted the term "Further India" to cover either the whole of Southeast Asia or the mainland portion

of it. The latter area, for purposes of discussion in this chapter, will be referred to as mainland, or peninsular Southeast Asia.

In a structural sense peninsular Southeast Asia is a southward prolongation of the mountain systems of southwestern China and the Tibetan borderland. On the northeastern edge, the region merges with the high plateau of Yunnan, averaging 6,000 feet in elevation; in the northwest the Patkai Hills make a right-angled bend with the eastern Himalayas. In this area of towering mountain ranges and deeply incised valleys, three major rivers—the Irrawaddy, Salween, and Mekong—flow in parallel gorges less than fifty miles apart, and, around 25° North Latitude, a fourth large river, the Song Koi (Red River), is added to the series.

Farther south the line of the Patkai Hills is continued by the Naga, Chin, and Arakan ranges, which, with their dense jungle cover and altitudes ranging from 3,000 to 8,000 feet, make a formidable barrier between Burma and the Indian subcontinent. To the east of the Irrawaddy Valley a plateau extending southward from Yunnan decreases gradually in height to form a relatively level tableland about 3,000 feet high, stretching from the Shan area of Burma through northern Thailand into the Laos country of Indochina. From this massif two prongs of highland extend still farther to the south, namely, the Annamite Chain of Indochina and the ranges that separate Thailand from Burma; in between lie the lowlands of another major stream, the Menam.<sup>3</sup>

Although three of the five rivers mentioned above—the Irrawaddy, the Salween, and the Mekong—are among the longest in the world, their basins are all relatively narrow, and the Salween Valley, in particular, retains its gorgelike character almost to the coast. Nevertheless, the alluvial deposits in the lower courses of these five rivers provide practically the only good agricultural

land in the region, and it is mainly here that peoples have settled during the historic past (see map on page 565).

#### SETTLEMENT PATTERNS

By virtue of a tropical monsoon climate all these lowlands have been favorable for wet rice cultivation, which has long been the characteristic agricultural practice throughout the region. Unfortunately, the climate is also largely responsible for the high incidence of insect-borne diseases, which, at least until recent times, have played a major part in retarding the growth of population. This factor, coupled with the comparative recency of settlement and the frequency of local warfare, goes far to explain why the average population density of 90 per square mile in peninsular Southeast Asia today is still only about one third that in nearby India or China proper. Such a situation may in the future present dangerous temptations to these or other overcrowded neighbors.

In broad outline the process of settlement has been the result of a series of southward migrations of predominantly Mongoloid peoples, originating in the plateaus of Yunnan and eastern Tibet. First among the culturally more advanced groups were the Mon-Khmer peoples, who were widespread over much of the peninsula at the dawn of the Christian era and whose descendants today comprise the Cambodians as well as certain minority groups in Burma and Vietnam. During the early centuries of the Christian Era, however, the ancestors of the modern Burmans began to spread down the Irrawaddy Valley, and there they eventually became the dominant group. To the northeast the Annamites, a people almost racially indistinguishable from the southern Chinese, were in occupation of the Red River Delta before the second century B.C. Later Annamite settlement gradually extended southward along the coast of Indochina, leading to the absorption of the Chams of southern

<sup>3</sup> The term "Menam" actually means "river" and refers to the Chao Bhraya River. However, Menam has been accepted as the name of Thailand's major stream, and most maps show it as such.



Annam and the Khmers inhabiting the southernmost portion of Indochina—Cochin China. Meanwhile the peoples known variously as Shan, Lao, or Thai—who also had begun to migrate into the Southeast Asian mainland in early times, but who still retained their own kingdom of Nan Chao in Yunnan until it was destroyed by Kublai Khan in 1253—flocked into the Menam Valley and also settled on the plateaus on both sides of it during the closing decades of the thirteenth century.

To a considerable extent the rugged jungle-covered ranges between the various major basins proved effective barriers against east-west movement, and the result of the isolation which this produced can still be seen in the political and linguistic divisions of the peninsula. But there are two important exceptions to this generalization. First, in the northeast no serious natural barrier, such as the Arakan wall on the west, separates the Red River Delta from the coastal lowlands of southern China, and from 111 B.C. to A.D. 939 this area down to the Annamite chain formed part of Imperial China. Second, the physical divide between the Menam and the lower Mekong is relatively insignificant, and, accordingly, these two areas have repeatedly been merged into one political unit, notably after the ninth century, under the Khmer empire, with its capital at Angkor, and, more recently, under the Thais.

#### HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

Apart from the Annamite lands, whose cultural links with China were extremely close, all the principal kingdoms that developed in mainland Southeast Asia were strongly influenced by Hindu-Buddhist culture from India. Indian colonization and missionary enterprise, which were closely bound up with trading activity along the sea route to China, transformed the maritime fringe of Southeast Asia and gave birth to the great Khmer civili-

zation, famed for the temples of Angkor Wat, as well as to several other lesser centers in southern Burma, Thailand, and southeastern Indochina.

Yet, in spite of the great influence of this sea-borne Hindu-Buddhist culture in the process of state formation, the original centers of most of the major kingdoms, notably Burma, Thailand, and Cambodia, were well inland. Later, from these nuclear regions in the dry zone around the Irrawaddy bend, the Menam Valley, and the lake basin of Tonlé Sap, respectively, control was gradually extended by the lowland peoples concerned over the inhabitants of the hills and plateaus on their borders. Because of the terrain and the great distances involved, control over these outlying areas was often far from effective; moreover, in many cases the upland peoples were racially and culturally different from their neighbors in the plains.

Partly because of the inland location of their nuclear areas and also because during the last thousand years shipping routes have ceased to hug the shores of the eastern Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, peninsular Southeast Asia was little affected by the sea-borne missionary activity of Islam or the early phase of European colonialism. On the other hand, the region's overland contact with China exposed it to intermittent pressure from that direction. At one time or another all the major kingdoms were in some degree tributary to China, although the effective influence of the latter rarely extended far beyond the fringes of the Yunnan Plateau, even in Manchu times (1644-1911).

The chance that the peninsula might offer alternative routes to China in place of the established seaway to Hong Kong and Shanghai was a major reason for the growth of French and German interest in various parts of mainland Southeast Asia during the second half of the nineteenth century. The British, however, had been active earlier and for different reasons. Thus their annexa-

0 100 200 300 400



tions, following the First and Second Burmese Wars (1824–26 and 1852), were motivated by the desire to strengthen the defenses of India, to secure key points on the eastern shores of the Indian Ocean, and also to obtain teak from Tenasserim and new markets for British manufactures.

French conquests in Cochin China (1862–67) and in Cambodia (1864) formed part of an elaborate project to gain control of the China trade via the Mekong River. When later exploration showed that this route was useless because of falls and rapids, the search for an alternative, via the Red River Valley, led to the conquest of Annam and Tonkin in 1882–85. In the end, the Red River proved to be no better for navigation than the Mekong, and the associated plan for short-circuiting the British route to China by a French-controlled canal across the Kra Isthmus of southern Thailand was also dropped because of the enormous cost it would have entailed. However, the French did succeed in 1910 in opening a meter-gauge (narrow-gauge) railway from Hai-phong through the mountains of Yunnan to Kunming. But elsewhere the many proposals put forward at this time, notably by British and German engineers, for building railway lines into southwestern China through either Burma or Thailand were all abandoned.

## BOUNDARIES

The two imperial powers gradually succeeded in reaching agreement to halt their territorial expansion in the peninsula as a whole. In particular, the British wished to preserve Thailand as a buffer state to guard their Indian Empire on the east as Afghanistan did on the west. Further, both British and French thought it desirable to block any possible Chinese encroachment southward at Thailand's expense. Accordingly, in 1893, the French seized the opportunity provided by a threatened Thai advance into the semi-

independent Laos states to establish their own control over the Laos plateau east of the Mekong. In 1896 an Anglo-French Convention accepted the Mekong line as the boundary between the Laotian territories thus acquired by France and the historically and culturally related Shan States (formerly feudal territories under the old Burmese kings), which, by 1890, the British had added to their domains in Burma. Thus China, which had already in 1885–86 been forced to abandon all claims to suzerainty over Annam, Tonkin, and parts of northern Burma, was cut off from direct contact with Thailand. Although China agreed to the delimitation of its boundary with Burma, this zone has been the subject of intermittent disputes ever since, and north of 26°45' it remains undemarcated.

In addition to the clauses accepting the Mekong boundary, the Anglo-French Convention of 1896 established separate British and French spheres of influence in Thailand. This arrangement, however, did not prevent further territorial encroachment on Thailand. In 1907 the French added Battambang to their Cambodian protectorate, and in 1909 the British obtained a transfer of Thai rights over the Malay states of Kelantan, Trengganu, Kedah, and Perlis, which were then added to the area already under British protection in Malaya.

As a result of these Western imperial rivalries, the political pattern of mainland Southeast Asia was completely transformed in the century preceding World War I. While Burma and Thailand survived as recognizable units—although Thailand had lost most of its outlying territories and Burma had become a mere province of India, from which it differed profoundly in both race and religion—the French-created Union of Indochina, which joined together the widely dissimilar territories of Cambodia, Laos, and the Annamite lands, lacked both historical precedent and geographical justification.

## BURMA

The territory that formerly comprised the British Indian province of Burma and now constitutes the Union of Burma covers an area of 261,789 square miles, which is slightly smaller than that of Texas. Total population in 1941 was 16,823,798; no postwar census has yet been taken, but a United Nations estimate in 1952 gave the total as 18,853,000.

Not all the population in the Union, established in January, 1948, is homogeneous. Marked differences in culture and institutions separate the Burmese<sup>4</sup> from the frontier people, who make up fourteen per cent of the population and inhabit forty-three per cent of the area. The Shans inhabit the northern plateau, known as the Shan States under British rule, and are closely related to the Thais in race and religion. A form of tribal rule still prevails in this area, as it does also in the Karenni region and in the Chin and Kachin districts. Of these hill folk the Karens, numbering more than 1,000,000, have migrated in large numbers into the plains of the Irrawaddy, the Sittang Delta, and down into Tenasserim.

Politically, the Karens feared the Burmese and, in 1949, led a revolt, during which they controlled most of the countryside before being defeated. To hold these disparate Burman peoples under one roof, the constitution of 1948 provides for a federation composed of Burma proper and several states which were the "Excluded Areas" under former British rule. Thus there exist the Shan states, the Kachin state (Myitkyina and Bhamo districts), and the Karenni state. All of these areas, as well as the Chins of the western mountains, have representation

in the Chamber of Nationalities in the Union and enjoy considerable autonomy in their home states. The attempt to win their co-operation even includes provision for their direct representation in the cabinet, a policy that appears to have wide support in the country.

### GEOGRAPHY

In broad outline Burma consists of a central lowland drained by the Irrawaddy, Chindwin, and Sittang rivers and surrounded on all sides, except the south, by rugged hills and mountains, which in the past have effectively isolated the country from contact with the outside world. Five main regions, three upland and two lowland, can be distinguished: the western and northern hills, the eastern plateaus, Tenasserim, the dry zone, and the Delta.

**UPLANDS**—The western and northern hills, forming the divide between Burma and India-Pakistan, are characterized by the steepness of their slopes and their extremely heavy rainfall (eighty to one hundred inches annually), which results from alignment athwart the rain-bearing monsoon winds from the Indian Ocean. The region is densely forested and malarial throughout and supports only a sparse population of primitive hill tribes, notably Chins and Nagas, who practice a form of shifting agriculture.

Conditions in the Kachin country of the northeast are generally similar to those just described, but farther south the largely limestone and crystalline plateaus of the Shan and Karenni states are much less heavily wooded and far more healthy. Annual rainfall here is around sixty to one hundred inches, and permanent cultivation of hill

<sup>4</sup> The term "Burman" applies to a member of the dominant cultural and linguistic group in contrast to "Burmese," the name for a national of the political area of Burma. Within Burma itself, however, these terms are used interchangeably.

rice is the normal practice among both Shans and Karens. Considerable mineral wealth is found in many parts of the plateau, and the silver-lead-zinc mines at Bawdwin, in the Shan states, and the tin-tungsten of Mawchi, in Karenni, were both important before World War II.

Structurally Tenasserim is a southward continuation of the eastern plateaus and, like them, contains valuable mineral deposits, especially tin and tungsten. Heavy rainfall permits the growing of rubber, but agriculture in general is mainly the subsistence cultivation of rice, which, supplemented by fish, constitutes the people's diet.

**LOWLANDS**—By far the most important parts of the country, both historically and economically, however, are the dry zone and the delta, which together comprise the central riverine lowlands. There are significant differences between the two regions. The delta is uniformly flat, has a heavy monsoonal rainfall, and is accessible to the sea. Here is found the present capital, metropolis, and major port of Burma—Rangoon, with slightly more than 500,000 inhabitants. By contrast, the dry zone in middle Burma around the Irrawaddy bend is undulating and has about one third the rainfall of the delta. Further, it has the country's economically important oil deposits. Mandalay, the largest center, has nearly 175,000 people and at the time of the British conquests in the nineteenth century was the capital of the kingdom under Burman rule.

## HISTORY

**BRITISH RULE**—Under British rule the dry zone in middle Burma no longer remained the seat of power. The Burmese kings were deposed, the new port city of Rangoon, virtually a British creation, became the capital, and the whole country focused on the delta. Although to an alien sea power con-

trol of the delta was obviously the key to control of the whole interior, economic factors also played a major part in this re-orientation. According to the doctrine of *laissez faire*, which in the mid-nineteenth century dominated British colonial thinking, Burma was encouraged to produce whatever export commodities would give the largest cash return and to spend the proceeds on British manufactures.

The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 made it profitable to export rice from Southeast Asia to Europe in bulk, within the period 1866-96 the rice acreage of Burma rose from 1,750,000 to 5,755,000. By 1941 it had expanded to 12,500,000 acres. In the same year the total production exceeded 7,000,000 tons of rice, of which 3,500,000 tons were exported, but mostly to India and Ceylon, rather than to Europe.

This vast increase in rice production took place primarily in the delta. Although other parts of Burma, including the dry zone, have continued to practice subsistence agriculture, with a considerable variety of crops, the delta has become essentially a monocultural region, its people concentrating on production for export in much the same way as farmers in the Canadian prairies concentrate on wheat. Moreover, the expansion in cultivation has been accompanied by a great influx of farming population into the delta, particularly Burmans from the dry zone and Karens from the eastern plateau.

In the expanding economy a lack of aptitude or experience in money matters on the part of the local peoples quickly attracted Indian traders, moneylenders, and shopkeepers. By the 1930's there were more than 1,000,000 Indians in Burma, mostly in the delta and the provincial towns, and their total investments even exceeded those of the British. Besides holding a commanding position in business enterprises, Indians had also taken advantage of Burmese indebtedness to obtain control over much of the

paddy land in the delta, in some districts of which seventy per cent of the land was owned by nonagriculturists<sup>5</sup>

Although Indians still form the largest alien group in Burma, many fled the country during the Japanese invasion, and the number remaining today is probably about 900,000. Members of the Chinese community number about 300,000, they are active in trade, in tin mining in Tenasserim, and to some extent in subsistence farming along the northeastern frontier.

The Japanese occupation of Burma during World War II, from March, 1942, until the spring of 1945, was accompanied by great material devastation, especially to transport and mining installations, from which the country has not yet recovered. Moreover, the lack of popular resistance to the Japanese, except in the later stages of the occupation, clearly revealed the weakness of the policies which had previously been followed. It is true that under British rule Burma had become the world's first exporter of rice and teak and an important producer of petroleum, lead, tin, and tungsten; but the greater part of the resultant wealth had gone into the hands of the British, Indians, and Chinese, and the Burmese were dissatisfied. Thus, although after the political separation of Burma from India in 1937 the British granted Burma a considerable measure of home rule, this did not remove the sense of grievance. Moreover, the British governor's retention of control over the frontier hill regions, inhabited by various minority groups, hindered the growth of full nationhood. After the defeat of Japan, therefore, Burma demanded a status of complete independence, outside the British Commonwealth, and the new constitution on this basis came into effect on August 1, 1948.

MODERN BURMA—In spite of much unrest, in part a carry-over from the chaos of war, the progress made by the new regime has been remarkable. Great changes have been made in the Burmese economy, and the current emphasis is on the eight-year "Pyidawtha" program for raising the standard of living. Under the 1948 Constitution the state was declared to be the ultimate owner of all lands, it alone could distribute lands among the people. The constitution provided further that no one individual could be allotted more than fifty acres. Redistribution of approximately one third of the total farmland has already begun. Since 1945 the rice export trade, formerly under Indian and British control, has been a government monopoly, but total production remains below that of prewar years (5,740,000 tons in 1952-53), and Burma has dropped to second place among the exporting countries. Nationalization has been extended to river and air transportation, and, according to the Constitution, all forests, fisheries, minerals, and sources of natural energy are to be preserved for exploitation by the Union of Burma or its nationals.

Before the war the need for further industrialization was a favorite theme of Burmese nationalists, and, in fact, prewar industry consisted almost solely of rice milling and the initial processing of petroleum, metals, and timber. Since independence the early hopes of establishing large-scale textile and engineering factories have been somewhat subdued by experience. As yet, Burma possesses neither the skills nor the capital for such ventures, and, furthermore, the relatively small size of its market means that industries of this kind would have to operate behind high tariff walls, which would defeat the whole purpose of raising living standards. Nevertheless, there is scope for more processing to be done within the country and for at least some development of textiles and other simple kinds of consumers' goods industries.

<sup>5</sup> The bulk of the Indian investment, in urban and rural areas, was in the hands of the Chettyars, a banking group from Madras.

In addition, the Pyidawtha plan favors the revival of the traditional cottage handicraft industries, which, though they suffered badly in the past from competition with Western manufactures, have by no means died out completely. The further development of such crafts as spinning, weaving, boat building, and pottery-making should help to diversify the peasant economy and reduce the former acute dependence of millions on the unpredictable fluctuations in the selling price of rice. Economically, therefore, the prospects for Burma are not discouraging, future prosperity, however, will inevitably depend on political stability and developments both at home and abroad.

The new government has placed great emphasis on the role of Buddhism as a unifying force in national life. In 1954 the sixth great Buddhist council (the first since 1870) was held near Rangoon and attended by representatives from the other Hinayana<sup>6</sup>

Buddhist countries, namely, Ceylon, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia. To a considerable extent the influence of Buddhism has modified the official Marxism, which the government claims is the basis of its national policy.

Some of Burma's most pressing problems are posed by its Indian and Chinese groups. While both the numbers and the influence of the Indians have declined somewhat since 1942, the rulers of Burma have reason to regard with anxiety the growing influence of Communist China in Southeast Asia. Especially is this true since the establishment in 1953 of Thai and Kachin Autonomous Districts on the Chinese side of the disputed northeastern boundary. In 1956 Chinese Communist forces actually occupied an area of over 1,000 square miles in northern Burma adjacent to China. Any major expansion of Chinese control in Burma would be aided by the presence of some 300,000 Chinese at key points inside Burma.

## THAILAND

### COMPARISON WITH BURMA

No two countries are more alike than Burma and Thailand. Although its total area of 198,271 square miles is smaller than that of Burma, Thailand's population of 19,192,000 in 1952 (United Nations estimate) is almost identical with that of its neighbor. Similarly, over eighty per cent of its inhabitants are Hinayana Buddhists. Moreover, in its physical pattern, consisting of a central lowland flanked by mountains, with a long narrow appendage extending to the south, Thailand forms a kind of mirror image of

Burma (see map on page 565). Climatically the resemblances between the corresponding parts of the two countries are equally pronounced. Finally, in the economic field, Thailand is characterized by the same predominance of one great city (Bangkok, 1,115,000), the same importance of inland water transportation, and the dangerous tendency to overconcentration on rice cultivation.

Since World War II Thailand has surpassed Burma as the world's leading exporter of rice, which forms forty-five per cent of its total export. The remaining items of export consist mostly of rubber, tin, and teak. Thus little basis exists for mutual trade between Burma and Thailand, and it is not surprising that the only railway be-

<sup>6</sup> Hinayana (the "little way") represents the older, ascetic tradition in Buddhism in contrast with the Mahayana (a more socialized form), which spread through the Orient.

tween the two, which was built for strategic reasons by the Japanese during 1942-43, should have been closed soon after the war. Because of their very similarity, therefore, Thailand and Burma carry over into the economic sphere today their traditional historic rivalries, which go back many centuries. Nevertheless, there are important differences between the two countries and a brief sketch of the regional and human geography of Thailand will illustrate some of these.

#### GEOGRAPHIC REGIONS

Four main geographic regions may be distinguished: the northern, eastern, southern, and central portions of the country.

**NORTHERN THAILAND**—The northern part of the country consists of dissected plateau country, as described on page 567, and is generally similar to the Shan States and Laos, which adjoin it. During the Japanese occupation two of the Shan States, Kengtung and Mongpan, as well as the part of Laos lying west of the Mekong, were annexed by Thailand but have since been handed back (see map on page 573). Ethnically the modern Shan, Lao, and Thai peoples are extremely closely related, and in northern and northeastern Thailand it is impossible to draw any precise boundaries between them. Essentially this region is one of subsistence agriculture, although teak is exploited commercially.

**EASTERN THAILAND**—Sometimes known as the Korat Plateau, the eastern sector of Thailand is essentially a shallow basin of sandstones and shales, draining eastward via the Nam Mun River into the Mekong. Infertile soils and a low and uncertain rainfall explain why the subsistence farming of this region supports the lowest standard of living in any part of the country. Although the great majority of its 6,000,000 people are Thais, the border districts contain many

Laotians and Cambodians, and there have been boundary disputes here between Thailand and Indochina. Most recent of these was the temporary annexation by Thailand of considerable portions of the Battambang, Siemreap, and Sisophon districts of Cambodia from 1941 to 1945.

**SOUTHERN THAILAND**—From about the latitude of Bangkok the southern geographic region stretches southward for some 600 miles, reaching the Malayan border only six degrees north of the Equator. In the northern half of this region Thailand controls only the eastern strip, but south of Victoria Point its rule extends across the full width of the isthmus. Although there has been no serious talk in recent years of reviving the Kra Canal project of the nineteenth century, the British insisted on including a clause in the postwar treaty with Thailand, signed on January 1, 1946, forbidding the building of any canal "linking the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Siam."

Both ethnically and economically the southern part of this region has more in common with Malaya than with the rest of Thailand, its population including some 650,000 Moslem Malays who are resentful of Thai rule. Commercially this area is important as a producer of tin and rubber. It was in this vicinity that the last of Thailand's wartime territorial gains was made when the Japanese "restored" Thailand's control over the four northernmost states of British Malaya. Here again, however, the territories concerned have been handed back, and today the Thai authorities are co-operating with the British to prevent the movement of Communist terrorists across the Thai-Malayan frontier.

**CENTRAL THAILAND**—The large alluvial plain and delta of the Menam-Chao-Phraya, in the heart of the country, is by far the most important of the four geographic regions. Although a much shorter river than the Irrawaddy, the Menam has a wider valley,



which, in respect of both soils and climate, is as well suited for paddy cultivation as the corresponding region in Burma. During their historic migration southward the Thai people advanced their capital on several occasions. From the fourteenth century until 1767 it remained at Ayutthaya, on the edge of the delta, then it was again moved still farther south to Bangkok. Around the turn of the last century, the Menam Valley, and especially the delta, underwent a process of intensive agricultural development similar to that in lower Burma. Bangkok, like Rangoon, expanded equally rapidly as a cosmopolitan port city and the focus of the national railway network.

#### MODERN THAILAND

The modern development of Thailand has differed in several important respects from that of Burma. Because of a relatively isolated situation away from the main sea routes and because of a skillful ruling house, which successfully played off the British against the French, Thailand was able to maintain political independence. As a result, anti-European sentiments, which elsewhere still present a major stumbling block to cooperation with the West, are largely absent in modern-day Thailand.

Freedom from external domination, however, has not placed the native Thais in any more favorable position than the Burmese in respect to the role played by Chinese and Indians. By the 1930's the Chinese community, whose total investments in Thailand were believed to exceed those of all the European powers combined, virtually monopolized internal retail trade and the fishing industry and had entered the fields of tin, rubber, and teak production. In an effort to correct this condition the government has within the last quarter century imposed innumerable restrictions on the activities of the Chinese and encouraged Thai nationals to play a larger part in commerce


and various small processing and consumers' goods industries.

A bloodless revolution in 1932, while restricting the commercial activities of the Chinese in favor of nationals, led to the growth of a Pan-Thai movement. On somewhat controversial historical or ethnic grounds, an effort was made to bring various parts of nearby Burma, Indochina, and Malaya under the rule of Bangkok. Even though some of these claims were only temporarily satisfied during the period of Japanese dominance in South Asia, Thailand's neighbors have not forgotten this interlude, despite the restoration of the status quo at the end of the war.

#### POSTWAR PROBLEMS

During World War II the Thais displayed their traditional diplomatic flexibility by keeping on the right side, first of the Japanese and later of the Allies. In so doing they avoided serious material damage to their country and also preserved the continuity of government. Thus in the years that followed they were able to profit from the chaos in rival rice-producing lands, notably Burma and Indochina, and as a result enjoyed considerable prosperity. No major social upheaval has taken place, nor on economic grounds does anything of this sort appear likely. Basically the peasantry are contented, the pressure of population (ninety-seven to the square mile) on the land is not acute. In the meantime, economic as well as political ties with the West—especially with the United States—have been greatly strengthened, and Thailand has come to be regarded as both the focus and the main stabilizing factor on the Southeast Asian mainland.

It would, however, be misleading to ignore the serious problems that remain unsolved. In particular, the allegiance of the Chinese minority of some 3,000,000, the largest single alien community in all South-



east Asia, is a matter of continuing uncertainty. Postwar attempts to restrict further immigration and to remove Chinese settlers from certain strategic localities, notably near the Malayan frontier, have helped in some degree to restrain the power of the community, but its immense influence in Bangkok and its stranglehold on the national economy have not been notably weakened. Certainly the absence of direct physical contiguity with China is no guarantee against attack or infiltration through the weak and poorly organized territories of Laos and the Shan States.

Furthermore, the presence of a Lao minority, as well as of groups of Cambodians and Vietnamese, in certain of the northern

and eastern border provinces may prove embarrassing as the Communist position in both Yunnan and northern Indochina becomes consolidated. Since 1953 Communist China has actively sponsored a union of all the Thai peoples under the leadership of the Autonomous District of Yunnan—a device aimed at expanding China's power in northern Thailand.

In the face of these dangers Thailand has aligned itself unmistakably with the West by participating in the Manila Defense Treaty, signed on September 8, 1954. In a strategic sense this is a truly revolutionary development, for it implies that the country is being transformed from a buffer zone into a bulwark of the free world.

## INDOCHINA

### DIVERSITY OF INDOCHINA

Both in its area, approximately 285,640 square miles, and in population, now estimated at some 34,000,000, Indochina is the largest country on the Southeast Asian mainland. Because of its physical structure and close historical connections with the rest of the peninsula, it inevitably shows many resemblances to Burma and Thailand. Thus there is a marked concentration of population in the alluvial lowlands, in which over four fifths of the people live on only one eighth of the total area. Also the economy is predominantly agrarian, with a dangerously heavy emphasis on rice as the major export. The rice-growing areas form two ends of a long pole extending along the coastal region.

In contrast to Burma and Thailand, however, the Union of Indochina is largely a creation of the nineteenth century, and since it is without the benefit of a political maturation process, this largely artificial unit is in process of disintegrating. The loosely knit

country includes three quite distinct national units, namely, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. The last two of these have cultural and, especially, religious affinities with Thailand, but the Annamites are much closer to China in these respects.<sup>7</sup> Thus the Annamites do not subscribe to the Hinayana form of Buddhism, and their hybrid religion includes elements of Confucianism, Taoism, animism, and Mahayana Buddhism. Moreover, their methods of rice cultivation and their skill in dike building, both of which may be attributed to early Chinese influence, have given them advantages over their immediate neighbors. History records a slow but steady Annamite advance southward, until the Annamites formed seventy per cent of the total population.

Although both Cambodians and Laotians

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<sup>7</sup> Vietnam, the traditional name for the Annamite lands (Tonkin, Annam, and Cochin China), was not used by the French, but since World War II it has been revived as the official name for this area.

have developed a traditional dislike for the Annamites, the three groups were united by France between 1887 and 1893, to form the nominally federal Union of Indochina. For all practical purposes administration was centralized, first from Saigon and later from Hanoi, which latter became the capital around the turn of the century. However, centralized control did not obliterate the regional and national differences, and today these are more pronounced than ever.

## REGIONS

**RED RIVER DELTA OF TONKIN**—Because of its long history of continuous settlement, the rich land area of the Red River in the north (Tonkin) carries much the highest population density of any part of Indochina. Apart from the urban population of Hanoi (217,000), Haplong (176,000), and other lesser centers, the rural density of the delta proper averages some 1,250 to the square mile. With such enormous pressure on the land, all the rice, supplemented by such other food crops as potatoes, beans, and vegetables, is consumed locally. Even so, it is not sufficient to meet the needs of the region, and under French control considerable quantities of rice were imported from Cochin China, the alternate food-producing area. In the land bordering the delta to the north, various minerals, notably tin, zinc, and, especially anthracite coal have been worked for many years.

**ANNAM**—The Red River Delta is bounded on the south by the Annamite Chain, which supports only a very sparse settlement of primitive Mois. A narrow coastal plain, interrupted at innumerable points by spurs branching off from the mountain backbone, extends south to merge ultimately with the Mekong Delta. This intervening stretch of mountain and coastline corresponds roughly to the political subdivision of Annam, whose capital, Hué (45,000), was in prewar days

the residence of the Emperor of Annam. Politically both Annam and Tonkin were ranked as protectorates, in contrast to Cochin China, which had the status of a colony.

**MEKONG DELTA OF COCHIN CHINA**—Compared with Tonkin the even larger delta of the Mekong is an area of far more recent exploitation and shows many characteristics of a frontier region. Rural population density here is only about 250 to the square mile, and consequently holdings are much larger. Much of the land has been brought under the plow for the first time as a result of large drainage and irrigation schemes introduced by the French. Before the war this particular delta yielded four fifths of the total Indochinese rice export of 1,500,000 tons. As in Thailand, the rice trade is almost completely controlled by Chinese merchants, and over three quarters of the 500,000 Chinese in the country live either in Cochin China or nearby Cambodia, by far the greatest concentrations being in Saigon-Cholon. These two cities, situated only a few miles apart, each had prewar populations of about 200,000, but since then the numbers have been swollen by refugees to a joint total now estimated at 1,600,000.

**CAMBODIA**—To the northwest of the Mekong Delta lies Cambodia, consisting for the most part of an extensive inland basin centering on the Great Lake (Tonlé Sap). Although Cambodians trace their descent to the Khmers, builders of the largest and most magnificent of the ancient empires on the Southeast Asian mainland, the modern inhabitants are a more easy-going people than the Annamites. Their decline may well be attributable to the cumulative effect of debilitating insect-borne diseases in this badly drained area rather than to any cultural decline. Nevertheless, there are wide expanses of excellent agricultural land, and, with an average rural density of only about forty per square mile, the country is far

from being overpopulated, although many peasants are badly in debt to the ubiquitous Chinese merchants. Under French rule the Cambodian kingdom was a protectorate, its capital, Pnom Penh (260,000), is still the only important city.

**LAOS**—In almost all respects the series of small principalities that the French united to form the protected kingdom of Laos recall the Shan States of Burma. Like the latter, Laos is essentially a plateau region, although the largest concentrations of inhabitants, who are sedentary cultivators, are in the more fertile valleys. A variety of Moi and other more primitive tribes occupy the higher ranges, where they practice various forms of shifting agriculture. Owing to its inaccessibility as a landlocked country, Laos has been little developed economically, although its potential mineral wealth, notably tin, is significant.

#### FRENCH RULE

During the period of colonial rule, France never entertained the idea of self-rule or independence for Indochina; rather, exploitation of the country for the benefit of the mother country was the goal of French policy. To peoples of such rich and diverse historical traditions as the inhabitants of Indochina this colonial policy had little appeal, especially to the Annamites, who proved openly antagonistic to French domination. Economically the policy was no more successful, for, although Indochina was a potential market for certain French manufactures, the natural outlets for Indochina's rice and coal were largely in neighboring Asia. For this reason, some attempts were made to develop the production of rubber, silk, corn, spices, and coffee, primarily for export to Metropolitan France. Nevertheless, the net effect of French economic policy was that in prewar days Indochina, although larger and more populous than any other

country in the region, had the smallest overseas trade of all

As in neighboring countries, Japanese occupation of Indochina during World War II provided the opportunity for latent and suppressed nationalism to assert itself. Although at first the Japanese treated Indochina as "friendly occupied territory" and worked through the existing French authorities, a change took place in March, 1945, when the French were interned and "independence within the Co-prosperity Sphere" was proclaimed. Very significantly the Japanese promoted not one but three new national regimes, respectively, in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, under the rule of the three reigning monarchs who had previously been under French protection.

Thus, for the first time since the nineteenth century, Indochina was split up into its component national and ethnic units. A military decision at the end of the war effected a cleavage of a different kind when Chinese Nationalists were permitted to occupy the area north of the sixteenth parallel while British Indian forces were left south of the demarcation line

**POSTWAR DISINTEGRATION**—Both of the divisions just mentioned have in essence been preserved by more recent developments. At first the returning French tried to reconstruct the supposed unity of Indochina as a subfederation within the greater federation of the French Union. This both the Cambodians and the Laotians—who are deeply hostile to the Annamites—resisted, despite the inclination of their leaders to look to the French for protection against their stronger and more virile neighbors.

The Annamite lands presented a much more difficult problem. After the defeat of Japan, in 1945, Bao Dai, the Annamite Emperor, abdicated, and control of Vietnam passed into the hands of the Communist leader Ho Chi Minh, who was able to establish his regime firmly in the north before

the Nationalist Chinese occupation forces finally completed their withdrawal. Thereafter Ho Chi Minh's *de facto* government,<sup>8</sup> capitalizing on anti-French feelings and economic discontent succeeded in starting a movement for independence. Failure to come to terms with France led to a long period of guerrilla warfare, which prevented the French from regaining more than a precarious foothold beyond Hanoi and the coastal area.

In the meantime, however, France managed to resume control over most of southern Vietnam, as well as of Cambodia and Laos. To meet the challenge from the north, however, France established an elaborate structure granting nominal independence to the three countries as Associated States within the French Union. At the same time a pro-French Vietnamese regime under Bao Dai opposed the claims of Ho Chi Minh as ruler of Vietnam. While these arrangements partly met the demands of Cambodia and Laos, the French Union forces were unable to dislodge the Viet Minh irregulars from the north where their strategic position was greatly strengthened following the consolidation of Communist power in the adjacent provinces of China. The costly nine-year struggle finally compelled the French to seek a negotiated settlement, including a cease-fire agreement, which was concluded at Geneva in July, 1954.

#### INDEPENDENCE

According to the terms of the Geneva agreement a military demarcation line divided Vietnam just south of the 17th Parallel and provided for the regroupment of military forces to the north and south. An international commission was charged with

the task of supervising the armistice terms. This division was not intended to be a political partition, and provision was made for elections within two years to establish an all-Vietnam government. At the end of the two-year period, however, no election was held. In the light of postwar conditions this "temporary" partition may well prove to be as lasting as that in Korea; certainly it is no less artificial. Ethnically and historically Vietnam is one country, and, like Korea, its two halves are largely complementary in an economic sense. The present line divides the country into fairly equal portions, with the north containing approximately 15,000,000 people and the South, 13,000,000. The north contains Hanoi and the port of Haiphong, the south has Saigon. Nevertheless, the north is a food-deficit area, and economically the south, with its rice and rubber surpluses, is in the stronger position. The north may well utilize the Hanoi-Kunming railway and work out close economic ties with southern China. Tactically the Communists have undoubtedly made a major advance with the acquisition of the Tonkin Delta.

The status of Laos and Cambodia is more difficult to assess. Under the Geneva terms both states are neutralized except for the retention of defense forces. In Laos, however, local Communist forces remained in control of two northern provinces. This situation and the internal weakness of Cambodia and Laos (whose populations number only 4,100,000 and 1,500,000, respectively), make the stability of the present governments most precarious. Still, both states are determined to preserve their independence in opposition to French influence and control. To some degree the Southeast Asia defense treaty, signed at Manila, is intended to provide an umbrella of protection as part of the collective defense plan for Southeast Asia.

<sup>8</sup> Known to the West as the Viet Minh regime, its official title is People's Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

## Study Questions

1. Contrast the railroad and airways pattern of mainland Southeast Asia.
2. Which are the main areas inhabited by the Lao-Thai-Shan peoples?
3. Why do Burma, Thailand, and Indochina together form the "rice bowl" of Asia?
4. Describe the main features of the population pattern of mainland Southeast Asia.
5. Why has no major state grown up centering in the valley of the Salween River?
6. Discuss the advantages and disadvantages to Burma of her separation from India.
7. Describe the character and functions of Rangoon.
8. Trace the effects of Indian culture in Burma.
9. Outline the major differences in economy between the delta and the dry zone in Burma.
10. Should the Malay territories of southern Thailand be incorporated into the Federation of Malaya?
11. Assess the importance of the Chinese in the economic and political life of Thailand.
12. Identify the main geographic regions of Thailand. What are the principal criteria used in delineating them?
13. Is there any geographic basis for the partition of Vietnam?
14. What were the ties between Indochina and China before the coming of the French?
15. What was the importance of Indochina to the economy of the French Union?

## CHAPTER THIRTY-THREE

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# *Indonesia and Malaya*

The Malay Peninsula and the islands of modern Indonesia lie athwart the Western World's lifeline between the Indian and the Pacific oceans. This vast area of tropical land and water extends through fifty-five degrees of longitude and fifteen degrees of latitude. From northwestern Sumatra to easternmost New Guinea is approximately 4,000 miles, a distance equivalent to that

between New York and Paris or between southern Greenland and northern Venezuela. For centuries this area was a scene of international rivalry among European powers, but only since the Pacific War of 1941-45 has the United States become keenly aware of its strategic importance; recent events have made it an area of major political importance as well.

### THE MALAY ARCHIPELAGO

On a map the Malay Peninsula and the islands extending eastward from it appear as giant steppingstones between the mainland of Southeast Asia and the continent of Australia (see map on page 580). This geographical area has been termed the Malay Archipelago. Most of it lies within the limits of the new Indonesian republic, which coincides geographically with the Nether-


lands Indies before World War II,<sup>1</sup> except that western New Guinea is excluded from the new republic. Also, although most of Borneo is under the Indonesian flag, the northwestern part of this large island, namely, North Borneo, Sarawak, and Brunei,

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<sup>1</sup> Commonly designated as Netherlands East Indies or Dutch East Indies.



is British. Portuguese Timor,<sup>2</sup> western New Guinea (Dutch), and the eastern part of New Guinea and the Bismarck Archipelago (administered by Australia under a United Nations trusteeship) further add to the political complexity of the Indonesian area. Malaya is the term applied to that portion of the Malay Peninsula that lies south of Thailand. It consists of the Federation of Malaya<sup>3</sup> and the British crown colony of Singapore.



The Malay Archipelago connects two continents, but, more significantly, it lies between two oceans. The shortest route for ships bound from Europe or southern Asia to ports of eastern Asia is through the Strait of Malacca. Hence trade routes converge on Singapore, a natural entrepôt for Southeast Asia.<sup>4</sup> Air travel, too, tends to focus on this region, but Singapore is only one of the major foci of international air routes. Bangkok, Hong Kong, and Manila likewise are

major centers, and eight or more international airlines serve each of these four major cities on the fringe of the South China Sea.

The Malay realm has consistently been an area of international conflict. Over the centuries European powers have struggled for the control of commerce and trade in the area. The resultant effort to establish favorable shipping lanes pointed up the significance of the Malacca Strait area. The British and Dutch built up the strongest imperial interests in this part of the world. The eventual mutual trust of these two powers was an important factor in the development of the area, for after two centuries of active rivalry, the two nations compromised their differences in the Treaty of London, 1824. The Dutch conceded to the British commercial and strategic advantage at Singapore in return for British withdrawal of territorial claims in the Netherlands East Indies, an arrangement which served to relieve the Dutch of burdensome defense costs. A strong Singapore, still a necessity to British commercial interests, materially aided Dutch sovereignty in the area.

Currently, the conflict is largely one of ideologies. A rising tide of nationalism is sweeping Asia. Former colonial possessions are demanding and receiving independent political status, despite the difficulty of establishing stable regimes in a rapidly changing political scene. Where power is being transferred from imperial rule to native control, Communist leaders have scored notable gains by exploitation of the residue of anti-imperialist sentiment that is the heritage of centuries of European rule in southern Asia. Economically, strategically, and politically, the Malay Archipelago is of major interest to the Western World.

<sup>2</sup> Portuguese Timor (7,883 square miles, 1940 population 438,000) comprises the eastern half of Timor Island and the exclave of Oe-Cusse (Okusi Ambeno) in the western Indonesian sector.

<sup>3</sup> The former Federated Malay States, Unfederated Malay States, and Straits Settlements.

<sup>4</sup> Singapore has not always been the control point of the area; Malacca, farther north on the Malay Peninsula, and Palembang and Djambi on Sumatra have, at one time or another, controlled shipping through the strait.

## REGIONAL SIMILARITIES AND CONTRASTS

**PHYSICAL SETTING**—The Malay Archipelago is an example of a large equatorial region

in which approach by sea renders the component parts sufficiently accessible from any direction. Great as is the size of the total land areas, the handicap to commerce imposed by long distances is offset by the mobility of water transportation on quiet, protected seas. Forested mountains and coastal swamps have been by-passed or penetrated by seas and straits, elsewhere tropical rivers provide a natural pathway through swamp-land and forest area. The waterways that provide the easiest lines of communication for the indigenous peoples made this tropical realm equally accessible to foreigners, whether they came to conquer and colonize or to trade and barter for the native wealth.

*Relief* The physiographic features of the Malay Archipelago present a pattern of great complexity (see map on page 583). Although in the Malay Peninsula itself elevations seldom exceed 5,000 feet, the mountain ranges extending through the islands have peaks in excess of 10,000 feet in elevation, culminating in the mountains of New Guinea, which tower over 16,000 feet. A number of the peaks in Indonesia are volcanic cones. The area is one of considerable volcanic activity, and many thousands of people have been killed by earthquakes and volcanic eruptions. In 1883 two thirds of the island of Krakatoa, located between Java and Sumatra, were blown away in one of the greatest eruptions in modern history. In contrast to their destructive effects, the volcanoes are responsible for the extremely fertile soil found in much of the upland areas of Indonesia.

The Malay Archipelago, however, is not all high mountain ranges; much of the area lies at an elevation varying between 1,000 and 5,000 feet. Heavy precipitation accelerates the active stream erosion, which has left little level land, except isolated areas of recent volcanic activity or islands uplifted from the sea. Large areas of low elevation are con-

fined to the eastern portion of Sumatra and to southern Borneo and southern New Guinea.

*Climatic Factors.* All of the Malay Archipelago lies within ten degrees of the Equator. The tropical location and the interruption of land areas by water account for a uniform temperature regime that prevails throughout the year. Temperature differences, then, are largely due to elevation rather than to seasonal changes. For example, the annual range of temperature at Singapore is about three degrees, at Djakarta,<sup>5</sup> two degrees, and at Padang, on the west coast of Sumatra, only one degree. Nevertheless, there is a wide variety of environmental contrasts from area to area. Climatic conditions change abruptly from coastal plains to, and beyond, nearby mountains. Tropical rain-forest conditions lie at the base of cold, foggy mountain peaks, or only a short distance from desert cacti in Portuguese Timor, or from protected grasslands in New Guinea.

Rainfall exerts greater influence than temperature upon indigenous plants and cultivated agriculture, and it is the rainfall regime, rather than quantity, that is the critical factor. Basically, almost all the area is classified as tropical rain forest, but eastern Java, southern New Guinea, and most of the islands between them have a savanna regime. Precipitation varies from more than 175 inches a year on parts of Sumatra to less than sixty inches on the eastern islands near Australia. Singapore has an average of ninety-three inches, and Djakarta, seventy-one inches, these figures being reasonably representative of lowland stations in the tropical rain-forest realm.

*Natural Resources.* Forest and mineral resources are varied. The heavy and rather uniformly distributed rainfall, together with

<sup>5</sup> Formerly known as Batavia (Java) during the period of Dutch administration.

consistently high temperatures, encourages continuous plant growth and an extremely varied flora, on Borneo, for example, at least 11,000 species have been listed. There are two primary lowland forest regions. (1) Over most of the area where there is no dry season or only a very short dry season the natural vegetation is a lush, tall, broad-leaf, evergreen cover called tropical rain forest, which makes up the commercial forest of the Malay Archipelago. (2) In areas characterized by several consecutive months that are rainless or practically without rain, a shorter, more open, deciduous broadleaf forest predominates. It may consist of scattered trees interspersed among savanna grasslands. This tropical deciduous forest, sometimes called "savanna forest" or "monsoon forest," has fewer species and is of less commercial value than the tropical rain forest.

Some of the mineral resources are of only local importance, for example, the low-grade coal of Sumatra and Borneo. But many of the minerals are of major strategic importance; these include the tin of Malaya, Biliton, and Bangka, bauxite in Bintan (opposite Singapore), iron ore in Malaya, sulfur and manganese in Java, nickel in Celebes, and the petroleum resources of Borneo, Sumatra, Java, and the western part of New Guinea.

**POPULATION AND SETTLEMENT**—Lands of the Malayan Archipelago have experienced wave upon wave of ethnic migrations from Asia and Europe. As a result there has been a continuous intermingling of population types. Some of the purest racial strains include the oldest and most primitive inhabitants, who have been pushed into the most inaccessible portions of the area, as, for example, the Negritos of New Guinea. The representative Indonesian inhabitant portrays a confusion of racial character, with the latest Asian immigrants providing the dominant traits.

Population figures of this area are as im-

pressive as its areal extent. Eighty-nine million people, somewhat close to the total for Japan, inhabit the area. Within the region population patterns are most complex. Java and Madura together have an average density of 818 per square mile, to qualify as one of the most intensely populated regions of the world, but Indonesia as a whole has a density of only eighty-three persons per square mile. Marked local variation in density is not unusual, Java is often pictured as distressingly overcrowded, yet small parts of the island are virtually without people. In contrast, Sumatra, with an average density of sixty-four per square mile, has small mountain basins where the density of population rivals that of Java or of the rice-producing lowlands of China.

The people of both Malaya and Indonesia are predominantly rural-minded. They are basically village dwellers and rice cultivators. Most of the people in the cities are laborers who live on the urban fringe, where the local communities are not markedly different from the agricultural villages. As elsewhere in the East, truly dispersed settlement is unusual. The agricultural hamlet is, in many ways, a commercial entity wherein the individual is strongly dependent upon his family, relative, or neighbor, to whom he is inclined to give first loyalty.

*Cities and Urban Growth.* Equatorial regions rarely support the large cities that generally accompany industrialization. This statement, however, must be modified to account for the steady growth of cities in Malaya and western Indonesia. In Malaya, Kuala Lumpur and Penang have more than 100,000 inhabitants; Singapore, the commercial entrepôt, has more than 1,000,000 people. Java has six cities with more than 200,000: estimated populations are Djakarta, 2,250,000; Surabaya, 1,500,000; Semarang, 250,000; Bandung, 600,000; Surakarta, 200,000; Djogjakarta, 1,500,000; and Palembang, on Sumatra, 150,000.

Most of the cities in the Malay Archi-

[illegible]

pelago center around commercial trade; they are port cities, or they serve as supply centers for the extractive industries—for example, in Malaya. Geographically, well-established cities are located along the periphery of the mainland and within the coastal lowlands. Both in Malaya and Indonesia excellent railways and roads connect the main cities and link them with chief ports. The inland cities of Java—for example, Bandung—are located in fertile but high plain areas where there are favorable climatic conditions. The growth of urban population centers that are associated with indus-

trial development is fairly recent. In Malaya such centers are few, dependent upon the smelting of tin and the canning of pineapples. In Indonesia manufacturing is more widespread and, owing to the pressure of population in certain sections, more significant. A major stimulus to manufacturing came between the two world wars, when trade restriction and reduced purchasing power forced Netherlands East Indies to set up local industries. Foreign companies also opened branch factories, and the Republic itself has supported an industrialization program.

## INDONESIA


The independence of Indonesia was proclaimed at Djakarta on August 17, 1945, following the Japanese surrender. The organization of the United States of Indonesia, however, was not officially attained until late in 1949, when Queen Juliana of the Netherlands signed the charter that transferred the sovereignty of the Netherlands East Indies (except western New Guinea) to the Indonesian people. This significant proclamation was decided upon only after prolonged negotiation at The Hague Round Table Conference that defined the nature of the new state and its relation to the Netherlands. The four-year interval between 1945 and 1949 was one of desperate struggle to establish political unity within the islands and thus to prevent the restoration of the Netherlands' government.

### INDONESIAN INDEPENDENCE

The Dutch had ruled their colonies in the East Indies with greater concern for economic development than for the preparation of the people of the islands for the responsibilities of self-rule. The administration of the islands was in the hands of a governor-

general appointed by the Crown. There was, however, concession to the extent that native officials were allowed to perform some functions of government under Dutch supervision. In the early part of the twentieth century, the Indonesians, influenced by events in China and by knowledge that the Philippines under direction of the United States were advancing toward independence, likewise made demands for self-government. The Dutch, in 1917, partly met this demand by agreeing to the creation of a legislative assembly. This assembly, however, which was largely an appointed body, had only advisory powers. It did not satisfy the Indonesians nor abate the growing spirit of nationalism and the demand for actual self-government.

When, during World War II, the Japanese overran all the East India islands, they sought to bring the people of the islands into their own sphere, and to this end they encouraged the nationalist spirit as a means of weaning the islands away from their former Dutch rulers. At the end of the war, as Japanese troops surrendered, the nationalist leaders in the islands proclaimed a republic in August, 1945, and organized forces



in Java, Madura, and Sumatra to fight for their independence. At this point British troops paved the way for the re-entry of the Dutch, a fact which in itself intensified and solidified Indonesian resistance to foreign rule. The islands of Java and Sumatra, the nucleus of the new Republic, became the scene of warfare; but other islands of the group were held in subjection by Australian troops. In these latter islands—Borneo, Celebes, Moluccas, and the Lesser Sundas—the Dutch continued to organize, hoping thereby to counterbalance the weight of Java and Sumatra.

At The Hague, the Crown offered some concessions to Indonesia but ignored the demand for independence of the islands. Dutch military strength and British pressure compelled the rebels to consent to negotiation, looking toward a new political status of the islands. At Linggajati (Cheribon), in Java, an agreement was reached in 1947 that gave *de facto* recognition to the government of Java, Madura, and Sumatra. Implementation of the Linggajati Agreement failed to materialize, owing to mutual suspicions and recriminations. Despite outright military action the Dutch forces were unable to extinguish the life of the new Republic. Even the blockade of ports, an act producing considerable economic distress for the Republic, failed to subdue an aroused populace. In August, 1947, the United Nations Security Council

requested a cessation of hostilities. The request was ignored, but it underscored the need for peaceful settlement. Eventually a truce and cease-fire agreement were arranged under a United Nations Committee of Good Offices.

The structure of the new Republic and the limits of its territorial jurisdiction were matters of direct concern to the nationalists and the Netherlands government between 1946 and 1949. Semiautonomous units in Borneo and the eastern islands organized their own governments and, as regional states, clashed with the new government at Djogjakarta.<sup>6</sup> Finally, with complicated pressure from the United Nations, as well as from Asian countries, a United States of Indonesia was created on December 27, 1949. On this date the existing Republic became a member of a federation which comprised the whole Indonesian archipelago, except Netherlands New Guinea. Necessity impelled the adoption of federalism as the price of creating Indonesia and transferring sovereignty from The Hague.

**SHIFT TO UNITARY STRUCTURE**—The task of operating a federalist state, as outlined in the provisional constitution of 1949, proved too difficult in view of the rising dissensions

<sup>6</sup> A city in south Central Java, Djogjakarta served as the temporary capital of the embattled republic until, with The Hague settlement in 1949, the government moved to Djakarta on the north coast.

and the threats to law and order. Indonesia had had little experience with a federal system, and the constitution of 1949 was unwieldy in character; it resembled, according to critics, that of old Dutch colonialism. Only a unitary structure seemed to offer prospects of a stable rule. Thus, on August 14, 1950, the new constitution abolished federalism in favor of a unitary nation-state of ten provinces (see map on page 585). With this act the name was officially changed to the Republic of Indonesia, and thereby the last of the autonomous units were brought under direct political control of the central government.

**INTERNAL PROBLEMS**—Political events attendant on the formation of the new nation have demanded most of the attention of the national government, and as a result various domestic problems have developed and multiplied. The ethnic complexity of the Republic seriously hampers the problem of political unification. Although Bahasa Indonesia, the official language, is understood by at least some persons in every part of the nation, actually more than twenty-five major tongues are spoken, the most important being Javanese, Sudanese, and Madurese. The bulk of the Indonesians are Moslems, but there exist large Christian, Buddhist, and Brahmin minorities, who were not politically integrated into the new nation. In some areas of Indonesia the authority of the central government was unrecognized or completely ignored in the early years. In western Java and parts of central Java a fanatical Moslem group defied the government and terrorized the rural population. As late as 1950, government tanks patrolled the streets in downtown Surabaya.

During the years since Indonesia became independent, there have been serious economic hardships due to continual inflation, shortage of consumers' goods, and the return of soldiers who have had to be absorbed into civilian life. Transportation and

trade have periodically been stifled, imports, at least until 1950, have exceeded exports consistently. A huge budgetary deficit has indicated the severity of the economic crisis. All of these conditions have provided a real test of the strength of Indonesian economy and have pointed up the magnitude of its reconstruction efforts.

## ECONOMY

**CORE AREA**—Java, with Madura, is the heartland of Indonesia. Both economically and politically, it is the nation's nerve center. Moreover, it is the home of two thirds of the population and contains the five largest cities in the nation. Java in the pre-1939 era provided thirty-six per cent of the exports of the country and was the destination of seventy per cent of the imports. Even today it has about seventy per cent of the railway mileage and produces most of the sugar and chinchona, as well as much of the rice and rubber. Djakarta is the financial center and was the leading port of the Dutch commercial empire. As Java was the heartland of the Netherlands East Indies, so it holds a similar position in the newly formed nation of Indonesia.

**AGRICULTURE**—Indonesian subsistence crops consist of rice, corn, cassava, sago, coconuts, sweet potatoes, fruits, vegetables, peanuts, and soybeans. On Java, rice and corn alone account for two thirds of the cultivated acreage. These crops are cultivated on small landholdings by primitive or semi-primitive methods. Production is favored by a climate which in some parts allows the harvesting of two or three crops each year.

Commercial agriculture is largely of the plantation type. Rubber, sugar, chinchona, tea, coffee, cacao, better-quality tobacco, good-quality copra, and palm oil represent plantation production (see map on page 587). Some of these crops require scientific research, or an integrated harvesting

and processing arrangement, or special marketing procedures. All of them, except copra, require an initial expenditure of considerable capital. They are best produced by an integrated organization rather than by a small independent grower. There are, however, other commercial crops that are cultivated consistently by small Indonesian farmers: coconuts, kapok, pepper and a few other spices, low-grade tobacco, low-quality rubber, and some coffee.

Prior to World War II, the Dutch government encouraged small-scale subsistence agriculture on the part of the natives, especially the production of food crops. As a result, only about one tenth of the cultivated land on Java was in foreign-controlled plantations, although on Sumatra and some of the other islands the proportion was much higher. In general, this policy has been continued by the Indonesian government, but its effectiveness is difficult to evaluate because of the internal instability that has prevailed.

With the exception of rubber, none of the products of commercial agriculture has yet regained its 1941 position. Rubber has led the recovery only because the high price of rubber has attracted small operators to increase the production of low-quality varieties; plantation rubber is still below the 1941


figure (see table on this page). The United States consumes over fifty per cent of the world's raw rubber and has been the principal source of dollar earnings in Indonesia.

Export of Principal Indonesia Products, 1947-50  
(Percentage of 1936-41 Average, on Basis of Weight)

Product	1947	1948	1949	1950
Smallholders' rubber	27.4	80.8	112.7	226.6
Estate rubber	8.7	41.1	64.7	63.4
Rubber total	17.4	59.5	86.9	135.0
Copra	35.7	59.5	73.4	65.7
Coffee	0.5	3.5	7.8	20.2
Tea	3.9	11.5	29.4	39.4
Sugar	0.1	6.0	4.4	0.1
Tobacco	5.8	3.2	22.1	28.0
Chinchona bark	29.9	63.3	38.8	75.0
Palm oil	1.1	19.9	51.0	49.5
Tin and tin ore	45.8	91.3	84.6	87.7
Petroleum and products	13.6	66.2	95.2	98.9

Java has been a major sugar producer and exporter because of a nearly optimal physical environment, an adequate supply of cheap labor, and extensive scientific research in the production of high-yielding varieties of plants. Some of the canes developed in eastern Java before the war were used in the Philippines, Hawaii, Cuba, and Louisiana. Indonesian sugar production dropped

### COMMERCIAL PRODUCTION





to negligible amounts during the Japanese regime. Since World War II internal turmoil has caused destruction of sugar mills, thus retarding any rapid return to prewar production figures. Rubber has easily replaced sugar as the primary export crop.

**MINERAL WEALTH**—The mineral industry has become an increasingly important phase of Indonesian economy. In prewar years petroleum, tin, coal, bauxite, phosphate, sulfur, nickel, manganese, silver, gold, and asphalt were produced. From the standpoint of political geography, petroleum and tin are the most important Indonesian minerals. The major oil fields are near Palembang and Padang on Sumatra and Balikpapan and Tarakan on Borneo. They have been developed largely by British and American oil companies. Balikpapan and Palembang are refinery centers. An annual production of 57,000,000 barrels (1951) gives Indonesia ninth place among world petroleum producers and first among producers beyond the Middle East.

Tin mining has largely been a government operation. Production is in the islands of Billiton, Bangka, and Singkep, off the east coast of Sumatra. In prewar years most smelting and all refining operations took place at nearby Singapore or at Arnhem in the Netherlands. Singapore still handles most of the postwar production. In world tin production, Indonesia ranks second to Malaya. Both the tin-producing islands and the major petroleum fields lie outside the areas of greatest internal strife. Both industries have essentially returned to—and, in fact, petroleum has surpassed—prewar production figures.

**TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION**—Because major shipping lanes crisscross Indonesia, many regularly scheduled vessels stop at the principal ports. Chartered, or tramp, steamers of many flags call at both major and lesser ports to share in the large export of raw materials. This ocean-going traffic is

supplemented by a large interisland fleet that connects the major islands and carries much domestic traffic. Many of the larger rivers on Borneo, Sumatra, and western New Guinea are navigable for a considerable number of miles, and much commerce is handled on these waterways.

Java has 3,000 miles of railways, and Sumatra, about 1,200, but in the rest of the archipelago railways are negligible. Java and Sumatra have also many miles of all-weather roads, and there is a skeleton road net on some of the other islands. In some areas, however, coastwise and river transport or the foot trail offer the only means of communication.

Air transport is well developed, but many of the lesser airfields are in need of repair. A domestic fleet of airliners connects the principal islands and Singapore, while five foreign international airlines offer regular service to one or more Indonesian cities.

**MANUFACTURES**—Modern industry, as developed in the Western World, is not a part of Indonesian economy. Most manufacturing in Indonesia consists of the processing of agricultural or mineral raw materials either for domestic consumption or for export; such processing may be done by the company that extracts or produces the raw material. It may be a cottage (home) industry or a larger establishment, but it is normally geared to the local market for food-stuffs, clothing, household furnishings, or related items. Only the weaving of hats and the colorful batik textile industries—both centered in Java—are export industries, for in general, Indonesians working in their homes or small shops cannot compete with low-cost manufactured goods from Japan and Western Europe.

The trend in economic development has been basically agricultural. In 1939 eighty per cent of the productive workers of Java and seventy per cent of those in the outer provinces were engaged in agriculture. Of

the total population, less than one per cent was engaged in any form of manufacturing, of these, about 300,000 were employed in establishments using mechanical power, and the remainder, in the various home industries. The prewar trend has reinstated itself.

**ECONOMIC RECOVERY**—Indonesia has made notable recovery since World War II, but there are major problems ahead. Potential economic hazards face any country exporting raw materials that are dependent upon a fluctuating world market, especially if that country relies on imports for essential commodities needed by its people. Indonesia needs a more diversified economy. American financial assistance given to Indonesia has been used to increase the production of raw materials. Large-scale foreign investment is undoubtedly desirable, but heavy local taxes and discriminatory laws tend to discourage foreign business interests from making investments in Indonesia. Unfortunately the people themselves hinder real economic progress through their lack of industry and initiative and their inability to organize their efforts for the country's economic and political well-being.

## INDONESIA AND WORLD AFFAIRS

**PATTERN OF WORLD TRADE**—Indonesian exports have been largely agricultural, with minerals in second place. In a few commodities, the Netherlands East Indies held, and Indonesia now holds, a near monopoly (see table on this page). From 1929 to 1949 rubber, petroleum, tin, and sugar accounted for one half to two thirds of the total value of the exports. Postwar exports have surpassed prewar figures in value, but they have not approached the prewar position in quantity. On the basis of weight, only rubber has exceeded its prewar figure; petroleum has essentially returned to its former position, and tin is between eighty and

ninety per cent of the prewar level (1951 figures).

Netherlands Indies Export Position  
(Average Percentage of World Total, 1929-46)

Chinchona	90	Agava	27
Pepper	81	Tea	17
Kapok	72	Palm oil	17
Rubber	35	Sugar	6
Tin	30	Petroleum and	
Coconut prod-		products	2.8
ucts	27	Cocoa	0.2

SOURCE The statistical data used have been adapted from Mildred I. Finney, "Indonesian Trade," an unpublished manuscript.

In 1950, exports to Malaya, the Netherlands, and the United States made up three fourths of the total. Malaya and Japan are the leading Asian markets for Indonesian exports. Imports, consisting largely of foodstuffs and manufactured goods, are supplied by Western Europe (principally by the Netherlands; secondly by the United Kingdom), the United States, Japan, Thailand, Burma, and Malaya.

Indonesian trade is extremely sensitive to the market demands of industrial nations. In prewar years the heavy exports of rubber and vegetable oils to the United States provided a dollar surplus which was used to purchase manufactured goods from northwestern Europe. Since World War II this triangular trade has been rendered insignificant because Indonesia has relied on American supplies and thus has depleted the dollar credit once used to purchase goods in Northwest Europe. Nevertheless, Great Britain continues to export largely to Indonesia because British Commonwealth ties permit Great Britain to borrow sterling balances of member nations, which are held in a joint pool in London. Trade with the Netherlands continues to be high as a result of large Dutch investments in Indonesia. Indonesia is destined to continue the general pattern of international trade, that is, export of raw materials and import of manu-

factures, especially machinery and equipment.

**FOREIGN POLICY**—Indonesia considers neutrality to be the best characterization of its position in world affairs. Government spokesmen prefer the expression "active independent foreign policy" as the best definition of the Republic's position with respect to the great powers. The origins and motivations of Indonesian world outlook are a product of the historic conditions that accompanied its rise to independence. In its new orientation is the conviction that Indonesia cannot contribute to world peace until it is strong at home. Indonesian leaders, therefore, regard problems of internal improvement and national unity as of primary importance to the nation. Then, too, young intellectuals in high places regard Nehru as the prophet and India the model in foreign policy. This Asian orientation draws Indonesia into closer sympathy with Asia's problems and attitudes than with those of the West. Added to this is the lingering distrust of European powers and a strong suspicion that the West endeavors to restore its imperialist controls. A long heritage of Dutch rule adds weight and substance to such fears.

Neutrality, in the eyes of Indonesian leaders, does not mean isolation or unconcern about the external world. Specifically, the orientation of Indonesian interests has taken two directions: toward the Netherlands and toward the East-West conflict. Relations with the mother country have been stormy and far from cordial. In part this can be attributed to the former stubborn determination of the conservative Dutch government to subdue the nationalist movement or, failing that, to disrupt or undermine its strength. The Indonesians, consequently, have worked tirelessly to sever all economic and cultural, as well as political, connections with the Dutch as a matter of national honor and pride. The Netherlands-Indonesian Union, which was set out in a statute at The Hague

in November, 1949, provided for collaboration between the two governments on a basis of close association and equality of status, but in the summer of 1954 the union was officially abolished.

In its attitude toward the East-West conflict Indonesia realistically accepts its position as a small power in the world state system. The path of positive neutrality, however, did not deter Indonesia from membership in the United Nations, where, since September, 1950, it has followed a moderate course. Indonesia has avoided any action that would antagonize the Soviet Union or Communist China. Its delegate, for example, abstained on the resolution to brand Red China as the aggressor in the Korean dispute. More in line with Indian leadership, Indonesia favored the cease-fire and truce arrangements under the United Nations as a solution to the Korean issue. On occasions Indonesia has expressed keen interest in the North African nationalist movement and in the struggle of the Arab states in the Middle East.

Toward the United States the Indonesian attitude has been rather cool or, at best, cautious. Leaders of the independence movement noted that American aid to the Netherlands after 1945 largely financed the cost of Dutch military operations on Java and Sumatra. This factor, according to Indonesian thinking, expressed an American endorsement of colonialism in preference to support for new independence.

**THE PROBLEM OF NETHERLANDS NEW GUINEA (IRIAN)**—No problem is more vexatious in the South Pacific than the status of western New Guinea. The territory is not important in itself, but it serves to symbolize the irritations that attend the formation of a new state. New Guinea is a sparsely settled island with undeveloped peoples inhabiting its tropical terrain. Politically it is divided, only the western half being under Dutch sovereignty. This area of 151,000 square

miles was officially a part of the Netherlands East Indies, one of the outer provinces in the archipelago. New Guinea was not included in the transfer of sovereignty in 1949, but Indonesian leaders claim it belongs to the Republic.

The people of New Guinea reflect no political consciousness, having taken no part in the nationalist revolution and having expressed no desire to join the Republic. Irians, inhabitants of western New Guinea, live in a primitive, unorganized economic

framework, and effective labor must be imported, presumably from Indonesia, to develop the area. This move is opposed by the Netherlands and by Australia as well. The latter regards all New Guinea as a vital buffer area against any attack from the north and considers the Netherlands as a reliable caretaker. Negotiations to resolve the status of western New Guinea have produced no solution, and the issue has increased tension and antagonism between the Netherlands and Indonesia.

## MALAYA

The geographical region of Malaya embraces the Federation of Malaya—a British Protectorate—and the Crown colony of Singapore. The Federation is made up of nine Malay states (Johore, Pahang, Negri Sembilan, Selangor, Perak, Kelantan, Trengganu, Kedah, and Perlis) and two settlements (Malacca and Penang), which were once colonies. Kuala Lumpur, in the state of Selangor, is the capital of the Federation. Malaya has an area of 51,000 square miles and a population of nearly 6,000,000 persons, or 117 persons per square mile. In prewar years Britain had devised three political units: (1) the Federated Malay States of Perak, Pahang, Selangor, and Negri Sembilan, comprising the tin- and rubber-producing areas which were supervised by a British high commissioner; (2) five unfederated states, which, being less populous, remained under native rule subject to British advisors in administrative affairs; and (3) the Straits Settlements, which included the important ports of Singapore, Penang, and Malacca, each of which formed a crown colony.

After World War II the British government decided to introduce changes that would lead to unification. The Malay rulers were induced to surrender most of their old

rights, and, in 1946, a plan for a Malayan union was announced. This proposal met the vociferous opposition of Malay nationalists who feared that liberal provisions regarding Malayan citizenship would permit non-Malay groups, particularly the Chinese, to dominate the government. Consequently, British arrangements for a Malayan union were replaced by a federation scheme that established a federal government over nine states, excluding Singapore. The constitution, which went into effect in February, 1948, permitted each state to maintain its own administration while the federal government exercised powers under British control. Thus, the sultans retained an element of fictional sovereignty, and the Malays won a privileged position in view of the complex definition of federal citizenship. After unification Malaya finally secured its right to independence, scheduled for August, 1957.

## ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

**SUBSISTENCE CROPS**—The people of Malaya eat a basic diet of rice and fish. Fishing in the sea rather than in inland water is most developed and most specialized, but all streams and canals provide some fish for local use. The fish pond, or fish-farming,

is not as extensive here as in Indonesia or the Philippines.

Of the 6,000,000 acres of agricultural land, about one eighth is normally planted in rice. Most Malayan rice is paddy, or wet, rice, but upland or dry rice is grown in small clearings of shifting cultivation and as a catch crop on newly cleared land that will eventually be used for other forms of agriculture. Nevertheless, Malaya is a food-deficiency area, for normal production supplies only about one third of the population's requirements. The remainder is imported from Burma and Thailand, most of it through Singapore.

**COMMERCIAL AGRICULTURE**—Commercial agriculture is geared primarily for foreign markets. Rubber, copra, coconut and palm oil, and pineapple products are major exports. Some of the rice produced by commercial agricultural methods enters domestic trade channels, as do lesser cash crops, such as cassava for starch and tapioca, sugar, corn, coffee, tea, spices, tobacco, derris, peanuts, and products of the market gardens near Singapore.

In terms of the area defined, rubber is the most important crop in Malaya, occupying more than one half the cultivated acreage and requiring about 500,000 employees. Malaya accounts for one third to two fifths of the total rubber production of Southeast Asia. The export value of rubber is about \$1,200,000,000, or more than one half of the total exports of the country. Singapore plays a significant part in financing Malayan rubber but does not process any of it.

**MINERAL PRODUCTION**—Though rubber is now most important in the Malayan economy, prior to 1920 Malaya was primarily dependent on tin mining carried on by the Chinese. Alluvial tin is still washed by primitive methods, but large dredges have been used for most of the mining since 1929. Chinese workers still predominate in the industry. The tin ore is transported in sacks

by rail to smelters at Singapore<sup>7</sup> and Penang. These smelters import and process ore from other Southeast Asian countries and normally smelt about one half of the world tin ore.

Iron ore, gold, low-grade manganese in conjunction with some of the iron ore, small tungsten deposits, and minor deposits of bauxite are present in Malaya. Prior to and during World War II the iron ore and bauxite were exported to Japan. No significant amount of iron ore is now mined in Malaya, but Australian aluminum plants use some Malayan bauxite.

#### RACIAL AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS

Malaya's population of 6,000,000 people is a mixture of national origins and of racial, ethnological, and religious groups. There are more than 2,500,000 Chinese, 650,000 Indians, and 380,000 nonindigenous Malaysians. Hence, less than 2,500,000, or forty per cent, are native Malays. The Malays are traditionally farmers, although groups of them live on the fringe of many towns. The Malayan Indians are shopkeepers or contract laborers in the rubber areas. They are said to be of little political significance, yet they vote in local elections, whereas many Malays and Chinese do not bother to do so.

Religiously, the Malays are mostly Mohammedans, the Indians, Hindu; and the Chinese, Buddhists. Linguistically, there is also division, for the Malays and Chinese each prefer their own separate tongues, and the majority of the Hindus speak Tamil.

The Chinese comprise the dominant merchant class throughout Malaya and are the laborers in the tin industry and in the cities. In contrast to the Malays, they are urban dwellers, and most of them live on the west coast, where eight of the nine largest Malayan cities are located. More than three

<sup>7</sup> The smelter is actually not in Singapore but on a small island (Pulau Brani) just outside the harbor.

fourths of Singapore's inhabitants likewise are Chinese. Some of the Chinese laborers are migratory workers. Rarely do they work as farmers, and consequently they are dependent upon others for their entire food supply. The Chinese in Malaya, as is true of Chinese elsewhere, have considerable economic power, for they are the shopkeepers, the wholesalers, and the money-lenders.

**COMMUNIST THREAT**—The Communist goal in Southeast Asia is a long-range plan, rather than a short-time offensive. The main movement is southward. The Malay Peninsula is the narrow roadway connecting the Asiatic land mass to the north with sources of raw materials that are deemed necessary for Communist industry. Malaya probably has the best organized Communist guerrillas to be found anywhere. A force of 5,000 rebels waged a war of attrition that pinned down a British-led army of 100,000 for five years. Malayan Communism bases its strength on the control of the labor unions and on exploitation of the economic maladjustments brought about by postwar reconstruction. It has sharpened the ethnic divisions between Malays, Chinese, and Indians and has terrorized European settlements. The Communist revolt in 1948 failed, however, despite its anti-imperialist slogans, to oust the British. Thereafter, Communist-led rebels retreated into the jungles and waged a long guerrilla campaign against British authorities. Part of the rebel strength depended on the aid and assistance given them by Chinese squatters—groups displaced during Japanese occupation—who had settled in fringe territory. Many Chinese, feeling that they had been disinherited under the federal constitution, tended to sympathize with Communism and remained neutral toward the pacification program, but once the British rehabilitated the squatters and provided greater measure of protection, the guerrillas in the jungle were

obliged to take to the defensive. Since 1952 the state of emergency has been less critical than in previous years, but disorders lie close beneath the surface in a country where racial antagonisms prevent the formation of a unified nation.

### STRATEGIC SINGAPORE

Singapore is the focal point of communications in the Far East. History has repeatedly demonstrated its strategic and commercial importance. Because it was a British naval base, it was seized by the Japanese in 1942. Following liberation it was incorporated into the British Crown Colony of Singapore.<sup>8</sup> The population of the city has grown rapidly: 445,719 in 1931; 727,000 in 1941; and more than 1,000,000 in 1953. Chinese have always been the chief element of the population.

The city lies on an island, some twenty-five by fourteen miles in extent, that is separated from the mainland by Johore Strait, a channel that is less than a mile wide. A causeway joins the island to the mainland with rail and road connections. The commercial city lies at the south side of the island, and the naval base northward near Johore Bahru on the mainland.

Prior to 1914 Britain regarded its sea power as supreme in the Pacific realm. Subsequent Japanese military expansion on the Asiatic mainland altered this picture and forced the strengthening of the Singapore naval base. At the outbreak of the Pacific war, the base still lacked sufficient facilities for complete servicing and repairing of capital ships. Moreover, Singapore's gun emplacements covered the sea approach but left the base unprotected from the mainland; consequently, the Japanese, by occupying the hinterland, were able to overpower the naval base.

<sup>8</sup> The colony includes Singapore Island as well as Christmas and Cocos islands in the Indian Ocean.

**CURRENT POSITION**—The island has the deepest harbor and the best dock facilities within a radius of 1,000 miles. Singapore is the entrepôt of the Orient but has no major industry except the tin smelter. It has grown upon transient trade, its waterfront is normally the scene of dozens of ocean vessels and hundreds of inter-island and lesser craft.

Singapore is a merging of East and West; thus the city has a rectangular street pattern, but city life is Chinese, its commerce is basically Chinese, but English is the communal language, although the newly immigrant Chinese still use their own vernacular and the Malay dialect is the language of the bazaars.

Imports are swollen by goods from Indonesia later to be exported—rubber, tin, and copra. Goods for domestic use in Malaya are largely European. Cloth is the principal manufactured item imported, to be distributed in Singapore, the Federation, and elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Singapore rarely processes any of the goods passing through it; its function is one of handling, breaking bulk, sorting, grading, forwarding, reshipping, and collecting. Its commerce is that of middlemen, with profit coming mostly from servicing activities. Singapore's gross trade is more than \$2,000,000,000 annually, principally in rubber, rice, cotton, textiles, and tin, ranking in that order.<sup>9</sup>

## BRITISH BORNEO

British Borneo includes North Borneo, Sarawak, and Brunei, a total of 80,000 square miles, drained largely by northward- and westward-flowing streams. It is the home of over 1,000,000 people, mostly Malays and Chinese, rather than Indonesians.

British Borneo is economically and culturally underdeveloped. Agricultural possibilities are not great, because much of the soil is poor, most of the surface rugged, and the climate hot, humid, and wet. The area, however, can and should be self-sufficient in foodstuffs. Strategically, it is important for the petroleum deposits—the first Japanese landings south of the Philippines were at the oil fields of North Borneo and Brunei. Production is not high, but there is the advantage that the petroleum is on or near the coast and the quality is excellent. The oil companies (North Borneo Shell, British Malayan Petroleum Company, and Sarawak Oilfields, Ltd.) have played a significant role in the development of the area, for as is true of most Western industrial and commercial enterprises operating in underde-

veloped lands, they have provided the leadership in health, education, and social improvement. British Borneo has been almost completely free of the social and political unrest that has characterized Indonesia and Malaya since 1945.

*North Borneo.* Prior to World War II North Borneo was administered by the British North Borneo Company under a charter issued to it by Queen Victoria in 1881. In January, 1946, both North Borneo and Sarawak received the status of Crown colonies. In many ways North Borneo has been a step ahead of the other British possessions on the island, and the credit probably belongs to the British North Borneo Company, which was generally successful in developing its territory (81,000 square miles and 380,000 persons). Of the British possessions on Borneo, North Borneo is the leader in rubber and copra production and in rice cultivation.

<sup>9</sup> E. H. G. Dobby, *Southeast Asia* (University of London Press, 1950), p. 146.

The chief towns are Jesselton (11,266), the capital and principal port, and Sandakan (14,045), the former capital and largest settlement. Both towns contain many Chinese, and the Jesselton area has some Indonesians, the remaining area is peopled largely by Malays. Settlement is restricted to coastal districts. An outstanding event in the recent history of North Borneo has been the rapid postwar recovery, with a favorable balance of trade restored by 1948.

When North Borneo became a British colony in 1946, the island of Labuan was annexed to it. Labuan, a few miles off the west coast, was attached to the Straits Settlements from 1907 to 1946, first as a part of Singapore, then, after 1917, as a separate colony. Recently it has become an air stop for international north-south flights.

*Sarawak.* Sarawak has more than sixty per cent of the area and about two thirds the population of British Borneo. It was obtained from the Sultan of Brunei in 1842 by James Brooke, an Englishman who governed it for many years with the title of rajah. In 1888 it was recognized as an independent state, under British protection, and the office of rajah became hereditary. This status continued, except for the Japanese military

regime of 1942-45, until the establishment of the Crown Colony in 1946. Since revenue has normally exceeded expenditures there is no public debt. Chief exports are rubber and oil, the principal imports, rice and cotton textiles. The most important oil field, at Miri, is the headquarters of the Sarawak Oilfields, Ltd. The refinery center is nearby Lutong, where oil from both Sarawak and Brunei is refined. The chief town and distributing point is Kuching, the capital, located on a navigable river near the coast.

*Brunei.* Brunei, smallest of the three British areas, is a protectorate. It consists of two separate lobes of territory, each with coastal frontage, but otherwise completely surrounded by the British colony of Sarawak. The total area of 2,226 square miles contains about 53,000 persons, mostly Malay. Oil production exceeds that of any other one part of the British Empire and constitutes eighty per cent of the total exports from the protectorate. Plantation rubber accounts for half the remainder. In 1948 the British resident was placed under the supervision of the governor of Sarawak, with which Brunei has always been closely associated, politically as well as physically.

### Study Questions

1. What are the basic factors responsible for Java's great population density?
2. Locate (a) the principal agricultural areas and (b) the principal mineral districts of Malaya and Indonesia.
3. List reasons for the sparse railway and highway networks in Indonesia outside of Java and parts of Sumatra.
4. Why were demands for an independent government much stronger in Indonesia than in Malaya?
5. Why was the Malay Archipelago of prime significance to the Japanese in their scheme for a "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere"?
6. Why does Borneo offer fewer opportunities for pioneer settlement than does Sumatra?
7. Compare the positions held by the Chinese in Malaya and Indonesia.
8. What strategic raw materials are supplied by Indonesia? What island or islands are significant for the production of each?
9. Compare the economic development of Sarawak and of British North Borneo. Account for any significant differences noted.
10. What are some of the economic enterprises



- in Indonesia on which independence may have permanent adverse effects? Justify your opinion
11. In general, the economy of Indonesia has been markedly handicapped by internal conditions, yet rubber, petroleum, and tin production has regained, or nearly so, the pre-war levels for these products. What factors have made this possible?
  12. Is Indonesian industrial development likely to include some heavy industry? Justify your decision.
  13. What political and geographic factors have contributed to make Singapore a great entrepôt?
  14. Why do Indonesian political leaders insist that Netherlands New Guinea should be Indonesian territory? What groups have opposed the assignment of this land to Indonesia? Why?
  15. To what extent has Indonesia supported the actions of the United Nations? Is there likely to be any alteration of this policy?

## CHAPTER THIRTY-FOUR


# Korea

The peninsula of Korea has been described by the Japanese as the "dagger point at the heart of Japan." Although this terminology exaggerates the danger which the peninsula has in the past held for the island empire, it at least characterizes the physical delineation of the area. Korea as a peninsula vaguely resembles Florida in shape and direction of axis, but it is more than half again as great in area. Nevertheless, its size appears insignificant when one looks at the map of Asia, in which the peninsula is overwhelmingly overshadowed by the gigantic dimensions of China and the USSR, its only two adjacent neighbors.

The buffer position of Korea in the Far East dominates the political geography of the peninsula. The country always has had an uneasy independence or has been under the political control of one of its more powerful neighbors (see map on this page).

Historically, Korea has had close ties with China, from which it learned its arts. For many centuries Korea considered itself in a subordinate position to China in the Con-

fucian oriental pattern of international relations. Nevertheless, Korea maintained itself as a separate and distinct entity in the Far East. This independence has been possible because of its geographical position and



its people. The peninsula is cut off from the Asian mainland by a broad mountainous base, and partly for this reason the 30,000,000 Koreans who inhabit it are a unique cultural and economic group. At the close

of the last century ties with China were broken, and in 1910 Korea was annexed by the Japanese, who at that time had risen to a position of military power. At the end of World War II, freed from thirty-five years of colonial status in the Japanese Empire, Korea faced an uncertain future. This situation was made more difficult when the country was divided at the 38th Parallel and even more difficult when the Korean War broke out five years later. China, now under Communist control, is in a resurgent position and has once again entered the Korean scene. The United States, a reluctant Pacific power, finds itself supporting the Republic of Korea in an explosive situation on the periphery of the Free World.

The future remains dim for the sturdy Korean people, caught in the midst of worldwide tensions between the Free World and the Communist World. However, the distinctive features of this political area need analysis, for, although Korea may be profoundly affected by outside pressures, the internal conditions likewise have great influence on its political geography.

#### PHYSICAL FACTORS

**LANDFORMS**—Korea is a land of beauty, of sparkling streams and high mountains, a land which has always made a deep impression on the inhabitants. Today, insecure and fast-changing economic and political worlds have greatly enhanced the traditional love of the Koreans for their country. Unfortunately much of the land was sadly battered during the Korean War, when fighting raged from one end of the country to the other. Actually, the peninsula, with its two gateways—one in the northwest and the other in the southeast—has been a bridge between the continent of Asia and the islands that fringe it in the Pacific Ocean. But the bridge, owing to the mountainous character of its terrain, has been no easy passage-way.

The peninsula extends 600 miles southward from a broad continental base. With the Sea of Japan to the east, the Korea Strait (Strait of Tsushima) to the south, and the Yellow Sea to the west, Korea has some of the insular characteristics of Japan. About 500 miles of its northern frontier lie along Manchuria, only eleven miles touch Siberia. This solid attachment to the large continent of Asia makes Korea a continental rather than an insular land. Much of the 85,000 square miles, an area about equal to that of Minnesota, is mountainous or hilly, only one fifth can be used for growing crops. On the small areas of plains and lower hill slopes the population is very densely crowded.

The mountains and hills have complex relief and structure.<sup>1</sup> In the north there is a block of ancient rock (extending into Manchuria) that has been overlaid in places with lava. The whole block has been raised in the south and east by movements of the earth's crust, and there is, in consequence, a slight northward tilt. Into this block the Yalu and Tumen rivers (forming most of the northern boundary), together with their tributaries, have cut deep, winding courses. On the southeastern edge of the same block the escarpment is quite sharp, on the southwestern edge, not so abrupt.

Another major structural block makes up central and southern Korea. In past geologic time the complex rock formations were leveled by erosion and then uplifted by a major crustal disturbance. The crest of the upthrown block is the mountainous ridge along the Sea of Japan. The principal streams, entrenched in the upland, flow westward to the Yellow Sea. In southern Korea a series of parallel ridges branch southwestward from the main block cutting the relief alternately into plains and hills or moun-

<sup>1</sup> For a more detailed, though still generalized, discussion of the relief of Korea, see Arthur H. Robinson and Shannon McCune, "Notes on a Physiographic Diagram of Tyosen (Korea)," *Geographical Review*, XXI, No. 4 (October, 1941), 653-58.

tains. The southwest corner of Korea is a veritable maze of islands, peninsulas, and bays, where mountain spurs have been cut by structural lines and the lower areas submerged.

The complex structure of Korea is the result of constant stream erosion. Headwaters of rivers and streams have cut back into the hills, while along the lower courses extensive flood plains with deposits of fertile alluvium have been formed. Subsequent uplift of some of the flood plains has developed areas of former alluvial soils which are now used for dry crops. It is on these ribbons of plains formed by the work of streams that most of the Koreans gain their livelihood.

**CLIMATE**—Just as relief is important to the farmers of Korea, so is the climate. The location of the peninsula between 33° and 43° North Latitude puts it in the belt of the westerly winds and cyclonic storms. Modifying this climatic control, however, is the position of Korea on the eastward fringe of the world's largest land mass; the heating and cooling of the Asian land mass cause seasonal drifting of monsoon air, oceanward in winter and toward the continent in summer. The deep Sea of Japan on the east and the shallow Yellow Sea on the west exercise additional climatic controls, modifying the extremes of winter and summer temperatures. Naturally the variations of elevation due to the mountainous landforms also lead to sharp variations in temperature and rainfall from place to place.

Multiple controls result in regional differences in the climates of Korea.<sup>2</sup> The dominant contrast is that between the north and south. The northern interior of Korea, cut off from the moderating influence of the sea and having a higher elevation, has long,

bitterly cold winters and short, warm summers. In contrast, the southern third of the peninsula has hot, moist summers and relatively mild winters. The northeast coast is influenced by cool currents, so that the summers are not so warm as they are in the northern interior and the winters are cool rather than severe. The northwestern and central parts of Korea have cold winters and hot summers. All of the peninsula normally has sufficient rainfall for agriculture. Although the southern part has considerable winter rain, the maximum rainfall of the peninsula comes during the summer season. Climatic differences from place to place, in part attributable to the topography, cause variations in the fertility of the soil and in the type of natural vegetation. Of even more importance to the economy, however, are the limits that the climate puts on the crops that may be grown. Thus, the southern part of the peninsula, in which double cropping is possible, can support a much denser population than can the north.

#### ECONOMIC PATTERN

The economy of Korea developed traditionally as a simple agriculture-based system. However, under the impact of modern industrialization, especially as Japan used the resources of Korea to help build up its military power, Korea's economy was transformed; but the shattering effect of the division of the peninsula and of the Korean War checked the growth toward modernization, and Korea is still an agricultural society. A possibility for a redevelopment of resources and for a further expansion of the economy exists today in Korea. Whether this potential can ultimately be utilized depends greatly on political conditions, not only within Korea but throughout the world.

<sup>2</sup> A brief account of these regions is in Shannon McCune, "Climatic Regions of Korea and Their Economy," *Geographical Review*, XXXI, No. 1 (January, 1941), 95-99

**AGRICULTURE AND FORESTS**—In Korea areas of level terrain and an adequate supply of water for paddy fields are determining fac-

tors in the distribution of crop land. As in other Far Eastern countries, rice is the most important crop. In the south production is stimulated by double cropping of some of the well-drained rice fields with barley. Winter wheat is a common crop on dry fields in both north and south, but in the south the same fields may also be used for an interim crop of soybeans or vegetables in the summer. In the north, hardy cereals—millet and rye on the upland fields and gram sorghum, corn, and soybeans on the lowland fields—are grown as supplementary to the staple rice, barley, and wheat. In the south, cotton enters the economy as an important product. Tobacco growing and the raising of mulberry for silk worms are fostered, especially in the south, to provide some cash income for the farmers. The medicinal root ginseng has been a distinctive crop in central Korea for centuries, but it is grown only in special localities.

Over four fifths of the land is too hilly for cultivation, but it supports large areas of forests. Unfortunately the combination of ravages by insect pests, commercial forest exploitation, and the indiscriminate cutting by wood-hungry farmers and charcoal burners has denuded many of the hills, especially near the cities and in the densely populated rural areas of Korea. There still remain some good stands of commercial timber in the northern interior and in the mountainous regions, but much of the land is in desperate need of controlled reforestation to provide an important continuing resource for Korea.

**MINERALS AND WATER POWER**—Korea has a substantial inventory of mineral and water-power resources, located largely in the north. The fact that the northern and southern parts of Korea complement each other in resources of land and people is an important factor in the urge to have a unified country. Traditionally, only a few mineral resources (building stone, clay, iron ore, coal, gold, copper, and zinc) were utilized by the Ko-

reans, principally for construction materials, household wares, jewelry, and brass utensils. However, in the modern age, new resources were exploited and brought into use. The peak of production was reached in 1944, at a time when the Japanese were striving to maintain their military strength by utilizing nearby resources regardless of cost. In the war period the Japanese tapped deposits of anthracite coal, found mainly in northwestern Korea and to a lesser extent and with less accessibility in southeastern Korea, and of lignite coal in northeastern Korea, as well as deposits of iron ore in northwestern and northeastern Korea. Gold and copper deposits, together with silver, lead, and zinc, were also exploited. Korea has been one of the world's leading producers of graphite, although mainly as an export item, the same is true of tungsten, which was mined from deposits in southern Korea.

The Japanese gave special attention to the development of the hydroelectric-power resources. Streams tributary to the Yalu River were dammed and the water diverted to fall down the escarpment and into the Sea of Japan. Construction comparable in size to that of Boulder Dam was installed across the lower course of the Yalu, and the power generated there was utilized in northern Korea and transmitted to southern Manchuria. Other rivers in central and southern Korea were likewise harnessed.

On the basis of this exploitation of resources during the last years of Japanese rule, Korea experienced a relatively great expansion of its industrial facilities. Most of the development took place in northern Korea. The leading industries in terms of production were iron and steel, light metals, chemicals, food, textiles, beverages, and tobacco. Among the innovations were new factories for cotton spinning and the weaving of cotton, silk, and rayon. Manufacture of shoes from imported or reprocessed rubber became an important consumers'-goods industry. Also constructed were large chem-

ical fertilizer plants, oil refineries, hydroelectric plants, and works for the manufacture of cement, paper, pottery, electric bulbs, and enameled ironwares. These new industrial facilities were especially hard hit by the hostilities raging in the peninsula and by the division of Korea. In the truce period industrial rehabilitation has proceeded very slowly.

**TRANSPORTATION**—The Japanese, for strategic military and economic reasons, strengthened land communications by the construction of several thousand miles of railway lines and many more of highways. The transportation pattern is diagrammatically in the form of an "X" with numerous side and parallel branch railways and roads. The main rail line extends from northwest to southeast, but north from Seoul and south from Taejon less important lines diverge toward cities in the northern and southern parts of the peninsula, respectively. The major seaport is Pusan in the southeast; Inchon, on the west coast, is the port for the capital, Seoul. Other ports were developed for the major cities or for rice- and mineral-exporting areas. Important in the late period of Japanese control were ports in the northeast which served as transit points to the interior of Manchuria. The postwar Republic of Korea has its own national airline and also receives service from intercontinental trunk-line carriers.

## PEOPLE AND CULTURE

Koreans constitute a distinct national group, but the racial origins of the people are veiled in antiquity. Definitely Mongoloid in racial character, they were probably the result of mixtures between successive waves of migrants out of Central Asia, Manchuria, and North China. Although Koreans today are distinct from both Chinese and Japanese, they do have dark straight hair, dark oblique eyes, and a tinge of bronze in the skin. In

height they are intermediate between their two oriental neighbors: taller than the Japanese and shorter than the north Chinese.

**CULTURE**—The distinct ethnic character of Korea is reflected in the language. It is polysyllabic and similar to the Altaic languages of Central Asia. Although Korean is different from Chinese in grammar and speech, many words have been borrowed from the Chinese language. Since Chinese was considered the classic language in the past, the Korean court and scholars in former times became skilled Chinese linguists. In modern decades Japanese has been widely used by many Koreans. The common people, and in recent times the scholars as well, use an alphabet of simple symbols with which they can represent all the Korean sounds. The use of this written language, invented five centuries ago, has been widespread in the post-World War II period, and since it is easily learned, illiteracy is fast disappearing.

Korean culture has been greatly changed in the past few decades by the encroachment of Western habits and customs, modified by the Japanese and, of course, by the Korean adapters. The old culture, largely modeled after the Chinese, has fallen into decay, and the present cultural life is a weird hodgepodge of the old and the new. Under the rule of Japan many drastic steps were taken to force the Koreans to follow Japanese cultural patterns. Since the freeing of Korea after World War II, there has been a return to many traditional customs. The Korean War also had a great impact on national culture, especially on the social life of the Koreans. The break-up of families, the necessary militarization and regimentation, and the disruption and change in social customs have had profound repercussions. The young people of Korea today are thirsting for education, especially for technical training that will enable them to adjust to their new life.

**POPULATION**—One of the significant developments of recent times is the "population explosion" which has been taking place. From historical records it may be assumed that the population of the peninsula approximated 7,000,000 to 8,000,000 people for the three or four centuries before Korea was opened to the outside world seventy-five years ago. The first provisional census count made by the Japanese in 1910 showed an estimated population of 13,313,000; the first complete census, that of 1925, revealed a figure of 19,523,000. By 1944, the date of the last complete census, the population had reached 25,900,000. Since then the exchange of populations with Japan, the flow of refugees from northern to southern Korea, and the loss of life during the war have upset all firm figures. It may be estimated, however, that the total population is now 30,000,000 people, with more than two thirds of them in the south.

At the close of World War II there were some 750,000 Japanese and 75,000 Chinese in Korea. However, all of the Japanese and most of the Chinese have since left the peninsula. At the same time there were some 1,550,000 Koreans living in Japan, about half of whom have now been repatriated; those that remain in Japan constitute a significant and irritating minority in the cities. In 1945 an estimated 1,500,000 Koreans were in China, most of them in Manchuria. Across the border in the area adjacent to northeastern Korea the population is predominantly Korean, numbering, according to reports, some 600,000. This minority group in Manchuria has in the past been a source of friction, and it may continue to be so in the future.

#### HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

**EARLY HISTORY**—The Koreans trace their mythology back to the time of Tangun, 2333 B.C., who, according to legend, established a dynasty that lasted for more than

1,000 years. Another legendary figure is Kija, a Chinese sage, who came to Korea in 1122 B.C. with 5,000 followers, settled among the uncultured natives, and brought the benefits of the superior agricultural civilization of China. His dynasty is said to have ruled until 193 B.C. The archaeological remains of three Chinese colonies that flourished in northwestern Korea at the start of the Christian Era give the first historical records of civilization in Korea. These early legends, together with firm archaeological records, are important indications of the manner in which Korea received its culture from neighboring China. It is significant to note that this cultural borrowing continued until seventy-five years ago, when Korea opened her doors to ideas from more far-flung countries.

The diverse topography of Korea led to the growth of many separate core areas. In early centuries many petty kingdoms were set up in different parts of the peninsula and in the adjoining area of Manchuria. The result was a succession of struggles for power. These kingdoms were in reality tribal organizations, which formed various alliances with one another, with the result that they were constantly shifting in power. Around A.D. 300 there were three major kingdoms in Korea. Silla in the southeast, Paekche in the southwest, and Koguryo in the north. Among these kingdoms Silla gained the ascendancy by 668 and ruled over most of the peninsula until 918. At that time a rebel war lord seized power, unified the peninsula under the Koryo dynasty, established as capital the present city of Kaesong in central Korea, and perpetuated Buddhism as the state religion. His kingdom borrowed heavily from China, copying the civil-service examination system and other governmental practices.

**INVASIONS OF KOREA**—All was not peace and quiet, for the Tatars, moving off the steppes of Asia, first conquered China and then, in

1011, invaded Korea and forced the Korean kings to submit to their suzerainty. Two centuries later another nomadic group, the Mongols, under the leadership of Genghis Khan, fanned out from the dry margins of China and seized the throne of the Koryo Kingdom. The Koreans sided with the defeated groups in China and thus were subjected to another invasion in 1231. Almost as serious as that invasion in the dislocation of economic life on the peninsula was Kublai Khan's use of Korea as a base for attempted invasions of Japan in 1274 and 1281.

The revolt against the Mongols and the establishment of the Ming dynasty in China were followed by a revolt and the establishment in Korea, in 1392, of a new dynasty, the Yi. The capital was moved to Seoul, and the name of the country was changed to Choson, meaning the "Land of the Morning Calm." For two centuries the new nation enjoyed a comparative calm, broken only by the coastal raids of Japanese pirates. Buddhism was suppressed as an aftermath of the undue temporal power gained by the monks in the preceding dynasty, but the gentle arts continued to flourish. One unfortunate aspect of the period was the growth of a party system among the court nobles. Political parties were not formed on the basis of fundamental issues but were characterized by personal rivalries and the formation of cliques. Bitter battles were waged for the favor of the king. The welfare of the common Korean farmer was neglected. Recent Korean politics follow the same pattern—rivalries between cliques centering around an individual or a family rather than contests between parties based on principles.

In neighboring Japan the warring feudal clans were finally united under Hideyoshi by 1590. Two years later, partly as a relief to internal pressures, Hideyoshi attempted to invade Korea, with the ultimate objective of subjugating China. Once more Korea

was invaded and overrun for a period of seven years but in this instance not conquered. The last invaders of Korea until modern times were the Manchus, who overthrew the Ming dynasty in China and invaded the peninsula in 1627 and again in 1631 in order to stop any aid from Korea to the Mings.

Korea, fearing more invasions, with their attendant suffering, tried to isolate itself. Foreign contacts were kept at a minimum, limited largely to exchanges made by Chinese envoys, the holding of periodical fairs on the northwestern border of Korea, and restricted trading with the Japanese at a post near present-day Pusan. During this period of isolation sharp cleavages appeared between the educated noble families and the common people. Within the ruling classes political parties carried on feuds. Thus Korea, the "Hermit Nation," was internally weak when its isolation was broken, first, by the conclusion of a treaty with the Japanese in 1876 and then by treaties with other nations during the following decades.

**INTERNAL POLITICAL ORGANIZATION**—The political life of Korea has been strongly influenced by Confucian political ideas derived from Chinese contacts. Westerners trained in European and American concepts of international law and relations are often at a loss to understand either the Confucian concepts or their manifestations, which, however, must be grasped if one is to understand the political geography in the Far East. Specifically, the Confucian concept embodies an approach to moral order and social stability through the channel of manners. Regulations of an elaborate etiquette govern every relationship and action. As part of the old political basis of the teaching of Confucius, the world is viewed as a unit, centering around China, the Middle Kingdom. The sovereign of China, who rules under the Mandate of Heaven, provides an example for his subjects. The people strive to live in correct



relationships with one another and with nature. When man and nature are in accord, individual and world peace and happiness result. Outside the Middle Kingdom are barbarians, who, when they are taught by example the principles of correct conduct, will then voluntarily submit themselves to the sovereign power of China, the superior nation, and its ruler, Heaven's chosen instrument. Obviously, these idealistic concepts have not entirely prevailed, but they have had an important influence in the past political scene of eastern Asia. In the frame of Chinese political thought, therefore, Korea was considered as a sort of "younger brother." The kings of Korea received investiture from the Chinese emperors.


The internal political structure was organized in accord with Chinese patterns. The king of Korea held supreme power; he was aided by court officials (often with flowery titles). Under the Yi dynasty, the country was divided into eight provinces, one around the capital and the others in various directions out from the center. Each province had a seacoast and comprised the drainage basin of one or more major rivers; each virtually formed a self-sufficient economic unit. Each province, in turn, was divided into districts, or magistracies, usually the tributary area of a major market town. The government officials were chosen by an examination system that was based upon knowledge of the Confucian classics. Thus there was perpetuated a rather rigid upper government structure, which was dominated by the scholar-official class, often allied with the landlord classes, who could afford education for their sons. The common people living in the villages had a form of simple democracy; by mutual consent informal leaders, or headmen, were selected to act as local arbitrators and as points of contact between the villagers and the government.

**LOSS OF INDEPENDENCE**—The internal weakness of Korea, with its wide gap between the common man and the ruling class (itself racked by dissension), was apparent as the country became a pawn in the game of power politics that developed when the Western impact began to have its effect. Control of the peninsula was a factor in two wars: the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5. Both resulted in victory for Japan, the first theoretically clarifying the status of Korea as a state independent of China. In 1897 the official name of the country was changed from Choson to Tae Han, and the Korean king became an emperor. The second war, the Russo-Japanese, resulted in Japanese military occupation of Korea in 1904, followed, in 1907, by the establishment of a protectorate, and, finally, in 1910, by outright annexation. The Korean royal family was amalgamated into that of Japan, Korea as an independent nation disappeared.

This historical sketch has omitted many details of intrigue between the neighbors of Korea and between groups within Korea, but it reveals how difficult the maintenance of Korean political independence has been. Whenever great powers have vied for supremacy in Eastern Asia, Korea, a small nation, has suffered. Nevertheless, through all these periods, Korea has been able to preserve a strong feeling of nationalism among its people.

## MODERN KOREA

**JAPANESE DOMINATION**—Under Japanese control Korea made definite material advances. The amount of arable land was increased; extensive erosion control and reforestation were instituted, and production of rice, together with that of other crops, notably cotton, was increased. Industrial progress included the building of roads and railways; greatly increased mineral production, es-



pecially of gold, iron ore, coal, and copper; and development of hydroelectric projects on a large scale. New industries were mostly of the basic heavy type, for the aim of the Japanese program was to make Korea an integral part of the economy of Japan, which itself was pointed toward war.

Modern cities in Korea showed a marked tendency toward industrialization and commercial activity. The chief city, Seoul (in Japanese, Keijo), was the capital, which, with its industrial suburbs, had a population of 935,000 in 1940. Its port, Inchon (Jinsen), had 171,000. Pyongyang (Heijo), with 286,000, in the northwest and Taegu (Taikyū), with 178,000, in the southeast were regional centers that had great industrial and commercial importance. On the southeastern coast lay Pusan (Fusan), with 250,000, a seaport that handled much of the traffic to and from Japan. Newer and much smaller seaports were developed along the western and northeastern coasts of the country. Among these Chongjin (Seishin), with 197,000, was the most important, for it also was an industrial center (see map on page 605).


During this period the Japanese naturally dominated the political and economic life of Korea. Most Koreans were allowed to hold only minor posts in government or business. The lack of true self-government on any level other than that of the village and the absence of political self-expression prevented political maturity. Although Koreans abroad kept alive the flame of independence, a discouraging disunity among the refugees impeded any marked steps toward emancipation. Thus it was only natural that Korea was only promised independence "in due course" by the Cairo Declaration of December, 1943.

**POSTWAR ERA**—At the end of hostilities in World War II, Korea was divided into two zones, separated by the 38th Parallel, for the avowed purpose of accepting the sur-

render of the Japanese. The Russians exercised this responsibility in the northern half, and the Americans in the southern half, of the peninsula. This artificial dividing line selected merely to serve the purposes of occupation was poorly chosen, for it cut across the land without any relation to local variations of terrain or habitation. According to the abortive Moscow Declaration of December, 1945, government in Korea was to be administered under the joint trusteeship of the USSR, the United States, Great Britain, and China until Korea should become ready for political independence. The trusteeship period, it was anticipated, would not endure for longer than five years. However, the American and Soviet delegates could not agree on an initial Korean government structure or personnel. As a result, the arbitrary division along the 38th Parallel remained in force, and the Soviet and American authorities set up different systems of administration within their respective zones. Somewhat ironically the end of World War II greatly jeopardized Korea's opportunity for peaceful growth and unified independence.

In November, 1947, the General Assembly of the United Nations approved an American-sponsored resolution to establish a United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea to supervise elections scheduled for May, 1948, and to help set up a Korean government for the whole peninsula. The USSR, which unsuccessfully sponsored a resolution calling for the evacuation of American and Russian troops in Korea by January 1, 1948, boycotted the United Nations Commission. The Soviet military commander in North Korea would not allow the Commission to operate above the 38th Parallel. Nonetheless, elections held under the auspices of the Commission in South Korea on May 10, 1948, resulted in the formation of a National Assembly and the creation of the Republic of Korea on August 15, 1948. This assembly promulgated the

constitution for the Republic of Korea and elected Syngman Rhee president. As a result, Seoul became the capital of South Korea, while a People's Democratic Republic in North Korea established its capital at Pyongyang. Except for a military advisory group, the United States withdrew its armed forces by June, 1949. The USSR had already announced withdrawal of its occupation forces on December 30, 1948.



During the following years the two governments, pursuing different patterns, developed in divergent directions. In North Korea Kim Il-sung, a young Korean who had been brought up in the USSR, consolidated strong internal control within the Communist regime. An unsuccessful attempt was made to hold an all-Korean political

conference in North Korea, designed to weaken the government south of the 38th Parallel. In the meantime, in South Korea, the new Republic was tackling, with American support, the numerous economic and political problems that faced it. In the spring of 1950, new elections in South Korea served to strengthen the control of Syngman Rhee, a powerful spokesman of the Republic for Korean unification.

After attempts of the northern regime to subvert the political developments in South Korea had proved failures, North Korea resorted to force and on June 25, 1950, launched a full-scale attack across the border. This aggression was met by prompt action by the United Nations, whose Security Council in the absence of the Soviet delegate recommended that assistance be given to the Republic of Korea "as might be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area."<sup>3</sup> Thus the Korean conflict was under way (see map on this page).

**THE KOREAN WAR**—The events of the following months are well known: the rapid advance southward of the North Korean forces; the compression of the United Nations and South Korean forces into a crescent around Pusan in southeastern Korea; the simultaneous break-out and the United Nations landings at Inchon in west-central Korea, which trapped many North Korean troops; the northward drive of the United Nations forces across the 38th Parallel far into North Korea; the entrance of the Chinese Communist forces and the retreat of United Nations forces southward; and, finally, the stabilization of the front on a

<sup>3</sup> The resolution of June 27, 1950, calling for collective action was preceded by that of June 25, which called upon North Korea to withdraw its forces to the 38th Parallel. Thereafter, on June 27, the United States, without a declaration of war, extended to the Korean Republic its full military support.

line south of the 38th Parallel in the west and north of it in the east.

The fighting was conditioned to a considerable degree by the existing terrain and climate. The use of the mountainous areas for guerrilla warfare, the importance of the ridge crests, particularly those which commanded the routes to the south, and the bitterness of the winter in the north and in the mountains all played their parts in the war.

The irregular battle zone across the peninsula became the truce line agreed upon after two years of arduous negotiations and inconclusive warfare. Much of the difficulty in arriving at the Korean armistice of July 27, 1953, grew out of disagreements concerning the repatriation of war prisoners and the complicated question of prestige, which involved both the Communist and the non-Communist nations.

The effects of the fighting in Korea were devastating to many aspects of the economy of the peninsula. Many of the cities, modern transportation lines, and industrial facilities were especially hard hit. The waves of people washed back and forth on the tides of war suffered greatly. Fortunately, the land gave some stability to the predominantly agricultural folk, and, as new crops were grown, some of the physical scars of war were hidden from view.

In the relative calm after the truce the problem of internal order and economic rehabilitation looms large. The peace is most uneasy for a Korea divided as it is. In the south, inflow of aid from outside sources has helped to bolster the economy. The creation of a strong army in South Korea has given the Republic great military strength, but the cost is a severe drain on the economy. In the north, Chinese Communist troops, who have been living off the land, are largely being withdrawn, but there, too, the military cost is burdensome. The hand of the USSR is still evident, although

it would appear that the paramount position of Moscow has been weakened as the Chinese have taken more and more control over North Korea. The military truce line is well defined, but it is not a natural boundary, dividing as it does a land which for centuries was unified, it must be considered only temporary. As long as this line exists, it will be a source of friction and unrest, just as was the 38th Parallel.

**DIVIDED KOREA**—The imposition of the truce line has left two contrasting regimes in Korea. These two governments, as has been noted, are organized on different lines, both, however, repeatedly express the fundamental desire of the homogeneous Korean people for political unification. Important geographic differences between these two areas emphasize the separation.

*North Korea.* North Korea is mountainous, with limited amounts of agricultural land. The winters are cold, bitterly so in the interior, and the summers are short, especially in the interior and along the eastern coast. Thus, North Korean farmers can grow only one crop a year. There the population is, as a consequence, less densely settled than in the south. The 1940 population was 8,223,477 for the five northern provinces, the density per square mile was 188.5 persons. In the north, because of the geological character of the land, there are resources of coal, iron ore, various nonferrous metals, and water power. On the basis of these resources the Japanese were able to develop an industrial complex, which also took advantage of the importation of materials from adjacent Manchuria and North China.

Within North Korea there are also regional contrasts between the mountainous interior, the northeastern coastal sections, and the northwestern plains, the latter serving as the focal center of the entire north. The building of railways along the coasts, across the narrow waist of the peninsula,

and into the interior tied the region together. The development of the People's Democratic Republic, with its high degree of autocratic centralization, furthered this integration. Today, with the influx of Chinese Communist military forces and political control, North Korea has become even more closely tied economically and politically to its mainland neighbors.

*South Korea.* The south, in contrast, although also mountainous and hilly for the most part, has more extensive plains than the north. The winters, though still cold, are not so severe as in North Korea, and double cropping is possible. As a consequence the densities of population are great. In 1940 there were 16,101,558 persons living in the eight southern provinces; the density of population was 386.5 persons per square mile, or approximately double that of the north.

Within South Korea there are many geographic diversities. In the central area there is a contrast among its several sections: the eastern coast, the central mountains, and the western coastal plains, centered around Seoul. The southwest differs from the Nakdong River Basin in the southeast. Ullung, a small volcanic island in the Sea of Japan, and Cheju, a large volcanic island to the southwest, are distinctively different from the rest of the south and differ from each other.

The Republic of Korea has been faced with many internal problems, a number of them accentuated by military events and demands, not the least of which is the accommodation of 2,500,000 refugees from the north. Much American aid has been obtained for relief and rehabilitation, but much more is needed in the way of capital projects to raise the standard of living to the level of that obtaining in 1940. Despite its vulnerable position, the South Korean government has maintained a hostile attitude

toward Japan, its near neighbor, the past history of exploitation and rigid subjugation by the Japanese is not easily forgotten by the Koreans.

These two parts of Korea, although they have geographic diversities, also have certain characteristics in common. For example, all Koreans form one highly nationalistic group speaking a single language. Further, all Koreans are proud of their past and have a way of life that does not markedly change from north to south. When knit together, these common factors and these geographic diversities may give Korea economic and political strength, but the artificial division of Korea has resulted in uneconomic developments and weaknesses.

**THE FUTURE OF KOREA**—Even if the two Koreas were to be united, many problems would persist. The basic geographic factor of location in the heart of the Far East, the essentials of the geographic character of the peninsula, and the political, economic, and military events that have taken place in the recent past must all be taken into account in the solution of these problems. The role of a buffer state in the Far East would be of great advantage to Korea, but, in order to survive, the state requires freedom to work out its own problems without outside interference and yet with access to world trade channels. As a small nation it has always suffered when the balance of power was upset. What is needed most now is a settlement of rivalries between great nations in the Far East. Externally, there are some boundary problems in northeastern Korea, where a large number of Koreans are settled on both sides of the Tumen River, which marks the border with Siberia. The lack of definition of fishing grounds between Korea and Japan and the presence of a Korean minority in the cities of Japan cause friction between Korea and Japan. Over-

whelmingly, however, the internal problems caused by the division of Korea are the most serious. In view of the limited resources and the increasing number of mouths to be fed, the plight of the Korean people on either side of the truce line is most lamentable; the situation has been deeply aggravated by the

tremendous toll taken by the Korean War on the productive capacity of the land and the people. The Korean Peninsula, although a land of beauty, is today no peaceful bridge, it has been buffeted in the past, it suffers today, and it faces an uncertain, unhappy future.

### Study Questions

1. Contrast the historical development of Korea with that of Indochina, Formosa, or another of the areas peripheral to China, the Middle Kingdom.
2. How does Korea differ ethnically from other Far Eastern nations?
3. Characterize briefly the agricultural practices of Korea.
4. How does Korea compare with other Far Eastern nations in mineral and hydroelectric power resources and production?
5. With an increasing population, the pressure of people on the land in Korea has reached a critical level; what solutions are possible for this problem?
6. What was the relationship of Korea to China through the last 2,500 years?
7. What were the major benefits to Japan of control of Korea from 1910 to 1945?
8. What alternatives were there for Korea at the end of World War II other than the division of the peninsula? What disadvantages did each of these alternatives have from the standpoint of (a) the Soviet Union, (b) the United States, and (c) Korea?
9. Study one of the military campaigns or battles in the Korean War in its relation to the physical geography of the part of Korea in which it was fought.
10. Make a map of Korea that will contrast the characteristics of North and South Korea.
11. If you were in a position to help in the planning of the economic reconstruction of Korea, what geographic factors would you stress in the plan?
12. What are the major points of friction between Japan and Korea?
13. Of what benefit is North Korea to Communist China's economy?
14. If Korea were reunited, what would be the flow of economic products between North and South Korea?
15. What are the prospects for trade between a peaceful Korea and other areas of the Far East and of the outside world?

## CHAPTER THIRTY-FIVE

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# *The Japanese Isles*

It has been said that Japan is the only country of the East with a truly Western complex. At any rate, within the last century the Japanese have demonstrated a remarkable aptitude for fast-moving power politics on a scale fairly comparable to that of European nations. Only in Japan has there been a major industrial revolution not attributable to European hands. And with the highest standard of living in Asia the Japanese are regarded as a progressive people whose ambitions exceed those usually characterized as "oriental."

Many striking examples from a wide range of geopolitical activities may readily be drawn from the Japanese record of the past 100 years. In 1850 Japan was a secluded and little-known land that rejected all foreign ideas, thus illustrating perfectly the principle of self-containment. At the other extreme the same nation embarked upon a road of empire building that carried ideas and culture far beyond the narrow limits of the home islands. Territorial aggrandizement quite naturally required offensive and


defensive efforts, on land and sea alike, which illustrate the pattern of international rivalry, tension, and war. Finally, after reaching the zenith as aggressive expansionists, the Japanese at the end of World War II were again reduced in territory to the home islands. Thus stripped of empire and no longer able to seclude herself from the rest of the world, Japan is engaged in still another experience, this time as a democratic nation.

### PHYSICAL ASPECTS

The territory of postwar Japan is limited to four main islands—Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, and Shikoku—plus some 500 small fringing isles, an area identical to the Japan of a century ago. This archipelago extends in a sweeping 1,500-mile arc off the eastern coast of the Asiatic mainland, most closely approaching the continent across the 110-mile-wide Strait of Tsushima, which connects the East China Sea with the Sea of Japan (see map on page 612).



The Japanese Isles extend north and south for about the 45th to the 27th Parallels. The same parallels also run through southern Maine and central Florida, respectively, on the eastern coast of the United States. Honshu is virtually the "mainland" of the Japanese group, comprising nearly sixty per cent of the total area, containing the bulk of the nation's population, and including the six great metropolitan areas. Hokkaido lies to the north, and Kyushu and Shikoku to the south, of Honshu. Altogether, the four islands total only 148,000 square miles, less than the area of California. Both distances and areas in the Japanese Isles are small in contrast with those usually associated with the great Asiatic land mass and the expansive Pacific Ocean. No point in Japan is more than seventy-five miles from the sea.



The insular nature of Japan gives it definite national boundaries, which have remained virtually inviolate since the settling of the islands by ancestors of the present

population. Even a smashing military defeat in World War II did not affect the fixed coastal boundaries of the Japanese homeland. A shoreline configuration some 18,000 miles long confronted the Japanese with strategic defense problems and presumably prompted the acquisition of outlying territory to serve as a protective screen. Prior to World War II the Japanese military authorities carefully fortified strategic coastal areas, especially the entrances to the Inland Sea between Honshu and Shikoku and the approaches to Tokyo Bay, with its great naval base of Yokosuka.

**RELIEF**—Throughout Japan human development has been oriented by landforms, principally by the rigorous restrictions imposed upon inhabitants wresting a living from the soil. The surface of the main islands consists largely of mountains separated by narrow valleys and rimmed by narrow coastal plains. The area is active in a geologic sense, having eighteen live volcanoes and being subject to frequent earthquakes.<sup>1</sup> In the north the mountainous backbone is a continuation of the Russian Karafuto chain, running southward through Hokkaido and into Honshu. In the south appears an easterly continuation of the mountain range found in China on the opposite coast. The two chains meet in the Japanese Alps in the heart of Honshu. In this area is a vast transverse fissure,<sup>2</sup> crossing from the Sea of Japan to the Pacific, within which are numerous volcanoes, mostly extinct or dormant. Here the sacred Fujiyama, or Mt. Fuji, sixty miles west of Tokyo, rises to an altitude of 12,388 feet, the highest point in the country.

So mountainous are the islands that only

<sup>1</sup> Movement along fault lines in the underlying rock structure of the mountainous archipelago accounts for the earthquakes, some of which are extremely destructive to property and human life, as were those in September, 1923, and December, 1946.

<sup>2</sup> This transverse zone is known as the Fossa Magna.

one sixth of the area is sufficiently level to permit normal agricultural utilization. The total arable land, including lower ~~hills~~ side slopes, which are customarily terraced, amounts to an area smaller than the state of West Virginia. Widespread commercial and industrial activities in the larger urban districts likewise utilize level or gently sloping lands. In the fertile agricultural valleys one can observe railroad tracks and entire towns that were built along, and on, the sides of hills in order to avoid using good rice-paddy land. Only the development of hydroelectric energy and certain activities involving the extraction of minerals and the utilization of forest products have attracted industry to rough terrain.

Lowlands of Japan are largely limited to river or stream valleys and coastal plains. Here are the core areas of the country, in which are concentrated the preponderance of the population, the greater share of industry, and the leading channels of commerce. In turn, the core areas may be interpreted as the country's critical areas, for political interest is naturally focused on those places suited to the creation and maintenance of the national economy. The power of the state springs from such areas, and quite logically they must be made to provide the maximum power in offensive action and must receive the greatest possible protection in defensive measures. In World War II, once Japan could be reached by bombing planes, these areas of concentrated population and industry, such as Tokyo and Nagoya, were especially vulnerable as targets.

Three lowlands stand out as being somewhat larger and more important than the rest, all face the irregular southern shore of Honshu with its excellent harbor sites. The great urban centers of Japan are clustered within these favorable areas, which, in addition, support high densities of agricultural population. First, the Kwanto Plain with

its nearly 14,000,000 inhabitants, provides the immediate hinterland for Tokyo and its port city of Yokohama. Second, the Kansai Plain at the eastern end of the Inland Sea contains Osaka and Kyoto, second and third cities of Japan, respectively, and the port of Kobe. Third, the centrally located Nobi Plain around Nagoya, Japan's fourth largest city, supports a rural population of even greater density than do the two other plains.

CLIMATE—Climate has placed fewer restrictions upon the Japanese people than has relief. The islands benefit from a marine location at the margin of a continent squarely within the mild portion of the temperate zone. Temperatures are generally stimulating, with pronounced, but not extreme, seasonal changes. North of Tokyo, winters tend to be more severe than those at similar latitudes on the eastern coast of the United States. Some of the heaviest snowfalls of the world are found on the Japan Sea slopes of the mountains of Hokkaido and northern Honshu. In contrast, the Pacific sides, along which flows the Japanese Current, enjoy relatively pleasant winters. A warm growing season permits rice culture as far north as the northern tip of Hokkaido. In southern Honshu and on Kyushu and Shikoku the winters are exceedingly mild, permitting the growth of some subtropical crops. The extreme southern coastal sections have a two-crop growing season for rice.

RESOURCES—Japan Proper does not possess the physical resources essential to the development and maintenance of a powerful world state. Soils require the most careful and intensive utilization, even at best, only about eighty per cent of Japan's food requirements can be met by domestic production. Grazing lands have never been important in Japanese economy, with the result that fish from the surrounding seas furnish the protein needed in the national diet. In the past, disputes with the USSR

and the United States over fishing rights reflected the concern of Japan relative to this important source of food.<sup>3</sup> At present Japanese vessels are barred by the Soviets from the rich fisheries to the north of Hokkaido around the Habomais and Kuriles. The postwar catch is running about fifteen per cent under the prewar average.<sup>4</sup>

Of mineral resources Japan, with but minor exceptions, does not have adequate amounts to develop a significant heavy industry or to export as surplus commodities. At best, the four islands yield only a few of the prime essentials for current peacetime needs. For the manufacture of iron and steel in postwar Japan about four fifths of the iron ore must be imported. Only in copper and sulfur can Japan be classed as self-sufficient. Deposits of other minerals are negligible or completely lacking, except for limited quantities of chromium and manganese.

Among sources of power coal is present in some abundance in Kyushu and Hokkaido, but it is poor in quality. Meager amounts of petroleum come from small fields in northern Honshu and Hokkaido; Japan lost some oil fields when Karafuto (southern Sakhalin) was taken by the USSR at the close of World War II. Partly offsetting Japan's paucity of mineral fuels, there are hundreds of tumbling mountain streams to provide power. They are short and swift and offer a vast supply of hydroelectric energy, some of which has not yet been fully harnessed.

Scarcity of resources at home and their availability in other countries or dependencies of the western Pacific were strong factors in setting Japan on the path of armed aggression. Development of an iron-and-steel industry in the puppet state of Man-

chukuo is the primary instance of supplementing slim stocks of domestic resources through control over foreign areas. In the discussion that follows, resources and their utilization, either directly or indirectly, go a long way toward explaining the events that have occurred in the Japanese Islands and which have molded the characteristics outwardly displayed in the Japanese people.

## ECONOMIC ASPECTS

**PREWAR VERSUS POSTWAR ECONOMIES**—The keynote of prewar Japanese economy was an industrial superstructure on a traditional agricultural basis as background and bulwark of sustenance. Nearly one half of the people eked out a living from the soil. Crowded two or three to each acre of tilled land, the debt-ridden farmers and their families had not only to provide for themselves but to nurture the nation's program of expanding industrialism as well. Since resources were not adequate, many phases of the resulting economic development were subsidized outright, and inevitably the tenant farmers and wage earners bore a large share of the costs in the form of low income and low wage earnings.

An ever-growing proportion of the population manned the machines that brought Japan into being as a world power. Little better off than their country cousins, these wage earners were in essence the "resource" of human labor that enabled Japanese goods to compete in the world market with countries more richly endowed with raw materials and with long-standing industrial experience. At the same time, neither farmer nor wage earner was allowed any significant participation in government affairs.

Directing the energies of these millions were the ruling factions, who were united in their effort to maintain supremacy. Often there were differences among leaders as to the exact course the empire was to follow, and at times moderate elements in

<sup>3</sup> Fishing forays off foreign shores provided Japanese Naval Intelligence the opportunity of studying waters from the standpoint of military operations.

<sup>4</sup> Postwar statistics based on 1948-51 averages, *Oxford Economic Atlas of the World* (Oxford University Press, 1954).

Japan favored a peaceful course in world affairs in preference to military action. On the whole, the precarious nature of the economic order strengthened the hands of the ruling class in guiding Japan's destiny toward domination of the Asiatic realm. Among the foremost of those at the helm were the industrialists and the military cliques, and it was these who made the decisions that ordained that Japanese economic strength be used to generate armed force.

In postwar Japan objectives have been reversed. Production is no longer slanted toward arming to the teeth and aspiring to control areas farther and farther afield. But Japan would still expand her commercial realm to where a strong industrial output flows to markets in all parts of the world. At first under the guidance of the United States as an occupying force and now as a democratic state, Japan seeks commercial channels amid keen competition. Unfortunately, however, many obstacles loom as barriers to make even the most worthy goal extremely difficult to achieve. Two sets of problems have not changed materially over those of prewar days—in fact, they have become more acute than ever.

First, Japan is still an overcrowded archipelago with a very low per capita resource potential—a ratio which continues to decline as a result of Japan's population growth of more than 1,000,000 each year. Coupled with this paucity of physical resources is the fact that an energetic people such as the Japanese are scarcely conditioned to submit quietly to a continual lowering of living standards while others are enjoying the benefits of improved technical production and a richer assortment of consumers' goods.

Second, opportunities in world markets are becoming increasingly difficult to procure. More and more countries in Asia are endeavoring to become industrial in response to currents of nationalism, and traditional trade channels extending from the United States and Western Europe offer

serious competition. On the other side of the "curtain," within the huge Soviet orbit, there are very limited marketing prospects for Japan even in Communist China, where the high level of prewar trade with Japan was based on political and economic circumstances which no longer exist.

The proportion of Japan's heavy industry devoted to production for military purposes has declined significantly since the war in favor of the percentage for non-military production, and the foreseeable expansion of Japan's defense forces will not result in disproportionate emphasis on heavy industry for the armed forces. But partly nullifying this release of human energy toward more productive pursuits is the unhappy fact that there are already too many hands to develop too few resources. Again, while an empire existed, it furnished Japan with many commodities and with employment opportunities for thousands of Japanese businessmen, administrators, and government officials. In a sense, however, the empire represented a captive market and source of supplies under the political direction of the state and therefore did not, in a comparative sense, serve as a true index to the economic value of the empire. For example, it cost Japanese taxpayers \$17 in military costs for the protection of every dollar invested in Manchukuo.

**AGRICULTURE**—More than fifty-five per cent of the cultivated land of Japan is given over to rice production, with average rice yields of 3,100 pounds per acre. The government rigorously controls prices and the marketing of rice in an effort to stabilize agriculture and to assure the country a dependable food supply. In the years 1948-49 rice imports were virtually prohibited by international allocation. However, wheat, barley, sugar, and soybean imports were heavy. Other grains, especially wheat and vegetables and fruits are raised as supplementary food items; but the over-all variety of crops is

low in comparison with what it could be in an environment so capable of diversified agricultural production.

Beyond supplying food for 90,000,000 people, Japanese farmers have found it desirable to augment their income by raising certain cash crops. Most important among these is silk—essentially a “crop” in that it is based upon the raising of mulberry leaves to feed the silkworms. Before the war Japan produced nearly four fifths of the world’s natural silk. Since the war it has produced about two thirds, most of which comes from the central part of Honshu, where the mulberry trees are grown on sloping land. Other cash crops include tea, flax, and tobacco.

The Japanese people have never been associated with nomadism, and the extensive mountain lands with their rough surfaces and coarse vegetation have not fostered a significant grazing industry. On the other hand, extensive fishing banks surrounding the Japanese Islands figure prominently in the national economy, giving employment to more than 3,000,000 persons.

INDUSTRY—The Westernization of Japan has been expressed through manufacturing. Before 1868 industry consisted almost entirely of handcraft trades, such as weaving, ceramics, and the production of cutlery. Following the Meiji Restoration, machine methods came into being, at first with foreign, and later with domestic, equipment. Until the 1930’s emphasis was placed upon the manufacture of foreign-type consumers’ goods that could be sent to markets all over the world. Japan’s great specialty was textiles, although the technique of fabricating more and more complicated types of commodities added to the list of export items and catered also to a growing home demand. There was a distinct carry-over from the more primitive preindustrial era, however, in that two thirds of the workers were employed in very small shops or were engaged

in piecework in their own homes. Great factories, with barracklike quarters for employees, came later.

It was with manufacturing that Japan made a bid for world importance in foreign trade. If raw materials were not to be found within the country, they were imported. To pay for vital imports, Japan required extensive markets and a sizable volume of exports, it depended primarily upon an extremely cheap and fairly efficient labor supply to keep costs down. In addition, managerial skill, a strategic commercial position with respect to world trade routes, and a willingness on the part of the government to subsidize industry aided in the production of low-cost wares. Low-income groups abroad, especially in eastern Asia, were willing to buy inferior products if they were cheap enough. Through these advantages Japan was able to establish a favored position in the world trade markets. In the prewar period Japan’s trade developed a multilateral pattern, being equally divided between Asia and the West. All of China furnished only ten per cent of Japan’s import needs prior to 1941, whereas South Asia furnished quantities of ores, oil, rubber, and vegetable fibers for Japan’s industries. This shift in the significance of trade from politically controlled areas to those in South Asia merely underlined the fallacy in the Nipponese thinking when they claimed that an empire was the solution for their economic ills.


Eventually tariff and quota restrictions inflicted by other manufacturing nations interfered with the vigorous Japanese policy of expansion of trade. Finally, defeat in World War II ended Japan’s rapid acquisition of territories that were rich in raw materials for homeland factories and could, at the same time, serve as markets in the “Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.”

At present, Japan, given raw materials and markets, still has the basis for a sizable industrial output, despite wartime losses due

to bombing, the dismantling of certain factories, and the obsolescence of machinery. Even though production in the decade since the end of the war has not reached prewar figures, the gain in the early postwar years has been impressive. For example, in industrial production—using the United Nations index, 1948=100—Japanese production had reached 220 in September, 1952. (At the wartime peak in 1944 it was 282.)

**TRANSPORTATION**—In attempts to establish and maintain an industrial economy, Japan required both internal and external lines of communication. The small size of the coun-

try and the limitation of intensive development to a relatively small number of low-land areas greatly simplify internal transportation needs. Further, the highly irregular coastline abounds with harbors conducive to coastwise trade. The protected Inland Sea between Honshu and Shikoku particularly has fostered domestic shipping. The country's favorable maritime location in the western Pacific means that a focal point could be developed for ocean shipping lanes that link the Japanese Islands with trans-Pacific lands, with Europe via the Suez Canal, and with many important economic regions in Asia and Australia.



By a system of trunk lines the rail network of Japan efficiently ties together all major industrial and urban areas (see map on page 617). Less important railways have been built along the more remote coastal plains and through the valleys, providing excellent communication for all areas that support appreciable numbers of people. Continuous interisland rail service is maintained by the use of fast ferries operating between Honshu and Hokkaido and between Honshu and Shikoku and by means of a tunnel that connects Honshu with Kyushu. From a traffic standpoint, railways greatly overshadow roads, the latter seldom having more than local importance. Although there are plans for major highways, it is yet a difficult two-day drive between Tokyo and Osaka—the two largest cities of the country and only 250 miles apart!

Commercial air service in prewar Japan was little more than a prelude to aerial combat and the transportation of personnel and supplies to areas of military control. Since 1945 the development of air transportation has enmeshed Tokyo in the world network of commercial routes—thirteen international companies now schedule planes in and out of that city. There are frequent flights across the Pacific to the United States and Canada and through the Middle East to the capitals of Western Europe. Japan Air Lines operates across the Pacific, to Okinawa, and to several points in Honshu, Hokkaido, and Kyushu. Several foreign regional companies maintain schedules from Tokyo to Far Eastern points, such as Pusan, Taipeh, Manila, and Bangkok, but none to cities in Communist China.

#### HUMAN FACTORS

Although the Japanese trace their origin to a mixed racial stock, they are today rather uniform in physical appearance. There has been little intermixture with other peoples during historical times. A Mongolian racial

strain predominates among the Japanese, with the usual physical characteristics, including black hair, short stature, and an epicanthus fold of the eyes. There are some strains from the South Seas and from islands off the southeastern coast of Asia. Some authorities claim that there is no positive way of distinguishing a Japanese from a Chinese on the basis of physical traits alone.

The only inhabitants in Japan who could be considered a racial minority group are the Ainus, gradually pushed northward onto the island of Hokkaido by the surge of Japanese expansion. As in the case of the aborigines of Australia, these people are dying out, in 1948 they numbered only about 16,000 and lived principally in their own villages apart from the Japanese.

Having no written language of their own, the Japanese borrowed Chinese ideographs around the third century. The pictorial symbols proved so awkward in use that later a syllabic system of signs was developed, made up of whole or partial Chinese characters. The resulting variants have made the Japanese language one of the most difficult in the world. Cultural differences between Japan and the West are undoubtedly magnified because of the linguistic element.

RELIGION—State Shinto, the national religion for many decades, has played an important part in the governmental as well as in the cultural life of the Japanese. Literally translated as the "way of the gods," Shintoism after the Meiji Restoration related the worship of countless deities to matters of the state.<sup>5</sup> The people were taught that Japan is transcendent among nations of the world; that the Japanese race possesses divine attributes, based upon their unbroken imperial line of rulers; and that the fulfillment of their god-given obligations rests on unwavering obedience, matchless loyalty, ex-

<sup>5</sup> There is nothing inherently nationalistic in the primitive cult of Shinto, which as a cult of nature worship still forms the basis of Japanese religion.

traordinary courage on the battlefield, and other manifestations of reverence to the state. Patriotism was thus instilled into the Japanese mind by extolling the virtues of national glory through religious beliefs and dramatized by religious rituals. From 1868 until the end of World War II state Shintoism was deliberately used to further the ultra-patriotic spirit of Japan. Deprived of its official status (including financial support) in 1945, the religion nevertheless continued to play a significant role in Japanese life. In fact, there are signs, such as numbers of people making pilgrimages, that since 1950 Shintoism has been increasing in popularity.

Despite the official sanction given to state Shintoism until 1945, Buddhism persisted on a large scale. During the sixth century it was introduced into Japan from Korea, which in turn had received it from China. Millions of Japanese are classed as Buddhists, moreover, there is nothing to prevent a person from being both a good Shintoist and a good Buddhist, since the two refer to different levels of belief. Buddhism is more of a humanistic philosophy than a form of religion as commonly accepted in the Western World. Although Shintoism and Buddhism seem to Westerners to present certain fundamental contradictions, these do not disturb the Japanese, because the two religions serve different functions. Shintoism represents a belief in the past; Buddhism, one in the future. The former is traditionally conservative, whereas the latter is progressive, being often associated with social progress and with advances in education, arts, and crafts.

**POPULATION**—Because of governmental efficiency and the definite delimitations of the country by fixed water boundaries, the population statistics are surprisingly complete. Since the middle of the Tokugawa Era, early in the eighteenth century, census counts have been remarkably frequent and apparently

reliable. From a population of about 25,000,000 at that time, the number of people in the Japanese Islands had increased only 2,000,000 by the time Perry visited Japan in 1853, more than a century and a quarter later. Oppression of the peasants by the ruling classes, the practice of infanticide in face of dire poverty, and a restriction of commercial enterprise while Japan was isolated from the rest of the world—all were largely responsible for this lack of population growth.

At the beginning of the Meiji Restoration in 1868, the total population stood at the 33,000,000 mark, and in less than a century the growth spurted upward to approximately 90,000,000. Japan's entry into world trade channels, combined with the advantages of industrialization and new techniques in scientific agriculture, enabled the Japanese to support additional millions in a land previously impeded by narrow customs, underdeveloped potentialities, and shackled energies.

In 1940, on the eve of World War II, an official census gave the country a population of 73,114,000, ranking it among the six most populous nations of the world. Just ten years later, even after a devastating four years of war, the official count had jumped to 83,200,000, denoting an increase of 10,000,000!

*Rate of Increase.* In the two decades before Japan went to war with the United States, the annual population increase had reached the remarkable rate of nearly 1,000,000. During the same period the United States, with its much greater total population, increased only around 900,000 per year. An industrial revolution, similar to, but much later than, that in northwestern Europe and the United States, deadened the immediate economic repercussions of the tremendous population increase prior to the war.

The war period itself saw a slight decrease,



to 72,000,000 in November, 1945. But in the first nine postwar years, based upon an official estimate in 1954, 16,000,000 were added to the Japanese population. However, this increase is not so incredible as it would at first appear. In 1946 and 1947 high natural increases reflected the higher birth rates immediately after the war. Also, approximately 5,000,000 can be accredited to the repatriation of both soldiers and civilians, largely from Manchuria.

It is estimated that the rate of increase is gradually decreasing and in the next ten years will result in from 1,000,000 to 1,100,000 additional people annually in the country. Acceptance of the necessity for birth control by the government is one controlling factor. Nevertheless, a figure of 100,000,000 is expected in the 1960's.

*Urban versus Rural Population.* Since the beginning of industrialization on a large scale, population increase has been chiefly reflected in the growth of cities. In 1893 there were five rural inhabitants to each city dweller. In 1950 about thirty-eight per cent of the people lived in cities and sixty-two per cent in rural areas, including villages. Cities of 100,000 or more population numbered only six in the Japan of 1893, whereas in 1950 there were thirty-eight, excluding suburbs in the Tokyo area.

Population of Six Leading Japanese Cities,  
1940 and 1950

City	1940 Census	1950 Census
Tokyo	7,100,000	8,277,500
Osaka	3,395,000	1,956,000
Kyoto	1,177,000	1,102,000
Nagoya	1,249,000	1,030,000
Yokohama	866,000	951,000
Kobe	1,006,000	765,000

Six Japanese cities stand out as great metropolitan centers, the smallest of which has more than 750,000 inhabitants. Note in the adjoining table that only Yokohama had by 1950 recouped its 1940 population.

These six cities are strung out along a 275-mile stretch of the Pacific coast of Honshu between Tokyo Bay and Osaka Bay, a region somewhat resembling the eastern seaboard of the United States between New York and Washington, D.C., with its concentration of large cities. Known in historical times as the "Tokkaido Road,"<sup>6</sup> the same route has long connected Japan's leading cities.

*Population Density.* In justification of colonial aspirations, Japan before World War II emphasized the crowded conditions of the homeland, frequently employing authentic statistics to strengthen its case. Pre-war population density reached about 500 persons per square mile, but the Japanese pointed out that a more accurate measure was the 3,100 persons per square mile of arable land. The latter type of evaluation, however, does not take into account the non-arable lands used in supplying hydroelectric energy and forest resources or the fishing banks in the surrounding seas.

During the first postwar years the occupying American forces were well aware of problems in Japanese economy caused by population pressure. Much attention was directed toward possible remedies, American scientists worked with the Japanese to increase the productivity of the soil. Agriculture was emphasized, but experts on forestry, minerals, electrical engineering, fishing, industry, and other fields also worked on the all-important question of how to make a limited area support an ever-increasing number of people.

At present the population density is approaching 600 persons per square mile, with more than six per cultivable acre. New and improved techniques for developing the existing resources of the islands themselves, together with an increasing export market, must bear the brunt of taking care of a mil-

<sup>6</sup> In medieval times this highway connected Kyoto, the imperial capital, and Tokyo, the feudal capital.

lion plus new mouths to feed each year. Emigration of a few thousand inhabitants to South America has proved virtually negligible in easing the problem. Lack of colonies, it must be stated, is not an important issue, for at the peak period of Japan's empire, there were but a few thousand Japanese able or willing to leave the homeland and settle in overseas territories.<sup>7</sup> Also, in crowded Asia, any potential colonial area probably has its own population to be supported by available resources.

### HISTORICAL SEQUENCE

The profound influence of Japan's geographic environment has been apparent throughout the historical period and is reflected even in the mythology of the country.<sup>8</sup> Of external importance were the sea and offshore location—nearness to the vast continent of Asia on the one hand and, on the other, remoteness and self-imposed isolation from the Western World. Of internal importance were the paucity of natural resources and the extremely mountainous terrain, the latter limiting free movement and the former restricting choice of economic opportunity within the narrow confines of the home islands. It is easy to establish the connection between these geographic influences and recent Japanese activities of international significance, such as the development of a strong navy, the quest for raw materials not found domestically, and the attempt to obtain foreign markets all over the world.

<sup>7</sup> The one exception was the puppet state of Manchukuo (1932-45), where there were more than 1,000,000 Japanese, almost all of whom have been repatriated.

<sup>8</sup> According to Japanese mythology the very islands of Japan were supposed to have been created from the drops of water that fell from the spear of Izanagi, a god, as he plunged it into, and withdrew it from, the sea. Myths and legends have furnished a potent background for modern Japanese propaganda.

For the sake of convenience Japanese history may be broken down into four divisions: the early age, terminating with the end of seclusion in the middle of the nineteenth century, the period of empire building, brought to an abrupt end by World War II, the occupation of Japan, 1945-52, and the postoccupation period.

**EARLY JAPAN**—Initial foreign relations of Japan were limited to those with Korea and China. These countries on the nearby mainland of Asia possessed the only significant civilization accessible to Japan. Except for the probability of a very early migration of population to Japan from or through Korea, the first cultural contacts between the two countries were affected during a period of six centuries prior to, and extending into, the Christian Era. In this period the use of metal and the art of writing seem to have been introduced to Japan from Korea. Thus, the Korean Peninsula appears to have been a bridgehead between Asia and Japan in cultural terms as well as a point of military significance in later history.

There are records of Sino-Japanese relations in as early a period as the first century of the Christian Era. From that time on, it is a story of Japan's receiving its first rather highly developed civilization from China. Of foremost importance in this connection was the formal adoption of the Chinese written language, probably early in the fifth century. Prior to that the Japanese had possessed no written language. Buddhism also came from China through Korea about 552 and with it, as well as afterward, came various scholars and artists, bringing all the appurtenances of the advanced Chinese civilization. Of some political interest is the fact that the sun, the importance of which was widely recognized by early peoples throughout the world, seems to have been taken over for the Japanese flag about the seventh century from the sun on the imperial banner of China.

During these early years mountains made communication and governmental organization difficult, probably contributing in no small measure to the historic, decentralized political system. Lack of a strong central authority persisted, in fact, until very recent times, and this weakness was combated by modern military propagandists. Relief has also affected the location of capital cities from the eighth century to the present time. Nara, Kyoto, and finally Tokyo (then Yedo) were selected by shoguns, or powerful lords, as the first centers of an imperial government, all suitably located at the heads of bays and protected by somewhat difficult terrain to the rear. Later the emperor retained Tokyo as a national capital.

Seas surrounding their islands thwarted Japan's attempts to expand to the mainland; they also served as a protective barrier against enemy encroachment. As late as the sixteenth century the Japanese shogun Hideyoshi attempted to conquer Korea and China, but without success. Likewise, two Mongol invasions in the thirteenth century were not strong enough to overpower Japanese sea and land forces. Lessons from the Western World in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were necessary before Japan developed a strong navy—seemingly late for so insular a people.


First contact with the West came about 1542, when Portuguese traders arrived. Spanish, Dutch, and English traders followed, as well as Jesuit missionaries. But in 1636 the shogun, suspicious of the missionary attempts to Christianize the people and fearful of outside interference, expelled all foreigners with but few minor exceptions.<sup>9</sup> At the same time the Japanese were forbidden to leave the home islands. Thus Japan's insularity and her extreme geographic remoteness from the Western World were em-

phasized by law. A very provincial type of civilization resulted, and although the society was largely feudal in character, the Tokugawa shogunate provided law and order. Under the Tokugawa rule the period of self-imposed seclusion endured for the incredible period of more than two centuries and was finally ended in 1853 by Commodore Matthew Perry's visit to Japanese shores—a well-known story in history books. The opening of a window in Japan soon ended the shogunate and in 1868 ushered in the Meiji Era—one which catapulted Japan from a feudal state to that of a modern industrial power.

Once more in contact with the outside world, the Japanese were aware that Western civilization had been developing at a rapid pace while their own domestic advancement had progressed sluggishly, if, indeed, at all. In feverish haste the Japanese undertook to equal the pace of modernization demonstrated by the West and even to compete with European powers in the race for domination of Asia and the building of overseas empires. The dynamic thrust into the realm of power politics unfortunately clashed with the established positions of the Western World, and an aggressive foreign policy in turn worsened Japan's relations with the European powers.

**EMPIRE BUILDING**—Japan's motives for attempted conquest and expansion were not basically different from the customary ones observed throughout history. Economic motives went hand in hand with a desire for world prestige and national security. Basic economic drives, cloaked as pleas for more "living space," actually disguised a drive for additional resources, market outlets, and a wider industrial base on which to establish an ever-stronger military regime. Political motives may be inseparably linked with geographic considerations. Japan, as an island domain, saw the advantage of dominating the sprawling littoral of the continent to the west, especially since the latter was

<sup>9</sup> A single Dutch outpost on the island of Deshima in Nagasaki harbor linked Japan with the outer world.



populated by an extremely numerous and potentially powerful people. On the other hand, the value of using the islands of the western Pacific as a screen against possible antagonists was not to be overlooked. Offensive as well as defensive considerations revolved around the spatial relation of these islands to the home base as Japan expanded territorially and ultimately sought to stave off defeat in World War II.

Psychological motives are intangible, and apt to be subtle, but it is known that the Japanese people as a nation were endowed with a remarkable degree of patriotism, self-discipline, courage, and self-confidence. Skillful propagandists exploited the myth that their emperor was a direct descendant of a sun-goddess and that as a divine race they were destined to rule the world. A type of exaggerated national pride colored Japan's position vis-à-vis the Western World and strengthened the hands of its chauvanistic elements.

Eighty years—from 1861 to 1941—were required to build up an empire on the western rim of the Pacific (see map on this

page). The steady advance in the Pacific and on the mainland was partly in response to internal forces, in part a Machiavellian quest for power, and in large part a matter of exploiting the opportunities for expansion provided by the two world wars. The first acquisition was the tiny Bonin Islands, some 500 miles south of Japan, in 1876. They would prove useful either as a stepping-stone or as a defensive screen. To the north Japan acquired title to the Kuriles in 1878 by giving up its claim to southern Sakhalin in favor of Russia.

The Sino-Japanese War in 1894, arising out of conflict over Korea, first thrust Japan into China. As a result China recognized Korean independence, ceded Formosa, the Pescadores, and the Liaotung territory to Japan. The two latter Japan later relinquished, under European pressure, but Formosa advanced Japanese sea power southward toward the Philippines and other lands of tropical richness. Once again, as a result of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, Japan moved on the mainland, acquiring southern Sakhalin, the Liaotung area, and the lease-

hold to Port Arthur. Most significantly Japan soon converted Korea into a protectorate, and, in 1910, annexed this strategic borderland.

World War I offered Japan, as an Allied power, an opportunity to replace Germany in Shantung and to take over, in 1917, the German-held Marshalls, Carolines, and Marianas. These three island groups were known as the Japanese Mandates after 1919. Thus was the flag of Nippon firmly planted in the Pacific as well.

Not until a decade later, as the Western World moved into a great depression, did the Japanese military take up the mission of even greater conquest. The Mukden Incident, in 1931, soon led to a military phase which was to end disastrously in 1945. Meanwhile, in 1932, Manchuria, the richest part of China, was converted into the puppet state of Manchukuo.<sup>10</sup> During the same decade the Japanese annexed Jehol and Chahar, as an entering wedge into North China, and in 1936 penetrated into Inner Mongolia. In mid-1937 Japan, after provoking an incident near Peking, launched a full-scale, though undeclared, war against China Proper.

Unable to devour the Chinese dragon and sorely pressed for matériel of war, Japan joined Germany and Italy in 1940 in order to profit from the European war. While Britain, France, and the United States were involved in a two-ocean war, Japan turned to the rich areas of Southeast Asia. In preparation for an all-out conquest in the Pacific Japan took over Hanoi and Saigon in 1940 and 1941. Strategic disposition of naval and air forces enabled the Land of the Rising Sun to challenge the United

States directly, when Japan's air forces attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.

In the ensuing eight months Japan's war lords carved out a vast military empire in an effort to gain the resources necessary for its mortal struggle with the giant of the Pacific—the United States. Of first magnitude in this strategy were the Philippines, with fortified Corregidor, Malaya, with strategic Singapore; Burma as a base of operations against Allied supply routes to China, the British stronghold of Hong Kong, and the lush Netherlands East Indies. Occupation of the Andaman Islands foreshadowed a drive toward India and the Middle East, where the Japanese might have joined German armies moving from the west. Actually the junction of the two never materialized.

After August, 1942, the Japanese perimeter ceased to be expanded, and pressure from Allied action put Japan on the defensive. Greatest pressure came from American naval and air operations on the Pacific side, with the result that Japan held interior lines of communication within the great bulk of her gigantic empire until the final collapse in August, 1945.

**ALLIED OCCUPATION**—In view of the terrible destruction visited on Japanese cities, especially by the atomic explosions over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Japanese had no choice but to surrender to the Allied forces. In recognition of the predominance of the United States in the Pacific war the Americans largely determined the post-surrender policies in Japan. Unlike Germany and Austria, Japan was never occupied by Soviet troops, even though the USSR was a member of the Allied occupation authority. In theory the Far East Commission in Washington was the supreme policy-making authority for Japan. In reality, however, behind this façade of international control General Douglas MacArthur, as Supreme Commander of the Allied forces in the Pacific

<sup>10</sup> Manchukuo, never officially designated as part of the empire, was set up as a republic with its own flag under a Manchu ruler, formerly deposed by the Chinese Revolution of 1911. In practice, however, it was as rigidly controlled as were Korea and Formosa, which were claimed as parts of the Japanese Empire.

area, acted as an American pro-consul. Thus Americans largely shaped the occupation policy and Japan's future course.

In its basic objectives American policy aimed at the rehabilitation of a shattered country and its restoration to the family of nations. The creation of a peaceful and democratic Japan, one cleansed of its aggressive proclivities, involved demilitarization and democratization in order that economic reforms might be successfully executed.

The most obvious measure to be effected was the demilitarization of the country, including the destruction of arsenals, factories, and naval bases and the abolition of the army, navy, and general staff. The move also required the return to civilian life of some 3,000,000 men who were in the armed services overseas. Decentralization of authority was initiated to encourage local autonomy, as opposed to centralized control from the capital. Japan is divided into forty-seven prefectures, which in some ways resemble the French departments. Individually or in groups these minor civil divisions were given regional responsibilities for specific political or economic functions (police action, forest management), with headquarters in a prefecture capital.

Democratization of Japan was another strong step undertaken during the period of occupation, probably the most significant in the long run. Here the United States merely paved the way for the growth of a democratic society; only the Japanese themselves through their political activity could bring democracy to fruition. The new Constitution, adopted in 1947, provided for a Bill of Rights, gave greater powers to the Diet, and vested sovereignty in the people instead of in the emperor—a far cry from the former autocratic document. A product of American authority, the Constitution embodied noble intentions.

One feature of Japan's postwar status has been the dismemberment of its empire. The

desire to punish Japan for past aggression as well as to restrain it in the future impelled the Allied powers to reduce Japan to its home islands. This aim was stated at the Cairo Conference in 1943 and reiterated at Potsdam on July 26, 1945. Not only was Japan stripped of its wartime gains, but it was equally deprived of territories legally held prior to 1894. The list of territories to which Japan renounced all right, title, and claim is impressive. It includes Korea, Formosa and the Pescadores, the Spratly and the Paracel islands, Bonins, Ryukyus, southern Sakhalin, and the Kuriles, as well as the former mandated islands of the Pacific.

The disposition of this empire has already had, and may well continue to have, strong geopolitical repercussions in the Pacific area and in the Asiatic world. A highlight of the sudden shift of political control was Japan's obligation to recognize the independence of Korea after forty years of control, thereby setting the stage for another world-shaking event (see Chapter Thirty-four).

Manchukuo as a puppet state vanished into postwar China, as did other mainland holdings of Japan in that country. All special rights and commercial interests in China, so laboriously acquired, were also lost. Thus did Japanese power, after a half century of struggle, disappear from the mainland of Asia.

**POST-OCCUPATION JAPAN**—The Treaty of Peace with Japan, signed September 8, 1951 (effective April 28, 1952), signaled the end of war and the restoration of Japan as a sovereign nation in the Pacific world. Six years of occupation had prepared the country for solving the complex problems facing it after the war. With great energy and industrious efforts, the Japanese immediately set to work to repair the war damage, and by 1953 the scars of flattened urban areas had largely been covered with new construction.

An enterprise much more difficult is the

serious business of raising food to support the growing population. Such a situation continues to threaten the political stability of the state. In an area deficient in essential material resources, democratic institutions are most susceptible to revolutionary movements and violent overthrows of the existing order. Future per capita production and export and import statistics are thus likely to be excellent indicators of the political stability of the Japanese nation.

### GEOPOLITICAL RELATIONS

Japan's foreign relations are likely to loom as the most important aspect of its contemporary status. The strategically located isles are enmeshed in a zone where interests of the USSR and of China on the Asiatic mainland impinge upon those of the United States in the Pacific. In the modern world no sharp line can be drawn between major power blocs; the result is a band of land and water areas paralleling the east coast of Asia, not entirely unlike that of the so-called "Shatter Zone" in Eastern Europe. In this context it is quite clear that Japan's power status depends upon the normalization of its relation with the USSR, China, and the United States.

**THE USSR**—Japan's international position, as in the case of other Pacific areas, must be viewed against the background of Asian developments. One major result of the war was the eclipse of Japan as a strong power in the Far East and the emergence of the USSR as its successor. But in addition to this shift of power, the present geographic relation of the two countries must be noted. On the Asiatic side, north of Japan is a Soviet arc, about 1,500 miles in length, giving approach from the northeast, northwest, and west. A prominent part of this arc consists of the forty-seven Kurile Islands, stretching northward from Hokkaido for about 700 miles to Russia's Kamchatka Pen-

insula. The southern point of the chain is only two miles distant from Hokkaido. It is significant that the United States Senate, in ratifying the treaty with Japan in 1952, refused to recognize the Yalta agreement of 1945 with regard to any transfer to the USSR of the rights of Japan in those islands or the transfer of southern Sakhalin and other nearby islands to the USSR.

It must be noted that the Soviet Union did not recognize the 1951 Treaty of Peace and agreed to restore normal relations with Japan only on October 19, 1956.

**CHINA**—From the geopolitical point of view, China, no matter what its complexion politically, could always be a potential menace to Japan for several reasons. China's principal advantages lie in a vast superiority to Japan in natural resources and population. In a major conflict involving Japan, air and naval bases in Manchuria and North China could be a source of potential danger to forces defending the Japanese Islands. Finally, and always of great concern to the Japanese people, is the problem of economic relations. China presents considerable opportunities as a possible market and a source of raw materials. Japan's postwar trade with China has been only four per cent of its foreign trade, but the import list includes iron ores, coking coal, soybeans, and salt. To be deprived of this trade through exigencies of politics would be a bitter blow. Stern necessity impels Japan to come to terms with Communist China in economic matters.

**THE UNITED STATES**—The presence of the United States in the western Pacific is a factor that tends to neutralize the danger to Japan from Soviet pressure. It is obvious that a disarmed Japan (provision to this effect was even made part of the new Japanese constitution) must rely on a friendly power, or powers, for its military protection for some time to come. Such a friendship on the part of the United States began to be

apparent early in the occupation period. The occupation policy of the United States in July, 1950, shifted to a clear-cut one of strengthening, rather than weakening, Japan militarily. This in a sense is a by-product of the attack from the north on South Korea. Japan fits naturally into a Pacific outer defense area, stretching from the Aleutians to the Philippines. During the military stages of the Korean conflict, in 1950-51, the value of Japan to the United Nations command was from the first clearly evident.

It is not surprising, therefore, to find that the treaty of peace with Japan did not preclude the retention of United States armed forces in Japan. In fact, in a separate security treaty, which came into force simultaneously with the treaty of peace, the United States assumed full responsibility for the defense of Japan. The terms of this treaty accorded the United States the right to protect Japan against armed attack, to

preserve peace in the Far East, and even to put down any large-scale internal disturbances in the country. It is proper to conclude from this treaty that Japan is both an ally and a protectorate of the United States.

Japan's future relations with the United States are clouded in uncertainty. As a potential industrial power Japan will look toward an independent role in the Pacific. An attempt at the recovery of its lost territories to the north and south must be taken into account. The use of the sword in carving out another empire appears to be ruled out by the islands' vulnerability to atomic attack and the rising power of Red China. Nor would the non-Communist world permit Japan to recapture its former trade advantages in Asia. Confronted with this dilemma, Tokyo must adopt a policy of co-existence with the Communist bloc and bargain for the best advantages from both coalitions in the Pacific.

### Study Questions

1. What lesson learned by Japan in her earlier history accounts for her rather strong navy in the early stages of World War II?
2. Why did Japan lack modern civilization as of 1850, and how did she try to correct the situation?
3. Compare or contrast the locations of Japan and the British Isles.
4. Cite some of the factors that probably contributed to Japan's downfall in World War II.
5. Why did the nature of the American occupation of Japan change not long after the close of World War II?
6. Assuming you were to defend the Japanese Islands, what use would you make of geographical factors?
7. Why could it be said that very near neighbors are not always an advantage?
8. How did the resources of Manchukuo, Korea, and Formosa fit into the economy of Japan Proper prior to World War II?
9. What have been the most important (a) external and (b) internal geographic factors in Japanese history?
10. In what ways does Hokkaido stand apart from Honshu, Kyushu, and Shikoku?
11. Trace the population increase of Japan from the early eighteenth century to the present day. Discuss population pressure.
12. How was religion in Japan used for purposes of nationalism?
13. What was the meaning of the phrase "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere"?
14. Trace the expansion of the Japanese Empire in the Pacific from the 1870's to Pearl Harbor.
15. What are the major postwar problems facing Japan?



## *The Philippines*


Ferdinand Magellan, a Portuguese navigator in the service of Spain, discovered the Philippine Islands in 1521. Twenty-one years later a Spanish exploration party named them in honor of Prince Philip, later Philip II, of Spain. During the next fifty years several Spanish expeditions gradually overran most of the larger islands in the group and established numerous permanent settlements. By 1600 the Spaniards were in peaceful possession of nearly all the Philippine archipelago.

Authentic accounts indicate that, long before the islands were known to Europeans, there were Chinese trading voyages to the Philippines dating at least as far back as the tenth century, probably earlier. Also Hindus, who presumably came by way of the Malay Peninsula, influenced the people, probably in the early centuries of the Christian era. Evidence of this Hindu influx is found in the many Sanskrit words in the languages and dialects used by the natives when the Spanish arrived.

The islands lie off the coast of Southeast

Asia, directly west across the South China Sea, 500 miles from Hong Kong and 600 miles from Saigon (see map on page 629). As an approach to the continent of Asia, however, the Philippines never figured prominently until the postwar era, when Manila became an international airport for trans-Pacific flights, sharing this honor with Tokyo. Because of their nearness to the Equator, the Philippines were not included on the Great Circle steamship routes across the Pacific to North America, as was Japan, farther north. Another important aspect of their location is that the island group is a part of the vast archipelago that rims the coast of Southeast Asia and thrusts southward toward Australia and eastward into the central Pacific. Directly north, 220 miles from northern Luzon, is the island of Taiwan (Formosa), present homeland of Nationalist China. Jutting eastward, Palawan, another of the Philippine group, almost reaches the isles off the northern tip of Borneo. Hence, the Philippines have no peculiarly unique position, although in cer-

tain instances they have figured in military strategy of the general area. They are best known for a diversity of natural resources and lush agricultural productivity, rather than as a strategic location. In the years ahead the country's potential economy may be realized if and when the rich environment is properly exploited and developed. In short, the Philippines are important in themselves and may aspire to become even more so.



Spain, which brought Christianity to the Philippines, is responsible for its religious advances. At the same time that country retarded genuine economic progress by a selfish interest in exploitable commodities. Monopolistic policies and high export taxes imposed by the Spanish prevented successful competition with either the West Indies or the Netherlands East Indies. The latter carried greater favor in the European markets, whereas the former were less remote.

Although the Moros in the southern islands continued to harass the Spanish until 1850 and other European nations tried to secure part of the trade or to capture part of the islands at various times, Spain retained fairly undisputed sovereignty until the Spanish-

American War. At the conclusion of that brief struggle the United States acquired sovereignty rights in the Philippines by virtue of the Treaty of Paris in 1898. Under American guidance came educational progress, advancement in public health, economic development, and finally full membership in the family of nations. The Philippine people have attained their political status of independence through peaceful cooperation, rather than through violence and bloodshed, a development that was watched with great interest by other subject peoples of the Far East.

#### PHYSICAL ASPECTS

The Philippine Islands form an archipelago that extends through sixteen degrees of latitude, a distance of more than 1,100 miles (see map on page 631). If a map of the Philippines were superimposed upon a map of the United States, on the same scale (irrespective of matching latitudes), the islands would extend from the Gulf of Mexico to Minneapolis. If Manila were placed at St. Louis, Aparri, in northernmost Luzon, would lie on the Illinois-Wisconsin boundary, about sixty miles west of Lake Michigan, and the southeastern tip of the same island would lie within Tennessee. Davao, the chief city of Mindanao, would be at the southeastern corner of Alabama; New Orleans would be covered by the island of Jolo, largest of the Sulu group; and Palawan would extend southwestward almost to Dallas, Texas. Actually the Philippine Islands have about the same latitude as Central America and southernmost Mexico.

There are more than 7,000 islands in the Philippine group, of which 463 have an area of more than one square mile. The total area of the islands, 115,600 square miles, is about equal to the combined area of New York, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia, and each of the eleven largest islands has an area greater than the land area of Rhode Island

(1,058 square miles). These eleven islands contain about ninety-five per cent of the total land area, but approximately two thirds of the archipelago's surface is made up of the two principal islands: Luzon (41,000 square miles) and Mindanao (37,000 square miles), which are, respectively, approximately equal in size to the states of Ohio and Indiana.

Area and Population of the Principal Philippine Islands

Island	Area	
	(in sq mi)	Population (1948)
Luzon	40,420	9,020,000
Mindanao	36,527	2,450,000
Samar	5,049	660,000
Negros	4,904	1,430,000
Palawan	4,549	65,000
Panay	4,445	1,445,000
Mindoro	3,757	166,000
Leyte	2,785	915,000
Cebu	1,702	1,040,000
Bohol	1,492	523,000
Percentage		
of Total	90% of area	90% of population

**RELIEF**—In the Philippines the relief and its underlying structure are complex. The islands have a highly irregular configuration and, in consequence, an extremely long coastline. Rugged mountains, folded strata, fault blocks, and volcanic ranges form the backbone of the islands, they trend roughly in a north-south direction. Mountain ranges in general parallel the coast and are separated from it by narrow, interrupted coastal plains. The principal intermontane lowlands are the Central Plain of Luzon and areas in Mindanao. In the central part of the island group many of the synclinal basins<sup>1</sup> are below sea level and form the bays and straits that separate the principal Visayan (central) Islands.


<sup>1</sup> A synclinal basin is a topographical depression caused by a downward fold of the rock structure on all sides.

**CLIMATIC CONDITIONS**—Rainfall regime rather than temperature differences determines climatic regions in the Philippines. The mean annual range of temperature varies from one to eleven degrees in different parts of the islands; only in the extreme north is there a noticeably cooler season.<sup>2</sup> Altitude exerts a greater influence than latitude. Along the western coasts there are three seasons: a mild dry period from November to mid-March, with average temperatures in the low or middle seventies; a shorter, hot, dry season lasting until mid-June, with considerably warmer days, although the absolute maxima rarely reach 100° F., and a rainy season from June through October, which is accompanied by considerable cloudiness and a high relative humidity.

The eastern coasts have maximum precipitation in the cooler months, but no dry season. In the far south rain is somewhat uniformly distributed throughout the year. In all regions interior valleys receive less moisture than coastal stations. The central and northern islands may experience typhoons at any time from April through December, although most of them occur between July and October. The high winds and torrential rainfall of the typhoons may cause heavy damage to coconut plantations, sugar cane, and abaca crops and may also interfere with coastwise shipping.

**BIOTIC RESOURCES**—Of the total land surface, commercial forests cover about two fifths; noncommercial forests, about one fifth; and *cogonales* (man-made artificial grasslands), about one fifth. Twenty-three per cent is in farms, but less than fourteen per cent is actually under cultivation (1939). The commercial forests, some of them relatively inaccessible, include some excellent hardwoods. Those of the *nara* and *lauan*

<sup>2</sup> In contrast, Kansas City has a mean annual range of 50° F., and Miami, 14° F.



groups are marketed as Philippine mahogany in the United States and Japan. The equatorial forests of the lowlands and southern uplands merge into a middle-latitude species in the higher altitude of Luzon; the more temperate oak thrives only at altitudes above 4,000 to 5,000 feet.

Some fishing takes place along all inhabited coasts, accounting in part for the normal menu of fish and rice in the average lowland household. The catch consists of tropical fish and a variety of shellfish. Since modern preservation is not commonly available, the catch is usually restricted to the market needs of the fishing community. The only well-developed aspect of the fishing industry is the commercial fish pond. They are found in the mangrove and *nipa* fringe of those tidal bays and estuaries that are accessible to urban markets and that have been diked and cleared of normal vegetation. The *bangos*, a fish that grows rapidly in the brackish water of these ponds, supplies the only significant commercial production from them. Fish ponds, which total 175,000 acres, give an annual catch valued at \$17,000,000 (1950). Thirty-one provinces have commercial fish ponds, but most of them are near Manila or on the islands of Panay and Negros.

#### PEOPLE AND CULTURE

Despite a diversity of racial and language components, the Philippines are characterized by a unity of culture. The cultural heritage, however, results from a fusion of contacts and ideals. Upon a basic Malayan society the Spaniards first superimposed Christianity and a modified feudal system. American control next introduced a veneer of Anglo-Saxon civilization and planted the seeds of democracy. Finally, immigrants from China and Japan, as well as a long-continued intercourse with these countries, have left discernible imprints of their own cultures on local communities or areas.

**RACIAL CHARACTERISTICS**—The original population of the Philippines consisted of the Negritos, a group of primitive, black pygmies with kinky hair, thick lips, and flattened noses. These people, of whom only a few mountain tribes remain, were forced into the more inaccessible regions by the invasions of Mongoloids, known as Indonesians in the northern islands and as Malaysians in the southern islands. From these two groups emerged the basic racial strain of the modern Filipino. A substantial proportion of the inhabitants have a further mixture of racial characteristics: part Spanish and part Filipino or part Chinese and part Filipino. These individuals are known as "mestizos," the Spanish expression for people of mixed blood.

For more than three centuries the Chinese have constituted the largest alien group in the Philippines, their number nearly tripled between 1920 and 1940. Chinese interests in the islands result from geographical proximity and close trade relations with the mainland that have existed for centuries. The pure Chinese, making up only a small percentage of the islands' population, are shopkeepers and traders. Much more numerous are the Chinese mestizos, probably totaling 1,000,000.

In the years prior to World War II many Japanese migrated to the Philippines. Although they settled throughout the islands, they tended to concentrate along the moist eastern coast, where the production of abaca prevails. In fact, this industry was largely taken over by the energetic Japanese, as the Filipinos disliked the strenuous hand labor required in the stripping operation. About half of the 29,000 Japanese (1939) settled in Davao, where they practically controlled the surrounding province. In 1941 Davao City, in many respects a Nipponese center, was connected with Tokyo by regular steamship service. After the war all Japanese in the Philippines were returned to their country, but many Japanese mestizos remain.

**RELIGIOUS IMPRINT**—The term "Filipino" connotes neither physical nor cultural characteristics, although current usage tends to restrict its use to designate the more active and progressive peoples and those professing the Christian faith. Christian Filipinos make up more than ninety per cent of the population and are the representative peoples of the islands.<sup>3</sup> They are the ethnic composite of the early Negritos, the Indonesians, and the mestizos. Their cultural traits spring from early Philippine, Spanish, and American customs and traditions in various stages of fusion.

Christian inhabitants are divided into seven principal ethnographic groups, each possessing characteristics, including a unique native dialect, that distinguish it from the others. Of these groups, the three largest and most important are (1) the Visayans, who inhabit the islands between Luzon and Mindoro on the north and between Luzon and Mindanao on the south, (2) the Tagalogs, who live in the provinces around Manila Bay; and (3) the Ilocanos, who occupy three narrow coastal provinces in northwestern Luzon (see map on page 631, for island locations). In recent years the Ilocanos have overflowed into nearby provinces and have also migrated to Mindanao and the Hawaiian Islands. Many of them are businessmen and have been termed the "Yankees of the Philippines." This choice of vocation may not be entirely voluntary, since their home provinces are in the drier, less-productive section of the islands, forcing many to seek a livelihood elsewhere. The Visayans of unproductive western Panay and Cebu have migrated to the sugar areas of Negros, while most of the migrants to Mindanao are Cebuanos, Boholese, or former residents of Leyte or western Panay.

Of the non-Christian groups, the Moros, most of whom live in Mindanao and the Sulu Islands, are the most numerous. Their origin probably differed little from that of the other inhabitants who came under Moslem influence some time before the fourteenth century. Their chief characteristic is an almost fanatical adherence to that faith. They were neither conquered nor converted by the Spaniards and were among the last people to submit to American occupation. In 1942 the Japanese found them as beligerent toward conquest as they had been forty years earlier. The central government has made concessions to these people, who possess a different religion, unconventional customs, and a distinct history of their own. However, the Philippine administration has also attempted to develop Mindanao and to assimilate the Moros. For the most part the efforts have been successful, but there has been some opposition by the Moro population. Oddly enough, the Moros are now probably the largest single group that would prefer a continuance of American control.

**LANGUAGE**—Despite a variety of languages and local dialects (eighty-seven are recognized), English has become the principal tongue. Leading Philippine newspapers and magazines are printed in English, but Spanish is still used in some localities. In 1937 a modified version of Tagalog was chosen as the official language, but, since only slightly more than one fourth of the population speak it, this selection caused some local dissension. English and Spanish are widely used in schools and in commerce. Literacy is slightly less than fifty per cent, although statistics on education are likely to be misleading, for the average period of school attendance is less than three years—not enough time to attain permanent literacy in any language. This diversity of tongues has impeded the development of democratic institutions at the local level, since the masses have only slowly acquired

<sup>3</sup> For a more complete treatment of Filipinos and alien groups, see J. R. Hayden, *The Philippines: A Study in National Development* (Macmillan, 1942), or Herbert Krieger, *Peoples of the Philippines* (Washington Smithsonian Institution, 1942).

English, preferring to maintain their own idioms and dialects.

**POPULATION GROWTH AND DENSITY**—As shown by the table below, the population of the Philippine Islands has nearly tripled since Spain lost control. The distribution of population throughout the islands is

Total Philippine Population, 1903-52

Year	Population
1903	7,635,425
1918	10,314,310
1930	12,588,066
1939	16,000,303
1948	19,234,182
1952 (est.)	20,000,000

far from uniform. In some areas the arable land is insufficient to support the rural inhabitants; other areas have large tracts of virgin domain. Of the larger islands, Cebu has 611 persons per square mile, but isolated, rocky Palawan has only 18.5 per square mile. To encourage a more uniform distribution, the National Land Settlement Administration began, in 1939, sponsoring migration from central Luzon and the more densely populated Visayan Islands to agricultural colonies in the sparsely peopled alluvial areas of Mindanao. Its current successor, the Land Settlement and Development Corporation, follows this same pattern.<sup>4</sup>

**CITIES AND URBAN GROWTH**—According to the census of 1948, the combined population of the urban communities now designated as chartered cities (1952) was almost 2,500,000 people, of whom more than 1,000,000 were in Manila and its suburbs. This figure is not necessarily a true indication of urban settlement, however. Tarlac, Tacloban, and many of the other larger municipalities

(towns) have a greater population and are more urbanized than the smaller cities,<sup>5</sup> and some of the chartered cities include a considerable area and population outside the city proper. This situation is notably true of Davao, Zamboanga, Basilan, and Calbayog. Tagaytay is a city in name only. The table below lists the chartered cities<sup>6</sup> and their populations as of 1948.

Chartered Cities in the Philippines, 1948

City	Population	Island
Manila	983,906	Luzon
Cebu	167,503	Cebu
Davao	111,263	Mindanao
Basilan	110,297	Basilan
Iloilo	110,122	Panay
Quezon	107,977	Luzon
Zamboanga	103,317	Mindanao
Bacolod	101,432	Negros
Pasay (Rizal)	88,728	Luzon
Calbayog	79,503	Samar
Legaspi	78,828	Luzon
Ormoc	72,733	Leyte
San Pablo	50,435	Luzon
Lipa	49,884	Luzon
Cavite	35,052	Luzon
Baguio	29,262	Luzon
Dumaguete	24,838	Negros
Tagaytay	5,233	Luzon

Urban growth has increased markedly in recent years. Between 1939 and 1948 the population of Manila increased fifty-seven per cent; of Iloilo, twenty-two per cent; of Baguio, twenty-one per cent; of Davao, eighteen per cent; and of Cebu, fourteen per cent. This strong urban development is related in part to the rapid increase in population for the entire country. But there is also a trend among rural inhabitants to move to the city for supposedly better eco-

<sup>4</sup> For an excellent treatment of government-sponsored resettlement in the Philippines in the prewar years, see Karl J. Pelzer, *Land Settlement in the Asiatic Tropics* (New York: American Geographical Society, 1945), pp. 127-59.

<sup>5</sup> A municipality is a legal entity, which includes the urban center (*población*) and surrounding semi-rural areas composed of villages.

<sup>6</sup> Chartered cities are permitted, under legislative authorization, to frame and adopt their own charters rather than operate under specific legislative provisions.

conomic opportunities, which for the most part do not actually exist at present.

### ECONOMIC ASPECTS

**AGRICULTURE**—The economy of the Philippines prior to World War II was predominantly agricultural, with nearly seventy per cent of the population dependent upon agricultural pursuits. Most farmers were small landed proprietors or tenants or were laborers on the larger sugar, abaca (Manila hemp), tobacco, and rice estates. In 1938 about 10,000,000 acres were under cultivation in the Philippines, almost half in rice. Roughly another one third of the cultivated area was used for the production of export crops, coconuts, abaca, sugar, and tobacco.

Although beneficial to a few plantation owners, processors, and exporters, this emphasis on cash crops in a state that has consistently imported foodstuffs failed to improve materially the level of national economy. A relict of the Spanish regime, the semifeudal agrarian system did not take into account the necessity of a well-balanced production, satisfactory to domestic demand. Even though there are many small landowners, the proportion of landless people is extremely high for an overwhelmingly agricultural country in which there is little industry and only one metropolitan center. Most of the farms, to a large extent concentrated in the fertile valleys and coastal areas, are small, averaging about ten acres each. Less than forty per cent of the 3,144,000 farmers own both house and land. A little over forty per cent own homes on rented sites.<sup>7</sup>

The islands occupy a latitude that, except for the higher altitudes, has a 365-day growing season. Thus two or more of a wide selection of crops may be grown during the year; likewise forage and shelter for live-

stock do not normally present significant problems. An insular position permits more moderate temperatures than are characteristic of larger land masses and in addition, ensures ample precipitation over most of the area. Even in the regions that have a dry season of several months' duration, there is still sufficient time to produce adequate food crops during the wetter months.

Because of regional differences in climate and soil, a variety of crops flourish: rice and tobacco in the fertile river valleys, coconuts on the sandy coasts, corn on the coralline soils of the central provinces, abaca on the moist eastern slopes, sugar cane on the fertile coasts of Negros and the central plain of Luzon, and sweet potatoes on the more rocky uplands. Rubber and pineapples offer commercial possibilities, although seven small rubber plantations, five of them in Zamboanga province, and a single pineapple plantation, also on the island of Mindanao, are the only significant examples of these particular products<sup>8</sup> (see map on page 637).

Postwar agricultural production has surpassed prewar figures in some, but not all, instances. The 1950 rice crop was the largest on record and was thirteen per cent above the 1939 production. Even so, the Philippines still import rice. Corn production has also increased, but yields per acre are extremely low. The introduction of proved hybrids will no doubt increase the yields materially, but this is a potentiality rather than a reality. The sugar industry has now returned to its prewar position, and the national quota for the 1952-53 milling season was met—for the first time since the war. Exports of copra and desiccated coconut are greater than in 1939, but coconut-oil production is below the prewar figure since some of the prewar oil mills have not been

<sup>7</sup> *American Chamber of Commerce Journal*, II (October, 1940), 8.

<sup>8</sup> For an indication of current status and possibilities, see Alden Cutshall, "A Pineapple Landscape in Mindanao," *Science Monthly*, LXXIII (1951), 130-33, and Alden Cutshall, "Philippine Pineapple Plantations," *Economic Botany*, VII (1953), 86-88.



rebuilt. Abaca is almost a Philippine monopoly. Production in 1951 and 1952 was the highest since the war, but still well below the 1,300,000 bales of 1940.<sup>9</sup> Tobacco, too, has failed to reach its 1940 position and may never regain the earlier peak.

Agricultural progress by slow, consistent expansion is probable, as there are many avenues of continued development. Further, mechanization will help, but that in itself is not the answer to Philippine agrarian problems. Scientific plant and animal breeding is just one of the desirable fields of improvement, for Philippine economy is, and will continue to be, cast on an agricultural base.

**MINING**—Mining was relatively unimportant until 1930, then it increased rapidly. The value of Philippine mineral production doubled between 1931 and 1936, then the 1936 figure was tripled by 1940. In 1940 and 1941 about a quarter of a million people depended upon mining for their living. In 1940 gold accounted for eighty-three per cent of the total value of the mineral products, but chromite, manganese, iron ore, copper, and coal were also significant. Of these, only chromite is of high quality. The Zambales deposits, originally estimated at 10,000,000 tons, supplied the United States with one fourth of its imports of chromite in 1940.

Little mining was done during Japanese occupation, and since the war reconstruction of the industry has been slow. Gold is again the leader, and the larger mines in northern Luzon and northeastern Mindanao have resumed full production. Smaller prewar mines in these areas and elsewhere have not been reopened. Zambales chromite has again been exported to the United States since 1946. For the three-year period of 1948-50

the Philippines ranked as the fourth producer—surpassed only by the Union of South Africa, Turkey, and Southern Rhodesia—providing about eleven per cent of the world total. (Figures for the USSR are unavailable.)

Postwar manganese production began in 1949, but ores are generally of low quality, deposits are scattered (Siquijor, Bohol, Busuanga), and mining methods are primitive. A single copper mine (northern Luzon) is again in full production, and a small amount of copper, along with silver, lead, and zinc, is recovered from some of the gold ores. Iron-ore deposits, for the most part, are unworked. Prewar production went to Japan, which is no longer a significant market. Production is confined to Samar and southern Luzon. Iron-ore reserves in Surigao Province, Mindanao, have been estimated at 500,000,000 tons, with a metallic content of forty-eight per cent, but development since the war has been slow.

The principal deficiency of Philippine mineral resources is power fuels. There are petroleum seeps, and a few test wells have been drilled, but results have been negative. Coal deposits are widespread, but seams are thin, and the coal is high in volatile matter. Producing mines are on Cebu and at Malangas, Mindanao. There is no known coal of coking quality in the Philippines. Hydroelectric development can, in part, substitute for the paucity of mineral fuels. Two developments on Luzon are already in operation; in process of construction is one in Mindanao, which utilizes Maria Christina Falls—the Niagara of the Philippines—with high head, ample volume, and uniform flow from Lake Lanao. At present there is no sizable market for power, but the development of this site has promise, since it fits into the over-all picture for economic expansion in Mindanao. The project is being developed with the aid of funds from the United States.


<sup>9</sup> For details of Philippine abaca production and attendant problems, see J. E. Spencer, "Abaca and the Philippines," *Economic Geography*, XXVII (1951), 95-106

**MANUFACTURING**—The industrial economy has never developed to the point where the demand for factory products could be supplied in more than a few items. Traditionally manufacturing has consisted of the service industries and those engaged in the processing of agricultural, timber, or mineral products. Destruction of plants and equipment and the loss of foreign markets between 1941 and 1945 forced even these manufacturers to begin almost entirely anew. However, the Philippines have a substantial industrial potential. One major asset is the large and increasing population with a relatively high capability for routine machine work. Another advantage is the variety of minerals, agricultural products, and forest resources, which provides ample raw materials. The hydroelectric power potential offsets, in part, a deficiency in mineral fuels. Finally, geographic proximity to possible markets in Asia should permit the insular manufacturer to compete successfully with Western producers because of his lower transportation costs.

Postwar manufacturing is exemplified in rice- and corn-processing plants, saw mills, coconut-oil mills and soap factories, sugar centrals (twenty-six) and related distilleries, desiccated-coconut plants, cordage factories, cigar and cigarette factories, one paper mill, and a pineapple cannery. Government corporations operate in a number of lines in which domestic capital is unable or unwilling to undertake home production; sugar refining, cotton textiles, and cement manufacturing are notable examples.

**TRANSPORTATION**—In no archipelago are transportation and communications easy. Insular isolation, rather than unity, prevails. In the Philippines the interisland steamers were the most prevalent method of communication before World War II. Postwar interisland steamers are still the principal cargo carriers, the present fleet consisting of a variety of former naval craft converted into

private cargo vessels. Except for a short line in central Panay and one on Cebu, the main railways are on Luzon. Wanton destruction during the war disrupted the transport system. Although almost totally rebuilt on Luzon, the roadbed is rough and much of the equipment is obsolete. Both




truck traffic and interisland shipping can and do effectively compete with the railway, for on linear-shaped Luzon this form of parallel competition cannot be avoided. Highway mileage is constantly being increased, with about 15,000 miles of paved and other all-weather roads in operation at present. These are largely national and provincial highways and form a skeleton system on Luzon and in the Visayan Islands. The real need is for additional secondary

roads and for new trunk lines on Mindanao and a few other islands.

Air service connects the principal islands and links the more distant provinces with Manila (see the map below). For the most part, passenger air service is frequent, and exact schedules are maintained between Manila and over thirty major Philip-

made a good beginning and will probably increase. It is essentially a contract service, but there are daily scheduled cargo flights between Manila and centers such as Cebu, Cagayan, and Davao.

**FOREIGN COMMERCE**—From a foreign trade valued at \$34,000,000 in 1899 Philippine commerce increased to about \$300,000,000 in 1941. Postwar trade volume has been from two to three times the 1941 figure, but statistics have been affected by inflation prices and large reconstruction imports—hardly a normal situation. In recent years the value of imports has been almost double that of exports, but in more normal situations exports of sugar, coconut products, gold, ferroalloys, timber and lumber, rattan, and embroideries are about balanced by imports of cotton goods, steel and steel products, petroleum derivatives, paper, rayon, automobiles and tires, grain and cereals, meat and dairy goods, and chemicals and drugs. Foreign trade has essentially followed a Philippine-American pattern. Trade in 1948 was with some seventy-five countries, but that with the United States accounted for 76.5 per cent of the total (\$87,400,000). Manila is by far the major port, but there are ten other ports of entry.



pine cities—in significant contrast with water, rail, and highway transportation. For example, there are seven round trips daily between Manila and Cebu and two which go on to Davao. Nine international airlines, including Philippine Air Lines, make Manila an air center of some importance, tying it to the west coast of North America and to Western Europe, as well as to cities in eastern Asia. Domestic air freight service has

#### POLITICAL FRAMEWORK

The Philippine Constitution is founded on democratic principles and on the whole provides an adequate foundation for political growth. The prescription of the constitution has not wholly coincided with actual practice, however, for the Philippine society has not developed on the scale necessary to operate a democratic government. Widespread illiteracy and strict suffrage qualifications combine to disfranchise the poorest sectors of the population. Lack of a politically conscious middle class has left political power in the hands of a dominant landowning group. Before the war the Nacionalista party of Manuel Quezon and

Sergio Osmeña dominated the political scene without competition. At times the Quezon and Osmeña forces engaged in major political warfare, but in 1935 the rival factions adjusted their differences to present a united front for independence. In November, 1935, under the provisions of the Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934, a commonwealth government was established in preparation for independence. In the interim the government and the people worked diligently to prepare for independence, which was granted, as scheduled, on July 4, 1946.

Minority political groups in the Philippines have found survival difficult. The old Democrata party was probably the strongest prewar minority group, but it could never offer successful competition to the Nacionalista party at the polls. During the period of Japanese occupation, organized guerrilla groups, for the most part made up of landless peasants, fought the enemy and fostered democratic ideals. Chief, and most important, of these was the Hukbalahap<sup>10</sup> movement, a coalition of several radical groups that fought to defeat Japan. The Huks were primarily interested in socioeconomic reforms, and they vigorously opposed the Nacionalista government, charging that it was run by collaborators and self-seekers. After the war several reform groups, including the Hukbalahap, formed a Democratic Alliance, which showed some strength in the 1946 election. It joined forces with the Osmeña faction on the Nacionalista ticket in an unsuccessful attempt to defeat the newly formed liberal party of Manuel Roxas. This type of jockeying for power is representative of Philippine politics, for the history of its political parties has been one of fusion, mergers, and absorption of minority groups.

**CURRENT POLITICAL PICTURE**—The Philippine political system, in actual operation, has in-

herited traits of its Spanish experience and has borrowed and adapted freely from the American concept of political organization. But, while the Filipinos have utilized much that is valuable from both the Spanish and the American systems, they have yet to mold a true and effective Philippine instrument. Opportunism, dishonesty, corruption, strong-arm tactics—all these elements have marred the political life of the Republic. Despite the evidence, especially in the presidential election of 1949, of corrupt influences and disintegrative tendencies, it is difficult to predict the future. The election of 1946, supervised in part by American forces, was reasonably peaceful and orderly. Even more surprising and hopeful was the fact that the election in 1951 resulted in the defeat of the party in power. Most miraculous was the 1953 contest in which Magsaysay campaigned on an anticorruption slogan and won over President Quirino.<sup>11</sup> Evidence exists that people will support honest leaders who strive to achieve substantial improvement in the lot of the masses.

#### PROBLEMS OF AN INDEPENDENT PHILIPPINES

The new Philippine Republic faces many problems and issues. Some of them are inherent in physical location and natural conditions; others are related to the war and subsequent conditions; still others originated in the postwar years. Some problems are in the fields of education, agricultural development, industrial expansion, and foreign trade; others may more appropriately be designated as political, economic, or strategic. Most of them are interrelated in one way or another.

The educational system is the most modern in Southeast Asia, but there is much

<sup>10</sup> The term means "People's army against Japan."

<sup>11</sup> For an explanation, see W. H. Elsabee, "The 1953 Philippine Presidential Elections," *Pacific Affairs*, XXVII (1954), 3-15.

room for improvement. Books and other materials are costly and in short supply. Teachers are poorly trained, underpaid, and overworked. Diversity of language handicaps effective instruction. The Philippine Department of Education, assisted by the UNESCO Technical Assistance Program, is working actively to overcome these handicaps, and progress is reported.

Minority groups have never seriously divided the Philippines. Racially the Moros are related to other Filipinos, although they differ in religion, dress, and local customs. Friction exists, but less so than in former years. The Chinese in the Philippines are not a problem group in themselves, but the fact that they are merchants and money-lenders has given them a disproportionate influence upon the national economy. This influence has led to an anti-Chinese feeling, which has, on occasion, reached serious proportions. Certainly the increasing role of the Chinese in national affairs has potential political, social, and economic pitfalls for a small country with long and undefended coastlines. Anti-Japanese sentiment, too, is strong, but since all Japanese were returned to Japan in 1946, the antagonism has subsided and does not manifest itself at the local level. There is, however, a genuine fear that Japan may rise again and launch another campaign of conquest.

A series of complex and troublesome situations are related to agrarian policy, past and present. Tenancy in some of the more fertile and more productive areas is unusually high, and rents are often exorbitant, leading to friction and unrest. Soil depletion and erosion are also problems of national concern. Fertilization is practiced in the sugar and tobacco areas and, although markedly less, in other regions. When land is tilled repeatedly with little or no fertilization, yields necessarily diminish. Since most of the cultivated land surface consists of hills and mountains, repeated planting has produced serious soil erosion. In most cases

primitive methods of tillage involve use of inferior seed and a poor quality of animal stock. Such conditions have augmented the general unrest and instability in the post-war period. Certainly the troublesome Huk-balahap problem is rooted in the agrarian discontent and desire on the part of peasants for some improvement in land tenancy, credit facilities, and land ownership. The armed insurrection of the Huks, under Communist leadership, presented a serious threat to the government, which employed the army to crush the resistance. Although internal security seems to prevail after vigorous suppression, it is doubtful whether stability can be lasting unless serious steps are taken to improve agrarian standards of living.

If the Philippine economy is to attain a favorable balance of trade, a greater supply of insular needs must be provided by domestic manufacturers. Looking toward this end, the government is encouraging new industries, but Philippine capitalists are sceptical about investments in industrial enterprises. By habit they prefer, instead, to invest in agriculture or various forms of transportation, that is, airlines, truck or bus lines, or intersland shipping. Consequently, foreign capital is needed for industrial development, but foreign capital is not normally attracted to areas of political instability. In the Philippines, however, an exception is made in the mining industry; most of the larger mines are operated, at least in part, with foreign capital.

In brief, a mature and realistic political leadership would do much to stabilize internal dissension. In turn, a more enlightened economic program would encourage, directly or indirectly, a better-balanced economy and should eventually lead to a higher level of living in the nation.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>12</sup> For a somewhat more detailed treatment of these and other problems, see Alden Cutshall, "Philippine Prospect," *Journal of Geography*, LIII (1954), 214-22.

FOREIGN RELATIONS—By a quirk of fate the Philippines achieved their independence only to discover ties linking them more, rather than less, closely with the United States. Especially is this true in defense matters, since by mutual agreement the United States has continued to maintain naval and air bases in the islands. American responsibilities for insular security include provisions for rendering military advice and extending military aid and assistance designed to strengthen the insular military forces. The reciprocal obligations of the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951 clearly place the Republic within the American defense system in the Pacific. In strategic terms the Philippines provide a potential staging area for American military power in the Far East.

In economic relations, too, the new Republic has continued to rely on American aid. After World War II the United States distributed millions of dollars as compensation for war damages, along with liberal sums for postwar reconstruction and the transferal of United States surplus property. More significant in the long run has been the Philippine Trade Act of 1946, which attempts to deprive the Philippine Republic of the preferential position it enjoyed in the American market. Through a complicated formula the act provides for a gradual increase of duties on Philippine imports until, by 1973, Philippine goods will pay full duties in the United States. Economic sovereignty has thus proved to be a mixed blessing to a country whose economy had been closely geared to American requirements. Thoughtful Philippine statesmen had long considered the prospects of a reorientation of trade once independence was achieved. To compensate for the expected decline in commerce with the United States (an unpredictable item), commercial contacts with China, Japan, and Korea may provide a partial answer. However natural these areas may be from a trade standpoint, politi-

cal elements of instability and hostility may hinder regional commercial development.

A north-south trade offers possibilities for the future. Australian beef and New Zealand butter, for example, are commonplace in Manila supermarkets. However, the South Pacific provides a limited market for tropical products, and other nearby areas, especially Indonesia, would offer strong competition for the Australian market.

A more pressing problem than future trade prospects was the serious deterioration of the Philippine economy after 1946. Wartime dislocations in part made the transition to economic independence more difficult, but the root of the maladjustment was the island's unbalanced economy and overdependence on a few export items. Largely because the United States required a strong ally in the Pacific, it dispatched the Bell Mission to see how the tottering economy might be strengthened. The findings of the Bell Mission Report in 1950 took the form of suggestions for Philippine reforms and American economic aid designed to implement capital undertakings. The United States agreed to provide \$250,000,000 to be used for hydroelectric development, mineral exploration, agrarian reforms, fiscal improvements and other projects. Despite the cogency of the Bell Report, however, transformations in the Philippines will come slowly and painfully. A country that has in the past failed to grapple with serious socioeconomic ills cannot be expected to work a miracle overnight.

What the Philippines lack in military and economic strength, they have countered with an active role in the United Nations. Carlos Romulo served as the first president of the General Assembly, other delegates from the Republic have performed in important committee work. Definitely aligning itself with the Western bloc, the Philippine government actively supported United Nations action in Korea, including the dispatch of a

small force of 1,000 men. In nonsecurity matters, however, the Philippines have rigorously supported new independence movements against Western colonial powers. In this the Republic displays a sensitivity to the nationalist movements, to which Filipinos attribute their own attainment of independence.

**PHILIPPINE PROSPECT**—The new protégé of America stands between the East and West. Historically and politically the Republic has received assistance and guidance from the United States. By mutual consent an associate-nations relationship has evolved and is likely to continue. But in a geographic sense the Philippine Islands are a part of the Orient. Even the social structure is basically Malayan, with a thin veneer of Western civilization overlying the archipelago. This "show case" of democracy may require decades to assimilate fully the strains

of Oriental and Western institutions and to evolve into a stable society.

At the mid-century Philippine leaders ponder their course in an atmosphere of international crisis and nationalist revolutions. On the horizon appear two basic factors that will determine its role in international affairs. The first is that the Republic is dependent upon United States military strength in the Pacific for its continued security in a troubled world. That the islands would be a battleground in any major conflict, as they were in the last war, does not render this prospect palatable to Filipino leaders. In the second place it is equally clear that only a balance of forces in the Pacific area can guarantee the new Republic an era of uninterrupted development. This involves a basic reconciliation of aims and interests of the major powers—the United States, Red China, the USSR, and possibly Japan—in the Pacific area.

### Study Questions

1. Compare the total area and the population of the Philippines with the area and population of (a) the United States and (b) your home state.
2. Why do Philippine farmers grow very little wheat, barley, or rye?
3. What are the problems facing the Philippine sugar industry in the future?
4. Why was the Philippine coconut industry the first to regain prewar status?
5. What are the current problems of the Philippine abaca industry?
6. Why are there so few railroads in the Philippines?
7. Compare the customs of the Moros with those of the Christian Filipinos.
8. Discuss the "Chinese problem" in the Philippines.
9. What military and naval bases does the United States have in the Philippines? How is this possible? What are the merits of this arrangement?
10. Name some of the principal manufacturing industries in the Philippines. Account for the importance of each. Why are the other kinds of manufacturing unimportant?
11. The Philippine government has been termed a "one-party" government. Is this still true? Justify your answer.
12. The Philippines has one of the best networks of domestic airlines in the Far East. How do you account for this air service?
13. How has the United States aided reconstruction and rehabilitation of the Philippines?
14. Compare the economies of Indonesia and the Philippines. What are the cultural and the political similarities of the two areas?
15. Comment upon potential foreign trade between the Philippines and other countries of Eastern and Southern Asia.

## CHAPTER THIRTY-SEVEN

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# *Australasia and Oceania*

In the southwestern part of the Pacific Ocean lie numerous islands varying in size from Australia, with its nearly 3,000,000 square miles, to small atolls covering only an acre or two. These scattered land areas extend from the longitude of the east coast of China to that of westernmost Canada, with several islands, resembling steppingstones, reaching nearly to the mainland of South America. North and south the limits are from about 47° South Latitude to well north of the Tropic of Cancer. Thus the area under consideration is spread over roughly one sixth

of the globe. Their remoteness from other lands and the general space relations give the political geography of these islands many common features, despite their disparity in size. For simplicity the area is broken down into three major divisions. Australia, New Zealand, and Oceania.<sup>1</sup>

The table on pages 644-45 presents the area, population, and political status of the various islands. It also indicates the components—usually island groups—of Oceania, all of which, taken together, comprise just over ten per cent of the total land area.

## AUSTRALIA

Australia, with 2,975,000 square miles, is slightly smaller than either the United States, Brazil, or Canada. It has been called an island, a continent, and an island-continent, and all are correct designations. It is generally counted, however, as one of the six habitable continents of the world. The land

mass of Australia, excluding Tasmania, is more compact than that of the United States:

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<sup>1</sup>Oceania is a collective name for these Pacific islands. Although it is sometimes used to mean Australia and New Zealand as well, in this chapter those countries are excluded.



Major Land Areas of Australia, New Zealand, and Oceania: Area, Population, and Political Status

<i>Name</i>	<i>Area (in sq mi)</i>	<i>Population</i>	<i>Political Status</i>
Australia	2,975,000	8,538,000	British dominion
New Zealand	103,740	2,088,000	British dominion
Oceania	401,000	3,783,000	
Hawaiian Islands	6,435	500,000	U.S. territory
Guam	225	59,000	U S possession
Wake	3	350	U S possession
Midway	2	407	U S possession
Johnston	0.06	69	U S possession
Line Islands (Baker, Howland, Kingman Reef, Palmyra, Jarvis)	10	1,000	U S possession
Mariana Islands	185	6,000	UN trust territory under U.S. administration
Marshall Islands	70	14,000	
Caroline Islands	461	36,900	
Bonin-Volcano Islands (incl. Marcus, Paracel, and Spratly islands)	55	8,515	U S administration
Samoa			
Eastern Samoa			
(incl. Tutuila)	76	19,000	U.S. possession
Western Samoa	1,130	83,000	UN trust territory (New Zea- land administration)
Gilbert and Ellice islands <sup>a</sup>	369	38,000	British colony
Fiji Islands	7,040	317,000	British colony
Pitcairn Island	2	126	British colony
Solomon Islands (eastern)	11,500	98,000	British protectorate
Tonga Islands	269	50,000	British protectorate
New Hebrides Islands (incl. Banks and Torres islands)	5,700	53,000	British-French condominium
Nauru	9	3,500	UN trust territory (joint— Australia, New Zea- land & Great Brit.)

it extends through fewer degrees of latitude and a greater number of degrees of longitude. Furthermore, it has no irregularities of outline equivalent to the Florida Peninsula or the indentation made by the Great Lakes and the Canadian province of Ontario. And probably most significant, it is the only one of the world's large countries that has no common boundary with any other country. Only about ten per cent of Australia is farther from the Equator than Los Angeles is; although the most northerly parts of the continent are as close to the Equator as the most tropical part of Mexico.

Thus, the preponderant part of Australia is in the tropics and subtropics.

#### PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY

**LANDFORMS**—The general elevation of Australia is low, only six per cent of the land rising above 2,000 feet. There are three main topographic divisions: the western plateau, composed of old granitic and metamorphic rock, the eastern highlands, a complex of folds and uplifted blocks, which form a series of plateaus divided by numerous lowlands; and the central lowlands, an area

Major Land Areas of Australia, New Zealand, and Oceania—*continued*

<i>Name</i>	<i>Area (in sq mi)</i>	<i>Population</i>	<i>Political Status</i>
<i>Oceania (continued)</i>			
Papua	90,540	373,000	Australian colony
Norfolk, Ashmore, Cartier, Macquarie, Heard, and McDonald islands	73	2,000	Australian colony
New Guinea			
Western New Guinea	151,000	1,000,000	Netherlands possession
New Guinea Territory (incl Bismarck Archi- pelago, Admiralty Islands, and western Solomon Islands)	107,000	993,000	UN trust territory (Austra- lian administration)
Cook Islands	99	15,000	New Zealand colony
Kermadec Islands	13	14	New Zealand colony
Tokelau Island	4	1,600	Administered as part of New Zealand
Niue (Savage Island)	100	4,500	New Zealand colony
New Caledonia and Depend- encies (incl. Huon, Belep, Loyalty, and Walpole islands)	8,548	65,000	French colony
Society Islands (incl Tahiti)	650	30,000	French colony
Marquesas Islands and lesser French groups	870	29,000	French colony
Galapagos	2,900	2,000	Ecuadorean possession
Easter Island	64	700	Chilean possession

\* Includes Phoenix and Line islands (Christmas, Fanning, and Washington) and Ocean Island. Canton and Enderbury islands of the Phoenix group are under joint United States-British administration

of recent undisturbed rocks, which separate the western plateau from the eastern highlands. Low ridges divide the central lowlands into distinct drainage basins, with the northern two thirds forming a great artesian basin. The island of Tasmania, separated by Bass Strait from Australia, consists chiefly of two plateaus and resembles a detached fragment of the eastern highlands.

**CLIMATE AND VEGETATION**—Because of its latitudinal location, Australia is affected throughout the year by the permanent sub-tropical high pressure and the trade wind belts, both of which are characterized by scant rainfall. The map of average annual

rainfall shows a coastal zone of high rainfall, with more than fifty inches in the north and about forty inches in the south, surrounding a dry central wedge, with less than ten inches, which runs inland from the western coast to about 135° East Longitude and covers one third of the total area. Only in the wettest section is the rainfall consistent and reliable. Summer (January) temperatures are high, for all the continent has an average of over 60° F. and most of it is over 80° F.; winter temperatures range from 50° F. on the south coast to 75° F. in northern Queensland.

The vegetation zones follow closely the belts of rainfall. In a few better-watered parts of the Queensland coast are ever-

green forests of cedars and pines; elsewhere along the coast are open forests of evergreen eucalyptus. Inland from this belt is a zone of poorer vegetation, typified by scrub, where clumps of dwarf eucalyptus and acacias rise above a sea of grass. Westward the transition continues to the true desert flora—saltbush and desert grass in the arid center where the rainfall is less than ten inches.

### ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY

**AGRICULTURE AND PASTORALISM**—The distribution of rainfall sets a pattern that can be traced on an economic map of Australia. The million square miles enclosed by the ten-inch isohyet are still unoccupied, and almost two million more are semiarid and devoted exclusively to pastoral pursuits. Cultivated land is less than one per cent of the total area, and of this only one tenth is irrigated.

Sheep rearing laid the basis of Australian economy in the nineteenth century, and it continues to be important. In 1950-51 there were 115,000,000 sheep, that is, fourteen per person in the country; the annual clip exceeded 1,000,000,000 pounds, amounting to one quarter of the total world supply. Sheep for wool predominate generally south of the annual isotherm of 70° F. in the zone receiving more than ten inches of rainfall. The greatest density is in New South Wales between the twenty-inch and thirty-inch isohyets, where there are fifty per cent of the total. Sheep for mutton have much the same distribution. Beef cattle are important in the wetter, hotter areas. The two main centers are in southern Victoria and in the corn-growing region about the Queensland-New South Wales boundary. The northern savanna belt, with its tall but coarse grasses, makes up a secondary cattle region.


Wheat is the main crop of Australia. It occupies sixty per cent of the cultivated land, mostly in the area that receives between ten and forty inches of rain and where the

heaviest falls come in winter and spring. The region can be identified as a narrow crescent belt between the eastern highlands and the ten-inch isohyet from New South Wales to southwestern Australia. About two thirds of the crop is exported. Cane sugar in Queensland and Mediterranean, or subtropical, fruits, along with temperate fruits, are also important.

**MINING AND MANUFACTURING**—Metallic minerals found in the old rocks of the western plateau, or in the upfolds which bring these rocks to the surface in the central lowlands, have been mined since 1851 (see map on page 647). There are 800,000 ounces of fine gold valued at over \$30,000,000 produced each year. Seventy per cent comes from Western Australia, Kalgoorlie alone accounting for fifty per cent of the Australian total. Lead and zinc are mined at Broken Hill in New South Wales and in western Tasmania. Australia ranks third among world producers of lead and holds fourth place for zinc. High-grade hematite ore is mined at Whyalla in South Australia and on an island in Yampi Sound off the northwestern coast near Derby. Reserves are estimated to be between 200,000,000 and 900,000,000 tons, annual production is about 2,000,000 tons, which is adequate for domestic needs.

Since Australia has limited resources of hydroelectricity and almost no oil, it relies on coal resources for the bulk of its industrial energy. Annual production is 16,000,000 tons of anthracite coal and 5,000,000 tons of lignite, sufficient to support the iron-and-steel industry. The main coal field lies under Sydney, and the pits are at Newcastle to the north and Bulli to the south, where the seams are nearest the surface. Lignite deposits are found along the eastern part of Victoria.

Since World War I manufacturing has developed rapidly, often with government sponsorship. Industry is concentrated near the main cities, on the coalfield site, and in



Tasmania, where there is a supply of hydro-electric energy. Iron-and-steel production centers are on the coalfields at Newcastle and Port Kembla and at Whyalla. Although the 2,000,000-ton output of steel is small compared with the productive capacity of the United States, still Australian resources maintain an extensive industrial development in proportion to the population. Both Melbourne and Sydney support complex types of manufacturing, including automobiles and aircraft.

#### POPULATION

The population, approaching 9,000,000, is

concentrated in the coastal districts, especially along the eastern and southern fringe from Brisbane to Adelaide. New South Wales and Victoria together have sixty-five per cent of the nation's people. Central Australia, especially where the rainfall is less than ten inches, and the hotter areas of northern Australia are practically empty. Despite the importance of agriculture and pastoralism, seventy per cent of the people live in towns and cities, and no less than one half in the six capital cities.

Each Australian state has its life center in a huge capital city, the size of which in each case is astonishing in view of the total population of the country. The largest of these

cities is Sydney, capital of New South Wales, which, including suburbs, is close to 2,000,000. In Great Britain only London is larger than Sydney. Melbourne, capital of Victoria, has 1,360,000 in its immediate area and presses Sydney as the foremost city of the Dominion. The remaining capitals—Brisbane, Adelaide, Perth, and Hobart—are much smaller but, nonetheless, are large when compared to the population of their respective states. Canberra, the national capital, located midway between Sydney and Melbourne, has only 25,000 inhabitants. It is remote from the populous centers and serves only as an administrative center.

#### HISTORICAL SURVEY

**PENAL COLONY**—Australia was first sighted in the sixteenth century, and between 1600 and 1660 Dutch sailors examined a good part of the arid, inhospitable western and southern coasts. The English adventurer, Dampier, visited the western coast in 1688 and recorded his impressions of the barren land. Later, Captain James Cook charted almost all of the eastern coast for the British Admiralty. He hoisted the Union Jack at Botany Bay in 1770, taking possession in the name of England. Thirty years later Captain Matthew Flinders circumnavigated Australia.

Permanent settlement in Australia followed the decision of the British government to rid itself of increasing numbers of convicts. In 1787 the first consignment of prisoners was brought to Port Jackson, near Botany Bay; one year later Sydney was founded on a better harbor a few miles north of the original site.

Convicts made poor pioneers, and accordingly free settlers were encouraged to go to Australia. The first group arrived in 1792 and started the pastoral industry, importing the first sheep in 1796. By 1821 sheep numbered 290,000 and in the same year 200,000 pounds of wool were exported as the first

shipment of this now all-important commodity.

The autocratic powers of the military authorities and the governors, natural in a penal colony, irked the free settlers. Demands for a voice in their own government and for an end to the practice of using their country as a penal colony marked a sharp change in Australian outlook. British opinion wavered between a desire to retain the penal colony and a growing interest in commercial possibilities. Eventually changes were made, an Act of Parliament in 1823 created a legislative council with advisory functions and limited the powers of the governor. Because of the rising commercial importance of the colonies, transportation of convicts to Australia and Tasmania ended in 1840 and 1853, respectively.

**DEVELOPMENT OF PASTORALISM**—As the population grew, settlement expanded beyond the eastern highlands. Need for more pasture land led to explorations of the Liverpool Plains, Darling Downs, and the Murray-Darling Basin. Desire to exclude other powers stimulated coastwise spread, and settlements were established on Melville Island (1824), near Brisbane (1824), near Melbourne (1826), and at Albany (1826). Perth, on the west coast, was founded in 1829 and in the same year the whole continent was declared British territory.

In 1831 the sale of land replaced the system of land grants and the money received was used to assist settlers out from England. In the next two decades 220,000 newcomers arrived. By the middle of the century Australia was producing 45,000,000 pounds of wool and supplying one half of all British imports of this commodity. Pastoralists now dominated Australian life.

**GOLD RUSH AND AFTERMATH**—The discovery of gold in 1851, first in New South Wales and then in Victoria (Ballarat and Bendigo), brought an immediate influx of settlers. Within ten years the population of Victoria

rose from 77,000 to 540,000 and for a time Melbourne replaced Sydney as the largest Australian city. Many immigrants were political rebels: Chartists from England, Irish Home Rulers, and Liberals who had left Europe after the 1848 revolution. They fought to break the political power of the wealthy and, as an example of their effectiveness, obtained manhood suffrage in the election of members of the Lower House in 1858. The gold rush not only accounted for a rise in population, in its wake followed the influx of capital and increased development in transportation and industry—the turning point for modern Australia.

The problem of settling the new immigrants brought many changes: numerous land acts were passed and the settlement of the sheep country of southern Queensland was accelerated; new industries were started in Victoria behind tariff walls; New South Wales, on the other hand, continued to enjoy a moderate prosperity under free trade; and, finally, the opposition of discontented miners to Chinese immigrants in the gold fields led to the beginning of the discriminatory control of immigration.

The world-wide fall in prices that began in 1870 did not immediately affect Australia. For a time the country benefited greatly from the introduction of mechanical aids to agriculture—the harvester, stripper, and modern plow. Refrigeration had made possible the export of meat and fruit to Britain; new finds of metals—gold, silver, copper, lead, zinc—and heavy government expenditure on railways combined to bolster prosperity. About 1890 this accelerated economic prosperity ended; wool prices fell by one half, the loan-fed land boom broke, and banks crashed. Employers took advantage of the depression to defeat the growing labor unions—an experience that taught labor the importance of political action and led to the rise of a Labor party.

Two developments restored economic prosperity, both hinging on the natural land-

scape of Australia. First the discovery of gold in Western Australia (Coolgardie, 1892, Kalgoorlie, 1893) gave new impetus to mining. Second, the breeding of drought- and rust-resistant wheat added 1,000,000 acres to the wheat area and increased the annual crop by 3,000,000 bushels.

**INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT**—The strength and vigor of Australia depend as much on industrialization as on agriculture. Several factors account for this amazing and rare development in the Pacific realm. The proximity of the coal and iron-ore deposits to centers of population and sea transportation is of primary significance. The tonic effect of the gold rush attracted the necessary capital and labor on which to finance and operate factories. A substantial tariff protection policy, begun in 1908, provided the necessary shield for infant industries to compete in world markets as well as to supply domestic needs. Great impetus to the growth of secondary industry was provided by World War I, whereas World War II promoted even greater industrialization when Australia served as the chief Allied base in the Pacific. As a result, factory workers number 1,000,000 and produce fifty per cent, in value, of the total production of the country.

The net effect of this growth is incalculable in national terms. Productivity, especially in providing employment, has increased national purchasing power and raised the total national income. A remarkable change occurred in the shift from primary industries—agriculture, mining, and wool production—to secondary and tertiary industries.<sup>2</sup> The last mentioned, secondary and tertiary, indicate a growth in the performance of services, in financial and commercial activities, that is, industries that de-

<sup>2</sup> For further explanation, see the excellent analysis in C. Hartley Grattan (ed.), *Australia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1947), Chaps. X, XII–XIV.

velop in a country only where there is a high standard of living and relatively high per capita income. The emphasis on manufacturing also meant the end of a purely agrarian economy and increasing preoccupation with industrial problems, such, for example, as unemployment insurance, labor-industrial relations, and social security. Inflation and speculation have served to distort the real picture of the national economy. Serious concern is now expressed in some quarters over declining food production in relation to the growth of population. Since 1939, for example, food output has increased nineteen per cent, while population has increased twenty-four per cent, a trend indicating the prospect of future food imports.

Yet, the economic gains are still substantial. A high degree of technical attainment accounts for the shipbuilding, aircraft, and electrical industries—assets in terms of military requirements. From a fiscal point of view Australia is less dependent on overseas borrowing than formerly, the amount declining from sixty-six per cent of its total borrowing in 1914 to twenty per cent in 1945. Import of capital continues, but a greater share is raised at home. The colonial character of Australian trade has been undergoing a steady change. Despite its commonwealth ties, Australian dependence upon Britain is decreasing in favor of other markets. Improvements in the total economy, on the whole, reflect a growth toward maturity.

**INTERNAL CIVIL DIVISIONS**—New South Wales, the first colony, had wide and undefined boundaries. As settlement spread, new colonies grew out of New South Wales. Tasmania gained separate administration in 1825 and a representative government in 1856. Western Australia (containing a third of the continental land area) was established as a province in 1829; seven years later South Australia received a similar status. Victoria separated from New South Wales

in 1851, and Queensland in 1859. Northern Australia, formerly part of New South Wales, was annexed to South Australia in 1863. These units, the product of national growth and expansion, endure today, with minor modifications, as well-established states (see the map below).



Plans for federation were discussed about the middle of the nineteenth century but did not materialize until the end of the century. The scheme for a federal government encountered opposition but was finally established in 1901. At this time the designation "Commonwealth of Australia" replaced the name "Colonies," the latter being thereupon termed "states."<sup>3</sup> The choice of Canberra as a federal capital was not made until 1908, when the Parliament, according to the constitutional terms, selected the site in New South Wales. The area of the Australian Capital Territory is about 900 square miles; its status resembles that of the District of Columbia in the United States in that the territory was surrendered to the new government for use as the capital. The process of transferring government operations to

<sup>3</sup> An exception is the case of Northern Australia, which South Australia transferred to the Commonwealth, as the Northern Territory, in 1911.

Canberra was not completed until 1927 when Parliament opened its sessions there.

### GOVERNMENTAL PROBLEMS

Federation marked the beginning of nationhood for Australia together with unending responsibilities. The political structure combined features from the British and American systems, creating a parliamentary-cabinet government system of the British type and a written constitution patterned upon that of the United States. The new constitution endowed the central government with extensive powers, especially over trade, customs, defense, and communications.

The role of the government in the economic life of the nation is a distinctive feature of the Australian political scene. In the United States economic development fostered a strong faith in private capitalism and resistance to government interference in economic affairs, in Australia, however, economic development of new areas has encouraged demands for government action. Several special factors have accounted for this situation: first, the remoteness of Australia; second, the practice of the government in assisting immigration; and, third, the need for governmental action to handle the rapid influx of people during the gold rush. Moreover, the government was held responsible for irrigation works and railway projects in areas where sparseness of population failed to attract private capital. Partly, too, the political outlook of the new immigrants entering the country at the mid-century favored government action. Whatever the exact causes, the government role in creating a social-service state is a unique feature of Australian democracy, avoiding as it does any doctrinaire socialist program and the preoccupation of Europeans with ideological theories.

**SPACE AND DISTANCE**—The subdivision of Australia into six states (including Tas-

mania) and one territory is largely the product of historic growth rather than a rational division patterned on geographic differentiations. Suggestions for a unitary state and a further subdivision of existing states have been advanced. The latter is favored in New South Wales where Sydney, because of its size, tends to dominate the entire state. An increase in the number of civil divisions would presumably multiply the cost of government and burden areas least able to shoulder the financial outlay. The problem is essentially one of adapting present forms to meet new requirements, particularly a greater degree of responsibility among local units of government.

Nothing can overcome the difficulties caused by regional differences of outlook and interest in the continental area of Australia. The difficulty of maintaining a federal system is increased by the scattered distribution of settlement. Nearly 9,000,000 people—fewer than the total in Greater New York—are dispersed over a large area around the southern and eastern edges of the "Great Desert Heart." This lack of concentration and the existence of multiple core areas create serious problems of communication and defense.

The location of the population coincides with the location of resources and the presence of suitable climatic conditions. As a result, Australia shows great disparities in the size, population, and wealth of its divisions. These factors are best illustrated in the table on page 652.

**Transportation.** Contact between the coastal groups has always been easier by sea than by land. Many of the railways are only short spur lines running inland from coastal centers. Three rail gauges (wide, standard, narrow) are used, thus reducing the effectiveness of transcontinental rail movement. It is possible to travel by train from northeastern Queensland to Western Australia, but there are six changes of gauge en route.



Since most interstate cargo moves by sea, this lack of uniformity is not a great obstacle. In 1946 agreement was reached on the establishment of a uniform gauge and the completion of the north-south transcontinental line from Darwin to Port Augusta.

Comparison of States and Territories in Australia

States and Territories	Area (in sq mi)	Pop- ulation (1952)	Government Expenditures
New South Wales	309,433	3,405,000	\$291,375,000
Victoria	87,884	2,352,000	\$142,775,000
Queensland	670,500	1,244,000	\$100,406,000
South Australia	380,070	744,000	\$69,394,000
Western Australia	975,920	607,400	\$64,800,000
Tasmania	26,215	304,000	\$18,147,000
Northern Territory	523,620	16,500	—
Australian Capital Territory	939	28,000	—

Road and air transport supplement the railway services; in fact, commercial planes now carry three times as many passengers as the trains. Three large air companies handle international and transcontinental services, and about a dozen regional carriers form a relatively dense network of lines over all the habitable area, including remote desert communities.

**IMMIGRATION**—The disadvantages inherent in space and isolation are partly offset by the fairly uniform nature of the population. The aim of the nation's immigration policy is to perpetuate a "White Australia." The 75,000 aborigines (full-blood and half-caste), most of whom live in the northern half of the continent, are too few to form a serious political minority. About one half follow the old primitive way of life on the reserves and about one sixth are employed as common laborers in rural districts. In general, Australia has tended to isolate this minority—somewhat in the fashion followed by the United States in its treatment of the American Indians—rather than amalgamate it into the body politic.

How to retain the desirable status of a "White Australia" is a major political problem.<sup>4</sup> Many areas of Asia are crowded. The wide spaces of Australia grow increasingly attractive as the pressure in overpopulated nations increases. Anxious to preserve cultural unity and the high standard of living, Australians have refused to admit large waves of immigrants, especially those from Southeast Asia. Immigrants are required to demonstrate knowledge of a European language—a stipulation that successfully discriminates against many Asiatics.

Immigration to Australia since World War II has added half a million, a number equal to those received in the previous half century. Every downward shift in business conditions or in the labor market acts as a brake on further immigration. With the estimated cost to the government of about \$2,100 for settling each newcomer, the additional economic strain serves to limit the influx of immigrants. During the first five years following the end of World War II a large number of displaced persons came to Australia from Europe, since then the level of immigration has declined considerably.

#### TERRITORIAL POSSESSIONS

Australian interest in the Pacific islands began early when, despite the East India Company's monopoly, the first settlers started a clandestine trade with the Fiji Islands. Strategic considerations in the southwest Pacific led Australians to warn Britain that France and Germany might be expected to annex islands in the area. In 1883 Queensland took possession of New Guinea, although Britain disavowed the action. Later Britain obtained southeastern New Guinea (Papua), which was handed over to Australia in 1905. In 1919 the German ter-

<sup>4</sup> For the Australian view on this problem, see W. D. Borrie, *et al.*, *A White Australia: Australia's Population Problem* (Sydney: Australasian Publishing Co., 1947).

ritories of Northeast New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago, and the northern Solomon Islands were handed over to Australia as the mandated Territory of New Guinea. Later this became a trust territory under the United Nations.

All of Australia's Pacific territories have a hot, wet climate, are malaria-ridden, and are unsuited to white settlement. Copra is the chief crop, and there are also coffee and tropical products. Gold, silver, and oil are produced in New Guinea. But in a basic sense the islands are underdeveloped. Their future is difficult to foresee, for with the rise of national feeling in Oceania will come the demand for independence. At the same time it is fairly certain that Australia

will not wish to see them pass from her control. Concern for the security of Australia has led its statesmen to support the Dutch in Netherlands New Guinea and to object strongly to the possibility of that section being handed over to the Republic of Indonesia.


In 1947 Britain transferred Heard and McDonald islands, located in the Indian Ocean half-way to South Africa, to Australia. Further transfer of the Cocos Islands, off the northwestern coast, has been arranged. Since 1936 Australia has extended her sovereignty directly southward over Antarctic territory, claiming a large sector of Wilkes Lands between 45° and 160° East Longitude.

## NEW ZEALAND

### GEOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND

New Zealand is made up of two large islands and several very small ones (see map on this page). North Island is about three fourths as large as South Island, and together they comprise an area of about 103,000 square miles, compared to 120,000 for the British Isles. It is difficult to realize that about 1,200 miles of water separate New Zealand from Australia. Southernmost New Zealand—Stewart Island off the coast of South Island—extends beyond 47° South Latitude, roughly the counterpart of Seattle in the Northern Hemisphere. The northern tip of North Island is as close to the Equator as Los Angeles.

**LANDSCAPE**—The islands of New Zealand are part of the circum-Pacific folds, the ridges of which form the backbone of South Island where several peaks rise above 10,000 feet. The mountains continue along the eastern coast of North Island but in this area do not rise much above 6,000 feet. Despite this lower altitude, the highlands form a major



barrier, across which there are only a few easy passes. To the west of the range extends a volcanic plateau topped by cones rising to between 6,000 and 9,000 feet. Geysers and hot springs on North Island indicate the recency of volcanic activity.

Fringing the mountain backbone on both major islands are coastal lowlands that vary greatly in width, fertility, and accessibility. The two most extensive are the Waikato district, south of Auckland in North Island, and the Canterbury Plains, on the eastern coast of South Island. The western coast of South Island lacks a coastal plain, having only a narrow fringe of discontinuous terraces.

Lying between 34° and 48° South Latitude, the islands are dominated by the prevailing westerlies and associated cyclones, but the difference between the subtropical climate of the northern tip and the more temperate climate of the south is lessened by the sea. Mild winters and cool summers are characteristic. January (summer) temperatures vary from 57° F. in the south to 67° F. in the north, and July temperatures, from 37° F. to 41° F.

Latitudinal position ensures abundant rain with a winter maximum, but the relief causes an uneven distribution. On the western coast of South Island the windward slopes have more than 100 inches, in some localities even 200 inches; forty miles away is the rain-shadow with less than twenty inches. North Island has a more regular distribution, with very few parts getting less than forty inches.

**ECONOMIC ASPECTS**—The mild climate favors meadowland and pasture, with the result that pastoral pursuits dominate the economic life and provide more than ninety per cent of the total exports. In 1950 there were in New Zealand 5,000,000 cattle—one third the number in Australia—2,000,000 of which were dairy cattle. In contrast with Australia's 115,000,000 sheep, New Zealand pastured 34,000,000. Dairy cattle are impor-

tant in most parts of North Island, except the center and the eastern highlands, and especially in the Auckland and Wellington districts. Sheep are important in the east coast lowlands of both islands, especially in the Canterbury Plains.

About two thirds of the country supports agriculture and grazing. Agriculture principally involves the production of fodder crops (hay, oats, turnips) and fruits. Not enough wheat is grown to meet home demands. Orchard fruits include oranges and lemons, grown in the northern subtropical area, and apricots, peaches, and apples; but only apples are exported.

Mineral resources are not great. Gold is mined in two or three areas, and some 3,000 tons of iron ore are produced annually from the shores of Cook Strait. From the west coast of South Island at Greymouth and Westport comes some good bituminous coal, which is supplemented by deposits of lignite. The combined output of coal and lignite, amounting to 3,000,000 tons, is sufficient for local needs.

The first settlers established basic industries, such as the manufacture of dairy products, the freezing of meat, and the working of lumber, but the plants were small and widely scattered. After 1918, as in Australia, other industries were fostered by the government in the hope of reducing imports and broadening the country's economic base. Favored by the excellent conditions for producing hydroelectric power, various industries came into being, specializing principally in the manufacture of gasoline engines, radio parts, chemicals, paper, boots, clothing, and hosiery. During World War II the list was lengthened by the addition of ships and small arms. In contrast to the wide dispersal of the earlier factories, the new industries are concentrated in and around the four principal cities.

No part of New Zealand is more than eighty miles from the sea, and this fact, together with the coastal distribution of popu-

lations and the rugged relief inland, has encouraged communication by sea. Railways operated by the government cover 3,531 miles along the coastal lowlands. Owing to the costs of construction the network is still incomplete, and many inland centers still depend on highway transport. A small air-route network has recently facilitated domestic transportation as well as communication with Australia.

**POPULATION**—The total population is close to 2,000,000 people, two thirds of whom are concentrated in North Island. Despite the importance of pastoralism and agriculture, only 750,000 live in rural districts—fewer than the combined populations of the four largest cities: Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch, and Dunedin.

Wellington, the capital, has an excellent harbor, but expansion of the city is hampered by the limited area of surrounding lowland. This handicap is offset, however, by a central location. Auckland, on an equally good harbor, is better placed with respect to Pacific trade routes, but its position in the far northern part of North Island prevented its choice as capital. Christchurch and Dunedin, on the east coast of South Island, complete the urban centers in New Zealand in the 100,000, or greater, class. Most of the cities of 20,000 or more are population clusters located in the coastal lowlands or facing the open sea.

#### DISCOVERY AND SETTLEMENT

Maori legends tell of the discovery of New Zealand in the middle of the tenth century and the beginning of settlement three centuries later when eight vessels arrived from overcrowded Tahiti. These settlers introduced the sweet potato, the only one of their native South Seas crops that could flourish in this cooler region. A small primitive group of aborigines, already in possession, were exterminated or absorbed. In 1642

Tasman, the Dutch explorer, sailed along the entire western coast, and between 1769 and 1777 Cook visited the islands five times. Other voyages of exploration followed, and by 1856 the coasts were sufficiently well known for a complete survey to be published.

Internally, the exploration of North Island was accomplished mainly by missionaries between 1814 and 1850, but the more rugged South Island was not completely known until the end of the nineteenth century.

**BRITISH SETTLEMENT**—The remoteness of New Zealand, "the last, loneliest and loveliest" of the Dominions, delayed settlement and gave it a distinctive character. Since few emigrants could afford the long journey, most of the early settlers were assisted by organizations such as the New Zealand Company. This company had been promoted by Edward Gibbon Wakefield, a reformer with a philanthropic inclination, who sought to relieve social tension in Britain by financing emigrants to new lands, where he hoped "little Englands" would flourish. The first emigrants who were sent out by his company arrived in 1840. They organized a settlement, and this started the colonization of New Zealand by the British.

Missionaries, anxious to protect the Maori against European contact, vainly opposed the spread of settlement. However, expansion could not be stopped, and in 1855, when the New Zealand Company went out of existence, all the chief towns in North Island except Auckland had been founded. In South Island similar settlements were established by the Scottish Presbyterians at Dunedin (1848) and by the Church of England at Christchurch (1850). In 1852 the British Parliament granted a constitution to New Zealand, and by 1856 responsible government had been established.

The presence of 250,000 Maoris, whose cultural level was far above that of the Australian aborigines, created difficult problems for the government. Relations be-

tween the Maoris and the whites followed the usual unfortunate lines, mainly, the constructive work of the missionaries was counteracted by escaped convicts from New South Wales and crews of visiting whalers who introduced alcohol, disease, and traffic in women. In 1840, on the advice of the missionaries, the Maori chiefs signed the Treaty of Waitangi, which brought the Maoris under the protection of the British and confirmed their ownership of the land, subject to the right of pre-emption by the Crown. Surrender of sovereignty to Britain did not bring the Maoris all the rights of British subjects, as the operation of pre-emption demonstrated. As immigration went on and more and more land was purchased, resistance grew, leading, in 1860, to a revolt on the part of the Maoris and to five years of bitter, fruitless fighting. Discouraged by defeat and envisaging a landless future, the Maoris lost hope and became increasingly demoralized. Before their lot was to improve markedly in the new century the number of Maoris had decreased to only 40,000 (see page 657 for further discussion of the Maori problem).

**INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT**—The discovery of gold at Otago (1861) and Westland (1865) brought many new settlers. Shortly after the newcomers arrived the world entered the trade depression of the 1870's. For a decade the New Zealand government succeeded in prolonging prosperity by borrowing and by using the loans to develop land and to build roads and railways. In the 1880's, however, the depression struck, and the effects were all the more serious because of the heavy borrowing in the previous years. As in Australia, the resultant distress forced labor into politics and created a demand for governmental activity in the economic field. Heavy taxation of undeveloped holdings broke up large estates, and the land, bought by the government, was rented on long-term leases to small holders. During these trying times the development of refrigeration saved the small

farmer. Increased facilities for the export of meat, butter, and cheese to the remote countries of Northwestern Europe gradually restored prosperity. Between 1898 and 1919 exports increased in value from \$32,000,000 to \$216,000,000. This prosperity also accounted for a farmers' party, which for twenty years used its power to expand farm production.

Similarly, in the depression years after 1929, governmental action was again demanded. This time the wage earners put in office a Labor government which set high standards in the field of social security and national welfare. At the same time it strove to strengthen the basis of New Zealand economy by promoting secondary industries, a policy pursued right through World War II, when New Zealand factories helped to supply the needs of Allied troops.

## POLITICAL PROBLEMS

**RELATIONS WITH GREAT BRITAIN**—Despite the strong sentimental and economic links with Great Britain, the remoteness of New Zealand has influenced her leaders to view many problems very differently from the way they are seen by the statesmen in London. In the mid-nineteenth century the freedom of action claimed by New Zealand engendered friction. By 1880 talk of independence and of affiliation with the United States was heard, and even after that crisis had passed relations were far from smooth.

As a colony remote from the center of empire, New Zealand relied upon British diplomacy and naval power for security. Thus, desire for an independent life did not result in a weakening of imperial ties. On the contrary New Zealand recognized the value of a strong relationship with Britain and consistently sought to strengthen it. Consequently, she favored a federal organization for the Empire; indeed, her leaders sponsored a scheme for such an organization at the Imperial Conference of 1911, but

their proposal met with a very cold reception. Later, when the Statute of Westminster, in 1931, met the demands of the other Dominions for complete autonomy and left them linked only by common allegiance to the crown, New Zealand was very critical and expressed fear that such an arrangement would promote the disintegration of the Commonwealth. In two world wars New Zealand demonstrated her concept of Commonwealth loyalty and responsibility by automatically following Great Britain into war.

**RELATIONS WITH THE MAORIS**—The bulk of the population of New Zealand is of British origin, and thus she is spared intercultural problems such as confront South Africa and Canada. Relations with the Maoris, however, present some difficulties. From the nadir in 1865 the condition of the Maoris has steadily improved. With proper opportunities and inducements they have proved their capacity for higher standards of life. Separate schools for them were set up in 1867, and in 1876 four Maori representatives entered Parliament. Young Maoris educated in the separate schools, mission colleges, and in some cases even in the universities, began the task of reviving the courage and pride of their people. Appeals in their behalf resulted in obtaining state funds for the development of Maori land. Dairy farms were started, and today more than 1,000,000 acres are being developed in this fashion. No attempt was made to adopt completely European ways; rather, new habits were grafted on to the old culture. Pride in the past revived, and renewed hope for the future succeeded in arresting the decline in population. At present the annual rate of increase is twice that of the whites, although the total number, about 115,000, is only 5.2 per cent of the population of the nation.

Most of the Maoris live in rural communities, but their holdings are still inadequate. It has been estimated that were

all Maori land developed, it would barely support one third of their number. A drift to the cities has begun, and the need for Maori technical schools to prepare them for city living is urgent. At the same time intercultural policies and education should be directed to prevent any growth of color prejudice as Maoris begin to compete with the whites.

**OVERSEAS TERRITORIES**—New Zealand shared Australia's early concern over the control of those islands nearest her coast, and alarm grew as the French annexed New Caledonia and the Germans occupied western Samoa. In 1888 Britain annexed the Cook Islands, which lie 1,500 miles to the northeast of Auckland, and in 1901 handed them over to New Zealand. Copra, citrus, and mother of pearl are the chief products of this small group, amounting to less than 200 square miles and having but 20,000 inhabitants. Niue, the largest of the Cook Islands, has been under a separate administration since 1903.

The Tokelau Islands, lying 300 miles north of western Samoa, became an overseas unit in 1926, when Britain transferred them to New Zealand. Since 1949 they have become part of New Zealand. New Zealand also administers western Samoa as a trust territory under a trusteeship agreement with the United Nations. Formerly a German possession, western Samoa was entrusted to New Zealand by the Allied powers as a mandated territory after World War I. Composed of two large islands, the land area of 1,130 square miles bears the marks of still active volcanoes and has a rugged mountain terrain. Within the fertile plains copra, cacao, rubber, and bananas are produced. Nauru Island, noted chiefly for its phosphate deposits, is also a trust territory under the United Nations, the administration of which New Zealand shares jointly with Australia and Great Britain.

New Zealand has safeguarded native interests and furthered economic development

in its overseas territories. Within the trusteeship terms New Zealand has sponsored the development of self-government, and in the case of western Samoa, a legislative assembly exercises wide legislative powers, and a council of state advises the high commissioner on Samoan affairs.

New Zealand also controls the Ross Dependency in Antarctica, where posts for the control of whaling and the relief of castaways are maintained.

#### AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND: PACIFIC POWERS

Australia and New Zealand are both outposts of Western civilization off the mainland of Asia, and relation to Asia is a dominant factor in their outlook upon world affairs. To Australians, particularly, the "Near North" represents overpopulated areas where land pressure and grinding poverty combine with strong antiwhite feeling to produce conditions dangerous to peaceful existence. The struggle between rival powers has accentuated this apprehension about security.

During the nineteenth century both countries relied on geographic isolation and the protection of the British fleet for their security. In practical terms territorial integrity took the form of preserving the continental areas exclusively for white settlers and of demanding that control of the island barrier to the northeast be under Australian or British domination. The twentieth century has seen the old defenses crumble. The war in the Pacific (1941-45) had a deep impact upon both powers, as the fall of Singapore and the demonstration of the military power of Japan signified the decline of British naval power in the Pacific. Moreover, in an age of air power the countries of the south were no longer invulnerable to powerful aggression from the north. For Australia and New Zealand the war re-emphasized the strategic importance of New

Guinea and the island arc stretching east to the Cook Islands. Most important, the role of American military power in the war was not lost upon statesmen in both Commonwealths.

Two postwar developments cast their shadow over the South Pacific: a shift of world-power focus to Asia and the rise of Asian nationalism. Both countries quickly recast their policies to meet these changes. In 1944 the Anzac Pact joined them in cooperative action for defense and control of the strategic island arc. The two powers were equally determined that sovereignty over the islands should return to prewar status. After the war they based their defense on support of the United Nations system of collective security, at the same time they strove to reduce tension in South Asia by support of the new independence movements. Desire to protect their communications with Britain has likewise made them sensitive to any weakening of British influence in the Middle East; at the same time, both countries have asserted the role of leadership in the southwestern Pacific area as successors to the British hegemony.

Both nations view the resurgence of Japanese military power with as much alarm as they do the encroachment of Communism on the continent of Asia. American plans to rearm Japan as a bulwark against Communism have aroused fears, which were allayed, at least in part, by a mutual defense agreement, signed, in 1951, by Australia, New Zealand, and the United States.

This pact, in which Britain has no part, together with the growth of American power in the Pacific, has pulled Australia and New Zealand well into the American sphere of influence and raised questions as to how this new orientation can be reconciled with participation in Commonwealth affairs. This uncertainty is a dilemma of a super-power world in which the power of the United States overshadows the British Empire.

## OCEANIA

As previously pointed out Oceania is an extensive island world in which fragments of land are scattered through enormous reaches of water. Usually the islands exist in clusters, but only in the southwestern part of the area does the proportion of land to water become significant. Both geographers and anthropologists divide up the islands under consideration as belonging to the Melanesian, Polynesian, and Micronesian groups. Melanesia lies south of the Equator, stretching from New Caledonia and the Fijis westward to Timor, and includes New Guinea, and the Bismarck, Admiralty, and Solomon groups. Polynesia extends in a triangle from Hawaii to Easter Island and westward to the shores of New Zealand. It contains a great number of small islands, including Samoa, the Cook, Kermadec, and Tokelau groups, Pitcairn Island, Nauru, the Tonga Islands, and the Society and Marquesas groups, as well as smaller French possessions in this area. Micronesia stretches north of the Equator from the Gilberts to the Carolines and includes the Marianas, Guam, and the Marshall Islands.

### GEOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND

Complexity and diversity are the essential features of the geography. The islands, excluding Australia, vary in size from New Guinea, across the Torres Strait from northern Australia, with its 300,000 square miles,<sup>5</sup> to small bits of land a few acres in extent. Their structure is equally diverse. Some, thought to be an edge of a former land mass, are called continental and contain granites and meta-

morphic rocks, for example, Fiji and New Caledonia, but most, classed as oceanic, are built of recent volcanic rocks (Hawaii, Solomons, Samoa) or of coral (Wake Island) and in many cases of both. The relief varies from high mountains surrounded by swampy forested lowlands to low limestone atolls.

All the islands lie in low latitudes, almost all within the Tropical Zone. Consequently temperatures are high (70° to 80° F.), and the seasonal range is not great. Rainfall varies according to elevation and position relative to the main pressure belts, but it is generally between twenty and thirty inches unless influenced by sharp relief. The windward slopes in Hawaii hold one of the world's rainfall records—more than 300 inches annually.

A similar lack of uniformity characterizes the human geography. Settled by a number of migrations from Asia, Oceania contains various groups showing affinities with Negritos, Mediterranean, and Mongol types, though all are greatly mixed. The cultural pattern is even more complicated, especially in Melanesia, where hundreds of different languages are spoken. Polynesians on the whole speak the same language, and their general level of culture, although still very varied, is, on the average, high.

Economic resources of the Pacific Islands are limited. In the old rocks of the continental islands are a few important minerals: nickel, chromium, copper, iron, and coal in New Caledonia, gold in Fiji, and gold and tin in the Solomons. New Caledonia produces seven per cent of the world's nickel and ranks eighth in the production of chromium. Fiji gold production compares favorably with that of Nevada in amount; gold is second only to sugar among the island's exports.

On the coral islands phosphates and bauxite are the only important minerals.

<sup>5</sup> The island of New Guinea is divided politically into Netherlands New Guinea, under Dutch administration; Papua, in the southeast, an Australian colony; and northeastern New Guinea, a United Nations trust territory administered by Australia.



Nauru, Ocean, and Christmas islands have the largest deposits among the islands; the first two together produce ten per cent of the world's phosphate supply. Other deposits are worked in the Carolines, which also produce bauxite from a reserve of 50,000,000 tons.

Most of the islands are self-sufficient in food and export increasing quantities of tropical plantation crops. Copra is the chief of these and is exported from almost every island, and others are sugar, cacao, cotton, coffee, pineapples, and bananas. The Hawaiian and Fiji island groups lead in the production of sugar, with 1,000,000 and 200,000 tons, respectively.

#### POLITICAL PATTERN

The institution of a political order dates from the Age of Discovery (about the sixteenth century), when the Pacific islands became areas of European explorations. Magellan, Mendaña, Tasman, and Captain Cook stand out prominently as pioneers in the charting of the scattered islands known as Oceania. For three centuries European contacts spread over the Pacific, especially through the activities of missionaries, whalers, traders, and adventurers. Enterprising traders made long journeys across the Pacific, missionaries went to the islands to convert the natives to Christianity or to protect them from exploitation and forced labor.

Activities of the Europeans reflected the colonial prestige of their mother country. The Portuguese and Dutch worked along the eastern fringe of the Pacific, off the coast of Asia. The Spanish operated north of the Equator, in the Philippines and the Marianas. For several centuries European powers, while sponsoring expeditions into the Pacific, showed little interest in the acquisition of isolated, remote islands. As a result, although native communities received the impact of European contacts, they largely retained their native systems of local rule.

**GREAT POWER RIVALRY**—The emergence of great-power rivalry in the nineteenth century worked a major transformation. Britain and France vied for control of the most desirable islands, supported by their respective missionaries and energetic merchants. Several causes account for the frenzy of colonial activity in the last quarter of the century. First there was the development of steamship transportation, which called for food stores and supplies between points in intercontinental trade. Second, transformation in naval power due to the application of steam-propelled engines, created a need for coaling stations and harbors for repair of ocean-going vessels. Industrialization in Western Europe also emphasized the value of raw materials, many of which were found in the island groups off the Asiatic mainland.

The arrival of new world powers—Germany, the United States, and Japan—quickened the pace of competition for territory, so that by 1914 all the islands were divided among the powers. Over the bitter protests of Australia, Germany, in 1884, annexed northeastern New Guinea. The United States, in 1897, demonstrated its manifest destiny with the annexation of Hawaii and, in 1898, the acquisition from Spain of the Philippines and Guam. In 1899, Germany purchased from Spain the Carolines and the Marshall Islands for \$4,000,000 and divided the Samoan Islands with the United States. American Samoa, east of 171° West Longitude, acquired strategic significance with the establishment of a naval base at Pago-pago on the island of Tutuila.

**SHIFT IN POWER BLOCS**—Two major wars effected a radical change in the pattern of great-power control in the Pacific area. World War I eliminated Germany and installed Japan as a principal custodian of former German possessions in the north Pacific. The Allied powers in 1919 disposed of the German Pacific islands by classifying

them as mandates under the League of Nations. Those north of the Equator (Carolines, Marshalls, and Marianas) went to Japan, those south of the Equator, to the British Commonwealth. Specifically, Australia gained administrative control over northeastern New Guinea and the Bismarck Archipelago; New Zealand gained western Samoa, and the island of Nauru was placed under the joint administration of Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand. The Pacific phase of World War II eliminated Japan and left the United States in custody of the Japanese mandated islands. The rest of the Pacific remained unchanged, except that the former mandates of Australia and New Zealand were transformed into trusteeships under the United Nations. World War II also introduced a new concept of trusteeship in the American trust agreements. Unlike the mandates, the terms of the new trusteeships permit the United States to maintain military bases in the islands. In actual fact the strategic trust territory of the Pacific is virtually a substitute for outright annexation, since the United States reports to the United Nations only on civil progress in the islands. However, with only 51,000 natives in the whole trust territory, the political problem is not one of major proportion. Postwar arrangements of areas in the Pacific indicate that the United States dominates almost all of Oceania north of the Equator.

**IMPACT UPON PACIFIC AREAS**—A full century of political activity in the Pacific has left an indelible impression upon the islands and created a basic pattern of political orientation. Outsiders, as representatives of more advanced civilizations, have generally dominated and controlled the scattered and unorganized entities in the tropical areas of the Pacific. In some cases this control has been disastrous for the natives. European exploitation of the natives nearly depopulated Easter Island and islands in the Ellice

group toward the close of the nineteenth century. The Japanese migrated into their mandated islands and successfully exploited their resources at the expense of the local inhabitants. Considerations of great-power interests have tended to overshadow or take precedence over native interests. This is best illustrated in the pattern of political division established in the Pacific area. Several large islands are divided, according to the rule of expediency, among competing factors. Thus the islands of New Guinea and Samoa are both divided politically. In the case of New Hebrides, Great Britain and France exercise a condominium over the valuable area of 5,700 square miles and share jointly responsibility for its administration.

Elsewhere three types of external control have endured. The first is direct colonial rule, under which a governor administers an area, with a colonial staff, on behalf of his government. Others have an indirect form of government, under which native rule is undisturbed except in matters of fiscal policy, defense, and foreign relations. Such areas generally enjoy protectorate status. Finally, trusteeships, as already noted, bring together a theory of international supervision and national administration for the mutual advantage of the administrative power and the native inhabitants. Independent status is practically nonexistent in the modern Pacific world. Tonga is the only independent kingdom in the Pacific, a status enjoyed since 1845. Even this area of 269 square miles of islands was, under an agreement of 1899, recognized to be a protectorate of Great Britain. The degree to which the powers used the Pacific islands to their own advantage is best illustrated by the record of the Pacific phase of World War II, which turned the islands into a staging area for the contestants.

The picture is not all black and white. Some changes in the twentieth century deserve notice. Under the trusteeship system most of the powers have made strides in

raising the health standard, improving economic well-being, and protecting the social life of the native inhabitants. Furthermore, the political pattern is much simpler now than in 1914, and international agreements are effecting further simplification and standardization. A South Pacific Commission, set up by six interested governments, has, since 1947, drafted international policies and programs for the economic and social advancement of nonself-governing peoples. Such guidance and control, in the wake of the unsettling effect of the war, can have a stabilizing influence and serve to enhance the waning prestige of the great powers.

Most of the islands are destined to remain as dependencies of other nations, they can

never revert to the status of an imaginary Pacific paradise. None of the islands forms a viable economic or political unit capable of holding a position of independence against the pressure of the states occupying the perimeter of the Pacific. In the air age the scattered atolls and coral reefs acquire strategic importance as fueling points, weather stations, or military bases in the unending struggle for power and security. Beyond this, geography has placed the islands along the great intercontinental trade routes that link the Western Hemisphere with the Orient. It is this trade which the islands serve and from which, in turn, they derive benefits through their contacts with the outside world.

### Study Questions

1. Is it true to say Australia and New Zealand are inextricably involved in Asiatic affairs? Why?
2. In what way has remoteness from Western Europe affected the development of Australia and New Zealand?
3. How are climate and the distribution of population in Australia related?
4. What is the relationship between the railway net and the physical geography of (a) Australia and (b) New Zealand?
5. Examine the site of Canberra. Is it satisfactory for a federal capital?
6. In what way has the desert heart of Australia affected political patterns and problems?
7. To what extent is the greater activity of the New Zealand and Australian governments in economic affairs, as compared with that of the United States, a result of geographical influences?
8. Compare the climate and economic activity of New Zealand with those of the Pacific coast of the United States and account for any differences.
9. List the four main cities of New Zealand and examine their locations.
10. In what ways did the evolution of settlement of New Zealand (a) resemble and (b) differ from that of Australia?
11. What geographical factors control the distribution of New Zealand's population?
12. Explain the common interest of New Zealand and Australia in the islands of Oceania.
13. To what extent are the population problems of Australia and New Zealand alike?
14. Using an atlas distinguish clearly between Melanesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia.
15. Which islands in Oceania south of the Equator do not belong to the British Commonwealth of Nations?

PART SIX

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*Conclusion*



## *World Political Geography at Mid-twentieth Century*

On the basis of discussions in previous chapters the reader may well consider the degree to which World War II has transformed the basic structure of the world political system. True, the nation-state is still the basic political unit, and the drive for independence, far from being impeded by wars, has, in fact, accelerated. At the same time the logic of transnational forces—efficiency and speed in transportation, communication, and technology—is contributing to the formation of new political groupings larger than the nation-state. Within a single decade after World War II, it has become clear that the pull between two concepts of international thought—nationalist parochialism and the transnational universalism—has introduced an element of instability into the world picture, which can be satisfactorily adjusted only in coming decades.

On a global basis World War II contributed to the rise of a two-power world, a condition affecting the most remote states.

The destruction of many independent power centers led to the bipolarization of power between the United States and the Soviet Union, as super powers and exponents of two opposing political systems. This took the form of a so-called Cold War between the Communist World and the Free World. As powerful antagonists the United States and the Soviet Union each tended to draw within its respective sphere those states whose security requirements seemed, from a geographic standpoint, best satisfied by being associated with one of the two blocs of powers. Characteristic of the two-power world are the element of inflexibility in diplomacy and international economics and the inability of the world to solve the basic questions of war and peace. The consequent stalemate, or uncertainty in power calculations, between the two blocs—the East and the West—dominates the arena of power politics.

## RISE OF NEW STATES

INVENTORY—The appearance of new states is singularly important in a politico-geographic study of the postwar era. The coincidental weakening of old empires and rising na-

tionalist drive among former colonial peoples has created new political entities in Africa, the Middle East, and the Asian realm. The distribution of the new stars in the international firmament is best illustrated by the following tables.

New Postwar States

	<i>Former Status</i>	<i>Date of Independence</i>	<i>Present Status</i>	<i>Area (in sq. mi.)</i>	<i>Population (latest est.)</i>
<b>Africa</b>					
Libya	Italian Empire	1951	Constitutional monarchy	679,358	1,340,000 (1954)
Eritrea	Italian Empire	1950	Federation with Ethiopia <sup>a</sup>	48,350	1,080,000 (1951)
Sudan	Anglo-Egyptian condominium	1955	Republic	967,500	8,764,000 (1955)
<b>Middle East</b>					
Syria	French mandate	1946	Republic	72,560	3,250,000 (1954)
Lebanon	French mandate	1946	Republic	3,474	1,416,000 (1954)
Israel	British mandate	1948	Republic	8,048	1,750,000 (1955)
Jordan <sup>b</sup>	British mandate	1946	Hashemite Kingdom	37,700	1,400,000 (1955)
<b>Asia</b>					
India	British Empire	1947	Republic in British Commonwealth	1,269,640 <sup>c</sup>	376,750,000 (1955)
Pakistan	British Empire	1947	Republic in British Commonwealth <sup>d</sup>	364,737	75,842,000 (1951)
Burma	British Empire	1948	Republic	261,789	18,853,000 (1952)
Ceylon	British Empire	1948	Dominion in British Commonwealth	25,332	8,385,000 (1954)
Outer Mongolia	Chinese suzerainty	1946 <sup>e</sup>	Republic	625,783	2,077,669 (1955)
Philippines	United States Territory	1946	Republic	115,600	21,940,000 (1955)
Indonesia	Netherlands Empire	1949	Republic	735,865	81,100,000 (1954)
<b>Indochina</b>					
Vietnam <sup>f</sup>	French Empire	1950	Associated States of Indochina	127,380	28,000,000 (1954)
Cambodia				69,480	4,100,000 (1955)
Laos				88,780	1,500,000 (1954)

<sup>a</sup> The constitution of 1952, drawn up by the United Nations, makes Eritrea an autonomous unit but federated with Ethiopia (September 11, 1952)

<sup>b</sup> The incorporation of former Arab Palestine on April 24, 1950, added 2,500 sq. mi. of area and about 1,000,000 people and about 367,000 refugees

<sup>c</sup> Excluding Kashmir and Jammu.

<sup>d</sup> Proclaimed an Islamic Republic on March 23, 1956, after adoption of a constitution on February 29, 1956

<sup>e</sup> Formal recognition by China of the Mongolian People's Republic, January 5, 1946.

<sup>f</sup> In 1954 Vietnam was divided into a northern (Communist-controlled) sector of approximately 77,000 sq. mi. and 15,000,000 people and a southern sector of 50,000 sq. mi. and 13,000,000 people.

## Territories Approaching Independence in 1956

	<i>Former Status</i>	<i>Present Status</i>	<i>Plan for Future</i>	<i>Area (in sq. mi.)</i>	<i>Population (est. for 1956)</i>
<b>Africa</b>					
French Morocco	French protectorate (Treaty of 1912)	Independence, but united by interdependence with France <sup>a</sup>		153,870	10,442,000
Spanish Zone	Spanish protectorate (Franco-Spanish Treaty of 1912)	Joined with independent Morocco <sup>b</sup>		18,009	1,010,000
Tunisia	French protectorate	Franco-Tunisian Protocol Agreement (March, 1956) recognized independence		48,362	4,062,000
Somaliland	Italian Empire	UN trusteeship under Italy, 1950	UN Resolution of 1950 provides for independence in 1960	194,000	1,255,000
Gold Coast <sup>c</sup> (Ghana)	British Empire	Transition toward independence in 1956	Dominion status in British Commonwealth in 1957	78,802	3,089,000
British Togoland	UN trusteeship under Great Britain	Referendum in favor of union with Gold Coast, 1956	Union with Gold Coast in 1957	13,041	410,000
French Togoland	UN trusteeship under France	Declared a republic in the French Union, 1956 <sup>d</sup>		21,893	1,929,945
<b>Asia</b>					
Malaya	British protectorate (exc. Singapore)	Arrangement for independence in the British Commonwealth, 1956 <sup>e</sup>	Scheduled independence for August, 1957	50,690	5,750,000

<sup>a</sup> The Franco-Moroccan agreement of March 2, 1956, recognized the "need for interdependence" between the two states, the terms of which were to be negotiated by consultation.

<sup>b</sup> On April 4, 1956, Spain declared the end of Spanish rule and recognized Moroccan independence under Sultan Mohammed V. The Spanish-Moroccan agreement recognized the need for "free collaboration" between the two states.

<sup>c</sup> The new name of the independent state is to be Ghana.

<sup>d</sup> A French proposal for a plebiscite in the trust territory did not receive the approval of the Trusteeship Council of the UN in 1956.

<sup>e</sup> Considerations of strategy caused Britain to reject moves for self-government and autonomy in Singapore.

**WEAKNESSES**—The statistics in the accompanying tables indicate in a general way the relation between space and human occupation. In all instances the new states are in Old World continents where settlement has long been established. Population pres-



sure is especially serious in Java and other favored parts of the Indonesian Archipelago, in the Ganges and Brahmaputra valleys of India and East Pakistan, and in Ceylon. Nevertheless, the majority of the new states enjoy a density ratio that permits some hope for further increases. With advances in irrigation, new methods of crop growing, utilization of known mineral resources and discovery of new ones, development of hydroelectric energy, and promotion of industrial enterprises there is at least some indication that the technical frontier can be pushed outward to allow greater population without a corresponding downward trend in living standards. Certainly this premise is the one upon which American aid in the form of a Point Four program was based.

Crude figures for entire countries, however, may be quite misleading. The viability of political areas must take into account a complex variety of factors within national boundaries, especially natural resources, economic progress, technological growth, and governmental stability. Measured in terms of national power rating, as applied in international relations, the new arrivals rank below the level of great powers. Broadly definable socioeconomic characteristics explain the low power rating accorded the new states. An undeniable fact is that the new areas are largely agricultural or raw-material regions where the masses of the inhabitants have no opportunity to enjoy the amenities of modern civilization. Markedly low per capita investment accumulation and dependence upon world market conditions for their growth and development further limit the potential of these recently established political entities. Their desire for industrialization can be realized only through great sacrifices or the borrowing of capital and supplies from the leading industrial powers. A sensitive nationalist spirit, self-conscious pride in independence, and extreme distrust of former imperial powers

combine to obstruct any rational solution to the problem of economic development.

Meanwhile, the demand for economic betterment is bound to keep internal politics in a state of flux. It is significant to note that Libya, Israel, and Jordan are all largely dependent upon foreign subsidies or loans for survival and at present are unable to meet their budgetary needs out of their own resources. In all the new states, except Israel, democratic institutions and the concept of individual rights and liberties are recent innovations as measured against the background of traditional oligarchical authority and strong central administration. If political stability is a criterion of national strength, the new postwar states tend to gravitate toward weakness, frequent changes in government, and general instability.

**THE CHANGING MAP**—The appearance of the new states on the map in the first instance has been largely due to action taken by the United Nations, as in the case of Israel, Syria, and Lebanon; to the division of former-enemy territory, as in the case of Libya; or to steps taken by the victorious powers in granting independence to former overseas colonial territories. In the last instance the mother country may have not only condoned the splitting off of a part of its empire but voluntarily furthered the establishment of the neophyte state (Philippines, Ceylon). In decided contrast, the cleavage may have been bitter, with widespread bloodshed before the new government could properly assume control (Indonesia, Burma). In any event, birth struggles have attended the initial efforts of the newcomers, whether in the form of boundary problems, which aggravate international relations, or the setting up of complex administrative procedures consistent with autonomy. The case of Israel in the Arab World is the most turbulent in the postwar period, but certainly the problems of Kash-

mir, West New Guinea, and Vietnam are no less disturbing in their respective areas.

Although not great powers, in world affairs the new states are not to be disregarded. In fact, evidence indicates that in United Nations affairs the Middle East and Asian states combine to form blocs in voting on certain questions affecting the welfare of former colonial areas. This is especially notable in questions concerning the independence movement in French North Africa, technical aid to underdeveloped regions, examination of reports from trust territories, and the question of racial equality in African areas dominated by Europeans.

Since the firing of the last shot in World War II, an average of more than one new national flag has appeared each year among those in the world community. For the next few years, at least, the same pace, or one even more accelerated, promises to continue as political entities in Africa launch, or are launched, under their own governments. To a certain extent this postwar political phenomenon has pushed into the background questions of territory and disputes of somewhat lesser portent so common in previous years. These latter had mainly to do with scattered fragments of territory important to the traditions, prestige, and perhaps the economic well-being of more than a single state. Not that border questions have ceased to exist. But today the more critical ones are likely to be associated with events of much greater moment, as, for example, in the case of Kashmir.

For a different reason, boundary disputes behind the Iron Curtain in Eastern Europe are largely negated. For example, national aspirations for territorial aggrandizement in Bulgaria, Rumania, and Hungary cannot find expression in the face of over-all policy in the Soviet bloc. In South America boundary questions have ceased to be flaming issues, although every one of the ten republics in that continent has in the past

disputed over boundaries, not infrequently to the extent of going to war (see Chapter Ten). It is to be hoped that the subdued nature of these territorial problems is indicative of a more rational statecraft and more effective power of arbitration among the various nations of the world.

## DISSOLUTION OF EMPIRES

Prior to 1939 it was customary in the Western World to view developments in most of Asia, Africa, and the Pacific area as subsidiary to the decisions made in the capitals of major colonial powers. Britain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Japan, and the United States exerted a predominant influence over vast areas and aggregates of population. To a degree the colonial powers preserved world peace and radiated an aura of strength in colonial areas. World War II has largely destroyed the prestige and power of London, Paris, and The Hague, as well as that of Rome and Tokyo. The break-up of colonial empires is attended by tensions and new problems. Britain evacuated the strategic Suez Canal area in favor of Egypt in 1954 and French hegemony in Indochina is rapidly coming to an end. The transition in empires is giving rise to new foci of political power. In the Middle East Egypt is aspiring to a position of leadership in the Arab World, in South Asia India is spokesman for the neutral bloc of nations, and farther east Red China is setting the standard for a new Communist order in Asia. Although new political centers are far from securely established, some do exert an influence on a regional scale. The very arrangement of the world political areas in this text underlines a fragmentation of political power on a world-wide scale.

**COLONIAL-TYPE STATES**—The appearance of new states on the colonial scene forces geographic, as well as political, relationships to

be remolded. A new national capital, newly established tariffs and customs regulations, and new political representation abroad must be matched by a reorientation of transportation and communication patterns, greater reliance on domestic production, and commercial representation abroad. A change-over toward national direction is more likely to be successful if gradual, and it may be facilitated by an interim of cooperation between the new state and the former colonial power. After Philippine independence American capital and technological know-how remained in the islands to help build up the economy of that country. Ceylon enjoys preferential treatment from Great Britain by virtue of remaining in the British Commonwealth of Nations as a Dominion. Nevertheless, each new state must weld its territory, population, and inventory of geographic resources into a self-sustaining unit or cease to exist as an independent unit. There can be reliance on foreign aid and on the world market, but this very dependence must be recognized and directed from the new capitals—Djakarta, Manila, New Delhi, and Beirut—not from established power centers, such as London, Paris, The Hague, and Washington.

Even though a newly created state may assume all the attributes of statehood and reach full maturity in the world community, it will still retain strong vestiges of the power which dominated it in colonial times. Even today, driving through the Spanish countryside, one may run across Roman ruins and recognize irrigation techniques of the Moors, in each case harking back through centuries to former rulers. So it is hardly surprising that features of recent colonialism should loom strong on the physical and cultural landscapes of the new nations. Whether the Indonesians like or dislike the Dutch, Indonesia's way of doing business will long be modeled after that of Amsterdam and Rotterdam. The entire railroad system of India is remarkably like that of Great Britain, even to the extent of recent nationalization of all

independent companies in both countries. In Beirut one recalls the Paris scene in the ways of life in this new Middle Eastern capital. In Libya one sees superimposed over Cyrenaica and Tripolitania a type of development directly reminiscent of Italy at a time when that country strove to acquire an empire in the northeast quadrant of Africa. Thus, in mid-twentieth century a string of new states extending across the broadest dimension of the Eastern Hemisphere have assumed the responsibilities of their own political destinies. At the same time they have accepted, either voluntarily or traditionally, a cultural heritage from their former rulers which can be modified and reoriented, but which cannot be eradicated.

#### FROM BIPOLARIZATION TOWARD NORMALIZATION OF POWER POLITICS

Change is an inevitable ingredient of the international order, as the disappearance of old empires and the rise of new states well demonstrate. Even in the area of great constellation of super-states the inevitable law of social equilibrium tends to work toward a gradual normalization of the world order. Specifically, neither the United States nor the USSR, despite their sizable territories and populations, has succeeded in annexing or establishing dominion over vast territories outside their immediate domains.

At the beginning of the second decade after World War II, the world is witness to a remarkable growth of neutralism and the rise of uncommitted areas. The full proportions of this phenomenon are yet to be measured, but its growth and significance in the community of nations cannot be ignored. Geographically the uncommitted region lies south of the Mediterranean in the African areas of emerging independence and along the South Asian perimeter of the Soviet-Chinese land areas. The territory stretches across 135 degrees of longitude, from the Atlantic coastland of Africa to the Indonesian

**Archipelago** The area, some 21,000,000 square miles, is impressive in that it constitutes forty per cent of the world territory,<sup>1</sup> whereas the Western World includes thirty-three per cent, and the Communist World, but twenty-seven per cent. The peoples of the uncommitted world are basically non-whites, composed of diverse races and cultures, and are identified in world politics as the Afro-Asian group. In numbers they constitute twenty-seven per cent of the world's population as contrasted with the thirty-eight per cent in the Free World and thirty-five per cent in the Communist World.

Largely an area in a low state of economic development, the uncommitted world is intent on increasing its rate of industrialization and on escaping the tentacles of colonialism. The period of transition is accompanied by growing pains and mistrust of more powerful nations and their network of military alliances. As long as the neutralist bloc resists the pressures from the East and the West, it tends to restrain the aggressive proclivities of the great powers. In time the uncommitted aggregation may constitute a third force in power politics, one holding a balance between two uneasy ideological opponents. Meanwhile, the rise of constructive policies in economic development and statecraft augurs well for a relatively stable era of peace through accommodation.

#### INTEGRATION VERSUS DIVISION OF POLITICAL AREAS

**GROUPING OF STATES**—For a generation or more statesmen have noted the inability of sovereign states to attain a level of security and prosperity deemed necessary for a stable world order. The destructiveness of global wars and the consequent economic dislocations, together with the drawbacks of economic nationalism, have led to experimenta-

tion with various forms of integration—political, economic, and military. West Europe is the principal testing area in the struggle toward political integration, owing largely to the economic pressure attending reconstruction after 1945 and a heritage of liberal political thought and experience with complicated political institutions. The ideal of a United States of Europe persisted between the two wars, but preoccupation with domestic issues prevented the realization of the great dream that Aristide Briand expounded with vigor and persistence. It remained for the great warrior, Winston Churchill, to propose a union of Britain and France in the dark days of 1940 as a step toward a European federation. Although this particular scheme never materialized, the Council of Europe, established in 1949, included most of the European states in the West and represented the idea of a European civilization. Although delegates in the Consultative Assembly exercise only recommendatory powers, representation is apportioned according to population and members vote and are seated not as nationals but as individuals. A spirit of European, rather than national, approach to common economic and political questions is in the making, although the Committee of Ministers actually wields power over basic policy matters.

On the economic side the European Coal and Steel Community marks a real step toward cooperation among the main industrial producers: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. According to the Schuman Plan, as set up in the treaty of 1951, the signatories established a single market for coal, iron, and steel and endowed the High Authority with power to abolish all trade barriers, currency restrictions, custom duties, and discriminatory freight rates in the coal and steel market. Success in building a strong industrial base in Western Europe is bound to affect cultural and political relationships as well. Interdependence is gradually superseding inde-

<sup>1</sup> Including most of native-inhabited Africa, a continent of potential movements for independence.

pendence as a basic pattern in the European sector of international relations.

At the military level Western Europe can no longer guarantee its own security. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization attests to the fact that in a super-power world the Western Hemisphere is a vital base in any military operations designed to protect the Atlantic Community against a powerful antagonist to the East. The type of structure inherent in NATO defense arrangements does not necessarily extinguish the sovereignty of its members, but it does link vast areas in a common strategic plan and calls for a subordination of national differences, in part at least, toward a common goal. The North Atlantic Treaty system of 1949 is a grouping of nations on the basis of free and voluntary association and represents a continuation of United States' wartime leadership in global strategy. Whether the coalition can survive beyond the period of immediate emergency remains unanswered at this time.

Numerous other groupings of states can be identified, but they are difficult to classify because they vary from long-standing traditional relationships between political areas to mutual agreements among countries with certain common interests. The British Commonwealth of Nations and the Soviet bloc are well known, and each includes a substantial proportion of the world's land area. Looser in structure, but also immense in dimensions, is the Pan American Union. Comprising twenty-one nations, it continues to be interested in problems peculiar to the Western Hemisphere. Coming rapidly to the fore since World War II, the Arab League bands together nine states in the Middle East.<sup>2</sup> It asserts a community voice over broad international issues as well as over localized Moslem affairs from Casablanca to Dacca. Quite specialized in function is the grouping of the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxem-

bourg into Benelux, in 1948, a common customs union. Possibly the smallest grouping of this kind is found in Central Europe, where the tiny state of Liechtenstein is included in the Swiss customs system.

**SPLITTING OF STATES**—In contrast with integration, the division of political areas into artificial units is an equally marked phenomenon of the mid-twentieth century. Caesar's famous commentary, "All Gaul is divided into three parts," might well be transposed into the modern setting with the observation that all problem areas are divided into two parts. Certainly the division of former states and areas has reflected the state of tension, the rivalry among the powers, and the lack of real international community of purpose. In the decade since World War II several critical areas around the globe have been partitioned. One type of division applies to areas in which both the United States and the Soviet Union sought predominance after World War II. Rivalry of this order accounted for the creation of East Germany and West Germany, the division of Korea at the 38th Parallel, and the temporary division of Austria into West and East occupied areas. The Trieste Free Territory prior to settlement in 1954 likewise fell into this category.

On the other hand, it must be noted that rival nationalisms, not always associated with the aggrandizement of the Communist World, may account for new partitions. The partition of Palestine in 1947-48, although under United Nations auspices, introduced bitterness and antagonism in the Middle East. The Partition Plan of 1947, which created the independent state of Israel, failed to internationalize Jerusalem City. As a result Israel and Jordan have divided the Holy City, the Old City being under Jordanian control and the New City forming the capital of Israel. Under somewhat similar circumstances of new nationalism in Asia, Vietnam in 1955 suffered a *de facto* division of au-

<sup>2</sup> Libya and the Sudan adhered to the organization after its formation in 1945.

thority along the 17th Parallel. In the Indian realm partition of the subcontinent into India and Pakistan produced yet another territorial dilemma—the Kashmir crisis. Moslem and Hindu hostility created the original rift, which remains a political impasse despite a decade of fighting, threatening, arbitrating, and waiting.

of the original causes for the division. Only a real consensus of views among the powers can eliminate the artificial fragmentation of postwar areas on the map.

Unfortunately the divisioning of states by militarists and diplomats nearly always disregards geographic logic. Political necessity or expediency are found to outweigh

#### Postwar Division of Political Areas

<i>Former Area</i>	<i>Postwar Division</i>	<i>Treaty or Agreement</i>
Germany	Four-Power Occupation. West German Republic (Bonn) and East German Republic (Berlin) formed from Western and Soviet occupation zones in 1949	Berlin Declaration of June, 1945
Austria	Allied Occupation (1945–55), Independence, 1955	Austrian State Treaty of 1955
Indian Empire	India and Pakistan	Indian Independence Act of 1947
Trieste	Free Territory of Trieste	Italian Peace Treaty of 1947
	End of Occupation of Zones A and B	London Agreement, October, 1954
Palestine	Jewish State and Arab State; Arab Palestine annexed by Jordan, 1950; Jerusalem City divided between Israel and Jordan	Resolution of UN, November, 1947 Israeli-Jordanian Armistice Agreement of 1949
Kashmir	Divided between Pakistan and India along cease-fire demarcation line	UN Resolution of 1949
Korea	Republic of South Korea (Seoul), North Korean People's Republic (Pyongyang), demilitarized zone along 38th Parallel	Geneva Conference, 1953
Vietnam	South Vietnam (Saigon), North Vietnam People's Republic (Hanoi), division at 17th Parallel	Geneva Conference, 1954

As crisis areas each of the divided territories presents its own peculiar cases of politico-geographic conflict. Even if formulas for the resolution of the problem areas can be devised along ethnic lines or on the principle of self-determination, the accompanying tensions and insistence upon absolute standards of justice militate against ready-made solutions. Although some divisions are obviously artificial in a political sense and are being resolved, the world community must, at this time, accept as semipermanent other partitions, regardless

consideration of factors which combine to give a region unity and to imbue it with the forces necessary to sustain the economic pattern best suited to its welfare. The 38th Parallel, pulled out of thin air in a moment of crisis to divide a country into two parts, served to disrupt completely the geographic balance of Korea. No consideration, for example, was given to the distribution of resources in the country. Likewise, the drawing of Indo-Pakistan boundaries through Bengal and also through the heart of the Punjab cut squarely across the established

geographic unity of two of pre-partition India's most populous and best organized agricultural regions. Railway networks were disrupted and marketing systems broken down. Even worse, each of the new states was to find itself short of what had been dependable sources of raw materials, not even importable across the freshly installed and often hostile customs barrier.

Within the states listed in the above tabulation, movement in present-day commerce exists freely in Austria and to varying degrees between India and Pakistan. But the border gates are often padlocked between West Germany and East Germany, between Israel and the Arab states, between the Koreas, between the Vietnams, and between Pakistan and Kashmir.

#### NEW VISTAS OF THE MID-TWENTIETH CENTURY

The twentieth century is largely an age of technological change in which aviation and the use of nuclear energy affect, and will continue to affect, the course of international relations. At the moment it is not certain whether the use of aircraft and atomic power will be directed into channels for the good of mankind or whether the destructive potentialities of both will lead vying states into a contest of world destruction. Part of the danger at the mid-twentieth century lies in the fact that the airplane and nuclear power serve both peaceful and military purposes, and in the balance the military function of both inventions receives primary emphasis in the councils of the "have" nations. The public is certainly more acutely aware of the strides made in the development of atomic bombs, rockets, and intercontinental missiles than of the experimental work on the harnessing of nuclear power. Likewise, new speeds achieved by jet fighters are more spectacularly acclaimed than improved passenger service on commercial air routes of the world. In terms of emphasis it cannot be otherwise as long as

nations rely on new weapons in their unending quest for security. Rivalry and competition, rather than cooperation, are the rule in the field of new weapons.

**THE AIRPLANE**—The air age, although well along in the laboratory and experimental stage before World War II, did not come into being until 1946. Only then did air routes crisscross continents and oceans alike to allow world transportation patterns to depart from established land routes and from traditional sea lanes deeply etched on world maps. Even more noteworthy than the directness of routes has been the time saving in intercontinental travel. In the military field aviation has to a large extent displaced the long-standing domination of sea power. An inventory of capital ships, cruisers, destroyers, and even of aircraft carriers is no longer an index of world-power status. An inevitable effect of speed in communication and transportation is to end isolation and the sense of security based on natural frontiers or wide expanse of oceans. The United States is an outstanding example of a nation which in the postwar era has been forced to reorient its world outlook and abandon its old isolationism.

Aviation tends to strengthen the position of the strong states and diminish the potential strength of small states. In modern warfare size and depth are most important factors in terms of survival. The concentration of population in small nations exposes them to destruction. This prospect assumes more weight in military calculations as thermonuclear bombs are measured in megatons, that is, in millions of tons of TNT. In general, modern weapons of warfare increase the power of offense over defense, despite all efforts to devise security schemes for urban centers and civilian populations. The imbalance between the two contributes to the state of tension that has marked the postwar years.

Despite the range of aircraft, generally estimated at a radius of 5,000 miles, nothing

like direct air power alone can give security or win modern wars. Effectiveness still depends on economy of operation, as it does in civil aviation, thus air bases located near enemy territory become a critical part of a security system. Here air-power exponents profit from experiences of the navies and arrange for a network of air bases far from the home territory. Among sovereign states this program requires a network of treaties and agreements spanning a substantial proportion of the globe. The United States, in conjunction with the rest of the Free World, has constructed an elaborate security network with the North Atlantic Treaty, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, and the Middle East Treaty Organization. A counterpart to the western design exists in the Communist areas bordering Soviet territory.

The development of national aviation systems are of course a most important asset to a nation's military strength. The type and numbers of military aircraft are less important than the progress demonstrated in the aviation industry itself. Aircraft tend to become obsolete, while a flourishing aviation enterprise can be converted with ease to wartime production. In peacetime nations do arrange international air flight schedules and coordination among the commercial airlines, but the larger competitors find it more difficult to establish real cooperation than some of the smaller national airlines. Calculations of military strategy on the part of great powers intervene to prevent national flag carriers from being joined together to form a true transnational airline system. Thus, even though speedy transportation appears to bring the continents closer together, political realities still divide nations into competitive units. Where aviation is concerned, the world places a premium upon industrialization and technological advancement. The record of expenditures on world armaments between 1919 and 1939 reveals that the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Japan accounted

for two thirds of the world's total, at the same time these states rated equally high in the category of total national production. The correlation between industrialization and military strength, as well as prestige status, explains the desire of new states to convert their primitive economies to an industrial base.

**NUCLEAR ENERGY**—The mid-twentieth century is on the threshold of an atomic age. The span from December, 1942, the date for man's first controlled nuclear reaction, to the present is too brief to permit any reliable prognostication of its future. The development of nuclear power for peaceful uses is now being launched through the United Nations. For the next fifty years such programs may remain purely experimental in nature or may supplement power output in regions deficient in coal or petroleum resources. Atomic power cannot displace present sources of fuel supply in North America, Europe, or South Asia on any competitive basis. On the other hand the impact of atomic weapons upon warfare and international relations is already having a revolutionary effect. An atomic war, as atomic tests have revealed, will destroy most of the industrial sectors on the globe. A single hydrogen bomb can obliterate a metropolis of any size. Experimentation with intercontinental missiles and atomic warheads is a revolutionary development which will make even the airplane obsolete as a weapon of warfare. Unless nations can develop a political world order able to control the new devices of destruction in the interests of the world community, it is indeed difficult to envisage an age of peaceful growth and development.

#### ANTARCTICA: THE LAST FRONTIER

The vast frozen continent of Antarctica, totaling 6,000,000 square miles, is about the size of South America. Thick ice caps, high mountain peaks, frozen plateaus, and



sharp ice cliffs make up the interior. Its coastline, 14,000 miles in length, is washed by three great bodies of water—the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian oceans (see map on page 677). Frigid temperatures rule out human occupancy, except for periods of brief exploration or scientific investigation. Remoteness of location and inhospitality of climate combine to explain why it is the last extensive land area to be explored by man.

Far more extensively explored and studied than the interior ice cap and unfriendly coastal fringes in the past century are the scattered islands in the bordering oceans outside the Antarctic Circle. Fishing expeditions in search of whales and seals have established outfitting stations at Greenwich Island and Heard, in South Georgia, and in the South Shetlands. An organized scientific expedition in the 1930's under U.S. Admiral Richard E. Byrd, established Little America as a base in the Ross Sea area, but this venture left no permanent outpost on the continent. A far more elaborate scientific study is envisaged for the International

nations—the United States, the USSR, the United Kingdom, Australia, and France—divided the coastland into a number of national sites. The main base sites assigned are listed in the table on this page.

**TERRITORIAL ISSUES**—Although no territorial claims are involved in the scientific endeavors of participating nations, political issues loom in the background. Rivalry over territorial claims in the Antarctic region antedate the staking out of areas for the International Geophysical Year. In 1948 the United States government proposed joint rule for the region through diplomatic arrangements in preference to single-nation ownership. Since that date it has been noted that the USSR has sponsored whaling expeditions to the south seas without expressing formal claim to any territory. Both the USSR and the United States claim to be the first to have discovered the Antarctic coast, on the basis of naval visits in the region of Antarctica during the year 1821, but neither state has formally claimed sovereign rights there. The disposition of claims by various states is a proper subject for an international conference. Meanwhile, the United States refuses to recognize the claims advanced by other powers.

Should territorial claims assume international importance, the reconciliation of conflicting sovereignties promises to be no simple matter. Three bases for solution suggest themselves: (1) the right of discovery; (2) the rule of occupancy, and (3) the sector-zone theory. Each presents great difficulties. Claim to sovereignty on the basis of discovery raises historic problems of a serious nature, for early navigators rarely entered the waters of Antarctica, and most of the chronicles are inexact or incomplete. The law of effective occupancy is inappropriate since no all-weather posts exist inside the Antarctic Circle region. The suggestion that the area be partitioned in sectors marked by the meridians of longitude converging at the South Pole is most plausible.

Meteorological Stations


<i>Nation</i>	<i>Sites</i>
United States	Knox Coast, Vahsel Bay, McMurdo Sound, Kaman Bay, Marie Byrd Land
USSR	Knox Coast
United Kingdom	Vahsel Bay, Palmer Peninsula
New Zealand	McMurdo Sound
Australia	Mawson on MacRobertson Coast
France	Adelie Land
Belgium	Haswell Island
Japan	Peter I Island
Argentina	Vahsel Bay, Palmer Peninsula
Chile	Palmer Peninsula
Norway	Queen Maud Land

Geophysical Year (1957-58), plans for which were set at a conference in Rome in 1954. A world-wide study of meteorological data, including preliminary arrangements and the establishment of expedition sites in Antarctica, is scheduled. In 1955 the principal

To date Australia, New Zealand, Chile, and Argentina have advanced the sector-, or triangular-, zone idea. Each of these four countries, in fact, views the Antarctic region as a geographic extension of its own territory but other arguments are also advanced to support the geographic claim. The case of Chile demonstrates the complexity of the problem.

South Shetland Island group, but the government of Chile argued that the archipelago is an extension of the Andean range and that Chilean fishing expeditions were authorized for over a century in the vicinity of the Shetlands and Graham Land. Great Britain has challenged Chile's claim to Greenwich Island, but the latter ignored the British request for arbitration of the dis-

NATIONAL CLAIMS AND GEOPHYSICAL YEAR BASES IN ANTARCTICA



In February, 1948, Chile formally annexed the Antarctic sector southward from the Strait of Magellan. Part of the claim was based on inheritance from Spain, which, in 1539, assumed all lands south of Tierra del Fuego—as far as the South Pole—to be parts of the Spanish domain. The 600-mile Drake Strait separates Cape Horn from the

pute. History texts in Chile include in the country a sector of Antarctica, which by decree includes the lands, islets, reefs, ice, and waters lying between 53° and 90° West Longitude.

**STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS**—The international focus on the last great continent suggests strategic considerations on the part of the

world powers. Exploration may reveal the presence of minerals below the ice cap—resources which could replace the dwindling stocks in the other continents. Nor is the strategic value of the southern polar regions lost upon the United States. In terms of global strategy submarine posts in Antarctica would permit an enemy of the United States to raid Allied shipping in the great sea lanes. Moreover, in an atomic age Antarctic outposts would enable a major air-sea power to control the passageway near Australia, Africa, and South America. A base on Palmer Peninsula, 600 miles south of Cape Horn, could command the strategic communication lane between the Atlantic and the Pacific, which warships too large for the Panama Canal would have to use. Certainly consideration of global strategy in the future may require the powers to exploit the vast territory on the icy continent.

## CONCLUSION

Geopolitically the world community at mid-century is in a period of transition. The dynamic flow of international events has been a hallmark of the 1945–55 decade. Certain of the events since World War II, briefly reviewed in this chapter, illustrate the adjustment process that marks power politics at the highest levels. Such adjustments serve only to determine the limitations of world peace or to delimit areas of international tensions. The crumbling of old established empires and the meteoric rise of new states are phenomena of great geopolitical import not only for the world but also for the individual states. In all cases the relation of human occupancy to a particular territorial area lies at the root of geopolitical problems. In most instances international conflicts must be viewed in terms of basic geographic settings—a condition too often disregarded in the conference halls of the world—since the geographic factor in one form or another (space, location, climate,

configuration of land surface) is common to all power struggles, large or small, over the surface of the globe.

From a synoptic point of view geography is a human adventure in man's unending quest for livelihood and security through the formation of political areas best designed to serve his needs. The extremes in this political process involve both consideration of the self-interest of a given community and the requirements of the world community. Accommodation between the two elements is the warp and woof of international politics, involving both geographic and nongeographic factors. Indeed, the geopolitical decade has stressed issues of ideology, ethics, and economic welfare in a vast array of new terms, such as Free World, Communist World, Iron Curtain, Cold War, and the H-bomb. The ear of the man in the street becomes quickly attuned to the new vocabulary of global issues, including remote geographic place names: Yalta, Bonn, 38th Parallel, Kashmir, Bandung, Suez, and Bikini.

The geopolitical decades between the two world wars witnessed a similar set of events and issues. Then the panorama of world struggle revolved within a different frame of reference—the attempt of new challengers, Germany, Italy, and Japan, to overturn the status quo determined by the victorious powers after World War I—as exemplified by German occupation of the Rhineland in 1936, Mussolini's march on Ethiopia, and the Manchurian Incident. Caught between the two earthquakes, continental America sponsored a policy of neutrality, developed a two-ocean navy as its concept of hemispheric security, and strengthened its inter-American ties of friendship and solidarity. Eventually the test of strength between the defenders of the status quo and the challengers consumed the manpower and resources of the major portion of the earth in a violent realignment of power.

The impact of two world conflicts has left

its imprint upon the pattern of geopolitical thinking in the twentieth century. Called into question are some of the major political premises underlying the total fabric of world politics: dominance of sea power, balance of power, hemispheric security, strategic lifelines and air bases. The necessity for a re-assessment of the old tools and concepts of international politics is being recognized. The need for greater political integration—the joining of political areas into larger units—is acknowledged. The world moves toward this goal very slowly and in piecemeal fashion. Meanwhile, the substantial portion of the world grapples with the more

familiar problems of individual adjustment. As the force of independence sweeps through Asia and Africa, geopolitical upheavals will continue. Only the development of a sense of world community in matters relating to the use of transportation, the application of technological skills, immigration, the development of raw materials and capital accumulation, while recognizing a substantial measure of national autonomy, can preserve the drive toward independence in an interdependent world. At the midpoint of the twentieth century geopolitical factors form a complex of forces in the great movement toward world cooperation.

### Study Questions

1. What features characterize the two-power world?
2. It is stated that evidence exists for the "break-up of the Two-Power World." What evidence can you cite?
3. To what forces can the rise of new postwar states be attributed? List the new states on an outline world map.
4. What elements common to new states contribute significantly to their *internal* characteristics?
5. Many territories are in the transition stage toward independence. Identify those areas that are emerging on the world map. What is meant by the term "independence-interdependence"?
6. Well-known colonial empires have broken to form new states. Identify the colonial areas and the mother country that ruled the territory.
7. Account for the rise of "uncommitted" areas.
8. What factors hinder the progress toward European integration?
9. What division of territorial areas can be attributed to the struggle between the East and West?
10. How do the divided territories in Europe differ in nature from Palestine and India? What elements are significant in each case?
11. Why is the atomic bomb sometimes referred to as the "absolute weapon"?
12. To what degree do national airlines compete for the world's air transport business?
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familiar problems of individual adjustment. As the force of independence sweeps through Asia and Africa, geopolitical upheavals will continue. Only the development of a sense of world community in matters relating to the use of transportation, the application of technological skills, immigration, the development of raw materials and capital accumulation, while recognizing a substantial measure of national autonomy, can preserve the drive toward independence in an interdependent world. At the midpoint of the twentieth century geopolitical factors form a complex of forces in the great movement toward world cooperation.

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- Weigert, Hans (ed), *Principles of Political Geography* (Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1956). Recent systematic approach to the field
- Weigert, Hans, and Stefansson, Vilhjalmur (eds.), *Compass of the World* (Macmillan, 1944). A selection of articles relating to political geography by a distinguished group of contributors
- Whittlesey, Derwent, *The Earth and the State: A Study of Political Geography* (Holt, 1944). An outstanding contribution to political geography by an American author
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## PART TWO: THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

### CANADA AND THE AMERICAN ARCTIC

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of Canada; Chapter 2, "The Geography," 33-52, is an excellent summary of the major geographic features, by J. W. Watson, Director of the Federal Government, Geographical Branch.

- Canada Handbook* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, published annually). A popular and inexpensive condensation of the *Year Book*, has general descriptions of Canadian industries and brief statistics, illustrated.
- Canada Year Book* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, published annually). The standard reference work on Canada, includes all the statistics, many articles of geographical interest, and an index to published articles.
- Canadian Geographical Journal*, monthly periodical published by the Canadian Geographical Society, Ottawa. The main periodical reference to articles on Canadian geography, bibliographies are available from the Society.
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- Dawson, C. A. (ed.), *The New North-West* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1947). The geography, peoples, and economic development of Yukon Territory and Mackenzie District, N.W.T.
- Geographic Branch, Department of Mines and Technical Surveys, Ottawa. Led and staffed by trained geographers, this government agency is the chief source of information about Canada. They have published excellent bibliographies, articles, and monographs on Canada and also issue a quarterly, the *Geographical Bulletin*. One of their monographs deals with *The Canadian Arctic* (1951).
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- Stone, Kirk, "Alaskan Problems and Potentials," *Journal of Geography*, L, No. 5 (May, 1951), 177-89. An excellent brief geographical view of Alaska.
- Taylor, Griffith, *Canada—A Study in Continental Environments* (London: Methuen, 1950). Topical and regional treatment of Canada; information is sometimes old and inaccurate, but the approach is stimulating.
- Weigert, H. W. (ed.), *Compass of the World* (Macmillan, 1947). Especially Chapter 18, "Canada's Role in Geopolitics," which shows how environmental influences and conditions will play a part in Canada's future world position.

#### THE UNITED STATES

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- Hartshorne, Richard, "Racial Maps of the United States," *Geographical Review*, XXVIII (1938), 276-88. Although old, valuable as background; maps.
- Kennan, George F., *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950* (University of Chicago Press, 1951). A thoughtful and provocative inquiry into the basic concepts behind the conduct of American foreign policy, two especially valuable articles on Soviet-American relations.
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### PART THREE: EUROPE

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- Lyde, L. W., *The Continent of Europe* (Macmillan, 1920) An excellent reference for a study of the geology and bedrock structure of Europe.
- Pounds, Norman J. G., *Europe and the Mediterranean* (McGraw-Hill, 1953). A useful, up-to-date, well-illustrated text on Europe.
- Robertson, C. G., and Bartholomew, J., *An Historical Atlas of Modern Europe, 1789-1922* (2nd ed., New York: Oxford University Press, 1924). A standard atlas on the subject
- Shackleton, M. R., *Europe, A Regional Geography* (3rd ed., Longmans, Green, 1942) One of the classic regional geographies of Europe.
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### THE SOVIET UNION

- Balzak, S. S., Vasyutin, V. F., and Feigin, Y. G. (eds.), *Economic Geography of the USSR*, Vol. 1 American edition edited by Chauncy D. Harris, translated from the Russian by Robert M. Hankin and Olga Adler Titelbaum (Macmillan, 1949). A basic book on the economic geography of the USSR, containing pre-World War II statistics
- Berg, L. S., *Natural Regions of the USSR*, edited by John A. Morrison and C. C. Nikiforoff; translated from the Russian by Olga Adler Titelbaum (Macmillan, 1950). Dealing

- mainly with physical geography, this book by the late academician is outstanding in discussing the natural regions of the USSR.
- Bergson, Abram (ed.), *Soviet Economic Growth* (Row, Peterson, 1953). Numerous articles by some of America's outstanding economists, historians, and geographers, discussions of resources, transportation, and other aspects of Soviet economic development.
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- Chamberlin, William H., *The Russian Enigma* (Scribner, 1943). A critical analysis of the Soviet state by a newspaper correspondent with much Russian experience, objective in the best sense.
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- Great Soviet World Atlas* (1938 and 1939). These two volumes contain a wealth of information; translated index sheets are available.
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- study on the economic strength of the Soviet Bloc versus the Western Powers, much statistical information
- Lorimer, Frank, *The Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects* (Geneva: League of Nations, 1946). Prepared by the Princeton University Office of Population Research, an outstanding scholarly study on the various demographic aspects of the Soviet Union, a wealth of statistical material
- Mackinder, Halford J., *Democratic Ideals and Reality* (Holt, 1919). By one of the early great writers in geopolitical literature, absolutely essential
- Notestein, Frank W., and Others, *The Future Population of Europe and the Soviet Union* (Geneva: League of Nations, 1944). Prepared by Princeton University Office of Population Research, a statistical population study combined with sound deductive analyses of population trends.
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- Shabad, Theodore, *Geography of the USSR* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951). A geography of Europe containing much up-to-date material; organized by political subdivisions rather than by geographic regions.
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- Spykman, Nicholas J., *The Geography of the Peace* (Harcourt, Brace, 1944). A prime stimulus to international thinking; a natural companion piece of Cressey's *Basis of Soviet Strength*.
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- Wiles, Peter, "The Soviet Economy Outpaces the West," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXI (July, 1953), 566-81. Contains a theory of future Soviet strength which, though debatable, is most thought-provoking.

## GREAT BRITAIN

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